Foreign Policy Blogs

Sultan Qaboos, who after 43 years in charge is the Arab world’s longest-serving leader (AFP)

Written by Shehab Al Makaleh

Since 2011, the Arab uprisings have engulfed much of the Middle East and North Africa, consuming the attention of publics and policymakers around the world. Indeed, while we pay close attention to the tragedies and (rare) triumphs that befall the region, perhaps we should be doing the opposite: looking to those nations left unscarred by revolution and upheaval.

What is it about their leadership and institutions that allowed them to survive and thrive? And what could potentially destabilize and upend these outliers?

The Gulf state of Oman, for one, has largely remained untouched by instability and, sadly, largely unnoticed by observers. Its stability is mainly attributable to the legitimacy and vision of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said, the longest serving Arab ruler still in power.

Since ascending to the throne in 1970, Sultan Qaboos has transformed Oman from an impoverished Bedouin land into a prosperous nation with first-class infrastructure, a booming tourism industry, and a military agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom.

However, this trend may quickly come crashing to a halt. Sultan Qaboos is advancing in age, has no children, and has not announced who the next heir to the throne will be. And the sultan will likely be blocked from selecting the next heir himself due to the complex nature of the Omani political system.

This potential vacuum of power may leave the small-but-significant country in a precarious position in an already-unstable region. Sitting on major trade routes from Asia to the Middle East, Oman is a veritable “marine silk road” of energy and goods—its disruption would send economic ripple effects across the continent. Its strategic positioning and domestic politics also make it a high-profile target for terrorist groups as they seek to expand influence.

In the 1990s, the Omanis discovered that their oil reserves were smaller than previously thought, which prompted officials in Muscat to accelerate plans for a transition to a post-oil economy. Oman’s proven reserves are 5.15 billion barrels of crude oil, far less than other Gulf Cooperation Council states such as Saudi Arabia’s 268 billion, Kuwait’s 104 billion, the United Arab Emirates’ 98 billion, or Qatar’s 25 billion.

By 1995, Oman decided to take on the challenges stemming from the nation’s more modest oil reserves and production rates when officials announced the Vision 2020. Oman was one of the first Gulf States to implement a robust long-term plan to diversify its economy.

Nevertheless, the 70% slide in oil prices since mid-2014 has truly underscored the risks of Muscat’s overreliance on the Omani petroleum sector. And on June 17, Oman raised $2.5 billion in a bond sale arranged by five international banks to help meet its budget deficit.

The next Sultan, regardless of who they may be, must continue driving national efforts to diversify Oman’s economy and create new job opportunities in both the state and private sectors. Though Oman’s population grows at less than 4% annually, which is amongst the lowest in the Arab region, a lack of job opportunities threatens to send Omani youth to the streets in protest or join extremist groups offering lucrative economic opportunities.

Extremist groups in Yemen, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (ISIS) as well as other radical groups, will likely threaten Oman’s security in the post-Qaboos era. The extremists of AQAP are less than 500 kilometers from Oman’s Salalah port. This strategically located port is home to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and connects the Middle East to key markets in Asia and Europe.

As a partner in trading and counter-terrorism, Oman has a cautious yet optimistic future with the United States. The Sultanate became the first Gulf Arab state to enter a formal defense relationship with Washington, signing a “facilities access agreement” in April 1980, which granted U.S. military forces access to the Sultanate’s military bases. From time to time, the U.S still accesses the Masirah Island as deemed necessary to support Muscat. Oman has also helped the Obama administration empty out the Guantanamo Bay detention facility by accepting about half of the inmates released since January 2014.

U.S. officials, however, should recognize the extent to which their counterparts in Muscat take pains to decrease the visibility of Oman’s military partnership with Washington. In terms of Muscat’s alliance with Western powers, Omani authorities must consider the risk of extremists portraying the Sultanate as a Western ‘puppet.’ The next Sultan must continue to strike a balance between allying itself with strong powers, yet maintaining its own autonomy. However, Oman has a key comparative advantage here: its national fabric is based on tolerance, dialogue, and nonviolence within the Omani community.

While there is much speculation over the next heir to Sultan Qaboos, potential successors must be ready to face a number of strategic trials. These challenges, in the hands of the wrong leader, threaten to unravel decades of progress and stability. But with a strong and capable successor at its helm, the country holds promise to remain a steady bulwark of security and prosperity in a fractured region.

Shehab Al Makaleh is the President of the prominent Jordanian think tank Geostrategic and Political Studies of the Middle East Media.

The post Whose Foot Will Drop in Oman? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

For the Islamic State (ISIS), old habits die hard. Improvised explosive devices, suicide vests, and car bombs—techniques and tactics that were the mainstay of the group’s forefathers, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—have once again become the order of the day.

The self-proclaimed caliphate, eager to shift the narrative away from territorial loses in Syria and Iraq, is beginning to fall back on a more traditional terrorism paradigm. The bombings being carried out across the region are a harbinger of things to come, and the machinations of ISIS’ global terrorist network are bearing fruit, as the group prepares for the day after Raqqa falls.

This shift in tactics, U.S. officials believe, signals ISIS may be abandoning the blitzkrieg-style territorial expansion that once garnered the group widespread notoriety; and, in its place, are focusing on building a terrorist network capable of orchestrating the sensational attacks that strike so much fear into the hearts and minds of Western governments.

On Monday, the latest example of ISIS’ tactical shift, erupted in a series of coordinated bombings in Syria and Yemen. The tactical and strategic sophistication of this operation, a combination of suicide and car bomb attacks, demonstrates a significant commitment of assets and resources, a high degree of command and control coordination, and a robust logistical infrastructure that stretches across multiple countries.

In Syria, ISIS orchestrated seven near simultaneous suicide and car bomb attacks targeting civilians in the coastal cities of Tartus and Jebleh. This region is considered an Assad regime stronghold—well-fortified and heavily guarded—with checkpoints and outposts along major roads and highways. The northwest coast also serves as a major staging ground for a large contingent of Russian military assets—Tartus is home to a Russian naval facility, and Jableh in Latakia province is near a Russian-operated air base.

ISIS’ ability to circumvent such robust security measures is a troubling sign for the Assad regime; especially when considering that up until these attacks, ISIS was not believed to be operating in the coastal provinces of Syria. The ability to build and sustain a terrorist network capable of orchestrating such a sophisticated operation, in the heart of Assad’s stronghold, is a feat that should not be easily dismissed.

The extraordinary nature of these attacks prompted some analysts to question whether ISIS was even responsible. The Assad regime, in a shameless attempt to gain political advantage, even tried blaming the leading rebel faction Ahrar al-Sham for the incident—ISIS publicly claimed responsibility for the attack.

A similar story unfolded in Yemen, where in the port city of Aden, the group deployed twin suicide bombers, targeting a gathering of Army recruits assembling to enlist. The recruits ISIS targeted were located in the Khormaskar district of the port city, which serves as a temporary headquarters for the Saudi-backed Yemeni government that is preparing to recapture Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, from Houthi militants.

The Hadi government is grappling with a fragile security situation, and while negotiations are underway in Kuwait to end the 14-month long war with Houthi rebels linked to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have been competing for territory and influence, as each try to one up the other in an alternating series of terrorist attacks.

A written statement released on social media accounts linked to ISIS, claimed responsibility for the attacks. The account stated that the bombings targeted “the apostate Yemeni army,”: similar to Syria, ISIS appears to have chosen its targets to achieve maximum political impact. Yemen, like Syria, is also home to rival AQAP, who ISIS is competing with for access to gradually diminishing terrorist real estate.

The emergence of an ISIS terror network capable of executing these types of attacks should serve as further evidence that the group is committing time and energy into the development and pursuit of tactics more reminiscent of the Sunni insurgency during the height of the Iraq War, than the territorial expansion that solidified the Islamic State’s hold on large swaths of Syria and Iraq.

The scope and nature of these attacks indicate ISIS is attempting to capitalize on the political instability across the region, exacerbating sectarian tensions, in the hopes of igniting a broader conflict between Sunni and Shi’a. Nowhere is this insidious agenda more pronounced than in Iraq. Over the last several months, ISIS operatives have conducted massive bombings—with targets ranging from soccer games to open markets—that have killed hundreds of Iraqi Shi’a.

This shift toward a traditional terrorism paradigm benefits ISIS’s asymmetrical disadvantage. With the host of regional and international military power being brought to bear against it, ISIS’ attempt to retain control over territory that stretches across two countries will become more difficult to sustain over the long term. ISIS flourished, due in large part, to comparatively weak and disorganized local governments, as well as a haphazard international response that became mired in a geopolitical tug-of-war—too busy to recognize the security vacuum emerging from the chaos of the Syrian conflict.

It’s difficult to fathom now, but there was a time when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s cavalcade of miscreant extremist did not hold sway in Raqqa, Mosul, or Fallujah. The remnants of al-Qaeda (AQ) were scattered and it seemed, at least for a time, that the operational cadres of AQ’s terrorist network were broken beyond repair. Now, however, AQ affiliated groups are once again on the rise. Buoyed by victories and substantial gains in Yemen and Syria, groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and AQAP are enjoying a renaissance of popularity.

For the time being, ISIS and AQ appear be at each other’s throats, vying for dominance and influence over the global jihadist agenda. But the idea of an alliance or merger between these two groups should not be discounted. Terrorism expert and Georgetown professor, Bruce Hoffman, recently explored just such scenario.

In a Foreign Affairs article, Hoffman writes, “Although admittedly improbable in the near term, such a rapprochement would make a lot of sense for both groups and would no doubt result in a threat that, according to a particularly knowledgeable U.S. intelligence analyst whom I queried about such a possibility, would be an absolute and unprecedented disaster for [the] USG and our allies.” Given fluidity of enemies and allies within extremist circles, the possibility that a beleaguered ISIS may find refugee with a group ideologically similar to its own is not impossible.

ISIS recognizes the writing on the wall, and while senior leadership continue to espouse fiery rhetoric, predicting great victories and the destruction its enemies, the group is now on the defensive—looking over the ramparts it can see the enemy at the gate. In Syria, The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces have begun its operation to retake ISIS’ capital, Raqqa, and preparations are well underway to retake Fallujah and Mosul in Iraq.

Of course, uprooting ISIS from its territorial stronghold will not, by any stretch of the imagination, signal the end of its ideological and operational contributions to the Salafi jihadist movement. They may soon find themselves without much territory to call its own, but the conflagration consuming the Middle East and the geopolitical ambitions of regional power brokers, like Iran and Saudi Arabia, guarantee a prolonged period of regional instability.

The Middle East is in the midst of the one of the worst periods of political strife in a century. If ISIS proves capable of adapting to the shifting sands of politics and power in the region, then its violent ambitions and apocalyptic vision will find fertile ground to take root and flourish among its adherents.

The post Amid Setbacks, ISIS Embraces Traditional Terrorism Paradigm appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Florence Fang interviewed by Chinese Communist Party media, 2015 (RedNet).

Prominent San Francisco businesswoman and former U.S. federal official Florence Fang’s activities on behalf of the Chinese government have been previously noted in this blog and elsewhere. Under her Chinese name, Fang Li Bangqin (方李邦琴), Florence Fang is the honorary president of the Northern California Association for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China, also known as Chinese for Peaceful Unification-Northern California.

Fang’s organization is just one of many overseas chapters of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification in Beijing, an “external propaganda” agency focused on asserting mainland Chinese control over Taiwan.

In comments to Chinese government media Fang has plainly expressed that her “mission” in the United States is to “put our ideas about peaceful reunification into mainstream American society” and to “prevent the spread of ‘Taiwan independence’ ideology.” At appearances with Chinese Communist Party officials Fang has called Taiwan a “fake democracy,” and in statements to Communist Party media she has expressed her undying patriotism for China despite living in the United States since 1960 and serving as a U.S. federal official under the George H.W. Bush administration.

Florence Fang with former President and First Lady Bush, from Chinese news website also noting Fang’s service on behalf of China’s “peaceful reunification,” 2015 (Sohu).

Her numerous appearances at the Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily and other Chinese government and state-run media websites include frequent meetings and photo-ops with high-level Communist Party officials, among whom she appears to be something of a celebrity. In these appearances her statements are virtually indistiguishable from those of the Chinese government. Her public profile at Chinese website Baike lists her not as a U.S. citizen, but as a citizen of China.

In addition to her “peaceful reunification” activities, Florence Fang’s efforts include educational exchange initiatives aimed at enhancing mainland Chinese influence in the United States. International educational exchange with countries including China is a worthy endeavor that should be encouraged, but Fang’s motives in doing so are highly suspect given the nature of her relationship with the Chinese government. In 2013, Fang launched the “100,000 Strong Foundation” to promote Mandarin language education in the United States and study in China for U.S. students.

Fang’s foundation was greeted enthusiastically by U.S. public figures including former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. As always, however, Fang’s statements on this initiative in Chinese media differ sharply from what has been presented to U.S. audiences (Should any of the sources cited in this article mysteriously disappear, archival web captures are available here).

In statements on her “100,000 Strong Foundation” to the Hubei Provincial Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese repeated in Chinese at her own Florence Fang Family Foundation website, Fang described “American ‘grassroots’ youth” as an impressionable “target group” of community members and voters whose ideas and opinions are not yet fully formed and would therefore potentially be open to ideological influence from their mainland Chinese peers while studying in China. Fang’s emphasis on American youth as a “target group” of voters clearly suggests a political motivation for her program.

Florence Fang meets with Chinese vice-premier Liu Yandong, 2014 (Xinhua).

Fang’s efforts on the “100,000 Strong” project have been in close consultation with Chinese vice-premier Liu Yandong, former Communist Youth League official and secretary of the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, with whom Fang has had extensive contact through the years. Liu is a noted member of what is known as the “Youth League Clique” associated with former president Hu Jintao. Liu’s role further suggests that these organizations would be involved in how U.S. students are channeled through the program and which Chinese students they would be grouped with (in all likelihood students handpicked for them from the Communist Youth League).

The United Front Work Department is a notorious propaganda agency under the direct authority of the Communist Party Central Committee, and is charged with asserting Communist Party “leadership” over non-Party groups at home and abroad. It is also an agency that is involved in almost everything that Florence Fang does on behalf of the Chinese government.

Florence Fang meets with Hunan Provincial United Front Work Department secretary Li Weiwei, 2014 (Hunan United Front Work Department, Central United Front Work Department).

The October 2013 inauguration of a language institute at Beijing University to host U.S. students funded by Fang included prominent appearances by officials from the United Front Work Department, the People’s Liberation Army, and the Confucius Institute in addition to Fang herself. The Confucius Institute is a noted part of Beijing’s “overseas propaganda” apparatus, and its presence on Western university campuses has been described as “academic malware” and as an educational “Trojan horse” due to its overtly propagandist character.

Also in attendance at Fang’s Beijing University event were officials from the State Council Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, another agency of the Chinese government’s external propaganda system. Its main purpose is to co-opt and exploit ethnic Chinese communities abroad (which it views as “overseas Chinese” rather than as citizens of the countries in which they live) for use as instruments of mainland Chinese foreign policy. Like the United Front Front Work department, this is an agency that figures prominently in Florence Fang’s dealings with the Chinese government.

Florence Fang meets with State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office deputy director Tan Tianxing, 2013 (State Organs Work Committee of the Communist Party of China).

Comments by Fang to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office on her “100,000 Strong” project express a thinly-veiled political purpose in line with China’s “public diplomacy” goal of “bringing foreigners to understand and accept China’s core values,” which of course include its national obsession with gaining control of Taiwan regardless of the wishes of Taiwan’s own citizens (most of whom in every public opinion survey are clearly opposed to reunification with mainland China for obvious reasons).

The involvement of these agencies in Florence Fang’s “100,000 Strong Foundation” makes it as questionable as any of her other activities in relation to China. In the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, there is no such thing as education or cultural exchange for its own sake: everything is political, everything is ideological, and everything must be made to serve the Party and the Chinese state. The “100,000 Strong Foundation” appears to be no exception.

The U.S. government might wish to choose its federal officials and educational “goodwill ambassadors” with greater care. U.S. students contemplating study in China might wish to choose a program that does not view them as a political “target group” for the Communist Youth League, the United Front Work Department, and the Confucius Institute.

The post Florence Fang’s “100,000 Strong Foundation”: Education or Indoctrination? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By Matthew Barbari

With Ban Ki-Moon’s term as Secretary-General (SG) ending this year, many candidates have been put forward to replace him. Due to the tradition of rotating the region from which the SG is selected, this year the spotlight has been placed on Eastern Europe. There are also calls for a woman SG—the first since the organization’s creation in 1945.

As stated by UN General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft, this election will be the most transparent to date. In the past, the election process was conducted behind closed doors and under the watchful eyes of the UN Security Council. While this election has already had public nominations as well as informal discussions between the General Assembly and each of the candidates, it is still ultimately the responsibility of the Security Council to select the SG.

Irina Bokova of Bulgaria is a popular choice to replace Ban Ki-Moon as she fills three essential requirements: she is from the region whose “turn” it is to hold the position, she has experience working in the system—going into her sixth year as the Director-General of UNESCO—and is one of the leading women in the UN. She is also the most favored candidate by Russia, who holds sway due to its veto power in the Security Council.

The prime minister of Moldova, Natalia Gherman, is also a popular candidate as she is both a woman and from Eastern Europe. However, her inexperience within the UN makes her bid less likely, despite the support she receives from Western countries such as the UK and U.S.

While Vuk Jeremic would continue the trend of having a man at the organization’s highest office, he does have years of relevant experience working as the President of the UN General Assembly and as Serbia’s minister of foreign affairs.

Many General Assembly members have voiced their dissatisfaction toward the current crop of Eastern European nominees. As a result, this has led to growing support for two candidates from outside the region, claiming that geography should not play a role in the selection process—especially if it leads to a subpar candidate.

Helen Clark, the current Administrator for the United Nations Development Programme and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, is a name that has been floated around. She has strong connections to the U.S. and UK, as well as China. In addition, she has years of experience at the UN, with many seeing her as a more qualified leader than other candidates.

Another “outside candidate” is Antonio Guterres who served as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and is a former Prime Minister of Portugal. Guterres has an impressive resume, and is the most well equipped candidate to face the current refugee crises, which are a main concern for Europe and the Middle East.

The major roadblock to him or Clark is the UN tradition of selecting an SG from a certain region, as well as a possible veto from Russia, which wants to see an SG that is amenable to its interests. While Moscow has publically stated that it would not veto a candidate selection solely on the geographical criteria, this strategy was previously employed by Beijing, helping Ban Ki-Moon back in 2007, when China threatened to veto any candidate who was not from Asia. The Security Council is expected to select its nominee in July with the election in the General Assembly happening in September.

Recommended Readings

Somini Sengupta, “At U.N., Ambassadors Hold Auditions for Next Secretary General,” The New York Times (Apr. 15, 2016).

Reid Standish, “Will the Next U.N. Secretary-General Be From Eastern Europe?” Foreign Policy (Apr. 29, 2016).

“Selecting a new UN Secretary-General: a job interview in front of the whole world,” UN News Centre (Apr. 8, 2016).

The post The UN Post-2015: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President Obama holding a town-hall-style meeting in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, on Wednesday. (Credit Doug Mills/The New York Times)

The recent U.S. decision to fully lift its arms embargo against Vietnam is a victory for both countries as they seek to balance China in the region. However, the U.S. must also realize that the decision will be measured against already-strong Russian-Vietnamese strategic and defense ties. Therefore, the embargo decision is a maneuver to not only counter Chinese influence in the area, but Russian power as well.

Embargo Lift Strengthens Re-Balance

As the U.S. continues its “re-balancing” efforts to counter China in Asia, it has strengthened military ties with allies in the region, most notably Japan and the Philippines. However, the U.S. has also realized that in order to maximize its impact, it needs to reach beyond formal treaty allies. Even though some of these states may not have had the best relations with the U.S. in the past, they now realize that increased U.S. ties are in their own long-term self-interest if they desire to balance China as well.

India is currently being wooed by the U.S.—Defense Secretary Ashton Carter’s recently visited the country to shore up defense ties. Vietnam also falls in the camp of non-allied states currently being courted by the U.S. Unlike with India, the legacy of the Vietnam War still runs deep in many quarters within Washington. However, despite past and current concerns with respect to Vietnam’s human rights policies, it would seem that realism based on mutual interests eventually prevailed and resulted in the decision to lift the embargo.

Even more crucially, the U.S. must realize that it is not the only one of several regional powers vying for Vietnam’s affections. Japan and India have both increased their own outreach efforts to Vietnam in order to balance Chinese influence.  They have done this both from a military perspective as well as an economic one, as Vietnam has several blocks of offshore oil in need of investment and development. The U.S., at this point, finds no fault in these efforts as they complement its own “re-balance”.

Russian Rivalry and Economic Factors

Russia, however, may prove to be a formidable obstacle to the U.S.’ charm offensive. Because of the Soviet Union’s support of North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, Russian-Vietnamese strategic ties are still quite abundant. Vietnam also plays a role in Russia’s “Asian pivot” as it seeks to both reduce its dependence on Western economic ties post-Ukraine and to simultaneously balance China itself, its erstwhile strategic partner, in Asia. Strong ties to Vietnam serve to actually put teeth behind Russian rhetoric of diversifying its Asian strategic portfolio beyond China.

Even though these strong ties have led to many past Vietnamese purchases of Russian armaments such as ships and aircraft, all parties must realize that Vietnam is not going to be exclusively in any one’s camp, save its own, for the foreseeable future. Vietnam, similar to India, realizes that the best way to maintain strategic autonomy is to pursue a truly multi-vectored foreign policy strategy.

If strengthened ties with the U.S. improves its own position based on its own interests, those ties will indeed be pursued. The same is true with respect to Russia, India, and Japan. Simply put, all of these powers must realize that they will always be only suitors and any feelings of actually consummating something more substantial will remain exactly that, a feeling.

The real front on which both the U.S. and Russia must compete for Vietnamese attention, however, is the economic one. This stems from the realization that it is China’s economic power, symbolized by its leading trading partner status with most southeast Asian states, which serves as the foundation for its growing military and diplomatic power. Chinese South China Sea maneuvers and the formation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) symbolize these, respectively. This realization was also behind the recent ASEAN leaders’ summit held in Sunnylands, California, the first ever hosted by the U.S.

Not to be outdone, Russia recently hosted its own ASEAN summit, held in Sochi. This summit, similar to Sunnylands, promoted increased economic and technological ties with southeast Asian states as the foundation for further strengthened political ties.  The case may be made that the Russian economic presence in ASEAN, apart from Vietnam, is scant. In the past, this has been due to the relatively low importance assigned to southeast Asia within Russian foreign policy objectives due to the region’s remoteness, as well as previous ASEAN skepticism with respect to Russia’s minimal economic footprint within the region.

On the economic front, the U.S. would appear to be in the lead in the race against Russia, given Vietnam’s accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). However, it can ill-afford to rest on its laurels as one of the Russian proposals highlighted at Sochi was to gradually integrate ASEAN economically with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Because of all these factors, the U.S. must always keep in mind that its Vietnamese courtship will inevitably go against Russian strategic machinations in Vietnam, as well as both Russian and Chinese economic endeavors in the region as a whole.

The post U.S. Must Still Compete with Russia for Vietnam’s Affections appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi’s convoy tours the front line in the Samarra desert, Iraq, earlier this month. (Associated Press)

Written by Miles Kopley

Since it was wrestled away from Iraqi forces in a startling June 2014 offensive, the ancient city of Mosul has been crucial for the Islamic State. It remains the largest city held by the group in Iraq, even as other cities such as Tikrit and Ramadi have been liberated by the Iraqi Army, backed by coalition forces. In recent months, Mosul has become increasingly vital to the military presence and economic viability of the group in the region. A lone defensive bastion in the Nineveh Governorate amidst a series of ISIS military losses, Mosul suffers from meager supply lines and the city’s crumbling infrastructure.

Although it’s a tall order, one that has already proven to be a challenge for an anti-ISIS coalition skeptical of itself, the retaking of Mosul would spell the beginning of the end for the Islamic State presence in Iraq. The defensive and economic benefits of capturing Mosul have been apparent since the Islamic State first began operations against Iraqi troops in 2014.

Shortly after taking the city, ISIS looted approximately $480 million in banknotes from financial institutions, providing an important funding boost to the expanding organization. It established extensive convoy routes spanning from the city to its self-proclaimed capital of Raqqa in Syria, providing economic and military relief to the insurgents and remaining civilians. It maintain Mosul’s local oil industry, pumping it from nearby wells and shipping it to destinations all over the region. The roughly half-million citizens who remained within the city faced increased taxes on agricultural land and additional duties on imports.

The defensive capabilities Mosul offers to the surrounding territory compounds the economic assets the city grants the Islamic State. Indeed, the Islamic State has extensive forward positions nestled in villages, valleys, and open fields surrounding the city, a system of fortifications that gives it added strength in holding the city.

In the past few months, however, the accomplishments of the Islamic State in Mosul have been largely dashed by coalition efforts. Oil revenue across the Islamic State has been halved by airstrikes targeting critical infrastructure. Mosul’s main supply route to Raqqa was severed last November, putting increased pressure on the city’s residents and forcing them to face frequent fuel shortages and electricity blackouts. Banks were extensively bombed in January, resulting in monetary losses ranging into the millions. The group has already lost approximately 45 percent of its territory in Iraq since the height of its power, and Mosul seems to be the next target in line for coalition efforts.

The Iraqi Army captures Mahana village just 60 kilometers from ISIS-held Mosul.

Yet, while coalition airstrikes have made significant headway, forces on the ground have had mixed results. Currently, the United States only has two hundred Special Forces troops dedicated to the ground offensive in Mosul, leaving most of the large-scale operations to the Iraqi Army.

Skirmishes between Peshmerga and Iraqi Sh’ia forces threaten the alliance they have built against the Islamic State, and complicated their plans to advance on the city. Splintering of troops along ethnic and communal lines has also led to miscommunication and mistrust among individual units, further damaging relationships. The Iraqi Army has also stated that it would need a force five to six times their current size in order to mount an effective attack on the Islamic State.

If the Iraqi Army and coalition forces are capable of freeing the city, however, a drastic chain of events could follow. Virtually all of Iraq’s oil fields are located in the Nineveh Governorate, where Mosul lies. If lost, the few convoy routes the group has would be severed, impacting the oil trade within the group’s territory and on the black market, and permanently reducing their financing capabilities. Losing the city would also mean the loss of the largest defendable position in the region, as well as any military support it could offer to combatants on other front lines.

With so much at stake for the Islamic State in Mosul, there has never been a better time—or chance—for coalition forces wrestle it back. Taking back Mosul would mean the recovery of one of the country’s largest economic centers: a key victory for Iraq and coalition forces and a disastrous defeat for the Islamic State.

The post The Fall of ISIS Begins with Mosul appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Following the disappearance of three shareholders and two staff members from a bookstore in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, Swedish diplomacy has unwillingly been drawn into the international spotlight. One of the missing bookseller’s, Gui Minhai, was given Swedish citizenship in 1996 after studying in Sweden in the 1980s. Despite Gui having requested in a video posted by China’s official media that Sweden did not intervene in the affair, the Swedish government could not ignore the incident because of diplomatic protocol.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry has also made clear that it does not accept China’s response to the situation. A consular official from the Swedish Embassy has voiced its government’s annoyance at having a request for contact with Gui turned down. The embassy has also repeatedly asked for clarification from China over the incident.

Ironically, Sweden is perceived as being one of China’s closest allies in the West. During the Cold War, Sweden was one of only a few countries that maintained a workable relationship with China; the positive tie between the two countries was probably one reasons why Gui went to Sweden to study. Although Sweden was once a European hegemonic power, it has adopted a policy of neutrality since its influence has declined.

In 1950, diplomatic relations between Sweden and China were officially established and ambassadors were exchanged. This marked Sweden as the first Western state to establish diplomatic relations with communist China. Sweden also supported the admission of China to the UN, and bilateral trading and economic relations between the two countries were built before those with any other Western country.

Today, Sweden is China’s biggest trading partner in Northern Europe, while in turn China is the biggest export market for Sweden. Recently, Sweden has strengthened its cooperation with China in the field of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). As IKEA has become an international paradigm in terms of its contribution to CSR, it has also become the role model for China’s “Opening-up Policy” and “One Belt One Road” initiative.

Another characteristic of Swedish diplomacy is its “human rights diplomacy*.” As a member of the European Union and the home of the Nobel Prize, Sweden uses “the protection of human rights” as part of its “soft power diplomacy.” It has proactively criticized human rights violations by other countries, for example, the US’ bombing of Vietnam and the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the USSR. Sweden has also been the main fund provider for the UN Human Rights Council, Refugee Council and others.

As a consequence, Sweden is seen as an appropriate location for NGOs involved in international human rights and civil society to establish themselves. More recently, the EU has included “human rights” as an important value in promoting its own external relations, and in doing so, mirrors Sweden’s strategy of “human rights diplomacy”.

There are precedents for Sweden jeopardizing its economic interests in order to safeguard its “human rights diplomacy”. For example, in 2015, Saudi Arabia cancelled the opening address at an Arab League meeting in Cairo which was to have been given by the Swedish minister of foreign affairs; it was irritated because the speech contained comments about women’s and human rights. The minister in question had earlier criticized Saudi Arabia’s lashing and jailing of a blogger for “insulting Islam”.

When Saudi Arabia cancelled the speech, Sweden immediately terminating its defense-related trade agreement with the country, which included a USD500-million-worth contract for weapons. In response, Saudi Arabia withdrew its ambassador in Sweden and criticized Sweden for interfering in its internal affairs. The tension between the two countries escalated. At the same time, the relationship between Europe and Saudi Arabia also deteriorated. However, certain EU member states, including Germany and the UK, have shown an unwillingness to go so far as sacrificing their economic interests to promote values. Sweden, on the other hand, has been able to uphold its value of human rights and earn the respect of human rights advocates.

The incident with Saudi Arabia has further links with Sweden’s foreign policy. On being appointed minister of foreign affairs, Margot Wallström announced she planned to pursue a feminist and human-rights foreign policy with an emphasis on equality. As such, Sweden recognizes Palestine as a nation and supports the state-building movement in Western Sahara, which is under pressure. Recently, Morocco (which controls the area) blocked the opening of the first IKEA store in the kingdom. A number of Swedish enterprises have since jointly urged the Swedish government to maintain an equable relationship with Saudi Arabia in order not to affect their business. This pressure has not triggered significant response domestically.

However, the Causeway Bay Bookstore saga present a different scenario as Sweden has to deal with a rising China. Beijing has posed a serious challenge to Sweden’s “human rights diplomacy.” If China provides Sweden with some room for maneuver, it is likely the issue can be solved in a restrained manner. But if it continues its present assertiveness without providing a way out for Sweden, it risks to jeopardize the long-advocated working relationship between China and Sweden.

*Human Rights Diplomacy: This recent model in Western diplomacy bears the official aim of “promoting and safeguarding human rights.” It is often used to adjust bilateral relations and economic policy in accordance with the level of human rights in the state concerned. Some states targeted in human rights diplomacy view it as a means for other nations to interfere in their internal affairs. They believe the situation in each country is different and the concept of Western human rights may not be applicable everywhere. In general, China opposes “human rights diplomacy.”

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Social media can do a lot of good for a brand’s image. It can be a place where an audience comes together to share their love of a brand, posting pictures and stories to engage with it.

It can also rip a brand to pieces: remember #AskSeaWorld. Sea World fell under public scrutiny for their treatment of orcas, due to the success of the film Blackfish. They invited the public to ask questions online using the hashtag #AskSeaWorld. Of course, they were hoping for real questions from concerned citizens.

But they forgot that they were opening up their Q&A to the world and disaster ensued. Rather than changing the conversation—their intended goal—they highlighted it and gave people a launchpad from which to collectively criticize Sea World. In fact, though the hashtag was first introduced more than a year ago, it is still in active use on Twitter today.

Another great (cautionary) example of trying to use a hashtag to reframe a narrative comes from the NYPD. During a particularly difficult time for their “brand” due to violence in the community, they invited the internet to come together and share nice stories about the NYPD using the hashtag #MyNYPD. What happened was as intense as it was predictable.

Israel—a country whose very mention can start fights on college campuses and at family dinners—decided that this was a model worth emulating. To celebrate Israeli Independence Day, Prime Minister Netanyahu hosted a Twitter conversation inviting people to ask him questions about Israel using the hashtag #AskNetanyahu. Unsurprisingly, chaos ensued.

Netanyahu tweeted from his personal handle @netanyahu and was also backed up by the more official channel @IsraeliPM. He responded to questions with text and short videos, both in English and in Hebrew. Some of the interactions were positive:

• He was asked if the dress was blue and white or black and gold. “The colors of the dress were clearly blue and white. Like my pen. Like my suit. Like our flag.”
• When asked if he was “human,” @IsraeliPM responded “01111001 01100101 01110011.”
• When asked if he would fire the person responsible for the hashtag, he responded, “Nope. Actually, I’m going to give… her a treat. You want to see her?” He then panned the camera down to show his very sweet dog sitting quietly at his side.

But of course, for every positive questioner, there were 1000 more looking to insult, provoke and ask truly difficult policy questions, ranging from Israel’s treatment of Holocaust survivors to their conflict with the Palestinians. If you search Twitter right now for the hashtag, here are the top images you will find:

Even though the Q&A component of the hashtag started—and ended—over a week ago, people are still using the hashtag to attack Netanyahu personally and Israeli policy towards the Palestinians in general. The campaign, rather than starting a positive conversation, instead served as an online space for critics. The movement was already there, and this campaign simply provided them with a gathering place.

The most retweeted instance of the hashtag, including any tweet sent by @Netanyahu or @IsraeliPM (save for the 01111001… tweet), was actually a bit of an ambush. Netanyahu received this question:

He saw the tweet, gauged that it was a real question from a real person (a journalist in fact!) and responded accordingly:

Hasan then responded:

Hasan’s response garnered over 500 retweets. What it did not garner: a response from Netanyahu. Therein lies one of the challenges of taking questions so publicly. A “real” or “fair” question can quickly turn into something the brand, organization, business or—in this case—world leader may not be prepared to answer. To me, this single interaction was more problematic for Netanyahu than any other component of the whole mess. He started a conversation that he was not prepared to finish. This made him look weak.

A town hall is a hard thing to manage. You never know what kind of questions you are going to get and once it starts, you are trapped. You cannot end it early because things are not going your way. Hosting a town hall on Twitter is like handing infinite microphones to an infinite crowd and then inviting them to pelt you with them as hard as they can.A quick search of keywords associated with the hashtag reveals the myriad hazards that overshadowed any potential political gain.

And yet it happened. And really, it’s still happening. While you probably won’t get an answer from him anytime soon, feel free to head over to Twitter and #AskNetanyahu any pressing questions you might have for him. You won’t be alone. Here is the current usage of #AskNetanyahu on Twitter.

Fun post script to the campaign: it even earned itself its very own parody handle! The fake @Ask_Netanyahu has over 3000 real followers. And it shares with its audience such nuggets as “I don’t believe in God, but God gave me the land,” “Had a long day reviewing records of newborns from Gaza’s Al-Shifa Hospital. I need to update my #KillList” and “I’ve initiated strategic long term planning consultations with George Zimmerman’s life coach.“

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The post With #AskNetanyahu, Bibi Asks for Trouble appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Henri Ladyi works to demobilize children from militias in the DRC.

In 2003, Henri Ladyi turned his back on the endless fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) when he started working at a small peace group called Centre Résolution Conflits. Twelve years later he has been called “Africa’s Schindler” for his efforts towards peacebuilding in the eastern DRC.

The vast Democratic Republic of Congo has seen many decades of suffering before and after independence from Belgium in 1960. The colony was originally a private fiefdom of Belgium’s King Leopold II. But Belgium had to take it over in 1908 from the king’s International Association of the Congo (IAC) after a public outcry. This private company had, not unlike the militias that plague the east of Congo today, achieved Leopold’s quotas on exports like rubber through a regime of forced labour, mass executions, torture and mutilation.

Belgium administered the region as a colony, but did little to develop it or create a type of civic national identity of the sort which has kept the peace in multi-ethnic countries like the United States or Great Britain. When independence came the Congo’s new politicians unsurprisingly failed to build a functional central government or control the new ‘Armée Nationale Congolaise’ (ANC). General Joseph Mobutu, who had risen through the ranks of the ANC, eventually seized power. His regime became a Western-backed kleptocracy for the duration of the Cold War. Its three decade rule, and the manner of the Mobutu’s final fall in 1997, were almost as ruinous for the DRC as Leopold II.

When conflict reached his area in 1997, Henri Bora Ladyi was a young man in the Ituri area of the DRC’s north-eastern Orientale province. The invasion had started the year before, as Mobutu’s meddling in neighboring Rwanda finally caught up with him. A full-scale rebellion against his dictatorship had begun during 1996 in the eastern border provinces of North and South Kivu. In concert with the armies of neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, rebel units swept westwards as Mobutu’s renamed Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) and his regime more or less dissolved.

For years the DRC’s state apparatus had been gradually ceasing to function in more and more parts of the country as the regime’s mixture of waste, incompetence and corruption undermined the formal economy. But the fall of the central government completed the country’s ruin. It set off a scramble by neighboring governments and their local allies to seize control of the DRC’s vast mineral wealth in an orgy of looting.

In the first 1996-1997 war Ituri was on the invasion path of the Ugandan army and its allies. But it also suffered from the same type of ethnic hatreds that had caused so much inter-Congolese violence, and left the fractured country prey to its neighbors. Under Mobutu, the north-eastern region had seen major outbreaks of violence between Ituri’s Lendu and Hema ethnic groups in 1972, 1985 and 1996. These earlier struggles revolved around the historically unequal land distribution between the two communities dating back to pre-Belgian times and favoring the Hema.

A politicized Mobutu-era land law passed in 1973 was also a recurring source of conflict. Under its provisions, people could purchase already-inhabited property, and then present title to the land in court two years later, by which time it became incontestable. The Lendu alleged the Hema elite used it to drive Lendus off valuable land, with the help of complicit Hema officials and forged documents. Certainly many Hema leaders thrived economically in the DRC’s chaotic economic conditions, and in the late 1990s some used their greater wealth and clout to further marginalize and exploit the Lendu.

Thus in 1998, when a second regional war began on the heels of the first, the Ituri area was still occupied by the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF). The UPDF wished to exploit Ituri’s resources of gold, diamonds, coltan, timber, and coffee. Human Rights Watch has chronicled how it used its control of the region to illegally export resources, especially gold, to international buyers. The money gained was then used to support local Hema warlords who helped in the Ugandan operation.

Elite Hema landowners, in their efforts to drive the Lendu off land they considered theirs, also called upon members of the Ugandan army to help them. Those Lendu not run off were often forced to work in the majority Ugandan-controlled mines under threat of violence. This state of affairs inevitably produced a negative reaction in response to the actions of Hema and Ugandan forces. The Lendu quickly formed their own militant groups to fight back and violence rose sharply by 1999.

Henri described the pressure put on him at the time to choose sides in vivid terms. When the Ugandans arrived in Ituri he was running a telecoms bureau in the provincial capital of Bunia, telling the BBC in Kinshasa what was happening in this eastern part of the Congo. Members of the local community would often come and use his satellite phone or other office equipment and he had a talent for making useful connections.

But the bureau itself also made him a target for Hema militants, who suspected him of passing on information about their operations to his Lendu compatriots. Henri was tortured several times by the militiamen, once having metal batons interwoven between his fingers and having his hands crushed. Even when he managed to talk his way out, his own people treated him as a potential traitor, shooting up his office and ransacking his home as warnings.

As events deteriorated his Lendu community demanded protection from its young men. Henri remembers members of his family joined Lendu militia groups and several of his relatives were killed in the violence. Political shifts meant Bunia changed hands several times, and at one point during the struggle Henri found himself press ganged into joining the ranks of the temporarily victorious Lendu militants in order to prove his loyalties.

He talked his way into job as a technician which kept him away from the frontlines, but by the spring of 2003 the tides of war had changed again. This time it was Hema fighters who were advancing on the city and they were looking for revenge. Even Henri could not talk his way out of this kind of trouble. Instead when Hema soldiers came searching to kill him, he had to flee into the bush with his young family.

Henri fled with 5,000 other refugees through the jungle towards the safety of Beni in neighboring North Kivu province. It was a week-long two hundred kilometers trek on foot and he was in an angry mood, with plans to buy weapons in the city and run them back to his brothers in Ituri to continue the struggle. But along the way an incident happened which was to change the course of Henri’s life.

At a village called Gety, militiamen held up the refugees, paranoid about traitors hidden inside their ranks. A massacre loomed over the mass of displaced people trapped there as the militants debated their fate amongst themselves. A natural leader, Henri asked to speak to their leader, despite being threatened with a machete to keep quiet. He knew already he was persuasive; unasked he took a dangerous gamble and negotiated with the militia commander for the refugees’ lives and freedom.

“As the eldest child there is no one do things for you.” Henri says with a laugh. “You learn to be the responsible one when you are very young.”

After a night of bargaining Henri got his way; the commander agreed to let the displaced civilians go. It was the start of a new direction in his life. When he arrived in Beni, instead of continuing with his plans to become a gun-runner, Henri got to hear of a church based peace group that was working with displaced people. The Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) organization had also had to relocate twice because of the war, but was continuing to hold peace rallies and invite its congregations out to learn how they could promote peace in the region. Henri joined it, and by 2004 he had become risen to become the CRC’s director. Eleven years later and he has never looked back.

CRC’s work has lead Henri into all sorts of situations as it has developed down the years. The group retain a reputation as effective mediators, a mixed blessing in a dangerous part of a country filled with guns. In one case they were asked to negotiate between the UN and a rebel militant group holding a village hostage. The UN was threatening to storm the settlement, while the militants believed themselves possessed by spirits that made them immune to physical harm. Eventually the CRC were able to resolve the situation by negotiating safe passage for the fighters out of the village.

In another instance Henri was contacted by militia commanders with too many mouths to feed. Wishing to barter for supplies they offered to demobilize some of the child soldiers in their ranks in return for goats. A bizarre exchange rate of goats for children had to be worked out; undeterred Henri went into the bush to negotiate and a ratio of ten animals for 40 children was agreed. With the help of UK charity Peace Direct, one of CRC’s international partners, enough goats to free 100 child soldiers were sent.

As the CRC has persuaded fighters to demobilize, or let children and teenagers leave the bush to return home, its operations have had to change to cope. The CRC has faced the task of reintegrating these fighters into communities filled with their former victims and often it is no longer a just a case of overcoming interethnic hatreds. Over time many militia groups degenerated into fronts for banditry or just formed to terrorize their own areas into handing over food and other supplies.

Many ex-fighters, adults, children and youths, are psychologically scarred by the terrible things they have seen and done, and afraid of communal rejection as well as revenge attacks. Faced by a lack of support and economic alternatives in one of the world’s poorest countries, they can easily be seduced back into armed groups.

Still based in North Kivu, Henri and the CRC have piloted a number of projects designed to mitigate these problems as much as they can. As well as disarming ex-combatants and returning them home, they try to give each a skill that can make them employable. Special efforts are made to prepare communities for the return of ex-fighters, so they are not rejected out of hand. Child soldiers are returned to their families or placed with special trained foster parents and then returned to school or given a livelihood.

Similarly for women who have suffered rape or sexual assault at the hands of the various combatants, they provide trauma counseling and micro-finance to set up small businesses. The organization also run community radio stations in more than 70 places, supporting interactive clubs which broadcast discussions by the community members about local issues, including the dangers of joining militia groups.

It has been twelve years since the end of the formal end of the war that set Henri on this path and he recently celebrated another anniversary with CRC. Although his work may never quite end, the legacy as a peace-builder he leaves behind him will be a proud one.

This article first appeared in H Edition magazine and is re-published here with kind permission.

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About two months before the NATO Summit in Warsaw, many wonder what the new strategy of the alliance in relation to Russia will look like.

Speaking at GLOBSEC 2016, a security conference in Bratislava held in mid-April, Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski emphasized that Poland expected “presence, presence, presence” of NATO troops and bases on the Eastern flank. Other Allies, including the United States and Germany, do not deem it necessary to build new NATO infrastructure. As Jim Townsend, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy, put it, “we support an enhanced presence, but we can do it without bases, bases, bases.” The current debate thus centers on the question how heavy the new NATO footprint on the Eastern flank should be.

Yet, while arguing about the differences between a persistent or permanent presence or what German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen called a “permanent rotational presence,” the Allies risk losing sight of the bigger strategic picture. The best outcome of the Warsaw Summit would be a clearly articulated common position of the Alliance that is well understood both by Russia and at home.

NATO can build on its previous efforts here. After all, reports on the disagreements among the Allies obscure the fact that NATO has been remarkably united in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea and Russia’s continued interference in Ukraine.

On the one hand, the Alliance has embarked on the “biggest strengthening of our collective defense in decades”, as Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg underlined at the Munich Security Conference in 2016. In addition to the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and an increase in exercises as decided at the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allies have agreed to strengthen NATO’s forward presence on the eastern flank. Even member states such as Germany, often criticized as overly reluctant, have demonstrated their clear commitment to a renewed emphasis on collective defense.

On the other hand, NATO members have recently tried to reinvigorate the NATO-Russia Council and underlined that they are open to dialogue with Moscow. All members, including those long accused of blocking engagement with Russia, have finally supported this decision. NATO member states should strengthen both aspects of this renewed dual-track policy—responding to the security needs of its most exposed members, while at the same time advocating dialogue and heightened transparency to diffuse tension in their relations with Russia.

The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, only a more visible presence will make a renewed emphasis on dialogue meaningful, signaling to Russia that NATO will not be intimidated by Moscow. And only a clear commitment to dialogue will allow all Allies to back a stronger defensive posture.

First, demonstrating that attacking one of NATO’s frontline states means an assault on all of NATO requires a multinational presence that goes significantly beyond the decisions taken at the Wales Summit. The Russian government needs to understand that it will not reach its goals by threatening its neighbors and testing NATO’s resolve. Although U.S. efforts to support the Eastern flank are crucial, it would be advisable to integrate it as much as possible under a NATO umbrella. This would not only signal the united stance of NATO, but would also be seen as less threatening by Moscow.

Moreover, the respective host countries should be supported in strengthening their own armed forces. While it makes sense that other Allies police the Baltic air space, they can expect the member states that feel particularly threatened to invest more in their own defensive capabilities, including necessary infrastructure such as airfields that multinational reinforcements would require. Among the Allies on the Eastern flank, only Estonia and Poland fulfill the NATO commitment to spend two percent of their GDP on defense.

Second, a more visible NATO presence necessitates new diplomatic efforts. Although the Alliance sees its moves as entirely defensive, Moscow will still read them as offensive and use them as a pretext for its own “counter measures” that in reality have often been long in the making. NATO should continue to propose new transparency mechanisms. It should also avoid being seen as the party rejecting dialogue, thus serving as an easy target for Russian propaganda. Even if it will not bring immediate results the reinvigoration of the NATO-Russia Council was thus an important message in itself.

NATO must also get better at getting its message across. Above all, this means that national leaders have to be more vocal and stress the differences between Russian and NATO policies. All information fact-sheets published by the NATO bureaucracy will not suffice if national politicians do not actively make the case for the new posture. In some member states, governments try to avoid a public debate on the revamped efforts, portraying them as minor adaptations.

This allows for misinformation and misinterpretations. Media reports sometimes claim that the NATO-Russia Founding Act generally rules out the stationing of troops in NATO’s “new” member states although the wording tells a different story. Few even mention that NATO publishes all its exercises on its website and invites Russian observers.

Russia, in contrast, regularly surprises NATO with snap exercises and ignores proposals to heighten transparency although numerous close encounters between the Russian military and Western military units or even civilian airliners have highlighted the danger of escalation. And while NATO members discuss the deployment of a few battalions, Russia has already announced that three new divisions will be created in its Western military district. For every NATO soldier on the Eastern flank, there will be roughly five to ten new Russian troops. This is hardly an escalation by NATO.

By avoiding public debate to explain and defend NATO’s new posture, national leaders endanger the long-term stability of the Alliance. Some opinion polls already show that the public support for the collective defense commitment is fragile. This is dangerous because deterrence only works if it is credible. But domestic support for deterrence will only be secured if the Alliance convincingly demonstrates that it is not interested in confrontation. It thus needs to offer dialogue, propose additional arms control steps, and think about a long-term perspective for NATO-Russia relations.

In the end, the question of what exactly the enhanced presence of NATO on the Eastern flank will look like is of secondary importance. What will matter most is whether the outcome will send a signal of unity and resolve, supported across the Alliance. In order to achieve this NATO needs both deterrence and dialogue. Both pillars of the renewed dual-track approach should be strengthened in Warsaw.

Tobias Bunde is Head of Policy and Analysis at the Munich Security Conference and Research Associate with the Center for International Security Policy at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

This article was originally published by EastWest Institute Policy Innovation Blog

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The impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff will become a precedent setting case in the historic and legal tradition of Brazil’s democracy. Whatever side Brazilians are on regarding president Rousseff’s six month suspension and possible permanent impeachment, a response was to the crisis was necessary. After so much popular demand for change and a severe corruption scandal facing Rousseff’s party—the Worker’s Party or PT—some action had to be taken.

As of now, it is unclear whether or not Rousseff will survive the Senate trial. The accusations against her that lead to the suspension are not directly tied to the corruption scandal plaguing the PT. President Rousseff has been accused of boosting her own economic policy record by using funds from state banks to cover budget shortfalls, which may have violated fiscal responsibility laws in Brazil. Although extremely worrisome, these practices are not linked to the corruption scandal which lead to the revelations that PT party members were taking bribes from large Brazilian companies.

Indeed, the end result of her trial may result in the reversal of her impeachment as the focus of the corruption scandal was not on her personal actions, but that of PT party members. Nevertheless, the scandals have left a indelible stain on her party’s image that will remain after the Senate trial.

There are strong precedents to it. In the British parliamentary democracy system, it is a customary tradition that a minister in charge of a department affected by a scandal should step down from his or her position, even if the minister was not aware of or linked to the scandal personally. There are two reasons for this custom: to maintain accountability of a department by the top decision makers so that the public ultimately benefits, and to ensure the legitimacy of the government and their party in the future application of policy making and governing.

President Rousseff may survive the impeachment trial as the case against her is not as solid as many of the accusations rallied against her fellow party members. But the governing party will no longer be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the Brazilian public. Rousseff’s possible success in the Senate trial will only prolong the inevitable: a loss in the next presidential elections and the implosion of the PT.

Claims that the constitutional process leading to her impeachment is tantamount to a coup, or that horrific results will come from an opposition government, or that the interim president will perpetuate Brazil’s dysfunctional political system abound . All parties should accept that if a government is not seen as legitimate by Brazilians, an immediate election should be called in. It is what a healthy democracy should demand and a positive end result of their constitutional process.

The post Challenging Brazil’s Democratic System May Make It Stronger appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

An opposition supporter holds up a giant hundred Bolivares note with the word, “Hungry” written on it during a gathering to protest against the government of President Maduro, and economic insecurity and shortages, in Caracas. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)

By Matthew Barbari

Problems for Venezuela and its president Nicolas Maduro continue to mount as the country heads inexorably towards its collapse. An economic system centered around oil exports revenues, a government that can no longer provide public services such as electricity or medical care, and growing civil unrest and violence have led Venezuelans to look for an alternative to Chavismo.

Under Hugo Chavez—Maduro’s predecessor—the Venezuelan economy boomed due to the high price of oil, with barrels selling for well over $100. With crude oil accounting for 96% of the country’s exports, Chavez’s political movement relied on heavy spending on social welfare programs.

However, the government failed to improve the oil production process, leading to a lower than average export price. With the price of a barrel produced in Venezuela dropping to around $20 in February, the entire economy dropped with it. This collapse in oil prices has compounded with an incredibly high inflation rate causing supply shortages in most basic necessities.

The economic troubles have permeated through all aspects of life of Venezuelans. Massive food shortages, lack of proper medical care and constant power shortages are pushing the country close to a humanitarian crisis and are enraging even the most loyal of government supporters.

While Hugo Chavez was sufficiently charismatic to maintain public support during previous economic struggles, President Maduro is not. Increasingly fearing popular outbursts against the government and in a desperate attempt to control the crisis, he has recently declared a nationwide state of emergency.

The growing unrest has been building for some time and has led opposition parties to gain more seats in the National Assembly. There is also growing support for a recall election and a referendum to impeach President Maduro. However, the opposition is not organized in a cohesive unit against the Maduro government.

The situation has now deteriorated to the point where there is concern regarding “plausible scenarios” where Maduro’s own party or a military coup would force him out of office—triggering further civilian uprising and possibly the outbreak of a civil war.

Even though there have been gradual increases in oil prices over the past months, Venezuela has had to slow down production due to rampant power outages, failing to take full advantage of the market’s improvement. No matter the outcome of the referendum, Venezuela is heading towards bankruptcy and chaos. Hugo Chavez’s dream is turning into a nightmare for the Venezuelan people.

The post The Collapse of Chavez’s Venezuela appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Written by Loïc Burton

The Kurds are often hailed as the West’s most reliable partner in the fight against the Islamic State. From its victories in the border town of Kobani in Syria and in Sinjar in northern Iraq, the Kurds have taken advantage of the chaos in the region to get closer to achieving their dream of statehood.

On March 17, after the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—under the umbrella of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD)—managed a streak of military victories, Kurdish leadership declared a federal region across much of northern Syria called Rojava. This in an attempt to formalize the semiautonomous zone controlled by Kurdish forces after five years of war, while falling short of complete independence from Damascus.

As a key ally in the coalition against ISIS, Syrian Kurds are in a much stronger position to bargain for their political autonomy. However this is anathema to both the Syrian and Turkish governments. The former—reinvigorated thanks to the Russian intervention—now believes that it could regain control over all of the country while the latter fears that increased Kurdish self-governance might increase tensions with its own Kurdish restive minority.

In Iraq, Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, has announced his intentions of holding a referendum on independence by the end of the year—a first step toward achieving full-fledged statehood. However, some believe the referendum will be used to distract the population from more pressing problems such as the region’s flailing economy.

In February 2014, as a result of a dispute with Baghdad, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was cut off from its share of the federal budget. In June, with the emergence of ISIS, security spending skyrocketed while an influx of 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons added pressure to its infrastructure and service delivery. The final blow occurred in mid-2014 with the global drop in oil prices hitting the region particularly hard—oil revenues account for as much as 80–90% of the KRG’s budget.

In addition to these recent developments, the KRG struggles with perennial issues. In a population of 5.2 million, 1.4 million are on the government payroll Moreover the practice of “ghost-employees”—arms of the government claim more staff than they actually have to inflate their budgets—is widespread. All these factors combined create an unsustainable economic situation and threaten to stall the momentum gained against ISIS: security services are currently only paid every four months.

Looking beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq, Turkey is the most concerned about the Kurds for the reasons aforementioned. As its fight against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party—to which the PYD has close ties—in Turkey’s southeast intensifies, Ankara has bombed Kurdish fighters in Syria and allegedly tacitly helped ISIS to prevent Syrian Kurds from forming a contiguous entity along its southern border.

Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet in November 2015 has put Ankara and Moscow at odds with each other. Since then, Russia has been much more inclined to support Syrian Kurds and the PYD, allowing the Rojava administration to establish its first overseas representative office in Moscow in February 2016.

Finally, the U.S. relation with the Kurds is complex: although the Kurds are reliable allies, Kurdish aspirations for autonomy complicate America’s strategic interests. Indeed, in addition to the risk of seeing the fragmentation of Iraq, American support for Syrian Kurds has increased tensions between the U.S. and Turkey—which allows the U.S. to use its military bases to conduct operations in the region.

Kurds are independent political actors whose interests are not always aligned with Washington. The coming months are essential for the future of their polity and the region as a whole.

Recommended Readings

Anne Barnard, “Syrian Kurds Hope to Establish a Federal Region in the Country’s North,” The New York Times (Mar. 16, 2016).

Zach Beauchamp, “America’s Kurdish problem: today’s allies against ISIS are tomorrow’s headache,” Vox (Apr. 8, 2016).

“Why Iraqi Kurdistan Is Struggling to Pay Its Bills,” Stratfor (Jan. 28, 2016).

The post The Future of Kurdistan: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A protester demonstrating against Taiwanese conglomerate Formosa during a rally in downtown Hanoi on May 1, 2016. (HOANG DINH NAM/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)

Last week, Rupert Colville, spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), called on the Vietnamese leadership to respect the right of freedom of assembly, after security officials stifled city-wide protests over an environmental disaster engulfing the country.

In a press briefing note released by UNCHR on May 13, the agency said it is “concerned about the increasing levels of violence perpetrated against Vietnamese protesters expressing their anger over the mysterious mass deaths of fish along the country’s central coast.”  

In recent weeks, Vietnamese citizens have rallied in the cities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Nha Trang, Vung Tau and Da Nang over reports that at least 100 tons of fish have died along a 200-kilometer stretch of coastland in central Vietnam since April.  Many of the protesters are angry over the slow response of the new leadership to pin the blame on a unit of Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics, which operates a $10.6 billion coastal steel plant in Ha Tinh province.

Vietnamese fishermen, whose income has been severely depleted by the pollution, led authorities to an illegal pipeline thought to be responsible for the poisoning of the fish, which was traced to the steel plant.  Formosa management claims to have safely treated the discharge, and initial government findings sought to deflect the blame from Formosa to a red tide caused by an algae bloom.  Newly-elected Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has promised a thorough investigation, vowing “We will not shield anyone found causing the pollution.”

Yet Vietnamese citizens are losing their patience, and the urge to demonstrate has been building momentum, alarming authorities. Vietnamese security apparatus allowed the first two protests on consecutive Sundays to attract hundreds of demonstrators.

Security officials cracked down on demonstrators the second week, however, using tear gas was used to disperse the crowd, and reportedly beating around  300 people and arresting others, according to the UNCHR report.  Videos and pictures circulating on Facebook also showed punches thrown and protesters being dragged off into buses.

In response to reports of demonstrators being beaten and arrested, the UNCHR issued the following statement: “We call on the Government of Viet Nam to respect the right to freedom of assembly in line with its international human rights obligations.”  This statement drew a harsh response from the permanent Vietnamese representative to the UNCHR,  Ambassador Nguyen Trung Thanh, who called the statement “inaccurate, unobjective and unverified.”  

While Article 25 of the 2013 Vietnamese Constitution ensures freedom of assembly and speech for its citizens, stating “The citizen shall enjoy the right to freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the press, to access to information, to assemble, form associations and hold demonstrations,”  Ambassador Thanh noted that freedom of assembly must be exercised without detriment to public order “to ensure traffic order, security and safety for the people, especially the elderly, women and children.”

This past Sunday, Vietnam’s state television, and several other major state-run channels, warned potential demonstrators to ignore calls by “reactionary forces” who intend to disrupt public order, saying “their intention to abuse and disturb was revealed when many subjects called for using knives and petrol bombs to attack the functional forces and to overthrow the authorities.”   

Authorities were also quick to blame the demonstrations on an anti-government plot by a terrorist organization named ‘Viet Tan’ (Vietnam Reform). Viet Tan’s website claims it “engages in actions that empower the Vietnamese people”, with its mission to “overcome dictatorship, build the foundation for a sustainable democracy, and demand justice and human rights for the Vietnamese.”

While it is arguable whether the safety and security of the people were endangered by the demonstrations (or by Viet Tan), the state television broadcast, a shutdown of Facebook, and a heavy security presence in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were enough to quell any significant gathering of protesters on the third Sunday of protest.  No more than 100 protesters gathered in Ho Chi Minh City, most of whom were quickly dispersed or detained.  

U.S. President Barack Obama was originally scheduled to arrive in Vietnam on May 22, a Sunday in which protests could flare again, and also the day in which Vietnam holds its election of the nation’s lawmaking National Assembly.  His trip has now been moved to the 23rd, and although his itinerary is still under discussion, events on the ground in recent weeks may give the issue of human rights more prominence.  

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(Flickr)

One might have expected British Prime Minister David Cameron, the host of last week’s anti-corruption summit in London, to have been a bit more cautious when speaking of the “fantastically corrupt” countries whose leaders were his guests. Cameron’s comments about Nigeria and Afghanistan were caught on tape as he described them—to the Queen, no less—as “possibly the two most corrupt countries in the world.”

Muhammadu Buhari, the Nigerian president, was shocked and embarrassed according to media and staff reports, but declined to ask for an apology, pointedly stressing that he would rather see recovered the many tangible assets hidden away by his countrymen in the UK.

For all the diplomatic drama—since, not to be outdone, Queen Elizabeth was caught on tape insulting the Chinese too—the anti-corruption summit moved forward with representatives of some 40 nations present and with Buhari delivering the keynote address. A final twist occurred when The Economist reported there had been speculation that Cameron’s indiscretion was actually intentional, designed to stir up additional media interest in the otherwise staid summit talks.

International cooperation in the fight against corruption

By most accounts, the summit was a good first step toward international cooperation on transparency and toward cobbling together a coordinated effort to target secretive tax havens and offshore financial arrangements tied to illegal activities. Of the 40 attending nations, ten are EU members.

These European participants are now looking to shut down the anonymous shell companies used for money laundering by developing registers of the true business owners involved. While Ireland will consider it, France, the U.K. and the Netherlands have pledged to make those registries public—albeit some of the U.K.’s overseas territories, like the British Virgin Islands, will not be forced to come clean.

Additionally, five EU nations pledged to increase transparency on corporate tax compliance, while the summit further addressed corruption in negotiating and awarding EU public contracts, protections for whistleblowers, and seizure penalties.

However, the fact that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry managed to shift attention away from America’s notoriously secretive states of Delaware, Nevada or South Dakota prompted many to argue that the West is more interested in pointing fingers at developing countries than addressing its own shortfalls. Looking ahead, participants agreed to hold a forum next year on asset recovery, one that will focus on assistance for challenged nations such as the “fantastically corrupt” Nigeria.

Nigeria and the culture of corruption

For his part, Buhari’s remarks referred to corruption as a “hydra-headed monster” that cannot be reined in without a coordinated effort. He detailed how four different Nigerian agencies are pursuing corruption investigations in a bid to respect his campaign promises from 2015. Buhari also addressed human rights issues in Nigeria’s fight against corruption, as well as the problem of oil theft, estimated at 150,000 barrels a day. The extent of Nigeria’s problem is reflected by data provided in the annual Transparency International index, which ranked the nation at 136 of the 168 countries evaluated.

Buhari, however, has so far failed to deliver on his lofty campaign promises to root out Nigeria’s endemic corruption. After a remarkably slow start to his term, which saw the country running without an appointed cabinet between May and November 2015, Buhari came under fire for using international aid money earmarked for cracking down on Boko Haram to fund a witch hunt against opposition politicians.

Indeed, according to reports, the nascent anti-corruption campaign has been targeting political enemies of the regime, raising fears that Buhari, a former military dictator in the 80s, is returning to his autocratic ways.

Beyond the shining example Buhari set for the wider region showing that democratic transitions can indeed be possible in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigerians are not faring any better.

The president who once claimed he could singlehandedly stabilize world oil prices is being sapped by a period of high inflation that has driven food prices higher, while the inefficient power grid and infrastructure are dragging down the embattled Nigerian economy. Improving just the grid would boost the country’s economy by a whopping 14%, but the process is stalled because of rent seeking and graft.

What’s most troubling though is the vicious circle of corruption in Nigerian society: the elites who avail themselves of the country’s assets cause the very suffering that they are then supposed to alleviate. The poverty rate among rural households has grown to some 80 % on the back of tumbling oil prices in an economy that has failed to properly diversify.

The ongoing conflicts with Boko Haram in the northeast—itself fueling, and fueled by, Nigeria’s corruption—and the unrest from Biafrans in the south contribute to the nation’s climate of instability.

Everything considered, Nigeria is one of the most revealing examples of the pitfalls of corruption, the way it warps and drags down the entire economic potential of a nation.

When coupled with incompetent leadership, the only hope for Nigerians would be for this year’s anti-corruption summit to yield practical results. A list of individuals hiding wealth in London’s ridiculously overpriced property market and laundering corruption proceeds through the U.K.’s overseas territories would be a good start, both for Nigeria and David Cameron.

The post Cameron’s Anti-Corruption Summit: A First Step in a Long Road appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A member of the Iraqi security forces holds an Iraqi flag at a government complex in the city of Ramadi, December 28, 2015. (REUTERS/Stringer)

Written by Loïc Burton

On March 22, terror struck Brussels with a twin blast at Zaventem Airport and the Maelbeek metro station, claiming the lives of 32 people and injuring over 300. The attacks claimed by ISIS came only a few days after a suicide bombing killed five and injured 36 in Istanbul—the fourth suicide bombing in Turkey in 2016.

The latest bombings have reheated the debate within the EU about tighter border controls—possibly foreshadowing the eventual breakdown of the Schengen Agreement. In addition, the attacks have hardened Europe’s determination to combat terrorism at home, with increased monitoring of ISIS fighters returning from the Middle East and improved intelligence sharing between EU members, and abroad, whether through ramping up aircraft deployments in the coalition against the Islamic State or by supplying weapons to local actors.

Experts have argued that ISIS’s increased activity abroad is a sign of weakness rather than strength. As the so-called caliphate begins to crumble—ISIS is thought to have lost around 20% of its territory in Syria and over 40% in Iraq since its peak expansion in August 2014—the group is allocating efforts and resources toward large-scale terrorist attacks abroad in order to influence the strategic calculations of the coalition member countries at a reduced cost.

Since ISIS’s “winner’s message” of “remaining and expanding” sounds increasingly hollow, this tactical shift is one way to catch global headlines and retain its legitimacy and ability to recruit.

Although the increased operational tempo of terrorist attacks is the manifestation of the group’s faltering, the ISIS underlying ideology is not expected to wither away anytime soon. Jonathan Schanzer, a former terrorism finance analyst at the Treasury Department, argues that “defeating the formal military presence of a terrorist group will not significantly mitigate the threat of lone wolf or small independent cells that are based in the West.”

In its heartland, ISIS is definitely in retreat. According to Pentagon officials, U.S. airstrikes have killed over 25,000 Islamic State fighters and deprived the group of millions of dollars in revenue. Financially debilitated, it has halved salaries of its civil servants and is releasing hostages for sums as low as $500.

Indeed, ISIS has not scored a significant victory since taking Palmyra in May 2015. The ancient city was recaptured by the Syrian regime, supported by Russian airstrikes, on March 27, 2016, reducing ISIS’s ability to threaten Syria’s coastal regions.

In Iraq, after retaking Tikrit in March 2015 and Ramadi in December, the government in Baghdad declared on March 24 the beginning of operations to retake Mosul. The offensive to regain Iraq’s second largest city will not be easy.

After some initial success reclaiming nearby villages, progress in the military campaign was stalled. More sober prognostics have now replaced the once optimistic talks of pushing ISIS out of Mosul by the end of the year—military analysts estimate that there is little prospect of an assault on the city before 2017.

With about 10,000 fighters and almost two years to erect a multilayered defense, a force of at least 40,000 would be needed to overcome the group, according to estimates. Indeed, the current under-strength Iraqi division supported by U.S. military advisers looks woefully inadequate for the task.

Moreover, because of ethno-religious tensions, Kurdish Peshmerga seem uninterested in helping take a city that would never be part of an independent Kurdistan while Shi‘a-dominated militias—instrumental in retaking Tikrit—will probably be kept away for fears of sectarian reprisals following the conquest of the Sunni-majority city.

An important factor in the battle for Mosul is America’s involvement. The Pentagon wants to go beyond air strikes and the current deployment of military advisers and introduce additional special forces. However, this goes against Obama’s “no boots on the ground” pledge—although an increasingly tenuous promise, it rules out the deployment on the scale necessary to retake Mosul.

After attempting to train local forces—leading to the disastrous $500 million train-and-equip program for Syrian moderates that yielded little to no results—and bombing oil production facilities under Operation Tidal Wave II, the U.S. is now focusing on a leadership decapitation campaign, using special forces on the ground. In March, American forces killed Haji Iman, ISIS’s second-in-command, as well as Abu Omar al-Shishanim, the group’s “war minister.”

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter explained current U.S. strategy: “we are systematically eliminating ISIL’s cabinet,” in order to “hamper the ability for them to conduct operations inside and outside of Iraq and Syria.” Although the leadership is capable of regenerating itself and operating on the ground, taking out leaders reduces the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks abroad as they require a more sophisticated network and superior coordination.

Talks of a new training program—allegedly more narrowly focused—and Obama’s decision to add 250 military personnel to the 50 already on the ground in Syria are the latest development in the U.S. effort to capitalize on the momentum in  the campaign against the Islamic State. It remains to be seen whether or not these new policies achieve the desired outcome.

Recommended Readings

Max Fisher, “The Brussels attack is Europe’s new reality,” Vox (Mar. 22, 2016).

Eric Schmitt and Alissa J. Rubin “ISIS Spreading in Europe, U.S. Intelligence Chief Warns,”
The New York Times (Apr. 25, 2016).

“The last battle,” The Economist (Apr. 16, 2016).

The post The Rise of ISIS: Great Decisions Spring Updates appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

“Departure for the coffee harvest by ox cart, Vale do Paraíba, Brazil, c. 1885” (image courtesy of Instituto Moreira Salles)

Of all of the countries in the Americas, Brazil imported the most slaves from Africa and was the last to officially abolish slavery. While slavery may have been abolished officially with the signing of the Lei Áurea (Golden Law) by Princesa Isabel on May 13, 1888, forced labor, or “trabalho escravo”, took its place.  

Forced labor, which the International Labor Organization (ILO) defines as involving “degrading work conditions and the impossibility of leaving the employer owing to fraudulent debts and the presence of armed guards,” was officially acknowledged by the State in 1995.  That same year, Brazil’s Ministry of Labor initiated a Special Mobile Enforcement Group to track down companies suspected of using slave workers.

In 2002, the ILO and the Brazilian government initiated a technical cooperation project called “Combating Forced Labour”. Since then, around 50,000 workers have been freed from slave-like conditions in Brazil.

Yet there is more work to be done as the practice continues to this day. This month saw the publication of a “dirty list” by the human rights group Reporter Brazil, which named and shamed 340 Brazilian companies caught employing people in slave-like conditions between May 2013 and May 2015. The companies had previously been identified and fined by Brazil’s Ministry of Labor, which accused them of using slave labor, forced labor, and employing workers for little or no pay in degrading conditions.

Companies were associated with clothing sweatshops, farming and cattle ranching, timber and charcoal production, and construction. More than 1,500 adults and 5,500 children were released during 2014.

While Reporter Brazil used the country’s Freedom of Information Act to reveal the names of companies and individuals found by government inspectors to use slave labor, the practice of tracking down forced labor in Brazil is a dangerous one. Three Brazilian judicial officials were murdered in January 2004 while looking into allegations of slavery on ranches near the nation’s capital, Brasília.

The following month, government inspectors discovered 32 slave workers on the ranch of right-wing Senator João Ribeiro in the northern state of Pará. The officials said the captives worked seven days a week without pay and had no running water or toilets.

In 2009, the ILO estimated that between 25,000-40,000 people were being exploited in Brazil, primarily in the states of Pará and Mato Grosso. Other organizations such as The Global Slavery Index put the number much higher in 2015, at around 155,000. These workers are primarily recruited from the cities of Brazil’s impoverished Nordeste region.

Recruiters, often referred to as “gatos” (cats), lure the poor with promises of good pay for hard work, and some are told the cost of their transportation will be deducted from future wages. The workers are then transported hundreds of kilometers away to work in logging camps, or on ranches raising cattle or tending to crops. Many workers are only told once they arrive at the camp or ranch that they will now be responsible for paying the costs of their transportation, which are often inflated.

In addition, if they are held in collection points for days or weeks, all food, housing and other expenses they incur are deducted from their future wages—usually at inflated prices. And the price-gouging does not end there. Since the camp or ranch is typically isolated from nearby cities or towns and transportation is limited, employers often charge a premium for bringing such provisions as food, drink, and other essentials to the site.

When you add the inflated upfront costs to the ongoing necessities of food, drink and shelter, it is little wonder the typical worker quickly becomes trapped economically. Why does the typical worker stay when he or she realizes his predicament? Isolation, threats, violence and sometimes homicide can make it a difficult and dangerous choice.

What can be done to curb the practice of slavery and forced labor in Brazil? The government has already developed a database of offenders, yet the aforementioned mobile inspection group could be strengthened, as could the rehabilitation program for former slaves which grants them three months pay, builds job skills and offers them legal assistance.  

A national pact has also been initiated with the help of ILO. It has been signed by almost 200 hundred private and public companies since 2005, obliging them to remove from their supply chains any inputs produced with the involvement of forced labor.

The efforts of the Brazilian government to combat forced labor, 120 years after the abolishment of slavery, have to date been laudatory, but must continue and intensify.

The post Slavery and Forced Labor in Brazil appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In most cases the scenario is similar: over the past decade, oil exporting countries used excessive revenues from oil to expand public services, or simply pursue populist policy in order to buy political stability. Once oil prices started to fall, the budgets did not shrink accordingly, which created a wide gap between the oil revenues and swelling fiscal demands.

In order to stem the rapid outflow of foreign reserves, the governments were forced to devaluate their national currencies. An unwanted consequence is almost always the rise in inflation and household prices, along with a decline in living standards and stalled economic growth.

Here are the five most affected countries by this devaluation trend.

The former Soviet republic is the first country to request a $4 billion emergency loan from the IMF and the World Bank in order to cover losses caused by low oil prices. Although the Azerbaijani government officially denied the need for a bailout, the country is in dire straits.

Income from oil and gas makes up around 75% of the country’s revenues, and the recent devaluation of the national currency manat by more than 30% incited public protests that might easily disrupt the political stability of the authoritarian regime of president Ilham Aliyev.

Venezuela has gone through an equally depressing scenario since July 2014. Although the country’s economy wasn’t sustainable even with triple digit oil prices, a prolonged period of low oil prices brought the economy close to a breaking point. Over the past two years, the national currency, the bolívar, lost more than 90% of its value. According to the IMF’s forecast, inflation will reach 720% in 2016.

Venezuela’s domestic woes are further aggravated by the government’s efforts to limit imports in order to raise enough cash to stave off default.

There is, however, an increasing danger that with a further slump in oil revenues, and with sovereign bonds yielding at around 30%, Caracas might default on its debts at some point in 2016. The real question is, how long will the Maduro regime be able to suppress the growing social discontent and increased pressures from the opposition-controlled parliament?

Africa’s largest economy was hard hit by the falling oil prices. The national currency, the naira, dropped against the dollar by 25% over the past year. On January 30, the Nigerian government requested a $3.5 billion loan from the IMF and the African Development Bank to plug its $15 billion budget gap.

The country’s oil revenues are expected to fall by 70% in 2016, while the hard currency reserves almost halved from $50 to $28 billion, and the state’s emergency fund went from $22 billion in 2009 to $2.3 billion currently.

Angola earned around $500 billion from oil exports between 2000 and 2014. But today the country’s economy is among the hardest hit in Africa. Inflation is at 14% and the national currency, the kwanza, devaluated by more than 50% since January 2015.

The country earns 75% of its fiscal revenues from oil exports, which make up around 95% of total exports. As a consequence, José Eduardo dos Santos’ regime is starting to feel the pressure from well-organized public protests that might turn into more widespread unrest if the economic situation continues to worsen.

Russia is going through some tough economic times, as the toxic combination of Western sanctions and low oil prices is devastating the country’s economy and living standards. Since June 2014, the rouble devaluated by more than 100% against the dollar. GDP is expected to shrink by 3.7% in 2016 alone.

How do these numbers affect the everyday lives of average Russians? Real wages fell by almost 10% in 2015, and the percentage of households that cannot afford sufficient food or clothing has increased from 22% to 39% over the previous year.

Although Russia is not an average developing, oil-exporting country, the severity of Russia’s economic and potential political troubles, which might come along with the low oil prices, puts the country well inside this infamous club.

These five countries are already feeling the effects of low oil prices and devaluation. And there are more candidates: Brazil, Ecuador, and even the rich Gulf countries are starting to feel the pinch, and it seems that the end to depressed oil prices is nowhere near.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Ante Batovic

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Source: Reuters

Written by Shehab Al Makahleh

Turkey, long hailed as a bastion of secular democracy in the Muslim world, could be spiraling toward an all-out civil war as conflicts between Turkish security forces and Kurds as well as other ethnic minorities continue to escalate. These conflicts have been exacerbated by the catastrophic war in neighboring Syria, which has created a refugee crisis in Turkey, expanded the government’s campaign against Kurds in Iraq and Syria, and pushed Turkish officials into collusion with ISIS.

The lurch toward autocratic rule by President Recep Tayyib Erdogan has long worried regional and Western observers, with curbs on freedom of speech and political repression of the Kurds. That policy has taken a bloody turn with the repeated bombing of Syrian and Iraqi Kurds and, since July 2015, escalating crackdowns at home.

The murder in November of Tahir Elci, a leading Kurdish human rights advocate and president of the Diyarbakir Bar Association in southeastern Turkey has dramatically increased tensions inside Turkey and put the Kurdish issue—seemingly settled only a few years ago—back on the agenda.

Turkey has other problems to contend with. The Russians—playing an increasingly important role in the region—have long maintained that Turkey is receiving oil from ISIS, through official complicity, illicit criminal networks, or some combination. The Associated Press corroborated Russia’s account by stating that upwards of 30,000 barrels of oil are being extracted each day by ISIS from Syria, with much of it ending up in Turkey.

While Erdogan and his ruling party have not been sanctioned by the U.S. or anyone in the West for that matter, one can only conclude that this willful blindness means that the U.S. is fearful for Erdogan’s political stability, not to mention Russia’s ascendant position in the region.

On the economic front, Turkey has recently lost a lifeline of non-energy trade with Russia–including agriculture and textile projects, tourism and construction—that supports tens of thousands of jobs in the country. It was severed following Turkey’s downing of a Russian plane flying combat sorties in Syria, a dangerous move by the Turks that could have easily (and perhaps justifiably) led to a Russian counterattack and a larger war involving NATO.

Russia held its fire, responding calmly when many expected escalation, and instead imposed economic sanctions against Turkey. This squeeze on vital elements of the Turkish economy could give rise to further internal discontent in the country. Lest we forget, bread riots helped start the civil war that toppled Egypt’s Mubarak, and economic issues sparked the fall of Ben Ali in Tunisia.

A more subtle but no less powerful force is also at work against Turkey: regional resentment. The region has a long memory of the “Ottoman yoke” which was ended 100 years ago by the Hashemite-led Arab revolt and finally the expulsion of the Turks from Arab lands.

Turkey’s brash role in the region today—backed implicitly by U.S. and NATO firepower–is seen by some as coming at the expense of its Arab neighbors, especially as more evidence on Turkish involvement in illicit trade with ISIS grows. Turkey’s assertive role in a new regional triangular power structure with Saudi Arabia and Qatar has also created greater diplomatic isolation from much of the region.

The confluence of these internal and external factors has put unprecedented pressure on the Turkish state as a viable entity. The conflict with the Kurds seems to be tearing the nation at its seams—the very idea of the secular, pluralist state is at risk.

But other clouds—economic, diplomatic, and military—are looming over the horizon. What happens next is not entirely in Erdogan’s control. Will Russia’s military restraint hold? Will the fragile regional alliances against ISIS shift against Turkey? Will ISIS itself continue to shake the Turkish people’s confidence? Or will it be Erdogan’s own policies that ultimately undermines the Turkish state?

Shehab Al Makahleh is a journalist and co-founder of Geo-strategic and Political Studies of the Middle East Media.

The post Could Turkey Implode? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Lately, the Zika virus made its way into the spotlight with a sudden and explosive growth of micro-encephalitis in newborns across Latin America. As a result of Brazil’s climate, inadequate public health system, and poor system for sanitation and water supplies, the virus found an ideal location to develop rapidly. While Zika has a devastating effect on pregnant women, especially in the low-income population, this issue has also brought to light other prevalent concerns regarding the Olympics this summer.

Zika looms over the Brazilian population and future tourists traveling from the around the world to watch the Olympic Games. The government’s response has been slow and inadequate; the Brazilian healthcare system has been heavily underfunded in recent years, with many poor areas in Rio de Janeiro lacking even basic infrastructure. In January 2016, hospitals ran out of money to pay for drugs, equipment, and salaries. Some patients died after they were not allowed into underfunded public hospitals.

Brazilian officials expressed concerns over the possibility of visitors staying away from Rio de Janeiro out of fear of contracting Zika. The city has taken precautions to ensure that tourists and athletes of the Olympics do not feel threatened, and officials have announced that venues would be inspected on a daily basis four months in advance, aimed at eliminating any stagnant water that could serve as breeding grounds for mosquitoes.

These efforts have not been able to eliminate global concerns over the issue. With the World Health Organization declaring it a global health emergency, Brazil has already been criticized for downplaying the risks of contracting the virus at the Olympics and the ongoing Carnival celebrations, which attract 1.5 million tourists a year.

Recently, allegations of bribery against the Brazilian speaker of the lower house, Eduardo Cunha, and five construction companies involved in Olympics projects have emerged. Brazil’s attorney general, Rodrigo Janot, claimed that some construction companies, already under investigation for their ties to the Petrobras scandal, paid bribes totaling USD 475,000 to Eduardo Cunha to help secure contracts for the building of venues and other works for Olympics.

These allegations are another example of the large impact the Petrobras scandal has had on Brazilian politics and the economy. Companies involved in Olympics construction projects found themselves blocked from receiving bank loans and credit lines during the ongoing Petrobras investigation, forcing Rio de Janeiro’s city government to act as a bank and lend companies money to prevent an inevitable slowdown in construction. Despite their efforts, projects for the Olympics have already been delayed and sometimes halted, including essential repairs on sewers in Rio de Janeiro.

However, Olympic officials have denied any delays and vow that the games will be free of corruption, serving as an example of how business in Brazil can be done “above the board”.

On November 16, three days after the Paris attack, a leading French recruit for ISIS tweeted “Brazil, you are next”. Attacks by Islamist gunmen in Egypt, Mali, Paris and elsewhere in 2015 has raised the alarm for big international events like the Olympics. Brazilian security agencies have trained over 85,000 security personnel, 47,000 police officers, and 38,000 soldiers to guard the 10,500 athletes and thousands of tourists attending the 2016 Games.

However, the security forces will need to focus on more than terrorist threats for the Olympics.  Violent political demonstrations, increased levels of robberies and shootings, and a growing amount of areas that are considered dangerous have worsened the already poor security situation in the city.

Amid a deteriorating fiscal situation, the once proud member of the BRICS has gotten used to its degrading economic status. Olympics organizers have tried to cut at least USD 500 million from the USD 1.9 billion operating budget for the Games, and already laid off temporary workers. Despite their efforts, the cost recently increased with an additional USD 100 million for electricity generation, with the final budget totalling USD 9.8 billion.

Brazil might be heading towards one of the deepest recessions since 1931. The currency plunged 33% in 2015, state security forces face a budget cut of 25%, inflation has risen to at least 10%, and unemployment has been hovering around 9%.

Brazil has also faced challenges in improving its public transportation system, particularly in the critical subway extension project. If it cannot be completed on time, Rio de Janeiro will face huge traffic jams along its mountainous coastal roads and potential empty seats in the new Olympic venues. Additionally, critical levels of water pollution and delayed infrastructure project led city officials to admit that they failed to improve sewage system in lake areas and the Copacabana coastline by 80%, a promise that was made in their Olympics bid in 2009.

Even if Brazil is able to host the Olympics with all venues prepared on time, there will be bumps in the road. The combined challenges make it very difficult to believe in a positive Olympic experience for Brazil. The legacy has the potential to do serious economic and social damage, requiring a brutal prioritization and fiscal austerity from the government afterwards. Rio de Janeiro city officials’ promise of showing how business can be done in Brazil “above board” is becoming more of an illusion than a reality.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI analyst Alicia Chavy.

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