Afrique

Vergesslichkeit ist nicht immer ein Grund zur Sorge: Menschen, die Wichtigem Platz machen, sind intelligenter und treffen bessere Entscheidungen, sagen Forscher. Aber ab einem gewissen Punkt sollte man aufhorchen.

Des célébrités, des cinéastes et des créateurs se sont produits lors de la plus grande soirée africaine consacrée au cinéma et à la mode.

Gebühren oder Steuergeld – das ist eine wichtige Frage bei der Finanzierung von Ausweisen und anderen amtlichen Dokumenten. Klar ist für mich, mehr als kostendeckende Gebühren soll dafür niemand zahlen müssen.

Drei ausländische Touristen sind vor der Insel Smola in Norwegen tödlich verunglückt. Ihr Boot kenterte am Sonntagabend. Rettungskräfte fanden die Männer in der Nacht auf Montag leblos im Wasser.

Frei laufende Ziegen gerieten in der Gemeinde Schlatt-Haslen an den Ablaufhahn eines Milchtanks, wonach Milch ausfloss.

Trotz milliardenschwerer Investitionen in künstliche Intelligenz fällt der SAP-Aktienkurs. UBS-Analysten sehen beim Titel aber Potenzial: Wachstumsprognosen von über 10 Prozent pro Jahr machen den europäischen Software-Giganten für Anleger wieder attraktiv.

Verena Grossenbacher fühlt sich betrogen. Ihre Augenarztpraxis bietet sie neuerdings an zwei Tagen statt wie bisher an einem auf. Ihre Behandlung wird dadurch um über 40 Prozent teurer. Dahinter steckt ein ausgeklügelter Abrechnungstrick.

Broschen galten lange als Relikt aus der Schmuckschatulle der Grossmutter – jetzt stecken sie wieder an Blazern, Mänteln und sogar Hoodies.

Ein HNO-Arzt in Brasilien macht Kinder vor Operationen zu Superhelden: Dr. Leandro Brandão Guimarães verwandelt Ängste mit Umhängen, Masken und Fantasie. Dafür gewann er 2025 den WEmbrace-Award für inspirierende Geschichten.

Marc ist Anwalt und lebt mit einer Lungentransplantation. Was als spontaner Camping-Trip mit seiner Tochter Youna begann, wurde zur Leidenschaft: voller Abenteuer, neuer Begegnungen und einer Beziehung, die unterwegs noch stärker wurde.

Doppelte Überraschung in der DSDS-Welt: Gleich zwei ehemalige Kandidaten haben fast zeitgleich verkündet, dass sie Nachwuchs erwarten. Ihre Fans feiern die freudige Nachricht im Netz – und gratulieren im Doppelpack.

Grosseinsatz der Polizei in der Schweiz und Deutschland: Ende April wurden fünf Personen verhaftet. Sie sollen Millionen aus Betrug und Drogenhandel per Kryptowährungen ins Ausland transferiert haben. Über 100 Polizisten beschlagnahmten Vermögenswerte.

Nach einer grossen Sommer-Eröffnungsparty am Zürcher Flussbad Letten liessen die Gäste einen riesigen Haufen Abfall an der Limmat liegen. Jetzt reagiert der Veranstalter auf das Güsel-Chaos.

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

A little more than a year into the Trump 2.0 era, it has become apparent that the “post–Cold War” international order is in its death throes. For three decades, global affairs have been shaped by a system dominated by the United States as the world’s only genuinely global power. American power was embedded in a “rules-based” international order founded on respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, alongside liberal-democratic norms such as “free” global economic exchange and institutionalised governance. Led by the United States and its Western allies, this order was considered by some in the early 1990s to be the “end of history”, a supposedly final stage in human ideological, political and economic evolution (Fukuyama, 1989). While the order was never without its practical and moral failings, and although many countries did not benefit from its protection, it was widely considered an improvement over past systems for organising international interdependence. Today, however, the liberal inter­nationalist project faces a profound crisis and is being challenged by geopolitical competition and a hollowing out from within (Ikenberry, 2024).

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

Caught between weak employment opportunities and widespread informal employment, Egypt’s manufacturing sector faces a dual challenge. Existing incentives in the labour market encourage both firms and workers to engage in informal employment arrangements. Firms benefit from lower labour costs and greater flexibility, while workers often seek higher take-home pay, driven by limited confidence in the benefits associated with formal employment. Many workers perceive tax and social insurance deductions as offering few tangible benefits or effective safety nets that would compensate for the reduction in current income. At the same time, policies aimed at promoting formal job creation that rely exclusively on stricter enforcement may backfire by increasing hiring costs, thereby creating an additional obstacle for job creation as well as for policymakers. 

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

The changing global order is reshaping the domestic politics of foreign aid. As many OECD governments shift their focus towards defence spending and narrower national interests, contributions to global public goods and development are declining. Development budgets, in particular, are traditionally among the first casualties of public spending cuts. Germany is no exception. Its core development budget has fallen from €12.4 billion in 2021 to €9.9 billion in 2026 – a decline of around 20 per cent. This decrease is driven by overall pressure on public spending and a decisive shift towards defence. A recent study projects a contested but illustrative estimate, suggesting that aid cuts could lead to an additional 9.4 million deaths by 2030 (da Silva et al., 2026). In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) presented a reform strategy that directly addresses these pressures. The strategy advocates a shift towards a more targeted approach, shaped in part by these budget cuts. However, it also addresses long-standing reform needs that predate them. Three aspects are particularly noteworthy: a clear focus on least developed countries (LDCs), where aid can have relatively high impact; explicit thematic prioritisation that recognises over-fragmentation as a key problem; and a stronger commitment to evidence and results, anchored in the statement that “effectiveness and evidence are central principles for steering German development cooperation” (BMZ, 2026). Possible concrete steps towards achieving these goals can be found in a joint CGD–IDOS policy paper on prioritisation (Hughes, Janus, Mitchell, & Röthel, 2025). However, questions remain about the strategy, most notably the apparent tensions between the focus on LDCs and ambitions to promote German business interests, the vague implementation plans and the fundamental question of political viability: Can these reforms generate meaningful change within the German development cooperation system and its wider political authorising environment?

Es ist eine Erleichterung für zwei Opfer des Pädo-Stiefvaters René F. (63) aus Herisau AR. Der Mann wird zu über vier Jahren Knast verurteilt. Das Urteil ist noch nicht rechtskräftig.