Afrique

The changing global order presents a complex set of challenges for Europe and is shaping the context in which its development policy operates. Successive global crises, growing geopolitical uncertainty and a volatile international environment have placed the EU in a near-permanent “crisis mode”, forcing it to react to events as they arise and often challenging its usual decision-making processes. For many years, the EU has often been compared to a slow-moving tanker in world politics, capable of significant influence but limited in terms of rapid decision-making and strategic agility. In recent months, however, the EU has become a think tank in international politics: passively commenting rather than actively shaping. Instead of influencing and steering global agendas through its strong rules-based institutions, the EU is plagued by a defensive siege mentality (de Wilde, 2025). Although the European Green Deal was once described as Europe’s “man on the moon moment” in 2019, it turned out the spaceship never actually made it beyond Earth’s orbit. Instead, the EU has rolled back aspects of its Green Deal ambition to reduce dependence on external inputs, including fossil fuels – a reversal that was already looking short-sighted long before Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026.

The changing global order presents a complex set of challenges for Europe and is shaping the context in which its development policy operates. Successive global crises, growing geopolitical uncertainty and a volatile international environment have placed the EU in a near-permanent “crisis mode”, forcing it to react to events as they arise and often challenging its usual decision-making processes. For many years, the EU has often been compared to a slow-moving tanker in world politics, capable of significant influence but limited in terms of rapid decision-making and strategic agility. In recent months, however, the EU has become a think tank in international politics: passively commenting rather than actively shaping. Instead of influencing and steering global agendas through its strong rules-based institutions, the EU is plagued by a defensive siege mentality (de Wilde, 2025). Although the European Green Deal was once described as Europe’s “man on the moon moment” in 2019, it turned out the spaceship never actually made it beyond Earth’s orbit. Instead, the EU has rolled back aspects of its Green Deal ambition to reduce dependence on external inputs, including fossil fuels – a reversal that was already looking short-sighted long before Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March 2026.

Die Air Zermatt erlebte 2025 ein Rekordjahr mit über 2200 Rettungseinsätzen und 6700 Flugstunden. Naturkatastrophen wie Schneechaos im Oberwallis und der Brand in Crans-Montana forderten die Rettungsorganisation massiv.

Since Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency, the UN system has come under unprecedented pressure. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the UN Secretariat were already struggling with a protracted liquidity crisis (caused by recurrent delayed or incomplete payment of assessed contributions from major contributors such as the United States and China), looming reductions in major donors’ voluntary contributions and rising geopolitical tensions among UN member states (Camelli & Patz, 2026; Haug, 2024). But the Trump administration’s disdain for multilateralism in general, and the UN in particular, poses an even more fundamental and pressing challenge to the UN, both financially and (geo)politically. Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, the United States has played a key role as the host for the UN headquarters in New York and the largest contributor to UN budgets. Although relations between the UN and the US government have long been complex – with influential anti-UN voices persistently present in US domestic politics (Browne & Nakamura, 2009; Mingst, 2003) – it had never reached a point at which broader US support for the organisation appeared to be under threat. This has changed, as exemplified by the formal or de facto withdrawal of the United States from many parts of the UN system, including withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2025, as well as disengaging from 31 other UN entities in 2026 (The White House, 2026). With the faltering hegemonic position of the United States, a general turn to overt geopolitics (Haug, 2026) and “my-country-first” policies, as well as long-standing criticism about the organisation’s inefficiencies, duplication and fragmentation – driven by donors’ chronic uncoordinated funding behaviour – the UN’s position as the centre of an imperfectly functioning multilateral system is at stake. Other major powers and blocs – from China and the BRICS grouping to the EU and a diverse group of medium-sized states from across the globe – have been unable to put forward a joint response to the fickle and often adversarial posture of the United States. Many have instead exhibited more transactional and self-focused behaviour, such as advocating for UN staff relocations to their own countries. So far, there is no shared vision of what the future of multilateral cooperation through the UN system – including its development, humanitarian and global regulatory agencies – ought to look like. Against this backdrop, we first outline why recent reform attempts under the so-called UN80 Initiative – triggered primarily by the shift in US policy towards multilateral organisations – have missed several opportunities to strategically reform and strengthen the UN system. We then argue that UN multilateralism is still needed – maybe more than ever before. Finally, we turn to recommendations on what stakeholders should do in order to make the UN fit for purpose in an increasingly challenging global environment.

Since Donald Trump’s return to the US presidency, the UN system has come under unprecedented pressure. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the UN Secretariat were already struggling with a protracted liquidity crisis (caused by recurrent delayed or incomplete payment of assessed contributions from major contributors such as the United States and China), looming reductions in major donors’ voluntary contributions and rising geopolitical tensions among UN member states (Camelli & Patz, 2026; Haug, 2024). But the Trump administration’s disdain for multilateralism in general, and the UN in particular, poses an even more fundamental and pressing challenge to the UN, both financially and (geo)politically. Since the establishment of the UN in 1945, the United States has played a key role as the host for the UN headquarters in New York and the largest contributor to UN budgets. Although relations between the UN and the US government have long been complex – with influential anti-UN voices persistently present in US domestic politics (Browne & Nakamura, 2009; Mingst, 2003) – it had never reached a point at which broader US support for the organisation appeared to be under threat. This has changed, as exemplified by the formal or de facto withdrawal of the United States from many parts of the UN system, including withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2025, as well as disengaging from 31 other UN entities in 2026 (The White House, 2026). With the faltering hegemonic position of the United States, a general turn to overt geopolitics (Haug, 2026) and “my-country-first” policies, as well as long-standing criticism about the organisation’s inefficiencies, duplication and fragmentation – driven by donors’ chronic uncoordinated funding behaviour – the UN’s position as the centre of an imperfectly functioning multilateral system is at stake. Other major powers and blocs – from China and the BRICS grouping to the EU and a diverse group of medium-sized states from across the globe – have been unable to put forward a joint response to the fickle and often adversarial posture of the United States. Many have instead exhibited more transactional and self-focused behaviour, such as advocating for UN staff relocations to their own countries. So far, there is no shared vision of what the future of multilateral cooperation through the UN system – including its development, humanitarian and global regulatory agencies – ought to look like. Against this backdrop, we first outline why recent reform attempts under the so-called UN80 Initiative – triggered primarily by the shift in US policy towards multilateral organisations – have missed several opportunities to strategically reform and strengthen the UN system. We then argue that UN multilateralism is still needed – maybe more than ever before. Finally, we turn to recommendations on what stakeholders should do in order to make the UN fit for purpose in an increasingly challenging global environment.

Der 19-jährige Sohn der Schauspielerin Lara Joy Körner wurde am Samstag leblos in der Isar bei München entdeckt. Die Polizei ermittelt, Hinweise auf ein Verbrechen gibt es derzeit nicht.

Over the last two decades, the People’s Republic of China has been central to significant shifts in the geography of international cooperation. With fundamental shifts in the United States’ posture towards international partnerships under the second Trump administration, China’s relevance has grown further, albeit on its own terms. In what follows, we discuss how recent international disruptions have affected China, how China-led cooperation has been evolving over the last decade and what more China-centred forms of cooperation mean for the future of bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

Over the last two decades, the People’s Republic of China has been central to significant shifts in the geography of international cooperation. With fundamental shifts in the United States’ posture towards international partnerships under the second Trump administration, China’s relevance has grown further, albeit on its own terms. In what follows, we discuss how recent international disruptions have affected China, how China-led cooperation has been evolving over the last decade and what more China-centred forms of cooperation mean for the future of bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

The year 1961 can be seen as the “Big Bang” of international development policy. First, in that year, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was established. In the context of the Cold War, the United States pushed for an international system to support developing countries. In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy consolidated existing efforts to assist developing nations into USAID. Last but not least, in the same year, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) was established in what was then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions (Bracho, Carey, Hynes, Klingebiel, & Trzeciak-Duval, 2021). The DAC has long been both a symbol of, and a “norm entrepreneur” in, development cooperation (Esteves & Klingebiel, 2021; Janus, 2022; Sumner & Klingebiel, 2025). It is often seen as synonymous with the form of development cooperation practised by “traditional donors”, that is, a club of high-income countries. Linked to this has been the criticism that the governance of ODA reflects persistent global power inequalities. At the same time, the DAC has served as the central forum in which key norms and quality standards of development cooperation have been negotiated over more than 60 years. It was within the DAC that the concept of “official development assistance” (ODA) was developed. ODA refers to public resources provided on concessional terms to promote economic and social development in developing countries. DAC members are also regularly assessed through peer review processes that assess their adherence to agreed standards (Ashoff, 2013). Like the role of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in education policy, these reviews in theory serve both disciplinary and supportive functions. In practice, no DAC member country has wished to be publicly criticised for failing to comply with jointly adopted DAC standards and relevant international agreements. Last but not least, the DAC members also issue statements of good practice and position papers on the international development agenda. These documents have been influential and have, for instance, influenced the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration and the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted – which in turn evolved into the current 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). DAC membership has expanded considerably since its creation, growing to 33 members today. Several nations once classified as developing countries, such as Spain, South Korea and a number of states that joined the EU in and after 2004, later sought and obtained DAC membership. At the same time, a growing number of OECD members, including Turkey, Mexico and Chile, have decided not to join the DAC. This reflects differing approaches to development cooperation and varying degrees of commitment to ODA-based norms. Countries that do not see themselves as part of a collective commitment around the ODA target of 0.7 per cent – such as Mexico, which historically identified with the Global South and was a founding member of the G77 before joining the OECD in 1994 – have so far remained outside the committee. Despite these variations, the United States played a decisive role in establishing the DAC as a rule-setting and coordinating body. US influence extended beyond institutional design. For decades, the United States also dominated personnel decisions and held the DAC chair until a rotating system was introduced (Bracho et al., 2021).

The year 1961 can be seen as the “Big Bang” of international development policy. First, in that year, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD was established. In the context of the Cold War, the United States pushed for an international system to support developing countries. In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy consolidated existing efforts to assist developing nations into USAID. Last but not least, in the same year, Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) was established in what was then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions (Bracho, Carey, Hynes, Klingebiel, & Trzeciak-Duval, 2021). The DAC has long been both a symbol of, and a “norm entrepreneur” in, development cooperation (Esteves & Klingebiel, 2021; Janus, 2022; Sumner & Klingebiel, 2025). It is often seen as synonymous with the form of development cooperation practised by “traditional donors”, that is, a club of high-income countries. Linked to this has been the criticism that the governance of ODA reflects persistent global power inequalities. At the same time, the DAC has served as the central forum in which key norms and quality standards of development cooperation have been negotiated over more than 60 years. It was within the DAC that the concept of “official development assistance” (ODA) was developed. ODA refers to public resources provided on concessional terms to promote economic and social development in developing countries. DAC members are also regularly assessed through peer review processes that assess their adherence to agreed standards (Ashoff, 2013). Like the role of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in education policy, these reviews in theory serve both disciplinary and supportive functions. In practice, no DAC member country has wished to be publicly criticised for failing to comply with jointly adopted DAC standards and relevant international agreements. Last but not least, the DAC members also issue statements of good practice and position papers on the international development agenda. These documents have been influential and have, for instance, influenced the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration and the eight Millennium Development Goals adopted – which in turn evolved into the current 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). DAC membership has expanded considerably since its creation, growing to 33 members today. Several nations once classified as developing countries, such as Spain, South Korea and a number of states that joined the EU in and after 2004, later sought and obtained DAC membership. At the same time, a growing number of OECD members, including Turkey, Mexico and Chile, have decided not to join the DAC. This reflects differing approaches to development cooperation and varying degrees of commitment to ODA-based norms. Countries that do not see themselves as part of a collective commitment around the ODA target of 0.7 per cent – such as Mexico, which historically identified with the Global South and was a founding member of the G77 before joining the OECD in 1994 – have so far remained outside the committee. Despite these variations, the United States played a decisive role in establishing the DAC as a rule-setting and coordinating body. US influence extended beyond institutional design. For decades, the United States also dominated personnel decisions and held the DAC chair until a rotating system was introduced (Bracho et al., 2021).

Das Schweizer Team Tudor Pro Cycling setzt auf Mathys Rondel und verlängert seinen Vertrag bis 2030. Der 22-jährige Franzose gilt als grosses Radsporttalent und sorgt für Ärger in Frankreich, wo man seit 1985 auf einen Toursieger hofft.

The rules-based trading system has been a central pillar of the post–Cold War international order. Predictable economic relations and lower trade barriers supported an unprecedented expansion of global trade and economic integration. Institutions such as the WTO helped establish a framework of shared principles designed to prevent protectionism and resolve disputes peacefully. This system contributed significantly to economic growth and poverty reduction, particularly in emerging and developing economies (e.g. Baldwin, 2016). However, the system has also faced mounting difficulties over time, with its gradual erosion becoming increasingly evident in the collapse of the Doha Development Round after 2008 and the paralysis of the WTO Appellate Body from 2019 onwards. More recently, unilateral trade measures, successive waves of US tariffs, rising geopolitical competition and the resurgence of industrial policy have not only undermined the multilateral trading system but also generated substantial disruptions and uncertainties in both trade and investment relations. Developing countries are among the most affected by these developments, not least because contemporary global trade involves more than just the exchange of final goods. Around 80 per cent of world trade now takes place within global value chains (GVCs) linked to transnational corporations, with production stages fragmented across multiple countries (UNCTAD, 2013). In these chains, developing countries typically occupy upstream positions and specialise in supplying raw materials or labour-intensive inputs, whereas more technologically complex and higher value-added activities are concentrated elsewhere. Especially economies in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in Africa remain locked into low-complexity, low-margin tasks, whereas foreign-controlled firms dominate higher-value segments (ADB et al., 2025). This structural position renders developing countries particularly vulnerable to substitution and constrains economic diversification and development (e.g. Barrot, Calderón, & Servén, 2018). Against this background, trade-related development cooperation plays a crucial role. At the multilateral level, it does so by helping to sustain a fair and inclusive rules-based trading system. At the regional and country levels, it does so by strengthening institutions and investing in infrastructure as well as productive and trade capacities. These efforts also enhance developing countries’ attractiveness as investment destinations and trading partners within GVCs, helping them integrate more effectively into global markets and supporting a more resilient development pathway in an increasingly fragmented global order. This contribution begins by examining the implications of a fragmenting global order for trade. It then highlights why development cooperation in the field of trade remains vital before concluding with an exploration of how development cooperation can help build a more equitable and sustainable international trading system.

In the context of the changing global order and rising nationalism, several countries, including the United States and some European countries, have cut their official development assistance (ODA). The OECD forecasts a decline of ODA by around 23 per cent between 2024 and 2025 (OECD, 2026). At the same time there is a significant financing gap for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), currently estimated at about $4 trillion. Furthermore, the annual financing required to achieve the SDGs by 2030 increased by 36 per cent between 2015 and 2022, rising from $6.81 trillion to $9.24 trillion. This increase was driven by climate-related challenges, the impact of the pandemic, supply chain disruptions, and rising food and energy prices. These two trends have led to a significant SDG financing gap, which is projected to reach $6.4 trillion by 2030, assuming that it continues to grow at the rate observed between 2015 and 2022. Furthermore, mounting debt obligations are exerting pressure on pivotal investments in health, education and climate resilience (OECD, 2025). According to the debt sustainability analysis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, about half of low-income countries are either at high risk of debt distress or already in debt distress.

Ab dem 1. Juli 2026 dürfen Schweizer Kantone erstmals seit 1955 Rundstreckenrennen bewilligen. Doch die Schweiz bleibt ohne moderne Rennstrecken. Fans hoffen trotzdem auf künftige Entwicklungen – und sogar auf die Rückkehr der Formel 1!

Elles ont été conçues naturellement, se sont développées ensemble dans le même utérus et sont nées de la même mère – mais ce sont des demi-sœurs ; Michelle et Lavinia doivent leur existence à un processus biologique extrêmement rare appelé superfécondation hétéropatérale.

L'Église orthodoxe serbe va créer une nouvelle Université de Saint-Sava, avec le soutien de l'État. Le statut de cet établissement - public ou privé ? - est incertain, mais le projet manifeste surtout le soutien politique de la hiérarchie orthodoxe au régime d'Aleksandar Vučić.

- Le fil de l'Info / Serbie, orthodoxie, Vucic, Courrier des Balkans, Culture et éducation, Religions

L'Église orthodoxe serbe va créer une nouvelle Université de Saint-Sava, avec le soutien de l'État. Le statut de cet établissement - public ou privé ? - est incertain, mais le projet manifeste surtout le soutien politique de la hiérarchie orthodoxe au régime d'Aleksandar Vučić.

- Le fil de l'Info / Serbie, orthodoxie, Vucic, Courrier des Balkans, Culture et éducation, Religions

Residents in Phú Yên, Vietnam, relied on a small wooden boat during a flood. Climate change and El Niño disrupted the livelihood of millions of people in Asia and the Pacific. Credit: Pexels/Long Bà Mùi Source: ESCAP

By Kareff Rafisura
BANGKOK, Thailand, May 11 2026 (IPS)

Climate models are converging: El Niño is likely to return by mid-2026 and could be strong. According to the World Meteorological Organization, it could emerge as early as May–July 2026, with several national hydrometeorological agencies in Asia and the Pacific already issuing alerts.

El Niño makes headlines not because it is rare, but because it amplifies climate risks. Past events have triggered major humanitarian crises, driving drought, food insecurity and public health emergencies across Asia and the Pacific. While each Niño event differs, their impacts tend to follow recognizable regional patterns.

In countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor Leste, strong El Niño events have repeatedly brought drought, forest fires, agricultural losses and water stress, with patterns reinforced even during the weaker 2018–2019 El Niño. These impacts provide clear signals of risks concentrated across food, water, health and livelihood systems.

In practical terms, an El Niño event is only fully established when the atmosphere reinforces the warming of oceans. As not all warmings reach that stage, this is where uncertainty lies, including how strong the event will become. While forecasts will improve in the coming months, historical impacts already indicate where risks are likely to concentrate.

To understand the risks, it helps to look at how past events have unfolded in the region. Strong events in 1971–73, 1982–83 and 1997–98 triggered widespread droughts, forest fires and vector-borne diseases, such as dengue, across South and South-East Asia and the Pacific.

While impacts vary by location, the pattern is consistent: risk intensity is highest where exposure overlaps with underlying vulnerabilities caused by poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition, as well as heavy dependence on subsistence farming.

The 2015–2016 El Niño is the strongest of this century and can serve as a useful reference should current conditions develop into a comparable event, given similar early warming patterns. The joint ESCAP and ASEAN report, Ready for the Dry Years, states that during this event, more than 70% of South-East Asia’s land area experienced drought, exposing over 200 million people to severe drought at its peak.

While El Niño affects large areas, its impacts are most severe where climatic exposure overlaps with structural vulnerability. This year, these risks are unfolding in a more complex climate and socioeconomic context, with tighter fiscal space, higher debt levels and persistent global economic uncertainty, as highlighted in the ESCAP Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2026.

At the same time, remittances, an important source of income for countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka are being affected, weakening a key buffer that has historically helped households cope with shocks.

Together, these pressures leave governments and households less able to absorb climate shocks than during previous El Niño cycles.

Climate change is amplifying baseline risks. Higher temperatures increase evapotranspiration (process of heat making water evaporate faster), reduce soil moisture and intensify drought conditions. The Ready for the Dry Years report shows that droughts increasingly occur under warmer conditions, magnifying their impacts.

Climate variability is now interacting with long-term warming trends, increasing systemic risks.

The implication is clear: waiting for certainty can increase exposure to avoidable losses. Historical evidence and current signals already provide a sufficient basis for early, no-regret action.

Because the impacts of El Niño align with extremes expected to intensify under climate change, there is a strong case for investing in resilience across scenarios. Three priority areas stand out.

First, turn climate forecasts into actionable decisions on the ground. Seasonal forecasts provide valuable signals, but decisions require localized insight: where water stress will emerge, where crops are likely to fail and which communities are most at risk. Advances in satellite data and analytics now allow near-real-time monitoring of soil moisture, vegetation health and water availability, and should be used to guide targeted preparedness.

Second, early financing is a no-regret investment in resilience. The impacts of El Niño are cumulative and can outlast the event itself. Acting early through social protection, support to farmers and better water management reduces long-term costs and protects hard-won development gains. In a context of constrained fiscal space, anticipatory action limits downstream losses.

Third, strengthen coordination across sectors. El Niño affects multiple sectors simultaneously, including agriculture, water, energy and public health. Coordinated responses enable faster and more efficient actions with benefits that extend beyond a single event.

Even as uncertainty remains around the strength of the evolving event, historical experience makes a clear case for early action to strengthen long-term resilience.

Kareff Rafisura is Economic Affairs Officer, ESCAP

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

  

 

Le département américain de la Défense a publié un grand nombre de transcriptions, de vidéos et d'enregistrements audio concernant des objets volants non identifiés qui se trouvaient depuis des décennies dans ses archives. Cette publication apportera-t-elle des réponses aux questions des ufologues ?

Le gouvernement Radev a été investi le 8 mai par le Parlement, mais le nouvel homme fort de la Bulgarie n'aura pas le temps de savourer son triomphe. Budget, inflation galopantes, financements européens et réformes douloureuses l'attendent.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Bulgarie, Politique, Economie