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Americas General Dynamics Land Systems won an $18.9 million modification for Abrams system technical support. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, Michigan, with an estimated completion date of February 27, 2025. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, is the contracting activity. Two US Navy pilots were shot down over the Red Sea early Sunday in “an apparent case of friendly fire,” the American military said. Both pilots were recovered alive but “initial assessments indicate that one of the crew members sustained minor injuries,” the United States Central Command said late Saturday local Florida time – where CENTCOM is headquartered. Middle East & Africa The United States State Department has approved the potential sale of more than $5 billion in arms for Egypt. The State Department informed Congress on Friday that it had approved the sale of $4.69 billion worth of equipment for 555 US-made M1A1 Abrams tanks operated by Egypt, along with $630 million in Hellfire air-to-surface missiles and $30 million in precision-guided munitions. Europe Germany will buy four more submarines from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems to increase the number of boats to six, part of a joint purchase with Norway that may also see the Nordic country increase its […]

Forest managers are advised to diversify the pool of tree species used in forests to ensure long-term stability and reduce vulnerability to climate change.

The post Europe’s conifer trees severely impacted by climate change; urgent action needed appeared first on Euractiv.

Nuclear fusion has achieved major advances. Euractiv spoke with Andrew Holland, CEO of the Fusion Industry Association, about when Europe can expect to see fusion energy becoming a commercial reality.

The post Believe the nuclear fusion hype, this time fusion energy is for real appeared first on Euractiv.

Middle Corridor cargo transportation is up 63 per cent from January to November 2024, reaching 4.1 million tonnes.

The post Kazakhstan’s transport renaissance paved way for global trade connectivity appeared first on Euractiv.

Videos reviewed by BBC Verify show men wearing RSF insignia boasting of killing locals in al-Seriha

Megjelent a mezőgazdasági kisüzemek beruházásait támogató pályázat felhívása. A pályázat keretein belül akár 10 millió forint 85%-os vissza nem térítendő támogatás igényelhető a kis méretű mezőgazdasági üzemek tevékenységének fejleztésére.

The end of the Edo Period brought forth several innovations in military technology to improve upon Japan’s two-century-long gap since its previous contact with any European civilization. From mass-produced sidearms to sabers that nixed the Japanese tradition of slow and meticulous craftsmanship, arguably the greatest improvement of all was an infantry rifle which did not, quite literally, blow up in your face. 

Of course, I am referring to the Arisaka rifle. 

Origins 

Named after Nariakira Arisaka, the foremost leading arms designer in industrial Japanese history and baron to Emperor Meiji himself, the standard infantry weapon of the Japanese Empire likely took inspiration from the German Gewehr 8mm Model 1888 bolt-action rifle. This adoption of European technology coincided with an existing cultural tsunami sweeping across Japan and breaking the highly structured status quo: the Meiji Restoration. Throughout the nineteenth century, Japan discarded its hierarchical Samurai class from the top of the national military’s totem pole. 

Who needs a handful of men studying the blade for a lifetime when you could send hundreds of soldiers through basic training in a matter of months? 

The new Japanese infantry, adopting Western-style military garments, began to equip its soldiers with the Arisaka Type 30, a huge improvement over the Murata Rifle family which still relied on black gunpowder at the time. 

The Type 30 was chambered for the 6.5×50mmSR cartridge and featured a bolt-action system with a five-round internal magazine. Despite its modern design, the rifle’s performance in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) exposed flaws, such as its insufficient stopping power and failure to perform under harsh conditions. 

As a response, the Japanese military introduced the Type 38 in 1905. This version retained the 6.5mm cartridge but improved its strength and reliability. The Type 38 became a staple of the Japanese military, remaining in service for decades. 

Shocking the World 

Field-testing the Arisaka proved to be a success in the aforementioned Russo-Japanese War, and the world’s jaw dropped at the news of an Asian power defeating a European army. This gave Japan and by extension the Arisaka prestige on the world stage as a weapon that can hold its own compared to its German, British, or American counterparts.  

The rifle followed the expansion of the Japanese colonial empire from the acquisition of Taiwan and Korea to even mainland China.  

At the precipice of World War II, the Arisaka rifle family had become a fixture of the Imperial Japanese Army. Millions of Type 38 and newer, sleeker Type 99 rifles were produced, equipping troops to expand the territorial possessions of the Land of the Rising Sun and all of the natural resources she needed to keep her up and running. Indeed, the Arisaka as the standard rifle of the Japanese Empire was the bite at the end of Hirohito’s bark. 

Performance During World War II 

In the early stages of the conflict, Japanese troops equipped with the Type 38 and Type 99 enjoyed success against poorly equipped opponents in China and Southeast Asia. The rifle was hailed for its reliability and allowed for the rapid advance of forces. 

As the war progressed and Japan faced more well-equipped Allied forces, the limitations of the Arisaka became more apparent. While the rifles were durable and accurate, they were outclassed by the semi-automatic M1 Garand used by American troops, which provided a superior rate of fire. From 1944 to 1945, as American forces were expelling Japanese forces from colonized lands, the quality of the Arisaka dropped massively. 

The Arisaka’s service died with the Empire of Japan. However, captured Arisaka found use even after the war, as Allied forces brought the infantry weapons home as war trophies and Chinese and Korean forces utilized them during the early stages of the Korean War. 

Lake Dodson is an Assistant Editor for the National Interest. His interests are Korean-American relations, cybersecurity policy, and nuclear energy/weapons policy. He currently studies the Korean language and has completed courses on North-South Korean Relations and conducted various experiments on an AGN-201K Nuclear Reactor at the prestigious Kyung-hee University in Suwon, South Korea. His specific interests are effective nuclear energy policy, cyber-security, and the economy and politics of East Asia. He holds a BA from the University of Mississippi.  

Image Credit: Shutterstock.

A pair of United States Navy pilots sustained minor injuries, but are safe after their Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet was shot down in a "friendly fire incident" on Sunday. The multirole aircraft was operating from the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75).

CNN reported that the twin-engine, two-seat Super Hornet was "mistakenly fired" upon early Sunday morning by the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg (CG-64), one of the warships that is part of the Truman carrier strike group (CSG). CG-64 along with CVN-75 only arrived in Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of responsibility last week.

The CSG is part of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led mission launched last December to protect commercial ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden from attacks carried out by the Houthi militants in Yemen.

What We Know

According to multiple sources, the Boeing-made Super Hornet, assigned to Carrier Air Wing One, was in the skies over the Red Sea when the guided-missile cruiser fired at the aircraft. The squadron wasn't identified but USNI News reported that "The only two-seat F/A-18F squadron embarked aboard Truman are the 'Red Rippers' of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 11 from Naval Air Station Oceana, Va."

The carrier operates between twenty-four and thirty-six F/A-18 Super Hornets.

"Both pilots were safely recovered. Initial assessments indicate that one of the crew members sustained minor injuries," CENTCOM said via a media statement. "This incident was not the result of hostile fire, and a full investigation is underway."

Recent Airstrikes On Houthi Positions

The friendly fire incident came just hours after CENTCOM also announced that U.S. forces "conducted precision airstrikes against a missile storage facility and a command-and-control facility operated by Iran-backed Houthis within Houthi-controlled territory in Sana'a, Yemen."

The strikes were meant to "disrupt and degrade" the Houthis' ability to carry out "attacks against U.S. Navy warships and merchant vessels in the Southern Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Gulf of Aden."

CENTCOM added that "During the operation, [its] forces also shot down multiple Houthi one way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA UAV) and an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) over the Red Sea," while acknowledging that the F/A-18s were involved.

The Houthi militants have gained a significant foothold in eastern Yemen, and have been targeting commercial shipping in the region in the guise of support for Hamas in Gaza, since Israel launched its invasion following the October 7, 2023, attacks into southern Israel.

Friendly Fire Incidents Not All That Uncommon

Serious questions will be asked in the hours and days to come as to how the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser mistook the F/A-18 for an enemy—as The Associated Press noted, the "ships in a battle group remain linked by both radar and radio communication."

Yet, as seen in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the fog of war remains a very serious issue, even in the era of advanced technology and improved communication. There have been multiple accounts of Russian air defense systems firing upon, and even shooting down, friendly aircraft. As previously reported, two Sukhoi Su-35 (NATO reporting name Flanker E) have been downed in such incidents in just the past eighteen months.

The U.S. Navy's deployment of warships to the Middle East has been repeatedly described as the most intense naval combat the United States has seen since World War II, as the warships have come until intense missile and drone strikes launched by the Houthis.

This is a developing story.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Anthony E Lim / Shutterstock.com

From the Vault

Could China Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier in a War?

USS Parche: The Navy Submarine That Could Self-Destruct

Roughly 61 percent of Canada’s entire population exists within the two Southeastern provinces of Ontario and Quebec, the home of the Laurentian Elite, which controls the rest of the vast amounts of sparsely populated land. However, a lack of population does not correlate to a lack of importance: Canada’s far north is extremely important to its military grand strategy.

Earlier this month, the Trudeau administration unveiled a thirty-seven-page security policy detailing plans to enhance its military and diplomatic presence in the Arctic, citing rising threats from Russian and Chinese activity.

Why the Sudden Interest?

The new security policy highlights the need for an increased Canadian military presence in the region due to recent close brushes in North American airspace with Russian pilots skirting the line of international boundaries. The report detailed Russian weapons testing and the experimentation of missile systems in the Arctic, which are capable of striking North America and Europe as, “deeply troubling.”

Canada likewise accused China of deploying vessels to carry out civilian and military missions. Collecting data in the region could strengthen Chinese claims that it is a near-Arctic state.

Canadian minister of foreign affairs Melanie Joly claims that “guardrails that prevent conflicts [between China, Russia, and Canada] are increasingly under immense strain…The Arctic is no longer a low-tension region.”

Both powers, but China especially, have been collecting research on potential Arctic trade routes. As climate change affects the far north, the once inhospitable climate and impenetrable ice sheets are more easily broken apart by modern icebreakers. As the ice continues to melt and military technology improves, capitalizing on these trade routes before they become important is vitally important to Chinese and Russian interests.

Canada, as part of this new security strategy, will establish consulates in Anchorage, Alaska, and Nuuk, Greenland, and is set to designate an ambassador to lead and coordinate Canada’s policies and actions in the region. The increased military presence in the area could include deploying new patrol ships and navy destroyers, ice breakers, and submarines capable of operating beneath ice sheets, as well as more aircraft and drones.

Can Canada follow through with the resolutions outlined in the new policy? This remains an open question, but according to the top brass of the Canadian military, the stakes are too high for failure.

Lake Dodson is an Assistant Editor for the National Interest. His interests are Korean-American relations, cybersecurity policy, and nuclear energy/weapons policy. He is currently studying the Korean language, has completed courses on North-South Korean Relations, and has conducted various experiments on an AGN-201K Nuclear Reactor at the prestigious Kyung-hee University in Suwon, South Korea. His specific interests are effective nuclear energy policy, cyber-security, and the economy and politics of East Asia. He holds a BA from the University of Mississippi.

Image Credit: J. Csiki / Shutterstock.com

Assana Bakayoko une jeune femme albinos, rêvait de devenir journaliste. Malheureusement, les discriminations liées à son handicap l’ont écartée de ce métier. Le temps d’un JT, elle a pu vivre sa passion à la télévision en co-présentant l’édition du 20h sur la NCI - La Nouvelle Chaîne Ivoirienne, le mardi 3 décembre dernier, à l’occasion de la journée des personnes handicapées.

C'est une attaque inédite en Croatie. Une élève de 7 ans a été tuée et plusieurs autres blessés ce matin lors d'une attaque au couteau dans une école primaire de Zagreb. Un jour de deuil national a été annoncé pour samedi. Des signes de solidarité sont envoyés de Serbie, frappée par le même type de tragédie en 2023.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Croatie, Société, armes

* * *

Fotó: Szórád Viki

Two fishermen tell the BBC why they have decided to become pirates in search of big ransoms.

Recent news reports indicate that President Biden plans to block Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel based on “national security” concerns, a justification that does not hold up to scrutiny. If these reports are accurate, Biden risks not only dashing the hopes of U.S. Steel’s 22,000 American workers and the communities they sustain economically but also undermining American national security in the process.

This deal promises job security for U.S. Steel’s workers, a substantial infusion of capital and cutting-edge technology for the company, strengthened domestic American steel production, and closer ties with Japan—our most important ally in the Indo-Pacific and an important contributor to the U.S. economy. 

Nippon Steel’s proposal is under review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), a panel comprised of representatives of key federal agencies that assesses foreign investments for potential threats they may pose to national security. It provides recommendations to the president, who has the authority to approve or block transactions.

Last week, The Financial Times reported that both the Pentagon and State Department—member agencies of CFIUS directly engaged in protecting national security—have concluded that the deal poses no national security risks. However, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai, whose job is focused on international trade policy, opposes the acquisition, reportedly due to national security concerns. While Nippon Steel has repeatedly offered to take steps to address her security concerns, Tai has shown no signs of reversing her position. 

Her obstinance is troubling on multiple levels. As a former CFIUS official in the Biden administration aptly put it, “Tai is playing a game that exposes the CFIUS process to becoming a permanent tool of politicians, unreasonably expands the scope of what is considered national security and will force the U.S. to put in writing that Japan is a national security threat, which is simply untrue and detrimental to American security.”

Indeed, Japan is our most important ally in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, President Biden prioritized the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of security and stability in the region when he launched his Indo-Pacific Strategy to address the challenges posed by China. In a rare demonstration of bipartisan consensus, the policies comprising the strategy are largely based on those implemented by the first Trump administration.

Blocking the deal would undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance. As Japanese prime minister Shigeru Ishiba noted just before taking office, rejecting it “could undermine the trust of its allies.” And once in office, he sent a letter to President Biden asking him to reconsider his opposition.

The proposed acquisition aligns with Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in a number of ways, including furthering the concept of “friendshoring” and the practice of building resilient supply chains among trusted allies to reduce reliance on potential adversaries. China’s increased use of its dominance in critical industries as a weapon underscores the importance of this strategy. Beijing, which now produces over half of the world’s crude steel, banned exports of minerals essential for the production of advanced semiconductors and military technologies to the United States just two weeks ago.

The economic benefits of the deal are equally compelling. Nippon Steel is renowned for its cutting-edge technologies that minimize emissions and produce high-quality steel efficiently and cost-effectively. Its investment in U.S. Steel would not only sustain existing jobs but also create new ones. That’s why steelworkers held rallies last week at U.S. Steel facilities in Pennsylvania, Indiana, Minnesota, and Alabama in support of the investment. 

Japanese investment undergirds the U.S.-Japan alliance, linking the economies of the two countries in mutually beneficial ways. Japan already holds $800 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States—more than any other country—while the United States remains Japan’s largest direct foreign investor by far. Japanese companies in the U.S. employ almost one million Americans—more than half of whom are in the manufacturing sector—and account for $80 billion in merchandise exports.

As CFIUS approaches a deadline of December 23 to make its recommendation, President Biden must recognize the strategic and economic merits of this acquisition and allow it to proceed. The proposal represents more than a simple business transaction. It will significantly benefit the American economy, strengthen America’s critical steel manufacturing capabilities, enhance the U.S.-Japan alliance, and bolster our national security. It will also be an important step in securing a bipartisan vision of a secure, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific and a vital measure in countering the economic and geopolitical challenges posed by China. 

Daniel Bob has worked on U.S. foreign and economic policy toward the Indo-Pacific in senior positions in the U.S. Senate and House.

Image: Evgenii Panov / Shutterstock.com.

Pour sa première exposition personnelle à la galerie, Dana Cojbuc fait le choix de réunir différentes séries sur lesquelles elle travaille depuis 2019 et de nombreuses œuvres inédites. Après avoir développé un travail photographique pendant plusieurs années, Dana Cojbuc effectue une singulière et sensible transition vers le dessin. À l'occasion d'une résidence artistique au Sunnhorland Museum en Norvège en 2019, elle passe d'une approche purement photographique à une vision dessinée du (…)

- Agenda / Roumanie, Région parisienne

While Canada’s national stereotype may be an overly polite and homely attitude to an almost comical degree, this certainly was not the case in World War I. In fact, throughout the Western Front, Canadian soldiers were feared for their cunning and brutality toward the Central Powers.

This was displayed in one of Canada’s most mythologized and revered tales of national pride on the battlefield, sandwiched between the infamous trenches of the Somme and the Belgian border: Vimy Ridge.

The Gritty Details

The Battle of Vimy Ridge was fought from April 9-12, 1917. As Canada was still classified as a dominion of the United Kingdom, Canadian troops were usually under the command of a British general, and this battle was no exception. British general Julian Byng alongside Canadian generals Arthur Currie and Andrew McNaughton led the Canadian Corps of the First Army of the United Kingdom.

This trio of Allied forces arrived at Vimy Ridge to dislodge the German Sixth Army and provide relief to the French in the region. To effectively oust the entrenched German forces from the rugged terrain, Currie and McNaughton coordinated a risky creeping barrage artillery tactic. While the idea of firing in front of advancing friendly troops is not a new strategy in war, and was quite common for the Western Front, the Canadians would advance closer than any other army to the barrage of heavy fire falling from the sky. 

It was hazardous, but if it worked, the Canadians would catch the Germans before they could emerge from their hideouts to return fire.

All four Canadian divisions advanced side-by-side for the first time in the war in a single attack on April 9, with over 15,000 Canadian soldiers advancing under the cover of artillery fire. While the casualties on the Canadian side were quite heavy—10,000 over just three days—the Germans were no match for the Canuck onslaught. The final objective, a fortification outside the village of Givenchy-en-Gohelle, fell to the Canadians on April 12.

Legacy

The victory at Vimy Ridge is often seen as a great turning point in Canadian history. It fostered a sense of national pride and unity, which contributed to Canada’s growing desire to be fully autonomous within the British Empire. 

In 1936, the Canadian National Vimy Memorial was unveiled on the ridge, commemorating the sacrifices of those who fought and died there.

Today, Vimy Ridge remains a symbol of Canadian resilience and achievement. The battle’s legacy is a testament to the courage and determination of those who served in the Great War, shaping Canada’s identity as a nation.

Lake Dodson is an Assistant Editor for the National Interest. His interests are Korean-American relations, cybersecurity policy, and nuclear energy/weapons policy. He currently studies the Korean language and has completed courses on North-South Korean Relations and conducted various experiments on an AGN-201K Nuclear Reactor at the prestigious Kyung-hee University in Suwon, South Korea. His specific interests are effective nuclear energy policy, cyber-security, and the economy and politics of East Asia. He holds a BA from the University of Mississippi.  

Image Credit: EB Adventure Photography / Shutterstock.com

So it appears the congressionally mandated National Commission on the Future of the Navy has commenced work at long last. As Breaking Defense recalls, the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act instituted the eight-member commission to “undertake a comprehensive study of the structure of the Navy and policy assumptions related to the size and force mixture of the Navy, in order to:

I) Make recommendations on the size and force mixture of ships 

II) to make recommendations on the size and force mixture of naval aviation.” 

Commissioners were supposed to have wrapped up their reportage and recommendations by now, but several lawmakers were tardy about nominating members. They have since remedied that.

Leaving naval aviation aside, here’s some counsel on future fleet design courtesy of the greats in the field. Historian and theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan advised fleet architects to center forces on “capital ships,” heavy hitters capable of dishing out and absorbing major blows in bouts with rival capital ships. 

A brawl between capital-ship fleets determines which force will command the sea, barring the maritime common to enemy naval and mercantile shipping while putting the common to use for strategic gain of its own. For Mahan, these brawlers are the decisive implement of naval strategy. 

He writes that “the backbone and real power of any navy are the vessels which, by a due proportion of defensive and offensive powers, are capable of taking and giving hard knocks. All others are but subservient to these, and exist only for them.”

Capital ships could dish out and withstand extreme punishment.

Commissioners should ponder these bracing words: was Mahan right about the primacy of the capital ship, does such a ship ride the waves today, and if so, what is it? 

Today’s capital ship is not the steam-driven battleship, the apex predator of Mahan’s day. The supercarrier has had a long and successful run at the forefront of American sea power. Whether it has run its course should and doubtless will be central to the commission’s debates. Maybe the guided-missile destroyer is the new capital ship, especially as new weaponry comes online, amplifying a tin can reach and destructive potential against hostile capital ships and aircraft. Maybe it’s an attack submarine if armed with some of that same long-range precision firepower.

Or maybe, bewildering the ghost of Mahan, there is no singular capital ship in today’s high-tech age. Dispersed swarms of small combatants able to concentrate firepower at the time and place of battle could be what hands the U.S. Navy a decisive edge in combat. Such a force would boast substantial offensive striking power in Mahanian parlance, while brute numbers along with dispersion in physical space would constitute its defensive power. 

Such a fighting force could lose substantial numbers of hulls to enemy action while, like the armored battleship of yesteryear, remaining resilient enough to stand in action against enemy ships of the line. That’s what happens when only a small percentage of a fleet’s fighting strength resides in any given hull.

Build Small, Lose Small

Speaking of which, Mahan goes on to propose a “broad formula” for gauging a navy’s sufficiency for ambient strategic surroundings. How to size a fleet or fleet contingent? The enemy force acts as a yardstick. 

The historian declares that a force must be “great enough to take the sea and to fight, with reasonable chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it…” 

The answer is simple: the friendly force must match up with the most powerful rival force likely to appear on the scene of battle. In the age of Mahan, determining the proportions of that hostile force demanded that U.S. commanders know their prospective foe, judging how compelling its interests were in the Western Hemisphere, the likeliest battleground, and thus how large a share of its fleet the hostile leadership would commit to action there. A potential antagonist like Great Britain or imperial Germany had commitments elsewhere around the globe that likewise demanded forces.

What London or Berlin could spare for Western Hemisphere contingencies after factoring in competing demands set the benchmark for U.S. naval adequacy at likely flashpoints. America need not run an open-ended arms race to accomplish its goals in expanses its leadership and society cared about.

However, commissioners need to update and amend the Mahanian formula, which after all is of 1890s vintage, for contemporary times and surroundings. He was writing for the America of his day, a rising maritime power on the make that aspired to predominance in its near seas, chiefly the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico. 

In other words, he was thinking in terms of regional defense of American waters, where the United States enjoyed the advantages that go to any home team even when confronted by a brawnier away team.

But where Mahan was contemplating how to dominate the Americas’ near seas against a distant aggressor, today’s U.S. Navy will be the distant contender trying to outmuscle a regional defender in its near seas. From regional to global: Marine history has witnessed an acute case of role reversal since the time of Mahan.

This is where Mahan’s English contemporary and foil Julian S. Corbett comes in. Unlike Mahan, the evangelist of regional sea power, Corbett was writing for the Royal Navy, a globe-spanning force that did little but play away games across an empire on which the sun never set. That’s because such a force, the Royal Navy back then, the U.S. Navy today, is typically scattered across the nautical chart performing a multitude of errands at the behest of political magnates. 

No force, not even the world’s supreme sea force, can be stronger than every potential opponent, every place, all the time. Naval affairs don’t work that way. Oceans and seas are too big, challenges too numerous, and the biggest navy too small.

Corbett grasped that a contender can be globally superior yet locally inferior. That being the case, officialdom had to devise workarounds to offset and overcome regional opponents’ homefield advantages.

To prevail in a contest off faraway shores, Corbett beseeched Royal Navy commanders to learn to play what he called “active defense” at the outset of the war. Active defense is a strategy whereby weak but cagey combatants flip the script on the strong over time and win. Practitioners of active defense try to balk at a locally superior antagonist’s strategy, keeping it from achieving its goals, and to weaken that antagonist while they gather combat power at the scene of battle sufficient to prevail. 

Corbett was no defeatist, then. He was all about offense and decisive victory at sea, just like his American counterpart. He merely saw victory as something that the Royal Navy would attain ultimately but probably not on day one of a high-seas conflict, the way too-exuberant navalists insisted. That’s why the English sage inveighed vehemently against chest-thumping among the Royal Navy old guard, whose Mahanians insisted that “seeking out” the enemy fleet in its home waters at the outset of war constituted the be-all-and-end-all of naval strategy.

In place of triumphalism, Corbett prescribed sobriety, realism, and patience. In a humble scribe’s view, molding attitudes represents probably his greatest single contribution to maritime strategic theory. 

No One Can Play Offense All the Time

Jointery, the art and science of getting armed services that inhabit different domains to work together in harmony, is his other great contribution. Corbett insisted that the fleet was not a war-winning implement in itself. It was an enabler that helped the army achieve its goals on dry earth. After all, land is the decisive theater in any war. People live there, therefore wars are settled there, and he was right. 

Here again, though, we see some role reversal between then and now. Corbett saw the navy as an implement for projecting power ashore in support of ground forces. That function endures. Today, though, ground-based air and missile forces working in concert with numerous, light, short-range naval forces can make things exceedingly tough on hostile fleets prowling offshore.

Corbett foresaw this turn of events at least dimly. He bewailed a technological “revolution” that seemed to render traditional fleet design, rooted in practices from the age of sail, moot. In the past, ships of the line had little need to concern themselves with lesser warships. Gunnery was the measure of a ship in yesteryear. Capital ships mounted more guns and would blast ships from lesser rates to kindling if challenged. 

That mismatch began to erode during the age of steam, as newfangled weaponry such as torpedoes and sea mines made its debut. All of a sudden small craft, rudimentary submarines, torpedo boats, and minelayers could do grave harm to capital ships that ventured within their reach.

Corbett called these flotilla craft, and he fretted at how they had upended his scheme for fleet design.

If new technology superempowered the flotilla in Corbett’s lifetime, it has hyperempowered it in ours. In particular, long-range, precision anti-ship cruise missiles have given surface patrol craft and submarines deadly striking power for any navy that avails itself of them. Commissioners should look at this as both a danger and an opportunity for the U.S. Navy. 

It’s a danger because potential foes like China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy have already installed anti-ship cruise missiles in a variety of platforms specifically to assail U.S. and allied surface navies. It’s an opportunity because the U.S. Navy can reciprocate. The commission should exhort Congress and the Pentagon not only to arm every hull in the inventory but to propagate hard-hitting flotilla vessels, crewed and, potentially, uncrewed, of America’s own. Stationed in embattled regions such as East Asia, such craft can help deny antagonists access to waterways where they must go to accomplish their aims.

Waterways such as the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea.

Swarms of flotilla ships acting in unison are sea-denial platforms par excellence, ideally suited for the opening phase of active defense against aggression. They can help confound an aggressor’s strategy until the U.S. Pacific Fleet and affiliated joint and allied forces can assemble in the theater in numbers. Buying time, weakening the foe, and amassing friendly forces is what active defense is all about.

This brings us from the greats of strategy to a few more specific items for the National Commission on the Future of the Navy to consider. The budget for sea power looms large, of course. More of everything is desirable considering how lean and fragile the U.S. Navy force structure has become since the Cold War. 

However, our Republic can afford more. Spurred by the fall of France in 1940, Congress set the Two-Ocean Navy Act in motion on the heels of several humbler naval expansion acts. By the end of fighting in 1945, the navy had swelled to close to 7,000 hulls of all types. Then the United States spent an average of six percent of GDP for the next four decades waging the Cold War.

That far exceeds what we spend today relative to our means. My back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that defense spending for 2023 came to three percent of GDP almost exactly. In other words, the republic can double expenditures on sea power should the government and society resolve to do so. Commissioners should impress on lawmakers, the incoming administration, and the larger society that they are making a conscious strategic choice if they decline to support more generous defense budgets. 

They are choosing not to compete with the Chinas, Russias, and Irans of the world, or to support longstanding allies, partners, and friends such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines.

They are choosing to relinquish America’s standing in world affairs.

Leave aside the glamour platforms that dominate discourses about force structure. They will get their due in the commission’s work. Here are some relatively low-cost ways to boost numbers and firepower in the U.S. Navy fleet in the fairly near term, if indeed more shipbuilding dollars are in the offing. 

First, retrofitting littoral combat ships with anti-ship cruise missiles is a start. An obvious one. “LCS is back!” proclaimed Secretary of the Navy Carlos not long ago, pointing to the installation of cruise missile launchers aboard these long-troubled small surface combatants. Are these ideal platforms to anchor an active defense, or for any other function? 

No. But they are hulls displacing water, of which the U.S. Navy has few to hand, and they are big enough to carry armaments useful for sea-denial missions. Neglecting to wring value out of them would amount to fleet-design malpractice.

Second, expanding the submarine fleet is a must. Yet the submarine industrial base is struggling to reach production rates needed to expand the U.S. Navy undersea contingent, let alone supply several nuclear-powered attack boats (SSNs) to the Royal Australian Navy as promised under the AUKUS arrangement. The U.S. Navy SSN contingent is limping along at about half its numbers from the late Cold War years. China poses challenges of at least the same dimensions as the Soviet Union. History thus implies that at least doubling the U.S. inventory of submarines would be a prudent move.

But submarines need not be nuclear-propelled to be effective. Many legends of undersea warfare were not. The good news is that conventional subs are cheap by contrast with their atomic-powered brethren. Japan’s latest diesel-electric sub, Taigei, runs the Japanese people about $720 million per copy, whereas a U.S. Navy Virginia-class SSN sets the American people back about $4.5 billion per hull. In other words, buying Japanese could provide our navy with six diesel boats, plus a little, for the price of one Virginia. Nuclear propulsion is desirable, but we need hulls in the water to compete strategically and fast. Nukes are not going to get it done. 

SSN construction is not going to expand the fleet noticeably in any timeframe that matters.

Diesels are Good Enough, Buy Some

Third, it’s high time to start fielding small surface combatants in bulk, the way service doctrine says should be done. Designs are readily available and in production. The U.S. Coast Guard operates fifty-eight fast response cutters that could be repurposed as U.S. Navy small surface combatants with relative ease. These cutters are a bargain at $65 million per copy, compared to around $2.5 billion for a frontline Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer. That’s thirty-eight gray-hulled combatants bearing anti-ship munitions for the price of one destroyer, cheap by today’s standards. 

Let’s purchase a seventy-six-ship flotilla for $5 billion. Forward-deployed to the first island chain, that would start looking like a swarm.

And antagonists would weep and gnash teeth.

Fifth, the commission should review plans for a medium landing ship (LSM), the workhorse vessel the U.S. Marine Corps wants to shift Marine Littoral Regiments along the first island chain to help the fleet with sea denial and active defense. The LSM is supposed to be a truck for hauling troops and their gear across relatively short distances. It should be simple and cheap. And yet the program has stalled, years after the Marine Corps leadership declared a requirement for it in 2019. 

This is a travesty. Commissioners should take a stand on this controversy one way or the other. Better to ditch operational concepts that depend on a contingent of LSMs if that contingent will be built too late to make good on them, as appears likely.

After all, a strategy or operational design without the implements to execute it is a wish. The commission can foster clarity on island-chain operations, helping the Marine Corps define its role as an adjunct to the fleet in sea-denial operations.

And lastly, logistics. This one hardly requires belaboring. Between the U.S. Maritime Sealift Command, Merchant Marine, and Maritime Administration, the United States fields roughly as many logistics vessels as it lost to enemy action, sunk or damaged, during the horrific opening months of World War II. 

Here’s an anecdote for you: when asked what the decisive ingredients of U.S. victory in the Pacific War had been, wartime Japanese prime minister Hideki Tojo picked three: U.S. island-hopping strategy, U.S. submarine operations against Japanese shipping, and the U.S. Navy’s ability to rearm, refuel, and reprovision at sea.

Notice that two of those three relate intimately to logistics. U.S. Pacific Fleet submarines raided the fleet of Japanese merchant vessels that carried raw materials hither and yon, binding together a scattered island empire. Sinking the logistics fleet helped dismember the Japanese Empire. Moreover, the U.S. Navy could fight more or less constantly because of lavish logistical support. Ships of war didn’t have to be put into port to restock with beans, bullets, and black oil, exiting the combat zone and depriving the fleet of their firepower. They could remain on station.

The service desperately needs to rediscover that philosophy. Whether it’s building new support ships at U.S. yards, buying from Korean or Japanese yards, or whatever—we need to restore our logistical dominance, pronto. Any war effort will fail without supply.

Strategy, operations, fleet design. So there are some observations from the masters of strategy, and a few from the cheap seats, as the commissioners set about their deliberations. Let’s wish them well and heed what they have to say.

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

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