Le colonel Alain Kiwewa, administrateur du territoire de Lubero, au Nord-Kivu, s’est alarmé mercredi 21 mai de l’intensification des affrontements entre différents groupes armés locaux dans son entité.
La veille, de nouveaux combats avaient éclaté dans la chefferie de Baswagha, entraînant la mort de deux personnes, dont un civil.
The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for April 2025.
A bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced legislation in the House of Representatives aimed at deepening U.S. security cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. The proposed legislation, titled the American-Hellenic-Israeli Eastern Mediterranean Counterterrorism and Maritime Security Partnership Act of 2025, was introduced by Rep. Nicole Malliotakis (R-N.Y.) and co-led by Reps. Thomas Kean Jr. (R-N.J.), Dan Goldman (D-N.Y.), and Josh Gottheimer (D-N.J.). It aims to bolster collaboration on counterterrorism and maritime security, while formalizing the 3+1 framework —a strategic dialogue initiative involving Greece, Cyprus, and Israel in partnership with the United States— as a platform for long-term strategic cooperation.
Having collaborated with President Donald Trump in the past, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis expressed confidence in his ability to do so again effectively, emphasizing the potential for a ‘win-win’ U.S.-EU trade deal, during an interview with Breitbart News, on April 9. Trump responded to Greek Prime Minister’s interview and his comments on a potential EU-US trade deal, stating “I agree. I know him, he’s a good man, I appreciate his comments. […] Yes, a deal can be made with any of them”.
Following a press release dated April 14, the American-Hellenic Chamber of Commerce announced the establishment of its branch office in Washington, D.C., strengthening its presence in the United States. The new office will actively contribute to the further development of bilateral trade and economic relations between the two countries, supporting the international expansion of Greek businesses and attracting American companies and investments. The establishment of the branch is a strategic decision that has been carefully planned and prepared over time, marking a new era for bilateral economic and commercial relations.
With regard to defence procurement, a key component of the 12-year, €28 billion defense procurement plan approved by the Greek Government Council for Foreign and Defense Affairs (KYSEA) on April 16 is the upgrade of the F-16 Block 50 fighter jets to the Viper configuration. During the KYSEA meeting, the discussion focused on ongoing negotiations between Greece and the United States, which seek to resolve financial differences surrounding the upgrade program. Under the Long-Term Defense Armaments Program (MPAE), €1 billion has been allocated for the upgrade of 38 aircraft. However, this amount still falls short of the informal US offer, which stands at €1.5 billion. American manufacturing companies have said that there is very limited room to reduce costs. Despite this, according to Stavros Ioannidis (Kathimerini), negotiations remain active, with the two sides exploring different options.
Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Tasos Chatzivasileiou, responsible for Economic Diplomacy and Extroversion, met on April 16 with a visiting US Congressional delegation. Both sides reaffirmed the historically excellent relations between Greece and the United States, and discussed bilateral cooperation and the challenges the global community faces. At the same time, both sides discussed Greece’s strategy in extroversion and the attraction of investments. Chatzivasileiou underlined that Greece is a responsible force of stability in the East Mediterranean and a reliable partner for the future of economic cooperation and geopolitical stability.
Deputy Prime Minister Kostis Hatzidakis met on April 17 with a delegation of the US Congress, consisting of 10 Representatives from the Republican and Democratic Parties, led by Congressman Vern Buchanan (R-FL). During the meeting, Hatzidakis stressed that “the Greek economy is growing steadily and is increasingly becoming an economy of opportunities for investment and new jobs.” “The combination of political stability and a mix of economic policies further enhances the attractiveness of the country,” he stated in a post on social media.
More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#
Russia is going to great lengths to ensure that the war in Ukraine is perceived by its citizens as a distant military operation that does not affect them directly. But the consequences of both the war and the forced integration of the occupied Ukrainian territories are large-scale, diverse and tangible throughout Russia. They include the growing number of human losses, criminalisation and legal nihilism. Moreover, the spread of gangster-like norms and practices from the occupied territories to Russia proper could eventually lead to the “Donbasisation” of Russia.
La troisième édition du Forum des jeunes sur la gouvernance de l’internet en RDC s’est tenue mercredi 21 mai à Kinshasa, sous le thème « La jeunesse, actrice clé de la transformation numérique et du développement de la RDC ».
We’re still outside the Single Market, with lost rights, new barriers, and no real plan to go back in.
That said, the new agreement this week between the UK and EU is a welcome sign of thawing relations – a shift away from the confrontational politics of the past decade.
For that, the Labour government deserves some credit. The deal removes some Brexit barriers – including student exchanges, pet travel, food exports, security cooperation, and a proposed Youth Mobility Scheme for young people.
These are practical changes that will make life easier for businesses, students, and travellers alike. It also signals an intention to rebuild trust with our European neighbours.
Yes, this is a fresh attempt to improve UK–EU relations after years of damage and division. But we should be clear: this is still Brexit.
For sure, this new agreement is better than what came before. But it’s nowhere near as good as what we once had.
We left Erasmus+ – only now to seek partial re-entry.
Freedom of movement is gone – and the new “Youth Mobility Scheme” may only allow limited, temporary stays for young people. Even if finalised, it cannot replicate the full rights we lost.
And while this new deal softens the blow for some sectors, it does not undo the deep economic harm caused by Brexit.
According to the OBR, the UK economy is now forecast to be 4% smaller than it would have been had we remained in the EU – a lasting hit to wages, growth, and tax revenues.
Rejoining the Single Market would bring far greater benefits.
Full EU membership would go further still: giving us back a seat at the table, a voice in decisions, and rights we once took for granted.
The new deal shows that rebuilding our relationship with Europe is possible. But it also highlights the absurdity of what we threw away – and how hard it is to claw back even fragments of what we had.
Call it a reset if you like – but the only real reset is rejoining the EU.
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One of the joys of listening to Radio 4 is that while having my regular daily walk yesterday I heard a lovely discussion about the 50th anniversary of Jaws, the film that created the summer blockbuster and gave us some top meme-worthy comment.
It feels apposite to mention this because one of my main takeaways from this week’s UK-EU reset summit was the realisation that we are now entering a semi-permanent state of negotiations between the two, which in turn means more work for me and further vindication of my decision to stick with studying UK-EU relations. Truly one of the last jobs for life that people used to have.
Since I’ve been busy having such thoughts, I come late in the day to the business of analysing the various documents produced on Monday: the Joint Statement, the Common Understanding and the one actually-concluded document, the Security and Defence Partnership (SDP; half of which is cribbed from the EU-Japan piece, as Anton Spisak notes) . You’ll also want to read the Commission’s Q&A, since it’s less ambiguous about what’s what.
If you want run-throughs, then I recommend Anton’s piece, as well as David Henig‘s and Steve Peers‘, the last of which is worth quoting at a bit of length for its conclusions, with which I fully concur:
Finally, it’s notable how many Rubicons have been crossed with this reset deal. As noted already, the UK now accepts the market access/integration trade-off. But the EU now accepts agreeing this trade-off with the UK in limited fields: the UK can have one foot several steps up the Barnier escalator, but the other one firmly on the ground. The EU has also accepted a Swiss-like complex legal relationship with the UK, having opposed it in principle for years. (In fact, the EU already conceded this point when agreeing the TCA; but that treaty hid its legal complexity better than the reset deal does). The UK has accepted an agreement with the EU as regards movement of (some) EU citizens; although it might claim this arrangement will simply resemble its youth mobility treaties with many other countries, the extent of that similarity will be dependent upon the details of the final deal. Above all, the EU, having accepted freer movement of some goods and demanded the freer movement of some people, can no longer lecture the UK on cherry-picking or cake-eating – what with all the crumbs and cherry juice smeared across the EU’s own mouth.
Rather than rehashing all these colleagues’ fine efforts, I’ll stick to adding some further thoughts.
Substantively, the package here is both more extensive than most had anticipated and less developed. Rather than sticking the Nick Thomas-Symond’s three-basket model we have a Common Understanding with five main headings, plus the bits that don’t fit in within them, like fisheries and the very idea of regular UK-EU summits.
At times, this all reads like someone has asked ministries/DGs to throw in anything they’d like to see discussed, which might not be a million miles from how the process went in the UK, but it sets a wide open terrain for negotiation.
And it is negotiation. Barring the SDP, there is not a single final decision. Even the fisheries access that generated much interest in the British press is only a political agreement, with a legal text at least a month away. As I note in my summary graphic below, there are a handful of commitments to negotiate, plus more vague intentions to do more together or to ‘explore possibilities’.
PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic140
Moreover, there’s not a single date for any of this to happen, even the topics that both sides agree will be negotiated. Therefore an early marker of how much effort is being put into this will be the speed with which the Commission produces and agrees mandates for SPS, Emissions trading, Energy market integration and youth mobility/experience. The speedy release of the competition cooperation text on Tuesday might be a good sign, but equally the fact it wasn’t ready to go with this package suggests that none of this will be easy.
On that point, it’s clear that this is not an era of unbridled euphoria and working together, but regular international relations, with each side pushing its interests hard. The French squeezed on fisheries over the weekend, just as the British evidently got youth mobility/experience parked to avoid more “it’s not freedom of movement” arguments that would just further link that scheme to freedom of movement in people’s minds (as more than one person has commented to me this week).
Indeed, it is the practice of the UK government in all this that raises the most concerns.
Across public policy there appears to be a profound aversion to open policy-making, instead keeping things in-house and driven by focus-group polling. It’s not necessarily wrong, but it does raise the risk of generating policy that lands badly. In this case, the harrumphs from devolved bodies, scrutiny bodies, sectoral interests and others with interest in the matter speak to the consequences.
A case in point is eGates. This was something that has been under negotiation for quite some time, held up by the EU’s delays in implementing the Entry/Exit System and some member states’ quibbles over legal barriers. The government decision to present this as an immediate benefit very quickly fell over in the face of, well, facts and took away from what was still a story that would have been a positive selling point.
If we are now entering a permanent negotiation then the government will need to work more on its narrative around this process. To return to Steve’s quote earlier, this isn’t an escalator back to membership, but equally it’s not clear what the underlying logic is. Put differently, everyone knows the government’s red lines, but it’s not clear why those are red lines.
As more and more cooperation occurs, that will mean more and more instances of the UK becoming a rule-taker: SPS, ETS and energy markets are all explicitly framed this way in the Common Understanding. That creates a discursive tension with the control that has been taken back, which requires some vision of why this works to be articulated.
Therefore, my second big indicator will be the extent to which the government is both able to articulate that vision and the effort it puts into so doing. The three-basket model was evidently a placeholder, but the public statements from Starmer this week don’t offer a replacement beyond the UK ‘being back’.
This will matter when the various negotiations start to come home to roost. While there is no explicit cross-linkage, undoubtedly that will occur at points when it suits one or more of the parties involved: remember too that all of this is happening on top of the previously-described reviews and negotiations within the TCA itself.
Youth mobility/experience is perhaps the most likely flashpoint. The wording on Monday was a classic piece of “we have agreed absolutely no principles or even whether it will happen at all”: as I’ve written for The Conversation, the problems are almost all domestically British ones, even as the EU genuinely struggles to see the issue. But now it’s a totemically-important item for some member states, there will have to be some kind of reckoning.
PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic127
So, early days on all this.
What matters is partly about political will on both sides, but also about capacity. The lack of interest in European media was palpable, reflecting the low salience of building more ambitious relations with a country with whom the EU already has a serviceable relationship. There has been no public discussion about whether the British machinery of government has the capacity or skills to run multiple, permanent negotiations of a kind that it hasn’t tried before.
Monday was full of good vibes and warm words, but it’s not those moments that will define how the relationship works in practice.
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