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China’s PGZ-95/PGZ-04A is likely the most modern and capable anti-drone system available in quantity worldwide.
Recent videos on air defence over Ukraine detailed the use of one of the original NATO versions of a surface-to-air missile system, the HAWK. It was the case during the Cold War that the Soviet military’s mentality focused around air defence of the realm in response to being invaded by the Germans from the West and suffering casualties in the millions during the Second World War. While the Soviets made air defence systems like the SAM SA-2 famous during its use in the Vietnam war, the United States and its NATO allies lay their focus elsewhere. The United States produced a limited number of air defence systems during the Cold War era, with the HAWK being one of the most well known and well distributed systems compared to the over fifteen Soviet system variants at the time. In 2025, most HAWK systems, including the I-HAWK improved variant, are in storage with Iran having some in use and Ukraine now using refurbished and dusted off systems to ironically target Iranian made drones targeting civilian infrastructure.
While old systems like the HAWK and German made Gepard Anti-Air system are effective against drones, the use of these retired systems are a remarkable achievement reflecting a stilted strategic overall policy against the elimination of civilian terror weapons. Recent policy directives supporting actions by Russian allies do nothing to stop the war, and in many cases extend the conflict. Little to nothing had been done by Ukraine’s NATO allies to target and eliminate drone production facilities, despite billions going into air defence costs to protect civilian targets of these pure terror weapons. The new policy by the US Administration to limit the consumers of Russian Oil and Gas have pushed Russia to the negotiating table faster than any other sanctions platform attempted previously. European indirect purchases of Russian energy products have done more to fund Russia’s military than sanctions have done to prevent further conflict. The lack of effort to displace Russian energy with North American energy in aid of European allies and in the displacement of sources of energy for nations consuming Russian energy products extended the war by months, if not years. Carrots to common allies like India would do more to stabilize the international security situation than making avenues for Russian profit off of Western allies. The reality on the battlefield is that most modern equipment has been spent, to the cost of hundreds of thousands of young lives on both sides.
With Ukraine having the ability to source arms from any nation offering it, it may become the case that Russia would look to purchase quick semi-modern equipment from any nation where such options are available without many barriers to these purchases. While North Korean tanks may not be the best option to equip the front line nor be available in sufficient numbers, China would be the best option for such a purchase, especially since Russian Energy would be used as payment in any large transaction.
The main defence initiatives for China really would not focus on heavy military tank forces in the most populated areas of China to maintain a proper defence perimeter. China’s artillery, missile forces, and Navy are the jewels of China’s military in the most populated and active sectors, with heavy main battle tanks serving a secondary role or being too heavy to transport via a sea invasion. The main threats to China that require large tank forces would ironically come from Northern sectors where Russia or North Korea may induce a conflict where modern tanks would be required. China’s most modern Type ZTZ-99 tanks are slowing becoming the mainstay of the PLA and would be the iron wall to stop any tank advancement from their opponent-allies in that region. In the mountain region near India, which could be considered a current hot conflict, smaller tanks like the ZTQ-15 are the main tactical weapons of the PLA as large tanks with engines that may stall in higher mountain air do not function properly in that region.
Russia’s Tank Biathlon competitions often used the T-72B variant tanks from many former Soviet nations and Russian allies as a friendly military competition for many years, with Russia using more modernised versions of the T-72. China is always invited to these competitions, being the only country to use their indigenous tank and more recently produced contemporary of the T-72B, the Type ZTZ-96. With the ZTZ-99 rapidly replacing the ZTZ-96 variants, a large stock of ZTZ-96 are likely available for purchase, equivalent to later modernised versions of the T-72B despite losing to it in competition. With Western allies and Russia and its allies using very old equipment from the 1970s in many cases, China looks to overturn new equipment rapidly, with much of their famed 2008 military parade equipment already being phased out as outdated by newer systems. A surprising example which would make a big difference over the skies of Ukraine and Russia in countering drones, is the 2008 introduced PGZ-95/PGZ-04A, a system with 4 cannons and 4 small anti-air missiles now being considered in a phase out position, being replaced by the newer PGZ-09. With the PGZ-95/PGZ-04A being decades newer than the Gepard and Soviet ZSU-23-4 used to kill drones, a large stock of such weapons would be able to efficiently defend against many drone attacks using modern radar systems.
China has spent many years trying to increase international weapon sales, with Russia being their main competitor and Russia winning the majority of such contracts in the process. The reality is that China’s weapons export receiving nations have not changed much since the 1970s, but that reality may start to change rapidly. China’s J-10 fighter jet’s success when used by Pakistan in the recent conflict with India showed how it’s planes and missiles were able to challenge some of Russia’s and Europe’s best produced fighters. An opportunity to not only sell to its main arms export competitor, Russia, but also show the superiority of its products in the market against its competitor’s products would change the game for China’s weapons export industry. Whether China is willing to accept tariffs in taking Russian oil imports or by selling weapons to Russia will come into question, but the likely reality is that China can manage it diplomatically.
China is currently receiving tariff threats over its use of Russian Energy, and will end up negotiating it in one fashion or another. Demonstrating that Ukraine’s allies were also purchasing Russian oil for years or were denying North American energy on the market would blunt criticism from Ukraine’s allies in the West. China selling equipment to Russia instead of silently donating supplies could be claimed as purely transactional along with other weapons export sales, as these are common actions taken by other nations in hot conflict zones. Selling drone killing systems from the 2008 era of PLA equipment to both sides of the conflict may be tactically wise as in the end as those systems would be killing unmanned vehicles, protecting civilians, and China should be acting to benefit itself over Russia in any scenario. The approach the US Administration has towards purchasers of Russian Energy will be of great interest as Western ally India and their adversary China would not respond well to sticks, when carrots would work brilliantly, yet differently in both cases. At this point, where both sides of the conflict in Ukraine have depleted their weapons stockpiles, China would be wise to take to profiting off their modern stockpiles as opposed to joining in a conflict for little gain to the country and its people. War should always remain as a last resort, especially if you are in the position to benefit your economy and avoiding a hot conflict locally.
Credit: Pascal.Van, licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0
By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Sep 2 2025 (IPS)
In late June, thousands flooded the streets of Lomé, Togo’s capital, presenting the ruling dynasty with its biggest challenge in decades.
The catalyst was constitutional manoeuvring by President Faure Gnassingbé to maintain his grip on power. In March 2024, his government pushed through constitutional amendments that transformed Togo from a presidential to a parliamentary system. This created a new position, the President of the Council of Ministers – effectively Togo’s chief executive – elected by parliament rather than by popular vote, and with no term limits. Gnassingbé assumed this new role in May, making it abundantly clear the changes were only about keeping him in power indefinitely.
This constitutional manoeuvre was the latest episode in a 58-year family saga that began when Faure’s father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, seized power in a 1967 coup. For 25 years, the elder Gnassingbé ruled over a one-party state, staging ritual elections that reached absurd heights in 1986 when he claimed re-election with close to 100 per cent of votes on an implausible 99 per cent turnout. Even after nominal multiparty democracy arrived in 1992, elections remained charades with predetermined outcomes, as opposition parties faced systematic obstacles that made fair competition impossible.
When Eyadéma died in 2005, the military simply appointed his son Faure as successor, despite the constitution mandating immediate elections. International pressure forced a hastily organised vote, but this followed the familiar script of violence, fraud and repression. The pattern repeated in 2010, 2015 and 2020, with each election offering a veneer of legitimacy for continued authoritarian rule – and eliciting successive waves of protest that were either violently repressed or pre-emptively suppressed.
Now, two decades after Faure took power, this latest constitutional gambit has triggered the most significant challenge to his rule. The constitutional changes designed to keep him in power have instead galvanised opposition, creating a focal point for decades of accumulated grievances.
The current protests differ from their predecessors by being overwhelmingly led by young people who’ve never known any other leaders than the Gnassingbés. Raised on promises of multiparty democracy, they’ve witnessed systematic electoral fraud to perpetuate a government wholly unresponsive to their needs. They connect their daily struggles with unemployment, power outages and crumbling infrastructure with the long-term denial of their democratic freedoms.
The arrest in May of a popular rapper and TikToker, Aamron – for posting a video calling for street protests to coincide with Gnassingbé’s birthday on 6 June – galvanised discontent, turning simmering frustration into organised resistance. Aamron’s detention sparked the formation of the 6 June Movement (M66), led by young artists, bloggers, diaspora-based activists and civil society figures who rely heavily on social media to coordinate protests, bypassing state-controlled channels.
The government’s response, however, has followed a familiar path of authoritarian crackdown. In late June, security forces killed at least seven people, including 15-year-old Jacques Koami Koutoglo, and they’ve also used teargas, beatings and mass arrests against protesters. The regime has detained journalists, forced deletion of protest footage and imposed internet shutdowns during protests. It has suspended international media outlets including France 24 and RFI for their protest coverage. it has even issued international arrest warrants for M66 leaders based abroad, accusing them of terrorism and subversion.
Protests have continued despite repression. The leadership of young people, less intimidated by the security apparatus and better connected through social media, has allowed for the diversification of opposition tactics, with activists shifting between street protests, legal challenges and international advocacy as circumstances dictate. The diaspora is also playing a role, with Togolese communities abroad organising solidarity protests and advocating with international organisations for sanctions against the Gnassingbé regime.
Significant obstacles however remain. Gnassingbé controls all levers of power, including security forces, the electoral commission and the Constitutional Court. For a democratic transition to result, international pressure would need to intensify, including the imposition of targeted sanctions on regime officials and their economic interests. Regional bodies, particularly the Economic Community of West African States, would need to act, including by threatening to suspend Togo until democratic reforms are implemented.
Whether these protests trigger democratic change or become yet another chapter in the history of repressed dissent will ultimately depend on the ability of pro-democracy forces to sustain pressure and whether the international community finally decides to act. Gnassingbé’s constitutional manoeuvre may prove to be his final act, not because it succeeded in keeping him in power, but because it awakened a new generation. Togo’s young people have discovered the power of collective action—and that could prove decisive.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Senior Research Specialist, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
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