European Union

The 25-year-old Noelia Castillo died by legal euthanasia in a Catalan hospice on Thursday. She had applied for the procedure two years ago, but her father had taken legal action to prevent it. Castillo, who had been placed in foster care by the state, had attempted suicide after experiencing traumatic sexual violence; she had been paraplegic ever since and suffered from chronic pain.

Bonn, 30. März 2026. Die Blockade der Straße von Hormus verdeutlicht die Anfälligkeit von globalen Düngemittel-Lieferketten für Störungen. Wasserstofftechnologien ermöglichen die lokale Produktion mit erneuerbaren Energien.

Im März 2026 schloss der Iran nach Angriffen durch Israel und die USA die Straße von Hormus. Dies kann erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Weltwirtschaft haben, da die Meerenge zentral für den Öl- und Gastransport ist und die Preise steigen würden. Weniger Beachtung fanden bislang die Nahrungsmittelproduktion und die Ernährungssicherheit im Globalen Süden, insbesondere in Asien und Subsahara-Afrika, aber auch in Brasilien. Das sich abzeichnende Problem ist eng mit der Düngemittelversorgung verknüpft, insbesondere mit Stickstoffpräparaten. Stickstoff (N), Phosphor (P) und Kalium (K) sind essenzielle Makronährstoffe, wobei Stickstoffdünger weltweit, auch in Afrika, die größte Bedeutung haben. Die globalen Lieferketten für Phosphor und Kalium greifen auf Lagerstätten in Marokko und Kanada zurück, während Stickstoffdünger nicht aus natürlichen Vorkommen stammen. Früher wurden Quellen wie Gülle, Kompost, Guano und chilenischer Salpeter genutzt, um Nutzpflanzen mit Stickstoff zu versorgen. Diese waren jedoch knapp und reichten für die wachsende Weltbevölkerung nicht aus. 

Eine entscheidende Innovation stellte das früh im 20. Jahrhundert entwickelte Haber-Bosch-Verfahren (HBV) dar. Heute werden rund 98 % des Ammoniaks so hergestellt, was enorme Ertragssteigerungen ermöglicht hat. Dabei wird Ammoniak (NH₃) aus Wasserstoff (H₂) und Stickstoff (N₂) hergestellt. Während Stickstoff relativ einfach aus der Luft abgeschieden werden kann, ist dies für Wasserstoff nicht möglich, da seine Konzentration in der Atmosphäre sehr gering ist. Stattdessen dominiert die Dampfreformierung von Methan (Steam Methane Reforming, SMR), bei der Erdgas unter hohem Druck und hoher Temperatur mit Wasserdampf umgesetzt wird. Dabei wird Wasserstoff (H₂) gewonnen und CO₂ freigesetzt. Nahezu die gesamte Ammoniakproduktion ist weiterhin von Erdgas und dem traditionellen HBV abhängig, was zwei Probleme verursacht: Erstens müssen die Treibhausgasemissionen der konventionellen Stickstoffdüngerproduktion deutlich reduziert werden. Zweitens ergeben sich sehr lange Lieferketten: Von weltweit lediglich rund 500 NH₃-Anlagen, die an Gasfelder oder Pipelines gebunden sind, gelangen die Produkte über Importhäfen zum landwirtschaftlichen Betrieb. Wie anfällig diese Strukturen sind, lässt sich derzeit beobachten. Auch wirken sich Schwankungen der Erdgaspreise unmittelbar auf die Preise von Düngemitteln aus. 

Geringer Düngemitteleinsatz in Afrika

Der weltweite Düngemitteleinsatz stieg von 55 kg/ha im Jahr 1972 auf 134 kg/ha im Jahr 2022 – mit erheblichen regionalen Unterschieden. Im Jahr 2022 wurden in Ostasien durchschnittlich 321 kg/ha, in Lateinamerika 187 kg/ha und in der EU 124 kg/ha ausgebracht. In Subsahara-Afrika hingegen blieb der Düngemitteleinsatz mit durchschnittlich 18 kg/ha sehr gering (1972: 10 kg/ha). Daten der FAO zeigen, dass Afrika die geringste Ernährungssicherheit aller Weltregionen aufweist, unter anderem aufgrund von Konflikten, Naturkatastrophen, dem Klimawandel und der COVID-19-Pandemie. Aber auch der geringe Düngemitteleinsatz verschärft die Ernährungsunsicherheit. Eine unzureichende Nährstoffversorgung verringert Erträge, Nährstoffgehalt und die für die Bodengesundheit wichtige Biomasse. Zugleich kann sinkende Bodenfruchtbarkeit zur Ausweitung landwirtschaftlicher Flächen und zur Entwaldung beitragen.

Zwei Erklärungen der Afrikanischen Union (AU) griffen dieses Problem auf: Die Abuja-Erklärung (2006) setzte ein Ziel von 50 kg/ha bis 2015, das jedoch deutlich verfehlt wurde. Der Entwurf der Nairobi-Erklärung (2024) bekräftigte dieses Ziel, integrierte es jedoch in umfassendere Strategien zur Bodengesundheit und bezog mineralische und organische Düngemittel ein. 

Technologische Innovationen für die lokale Ammoniakproduktion und eine geringere Abhängigkeit von Lieferketten 

Ein vielversprechender Ansatz ist die dezentrale, klimaneutrale Produktion von Ammoniak auf Basis eines elektrifizierten HBV, das mit erneuerbaren Energien betrieben wird. Diese Technologien haben bereits einen hohen Reifegrad erreicht; eine erste Anlage wurde auf einem exportorientierten Großbetrieb in Kenia installiert. Forschungsergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass solche Lösungen in wenigen Jahren wettbewerbsfähig werden und erheblich zur Ernährungssicherheit beitragen könnten, insbesondere in „unterdüngten“ afrikanischen Ländern. 

Eine weitere Technologie, die sich derzeit noch in einem frühen Entwicklungsstadium befindet, ist die Rückgewinnung von Ammoniak aus Abwasser. Dieser Ansatz ist auch für die Bewältigung eines weiteren Problems in vielen afrikanischen Ländern relevant: der Eutrophierung von Gewässern infolge übermäßiger Stickstoffeinträge in Oberflächen- und Grundwasser, ein Problem, das durch das rasante Bevölkerungswachstum weiter verschärft wird.

Kleinere Ammoniakprojekte, etwa im Rahmen öffentlich-privater Partnerschaften, könnten zusammen mit Genossenschaften oder ländlichen Gemeinden umgesetzt werden. Entwicklungsprogramme könnten diese Innovationen im Sinne der Nairobi-Erklärung mit Initiativen zur landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung und zur Bodengesundheit verbinden. Darüber hinaus ist elektrolysebasiertes Ammoniak zwar ein nahezu klimaneutrales Produkt, dessen Handhabung, Transport und Lagerung jedoch weiterhin anspruchsvoll und potenziell gefährlich sind. Dies erfordert entsprechende Maßnahmen zum Kapazitätsaufbau sowie zur Standardisierung und Qualitätssicherung.

Dr. Andreas Stamm ist Geograph und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Forschungsabteilung "Transformation der Wirtschafts- und Sozialsysteme” des German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Dr. Christine Bosch ist Agrarökonomin und derzeit Postdoktorandin in der Abteilung „Sozialer und institutioneller Wandel in der landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung“ am Hans-Ruthenberg-Institut der Universität Hohenheim.

Fernanda Nan ist eine internationale Wirtschaftsexpertin mit Spezialisierungen in Recht, Nachhaltigkeit, Compliance- und Prüfungsstandards, Circular Economy Agribusiness und Energie. Sie ist Gastdozentin für das Seminar „Accountability, Ethics, and Governance“ an der Hochschule Osnabrück in Deutschland und unterrichtet „Global Sustainability Business“ an der Fakultät für Ingenieurwissenschaften der Universität Montevideo (UM).

The UNFPA released a report detailing how women were suffering widespread mistreatment during childbirth across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Credit: UNFPA

By Ed Holt
BRATISLAVA, Mar 30 2026 (IPS)

Government and medical professionals must implement systematic changes to deal with a “crisis” of obstetric violence (OV) across Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA), experts and rights campaigners have said.

The call comes as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) released a report on March 12 detailing how women were suffering widescale mistreatment during childbirth across the region.

“This report is a wake-up call. All stakeholders must make sure that women’s rights are respected and protected in all facilities in the health system and beyond,” Tamar Khomasuridze, UNFPA Sexual and Reproductive Health Adviser for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, told Inter Press Service (IPS).

The report, Respectful Maternity Care: Women’s Experiences and Outlooks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, highlighted what the UNFPA said was a “pervasive yet often hidden OV crisis that violates women’s fundamental human rights and dignity”.

The survey, which was based on online responses from over 2,600 women who gave birth recently and conducted across 16 countries and territories in the region, found that 67 percent of respondents reported at least one form of mistreatment, including non-consensual medical procedures, verbal and physical abuse, and significant breaches of privacy.

Nearly half (48.1 percent) of women underwent obstetric procedures – such as episiotomies, Caesarean sections, or the administration of oxytocin – without their informed consent.

Meanwhile, about 24 percent of surveyed women reported experiencing verbal abuse, including yelling and humiliation, and 1 in 10 endured physical or sexual abuse during labour or gynaecological examinations. For example, 12 percent of the surveyed women reported being physically restrained during labour, such as being tied to the bed or subjected to aggressive physical contact under the pretext of facilitating delivery. Just over 10 percent experienced different forms of sexual abuse, ranging from inappropriate touching to more severe forms of assault (disrespectful manipulation of the genitals).

The survey also revealed a massive lack of awareness of OV among women in the region – almost 54 percent of surveyed women said women were unfamiliar with the term “obstetric violence”. And of those that knew they were victims of OV, very few reported such incidents – only two percent of those mistreated officially reported their experience, often due to a lack of trust in accountability mechanisms or fear of retaliation.

Previous research into the extent of OV in the region is limited and experts say it is difficult to gauge whether the situation in the region has changed in recent years.

But campaigners say the report underlines that it remains a serious problem.

“Obstetric violence has always existed, but for a long time it remained invisible, normalised, and embedded within what was perceived as ‘standard medical practice’. The major shift over the past decade is not necessarily in the prevalence of the phenomenon but rather in its increased visibility at the public, legal, and institutional levels, including its inclusion on the global agenda of human rights and public health,” Alina Andronache, a gender public policy expert at the Partnership for Development Center (CPD) in Moldova, who helped author the UNFPA report, told IPS.

“The report outlines a mixed picture: recognition and visibility of the phenomenon are increasing, yet the prevalence of experiences of abuse, coercion, and lack of consent remains alarmingly high,” she added.

Rights activists say that the phenomenon is closely linked to the wider issue of prevalent attitudes to women in the region.

“The report clearly shows that obstetric violence is not merely an issue of inadequate medical practices but is deeply embedded in broader social and cultural structures—particularly gender discrimination, power imbalances between the patient and medical staff, rigid institutional hierarchies, and norms that socialise women to accept authority without questioning it, including in highly intimate and vulnerable contexts such as childbirth,” said Andronache.

She highlighted the report’s finding that 58.4 percent of respondents believe that a mother must accept any intervention for the benefit of the child, even if it may harm her, while 19.6 percent consider that doctors may take a decision without a woman’s consent to protect the child.

“These perceptions reflect a profound internalisation of the idea that women’s bodily autonomy can be suspended during childbirth in favour of a medical authority perceived as unquestionable. This internalisation has two major consequences: it legitimises abusive or coercive practices, which are no longer perceived as violations of rights but as ‘necessary’ or ‘medically justified’ interventions, and it  directly contributes to underreporting and to the difficulty of recognising obstetric violence as such. If women are socialised to believe that they do not have the right to refuse, to ask questions, or to negotiate interventions, then their experiences are not necessarily identified as abuse but rather as a ‘normal’ part of childbirth,” she explained.

The report includes a call to action that outlines critical steps to address systemic problems with OV in the EECA states. These include legislation to protect women against OV; human rights-centred training for all healthcare personnel to shift clinical attitudes and ensure dignity is maintained at the point of service, as well as implementing monitoring and other measures to ensure accountability; and strengthening education and wider awareness of OV.

The UNFPA says its call to action has been endorsed by all countries in the survey and other stakeholders and will become part of action plans on OV at the national level.

But it is unclear how easy it will be to effect meaningful change, especially in a region where some countries have very conservative social cultures and wider problems with women’s rights.

The report showed that among respondents from Central Asian countries, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, around two thirds of women were unaware of OV. The report says this is due, in part, to traditional norms surrounding women’s roles and childbirth, which may make women less open to discussions about obstetric abuse.

Khomasuridze admitted that there were “of course sensitivities in different countries” in the region but was confident that with the help of various stakeholders, including civil society organisations, women’s rights groups and patient groups, changes would be implemented.

Andronache said that in countries where strongly conservative political policies and societal attitudes are prevalent, it was crucial that “the message be adapted to the context”.

“In more conservative societies, the approach should not be perceived as confrontational or ideological but rather framed as an issue of safety, dignity, and quality of care for both mother and child. Emphasising health, respect, and communication may be more readily accepted than a discourse focused exclusively on rights,” she said.

She added that it was essential that women be made aware of OV during their engagement with healthcare professionals – prenatal courses should be accessible and include, alongside medical information, clear explanations about women’s rights, informed consent, and what respectful care entails. ‘Meanwhile, information must reach those who need it most, she said — particularly in rural areas and in communities with more limited access to education.

“This requires simple messages, delivered in accessible languages and through channels that women already trust, including healthcare providers, community leaders, or other women sharing their experiences,” Andronache said.

“Awareness is built not only through the dissemination of information, but also through the creation of a space in which women feel able to ask questions, understand what is happening to them, and recognise when their rights are not being respected,” she added.

However, even in places where there is more awareness, serious problems with OV remain.

The study found that awareness of OV is higher in Eastern European countries, in part because advocacy initiatives regarding women’s rights during childbirth have contributed to increased visibility of the issue. Yet OV is widespread in some of these states.

In the survey the highest dissatisfaction rates with their childbirth experience were recorded among respondents from the Western Balkans (Albania, Serbia and Kosovo).

In 2022, a study by lawyers in Serbia found that women in the country are regularly subjected to various forms of violence at maternity clinics and hospitals, including not just verbal abuse and humiliation at the hands of staff, but violent physical examinations and invasive procedures without consent.

In January 2024, Marica Mihajlovic, a Roma woman, claimed that during labour her doctor jumped on her stomach, slapped her and racially abused her. Her baby died soon after birth.

A 2023 report on OV in Moldova included testimony from scores of OV victims, some of whom were left with serious physical and mental health issues afterwards.

As well as having to deal with the physical and mental damage of their experiences, victims of OV in the region also often face significant barriers to any redress for their suffering.

“Women who are aware of obstetric violence and would like to take action encounter, in reality, a form of distance—not only physical, but also emotional and institutional. In theory, reporting mechanisms should be ‘within reach’: easy to understand, accessible, and safe. In practice, in many countries this distance is far too great,” explained Andronache.

She said many women who want to report OV struggle with difficult and bureaucratic systems for doing so. Many are also put off by feelings that reporting what happened to them will not change anything or, worse, “that they would be placed in a position of having to prove their suffering, of being questioned, or even invalidated”.

“In the absence of clear and credible accountability mechanisms, reporting is not perceived as a solution, but as a long, uncertain, and emotionally draining process,” Andronache said.

Some also find that after a difficult or traumatic experience, they simply do not have the emotional resources to engage in a formal process. “They seek calm, recovery, and the ability to care for their child. The question ‘is it worth going through this?’ becomes very real,” said Andronache.

While the report identifies the scale of the OV crisis in the region and changes needed to reverse, or at least lessen it, fundamental improvement is not expected to come overnight, regardless of how enthusiastically governments embrace the UNFPA’s recommendations.

“Some changes can be implemented relatively quickly—for example, establishing clear and accessible reporting mechanisms, informing women, introducing more transparent procedures, or providing basic training for medical staff. These depend largely on political will and organisational capacity and can be achieved within a relatively short timeframe.

“However, the more difficult aspect is the transformation of mindsets—both within the medical system and in society at large. A deeper transformation to a system in which women feel safe to speak out and which responds with accountability and respect is a long-term process that may take a decade or more. At its core, this is a cultural shift, not merely a regulatory one,” said Andronache.

Khomasuridze agreed.

“We and our partners have a long way to go. Progress depends on action at the national level and we are very well positioned in [EECA] countries to accelerate progress, working with government, professional societies, civil societies, women’s groups, and patients’ groups to make sure that this transformative agenda is implemented,” she said.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Credit: Ryan Brown/UN Women

By Inés M. Pousadela and Samuel King
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay / BRUSSELS, Belgium, Mar 30 2026 (IPS)

On 19 March, the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) did something unprecedented in its eight-decade history: it held a vote. The Trump administration, having spent two weeks attempting to defer, amend and ultimately block the session’s main outcome document, known as the agreed conclusions, cast the only vote against its adoption. That dissenting vote said a lot, as it came from the world’s most powerful government, backed by financial leverage, bilateral reach and a network of anti-rights states and organisations that are making inroads at many levels.

Established in 1946, the CSW brings together 45 states each year to negotiate commitments that, while not legally binding, shape domestic legislation, set international norms and signal the direction of political will. Civil society plays an important role in it: the NGO Committee on the Status of Women coordinates thousands of organisations, from large international bodies to grassroots groups, with the aim of ensuring those most affected by policy have a seat at the table. For several decades, this has been the closest thing the world has to a dedicated annual intergovernmental negotiation on women’s rights.

The assault on gender equality

The Trump administration arrived at CSW70 having withdrawn from UN Women in January and from its Executive Board in February, citing opposition to what it calls ‘gender ideology’. It submitted eight amendments targeting language on reproductive health. When these didn’t succeed, it attempted to defer or withdraw the conclusions entirely. When that too failed, it voted against adoption and tabled a separate resolution seeking to impose a restrictive definition of gender, effectively attempting to rewrite 30 years of carefully negotiated commitments. Its resolution was blocked.

At the Munich Security Conference in February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio defined western civilisation as bound together by Christian faith, shared ancestry and cultural heritage, an ideological approach that treats women’s equality, reproductive rights and LGBTQI+ rights not as human rights but ideological impositions to be rejected. The Trump administration’s financial muscle is now the delivery mechanism for this worldview.

Defunding as a weapon

The immediate material crisis at CSW70 was the collapse of funding. The elimination of 90 per cent of USAID contracts wiped out US$60 billion in foreign aid. The USA is instead negotiating bilateral deals with 71 countries under its ‘America First’ global health strategy, extending its global gag rule not just to civil society organisations but to recipient governments. This means any institution that receives US health funding must certify that neither it nor any organisation it works with promotes or provides abortion.

Funding will now flow through faith-based groups, with ultra-conservative Christian organisations such as the Alliance Defending Freedom and Family Watch International set to benefit, having spent years building networks across Africa, Asia and Latin America. They use the language of family values, parental rights and national sovereignty to consolidate conservative influence over laws affecting women, LGBTQI+ people and young people. In many countries, they already have direct access to governments while progressive organisations are routinely excluded.

With threats intensifying, the UN is signalling retreat. A proposal under the UN80 cost-cutting initiative to merge UN Women with the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) has alarmed civil society worldwide. The stated rationale is efficiency, but there’s little overlap between the two agencies and their combined budgets make up a small part of the UN’s overall spending, suggesting savings would be modest. It’s hard to escape the conclusion that the targeting of these organisations reflects the increasing contestation of their rights-based mandates rather than any logic of organisational efficiency.

Over 500 civil society organisations signed an open letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres warning that, when sexual and reproductive health rights are absorbed into broader mandates, they risk ‘being deprioritised, underfunded, or rendered politically invisible’. Some states have urged caution but so far none has committed to blocking the merger.

Civil society holds the line

In difficult times, over 4,600 civil society delegates attended CSW70 and made their presence count. They took the floor to name structural barriers and demand accountability: youth representatives challenged the normalisation of online violence, Pacific Island delegates described how geography compounds the denial of justice for survivors, and activists from Haiti documented the labour exploitation of migrant domestic workers. They all emphasised that when women’s rights organisations are restricted or defunded, survivors lose their primary pathway to justice.

The NGO CSW Forum hosted over 750 events alongside the official session. But not everyone could participate. US visa restrictions meant several women’s rights activists, particularly from the global south, couldn’t enter the country. This is a worsening problem that limits civil society’s ability to engage.

CIVICUS’s newly released 2026 State of Civil Society Report documents exactly what civil society has been up against: institutions built to protect women’s rights under sustained, coordinated attack, their funding cut, their mandates targeted and the human rights values they are built on reopened for revision. CSW70’s agreed conclusions offer hope, committing states to action on AI governance, discriminatory laws, digital justice, labour rights, legal aid and the formal recognition of care workers. But as the contest over them made plain, political will is running low and the anti-rights community is emboldened. Civil society left CSW70 without losing ground – and this seems to be the measure of success in the regressive times we live in.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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Written by Kamil Baraník.

European political parties (‘europarties’) emerged in the 1970s, preceding the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 granted them legal recognition; however, it was only in 2004 that EU law defined their status, set establishment criteria, and provided independent funding. The most recent regulatory change in 2025 emphasised protecting EU values, strengthening safeguards against foreign interference, and updating transparency and financing requirements. Europarties’ influence depends on balancing European and national interests. Ongoing deliberations seek to enhance europarties’ resilience, and their independence from national politics, reflecting the broader debate on the balance of power between Member States and EU institutions. This search for equilibrium continues to drive significant academic and political discussion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European political parties‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Az 1980-as évek közepén a lassan kiöregedő Kamov Ka-26-os mezőgazdasági helikopterek pótlására - akkoriban szokatlan módon - nyugati irányba indultak meg a tapogatózások. Több forgószárnyas is bemutatkozott Budaörsön és közülük egy amerikai típus, az MD 500-as lett a befutó. A gazdasági helyzet nem tette lehetővé a teljes Kamov flotta cseréjét, és az MD 500-asokból mindössze tizenegy példány repült a Repülőgépes Szolgálat sárga-fekete színeiben. A típussal kapcsolatos élményeket felidézve, folytatjuk beszélgetésünket László Ferenccel.

Mikor tudtad meg, hogy lehetőséged lesz MD 500-assal repülni?

- Éppen valamilyen rekreációs üdülésen voltunk siófokon, amikor kaptunk egy táviratot – mobiltelefon még nem volt – hogy menjünk fel Budaörsre. Laki Zolival mentem fel és a kocsiban végig azon tanakodtunk, hogy vajon kinek mit mondtunk, mert ha felrendelnek, akkor valami történt. Meglepődtünk, mert Budaörsön Nikolits István főigazgató-helyettes fogadott. Akkor láttam először. Tizenketten voltunk és néztük, hogy mi van itt? Nikolits elmondta, hogy jönnek az MD 500-asok. A beszerzésre rábólintott a pártszervezet is, ami hatalmas dolog volt akkoriban, a szocialista táborhoz tartozó Magyarországon. Nagyjából akkora, mint amikor a MÁV-nak beszerezték a svéd Nohab mozdonyokat, vagyis a csoda kategóriába tartozott abban az időben. A pilótákkal szemben két követelmény volt: kétezer óra repült idő és eseménymentesség. Így kerülhettem be a tizenkét fős csoportba. Elmondták, hogy az MD 500-asok pilótaüzemeltetésben lesznek, két pilótával, szerelő nélkül. Átlagfizetést fogunk kapni, hogy ne legyünk korlátozva, hogy egy új géppel kell dolgozni. A Matyikó Feri kért egy kis szünetet. - Gondoljatok bele, egész nap dolgozunk, aztán még gépmosás (az MD 500-ast nem kellett naponta szerelni) és csak utána autózhatunk haza – mondta. A másik nyomós érv az volt, hogy megtudta, hogy azokat a szerelőket, akikkel mi dolgoztunk, ki fogják rúgni vagy hangárba teszik, ami akkoriban egy visszaminősítés volt. Ezt nem akartuk, visszamentünk és azt mondtuk, hogy ragaszkodunk a szerelőkhöz. Ezáltal a műszaki kollégákkal a hagyományos módon dolgoztunk együtt ezen a típuson is. Azután következett az, hogy ki hova kerül. Az egyik MD 500-asnak Pápát jelölték ki, engem is oda tettek volna, ahol egyszer már voltam egy évet. Egy nagyatádi kollégával gondolkodási időt kértünk és huszonnégy órát kaptunk. Hazajöttem, kiterítettem a térképet, és kiszámoltam hogyan járok anyagilag jobban. Abban az évben költöztünk be a családommal Kutasról Kaposvárra, a lakótelepre és én megtapasztaltam, hogy milyen könnyebbség, ha nem kell egy órát utazni naponta. Másnap mondtam, hogy mivel a következő évben jön a többi gép, inkább akkor kezdenék. Belementek azzal, hogy akkor számolnak velem.

[...] Bővebben!

The craze for collecting ants takes Kenya by surprise as smugglers zone in to make a profit.

The People’s Republic of China has recently announced several global governance initiatives, with the Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the forefront. Launched in 2021, the GDI is simultaneously embedded within United Nations (UN) frameworks surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals and supposed to advance ‘true multilateralism’ aligned with China’s broader vision for world order. In doing so, the GDI complicates both ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ interpretations of China’s engagement with global governance, alongside efforts to refine this binary. Bridging historical institutionalism and Neo-Gramscian political economy, we argue that the GDI constitutes a form of ‘institutional layering’ that serves as a component of a broader counter-hegemonic strategy: Rather than displacing existing frameworks, China seeks to embed new practices, principles, and alliances within them to advance its material, ideational, and organizational interests. We demonstrate how the GDI functions as a low-cost, low-risk component of a ‘war of position’ that leverages UN legitimacy while incrementally contesting liberal norms and assess its transformative potential for altering the nature of global (development) governance.

The People’s Republic of China has recently announced several global governance initiatives, with the Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the forefront. Launched in 2021, the GDI is simultaneously embedded within United Nations (UN) frameworks surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals and supposed to advance ‘true multilateralism’ aligned with China’s broader vision for world order. In doing so, the GDI complicates both ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ interpretations of China’s engagement with global governance, alongside efforts to refine this binary. Bridging historical institutionalism and Neo-Gramscian political economy, we argue that the GDI constitutes a form of ‘institutional layering’ that serves as a component of a broader counter-hegemonic strategy: Rather than displacing existing frameworks, China seeks to embed new practices, principles, and alliances within them to advance its material, ideational, and organizational interests. We demonstrate how the GDI functions as a low-cost, low-risk component of a ‘war of position’ that leverages UN legitimacy while incrementally contesting liberal norms and assess its transformative potential for altering the nature of global (development) governance.

Written by Clare Fergurson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

European Union–United States trade deal

Against a background of trade tariff instability, and to pave the way for negotiations with the Council on implementing the 2025 framework agreement between the EU and the United States (the ‘Turnberry deal’), Parliament debated and adopted its first-reading position on Committee on International Trade (INTA) reports on the two regulations proposed. The report on the main proposal covers EU industrial tariff liberalisation/agricultural tariff rate quotas, proposing a ‘sunset’ date of 31 March 2028, defensive measures in case of additional demands, and a safeguard clause. The second report, which deals specifically with trade in lobster, proposes a ‘sunset’ date of 31 December 2028, and includes defensive measures in case of US imposition of additional tariffs, breaches of human rights or threats to EU security interests. Both reports propose to evaluate the situation six months after implementation of the EU-US framework agreement.

Deposit protection and early intervention measures

Members remain determined to protect taxpayers from the consequences of failed banking institutions. A joint debate took place on deposit protection and early intervention measures, followed by a vote on agreed texts on a package of proposals that seek to further harmonise the current EU bank crisis management and deposit insurance framework. The agreements would facilitate access to industry support for failing banks, with resort to national deposit guarantee schemes set as a last resort. They also clarify the criteria for choosing whether to liquidate or rescue a bank and retain the current two-tier system for deposit protection.

Combating corruption

Following lengthy negotiations, Members approved a provisional agreement on the proposed directive to combat corruption. Aimed at developing a more robust legal and policy framework, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs’ report on the proposal called for an extended definition of a ‘public official’ potentially subject to criminal proceedings in the case of ‘abuse of function’, and to introduce new categories of offence. It also sought enhanced rights for the public to participate in corruption-related proceedings and called for EU countries to adopt anti-corruption strategies. Parliament’s recommendations shaped the compromise text in this latter respect, but with limited extensions to definitions.

Digital omnibus on artificial intelligence

The development and use of artificial intelligence (AI) is changing many aspects of daily life, and at considerable speed. The EU’s flagship Artificial Intelligence Act introduced measures to encourage development whilst also protecting citizens. However, setting up the governance structure to apply the act takes time. To ensure safe AI development can continue in the interim, Members adopted Parliament’s position for trilogue negotiations on proposed measures to simplify application of the AI Act. A report from Parliament’s Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs agrees with the Council position that fixed deadlines should be set for delaying the rules governing high-risk AI systems. The report also introduces a targeted ban on AI generation of non-consensual sexual and intimate content.

Global gateway

The EU’s global gateway strategy seeks to promote clean and secure energy connections by working with international partners worldwide. Members debated and adopted an own-initiative report from the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on Development (DEVE), assessing the first four years of the strategy’s implementation. While noting the funding has been successfully spent on promoting sustainable and inclusive growth in non-EU countries, the report nevertheless proposes improvements. These include moving to a more demand-driven strategy, based on partners’ needs and greater private sector involvement. The committees recommend revising the governance structure for greater democratic legitimacy, and advocate simpler and more predictable financing, as well as avoiding global gateway projects exacerbating debt in third countries.

Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive

In the EU, citizens largely enjoy access to clean water. The EU’s urban wastewater legislation was updated in 2024, to bring it into line with the EU’s climate neutrality targets. The new Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive (UWWTD) introduced stricter requirements for urban wastewater treatment, water re-use and sanitation. Members posed an oral question to the Commission on the implementation of this directive, with Members debating how to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle without risking production of vital medicines, as the pharmaceutical industry is a major user of water resources. During negotiations on the file, Parliament insisted on measures to avoid unintended consequences for vital products like medicines and to promote the re-use of wastewater and plant modernisation.

European Citizens’ Initiative – ‘Ban on conversion practices in the European Union’

Against the backdrop of several national bans on conversion practices in EU countries, Parliament debated a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), with over one million signatures in support, calling for an EU-wide ban on conversion practices targeting LGBTIQ+ individuals. Conversion practices (also known as conversion ‘therapies’) are widely condemned as constituting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, resulting in severe physical and psychological harm. The European Parliament firmly opposes conversion practices and has long denounced all forms of LGBTIQ+ discrimination.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

One decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations from the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on the common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union (Return Regulation), announced on 12 March 2026, was approved by vote.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – March II 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Knowledge brokers have emerged as a key mechanism for facilitating knowledge exchange across institutional and epistemic divides to enable more inclusive, informed, and context-sensitive decision-making. However, despite growing recognition about their value and importance, critical gaps remain related to how knowledge brokers operate that hinders their effectiveness and efficiency in practice. One such gap relates to the ethical dimensions of their work, which remain underexplored and lack formal conceptualization. This perspective addresses this gap by examining the overarching ethical challenges knowledge brokers face, and proposing a set of twelve experientially-derived principles to guide more ethically grounded knowledge brokering. For each principle we also outline a suite of practical behaviours, attitudes and actions to support their realisation in practice. In doing so, our goal is to help recognize and engage with the depth of ethical complexity that knowledge brokers must navigate, support those working in these often-invisible roles, and contribute to a broader conversation about how to strengthen the interface of sustainability science, policy and practice. We conclude by calling for greater institutional support, leadership, and a shift toward ‘ethics by design’ approaches that embed ethical reflection and practices in knowledge brokering efforts from the outset.

Knowledge brokers have emerged as a key mechanism for facilitating knowledge exchange across institutional and epistemic divides to enable more inclusive, informed, and context-sensitive decision-making. However, despite growing recognition about their value and importance, critical gaps remain related to how knowledge brokers operate that hinders their effectiveness and efficiency in practice. One such gap relates to the ethical dimensions of their work, which remain underexplored and lack formal conceptualization. This perspective addresses this gap by examining the overarching ethical challenges knowledge brokers face, and proposing a set of twelve experientially-derived principles to guide more ethically grounded knowledge brokering. For each principle we also outline a suite of practical behaviours, attitudes and actions to support their realisation in practice. In doing so, our goal is to help recognize and engage with the depth of ethical complexity that knowledge brokers must navigate, support those working in these often-invisible roles, and contribute to a broader conversation about how to strengthen the interface of sustainability science, policy and practice. We conclude by calling for greater institutional support, leadership, and a shift toward ‘ethics by design’ approaches that embed ethical reflection and practices in knowledge brokering efforts from the outset.

Après le décès de Toumba Diakité, retour sur une série de morts en détention en Guinée qui soulèvent des questions sur la justice, la transparence et les conditions carcérales sous la transition militaire.

Suite aux attaques américaines et israéliennes, l'Iran a commencé à cibler les pays du Golfe qui abritent des bases militaires américaines.

Máximo Torero, Chief Economist of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), briefs the Security Council meeting on Conflict-related food insecurity: Framing the global dialogue: addressing food insecurity as a driver of conflict and ensuring food security for sustainable peace. Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías

By Naureen Hossain
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 27 2026 (IPS)

The current conflict in Iran and the Middle East region threatens to disrupt the global energy and agri-food sectors, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects oil and fertilizer exports for farmers during critical harvest seasons.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warns that if the war does not come to an immediate end, global markets could collapse from the high demands for oil and crops.

Within the next two weeks, global markets may be able to absorb the shocks brought on by the war thus far and could therefore minimize the risks of food insecurity, said FAO’s chief economist Máximo Torero.

“If this crisis continues for the next three to six months, then yes, it will have an impact not only on the food security sector; of course, energy will impact all other sectors and all other inputs that have been affected,” Torero said.

The Strait of Hormuz carries up to 30 percent of international trade fertilizers and up to 35 percent of global crude oil and natural gas. Premiums on the costs of these resources are increasing as the war continues in the region. Torero told reporters on Thursday that farmers face the “double choke” of higher prices on fertilizers and rising fuel prices, the latter of which is used by the value chain to produce the food available in markets. With limited supplies, farmers may be forced to adapt their crop cycle by reducing the amount of fertilizer or switch to crops that require less nitrogen fertilizer.

Credit: UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

Torero remarked that the immediate impact will be on the next season of crops, which will likely have fewer yields than before the war started. If the fighting concludes within a month, countries with higher reserves of fertilizers and fuels may mitigate shocks to the global markets. If the fighting lasts three months and the Strait of Hormuz stays closed, the shocks will be global and harder to manage. The consequences could include fewer yields from crops and more pressure on global exporters such as the United States, Brazil and Australia. As oil prices increase, this may encourage farmers to switch to biofuels to help meet the demands for crops. Yet such actions may also cause higher consumer prices.

When it comes to the war’s impact in the region, Torero reported that Iran was already dealing with high food prices before the fighting began, which it has only exacerbated. Meanwhile, for Gulf states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, they are largely reliant on food imports and will face more challenges as there are no ships carrying imports through the channel.

Beyond the Middle East, FAO identified certain countries that will be impacted by fertilizer and fuel shortages, such as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which are currently in their respective rice harvest seasons, and sub-Saharan countries like Kenya and Somalia, which rely on 22 to 31 percent of fertilizer imports.

One area that will also be affected by the conflict is remittances. Migrant workers from South Asia and East Africa live and work in the Gulf states, including at airports and places of business that have been targeted by military strikes. Torero explained that if these workers cannot send money back to their households in their home countries, the resulting decline in remittance inflow will affect many countries where remittances make up a “significant share” of their GDP.

“There’s a significant amount of labor employment that comes from this region,” Torero said. “Now, if the airplanes are not flying… If the operations that used to flow through the airports are not happening, that will impact of course their economies, and that will impact all these temporary laborers that are working in those locations.”

The rich economies that attract migrant labor could be impacted, Torero said, and the workers whose families rely on remittances would also be severely affected.

While the war in the Persian Gulf continues to threaten the global energy, fertilizer and food markets, the international community is encouraged to take short- and long-term measures to mitigate the shock and protect vulnerable populations.

Torero and FAO recommended developing alternative trade routes to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Vulnerable import-dependent countries, including low-income states, need support through emergency food aid, balance-of-payment support and targeted subsidies. Farmers should also be financed to maintain agricultural production and to prevent liquidity constraints.

Torero also recommended that states should diversify their import sources and promote regional coordination. He added that states need to build resilience in the future, which means investing in sustainable domestic agriculture and alternatives to fertilizers and preparing for structural market shifts that may result from prolonged instability.

“We need to treat food systems with the same strategic importance as energy and transport sectors and invest […] accordingly to minimize those shocks.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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By CIVICUS
Mar 27 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses Portugal’s presidential runoff election and the rise of the far-right Chega (Enough) party with Jonni Lopes, Executive Director of Academia Cidadã (Citizen Academy) and a Steering Committee member of the European Civic Forum, an organisation working on civic engagement, democratic participation and the protection of civic space at national, regional and international levels.

Jonni Lopes

On 8 February, Portugal held the second presidential runoff in its democratic history, and the first to feature a far-right candidate. Backed by a cross-party coalition spanning centre-left to centre-right, Socialist Party candidate António José Seguro defeated Chega leader André Ventura. The result was a significant rebuff to Ventura, but in just a few years Chega has changed from being a fringe movement into parliament’s second largest party, and continues to influence Portugal’s political landscape.

Why did centre-right voters back a Socialist candidate?

Despite not agreeing with his politics, centre-right voters backed a Socialist candidate to build a firewall around the presidency, recognising that the office demands deliberation, predictability and respect for democratic rules, none of which Chega represents. Seguro’s campaign made this possible. He distanced himself from party politics, avoided turning the race into a debate about the Socialist Party and positioned himself as a stable figure capable of providing institutional continuity during a political crisis.

This was practical risk management, not ideology. The centre-right Social Democratic Party is pushing labour law changes that triggered a joint general strike in December, with over three million workers participating. With Chega already holding significant parliamentary power, voters feared that a far-right president would go further still, using veto powers not to check the government’s agenda, but to entrench it and block any legislation protecting workers’ rights.

This coalition shows that a clear boundary against the far right still exists, at least when it comes to leading the state. It’s a defensive pact: democrats can disagree on policy, but there’s a line when it comes to handing power to a reactionary force that threatens democratic institutions.

What does the result mean for Portugal and Europe?

For Portugal, this result is a temporary reprieve for democracy. Seguro won two-thirds of the second-round vote and over 3.5 million votes, the most ever cast for a presidential candidate in Portugal, despite storms that disrupted voting. This shows that, faced with a genuine far-right threat, Portuguese democracy can still mobilise broadly to defend itself.

But this wasn’t a clear victory against the far right. Ventura won one-third of the vote, strengthened his base and positioned himself as a serious contender for right-wing leadership. In just a few years, Chega has gone from a fringe party to parliament’s second largest.

This sends a mixed message to Europe: broad democratic coalitions can still prevent far-right candidates reaching the top office, but the far right is now mainstream, shapes political agendas and forces other parties to constantly define themselves in relation to it. This is the new normal. This matters particularly for the European Commission, as far-right movements are structural threats and the only response is to strengthen the rule of law and democratic institutions.

Where does Chega go from here?

Ventura lost the presidential election, but Chega has emerged stronger. Winning a third of the vote against a candidate backed by the entire democratic spectrum cements its position. Ventura can now claim to speak for a significant portion of the right, and his loss only strengthens that claim, as he can frame the firewall as evidence that the political system is rigged against him, feeding narratives of elite persecution. He will also use his parliamentary strength to extract concessions by supporting or blocking the government’s budget and pushing on immigration and security, winning enough policy gains to show he delivers for his voters.

Ventura has already said that support for stability ‘has limits’. If the government hits serious problems, such as a budget crisis or a political deadlock, Chega will position itself as the only force willing to break the impasse and ‘fix things’. He’s not treating the presidential loss as the end of his political project but as a stepping stone to bigger gains in future elections. His calculation is that electoral legitimacy can eventually become governmental power.

What does this mean for civic space and civil society?

Portugal’s civic space is shrinking. Hate speech is becoming normalised, immigration rules are tightening, government administration is becoming more exclusionary, protest organisers face police intimidation and civil society organisations are struggling financially. These create real barriers to people exercising their rights. Chega’s rise and its racist and xenophobic rhetoric now heard in parliament raise the risk that discrimination and violence against migrants will become politically acceptable.

A president committed to rights protection can set limits: vetoing discriminatory laws, refusing to suppress information the public needs and protecting communities and organisations under attack. The presidency alone cannot reverse the shrinking of civic space, but it can prevent the government from fully institutionalising a far-right agenda.

Human rights organisations, labour movements and migrant groups see this moment as an opportunity to strengthen protections, not a final victory. Turnout held strong despite devastating storms and emergency conditions, evidence that people were genuinely mobilised by the threat, particularly urban voters connected to civil society, including unions, who had already fought the government over labour rights. The organisations that coordinated the strike now expect the president to use his powers to defend rights.

How should Seguro use his presidential powers?

Seguro has been clear he won’t be the reason parliament is dissolved, and has committed to working with the government while demanding ‘solutions and results’. This means dissolution of parliament will be a last resort in a genuine crisis, not a tactical move to tackle normal political disagreements. He will use his veto power to block laws he thinks violate the constitution and rights and mediate between the government and opposition to push them towards compromise.

The challenge will be to keep the democratic parties, both government and opposition, at the centre while Chega tries to dictate the agenda. If Seguro dissolves parliament too quickly or without a strong reason, he’ll just fuel Chega’s narrative that the system is broken. If he’s too passive and doesn’t use his veto when rights are threatened, he’ll look complicit in democratic erosion. Both scenarios would help Chega: either the system looks incapable of functioning, or it looks unwilling to defend people’s rights.

Seguro will have to walk a very fine line between doing too much and doing too little, while a far-right opposition waits to exploit whatever mistakes he makes. If he gets it wrong, his historic electoral victory will give way to deeper crisis rather than democratic renewal.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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SEE ALSO
Portugal’s far-right surge CIVICUS Lens 30.May.2025
‘Civil society must engage to prevent discussions devolving into demagoguery’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Jorge Máximo 28.May.2025
‘The rise of the populist right only further weakens trust in the political system’ CIVICUS Lens | Interview with Ana Carmo 19.Feb.2024

Donald Trump will unbedingt sein Gesicht auf US-Münzen prägen lassen. Eine Goldmünze zum 250. Gründungstag der USA wurde bereits genehmigt. Auch seine Unterschrift soll bald auf Dollarnoten erscheinen.