ELIAMEP

You can read here the article on the future of Europe, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 13 July 2016 [in Greek].

This is the work of Jean Plantureux (Plantu) following the attack in Nice

Following the terrorist attack in Nice Director General of ELIAMEP, Dr Thanos Dokos, wrote an article explaining the rise of terrorism and elaborating on potential measures to eradicate the problem. He also paid particular attention to the case of Greece. The article is available in Greek and can be accessed here.

You can read here the article on the Cyprus Question written by Research Fellow of ELIAMEP and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. This commentary was published in Kathimerini on 12 July 2016.

You can read here the article on the attempt to change the Greek electoral law, which was written by Professor George Pagoulatos. The commentary was published on 10 July 2016  in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini and is available in Greek.

Associate Professor  at the University of Athens and  Senior Research Fellow at ELIAMEP Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos explained on EU Observer how the third bailout is implemented by the Greek government. The article was published on 5 July 2016 and is available here.

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the European Policy Centre (EPC)  organised as Policy Dialogue on ‘Union, disunion or time for a paradigm shift?, on Wednesday 13 July 2016 in Brussels. The event was inspired by discussions held during the 13th European Seminar involving participants from all over Europe, organised by ELIAMEP, in cooperation with the EPC on 30 June-3 July 2016.

Speakers were: Ms Elizabeth Collett (Founding Director, Migration Policy Institute Europe; Senior Advisor to MPI’s Transatlantic Council on Migration, Brussels), Dr Ruby Gropas (Team Leader, Social Affairs, European Political Strategy Centre, European Commission), Professor George Pagoulatos (Athens University of Economics and Business; Member of the Board of Directors, ELIAMEP) and Mr Janis A. Emmanouilidis (Director of Studies, European Policy Centre). Dr Giovanni Grevi (Senior Fellow, European Policy Centre) will moderate the discussion.

You can find here more information.

Sino-Greek relations have been growing rapidly over the last decade. In the wake of the Olympic Games hosted by Athens in 2004 and Beijing in 2008, but above all since the COSCO investment in the Piraeus sea port the two countries have come a long way from initial contacts to developing a close economic and political relationship. This is the view of the Greek Consortium for Chinese Studies, which brings together the Institute of International Economic Relations (IIER),  the Institute of International Relations (IIR) of the Panteion University, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), the Political Science and International Relations Department of the University of the Peloponnese, and the Department of Mediterranean Studies of the University of the Aegean.

The two countries have been coming closer together despite the economic slump in Greece and notwithstanding some challenges in relation to the COSCO investment in Piraeus. These difficulties have not discouraged China which remains fully committed to developinig its relationship with Greece. Beijing’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) vision is also a major factor to be reckoned with, as Piraeus is one of the key hubs on trade routes between China and Europe.

How is Athens contributing to making the best of the vast potential of Sino-Greek relations? Despite some persistent issues with regard to the Piraeus project, particular attention has been paid to co-operation between Greek shipping businesses and Chinese shipyards, even if Greece as a whole could have benefited to a larger extent from this significant sector of the economy. Growing numbers of Chinese visitors to Greece are yet another encouraging sign of an ever-closer partnership. On the flip side, prospects of boosting Greek exports to China remain limited, despite the fact that the latter has the second largest economy worldwide with a gigantic $6 trillion GDP.

The upcoming visit of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras coincides with the tenth anniversary of the 2006 Joint Communiqué between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Greece on the Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This could well herald the start of a new phase in Sino-Greek relations, one that would help maximise mutual benefits. The  Consortium for Chinese Studies highlights the following steps worth considering:

1. Confirming the role of Greece as a strategically important hub on the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) between East Asia and Europe, through the promotion of high-quality logistics services and intermodal transport, upon the speedy completion of the Piraeus port authority privatisation deal.
2. Re-confirming the potential of Greece with a view to foreign investment, with the development of strong links between Chinese and Greek enterprises. It is noted that at present a number of competitive local businesses in Greece lack the size to link up to Chinese partners.
3. Systematic support to be provided to Greek businesses interested in entering the Chinese market. However, this should be pursued on the basis of a comprehensive long-term strategy and not as one-off attempts, which has largely been the case so far. Growing domestic demand, in conjunction with Greece’s positive image in China, could play a significant part in the promotion of Greek exports. Notably, at present China is the destination of a meagre 2 percent of Greek exports.
4. Further facilitating the flow of Chinese tourists to Greece through easier access, as China’s outward tourism has been rapidly growing.
5. Devising a full-fledged strategy for co-operation between Greek and Chinese cultural and research/academic institutions.

Greece has been treading a difficult path. Historically, support for the EU has come with tangible and intangible benefits: stability, prosperity, a protecting framework, a seat at the big table. However, membership of the inner sanctum, the single currency, has triggered following the ‘good years’ of consumption-ridden profligacy significant costs: an economy in disarray, excessively high unemployment and rising inequality.

Greece’s painful predicament, as it is called upon to implement its third and harshest yet adjustment programme, inadvertently conflates the ‘euro’ with ‘Europe.’ It thus turns a previously overwhelming record of support into growing disquiet and discontent regarding Europe’s ability to achieve its core objectives, including balanced economic growth, broadly based prosperity, and the well-being of its peoples. European crisis management over the refugee crisis is also taking its toll.  The country did make its own set of mistakes, yet burden sharing  -in relation to a problem that far exceeds Greece’s economic, institutional and absorption capacity-  has been amiss.

The decline in Greece’s EU support is symptomatic of a wider malaise. The EU has long lost its capacity to unite and to deliver: the absence of a finalité, a common destination goal, is fast becoming a liability, worsened by the lack of a shared narrative. For Greece, which has also seen trust in the EU decline to the low levels usually afforded to national institutions, the EU is transitioning from an anchor of economic and social progress into a stifling and debilitating constraint.

The EU is still a roadmap for Greece yet it needs to provide real convergence

Greece has, of course, been far from a model student. Throughout its membership and in spite of substantial fiscal transfers, it has failed to catch up with the EU. It has been invariably blamed, particularly during the height of the sovereign debt crisis, for threatening the integrity of the euro and, by default, the EU. Today Greeks are caught between the costs associated with half-baked, austerity-filled bailout packages and the country’s inability to move beyond its weak structural and institutional set-up. For them, the EU should provide a roadmap for real convergence.

Critical in this respect is support for a significantly larger EU budget, extending its remit beyond investment spending. Greece has been left with zero fiscal space, a corollary of its tough fiscal commitments; it has also been left to fend for the prospect of future large shocks. Building up the budget constitutes a useful political half-way, it shields against the voices in the EU that would cry moral hazard and sets the scene for a future fiscal capacity. Greece’s endgame would, of course, be some form of fiscal union- assuming that it could withstand politically the requisite transfer of sovereignty.

A pro-integration country with limitations

The appetite for political centralisation, in the form of a European government, is limited however. Greeks also remain wary of the ascendancy of the intergovernmental method; it might have engineered the stability mechanisms that kept Greece afloat, yet it imposed an asymmetric adjustment agenda. Even a reformed Commission, broadly consideredan ally in Greece’s seven-year crisis would not do. The loss of democratic oversight over vital choices that affect people’s livelihoods translates into deep and diffuse distrust of the European project.

If the EU is to offer a credible exit from Greece’s adjustment conundrum, and a security framework to mend its fractured society, then it must re-think the way that it distributes costs and benefits. Post-crisis governance should do some fine-tuning of its own. This should involve a re-balancing of the current policy mix, the current ‘coordination’ of fiscal policies creates negative externalities that hinder growth; a repackaging of the Stability and Growth Pact in a fiscal sustainability frame, to ensure the long-term sustainability of public debt; an inclusion of social and employment indicators alongside macroeconomic ones in the European Semester, and a re-working of the application of rules to create the conditions for equal treatment- the economic imbalances of the big countries are left unpunished and/or they are allowed budget flexibility in line with their electoral cycles and other domestic concerns.

Greece, economically and financially beaten, has been banished to the periphery of decision-making. It still has the incentive to be an integration player however, not least because the EU has historically constituted its stabilisation and modernisation anchor. Hence, it would vouch for the swift integration of the digital, energy, and capital markets, giving its companies the tools to boost competitiveness. It would support moves to complete a real banking union, restoring the impaired credit channel and severing the damaging bank-sovereign loop. It would strive to make the European investment package more visible and more accessible, as the Greek economy is in need of a major reboot. In the end, Greece offers a useful lesson of its own when re-thinking integration or attempting to gauge Europe’s future. No amount of financial transfers or institutional support will work without the exercise of national responsibility. Reform should begin at home.

Source: Clingendael

President of ELIAMEP, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis wrote an article in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini on what Brexit means for the UK and Europe. This article was published on 3 July 2016 and is available here (in Greek).

Research Fellow of ELIAMEP Dr Filippa Chatzistavrou wrote  an article in Le Monde analysing Brexit from a Greek perspective. The article was published on 2 July 2016 and is available here.

You can read here the article on the future of Europe, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 29 June 2016 [in Greek].

You can read here the article on Brexit, which was written by Professor George Pagoulatos. The commentary was published on 26 June 2016  in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini and is available in Greek.

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) is interested in hosting researchers intending to submit an application for the call of Individual Fellowships in the framework of the Marie Sklodowska Curie Actions programme (MSCA-IF-2016). Applicants must have α doctoral degree or at least four years’ full-time research experience by the time of the call deadline. Applicants can be of any nationality but they must not have spent more than 12 months in the last 3 years in Greece (mobility rule). Fellowships take form of European Fellowships or Global Fellowships. Please, find below further information on the Fellowships.

ELIAMEP welcomes project proposals from all areas of social and economic sciences. However, priority will be given to those projects that fit best with ELIAMEP’s existing research interests and orientations and gain the support of at least one ELIAMEP senior researcher. The project proposal will be submitted jointly by the researcher and ELIAMEP. Researchers who wish to cooperate with ELIAMEP for the submission of a proposal should check that they fulfill the respective eligibility criteria and then send an expression of interest, consisting of a short CV and a two-page summary presentation of their research proposal, to development@eliamep.gr .

Expressions of interest may be submitted to ELIAMEP up to 2 months prior to the call deadline (14 September 2016). Proposals will be pre-selected on the basis of internal evaluation and the availability of suitable supervision. Candidates will be informed of the results of the pre-selection well before the call deadline.

 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships- European Fellowships (MSCA-IF-EF)

European Fellowships are open to researchers either coming to Europe from any country in the world or moving within Europe. The researcher must comply with the rules of mobility. Return and reintegration of researchers (MSCA-IF-EF-RI) into a longer term research position in Europe, including in their country of origin, is supported via the multi-disciplinary Reintegration Panel (RI) of the European Fellowships. Support to individuals to resume research in Europe after a career break, e.g. after parental leave, is ensured via a separate multi-disciplinary Career Restart Panel (CAR) of the European Fellowships (MSCA-IF-EF-CAR). To qualify for the career restart panel, researchers must not have been active in research for at least 12 months immediately prior to the deadline for submission. The Society & Enterprise Panel (SE) aims to facilitate career moves between the academic and non-academic sectors and to open attractive career opportunities for researchers outside academia (MSCA-IF-EF-SE). In the Career Restart Panel (CAR), Reintegration Panel (RI), or Society & Enterprise Panel (SE), the researcher must not have resided or carried out the main activity (work, studies, etc.) in the country of the beneficiary for more than 36 months in the 5 years immediately before the call deadline.

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships- Global Fellowships (IF-GF)

Global Fellowships are based on a secondment to a third country and a mandatory 12 month return period to a European host. The researcher must comply with the rules of mobility in the country where the Global Fellowship secondment takes place, not for the country of the return phase.

President of ELIAMEP, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis, gave an interview on Political Exterior Journal in which he discussed the future of Europe. The interview was given on 12 June 2016 and is available here.

 Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos gave an interview on News247 on the UK referendum and the Brexit scenario. The interview was published on 17 June 2016 and is available here.

You can read here the article on the UK referendum, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 15 June 2016 [in Greek].

On the occasion of the completion of the field research in the frame of the research project entitled “Unravelling the Eastern Mediterranean Refugee Route”, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) organised a workshop entitled ‘Unravelling the Eastern Mediterranean Refugee Route: Emerging findings and policy implications of the MEDMIG research’ on Wednesday 15 June 2016, from 9:30 to 13:00. The aim of the workshop was to present the findings of MEDMIG research project on the same subject, and to provide a ground for discussion among representatives of governmental and non-governmental actors.

The “Unravelling the Mediterranean Migration Crisis” (MEDMIG) research project explores the factors, opportunities and constraints that shape the decision of individuals and families to abandon their homes and migrate to Europe. Its aim is to a) better understand the causes behind the recent unprecedented levels of migration across the Mediterranean; b) map the interaction of migrants with a multitude of non-state actors (for example ‘smugglers’ and NGOs) and state actors (for example navy / coastguard); c) explore the relevant opportunities and constraints that migrants face in countries of origin and refuge/transit; and d) provide a robust evidence base to inform the development of policy responses by governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental actors. The research was undertaken in 9 sites in four countries: Italy and Malta (Central Mediterranean route) and Greece and Turkey (Eastern Mediterranean route), and a total of 500 interviews with refugees and migrants have been conducted. MEDMIG research project is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in the United Kingdom, under the ESRC Strategic Urgency Grants scheme. The Coordinator of the research project is the University of Coventry.

 A few key points from the research findings presented at the event can be highlighted:

• The nationality composition of flows to Greece remained largely consistent but there was a significant increase in the proportion of women and children  during  2015 (60% of those arriving in 2016) which reflects secondary flows and efforts to reunite families
• 90% of those arriving in Greece in 2015 came from just three countries – Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq – countries is which there is well-documented conflict, political unrest and human rights abuse. This is reflected in the data collected from interviewees. We interviewed 215 refugees and migrants in Greece (Athens and Mytilini, Lesvos), 89% of whom said that they had been forced to leave their countries of origin
• Circumstances vary by country of origin and also gender and ageà Syria (conflict, ISIS, kidnappings), Afghanistan (conflict, Taliban, ISIS, military conscription in Iran), Eritrea (forced conscription), Iraq (conflict, ISIS)
• Nearly a third (29%) of respondents talked about ISIS / Daesh
• Although the increase in the scale of flows is partly explained by the deteriorating situation in Syria, the drivers of migration to Europe are complex and multi-faceted
• Complex relationship and overlap between ‘forced’ and ‘economic’ drivers of migration are a key finding of our research across both Eastern and Central Mediterranean Routes
• In terms of destination country, nearly a fifth of those interviewed in Greece did not know which country they wanted to go to or were heading to ‘Europe’. Among the others a total of 24 different countries were mentioned as potential destination countries. Many people mentioned multiple destinations i.e. no single ‘choice’ of country
• Germany was the country with the highest proportion of mentions (32%), followed by Sweden (12%), the UK (6%), Switzerland (4%), Denmark and Norway (both 3%). The main factors for the countries mentioned were access to protection / residence permit and opportunities to secure employment
• Nearly two thirds (59%) of those interviewed had pre-existing contacts (family members or friends) in the country of destination
• There is evidence that refugees and migrants have only partial information about migration policies in particular countries and that decisions about where to go are made ad hoc, along the route and more often based on a number of intervening variables and opportunities
• The average duration of journey varies by route à much quicker in the Eastern than Central Mediterranean Route with 57% of journeys to Greece taking less than 3 months cf. 16% of journeys to Italy
• The average duration of journey to Greece varies significantly by country of origin e.g Iraqis 1.4 months compared with Afghans 78.9 months

For further information, please contact the ELIAMEP researchers, Dia Anagnostou (anagnostou.eliamep@gmail.com) and Dimitris Skleparis (skleparis@eliamep.gr)

You can read here the article on Greece and the European normalisation, which was written by Professor Emeritus and Member of the Board of Trustees of ELIAMEP Theodore Couloumbis. This commentary was published on 12 June 2016 in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini. It is available in Greek.

The new book of Loukas Tsoukalis: In Defense of Europe. Can the European project be saved? is published by Oxford University Press. Europe has not been so weak and divided for a long time. Buffeted by a succession of crises, it has shown a strong collective survival instinct but a poor capacity to deliver. Loukas Tsoukalis is critical of the way Europe has handled its multiple crises in recent years. He addresses the key issues and difficult choices facing Europe today.

In particular:

- Can Europe hold together? Under what terms? And for what purpose?

- A look at the key choices facing Europe today, by a leading political economist and former special adviser to the President of the European Commission

- Explains how the international financial crisis has become an existential crisis of European integration

- Asks whether Europe can ovecome the basic contradiction of a currency without a state

- Looks at how the European Union can accommodate greater internal diversity – and thereby hope to avoid a Brexit or a Grexit

- Examines whether there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Europe’s yearning for soft power and the hard realities of the world outside

Book Reviews

‘An inexorable analysis. An eye opener, a heart cry from a true European’ - Herman van Rompuy, former President of the European Council

‘A deeply insightful book that illuminates how only a combination of skill and passion can save Europe’ – Enrico Letta, former Prime Minister of Italy

‘The European project has traditionally been driven by the region’s political, business and technocratic elites, with ordinary people indifferent and often hostile to it, even as benficiaries. This clear-sighted, non-idelogical book shows how this has to change for the project to survive. Tsoukalis argues Europe needs a wide range of reforms that deepens integration in some areas, while allowing for greater differentiation and democratic decision-making in others. He eschews simple solutions and magic pills. It is the book’s great virtue that is clarifies both the scale of the problem and some of the ways forward’ – Dani Rodrik,  Harvard Kennedy School

‘This is an important and enlightening book in which one of the most knowledgeable scholars of European integration takes a hard look at what has has gone wrong over the last quarter century. Though deeply committed to the success of the European project, the author’s account of present European crises is characterized not only by an unflinching realism but also by the masterly integration of economic and political analyses – and by the perceptive reconstruction of the conflicting interests and (mis-) perceptions that explain German, British and Greek contributions to present policy failures. Remarkably, nevertheless, the book ends neither in a counsel of despair nor in idealistic precepts but in a series of pragmatic proposals whose usefulness is not obviously in conflict with political feasibility’ – Fritz W. Scharpf, Max Planck Institute

‘As ever thoughtful and thought-provoking, Loukas Tsoukalis prompts us to re-examine the fundamentals of contemporary European integration. His deep analysis is timely, nuanced and challenging’ - Dame Helen Wallace FBA, British Academy

You can find here more information on the book.

In the eyes of Greeks the meaning of Social Europe has changed over time, spanning the range from funds to promote social cohesion to externally enforced welfare state reforms in an austerity context. To the extent Greeks became familiar with Social Europe, they never took it to heart but would admit that they have periodically benefited from Social Europe’s tangible outlays, such as the European Structural Funds. Nowadays the Greek experience of a protracted economic crisis and a sudden refugee crisis can contribute towards rethinking Social Europe.

Welcome and unwelcome aspects of Social Europe

In pre-crisis Greece, Social Europe used to mean a welcome invitation to make Greece’s living standards converge with those of the rest of the EU. It also meant a less welcome push to introduce into Greece labour market and pension reforms, which would alter a patronage-based divide between insiders and outsiders.

European social policies, including active labor market policies and flexicurity, were alien in Greek society. Social Europe was not received well in a society in which many thought that they were entitled to a stable job and welfare benefits, dispensed by the state, by virtue of belonging to a group treated differently from other groups.

Examples of insider groups included civil servants, bank employees, journalists and the liberal professions. The majority of the rest were outsiders. An insider-outsider division has been the result of a particular historical legacy of state-society relations.

Social equity Greek style

Greeks hold complicated views on social equity. On the one hand they entertain egalitarian ideas as, in contrast to other European societies, there has never been an influential landed aristocracy in the Greece, while heavy industrialization was mostly absent from the country’s path to development.

On the other hand, Greeks often show more social solidarity with the narrow occupational group to which they belong rather than with the weaker social strata in general. While most Greeks reject any kind of social privilege, they simultaneously adhere to tailor-made, occupation-based privileges, such as rights to early retirement available to selected groups or preferential access to public sector jobs through political party patronage.

Social Europe after the crisis: from entitlement to austerity

After the crisis struck, the EU-imposed fiscal consolidation of the Greek economy led to the expansion of poverty, soaring unemployment and a deeper insider-outsider division between Greeks who have been relatively untouched by the crisis and their co-patriots who have been economically destroyed by it.

The economic crisis was very quickly transformed into a social crisis. Social Europe was flushed out of Greece along with the bathwater of relatively generous pensions, incommensurate to past insurance contributions, and wages standing higher than productivity levels.

Meanwhile, successive Greek governments fought to support their political clienteles by preventing substantive reforms in the aforementioned highly discriminatory welfare system, which pits insiders against outsiders. This is a fight that continues to this day. Thus, in crisis-ridden Greece, Social Europe has been associated, not so much with the rationalization of the welfare state, as with deep social spending cuts.

Rethinking Social Europe

However, as soon as the refugee crisis broke out in 2015 and hundreds of thousands of desperate people landed on Greek islands, Greeks rushed to offer help. Noticing the glaring absence of central state authorities, Greeks started pouring clothes, shoes, food and medicines on to incoming waves of refugees. Suddenly for Greeks, who during the crisis had taken Social Europe to mean indiscriminate austerity measures, being a European now meant sharing one’s own reduced resources with non-Europeans emerging from the sea.

Seeing a real humanitarian crisis from close by, Greeks have started putting Greek and European politics in perspective. In 2015 populist promises that other Europeans would rally around an anti-austerity Greek and South European vision to reshape Social Europe have evaporated. Pre-electoral claims that all that was necessary for Greeks to enjoy pre-crisis living conditions was to banish the EU-imposed austerity packages have contributed to the government turnover of 2015, but have soon proven futile. Almost every Greek has realized that a patronage-based system of welfare is normatively indefensible and financially unsustainable.

Distrust and dissatisfaction with the EU

But the fact that unfettered and one-size-fits-all austerity can rapidly lead an once relatively prosperous EU Member-State, such as Greece, to acute social crisis, has indicated how fragile Social Europe has become as well.

On this issue, the governing coalition of Syriza party with the right-wing Independent Greeks party, which has been in power since January 2015, believes that in the past Social Europe spelled the undermining, rather than the protection, of workers’ rights, for example, through introducing unacceptable flexibility in labour relations.

Finally, the coalition of Syriza would like to see more flexibility in the Stability and Growth Pact’s rules and the abandonment of Fiscal Compact, so as to allow national governments in Member States to follow expansionist economic policies. Simultaneously the radical left/right coalition distrusts the strengthening of decision-making powers of EU’core, including a stronger EU budget. Yet Syriza does call for an EU-wide increase in public investment.

Source: Clingendael

Author: Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos