The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN)

Afghanistan’s parliament has relocated to a new building of Indian construction in Kabul. Moreover, a date has finally been set for the next parliamentary elections. With the parliament’s term extended until the elections, it has another year of sessions, which raises the issue of its very legality. AAN researcher Salima Ahmadi (with contributions from senior analyst Thomas Ruttig) explains how the two chambers are elected and how they function, focusing on the lower house. Salima also looks at the dispute surrounding the legal status and legitimacy of the parliament, and comes to the conclusion that, constitutionally, there is no provision that authorizes the president to extend the parliament’s term.

On 13 January 2016, a week before Members of Parliament (MPs) went into winter recess (a 45 days break, see here), the members of the Wolesi Jirga, the Lower House of Parliament, held their first session in the new parliament building. The new complex is a “symbolic gift of democracy”  by the Indian government to Afghanistan. It covers 100 acres of land and its construction, which began between 2007 and 2009 (depending on the source), cost 200 million US dollars. The complex includes two session halls, one for the Wolesi Jirga, with a capacity for 294 seats and one with 190 seats for the Meshrano Jirga. Both leave space for the eventuality of an increase in the houses’ membership. Additionally, the building comprises five halls for parliamentary commission sessions, conference, press, computer and dining rooms, a library and a mosque able to accommodate 400 worshippers. Working offices for MPs have yet to be built but there is a plan to add them in the future. In 2005, former King Zahir Shah, then President Hamid Karzai and then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, laid the foundation stone (see here). The new central building – a mixture of Moghul-style and modern architecture, with a copper dome and marble works, is named “Atal Block”, after former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It was inaugurated on 25 December 2015 by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an official visit to Kabul. (Read the full text of his inauguration speech here.)

Exterior of the new parliament building while still under construction (Photo Credit: Baser Mobarez)

Of some symbolism, perhaps, is that the new parliament complex is located close to the Dar-ul-Aman Palace in the southwest of Kabul, built under King Amanullah (1919-29) by German architects but destroyed beyond repair during a 1990 military coup attempt. Often mistakenly referred to as the ‘King’s Palace’, it was originally meant to house the first Afghan parliament.

The ruined Dar-ul-Aman palace. Photo: Thomas Ruttig.

Despite the new parliament building having already been inaugurated, various sections remain unfinished. As the author observed at the end of January, carpeting, furniture and other interior elements are still missing. There are also problems with the sound system in the Wolesi Jirga hall that make it difficult for reporters and observers to make out MPs’ discussions. The Indian cabinet has approved additional funding to address these problems. Like the old building, the new one is not equipped with an electronic voting system. Thus, red or green cards are still used as ‘no’ or ‘yes’ votes.

The Meshrano Jirga (parliament’s upper house), the commissions of the lower house and other parliamentary staff continue to work in the old parliament building. All members of staff are expected to start work in the new building before 6 March 2016, the beginning of the new session.

Facts and Figures

The National Assembly (Shura-ye Melli) of Afghanistan consists of two houses, the Wolesi Jirga (House of People) and the (De) Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), also known as the Senate. This bicameral model was inaugurated in the 1964 constitution and the stipulation was renewed in the 2004 constitution. The current Wolesi Jirga represents the 16th legislative term since parliament was first established under reformer-King Amanullah (1919-29) (1), and the second legislative term following the collapse of the Taleban regime.

According to the Constitution, the Wolesi Jirga has 249 members and 68 of those seats are allocated to women through a quota system. Currently, however, there are 69 women in parliament as one woman was able to secure enough votes to enter parliament even without this quota. The Constitution stipulates that there must be “at least, on average” two women from each of the 34 provinces (Art 83). Of these 68 seats, three are allocated to Kuchi women. (2)

Members of parliament are elected in a general election every five years – the last election took place in 2010. The one following this should have been held at the latest by June 2015, but has now been scheduled for 15 October 2016 – AAN analysis here.

The overall membership of the current Wolesi Jirga has been reduced from 249 to 246 as a result of terrorist attacks, whereby three MPs were murdered. (3) However, there is a legal provision stipulating that their seats be left open. Between 2005-10, when there was an even higher number of such incidents, victims were simply replaced. The candidate who had secured the next largest number of votes would assume the vacant position. However, given that he/she may have been a political opponent, this practice, which was widely known as the “assassination clause,” was seen as possibly encouraging of such acts. Therefore, this practice was altered and   now only those MPs who die of natural causes are replaced, and only “if more than one year remains until the end of the term of office of Wolesi Jirga.” (4) So far the only MP replaced has been Shahnaz Hemati from Herat province, who died in a car accident. The next female runner up for Herat province, Semin Barakzai, took her seat.

Other replacements of MPs occurred because at least seven MPs from the current parliament resigned ahead of the 2014 presidential elections in order to campaign for presidency or other key positions in the government. The parliament replaced the resigning MPs, including Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq, Sayyed Ishaq Gailani, Sayyed Hussain Anwari, Abdul Rab Rassul Sayyaf, Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali, Sayyed Hussain Alami Balkhi, and Ibrahim Qasemi. However, later on in 2014, other MPs resigned as well ahead of the second round of the presidential elections because they were hoping for key positions in the new government (such as ministers, for example.) Those who resigned were not replaced, as this parliament entered its last year of tenure.

The Meshrano Jirga has 102 members, three individuals from each of the 34 provinces. A third of them are appointed by the president for a five-year term, but President Ghani has just extended the term of these appointed members until the end of the 16th period of the Wolesi Jirga (see here). The remaining two thirds are elected from both district and provincial councils. The members of each of the 34 provincial councils must elect one parliamentary representative from among themselves, as should all district council members for each province. Half of the president’s appointees should be women. The Meshrano Jirga also has two seats reserved for Kuchi and two seats for the disabled and impaired. (5)

As no district council elections have yet taken place, it was decided on 20 February 2011 by presidential decree (during Hamed Karzai’s tenure) to put in place an interim measure to temporarily fill the missing seats of the district council representatives with 34 provincial council representatives. Thus, instead of selecting only one provincial council representation for the Meshrano Jirga, each provincial council selected two.  However, on 18 January 2015, President Ghani informed the Meshrano Jirga in a letter that “he could not nominate anyone for the Senate seats reserved for district council representatives” – and that therefore the Meshrano Jirga would only consists of 69 members until the district council elections are completed.

How is the Wolesi Jirga elected?

Neither the Afghan Constitution nor the Electoral Law specify which electoral system is used for the parliamentary elections. Article 24 para 1 of the 2014 gazetted Election Law  notes that the candidates with the most votes will be awarded a seat. A system based on the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) was eventually chosen. (6)

In a SNTV system, candidates run as individuals (as independent or political party candidates) but not on a party list. Candidates also stand in multi-member constituencies and the female quota has to be figured in. Constituencies are the same throughout the 34 provinces. The number of seats is allocated according to their respective population size. For example, in Kabul province there are 33 Wolesi Jirga seats, out of which nine are for females. These seats are then given to candidates who receive the most votes, regardless of gender. If, however, female candidates do not win at least the number of seats reserved by law for their province, the women who win the most votes among all female candidates will then be allocated those reserved seats. This prevents the fixed quota from indirectly setting a limit on how many female candidates can be elected in each constituency.

Controversially, while ten seats in the Wolesi Jirga are reserved for Kuchis, none are set aside for the Hindu or Sikh minorities (see AAN’s previous report here). This proposal was part of a reform packet submitted by the Electoral Reform Commission, however it was rejected by parliament.

How does parliament function?

According to the Afghan constitution, the parliament is the highest legislative organ in the country (Art 81) and has the power to ratify and approve laws, legislative decrees and budgets (Art 90). All legislation must be approved by both Houses and endorsed by the president. (7) Each House has an administrative board (the president, the vice-presidents, the secretary and assistant secretary) as outlined in chapter 3 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga that prepares and presides over the plenary sessions, standing commissions (ad-hoc commissions can also be appointed for specific tasks), a Committee of Presidents (of the Commissions), joint committees (between the upper and lower house, and within the lower house) and a General Secretariat (in charge of the minutes of the meetings and in control of the speakers list).

The Wolesi Jirga holds regular plenary sessions three times a week, on Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays. From 6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016, the Wolesi Jirga held 51 plenary sessions. Each year the parliament has two sittings, divided by a winter (45 days: 20 January to 5 March 2016) and a summer recess (45 days: 23 July 2015- 6 September 2015). The Wolesi Jirga’s president/speaker of the house is elected for the term of legislature, which is five years. The remainder of the administrative board (the first, second vice presidents/speakers, secretary and assistant secretary) is elected for a one-year term. Following the winter recess, there is a vote under the supervision of the Speaker of the House, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, to elect new first and second vice presidents, and both a secretary and an assistant secretary to the Wolesi Jirga.

In the plenary sessions, all MPs must be present and these sessions are broadcast live on the parliament’s own TV channel. Each session has two parts, the ‘free hour’ discussion (usually from 8:00 to 10:30 am), in which MPs can suggest topics or make statements and set the agenda for the session. In the latter part, only those issues approved in advance by the Committee of the Heads of the Wolesi Jirga’s commission are discussed. Key government officials may be summoned, questioned and – if 2/3 of those MPs present agree – subjected to a vote of no confidence. Since the end of the summer recess, two ministers have been summoned but both survived a vote of no confidence.

Standing Commissions of the Wolesi Jirga

Commissions are specialised bodies that deal with specific issues on different topics. They discuss and review draft legislation before it is added to the plenary session’s agenda for discussion and vote. The commissions hold sessions twice a week, on Sundays and Tuesdays.

There used to be 18 standing commissions of the Wolesi Jirga (see list of commissions and members in Dari) but on 28 December 2015 the House amended its Internal Rules of Procedures and reduced their number to 15. (8)

There are no strict criteria for how an MP becomes a member of one of these commissions, or of which one. The Wolesi Jirga Rules of Procedures only indicate that “each member based on their profession and experience could choose a committee,” and that “each Standing Committee shall be composed of 10 to 25 Members.”

A low attendance rate in the Wolesi Jirga was also reflected in the commissions, and reported to affect the quality of their work. Many MPs complained about flaws and problems in legislation put up for voting in the plenary. Talking to AAN, legislator Haji Abduh, head of the Judicial and Justice Commission, stated that “out of 25 members only about five to seven showed up in the commission meetings.”

Security challenges

During the Wolesi Jirga’s first post-Taleban term, mainly individual MPs were targeted by insurgents; now it seems the parliament has also become a target. During its session on 22 June 2015, the Wolesi Jirga hall was attacked precisely when MPs were due to review the government nominee – Muhammad Masum Stanekzai – for the defence minister’s position. The attack began with a suicide car bomb detonating at the front gate of the compound. While the attackers were unable to penetrate the parliament building itself, the explosion caused damage to the structure and slight injuries to observers. No MPs were wounded or killed but two passers-by, a woman and a child, died while dozens of others were injured (see report here). In another incident in November 2014, Shukria Barakzai, an outspoken MP and women’s rights advocate, survived a suicide attack on her vehicle near parliament, on the Dar-ul-Aman Road; she was slightly wounded.

Is parliament legal at the moment?

The current Wolesi Jirga was elected on 18 September 2010 and its regular term was supposed to end on 22 June 2015. The Afghan Constitution states in Article 83 “…the work period of the House of People shall terminate, after the disclosure of the results of the elections, on the 1st of Saratan [22 June] of the fifth year [of its term] and the new parliament shall commence work.” This effectively means that new parliamentary elections should have taken place and the election results announced before 1 Saratan 1394 (22 June 2015). The new parliament should have started work on that date. However, elections were postponed as the NUG (National Unity Government) had promised an electoral reform (see previous AAN report here. Given this has not happened, there is now some confusion both within and outside parliament as to whether the current Wolesi Jirga is even legal.

The current parliament’s mandate expired on 22 June 2015 without new representatives having been elected and without a new election date having been set at that point. In order to avoid a legal and constitutional vacuum that might have led the country even deeper into crisis, President Ashraf Ghani extended the parliament’s term on 19 June 2015. (9) It allowed MPs to continue their work until the next parliamentary elections were held – whenever that would be.

The extension of the parliament’s tenure was welcomed by some MPs, who believed it to be a necessary step to prevent a deepening crisis in the country. Some of them may have been motivated by the chance to remain in their positions in order to enjoy their privileges and powers. Other MPs and some legal experts – including the typically vocal and popular Ramadan Bashardost – vehemently opposed the decree. By invoking popular hearsay, he indirectly accused MPs from the first group of “trading” with government leaders, extending parliament’s term “in exchange for collecting votes in their favor in the second round of presidential elections.”  Gul Rahman Qazi, a law professor and chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Commission in the previous administration, stated “at the outset of the new government, first our executive power lost its legitimacy, because it is formed based on a so-called political agreement.” “Apart from that, we are witnessing that the judiciary’s power is being run by an acting head that entirely has no legitimate reference in the constitutional law, either. As a final point, we have our legislative power, whose term will end,” (see here). According to MPs and experts, the extension of parliament is “arbitrary” and a “violation of the constitution,” and the continuing functioning of the House of Representatives beyond 22 June 2015 illegal.

The debate about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the Wolesi Jirga’s continuing work has caused many MPs to stop coming to (most of) the plenary sessions. The attendance rate – already low and often too low for a vote – has sunk to an alarming level. Some MPs only turn up when votes are due, particularly regarding new government appointments. A number of MPs, including Bashardost, Baktash Seyawash and Farkhunda Zahra Naderi, as well as around 20 others, have ceased to attend plenary sessions altogether as a sign of protest, while stopping short of officially resigning (this group have also boycotted appointment sessions.) Nevertheless, MPs in nearly all sessions demanded that an election timeline, including a new election date, be set.

That parliament in its diminished form rejected the presidential decree on the Structure, Authorities and Duties of the electoral bodies (part of the demanded electoral reform, see here), reflects the controversy between the Ghani camp and the Abdullah camp about what exactly should be reformed in the legal and institutional framework of the elections. It also shows that both camps are able to muster a quorum when such key decisions have to be taken.

But even in this, there is a problem of legality. According to the constitution, the Wolesi Jirga does not have the authority to alter election-related laws in the last year of its tenure. Current confusion regarding the Wolesi Jirga’s legal situation as well as the election issue in general, including the need for electoral reform and what this should entail, is the result of half-solutions for legal and technical problems that have been mounting since the first electoral cycle of 2004/05. This not only throws into question the legality of the forthcoming elections (possibly going ahead without significant reform), but also the legitimacy of some of Afghanistan’s key institutions.

(This dispatch will be followed by an analysis of what the Wolesi Jirga did during its last sitting from 6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016, and how it performed.)

 

(1) The constitution (nezamnama) of 20 Hamal 1302 (9 April 1923) established an advisory “State Council,” consisting of equal numbers of members appointed by the king and elected “by the people.” Neither the overall number of council members nor the election system was specified.

(2) The second clause of Article 83 of the Constitution stipulates “the number of the members of the House of People shall be proportionate to the population of each constituency, not exceeding the maximum of two hundred and fifty individuals. Electoral constituencies as well as other related issues shall be determined by the elections law. The election laws shall adopt measures to attain, through the electoral system, general and fair representation for all the people of the country, and proportionate to the population of every province, on average, at least two females shall be the elected members of the House of People from each province.” For some provinces – such as Nimruz, Panjshir and Nuristan – with a relatively small population, the total number of seats in parliament might equal the total number of seats reserved for women per province (see a previous AAN report here).

Based on a complicated system of seat allocation, some provinces might in fact also have fewer than two seats reserved for women. As stated in the law, it is important to note that on average at least two seats should be allocated – meaning not every province will have exactly two seats for women.

(3) Overall, in two parliamentary terms, 14 members of the Wolesi Jirga and 3 members of the Meshrano Jirga have been killed in suicide attacks. In the second parliamentary term, three MPs were murdered. In 2011, Mohammad Hashem Watanwal, an MP from Uruzgan province, was killed. Later that year, Abdul Mutaleb Beg, an MP from Takhar, was assassinated. In 2012, Ahmad Khan Samangani, from Samangan province, was killed (see here).

(4) According to a long-term parliamentary observer, with whom AAN spoke, there had been a vote at one point during the 15th legislative term when Qanoni was the speaker, where the MPs voted to only replace those MPs who die of natural causes. Furthermore, the Analysis of the Electoral Legal Framework of Afghanistan (2006) by Dennis Ennis, discusses options for the replacement of elected members who due to death or other reasons can no longer hold his/her seat. He mentioned a December 2005 Presidential “decree amending the Electoral Law to provide for by-elections when elected members die of unnatural causes,” which AAN was not able to locate and which has also never been put in practice.

(5) Article 84 of the constitution stipulates that Meshrano Jirga members sent through the district councils are elected for three-year terms, those through the provincial councils for a four-year term and those nominated by the president for five-year terms, adding to Afghanistan’s already full electoral calendar. The individuals elected lose their membership in the related council and are replaced by the runners-up in the elections for the respective council.

(6) The final decision in favour of SNTV was taken by President Karzai who, in May 2004 (before the presidential election) effectuated a cabinet decision to that avail. This, however, was preceded by an intervention by then US president George W Bush, as described by Scott Smith, himself a former UN official in Afghanistan, in his book Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition (quoted from the first Indian edition, New Delhi 2012, 160): Then US ambassador Zalmai Khalilzad “intervened brusquely at a meeting with United Nations officials and diplomats in Kabul to declare that he had just spoken to President Bush, who said ‘SNTV is the choice. SNTV is going to happen.’”

The AREU, that had already dissected the SNTV system in detail in this 2004/05 briefing paper, concluded in another 2004 report authored by Andrew Wilder: “SNTV (…) is the wrong system for Afghanistan.” (on p 45)

In a 2012 report, AREU further wrote:

In Afghanistan, the birth of SNTV was initially something of an accident, engendered by a widespread distrust of political parties associated with the Communist and civil war eras, a misunderstanding of the implications of having a single vote for individual candidates in large multi-member constituencies, and a possible strategy on the part of the executive to limit the emergence of organised opposition. In 2004, a provincially-based list PR system was promoted by the UN as the most appropriate for elections to the Afghan Wolesi Jirga, but there was reportedly a misstep in the adoption of the rules when they came before the cabinet. After the UN-crafted proportional electoral system was poorly explained by an Afghan cabinet minister, President Karzai changed the proposed provincially-based list PR system to SNTV by simply pronouncing that voters would select a candidate rather than a party, list or block, and that candidates could not show party affiliation on the ballot. The electoral law decreed in 2004.

Thus announced that voters would choose between individual candidates rather than parties, but still in the multi-member provincial constituencies originally intended for use in the list-PR system. There has also been significant speculation that, while Karzai’s distaste for parties may have been genuine, the administration’s adoption of SNTV (or at least its support of its continued use into 2005 and beyond) was also a strategic calculation aimed at weakening parties’ potential as sources of political opposition.

More information about SNTV technicalities in Afghanistan in this fact sheet jointly written by the UN and one of Afghanistan’s former electoral bodies here.

(7) Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga – the text of a Bill approved by the House of People shall be submitted to the House of Elders.

Rule 90 – If one House rejects or amends the Bill approved by the other, a Joint Commission composed of an equal number of Members from each House shall be formed to resolve the difference, in accordance with article 100 of the Constitution.

The Standing Committee responsible for the Bill shall propose Members to sit on this Commission and the list of members must be approved by the House in a plenary sitting.

(8) The Counter-Narcotics Commission was included in the Health, Youth, Work and Labour Commission, the Martyrs and Disabled Commission was included in the Nomads, Tribal Affairs and Refugees Commission and the Lower House Commission on MPs’ Rights, Protection and Privileges was included in the Complaints and Petitions Commission.

(9) It is not quite clear by what measure the term was extended. International media claimed that it was done by a presidential decree (see here and here). However, Afghan media described the process as the president making a statement/declaration/proclamation, the Wolesi Jirga then discussed it and approved it by majority vote. See here in English, and here (statement approved by majority vote), and here (statement) in Dari.

In the last two months of 2015, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) conducted a significant counteroffensive to remove the Taleban from areas just outside Kunduz city as well as from a number of its outlying district centres. Since recapturing the city on 13 October 2015, efforts have barely had an impact, especially in the districts. Yet, it was Taleban control of such key districts that rendered Kunduz city so vulnerable in the first place – and the continuing control over parts of these districts keeps it that way. Obaid Ali examines the still precarious situation in two key districts, the Taleban strongholds of Chahrdara and Dasht-e Archi, as well as the lessons (so far failed to be learnt) from President Ghani’s Kunduz Fact-Finding Delegation report. He also looks at the increasing presence of Jundullah in Kunduz, a relatively new Uzbek insurgent group, and its relationship with the Taleban.

The two-week offensive by the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ending on 13 October 2015, finally pushed the Taleban back far enough to be able to recapture Kunduz city (read our previous analysis here). However, fear and anxiety following the fall of the city to the Taleban in late September 2015 remain both inside and outside of the provincial capital. Local residents are also concerned that the city might fall again to the insurgency. The reason: The Taleban retain control of certain outlying areas of the municipality from where they continue to pose a serious challenge to government employees attempting to travel even just a few kilometres beyond the city’s fringes. According to locals, the Taleban control several villages on the capital’s immediate periphery –including Alikhel to the south, Hazrat Sultan in the northeast and Gor Tepa in the northwest. The latter was a crucial launch pad for the September 2015 attack.

Residents of Kunduz to whom AAN spoke expected that the ANSF would conduct thorough clearance operations in and around the city to eliminate remaining insurgent threats. This has not happened, and the city remains vulnerable (read short reports here and here).

A ‘district gap’ in the Kunduz fact-finding report

The loss of control over some of the province’s critical districts was an important point that the Kunduz Fact-Finding Delegation failed to highlight. The delegation, which was appointed by President Muhammad Ashraf Ghani in October 2015, submitted its final report on 21 November 2015 during a press conference in Kabul. (1) In its report, the delegation laid out what it perceived to be the “major factors” in the fall of Kunduz: weaknesses in the security forces’ leadership in Kunduz, a de facto power vacuum in the city,  the convoluted decision-making system within the National Security Council (NSC) (2) and the “misuse of state resources and facilities.” (On the last point, no details were mentioned in the public version of the report, which appears to be only an excerpt or a summary of parts of the complete report handed over to the National Security Council). It was further highlighted that the many layers of civil and military government authorities in Kunduz created a “mistrustful and ambiguous environment” at the local level because various security force entities were not cooperating well with each other. The report also stated that due to a lack of any single command among the security forces, prior threats received about a possible attack on the city were not taken seriously.

It came as a surprise that the report neither attempted to assess the capacity of the Taleban at the local level nor that it addressed the continuing challenges to the city’s security situation emanating from key neighbouring districts (see here for AAN reporting on the security dynamics in Kunduz province, highlighting potential threats the insurgency has posed to Kunduz for a number of years). For example, the report does not indicate the number of insurgents involved in the attack, nor does it explain how the Taleban leadership, at the local level, was able to organise this first large-scale attack on a major urban area since 2001. Neither does the report mention the district centres that fell immediately following the collapse of the city, or hint at the struggle the ANSF have faced in the province since the recapturing of its capital. The public version of the report received by AAN seems to focus on government sources only – while not even providing basic information about the insurgency that was reportedly available to the local NDS at the time of the attack. However, this very information is essential to the ANSF, who are still struggling to wrest control from the insurgents in key districts.

Speaking to AAN, Ayub Rafeqi, a member of the fact-finding delegation, said it is difficult to obtain precise information regarding the number of Taleban who attacked the city. He added that the provincial NDS told the delegation that 800 fighters assaulted the city on 28 September 2015, while the police chief stated that “up to 2000“ insurgents could have been involved.

After reviewing the report, President Ghani visited Kunduz on 26 November 2015, where he described the fall of Kunduz city as “a failure, not a conspiracy.”(3) He sacked the provincial NDS director and threatened to prosecute security officials who neglected their duties. He also called on ‘unofficial armed groups’ (ie, militias) to join the regular security forces or face the threat of force used against them. Ghani also remarked that “none of the politicians will be allowed to have his own ALP[Afghan Local Police]” (see here and here). (4) However, all stakeholders agree that there is still an obvious lack of comprehensive strategy to tackle the security situation.

Instead of addressing security concerns in two key districts, Chahrdara and Dasht-e Archi, where the ANSF are struggling to repel the Taleban even from the district centres, the president announced the formation of three new districts (read the palace statement here). The areas that the president mentioned – Gulbad (currently part of Imam Saheb district), Aqtash (in Khanabad district) and Gortepa (on the rural periphery of Kunduz city) – are far from district centre government offices, and local elders have repeatedly suggested that the government upgrade these large areas to district-level status. But, these areas are entirely under Taleban control at the moment.

The case of Chahrdara district

One of the districts crucial to the security of Kunduz city is the largely Pashtun-populated district of Chahrdara. Its centre is located only six kilometres west of the city and it was the first district in the province to come under Taleban control again temporarily on 19 June 2015. The Taleban ruled the district for several days following which local elders requested that their fighters be removed from the district centre in order to prevent fighting with government forces during the harvest season. Haji Shokur, a tribal elder from Chahrdara, told AAN that after these negotiations, the Taleban left peacefully and government officials were able to return to their offices. This arrangement lasted until the attack on Kunduz city, at which point government officials in Chahrdara fled to Kholm district in neighbouring Balkh province and the district once again fell to the Taleban. Chahrdara has a long history of insurgency presence, as previously reported by AAN. As early as 2008, hundreds of Taleban fighters and commanders arrived in Chahrdara from Pakistan, making it the main insurgent hub in the province.

After recapturing Kunduz city, Chahrdara became one of the main areas for ANSF’s clearing operations. However, the Taleban maintain a significant presence in the district and continue to pose a serious threat to the government. According to Muhammad Zaher, then acting district governor of Chahrdara (who resigned from his post recently), the October 2015 clearance operations only served to regain control over some parts of the district centre as well as the six-kilometre long road that connects the district with Kunduz city. Other areas of the district remained under Taleban control. He added that the Taleban maintain a significant presence even just 1,5 kilometres away from the district governor’s office. Zaher further stated that “340 ANA, 210 ANP and 32 ALP [fighters] are enough to defeat the insurgents, but there is no morale to fight.” Speaking to AAN, Gul Ahmad, a local ALP commander, said that most parts of the district remain under Taleban rule and that the frontline between ANSF and the Taleban is within a kilometre of the district governor’s compound.

Involvement of foreign fighters

Another issue that was highlighted by some government officials prior to the release of the fact-finding report was the alleged presence of large numbers of foreign fighters alongside the local Taleban. However, Ayub Rafeqi, a member of the Kunduz fact-finding delegation, said it was difficult to confirm this: “We found no evidence to prove the presence of foreign fighters in the Kunduz assault. The NDS had recorded some phone conversations among the Taleban asking their followers to protect the ‘guests.’ [But] there is no specific date for this conversation to prove that this recording was done during the assault.” Hekmat Khalil Karzai, one of the deputy ministers for foreign affairs, during the opening ceremony of the 6th Regional Economic Cooperation Conference of Afghanistan, also noted that foreign fighters from various terrorist groups had participated in the recent battle of Kunduz. He estimated their number to be greater than 1300. The fact-finding report summary did not mention a specific number of foreign fighters involved – only the names of foreign terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Jundullah, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkar-e Tayeba and Jombesh-e Nasr-e Tajikistan are listed as having participated in the Kunduz attack in the first page of the introduction. (5)

Jundullah and the Taleban in Chahrdara

The presence of foreign fighters in Chahrdara district after the fall of Kunduz is an issue that has been repeatedly raised by government officials. The implication seems to be that Kunduz only fell because the local Taleban had the assistance of foreign fighters.

Apart from the Taleban, there are two other insurgent groups rumoured to be operating in Chahrdara, according to independent sources. One group is said to consist of a few local commanders from Zadran village. They belong to the Pashtun tribe of the Zadran, mostly found in southeastern Afghanistan, some of whom migrated to Kunduz decades ago. Considering their tribal affiliations, they are thought to be supported directly by the Haqqani network, one of the biggest local networks within the Taleban movement, but mainly active in the southeast and parts of Kabul region (see here and here). Locals and government officials refer to this small group as the ‘Haqqani network’ and as al-Qaeda supporters.

While this group is reportedly relatively insignificant, so-called Jundullah, (6) an armed splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), is more visible and therefore of greater concern to the government. It is perceived as the most radical group in Kunduz at the moment. This group mainly follows their own radical ideology, thereby largely ignoring the local culture, while the local Taleban, for example, often allow and respect the elders’ system of traditional mediation on a number of issues. In many cases, Jundullah first criticised and subsequently opposed the local Taleban, in particular for releasing captured local militia fighters as well as government employees when the Taleban released pro-government militia fighters in Gor Tepa in April 2015.

Jundullah (Army of God in Arabic) is not a countrywide structure but rather a group of local Uzbek commanders in Uzbek-dominated areas in the north of Afghanistan who parted ways with their former organization, IMU. As Jundullah has been increasingly visible, the group has suffered serious losses as a result of US airstrikes (read here).

Jundullah’s rank-and-file consists of fundamentalist youngsters. Supporters of this group regularly express sympathy for IS fighters in Iraq and Syria by sharing Daesh’s brutal video clips on social media.

In Chahrdara, Haji Omar – an Uzbek from Kunduz province and former commander from the insurgent wing of Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – initially established Jundullah in Kunduz and became the group’s provincial head. According to local sources, he was killed in an airstrike in 2009. Soon after, Qari Basher Madani – a young madrasa-educated Uzbek from Kunduz – was appointed as his successor. Later, Qari Basher, along with a few other local commanders such as Ghulam Hazrat (alias Huzaifa) and Abu Shahid, fled to Pakistan to escape airstrikes and night raids conducted in the area.

In 2013, Qari Basher, Huzaifa and Abu Shahid returned to Chahrdara. A year later, they became more active and influential in the district. They managed to swiftly gather more local IMU commanders to join them and, as a result, were able to expand their network over the entire province as well as in neighbouring Baghlan and Takhar. Local sources confirmed that the assault on Chahrdara district centre in June 2015, which resulted in its fall to the Taleban, was organised by Jundullah fighters.

Jundullah initially intended to remain independent from the Taleban, an issue that has often generated tensions between the two groups. Pre-existing tensions between the two further increased after Jundullah followers were targeted by airstrikes in Kunduz in 2011 (see here). (7) The Jundullah commanders suspected that the Taleban might have given away the positions of their hideouts.

It was also initially unclear as to whether the group continued to maintain ties with the IMU, with whom they were sympathetic due to ethnic ties. It also shared the same objective as the IMU – to carry out frequent independent operations against the ANSF in northern Afghanistan.

Following the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in July 2015, the Taleban’s shadow governor for Kunduz, Mullah Salam Baryalai, attempted to coerce Jundullah and to convince them to pledge allegiance to the newly appointed Taleban leader, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur (read AAN dispatch here). After several meetings with Jundullah commanders in Chahrdara, the head of the group, Haji Basher Madani, and Huzaifa were finally talked into taking part in a Taleban gathering in the district on 25 August 2015, in order to pledge their support to Akhtar. Haji Basher presented his terms and conditions for supporting Mansur in a short speech. He emphasized the group’s commitment to strengthening the rule of Islamic law, for the Ummah (Muslims) not to be harmed and for its unity to be protected (the video can be seen here).

That same evening, Huzaifa, along with other Jundullah commanders, were killed in a US airstrike in Kunduz (read here). This renewed the distrust between the two groups, as Jundullah supporters accused the Taleban of spying for Afghan government intelligence and hence being responsible for the death of prominent Jundullah commanders. After this attack, many Jundullah commanders left for Borqa district of Baghlan province and Eshkamish district of Takhar province, where the group has larger areas under their control. Reportedly, only Abu Shahid, an Uzbek from Kunduz, along with a few dozen supporters, have remained in Chahrdara district.

However, the Taleban’s strong presence in Dasht-e Archi and Chahrdara – and their leaders’ oath of allegiance – have prevented Jundullah from independently carrying out operations. The group has tried to avoid risking an open confrontation with the Taleban.

The case of Dasht-e Archi

Chahrdara was not the only district in trouble long before the attack on Kunduz city. The Taleban also overran Dasht-e Archi district (locally also known as just Archi) in June 2015. Since then, the district has become another stronghold for the insurgents in Kunduz province. There, according to locals, the Taleban have established military training camps, which are visited frequently by insurgent military commanders from other parts of Afghanistan and also occasionally from Central Asia. The fact that Archi has become such a hub for the Taleban is no coincidence, as the district is the homeland of the provincial shadow governor of Kunduz, Mullah Salam Baryalai – the man suspected of orchestrating the attack on Kunduz city in September last year.

Mullah Salam, a Pashtun from Qezel Tepa, an area only nine kilometres west of Archi’s district centre, reportedly served as sub-commander to Mullah Dadullah-e Lang (“Lame Dadullah”), an infamous and prominent Taleban commander who served at the forefront of the northern front during the Taleban government. In February 2010, Mullah Salam was arrested in Pakistan, where he was kept in detention for over two years (read a short report here). He was released in 2012, after a delegation from the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) urged Pakistan to free captured Taleban from its prisons. Upon his return to Kunduz in 2013, however, Mullah Salam resumed his role as the head of the Taleban for the province. (8)

Given the strong Taleban control of Archi district, it was also slated for an operation to eliminate their stronghold there after the recapture of Kunduz city. On 27 October 2015, Afghan Special Forces (ASF) entered Tank-e Sokhta, an area about 600 metres southeast of the district centre. According to Nasrudin Sahdi, the district governor of Archi, the Special Forces came by helicopter from Khawja Ghar district of Takhar province. From Tank-e Sokhta, they then staged their attack to re-take the district centre. Within 24 hours, they managed to push the Taleban back and bring parts of the district centre under their control. The Special Forces, however, were not able to maintain control of the district centre for long. On 29 October 2015, Taleban counterattacks were launched from the nearby villages of Shinwari and Haji Na’im, just west of the district centre. The insurgents managed to push the ANSF back out of some parts of the district centre. In the end, most of the government’s forces had to retreat to Tank-e Sokhta. After months of fierce fighting, the district centre of Archi remains the frontline today.

Commander Nasrullah, the head of the district ALP unit in Archi, confirmed to AAN that the ANSF is only in control of parts of the district centre. They have only managed to retake control of the central town square known as Chawk, where many government offices are located, as well as the areas immediately surrounding it. “The main bazaar and its shops have been closed for the past few months due to fear and ongoing fighting.” For the district governor, signs of unrest were already present some years ago. But, as he explained in an interview with AAN, “the [provincial] governor didn’t pay any attention.”

The district governor of Archi, Sahdi, also confirmed that the transit route to Kunduz city, covering approximately 50 kilometres, has been blocked for the past six months. According to him, the Taleban continue to maintain a strong presence in Archi district. There are several military training camps operated by the insurgents’ military experts, he said. “One of these training camps is located only six kilometres away from the district centre.”

General Muhiuddin Ghori, the commander of the 20thANA corps, codenamed “Pamir” confirmed in the media that Operation Storm-11 is still ongoing in Archi. (9) At the same time, he emphasised that “order had been restored and the ANSF has been successful in its operation.” He added that across Kunduz province around 1345 Taleban militants, including senior commanders, had been killed since September 2015, thus “the security situation in Archi is better now.”

Contrary to these comments and in line with reports from the district governor, a local elder from Archi told AAN that schools and health centres are still closed and the Archi district centre is deserted. District governor Sahdi agreed that security forces had not made much progress in Archi. “There is no achievement. The security forces are stationed in a few bases inside the district centre, and the Taleban’s strong and wide presence still poses a serious challenge to the ANSF.”

This has a significant impact on the population. Ghulam Haidar Haidari, a civil society activist from Archi, told AAN that most of the residents of Archi district centre have fled to Kunduz city because of the armed clashes between the ANSF and the Taleban, which occur on an almost daily basis. “The main bazaar is closed and the local government of Archi is paralysed due to serious fire fights in the town.”

Dasht-e Archi as a seat of Taleban provincial structures

There are indications that the Taleban established a strong military commission in Archi district before the assault on Kunduz city, which organises all military affairs throughout the province. It is headed by Obaida, and includes the provincial shadow governor, the shadow district governor of Archi, military commanders and military experts from other parts of the province. According to sources close to the Taleban, its main task is to draw up military operational plans, not only for Archi, but also for the other districts in the province. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of fighters this commission controls. Local sources report between 800 and 1200 fighters in the district. Nasruddin Sahdi told AAN (on 24 January 2016) that the number of insurgents had increased from 600 to 4000 fighters over the past seven months, after the fall of Archi in June 2015. However, this statement (as well as information on nationalities) needs to be taken with a grain of salt – local officials often exaggerate insurgent numbers. Nevertheless, Archi has become a, if not the, key military operational base for insurgents in Kunduz – and should have been identified as such in the Kunduz Fact-Finding Delegation’s report.

Jundullah in Archi

Apart from the Taleban, there is another active group of insurgents in Archi. Sources close to the Taleban said it is called Jabha-ye Qariha (Front of the Qaris, a religious rank) and considers itself to be the military wing of Jundullah in the district. Qari Aminullah Tayeb, who is originally from Rustaq district in neighbouring Takhar province, initially established Jundullah’s Archi faction. He came to the district in 2013 to serve as a preacher in a mosque. According to locals, Qari Tayeb mostly targets young Uzbek boys, encouraging them to attend his madrasa in Qarloq village, where he spreads a radical interpretation of Islamic ideology and is mobilising them against the government.

Since 2013, Qari Tayeb has been regularly sending groups of boys to Gor Tepa, a large area on the border between Archi and Khwaja Ghar district of Takhar (10), to receive military training. The front consists of 50 to 60 fighters and a few local commanders such as Qari Asad, Sadam and Nur Muhammad – all Uzbeks from Kunduz province. Several local sources mentioned that this faction is well trained, ready for operations and ideologically hardened; most of the men were ready to kill themselves targeting the government. Jabha-ye Qariha is primarily based in Shahrwan, an area about 15 kilometres northwest of Archi district centre. This area is also known as a safe haven for the Jundullah group, where they maintain a high degree of influence and also some training camps.

Kunduz still volatile

So far there are few signs indicating that the ANSF have been able to retake control of the key district outside of Kunduz city. Despite their serious counteroffensive in the wake of the fall of Kunduz city, the significant presence of various insurgent groups around the city and in neighbouring key districts has not been reduced. This represents a potential new threat for the provincial capital. Beyond bringing the districts of Chahrdara and Dasht-e Archi under the control of the security forces, there is also an urgent need to develop a strategy to tackle the vast number of other issues that were highlighted by the Kunduz Fact-Finding Delegation. If the government fails to deal with the current insecurity in Kunduz province properly and in a timely manner, and does not address the issues identified by the Fact-Finding Delegation, then the ANSF will face a serious challenge in the Spring when the main fighting season resumes.

 

(1) The fact finding delegation consisted of the following members: Amrullah Saleh, former chief of the National Directorate of Security; Ghulam Faruq Wardak, former Minister of Education; Fazel Karim Aimaq, a former mayor of Kabul and member of the High Peace Council; Ayub Rafeqi, a political analyst close to President Ghani’s camp; and Abdalullah Muhammadi, a representative of Samangan province in the Lower House of Parliament. This delegation was tasked to investigate the reasons behind the fall of the city within 18 days – between 11 and 30 October 2015 (read the Palace statement here). On 21 November 2015, in a press conference, the Kunduz Fact Finding Delegation announced that it had completed its task and submitted its 200-page report to the National Security Council (NSC). At this event, a 23-page summary of the report to the NSC was distributed to the limited audience present. Based on AAN’s research, the complete version of the report is not available to the public. While not articulated to the press, the delay in the publication of the report was due to Saleh wanting to present the report in a certain way. According to a senator that AAN spoke to, he tried to include opinions in the report that would make him a more desirable candidate to return to a government position.

(2) According to the report, the NSC, which consists of “16 to 18 members,” has reporting lines and procedures that are too complicated for obtaining up-to-date security information in a timely manner.

(3) Several theories had circulated that the fall of Kunduz was due to a conspiracy. For example, on one hand “Afghan parliamentary deputies alleged that Safi [the Kunduz provincial governor] took bribe payments in exchange for handing Kunduz over to the Taliban;” on the other hand “Interior Minister General Noorul Haq Uloomi claimed that many personnel of the security and law-enforcement agencies had a role in the debacle.”

(4) Some powerbrokers and influential Jihadi commanders retain their own armed groups. These groups are not officially registered with the government and are mostly known as armed militia. In the last few years, the local government in Kunduz has often used these groups to combat the Taleban. These groups are known as pro-government militias. Some of the pro-government militias transformed into ALP (Afghan Local Police) units, which usually received training, weapons and other equipment from the Afghan government, often through US or other international forces on the ground.

(5) In the summary of the public version of the 23-page report it said that “based on governmental institutions’ statement, elements from Lashkar-e Tayeba, Al-Qaeda, Jundullah, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jombesh-e Nasr-e Tajikistan and Uighurs participated”.

(6) Some of the Jundullah commanders killed in the NATO airstrike in Kunduz were referred to as IMU, because at the time the group was not yet officially known as Jundullah.

(7) Most of the Jundullah commanders and followers are ethnic Uzbeks, therefore they are more visible in the Uzbek dominated areas of the north.

(8) According to the DPA, Mullah Salam had already announced that he had plans to overrun Kunduz earlier in 2015. The same article also clarified that Mullah Salam had been close to Mullah Baradar and hence considered to be a prominent member of the Taleban before 2010 ( Mullah Abdul Salam Profile text as the original link is no longer accessible).

(9) General Ghori has been tasked by President Ghani to lead counter operations against the insurgents in Kunduz – all security units must work under his command.

(10) There are two Gor Tepa areas in Kunduz province: one is located in the northwest of Kunduz city,  the other in the northeast of Archi district.

The introduction of electronic ID cards – or e-tazkera – in Afghanistan remains haunted by delays, obstacles and poor planning. Although CEO Dr Abdullah approved the e-tazkera pilot phase on 3 August 2015, the process has yet to begin. Since then, President Ghani has questioned the very feasibility of this oft-delayed project, while main donors have suspended funding. In this second issue of a two-part dispatch, AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Martine van Bijlert take a closer look at the technical stumbling blocks.

A short history of the e-tazkera project

Two ministries

The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MoCIT) started work on the project in February 2009. Six months later, it formally announced the introduction of an ‘electronic tazkera’ containing biometric information. The aim of the project is to create a modern, uniform and unique identity card for Afghan citizens that would replace the six versions of tazkera (ID documents) currently in circulation. (1) Because the paper-based tazkera system lacks proper security features, it is prone to manipulation and falsification. Moreover, there is currently no centralised system to gather and store population data.

The project is divided between two ministries, which, over time, have competed for a leading role: the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MoCIT), which handles the e-tazkera’s software development, design and production; and the Ministry of Interior (MoI), responsible for registration and distribution. In 2011, the E-Tazkera Authority (ETA) was established as the lead agency (based on the Council of Ministers’ resolution no 37) and placed within the MoI. It is also referred to as the E-Tazkera Department.

The contract for the original project, the National Electronic ID Card (e-NID), was won in December 2010 by the private company Grand Technology Resources (GTR). GTR is a multinational, Afghan-Malaysian company, specialising in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and registered in Malaysia. (2) It was contracted to implement the project within three years, which was an optimistic timeframe. As soon as the contract was signed, the lead ministry at the time (MoCIT) informed the public that distribution would start within eight months – by September 2011.

The introduction of a standardised ID document that could also be used as a voter card or to help establish reliable voter lists, has long been seen as a prerequisite to effectively reducing election fraud. As a result, in 2013, discussions surrounding the process were superseded by a wish to accelerate both the project and distribution of the cards in the run-up to the presidential elections. On 17 September 2012, the Afghan cabinet rejected a proposal by the Independent Election Commission (IED) to launch a new voter registration process, preferring instead the countrywide distribution of the e-tazkera. The registration phase for the ID cards was scheduled to begin in Dalw 1391 (January/ February 2013), although it was clear that, even under the best of circumstances, only part of the population might be issued with an electronic ID-card before the 2014 election. (3) Other delays and controversies stalled the process (see part 1 of this dispatch, published on 25 January 2016).

Following the inauguration of the National Unity Government (NUG) and in light of the upcoming parliamentary elections (now scheduled for 15 October 2016), discussions regarding the e-tazkera and the elections were revisited. However, they were laid to rest when, on 19 June 2015, President Ghani extended the parliament’s term, until then scheduled to end on 22 June 2015. With discussions regarding electoral reform underway and the realisation that the two processes had very different timelines, talks regarding the e-tazkera and elections were pushed into the long grass.

Partners involved

The e-tazkera project is worth over 200 million US dollars, jointly funded by the Afghan government, the European Union and the United States. From this amount, a contract worth 101 million US dollars was awarded to GTR to set up the system and to procure all necessary equipment and software. GTR had previously been awarded two other data-centric contracts by the Afghan government. (4) The remaining funds were allocated to the distribution of the cards and administrative costs.

According to a report by the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), the Ministry of Finance (MoF) allocated five million US dollars of its own funds for 2015 through the annual national budget. As of September 2015, the Afghan government had spent approximately 64.5 million US dollars on the project. (7.5 million US dollars were spent by the MoI on salaries and 57 million US dollars by the MoCIT to establish the system.)

The exact details of GTR’s contract are not known. In a recent report on the e-tazkera project’s susceptibility to corruption (more below), the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), which independently monitors and evaluates national and international efforts to fight corruption in Afghanistan and it reports to the public, Parliament, President, and international community, remarked that the committee could not report on the GTR contract “due to the technical aspects of it.” However, it was clear that the MEC had been unable to obtain all the information required to produce a balanced report. This included, for instance, a full list of IT equipment that the MoCIT had contracted, along with necessary specifications. The MEC recommended that the GTR contract “be examined by a professional team of IT experts from an independent third party organisation.”

In its bid for the contract, GTR included a number of technical partners. These included the company IRSI , which specialises in poly-carbonated cards with security features and their integration into the overall system (so far 15 million cards have been ordered, of which seven million have already been delivered); the Korean company HYUNDAI-IT, which specialises in system development methodologies (HSDM) for applications development, system integration and system
security; the company DongDO for the system integration and application development with HYUNDAI-IT; and a company called ENTRUST for the “public key-infrastructure.” According to GTR, the company’s tasks are “to lead the overall project, to provide system integration, client mentoring, coaching and capacity building and to ensure responsible transfer of the project to the government.”

The pilot phase: approved, announced but yet to get underway

The e-tazkera project is divided into four key activities: (a) public awareness and data collection (for an illustration on the challenges of data collection, see this article (5)); (b) citizens’ identity/data verification; (c) biometric registration in enrolment centres; and (d) printing of IDs. Work on the first two activities – data collection and verification – has started at a low level (data for 400,000 citizens in Kabul were collected and some 100,000 verified). In consultation with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which provides technical support to the project, the ETA has now proposed a start-to-end pilot project, in which all four key activities in the process will be tested on a small scale.

When planning the pilot project, IOM suggested three options: either to focus on a limited number of areas in Kabul; or, for the project to be implemented in Kabul and four other urban centres; finally, to implement it in Kabul and three districts in different provinces, in order to ensure that the system be tested in different geographic and social settings. In the end, the ETA opted for the first (and least complicated) option. The pilot project would, in theory, take place over 150 days: 60 days for its preparation (although the MoI initially believed 30 would suffice) and 90 days for its practical implementation. The estimated cost is three million US dollars, to be shared equally between the Afghan government and international donors.

The proposal for the pilot project was presented to the president in June 2015 and approved by CEO Abdullah and the Council of Ministers on 3 August 2015. It was initially scheduled to start on 19 August 2015, which coincided with Afghanistan’s Independence Day. However on 18 August 2015, during a meeting at the palace, the president insisted that the day’s focus should be “on commending and decorating the national defence and security forces.” According to a palace statement, it was decided that the e-tazkera pilot be launched at a later date in the presence of officials and notables (English version of the palace statement here;  the clearer Dari version can be found here ). This has not yet happened.

On 18 August 2015, the E-Tazkera Authority organised a ceremony in which dozens of sample IDs were handed out to civil society representatives in an attempt to launch the project.

Although the pilot has been announced, it remains unclear whether the project is technically ready and, more importantly, whether it has the political buy-in it needs. The President himself appears to have reservations, given several orders he has issued to assess the feasibility of the project. Moreover, he has still not formally given the go-ahead for the pilot phase of the project. Setbacks and politicking have hindered the project from the beginning (see part one of AAN’s e-tazkera series available here).

Logistics, weaknesses and concerns

Three assessments

Since last summer, at which point there was still enough pressure to propel the project forward, the President has tasked at least three commissions to advise him on the e-tazkera’s feasibility and its potential pitfalls: in June 2015 he ordered a rapid technical review of the project; in September 2015 he requested an assessment of the project’s susceptibility to corruption; and in October/November 2015 he ordered a more political review of the implications and sensitivities of the e-tazkera, as well as a look at the main technical concerns raised in earlier reports.

The technical review in June 2015 was conducted by a three-member committee and resulted in a long report that flagged various concerns relating to issues including data processing and data security. According to an abridged copy (seen by AAN), concerns included the securing of data transmission and data storage, the possibility of data loss, issues of connectivity (and the possibility that this might exceed the budget) and the lack of a robust testing of the system. However, the scope of the conclusions was limited to technical aspects of the project, as the review focused on what needed to be done before embarking on the pilot.

Secondly, the president instructed the country’s two anti-corruption bodies – the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC)  and the High Office of Oversight and Corruption (HOO)  – to jointly conduct a Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment (VCA). A public summary of the findings, released on 21 October 2015, flagged two key concerns: the nepotism, discrimination, political interference and ethnic conflicts within the ETA; and financial corruption in staff recruitment and procurement. The MEC report concluded with two recommendations: reform of the administrative structure and human resources procedures of the ETA through the introduction of a transparent, competitive and merit-based hiring process; and an independent audit of the GTR contract. (6)

On 10 January 2015, ToloNews released details of the confidential version of the VCA report that they had had access to, stating that:

The report reveals that scores of high school graduates and unprofessional individuals have been appointed in the department without considering their abilities and skills for the posts. “Nearly 27 employees of the e-NIC [department] have been appointed by direct order of former interior minister [Muhammad Umar Daudzai] and his deputies – without going through the employment process. In addition, the leadership of the e-NIC department has been appointed based on the order of the Interior Ministry and the Chief Executive Office,” the report reveals. Only 320 out of 1,046 employees in the e-NIC department have been appointed through free competition, but the remaining officials have been appointed based on direct orders by a number of MPs and former leaders of the Interior Ministry, the report says. The leaked documents also reveal that 519 employees of the e-NIC department were first appointed directly by the MoI and then they were provided the grounds for a competition process and finally they were hired as permanent staffers in the organization. However, e-NIC officials have said they have done this because of the pressure on them.

The third review, which began in October/November 2015, looked into concerns that had been raised in both the technical review and the VCA, to see whether they had been addressed and to advise on the political sensitivities surrounding the e-tazkera (see part one of AAN’s e-tazkera series available here). The commission was headed by Abdul Salam Rahimi, former head of the Office of Administrative Affairs, currently head of Public Policy Formulation in President Ghani’s office. The findings of the commission are not known to AAN. The commission has apparently advised the president that its main concerns had been addressed, however the president appears to remain sceptical.

The slow dissolution of the ETA

E-tazkera staff lose jobs

The EU provided funding for 300 of the MoI employees in the E-Tazkera Authority (ETA), which came to an end in June 2015 (although some 100 e-tazkera employees remained on the payroll until 15 August.) The EU’s commitment of funding until the end of 2015 was based on the condition that it would not cover operational costs. When EU funds ran out, the Ministry of Finance took over the payment of the 300 e-tazkera staff salaries, in addition to the other salaries it was already covering. This came to an end on 20 December 2015 (30 Qows) when contracts ended and were not extended. The e-tazkera project had employed over 1000 staff in the MoI over three years. (7)

Many e-tazkera staff continued to show up for work, hoping to retain their jobs. Some argued they had continued to work despite the fact that the project had long since come to a halt. Zmaray Baher, head of the registration (also termed enrolment) department at the ETA, published an article on the Hasht-e Sobh website on 28 October 2015, in which he described how staff continued to gather bio-data and confirm existing identity documents for the e-tazkera and to digitalise the records of the population registry department (a project separate from the e-tazkera). (8) “Since a few months we have not received a salary,” he lamented. “We face shortages of stationary and other supplies; we face a shortages of forms, which are at the heart of our job; and most important of all, each day the interest of the citizens for this process is waning.”

Once a start date for the pilot project is announced and work resumes, the IOM will be tasked to screen all ETA employees and ensure that future recruitment be transparent (recruitment had initially been one of IOM’s responsibilities, however by the time the organisation got involved, they found all staff had already been hired). The screening will take place during the pilot’s two month-long preparatory phase. This is particularly important, given the findings of the MEC’s susceptibility to corruption report:

Among the problems MEC identified were a lack of written procedures for recruitment; a tendency to ignore the Civil Service Law in the recruitment process; a lack of oversight; and the interference in the process by powerful individuals from the government, parliament, and elsewhere—all of which have created corruption vulnerabilities and facilitated the improper hiring of approximately 70% of the authority’s staff.

E-tazkera staff push for resumption of project

In the meantime, the ETA and in particular its head, Homayun Mohtat, had attempted to continue the project. In September 2015, the Minister of Interior, Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi, sent a letter to President Ghani, saying that if the e-tazkera process, which had ground to a halt in August 2015, was not restarted, over 1000 people would be left without a job.

On 15 December 2015, a local media outlet leaked another letter from the Minister of Interior that was sent to the President on 28 November 2015. It stated that the ETA had lost funding and the MoI faced difficulties paying ETA staff salaries: “Luckily with the exceptional help from the Ministry of Finance and reduction in salaries the ETA managed to find the resources to keep the staff and provide them with salaries until the end of 1394 [21 March 2016]. Unfortunately practical work on e-tazkera has not started and the MoI would not be able to extend the contracts of their staff after the end of December 2015.” This appeared to be another attempt to force the issue on to the agenda.

Additionally, in November 2015, ETA’s head, Mohtat, sent a nine-page document to the President (to which AAN had access), addressing e-tazkera challenges and offering recommendations. He suggested a new management structure, addressed issues concerning staff recruitment raised by the MEC report and in general appealed to the President not to scrap the project. On 20 December 2015, Mohtat also told the press that a new draft plan to improve the identification of individuals through biometric data had been sent for government approval.

On 26 December 2015, ETA employees in a public protest called on the government to start the distribution process. They blamed political disagreements within the NUG leadership for the delays, including the inclusion (or lack thereof) of ethnicity and nationality on the ID cards, and said that getting rid of the employees was a waste of money already spent. Another demonstration was held on 6 January 2016 (see here).

On 28 December 2015, Mohtat wrote on his Facebook page that CEO Abdullah, in coordination with President Ghani, had approved the MoI’s proposal to begin with the biometric data collection, the third key activity of the e-tazkera project (this Facebook page is no longer available.) There, Mohtat explained that in phase three, the families covered under phase one and two would be invited to enrolment centres to record their biometric data (iris scans, fingerprints, digital photographs and signatures) and enter their information into the system. “When the legal and political issues are solved, the data printed on the front of e-tazkera will be finalised and we will print the e-tazkeras.” He also wrote that, “due to the ambiguous circumstances around the start of the project and the lack of sufficient funds, we closed four of our nine field offices and plan to close our remaining offices.” He pointed out that each of the field offices had up to 150 staff, that the equipment had been moved to warehouses, and that the citizen information forms had been shifted to archives. “When the political and legal issues are solved and the contents of the e-tazkera is finalised, we will be able to start issuance without waiting on the other phases. Then attracting international funds will not be a big issue,” he wrote in his closing line.

By this time the ETA leadership’s frustration was palpable. On 28 December 2015, Mohtat told AAN:

This is a dead-end… The e-tazkera is the second of the six commitments of the National Unity Government. It is the mother of all other reforms in the country. Now it seems to be the victim of the government’s mismanagement at the top.

Technical problems, possible glitches

Political issues, delays and public clamouring aside, the project has been plagued by a variety of technical problems and pitfalls.

A current concern is the system’s lack of rigorous testing. Although GTR claims that the system has been tested and is fully operational (GTR tested the system in August 2015 after the Council of Ministers had decided to launch the issuance of the e-tazkera), AAN has been told that this test was done in optimal conditions but only for small volumes. Moreover, the bandwidth was provided by GTR and not by state-owned Afghan Telecom (which does not yet have a contract with the MoI for internet connectivity). It is therefore unclear how the system would perform in actual conditions, or indeed how it would hold up when all enrolment centres begin feeding data simultaneously. The IOM has been pushing for an end-to-end test since the beginning of 2015, but until now GTR has not consented to this. (9) There were some initial glitches in the design of the registration system – for instance, it was not possible to register women as household heads – an issue that may or may not have been sufficiently addressed.

There are also concerns that some of the devices procured by GTR are now out of date. According to the June 2015 technical review of the project, “since the project took considerably longer than anticipated, some of the products that were initially considered were discontinued by the manufacturers, and replaced with newer models. However, there are still some devices, which are announced end-of-life by the manufacturer and will stop providing support, for some devices, as early as May 2016.” The report concludes that “there is no immediate need to replace any devices in the data centre for the pilot,” but it does not mention what might be needed after the pilot is concluded.

ETA’s head Mohtat also informed AAN that some of the equipment had been gathering dust in a basement at the MoI for three years and that the warranty for these machines may soon expire. He said the four printing machines that have been placed in the MoI are supposed to have an overall printing capacity of 32,000 ID cards per 24 hours. This has, however, never been tested.

Finally, GTR was supposed to train e-tazkera employees in software and hardware handling. However, AAN was told that 75 per cent of contracted hours of training have already been used. Suggestions that GTR train a number of master trainers in order to ensure a smooth and continuous transfer of skills have never been acted upon. It seems the impetus for this was lost somewhere between the MoI, the MoICT and GTR. This means that the continuation of the e-tazkera program is currently unlikely to survive the end of GTR’s contract.

Aside from the political challenges analysed in part 1 of this dispatch, the e-tazkera project thus also straddles a large number of technical ones. Although donor interest in a modern and secure national identity card in Afghanistan remains (and is likely to grow) in the face of increasing refugee movements to Europe, it has waned in the face of the many problems surrounding the project. It would be a major feat to revive the technical process, calm the political controversies and rekindle donor interest. While not impossible, the challenges are considerable.

 

 

(1) The different tazkeras in circulation were issued under different regimes. Before the Karzai regime, both 
the Daud Khan (1973-78) and PDPA governments (1978-92) issued versions of the tazkera that are still widely circulated today. Although less common, tazkeras issued during the Taliban regime (1996-2001; two versions), the mujahedin era (1992-96) and under the monarchy (pre-1973) are also still in circulation and are generally considered valid forms of identification, as long they contain photographs and are still readable. A majority of the people (77%), however, appear to hold tazkeras of a post-2001 vintage. These tazkeras have the form of a one-page document in an A4 format, while most pre-Karzai tazkeras took the form of a 16-page booklet. (Source: An Exploratory Study of Afghan Tazkera Ownership, The Liaison Office (TLO), June 2013.)

(2) According to its website, the Grand Technology Resources (GTR) has been registered in Kuala Lumpur since 2006. Mirwais Alizai, the young Afghan businessman who heads GTR, was born in 1979, either in Kabul, Kandahar or Helmand (there are several versions of his biography on the GTR website; the Kabul-born version here , the Kandahar-born version screen shot, and for Helmand-born version see this website). Apart from GTR, Alizai has also established the crude and refined oil company Globix that works in various countries, mainly across Asia and the Middle East, and he has “been investing in the fields of aviation” since 2005. Mirwais Alizai also “supports and contributes to the culture and arts programs and events around the world.”

(3) The Ministry of Interior (MoI), at this point the ministry with the lead on the project, clearly stated that the distribution of electronic ID-cards was “too tough a task to be fully completed ahead of the elections.” The MoI estimated that, realistically, 70 per cent of the distribution could be completed within the next three years, and that for the remaining 30 per cent of the population, mainly living in insecure or remote areas, it could take another three to six years. This was a little over a year before the elections. For more details see this AAN dispatch from January 2013.

(4) GTR’s earlier contracts with the Afghan government were for the establishment of the Afghanistan National Data Centre (ANDC) with the same ministry and for the establishment of the AFMIS (Afghanistan Financial Management Information System) Data Centre for the treasury department of the Ministry of Finance.

(5) This New York Times report from December 2014 erroneously uses the word “census,” while in fact the data collection described in the story is part of the e-tazkera process (national identity cards distribution and census are often used interchangeably, even though they are two separate processes).

The phenomenon of choosing one’s family name, and the confusion it can bring, as described by the New York Times, is not new in Afghanistan. As described by Louis Dupree in the late 1960s (Afghanistan, Princeton University Press: 1980, 2nd edition):

Aside from some literates (mainly Western trained), few Afghans have family names, but call themselves “son of so and so.” Family names, however, relate to the necessity to identify oneself beyond the extended family group for some – but not all – bureaucratic purposes… Family names become necessary, however, to those Afghans who leave the country for overseas educations. Others, particularly writers and scholars, choose to elect personal identifications. Some adapt geographic names: Panjsheri, Ghaznavi or Kohzad (“of the mountains”); some open a book with eyes shut point to a word; still others adopt an adjective which relates to their occupations or interests, e.g., Tarzi (“stylist.”)

(6) The MEC also hinted to AAN that it had suspicions with regard to GTR’s procurement methods, as the MoI never provided MEC with technical specifications for the equipment (serial numbers, part numbers), claiming that “everything had been installed and could not be disassembled again.”

In addition, the MEC report raised concerns that the procedure for obtaining an e-tazkera – after certification by two Afghans and approval of the NDS – made the process vulnerable to corruption and abuse.

(7) According to this article, the organisational structure of the ETA is composed of a general directorate and five sub-departments (human resources, technical, financial, operational, and registration). Out of the 1046 personnel, 194 worked for the general directorate and 852 for the various sub-departments.

(8) According to Baher, e-tazkera mobile teams had visited homes and offices and had already finalised and collected the identity forms of 400,000 citizens in Kabul. He said his teams had started approaching students and staff at Kabul universities and encouraged them to cooperate with the process, despite the uncertainty over its timing and fate. He also wrote that, to date, more than 100,000 Afghans’ identities had been confirmed and that the personal information of half a million (500,000) citizens had been digitalised.

(9) The ETA mobile teams collect personal data from citizens in provinces, after which ID cards will be printed in the capital and sent back to the provinces. Enrolment centres collect the data in urban areas.

There is a fairly broad consensus among Afghans and donors alike that the introduction of an electronic ID card – or e-tazkera – would be a good thing; it would provide accurate population data, standardised ID documents and the possibility of, in the case of elections, drawing up reliable voter lists. The project, however, has been stymied by political controversies and fundamental technical questions. In this first part of a two-part dispatch, AAN’s Martine van Bijlert and Jelena Bjelica take a look at the most pressing controversies that threaten to indefinitely paralyse the project.

Discussions over the introduction of a standardised and computerised ID card in Afghanistan have been around for years, but the project was only started in earnest in February 2009. In December 2010, a contract was signed with a private company, Grand Technology Resources. The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MoCIT), the lead ministry at the time, told reporters that distribution of the cards would start by September 2011, even though the Afghan cabinet had not yet decided on their design. The project was, however, plagued by delays due to capacity constraints and concerns over data security. (1) Only in late 2012, as planning for the 2014 elections commenced, did the project regain a sense of urgency.

The introduction of a standardised ID document that can also function as a voter card or at least help establish reliable voter lists, has long been seen as a prerequisite to reducing the fraud that had plagued Afghanistan’s elections. As a result, in the course of 2013, discussions on the e-tazkera were ‘hijacked’ by the wish to suddenly accelerate the project and rush the distribution of the cards in the run-up to the presidential elections – even though the system had barely been tested and clearly a complete rollout in such a short time would be impossible. (2)

Trying to rush the e-tazkera in the face of an election

The government thus announced that the registration of population data was scheduled to begin in early 2013. A decree by President Hamed Karzai, dated 23 January 2013 (PD 6677), instructed relevant ministries to expedite the process and start distribution of the cards by 21 March 2013. By then, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) had already embarked on a staff-recruitment drive while the MoCIT was ordered to start shipping the necessary equipment to the provinces, particularly to locations that had no or only limited access to the internet. The pretence was kept up for quite a while. On 24 February 2013, then Deputy Minister of Interior Muhammad Mirza Yarmand told a press conference that up to 14 million Afghans would receive an e-tazkera within a year. The Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions, an informal political pressure group for electoral reform  similarly argued that with 600 registration centres, it should be possible to register at least 1.5 million people per month, if each centre registered at least 100 people per day. This wish to rush the e-tazkera distribution signalled a shared recognition of the need to tackle electoral fraud. But it was also unrealistic, as it did not allow time for preparation, testing and the correction of glitches or take into account that several fundamental issues had not yet been settled (including the design of the card and what data was to be included).

The practicalities of the distribution, however, were soon eclipsed by the politics of which data to register and what to display on the card, as the parliament started discussions on the Population Registration Act.

Tripped up by politics: The fight over which personal data to include

In March 2013, when the distribution of the cards should have already started, the draft Population Registration Act, on which the whole project would be based, was sent to the parliament. The Wolesi Jirga debated the draft in early summer and on 19 June 2013 reached an agreement on all points except one: article 6 that stipulates what should be written on the card. The government had suggested that personal data should be limited to: name, father’s name, grandfather’s name, place and date of birth, and residence (current and permanent). A heated debate ensued, splitting the session into those arguing for the inclusion of ethnicity and those demanding the use of the general term “Afghan” for nationality. Several MPs argued that without these additions – ethnicity and/or nationality – article 6 would be unconstitutional and suggested that the text be sent to the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC) for an opinion, before embarking on further discussion.

On 15 July 2013, the issue was revisited in parliament (without ICSIC opinion). The debate over whether or not to include ethnicity in article 6 (and thus on the card) quickly descended into a scuffle. When the chair suggested a vote on a version of the draft law that included nationality, but not ethnicity, a large group of MPs staged a walkout in protest. In the midst of the upheaval, the chair quickly put the law to the vote, after which it was passed. Several MPs protested, calling the decision “unconstitutional,” arguing that it would erase the identity of (minority) ethnic groups in the country if they were not allowed to register by ethnicity as well. Balkh Governor Nur Mohammad Atta, one of the vocal proponents in favour of including ethnicity, warned that if this were not mentioned on the new ID cards, he would not want to collect his. Since then, many have followed his example, warning that if the ID card does not include what they deem essential – whether ethnicity, nationality or religion – they will not want to have one.

The vote was not only controversial for political reasons, but also appeared to have been procedurally shaky, as the MPs who walked out claimed they had broken the quorum. The chair initially argued that as they had not yet left the hall when the vote happened, they could still be counted as present. In the next session, however, he backtracked and said that a commission would need to check whether there had indeed been a quorum.

A week later, the parliament went into its summer recess. The issues were apparently laid to rest, and the draft law was forwarded to the Meshrano Jirga. On 10 November 2013, the Meshrano Jirga managed to ratify the first five articles, but as soon as article 6 was discussed, the meeting descended into a “furious debate.”  On top of the usual sensitivities over what should be included, the text of article 6 was discovered to have been changed before the draft law was sent to the Meshrano Jirga for a vote, with nationality omitted from the new version. (3)

The Meshrano Jirga committees that had studied the law suggested the reinsertion of the word “Afghan,” while others again insisted on the inclusion of ethnicity as well. The discussion ended in another walkout. On 26 November 2013, the issue was revisited once more. The session was heated, but the speaker managed to prevent a brawl. When the matter was finally put to the vote, a majority opted to keep the ‘original’ (government) version of article 6 – with no mention of either nationality or ethnicity. (4) The decision led to angry outbursts, and subsequent sessions of both the Wolesi Jirga and Meshrano Jirga erupted into fierce shouting matches.

The issue was further polarised when on 27 November 2013, the day after the Meshrano Jirga vote, General Abdul Wahid Taqat, a PDPA-era intelligence official and now political commentator, during a TV talk show (5) insisted that “Pashtun” and “Afghan” were synonymous and Afghanistan was the land of the Pashtuns. (6)

Taqat’s statements caused an uproar in both regular and social media. First, there were demonstrations against both the former general and the TV station,  but when the former general was arrested on 12 December 2013, his supporters took to the street and clashed with the police (see here).

The episode was finally defused after Taqat issued a televised apology. At the same time, the Meshrano Jirga was already backtracking and denying that it had removed the word “Afghan” from the card.

It should come as no surprise that, in the midst of all this upheaval in late 2013, President Karzai chose not to sign the law. (It may also have been difficult to determine which version to pick.) Strictly speaking, according to the Constitution, Karzai actually did not need to sign the law for it to be enacted (as argued by MP Shukria Barakzai here), but clearly nobody wanted to touch this. With the elections only four months away, the thorny issue of the e-tazkera and what to include on the card was no longer a priority. That changed, however, once the National Unity Government (NUG) took office.

The National Unity Government revisits the issue

The agreement that established the NUG  lists five commitments linked to the convening of a Loya Jirga (that is to decide on the CEO position within two years of the establishment of the NUG). One of these is “the distribution of electronic/computerised identity cards to all the citizens of the country as quickly as possible.”

On 9 November 2014, President Ghani signed the Population Registration Act that was passed by the parliament in 2013, thus ratifying the version that mentioned neither ethnicity nor the word Afghan. (An unofficial translation of the law can be found here, although it appears to be either incomplete or an older version, as under article 6 the reference to religion is missing.) On 3 December 2014, MoI officials announced the start of the e-tazkera distribution.

Unsurprisingly, the signing of the law and the announcement of the restart of the process sparked renewed protests. The president sought to defuse the issue by meeting protesters and civil society activists. According to the presidential spokesperson, he referred the controversial article to the Supreme Court for an opinion. (7) Civil society activists claimed this meant that the process had been halted while the e-tazkera department under the MoI (E-Tazkera Authority or ETA) insisted that the distribution was going ahead and would start within days.

In late December 2014, the Wolesi Jirga readied itself to discuss and amend the law again,  but the MPs were so divided that the initiative fizzled out, with delegates accusing each other of illegally sabotaging the issue.  In particular, the committee responsible for preparing the new draft was accused of stalling.

Technical preparations and political controversies clash again

In the meantime, technical preparations to start the process continued. In June 2015, the ETA presented the president with its plan for a pilot project that aimed to test all systems and hand out e-cards to the approximately 400,000 citizens that had already been registered in Kabul city. The president ordered the ETA to expedite the distribution of the cards,  but at the same time he also embarked on a series of technical and corruption-related reviews (see part 2 of this dispatch), suggesting misgivings on his side over the technical solidity of the project. At this point, the donors, tired of the delays, suspended their funding.  

The government continued to give conflicting signals on whether the issuance of the ID cards would start, and the controversy over what should be included in the cards resurfaced again in August 2015. The CEO’s office set 19 August 2015 as the date to launch the pilot project; the president then delayed it.  The political class remained divided, with some pushing for a speedy start of the distribution, while others continued to demand amendments to the law.  Some groups said they called off their protests after the president, according to them, assured them that the law would be amended, while others continued to demonstrate.

After about a month of protests, (8) the political urgency of the issue seemed to cool and the demonstrations fizzled. In the meantime, the ETA continued efforts to revive the project – also attempting to secure renewed funding and rehire the staff it had been forced to let go – but has so far received little backing from the country’s political leadership. (9) Even if the president and the CEO decide that the main technical concerns of the project have been addressed and that it is now time to at least embark on the pilot project, political sensitivities have been far from resolved and would probably upend any such effort.

Where do we go from here?

The government now finds itself in a difficult bind. Whatever it chooses to do will likely re-spark sentiments that, to a large extent, seem to have been intentionally polarised. If the government includes “Afghan” but not ethnicity, it will run afoul of those who insist on including ethnicity as well. If it goes ahead, based on the existing law (and the seven million cards they have already ordered and received) – with cards that include religion, but not nationality or ethnicity – it threatens to alienate all groups that have cared enough about the issue to protest.

Although nationality and ethnicity are emotive issues, the protests also seem to have served as a warning to the government as a sample of the kind of trouble that political opponents are capable of stirring up. So far, this government has lacked the savvy to negotiate the buy-in of opposing views in the matter and has mainly sought to defer and stall. It would be a major feat if the government could calm the political controversies and focus on reviving the technical process and rekindling donor interests. It is not impossible, but the challenges are enormous.

 

(1) According to this article, the first phase of the e-tazkera project –setting up the National Data Centre – was delayed due to capacity constraints and was rescheduled to start in mid-2011. Concerns over who would have access to the biometric registration data caused another delay of at least nine months in 2011, as the government put in place protocols to maintain sole ownership of the data. There was also apprehension over the use of the e-tazkera during elections, given the limited availability of electricity in many polling centres.

(2) The Ministry of Interior, by then the lead ministry in the process, clearly stated that the distribution of electronic ID-cards was “too tough a task to be fully completed ahead of the elections.” The MoI estimated that, realistically, 70 per cent of the distribution could be completed within the next three years, and that for the remaining 30 per cent of the population living mainly in insecure and far-flung areas, it could take another three to six years. This was a little over a year before the elections. For more details, see this AAN dispatch from January 2013.

(3) When the issue was later discussed in the Wolesi Jirga, on 30 November 2013, Deputy Speaker Saleh Muhammad Seljuqi blamed the Internal Security Committee, which he said had sent him a “corrected” version of the law claiming spelling errors. Some MPs accused Mirdad Khan Nejrabi,  the chair of the commission, of having omitted the word “Afghan” on the instruction of Balkh Governor Nur Muhammad Atta (see this video), while other MPs came to Atta and Nejrabi’s defense.

(4) During earlier discussions in the Wolesi Jirga, talk had been of a compromise in which ethnicity would be registered in a database but not displayed on the card, but when the law was passed, ethnicity had been dropped – both on the card and in the database. According to this article, the Wolesi Jirga had also decided to include religion and takhalus (in the Afghan media sometimes translated as “pen name,” but in essence it involves the introduction of fixed last names). After the Meshrano Jirga reverted to the ‘original’ version of article 6, as drawn up by the government, a joint commission was established to solve the differences between the two houses. This could explain the addition of religion to the version of the law that was finally signed and gazetted.

A suggestion, as argued here, to also include mothers’ names on the e-tazkera, so far does not seem to have gained any traction.

(5) The talk show in which Taqat made his comments was aired by Zhwandun TV, a station owned by Muhammad Ismail Yun, a Pashtun ethno-nationalist and a vocal proponent of the inclusion of “Afghan” on the card. Yun has been a vocal supporter of both Karzai and Ghani during their election campaigns.

(6) The synonymous use of “Afghan” and “Pashtun” was indeed common in the past, both in Afghanistan and in the literature about the country, until around World War II. Governments, for instance, used it between the 1930s and the 1950s to promote (the much less officially used) Pashto. In the decades after, “Afghan” increasingly became recognised as a label of citizenship and nationality. Some Pashtun ethno-nationalists, however, continue to use “Afghan” to mean “Pashtun.” It is also used in colloquial language among some ethnic minorities (for example, rural Hazaras often refer to Pashtuns as “Awghan” or “Awghu.”)

For this reason, some non-Pashtuns have insisted that ethnicity be specified on the card as well. (Another reason to include ethnicity is that such a registration would quantify the relative strength of various groups and could show that so-called ‘minority’ groups are larger than assumed.) Others argue that the display of the logo of the Islamic Afghan Republic at the top of the card should be enough to show the nationality of the cardholder.

(7) It is unclear whether the government is actually still waiting for this opinion, or whether this was simply a way to stall or defer responsibility. A Supreme Court opinion, however, is unlikely to lay the issue to rest, as Afghanistan has two separate organs that are mandated to interpret the Constitution – the Supreme Court and the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC) – and their authority vis-à-vis each other has not been spelled out. In June 2013, several MPs, arguing in favour of the inclusion of ethnicity, sought to consult the ICSIC – not the Supreme Court (which is traditionally considered closer to the executive) – on article 6.

(8) Demonstrations occurred in, among other places, Kabul, Paktia, Herat, Nangarhar, Balkh and Kunar.  See also video footage for Kabul, Balkh, and Nangarhar.

(9) In a nine-page document offering recommendations to the president, the head of the ETA, Humayun Mohtat, reiterated the MoI’s suggestion that “Afghan” be included on the card and ethnicity be registered in a database only – based on international standards and experience, as he said. He called on the president to take leadership and to put the ball back into the parliament’s court by sending them a cabinet-approved suggestion to amend the law.

A recent decree by President Ghani on how to deal with terrorist crimes has introduced the prospect of detaining, without trial, Afghans (and foreigners in Afghanistan) suspected of planning acts of terrorism. The relevant article allows the Afghan authorities to detain suspects indefinitely on very little evidence and with little or no opportunity to defend themselves. The president has, also, through this decree, mandated a tripling of the period that the state can hold terrorist suspects whom it wants to put on trial before they have to be sent to court. Introduced quietly together alongside other presidential decrees, these sweeping new powers have hardly been subject to public discussion so far. The measures seem to be an attempt by the Afghan government to circumvent the legal system and its protections of basic rights. AAN’s Lenny Linke reports (with input from Kate Clark).

The new decree

Presidential Decree 76 “Annex Number One (1) to the Criminal Procedure Code on Terrorist Crimes and Crimes against Internal and External Security,” creates an annex to the existing Criminal Procedure Code (which can be found here in English and Dari) and delivers additional provisions for “terrorist crimes and crimes against internal and external security.” This decree was endorsed on 25 September 2015 and published in the Official Gazette (number 1190) on 19 October 2015 and, thereby, already has the force of law. The aim of decree, according to its first article, is the “effective prosecution” of perpetrators of terrorist crimes and sixteen other offences that are mentioned in the Law on Crimes against Internal and External Security. This earlier law was passed in 1987, under the leftist, Soviet-backed Najibullah regime and was aimed at offences ranging from treason and sabotage, to assisting an enemy force, to anti-state propaganda (including “intentionally spreading false news or self-serving allegations”) and, also, not informing authorities or trying to cover up ‘anti-state crimes.’ The wordings of many of these crimes are rather broad and potentially open to abuse or the casting of a very wide net. (1)

The decree can essentially be divided into two part: 1) articles 2-9 and 11-13 of the annex contain provisions for individuals suspected of terrorist crimes and crimes against internal and external security which, among other items, extends the period of pre-trial detention and allows covert intelligence gathering without prior authorisation, and 2) article 10, which authorises “Exercising of Precautionary Measures.”

As the new decree has been introduced quietly and together with more than a dozen other decrees, there has been little public discussion to date. Human rights organisations and some people in the parliament, have caught on to the fact that, in its current form, it threatens to undermine important rights and protections. Article 10, titled “Exercising of Precautionary Measures,” has attracted the most attention.

Article 10 – measures that allow for indefinite detention without trial

With article 10 of the Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code, the state has established an internment regime – also known as administrative or preventative detention – in just four short paragraphs. Based on this single article, the Afghan state can now detain, without trial, people who are strongly suspected of having committed a crime – and keep suspects it thinks may commit (again) acts of terrorism, or ‘crimes against internal and external security’ in the future after their release from detention, even when there is not enough evidence to launch an investigation.

Article 10 reads as follows:

(1) Precautionary measures shall be taken in the following circumstances:

The person is suspected of committing terrorist crimes or crimes committed against internal 
and external security but gathering of incriminating evidences is not possible and as a result of detective activities, based on strong indications or reliable information, there is a strong probability that he/she will commit a crime if released. 


The person has been sentenced to imprisonment for commission of terrorist crimes or crimes against internal and external security and has served his/her sentence term and based on strong indications and reliable information, there is a strong probability that he/she will again commit crimes if released. 


(2) National Directorate of Security shall propose to the Supreme Court detention of the suspect or the convict stated in paragraph (1) of this article after obtaining the agreement of the relevant prosecution office and confirmation of the Attorney General’s Office. 


(3) The period for exercising of security measures shall be one year and in case the situation set forth in paragraph (1) of this article continues, it may be extended consecutively. 


(4) Persons mentioned in paragraph (1) of this article shall be kept in a special place under the supervision of the prosecutor, separate from the detention center and prison.” 


Based on the above article, the Afghan state can now hold someone without trial under one of the following two scenarios:

Scenario 1: If a person is suspected of having committed or may commit terrorist crimes or crimes against internal 
and external security in the future, but it is not possible to gather “court-worthy” evidence. This means, if no evidence has been found, or an investigation has been inconclusive, but “detective activities” (2) based on strong indications or reliable information indicate a strong probability that he/she will commit a crime, if released (art 10, para 1, pt 1).

Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted and is in prison for a terrorist crime, or a crime against internal and external security, and has completed his/her sentence term, the state may choose not to release him or her if, “based on strong indications and reliable information,” the authorities think “there is a strong probability that he/she will again commit crimes, if released.” (art 10, para 1, pt 2)

The decree does not detail what could amount to ‘strong indications’ or ‘reliable information.’

These above-mention scenarios are not unique to Afghanistan – other countries have adopted similar measures post-9/11. Unlike in anti-terrorism legislation formulated by other countries permitting detention without trial, for example, by Australia, article 10 of the annex to the Criminal Procedure Code does not even specify an immediate future – only any time in the future ­­– for a possible suspect believed to possibly commit a crime. Many other countries severely limit the maximum period during which a person can be held without trial. In Australia, it is just 14 days. The Australian legislation also extensively details the procedures governing preventative detention – in 75 pages, as opposed to the Afghan decree’s one article with four paragraphs. See here for analysis of the Australian legislation and here for the law itself.

Who investigates and detains?

In terms of procedure, according to the new decree, it is the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) that can ask for normal due process to be suspended so that an individual can be detained without trial. The NDS proposes to the Supreme Court “the detention of the suspect or convict stated in paragraph 1 of this article after obtaining the agreement of the relevant prosecution office and confirmation of the Attorney General’s office” (art 10, para 2). There is no provision in the law to allow suspects to defend themselves. There is also no mention of counsel and representation from a defence lawyer. The law, moreover, does not actually specify what the NDS has to show to the Supreme Court so that it can be given the necessary authorisation. In fact, article 10 paragraph 2 only states that the NDS has to propose the detention to the Supreme Court – from the text itself it is not clear in what form the proposal is required, or within what time frame and how the Supreme Court needs to respond to the request.

The new decree says that “the period for exercising the security measures shall be one year and if the situation set forth in paragraph 1 of this article continues, it may be extended [by the Supreme Court] consecutively” (art 10, para 3). This implies that any detention under article 10 would be fixed to one year (not more or less) and that, after that first year, all that seems to be required for the detention to be extended is that the original circumstances are deemed to be unchanged. Again, no opportunity is set out in the legislation for a suspect to argue against the continuing detention. Only another request from the NDS to the Supreme Court proposing an extension is required. The article does not specify any maximum number of renewals, nor does it mention any way that an individual could challenge or appeal against this preventative detention. However, circumstances might change or evidence might emerge that clears the detainee of suspicion. But there does not seem to be a process that would allow this new information to be brought in. In effect, this article provides the opportunity to detain a person indefinitely and without recourse.

According to Article 10 paragraph 2, the NDS needs to propose the detention without trial to the Supreme Court. It is not clear from the decree (art 10 para 3) whether individual members of the Supreme Court (official name: High Council of the Supreme Court (in Dari: شورای عالی ستره محکمه) can decide about such a NDS request or whether a full session of all of its nine members needs to take a decision.(3)

The Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code does not require any defence files to be presented or indeed to allow for anyone to argue for the detainee. In effect, this makes the procedure just an exchange of letters. Nor are there any other safeguards in the law against rubber-stamping requests. There are concerns that the session of the High Council (which do not take place every day and where other issues also need to be discussed) might not provide enough time to carefully study each case file. In particular, when the entire High Council of the Supreme Court needs to evaluate the credibility of the evidence, assess the potential threat a person might present and then come to a collective and reasoned decision.

How the Government justifies detention without trial

It is now almost three years since Afghans were last officially detained without trial on Afghan soil. The US had put a great deal of pressure on then President Karzai and his government to continue the US practice, but this was ultimately banned by Karzai who said it breached Afghan law. In the subsequent power struggle with the Americans, Karzai managed eventually to wrest control of Bagram’s Afghan detainees and, since 25 March 2013, they have had to be either put on trial or freed. (4)

Now, however, President Ghani appears to have decided to revert to the old practices. Hence, the decree came as a surprise to those who work on rule of law and detention issues, especially as Ghani has been among those criticising the US’s use of indefinite detention without trial at Guantánamo and, formerly, at Bagram. Human Rights Watch said it was “incomprehensible” that he would now introduce this draconian procedure to Afghanistan. (5) Detention without trial is an extreme measure for any state to take, but it is particularly risky where weak rule of law makes the power open to abuse. For President Ghani, however, it is the very weakness of the judicial system which, he said, led him to introduce the new powers: “We are dealing with a weak judicial system… sentences are reduced because of corruption in the courts… our security forces thought this was a mockery and people were getting out [of prison] with impunity….” (6) He added there had been “a need for a signal in the time of national emergency.” Despite the obvious need to have effective means of dealing with terrorism, this looks like a very risky way to try to do that, and here is why…

Problems with Article 10 of the decree

The issues with article 10 seem to be two-fold. First, in general, detention without trial is inherently problematic and a serious step for a state to take. Secondly, and more specifically, there is concern about the lack of defence lawyers, the ease of the process, the insufficient oversight and the absence of safeguards to ensure detainees cannot be ‘forgotten’ in Ghani’s decree.

Added to this, the Afghan context makes detention without trial particularly problematic. Currently, the war looks open-ended. This prompts the question of when and how an individual may no longer be deemed a threat. The Taleban and other militants are not identified by uniform or membership card, but mingle amongst the civilian population. This makes false arrests and false accusations easy. The decree’s language outlining what is needed to make an individual a terrorist suspect is scanty and vague: the NDS must just provide “reliable information” to the Supreme Court. Article 10 could thus very easily be used to frame another person – a business rival, a bothersome neighbour or a petitioner in a land dispute, for example, with false claims that could amount to ‘strong indications’ that this person is connected to the Taleban or Daesh (Islamic State).

There are already multiple problems with the Afghan law enforcement and judicial system when it comes to both ordinary and security crimes. Despite improvement over the past few years, Afghanistan continues to struggle to implement procedures to a satisfactory standard. This has been mentioned by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), for example, for ordinary crimes and for security-related crimes by UNAMA. (See the February 2015 UNAMA report on the Update on the Treatment of Conflict- Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129 – which focused on a population detained for security crimes.)

Is Article 10 even legal – or necessary?

The Laws of Armed Conflict (also known as International Humanitarian Law) acknowledge that a state may use preventative detention during wartime. For example, Additional Protocol II (APII) to the Geneva Conventions which Afghanistan ratified in 2009 says that, when a state is at war, it may deprive its citizens of “their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict.” The first Memorandum of Understanding on handing over the Bagram detention facility from US to Afghan hands, in March 2012, (read the text here) nods to APII. However, APII does not necessarily make preventative detention legal in Afghanistan. It just makes it not a war crime per se. International Human Rights Law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also recognises that some rights, including the right to a prompt trial if arrested, can be derogated from “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed” (art 4, para 1). But…

The Afghan constitution already provides for such a suspension of rights during a state of emergency. Thus, President Ghani could have legalised internment by invoking article 143 (7) of the constitution and declaring a state of emergency. This is possible if there is “war, threat of war, serious rebellion, natural disasters, or situations similar.” The state of emergency can be declared in the whole country or in part of it and is permitted for two months (extendable) and with Parliament’s agreement. The president can then, with the agreement of the speakers of the Wolesi and Meshrano Jirga, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court make use of article 145 (8) which provides measures to suspend or restrict a number of constitutional provisions, including clause 2 of article 27 that says the due process of law must be followed in detention.

Both those drafting the constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clearly recognised that partially suspending the rule of law is such a serious step for the state to take that it should be in the context of a declared state of emergency. However, Ghani chose not to take this route. He may have rejected this option for political or practical reasons – too much publicity, too many possible naysayers and too much potential political fallout (a state of emergency is a measure of last resort – and not utilized to ‘only’ suspend some legal provisions). But, by doing so, he has opened himself up to the accusation that he has violated the constitutional right to a trial.

More rights lost or curtailed with this decree

The other articles of Decree 76 deal with those whom the state does want to put on trial for terrorist crimes, for crimes against internal and external security and where sufficient evidence is available to do so. What the other articles of the annex do, however, is to expand many of the current time frames and provisions that are within the international norms to an extent that now they could be considered illegal. The most important ones are those that extend the powers of the state with regards to:

Covert Intelligence (article 3)

Article 3 deals with covert intelligence. Up until now, written permission (or oral permission for counter-narcotics-related activities) had to be obtained from the prosecutor’s office for any “covert detective operations,” such as wire-tapping. There is now no need for prior permission. Instead, the police or NDS can conduct wire-tapping of anyone they suspect of terrorist crimes or crimes against internal and external security for up to five days before they have to request permission from anyone to do so. Only on the sixth day do they need to have obtained a “verification of the lawfulness of their activities from the relevant division of the Supreme Court through the Prosecutors Office.”

This verification can be based on evidence collected during the first five days of surveillance. Article 3 remains silent on what happens to any intelligence if the continued collection of it is not deemed lawful – will it have to be destroyed, or is it still permissible to use in court as ‘reliable information’ for indefinite detention, even though the collection of further covert intelligence has been denied? Article 3 also fails to outline what will happen if covert intelligence operations are continued without permission after the five days. This lack of precision leaves gaps that could be easily utilized to circumvent any effective controls on the covert intelligence gathering process.

Pre-trial detention lengthened (articles 4 – 6)

Security personnel now have ten days “after learning about the occurrence” of a terrorist crime, or after the arrest of a suspect, before they need to hand over “the suspect and their activity report, documents, evidence and other collected substantiating materials” to the relevant prosecution (art 4, para 1). This more than triples the maximum period of pre-trial detention, from the current 72 hours (as per article 87 of the Criminal Procedure Code). International criminal procedure norms, according to the International Convent on the Civil and Political Rights, advocate a maximum of 72 hours before a suspect should be charged, released or further permission sought for detention. Although security personnel now have ten days to hold a suspect, according to article 5, they must still inform the prosecutor of the arrest within 24 hours.

After 72 hours of police or NDS detention, the prosecutor previously was allowed to request additional time for their investigation under existing law. The 2014 Criminal Procedure Code (article 100) allowed a judge to accede to a request for an additional seven days in the case of misdemeanours and 15 days for felonies. For terrorist crimes, these seven additional days for investigating misdemeanours have now, based on article 6 of the Annex, turned into 30 days, and the 15 days for felonies has turned into 60 (ie from two weeks to two months). A person suspected of involvement in a terrorist crime can now spend up to 70 days in custody before seeing a judge. While, under the existing Criminal Procedure Code, a total of 78 days of pre-trial detention was possible, the last 60 days at least had to have been approved by a judge and required the suspect and his or her defence lawyer to be present in court.

Other articles

Article 8 of the annex titled “Detention of the Accused during Trial” outlines the maximum number of days for each phase of the trial for the Primary, Appeal and Supreme Court – stating in paragraph 2 that the total period of detention during trial for all three stages cannot exceed 210 days. While the commitment to process a trial, so that detainees are not held for longer than necessary, is laudable, the timeline in the annex appears to be unrealistic. The setting of such a timeline is also not necessary, as due process often requires time and should not be dictated by a schedule. Such a timeline is not even set for trials in countries without the challenges of the Afghan judicial system, which tends to be plagued by delays and backlogs. A strict following of this provision threatens to harm, rather than help, due process.

Article 9 of the annex designates the Justice Centre in Parwan (at Bagram Airbase) as the venue for any primary and secondary stages of the counter-terrorism court – this means that all trials to do with terrorism or crimes against external and internal security must be held there, without exception. (9) Generally, prosecution takes place in the same geographic location as where the crime was allegedly committed. Given the good reputation of the Justice Centre in Parwan by Afghan standards and the extensive experience among judges, prosecutors and notably defence lawyers, of dealing with these types of cases, the move to Parwan might be positive. The Justice Centre in Parwan was already dealing with the majority of terrorist crimes before Decree 76 came into force. There is the concern, however, that it might become overwhelmed with the number of cases, particularly as ‘crimes against internal and external security’ is a rather broad term. Already, there are delays with the release of prisoners who have served their time, but have not been released yet. (10)

Article 11 – 13 contain additional provisions, such as bans on non-prison terms or pardons for those convicted or terrorism or crimes against external and internal security and an authorisation to seize convicts’ assets according to the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crimes. Again, for these provisions, there is no clear indication of how a suspect under the new decree can contest or reverse these measures. (11)

Why is this a ‘dangerous’ decree?

The new powers given to the state in this decree would be disquieting even in a stable system with a good record on the rule of law. In the Afghan context, the annex is likely to present a true challenge to upholding human rights. The AIHRC has already raised concerns pointing out that the article 10 of the annex to the criminal procedure code contradicts the human rights standards and norms. As evidenced by various reports on the Afghan system, such as UNAMA’s “Update on the Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghan Custody: Accountability and Implementation of Presidential Decree 129“ in February 2015, or even recently released information by the AIHRC (see here), it is clear that, currently, the Afghan state cannot even efficiently and accurately implement the rules and regulations already in place.

Adding the more complicated and often ambivalent and vaguely formulated provisions of Decree 76 to the current legislation will not improve the overall situation.  For example, it is not unheard of for files, and even detainees, to go missing ahead of, or even during, a trial, or for detainees to not be released after the sentence is over, or when they have been acquitted. It is a system where the powerful can easily use the law to oppress the powerless, where bribes or pressure on police, NDS, prosecutors and judges are used by strongmen to get the ‘right’ judicial outcomes. To then introduce new procedures that provide far less oversight and virtually no opportunities for defence appears to be a reckless loosening of what laws and protections Afghans (and foreigners living here) do enjoy. For example, according to the 9 December 2015 statement by the AIHRC, “at the moment more than 300 detainees in Bagram prison [aka Justice Centre in Parwan] have completed their sentences but are still incarcerated.” Afghanistan may be in a dire position vis-à-vis a brutal insurgency, but interning citizens runs the risk of being completely counter-productive.

President Ghani, in the meantime, has suggested that it was impossible for violations of the state’s new powers to take place, since human rights groups would be closely monitoring the implementation of the new law. “[Their] voice is not absent in Afghanistan,” he said in a television interview, “[their] voice is present and paid attention to. Countries get away with this when there is no voice. When there is voice, accountability follows.” However, normally, checks, balances and safeguards would be included as statutory obligations in the legislation, rather than relying on non-governmental organisations – with no statutory authority – to prevent miscarriages of justice.

Moreover, the presence and “voice” of human rights organisation has not been able to prevent other abuses from recurring. There has been, for instance, consistent evidence of the police and NDS using torture against terrorism suspects, as documented by UNAMA and AIHRC and of elements in the state manipulating the justice system to protect themselves or to deal with rivals. Human Rights Watch’s Patricia Grossman, thus cautions, “This presidential decree attempts to end-run the legal system and could put detainees at of risk of grievous, unlawful abuses.”

The fact that there were already contradictions between the process as outlined in the new law and how President Ghani described it, is also potentially worrying. For example, the decree says those to be detained without trial “shall be kept in a special place under the supervision of the prosecutor, separate from the detention centre and prison” (art 10, para 4). Ghani, however, in the same interview said the Supreme Court would have oversight and, rather than detainees being held in a place separate from detention centres or prisons, they will be held at “the Bagram, Parwan detention facility that is specifically geared to provide maximum access to rule-based approaches.” (12) There would be “no black sites,” he stressed. However, the point of article 10 paragraph 4 appeared to be that suspects would be housed separately from convicts or those going to trial, but still under the prosecutor. (13)

Considering the (deteriorating) security situation in Afghanistan in 2015, it is understandable that the state feels the need for more robust legislation and associated procedures to deal more effectively with those who have, or are planning to commit terrorist crimes against the state. But the questions arise as to whether these are really necessary, given the current robust laws in place and the legal options provided by the constitution to suspend some freedoms in the case of an emergency. Therefore, the introduction of a regime of detention without trial and the extension of pre-trial detention beyond international standards risks making a system with already serious challenges much worse.

Next steps for this decree

Every decree signed by the Afghan president automatically has the force of law. This is also the case with the annex to the Criminal Procedure Code that has already been published in the Official Gazette. However, parliament still has the option of rejecting it with a veto (under article 79 of the Afghan Constitution). If, however, it does not take such action, the decree will remain in effect.

Since October 2015, when the decree was published in the Official Gazette, it could have been considered by the judiciary commission, which is tasked with reviewing decrees and recommending members of parliament to either veto or uphold them. If the decree is upheld, it has the force of legislation, since both president and parliament have agreed to it.

At the time of writing, the parliament has already rejected several of the decrees put forward by President Ghani during the last parliamentary recess session, mostly using article 79 of the Constitution, which precludes presidential decrees “in matters related to budget and financial affairs.” The rejected decrees dealt with a variety of issues, including ministerial caretakers, taxation on mobile phone cards, amendments to the customs laws, the establishment of an economic advisory unit and amendments to the electoral laws.

For the annex to the Criminal Procedure Code, there are legal grounds to justify a rejection of the decree, apart from article 79 (which might not work for this decree as there are no explicit but possibly implicit, budgetary matters). For example, based on article 7 of the constitution, (14) Afghanistan is obliged to observe its international commitments (eg International Convent on Social and Political Rights). Some of the articles in the new annex violate Afghanistan’s obligations. When Afghanistan ratifies a particular treaty or convention, it implicitly agrees to adjust its national legislation to conform to these commitments and this needs to be done through an official amendment. Article 7 of the constitution, by extension, also requires that new laws do not contradict Afghanistan’s obligations – as the Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code does.

So, while the parliament has several grounds on which to justify a rejection of the Presidential Decree 76, there are concerns whether the judiciary commission is able to effectively present these reasons and, thereby, underline the dangers of this decree. In light of statements by the palace, such as by Sayed Zafar Hashemi, the deputy spokesperson, who presented this decree as necessary to protect the Afghan population from terrorism, there is the concern that political pressure might be exerted on members of parliament to avoid a rejection of the decree.

On 16 January 2016, the head of the judiciary committee, Haji Abduh, told AAN that the judiciary commission had only recently started to discuss Decree 76, but that this discussion had not been finalised yet as “it is a very sensitive matter that requires thorough consideration.” As the parliament goes into its winter recess, which lasts for 40 days, on 21 January 2016, the decree will remain in force – meaning detention without trial can take place and all other new powers apply – until at least the beginning of March 2016. Haji Abduh also indicated that, even after the recess, the judiciary commission would still need to get extensive input on the decree from experts before it will be ready to have the decree voted on in parliament. So, while there is hope that the efforts by civil society and other stakeholders can still bring about a rejection, or at least an amendment of the decree to prevent detention without trial to Afghanistan, the already on-going implementation of the decree in the meantime cannot be underestimated in terms of its potential for human rights violations.

 

(1) Article 1 of the Annex of the Criminal Procedure Code says suspects of the following offences from The Law for Crimes Committed against Internal and External Security can be detained without trial: national treason (article 1); espionage (article 2); terror – ie assassination of state personality or political, social, or religious leader, in order to sabotage and weaken the people’s sovereignty (article 3); sabotage – ie intentionally or unintentionally committing acts to weaken state authority, or key economic activities or disrupting the activities of state or social organisations (article 6); anti-state propaganda – ie for personal purposes and for the purpose of weakening the people’s authority, intentionally spreading false news or self-serving allegations, embarking on provocative propaganda, or oral and written propaganda or the possession of such publications (article 7); propagating war in any form (article 8); organised activities against internal and external security – ie forming, organising or administering an underground/secret organisation in order to commit crimes, or becoming a member of such organisation or establishing contact with such an organisation in order to achieve illegitimate goals, or encouraging and persuading others by physical or mental pressure (article 9); crimes against the diplomatic relations of Afghanistan with foreign countries – ie any act that harms or damages the bi-lateral relations of Afghanistan with foreign states or leads to the breakage of the diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and foreign nations (article 10); wilfully moving and administering Armed Forces divisions without an authoritative order or legitimate reason, in order to commit a crime, or despite an order to stop or disarm continuing to act (article 12); exposing state secrets without any intention of committing treason to homeland (article 13); looting, banditry or gangsterism (article 15); illegal occupation of public facilities (article 18); assisting the force of the enemy to gain material or spiritual benefits (article 23); not passing on valid information about crimes of upcoming crimes of national treason, terror, espionage, sabotage, disruption, war propaganda, anti-state activities, banditry and forgery (article 28).

Offences not listed in the Annex to the Criminal Procedure Code include destruction (art 5), hostage taking (art 16), collecting money and material assistance for anti-state organisations (art 20). The full text of “Crimes against Internal or External Security” in English is here.

(2) Article 10, paragraph 1, point 1 refers to “detective” activities, meaning detection (in Dari “کشف“) of crimes, rather than investigation (in Dari “تحقیق”). In the Afghan context, police and NDS detect the crime and prosecutors then investigate it after a suspect has been arrested and his/her file has been handed over to the prosecution.

(3) Unless the Supreme Court later interprets the provisions in article 10, paragraph 3 as meaning that only one or more judges of the High Council can make these decisions. Ghani has also referred to the entire Supreme Court making the decision.

(4) In 2012, when the Afghan state started to gain control of Bagram prison, it initially signed up to detention without trial and for several months, as AAN reported, the Afghan state did indeed hold Afghans without trial. However, when President Karzai found out that he had unwittingly agreed to this practice, he banned it, saying it breached Afghan law.

The exception to this are the seven Afghans still held by United States forces in Guantánamo and at least four foreign detainees still held by the Afghan state at Bagram (officially known as the Detention Centre in Parwan) also without trial.

(5) “Given President Ashraf Ghani’s sharp criticisms of United States practices at Guantanamo, it is incomprehensible why he would want to bring indefinite detention without trial to Afghanistan,” said Patricia Grossman from Human Rights Watch. “Afghanistan needs to take steps to address terrorism and protect public safety, but not by denying Afghans the right to a fair trial.”

(6) Taken from the interview with Ashraf Ghani in Deutsche Welle’s “Conflict Zone” programme, recorded on 16 December 2015. The relevant part is from 15:58 to 18:21. The transcript (by AAN) is as follows:

Tim Sebastian: But you did find the time to propose a pretty draconian amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code, didn’t you? That would allow for indefinite detention without trial. Why when you were so critical of American methods in Guantanamo, do you adopt the same kind of method –

Ashraf Ghani: – we have not –

TS: – indefinite detention without trial

AG: ­– we are dealing with suicide bombers on a daily basis, we are dealing with a weak judicial system, where people are given one year sentences in the primary court, their sentences are reduced because of corruption in the courts to six months or a year and they did not serve, our security forces thought this was a mockery and people were getting out with impunity – and repeatedly committing crimes. Because of this there was need for a signal in the time of national emergency and to be able to do this ­– But the procedure, again you need to understand and I respectfully bring it to your attention, it is the Supreme Court that makes the decisions and not the administrative part.

 TS: But human rights groups think it is a mockery because there is no specifying if the detainee will have access to family members or a lawyer or the right to examine the evidence against him, or the right to challenge this evidence

AG: The court system can ensure [this] once the Supreme Court is charged with this and we have an excellent chief justice whose integrity and commitment to law is second to none, {he] can ensure this.

TS: And they are kept supposedly in a special place under the supervision of the prosecutor, separate from detention centres and prisons. What kind of place are these, are these black sites? Á la CIA?

AG: No black sites, it’s the Bagram, Parwan detention facility that is specifically geared to provide maximum access to rule-based approaches

TS: Without oversight?

AG: Oversight is that by the Supreme Court, I just brought this to your attention.

TS: But how do we know that they are going to do that properly?

AG: Ask the Supreme Court!

TS: And avoid the unlawful abuse that we have seen at other detention centres.

AG: You think that the human rights community is silent? With the megaphones that they have? There is going to be silence…any abused? Voice is not absent in Afghanistan, voice is present and paid attention to. Countries can get away with this when there is no voice. When there is voice, accountability follows.

(8) Article 145 of the Afghan Constitution states: During the state of emergency, the President can, after approval by the presidents of the National Assembly as well as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suspend the enforcement of the following provisions or place restrictions on them:

1. Clause Two of Article Twenty-Seven (No one shall be pursued, arrested, or detained without due process of law.)
2. Article Thirty-Six (The people of Afghanistan shall have the right to gather and hold unarmed demonstrations, in accordance with the law, for attaining legitimate and peaceful purposes.);
3. Clause Two of Article Thirty-Eight (In case of an evident crime, the responsible official shall enter or search a personal residence without prior court order. The aforementioned official, shall, after entrance or completion of search, obtain a court order within the time limit set by law.)

(9) The Justice Centre in Parwan on the Bagram airbase has pre-trial detention and prison facilities, along with prosecutors offices and a courthouse: it is where the United States held its detainees without charge for more than a decade and where the Afghan state now tries and houses most terrorist suspects and convicts.

(10) While article 9 paragraph 2 acknowledges that the juvenile code applies to the confinement of juveniles falling under this decree, it does not detail explicitly which procedures will be applied during the investigation and interrogation of juveniles.

(11) Article 11, which states “Convicts of terrorist crimes and crimes against internal and external security may not benefit from the decrees on pardoning and commutation of penalties,” ensures that, unlike in the past, those rightfully convicted cannot find a loophole to secure their release. However, given the increase of the other powers in this annex there is the concern that, in cases of miscarriages of justice, it will be more difficult for those individuals to be released.

Article 12, which covers “Proceeds of Crimes,” make reference to “suspects and accused of crimes stated in this annex” and tasks “Security Personnel, prosecution offices and courts” “to identify the properties [of those individuals] which are under their possession or have, somehow been transferred to other persons and determine the proceeds of the crime and take action to seize, freeze and confiscate such proceeds, in accordance with the Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crimes.” There is no mention of how those affected by this provision are able to regain possession of their property.

Articles 13 on “Restrictions” outlines that “provisions on Alternatives to imprisonment, suspension of enforcement of sentence, temporary release, release on parole, and granting of time-offs shall not be applicable to convicts of terrorist crimes against internal and external security.”

(Article 14 only specifies the immediate enforcement of all the provisions in the annex and its publication in the official gazette).

(12) Although the official designation for the location is Justice Centre Parwan or Justice Affairs Centre Parwan, it is still commonly referred to as Bagram Jail, Bagram Prison or Bagram Detention Centre. This might also explain Ghani’s “Bagram, Parwan” reference.

(13) Housing those in detention without trial in a separate facility from the suspects under investigation by the prosecutor for terrorism crimes (pre-trial detention) or convicted terrorists (prison) seems prudent, in order to prevent these populations from mixing and to thereby risk potential radicalization. At the same time, as HRW points out, “segregation of these suspects from the regular criminal justice system, without any provision for their access to counsel, raises the risk of torture or other ill-treatment.“

(14) Article 7 of the Afghan Constitution states: “The state shall observe the United Nations Charter, inter-state agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

Text of the Presidential Decree 76 – in Dari (Annex1 of CPC-Official Gazette 1190) and English (2015 09 Pres. Legis. Decree 76, Annex 1 to CPC English- 2016 Jan. 11 v.4 from UNAMA)

In a brief press conference on Monday 18 January 2016, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) announced the date for Afghanistan’s next vote: 15 October 2016. But the preparations for the elections – for the lower house of parliament and, for the first time, district councils – are complicated by ongoing controversies over the legitimacy of the current IEC, the nature of the electoral reforms that need to precede the elections, as well as who will be organising them and under which amended laws. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look.

The facts

The IEC had come out in full force for the 18 January press conference, with ten people sitting at a long table in front of a row of large Afghan flags. IEC chair Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, appointed by former president Hamed Karzai in the run-up to the 2014 presidential vote, started the conference by noting how the government, so far, had failed to show any sign of preparation or cooperation for the upcoming elections, and asking the government to cooperate with the date he was about to announce. He then requested the government to provide the necessary budget, to ensure security – for polling centres, staff, candidates and voters – and to instruct all government bodies to cooperate. He asked civil society, the media, political parties and citizens to take on their roles and responsibilities in an honest manner. He thanked the international community for their support in previous elections and asked them to continue on the same path. He, finally, asked all actors to respect the authority of the IEC.

The date then was announced for 24 Mizan 1395, or 15 October 2016, which is eight months from now. The elections planned for this date are already overdue, as according to the Constitution they should have been held  by June 2015. The Wolesi Jirga elections will be held for the third time, but the district council elections are a different matter, with the large number of electoral constituencies, several of which are highly insecure, and the practical obstacles of varying district lists and unclear boundaries. Two days earlier, however, Nuristani had optimistically told the Wolesi Jirga that the IEC was already “fully ready” to hold elections.

Nuristani finally said the IEC had learned from past mistakes and was ready to implement its own reforms as planned, without specifying what these reforms would consist of.

The controversies

The announcement of the electorion date by the IEC is complicated by three controversies: the status of the current IEC, the nature the electoral reform needed before the elections, and the competing pressures surrounding the electoral timeline.

When the National Unity Government (NUG) came into being the two sides agreed on the need for “fundamental changes” to the electoral laws and institutions before the parliamentary elections. It was however obvious that they would have differing views on what kind of reforms would be necessary. The Abdullah camp, apart from generally pushing for changes to the electoral system, has particularly insisted on the replacement of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC).

Although initially very slow, the electoral reform process finally did catch (some) steam. The position of the IEC and IECC became increasingly precarious, as the government got ready to replace at least some of the commissioners. The IEC leadership strongly resisted these moves, arguing that they had been appointed for six years, that the executive did not have the authority to interfere and that, as the country’s main and independent electoral body, they should be in charge of everything election-related – including their own reform. The government, however, increasingly bypassed the IEC, instead relying on the recommendations of the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) that was established as part of the NUG agreement. So today’s announcement of the election date, whether chosen in consultation with the government or not, will  probably look to many Afghans as an act of defiance by the IEC.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the NUG agreement puts competing pressures on the electoral timeline, as it sets out a very ambitious sequence of events: electoral reforms before the 2015 [sic] parliamentary elections; parliamentary and district council elections before the convening of the Loya Jirga; and the Loya Jirga within two years of the establishment of the government. Proper electoral reform is, of course, likely to take much longer, particularly at its current pace (and particularly since the Loya Jirga, strictly speaking, would already have to take place in September of this year).

This tension is already being used by political pressure groups. Shortly after the president on 31 December 2015 indicated that the elections would probably take place between summer and autumn, the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, with Ustad Sayyaf as its most prominent spokesperson, released a statement welcoming the government’s commitment, but calling the timeline “unrealistic.” Rather than arguing that the elections would probably take longer to prepare – given the complexity of the reforms and the fact that the district council elections have never been held before – the group argued that the timeline would make it impossible to still organise the Loya Jirga within two years of the NUG’s inauguration. It called for an election between spring and summer, which, the statement noted, would still be possible “if the government really meant to have elections.”

The council says it wants to constructively encourage reform and has no intention of bringing down the government. The fact, however, that the group is already implicitly questioning the legitimacy of a national unity government that does not follow its own agreement, is making the government uneasy.

What about the electoral reforms?

The government’s efforts to effect electoral reform, in the meantime, seem to have stalled. The long delays in the establishment of the Special Reform Commission (SERC) initially led to suspicions that the Ghani camp was dragging it’s feet. When the SERC finally got to work, in the summer of 2015, it prepared two batches of recommended for reforms. The first batch, presented to the CEO on 30 August 2015, resulted in several amendments by presidential decree to both the Electoral Law and the Law on the Structure, Authorities and Duties of the Electoral Bodies (the SAD Law). The most controversial amendments, at least according to the IEC, were those that changed the requirements and tenures of the electoral commissioners, opening the way for the replacement of at least some of them. (1)

On 21 December 2015 the SERC handed in its second, more complicated batch of recommendations, including changes in the electoral system and the electoral constituencies. This however came to a halt, when on the same day the Wolesi Jirga voted off the earlier decree that had amended the SAD Law and that was the basis for the establishment of a Selection Committee which was about to start looking for new electoral commissioners. On 26 December 2015, the Wolesi Jirga proceed to also vote off the decree amending the Electoral Law. On 5 January 2016 the Meshrano Jirga followed suit, voting off both decrees without discussing the merits of the amendments.

With the rejection of the decrees, the electoral reform efforts are not only back to square one, it also means that the legal basis for the replacement of the IEC and IECC commissioners has, for the moment, been removed.

In a press conference on 6 January 2015, possibly emboldened by the parliament’s actions, Nuristani said the IEC would announce the election date in the next week, and added that he hoped the president would now stop sending decrees to the parliament. He stressed once again that the 2014 vote had been the best elections ever and that the Selection Committee had been established against the law. The head of the IECC Saadat also welcomed the parliament’s decision and stressed that both the Reform Commission and the Selection Commission would now have to stop working.

Where to go from here?

The government has not yet formally reacted to the IEC’s announcement, which may be in part because they were busy with the quadrilateral ‘peace talks’ (or rather, the preparatory talks for hoped-for talks with the Taleban) that were taking place in Kabul on the same day.

But on the day before, after the IEC had announced it would hold a press conference, CEO Abdullah Abdullah told the council of ministers (and subsequently the press and social media) that the government considered electoral reform a pre-condition for elections and that “Afghans are still concerned over the flawed management of the previous elections” (the Twitter account in his name was much blunter, saying that “some Afghans are concerned that former commissioners convicted of fraud may be leading another election”). He left no doubt as to what reform would need to entail: “Upcoming elections will be held under the supervision of a new commission.”

President Ghani had earlier said something similar on 31 December 2015 during a televised press conference, when he stressed the government’s continued commitment to reform. He reiterated that the Selection Committee’s work would result in new commissioners (but did not specify how many) and said that the elections would be held between summer and autumn [2016] and that the IEC would fix the exact date. His words, slightly different from what Abdullah said, indicate that he is probably aiming for a compromise which would leave the current electoral bodies at least partially intact and for reforms that are not too far-reaching or time-consuming.

At the end of the day, the electoral reform discussion remains plagued by two fundamental problems: on one hand, the lack of consensus on what the problems of the 2014 election were and, on the other hand, the lack of real options to decrease the likelihood of fraud, manipulation and a contested outcome in the upcoming elections (the most important intervention would be the introduction of reliable voter lists, based on centralised population data, but this is unlikely to go ahead any time soon). It should then come as no surprise that, despite all the talk of commitments to both electoral reform and the convening of elections, there is probably very little real appetite to embark on another complicated and politically tense vote.

 

(1) The amendments to the two laws by presidential decree included 1) the cancelation of the existing voting cards, the establishment of voter lists based on voters’ tazkeras (ID documents) and the linking of voters to specific polling stations; 2) review of the polling centre distribution; 3) changes in composition of the Selection Committee for the electoral commissioners; 4) changes in the composition and tenure of the IEC by decreasing the number of commissioners and both decreasing and staggering the term of service; 5) changes in the requirements for the IECC commissioners; 6) changes in the composition of the Wolesi Jirga (an extra separate seat for Sikhs/Hindus) and provincial and district councils (25% women’s quota); and 7) the employment of school teachers and others civil servants as temporary electoral personnel.

Taleban fighters broke into the Ghazni jail and freed hundreds of inmates, including key Taleban commanders, in the early morning of 14 September 2015. It was the ninth spectacular jailbreak since 2001, but the Ghazni jailbreak was different than most of them: better planned and with more fighters. The government forces, on the other hand, lacked coordination between the jail protection unit and other security forces, and there may have been someone on the inside helping the Taleban. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary talked to government officials, local witnesses and people close to the Taleban, to find out whether it was the weakness of the Afghan government or the better planning of the Taleban fighters that led to the successful jailbreak.

The Ghazni jailbreak; how it happened

On 14 September 2015, at 1:50, the attack started. Taleban fighters first shot a rocket at the main entrance of the jail to open the way for a suicide attacker who drove his Toyota Corolla to the gate and blew it up. The blast was so big that it shattered the windows of several houses nearby and caused the entrance post to catch fire. The first suicide attacker was said to have had nine comrades, who were ready to blow themselves up if the jail protection guards showed strong resistance. Three of them were killed during the initial, short resistance by the jail guards. After the blast and the short fight, a group of 40 attackers, who had been waiting in an adjacent canal, entered the jail to free the prisoners.

An eyewitness who lives about 120 meters from the Ghazni prison and who was asleep at home when the attack happened, described how the blast shattered the windows of his house and woke him. He first heard the shouting of “Allahu Akbar” and then gunfire. The shooting lasted for a few minutes. The explosion had set the police post at the entrance on fire, so what was happening at the prison’s gates was clearly illuminated. “I could see a large number of people coming out of the jail,” he told AAN. The jail guards, he said, had resisted only briefly and at nearby police check-posts there was only “shooting in the air.” An hour later, he said, “at 2:50am when the [other] government security forces arrived, they started shooting in all directions until sunrise.”

A source close to the Taleban said the group of Taleban fighters that freed the prisoners had been told beforehand that there would be ten persons, who also were inmates, inside the jail who would be wearing white clothes and would be waiting for them. These ten persons had broken the doors of several cells immediately after the blast. When the fighters got in, they did not face any problem freeing the prisoners. The group apparently went from cell to cell fearlessly freeing prisoners. The interior ministry later said a total of 355 prisoners had been released. As a result of the attack, four attackers and seven guards were killed, both by the blast and in the firefight.

At 2:50 when the government security forces from Ghazni city finally arrived at the jail, witnesses said they started shooting in every direction, but by this time, everything had already ended. The freed prisoners were on their way to Andar and other areas out of the government’s reach; some had probably already arrived to safety. The freed prisoners were from Ghazni, Paktika, Paktia and Zabul provinces. They were first moved to Kalakhel, Alizai, Khadokhil and several other villages in Andar district, about 17 kilometres to the south, and were then sent to neighbouring Giro, Qarabagh and other districts of the province.

In a statement later that day, on 14 September 2015, Taleban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed said that hundreds of fighters from several districts had participated in multiple attacks in the city. Indeed, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) had been caught in a complex situation, as Taleban fighters launched attacks, not just on the prison, but on several other security check posts and key government institutions at the same time, including the main police headquarters. This made it difficult for the security forces to identify the main target of the attacks and probably led to confusion and great difficulty with coordination.

What is clear, however, is that the Afghan National Army (ANA), the prison guards and the police who were in the vicinity of the jail did not put up much of a fight. Although the guards at the gate fought for a short time, the guards in the central and other towers did not support them and the few guards who resisted were ultimately killed. Moreover the jail guards did not contact the police headquarters to ask for help, until much later. Ghazni police chief Muhammad Hakim Angar, who has since then been replaced, told AAN that when they were finally contacted, supporting forces arrived at the jail within ten minutes, but by that time everything was already over.

The Ministry of Interior, on the same day of the attack, sent a delegation to Ghazni to officially investigate the incident. On 19 September, five days later, interior ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi told Hasht-e Subh daily that the investigation was completed and the findings had been sent to the president’s office. He said they would share the findings with the media, but months later still nothing has been shared. AAN has tried several times to reach the spokesman, but his phone has either been off or he did not respond.

The media and other commentators, in the meantime, were swift to come up with their own verdict. A day after the attack, local media vehemently criticised what they saw as the security officials’ incompetence and lack of coordination. Hasht-e Subh daily in an editorial wrote: “After the first Kandahar jailbreak, officials said they had learned and were now prepared to prevent similar attacks in the future, however the Ghazni jailbreak proved that the officials did not learn anything.” According to Sarkhat daily, jail superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and security director Omarakhan had not been at their duty stations when the attack happened.

Taleban preparation

The multiple attacks in Ghazni on 14 September 2015 was a complex operation, targeting a large number of check posts and involving a large number of Taleban fighters. Most of them had apparently not been told what the main target was (except 50 of them, among them, the ten suicide attackers). Interestingly, several separate groups of Taleban fighters participated in these attacks and every group was given a different task without knowing the tasks of the other groups. A source close to the Taleban said that one group of fighters had simply been instructed to follow their commander and only around midnight, when they realised they were close to the main Ghazni-Paktika highway and near the jail, were the fighters told they were attacking the central jail of Ghazni. This group, which he said consisted of 180 men, did not attack the security check posts around the jail; instead, some of them entered the jail after the blast and freed the inmates. Others were told to target the government reinforcements if they showed up, and otherwise to just accompany the freed prisoners to the villages – which they did.

Moreover, the Taleban simultaneously attacked several security posts around the jail and in other parts of the city, as well as in the districts. Targets included the base of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and the check-post in the former base of the US Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Ghazni city, two posts in Qala-e Qazi and Zargar immediately outside the city, and posts in Suleimanzai (in Deh Yak district), and Mullah Noh Baba (in the south west of Andar district). This seems to have successfully confused the Afghan security forces, a trick that the militants did not try in other jailbreaks. Not letting their own fighters know the full plan also appears to be a tactic not used in other, similar attacks, particularly on jails.

Later on the day of the attack on 14 September 2015, the Ministry of Interior said that three – of the 355 – escaped prisoners had been re-arrested, although local sources a week later could confirm only one (a prisoner who had originally been sentenced for theft and who was re-arrested in the Zarghar area near Ghazni city). Former police chief Angar later told AAN that, since then, 28 prisoners had been recovered; he said most of them had returned voluntarily and a small number were re-arrested. This figure has not been confirmed by other sources aware of the incident.

Although NDS director Ali Ahmad Mubariz on 3 October 2015 said that an operation had been immediately launched to track down the freed prisoners, no one in the surrounding areas appears to have seen a single police or government force. If the government had indeed conducted such an operation, local people said they would probably have encountered the Taleban fighters who were waiting for them in Mangor area, not more than ten kilometres to the south of the city.

After the Ghazni jailbreak; flowers and executions

AAN has followed what happened to the prisoners who were freed and found that they were first moved by the Taleban to several villages in Andar district (which neighbours the district centre to the south-west) and then sent to Giro and other districts of the province. Locals in Alizai, Kamalkhel and Hayatwal villages told AAN that a large number of people came to Andar to greet their freed relatives with flowers. Habib Rahman, a Taleban commander from Hayatwal village who is also known as Mansur, and his brother, were welcomed in this way; both received flowers after they arrived in Andar.

Taleban jailbreaks do not only involve the release of their own comrades, but often also general criminal prisoners. After the prisoners’ arrival in Andar, the Taleban divided the prisoners in groups, selecting those whom they believed should be punished and those who should be released. The first group included former members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and major criminals. Two prisoners were executed by the Taleban. All others, AAN was told, were freed a week after the jailbreak. Some of the freed prisoners who had previously worked in the ANSF were asked for a guarantee that they would not rejoin the government’s forces.

The two prisoners the Taleban executed were Enayatullah Taqat, also known as Natak, from Andar district, and Alawadin from Qarabagh district. Natak ran in the provincial council election in 2014, while Alawadin was with the police in Qarabagh district. The reason for the executions, according to a local source, was that they had committed serious crimes. Natak, who was also the stepbrother of former Andar district chief Lahur, had apparently been involved in kidnappings as well as murders. According to a local teacher who spoke to AAN, Natak had, in the autumn of 2014, killed a man called Sharaf from Laghar village and married his wife a month later. He said Natak had also kidnapped a person from Ghazni city in spring 2015 and had only freed him after receiving a ransom.

Alawadin was executed in the neighbouring district of Qarabagh. He had been involved in killings and robbery. A local resident told AAN that Alawadin had killed his brother, who was working as a doctor in Kandahar, on 1 March 2015. The brother had been driving from Kandahar to his hometown Moqur, when Alawadin, who had recently been deployed to Moqur district as a policeman, asked the victim to drop him off at Moqur bazaar, together with a friend who was a member of the ALP. On the way, between Janda and Moqur, Alawadin and his friend stabbed the doctor, threw his body into a nearby well and stole his car. When the family of the victim learned about this, they informed the district officials, who arrested Alawadin. The other man fled.

How the jail break could have happened

Talking to AAN, deputy governor Ahmadi gave several reasons why the Ghazni jailbreak may have been so successful. He said that, first of all, also according to the investigation team from Kabul, there had been a lack of coordination between the security forces. The jail guards did not inform the nearby security posts; and the police and the army stationed nearby did not show any reaction, even though they must have seen and heard the fighting. There is a security post of ANA soldiers about a kilometre to the southeast of the jail on Kohibad hill, from where soldiers only fired a couple of warning shots in the air, but according to former Ghazni Governor Faizanullah Faizan, they did not contact the jail guards to ask what was happening or if they needed help; nor did the jail guards inform them.

There are, all in all, ten police check-posts in the neighbourhood, but none came to help or rescue the jail guards or to stop the attack. There may be valid reasons for inaction by some of the posts: they could have been confused because they were also attacked, or they did not receive information from the jail security guards. Others may not have come out of their posts for fear of being ambushed by the Taleban fighters outside the posts. However, according to Ahmadi, if they had reacted and with coordination, the attack could have been fought off, or at least they could have prevented such a large number of prisoners from fleeing.

Secondly, according to Ahmadi there was weak management and coordination within the jail protection unit, who did not act as they were supposed to: they barely fought the attackers and did not prevent them from getting into the jail. He said the jail guards did not resist because they were not “serious and faithful people.” Some of the guards were sleeping, he said, while some others had intentionally failed to resist. Last but not least, he said there was the possibility that the Taleban had a secret agreement with some of the jail officials. Ahmadi particularly mentioned superintendent Muhammad Latif Hassanyar and his deputy Agha Jan, who were arrested on 14 September 2015, together with three security guards, on suspicion of negligence and collusion with the Taleban.

Faizanullah Faizan, a former Ghazni Governor who closely followed the jailbreak, also said the jail guards did not honestly resist the attack. He confirmed that the guards near the entrance did show a reaction but received no support from their colleagues, and that this was why only these seven guards were killed. He moreover said that, if the jail guards had immediately informed the nearby soldiers and the police, they could have at least stopped the prisoners from escaping the jail. Faizan, who was a mujahedin fighter in the 1990s, had at the time himself participated in an attempted jailbreak. Comparing this jailbreak with his own experience, he told AAN: “We failed to break into Ghazni jail in the 1990s because the police forces reacted honestly and were well-coordinated.”

One source close to the Taleban said that after the prisoners were freed, a Taleban commander looked around the entire jail, but could not find a single security guard. “It means all the guards of the jail either hid somewhere or escaped during the attack,” he said. This, despite the fact that, based on the attendance sheet, 110 of the total of 173 guards were supposed to have been present on the day of the attack (although according to deputy governor Ahmadi only 60 guards were actually there). Moreover, according to Ghazni police chief Angar: “We found that only four pika machine gun bullets, seven kalashnikov bullets and five pistol bullets were fired by the jail’s security guards and not a single bullet hole could be seen in the exterior walls of the towers.” This is another indicator that the jail guards in the central towers did not resist; if they had done so, they would have been shot at by the Taleban fighters.

Angar also pointed to what he considered interference in the hiring of jail staff. He said that parliamentarians in Kabul and provincial council members in Ghazni had interfered in the appointment of the staff (including the superintendent and security guards) which meant that they were more loyal to the MPs than the government, lacked professional skills and had not been trained in security tactics. He thought they had either lacked the ability to inform the other security forces and/or had not seriously tried to resist the attackers.

Earlier jailbreaks; differences and similarities

Since 2001, Afghanistan has experienced eight Taleban-planned jailbreaks in which a total of 1,954 prisoners were freed and 17 jail guards killed. In the first jailbreak in 2003 in Kandahar’s Sarpoza prison, the Taliban tunnelled their way out of Sarposa and forty-one prisoners escaped. After a weeklong search, only a handful was recaptured). In a second jailbreak in Kandahar in 2008, Taleban fighters carried out a massive attack, which killed 15 security guards, and freed at least 1,200 prisoners including important Taleban members. Before the attack, the Taleban had apparently warned locals living in the vicinity of the prison that they should evacuate their houses. (1) In the third break into Sarpoza prison in 2011, 500 prisoners were freed through a one kilometre long underground tunnel that had been dug by the Taleban. In the north, in Sar-e Pul province, Taleban fighters were able to free 170 inmates in 2012. The jailbreak followed a powerful bomb blast inside the building and a well-coordinated attack from three directions.

Smaller jailbreaks include from Farah prison when inmates broke out by digging a tunnel from their cell to the outside, on 28 November 2009. Officials captured a thirteenth prisoner as he tried to escape. Eight months later, on 18 July 2010 after a bomb went off at the main gate of the same prison, nineteen inmates escaped. Officials said that only one guard was killed. They also had said that eight escapees were re-arrested. In Zabul, eight prisoners overpowered a jail guard, who had taken them out for the Fajr dawn prayer, and fled on 15 July 2009. Lastly, four foreign prisoners escaped from the heavily fortified and well-guarded then US-controlled Bagram jail in 2005. Military officials familiar with the episode said the suspects are believed to have picked the lock on their cell, changed out of their bright orange uniforms and made their way through the heavily guarded military base under cover of night. They then crawled over a faulty wall where a getaway vehicle was waiting for them.

Interestingly, none of these jailbreaks caused many casualties on the side of the Taleban. Only during the Sar-e Pul jailbreak were three insurgents reportedly killed, and one suicide attacker in Kandahar in 2008. This suggests these operations were all well-planned, but also points to the likelihood of repeated inside assistance.

Since the Ghazni jailbreak, two more have ensued. When Kunduz city fell to the Taleban on 28 September 2015, about 700 prisoners were freed, (see a video here), while in another jailbreak, in Ghorian district in the western Herat province on 21 October 2015, six Taleban prisoners were released.

Conclusion

It seems that the Taleban fighters were smart enough and well-prepared enough to carry out their operation exactly as they wanted. They distracted the Afghan government forces by attacking several security check posts at the same time. They also kept their own fighters largely unaware of the plan. Though officials said there was inside cooperation with the Taleban at the government’s side, it also seems that, if this had indeed been the case, there would have been no need for such a big, complicated operation or such a high level of secrecy. Even bearing in mind the multiple attacks that night, the Afghan government displayed great confusion in response to the attack. They were uncoordinated and failed to even try to foil the attack and the escape of the prisoners. If the jail protection guards had immediately informed all the surrounding check posts, the Taleban fighters could have faced a much stronger resistance. It is less likely they could have freed all the prisoners and taken them to local areas while losing so few fighters.

Although, the jailbreak in Ghazni is over, it is clear that similar attacks can happen again, unless the Afghan government manages to improve the protection of its jails and other key institutions.

 

(1) For a detailed account of 2008 Sarpoza jailbreak see Graeme Smith’s book “The Dogs are Eating them Now: Our War in Afghanistan,” Alfred A. Knopf, Canada, 2013 (pp. 215-233).

Mention drugs or Google the word ‘opium’ and the link to Afghanistan will never be far away. No wonder, since over the last few decades, Afghanistan has become the largest opium producer in the world. But where did opium come from, how did it spread and what are its cultural expressions? AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig and Doris Buddenberg – member of the AAN Advisory Board, former head of UNODC Afghanistan and curator of a recent exhibition on opium – have been taking a closer look.

In 2015, opium poppy was grown in Afghanistan on an estimated area of 183,000 hectares. The annual production was expected to be 3,300 metric tons, down because of a bad harvest from 6,400 metric tons in 2014. But it has not always been this way. Afghanistan became the world’s largest opium producer only in the 1980s and, although, opium is often identified as an ‘eastern drug’, its use actually originally spread from Europe and the eastern Mediterranean to southeast and east Asia.

While travelling from Europe to Asia, opium morphed in people’s perceptions from a plant grown mostly for its nourishing oil and seeds into one that was farmed for its intoxicating content. In later times, it also morphed from a commodity on which colonial empires were built (1) and from which later guerrilla groups were financed to fight communism to a commodity that is perceived as funding terrorist groups and mafia networks and needs to be eradicated.

Afghanistan and its opium both feature in an exhibition curated by Doris Buddenburg, one of the two authors of this dispatch. The exhibition titled “Opium” is on at the Museum of Cultures in the Swiss city of Basel until 24 January 2016. It specifically covers the cultural history of opium and how its use spread from Europe and the eastern Mediterranean to Asia. The exhibit includes harvesting tools and smoking utensils, a statue of a Greek goddess with a poppy head as her symbol, a hall of fame of opium eaters in the colours that the drug users see, an iconic perfume bottle – and, yes, a cube of real raw opium.

Harvesting opium and its tools

One of the intentions of the exhibition is to show the material culture that developed via opium production and use, and not just discuss opium through words and statistics. (2) Harvesting opium is a labour intensive task, as it requires each poppy head or pod to be incised several times over a few days. It is estimated that, during the harvest season, up to 300,000 seasonal labourers work on the large opium fields of Afghanistan. As family labour is not sufficient, seasonal labourers follow the harvest from the warmer southern provinces where the harvest starts, all the way up through the cultivating provinces to the north. It remains a surprising aspect of the opium culture in Afghanistan that such large groups of people, which have to be fed, accommodated and transported, can move across large parts of the country without incident.

The instruments the labourers use have to be simple, easily replaceable and cheap. The tools for cutting the surface of the poppy pods, to let the white latex containing the morphine seep out over night, consist of a small wooden handle, with strips cut from razor blades inserted and fixed with glue. The form of these scratchers, or lancets – called nishtar or neshtar in Dari and Pashto – differ according to the regions and provinces where they are used, showing how cultural differentiation occurs even in such simple tools. The depicted scratchers were collected in the 1990s in Kunar, Nangrahar and the southern provinces.

Tools for the collection of opium poppy ‘latex’. © Andrew Weir

After that, the opium is scraped off the poppy pods with scoops, usually made from metal. The opium resin is then formed into lumps that can be stored over a long time, as it is not perishable.

The opium poppy’s botany and origins

There are many species of poppies, but only one produces seed pods that, after the flower has withered, contain morphine and from which the derivate heroin or opium paste can be produced. Its Latin botanical name is papaver somniferum meaning the ‘sleep-inducing poppy’. The cultivated plant probably originated from the wild form of the poppy called Papaver somniferum subspecies setigerum which contains a very low amount of morphine. Opium poppies with a high morphine content, as grown in Afghanistan today, are the result of millennia-long history of breeding.

The wild version of the plant can grow up to a northern latitude of 56° – which is the line roughly connecting Glasgow, Copenhagen and Moscow. But where the cultivated, morphine-containing plant was initially cultivated is not fully clear. In older sources, it is often described as “a native of Persia.” One of the earliest UNODC reports, published in 1949, said its “original home” was “probably the Mediterranean region.” (3) But the plant’s cultivation seems to have started further west. The most ancient poppy seeds ever found, dated to 7000 BC, and were discovered in Cologne in modern-day Germany. As the Rhine river was an old trade route, it is likely that the poppy seeds came travelling down the river, perhaps from areas around Lake Konstanz, that are now on German, Swiss or French territory. Urs Leuzinger, a Swiss specialist on the late Neolithic period and director of the Archaeology Museum of the Kanton of Thurgau, has said:

“Poppy was cultivated in vast quantities in the pile dwellings at Lake Konstanz. It can be assumed that those people were after the oleiferous [i.e. oil-containing] seeds. We find them in excavations as plant remains of the ripened fruit. Those, however, are not suited for the production of opium anymore.”

Leuzinger adds that there is no “absolute archaeological proof” that the people of the Neolithic (between 4400 and 3500 BC in Central Europe) used the poppy seeds’ mind-extending substances. But, he said, it also cannot be excluded:

“But the people of the pile dwellings [at Lake Konstanz] knew nature by heart. They surely also knew about the effects of the poppy and presumably have used it. It is highly probable that it was consumed as a pain reliever.”

Opium praised, opium damned

Mass production and the use of opium as a drug, however, did occur for certain in the eastern Mediterranean in what is now modern-day Iraq, Syria and south-eastern Turkey. The oldest scriptures mentioning the cultivation of poppy have been found on Sumerian clay tablets that date back to 3400 BC. Through the Assyrians, for whom poppy was considered the “plant of life” and the “medicine of the gods,” the cultivation of opium poppy spread to Egypt, with Thebes as its centre, and to Cyprus in the 13th century BC. A statue of the Minoan ‘Moon Goddess of Gasi’ found on Crete and shown in the Museum of Heraklion, wears an opium poppy crown with the pods scratched (a photo here, p 27). Poppies and opium also became important substances in ancient Greek medicine. In the 4th century, however, early Christians banned its use as a painkiller, as they saw illness as a punishment from God that should be endured. The use of opium was later rediscovered through Arabic medicine in central Europe in the 14th and 15th century and popularised by Paracelsus in the 16th century under the name of laudanum. (4)

The intoxicating quality of opium was known early on. Early Roman emperors such as Nero, Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius were all major consumers of opium. An inventory of the Imperial Palace of Rome, dated to the year 214 AD, lists 17 tons of opium there. Poets across many cultures used it as an inspirational help. The Basel exhibition’s hall of fame includes among the Persian-speaking poets, from Attar the Perfume-Maker, Nizami and Nasir Chosrau from the classical period to 20th century Sadeq Hedayat. On the European side, the list contains Novalis, Heinrich Heine, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, John Keats, Oscar Wilde, Charles Baudelaire and Pablo Neruda. Also featured is fashion designer Yves Saint-Laurent who, not incidentally, created a perfume called ‘Opium’.

A Persian author, Abu-l-Qasem Yazdi, wrote the Treatise for Opium Smokers. Published in 1898 in Bombay, his 50-page treatise contains verses and prose, philosophical deliberations and practical advice on opium smoking and for opium smokers. The opium, Yazdi says, heals the diseases of the body and the suffering of the soul; it strengthens friendship and unity among its admirers, and keeps them away from involvement in earthly irrelevancies.

A short history of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan

Some sources, like German researcher Katja Mielke, suggest that in several parts of Afghanistan “cultivation of opium poppy with the aim to produce raw opium for self-consumption had a long tradition.” She mentions Badakhshan in the northeast, in particular, as a place where opium has long been used on as a remedy against snakebites and other pain, as well as to quell hunger. However, she and other sources do not tell us exactly how long “long” may have been. Jonathan Goodhand, from the School of Oriental and Asian Studies, says Badakhshan’s poppy cultivation had come from China and Bukhara via the silk route. (5)

However, the spread of the opium poppy to Afghanistan, via the eastern Mediterranean and Persia seems more probable – see the references in the 12th to 14th century Persian literature. Ibn Sina (Avicenna) who lived from 980 to 1032 and worked in Bukhara and Hamadan stilled described opium as the “sun-dried juice of the Egyptian black poppy” (our emphasis) in his al-Qānūn fī ṭ–Ṭibb (Canon of Medicine), indicating that opium poppy was apparently not yet regularly cultivated in the region that nowadays includes Afghanistan. In China, opium cultivation for regular consumption started very late, probably only in the 15th century when it was transformed from a rare medicine into a luxury item. (6)

Another sign that the opium poppy came late to Afghanistan is that there does not seem to be an original Persian name for the plant. In Afghanistan, a Turkic word – koknar – is used; kok mean “green” and nar means “pomegranate” (anar in Persian), which may be an allusion to the poppy pod’s shape. Opium is locally called taryak, which comes from the old Greek word theriac (7); in the Middle East and south Asia, this word is used more widely than just for opium. It denotes a substance or mixture used to treat pain, wounds and snakebites, and could refer to any number of various of plant and mineral origin including opium. In Sa’adi’s 13th century Golestan, one of the most outstanding works of classical Persian literature, for example, there is the line:

Before theriac arrives from Persia, the one bitten by the snake has already died.

Theriaca, Andrew Weit 2015 MITTEL

As to the recent past, a 2003 UNODC report says “opium poppy was not really a ‘traditional crop’ in Afghanistan” and that “unlike many other countries in the region, Afghanistan did not have much of an ‘opium culture’” in the past. The 1949 UNODC report quoted earlier said that, according to the then most recent data sent by the Afghan government (in 1937), “in 1932 the area of cultivation was 3,846 hectares. [This would have been 1.7 per cent of the 2014 peak.] The production was then estimated at 74.5 tons.” The report also mentioned pre-World War II imports of Afghan opium by the Soviet Union, Germany, the US and France and the fact that Afghanistan had prohibited the production of opium in 1945: “No information as to the observance of this prohibition” was available, though, and the 1949 UNODC reports stated that “[t]he Annual Report of India for 1946 mentioned continued smuggling from Afghanistan.” By 1956, Afghan production had fallen to twelve tons.

Two pre-war producing areas were mentioned in the 1949 report, “one in western Afghanistan, adjacent to Khorassan province of eastern Iran [which may have been Herat or Farah], and the other in eastern Afghanistan, near Kashmir [probably Badakhshan and Nangrahar].” However, according to the 2003 report, poppy “was not cultivated in most parts of the country until the 1990s“

In 1971, however, the UN expressed concerns (quoted here) that the Afghan government was “too passive in response to its own recognition that illicit opium production was increasingly taking place and its stated inability to achieve a significant suppression of production” despite the 1945 ban. Two years later, in 1973, German magazine Der Spiegel reported that, driven by a five-fold increase of heroin prices, “farmers in the southwest of Afghanistan are expecting the most abundant opium harvest in living memory – thanks to new irrigation systems installed by US aid workers.” American protests about opium production were rejected by the Afghan government, after which Washington threatened to cut off development aid. Helmand and Kandahar have ever since remained major opium production areas in Afghanistan.

The growing of opium poppy started booming in Afghanistan as a result of two developments. First, as a UN report stated, “between 1972 and the early 1980s three main sources of opium production, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, were enforcing bans or severe drug control laws, creating an opening for other sources of opium in South-West Asia. … As early as 1972 … it was already clear that Afghanistan could [but had not yet] become an alternative source of supply.” The main opium producer of the late 1970s and early 1980s was still Pakistan and it was in the 1980s that production shifted to Afghanistan, especially the eastern provinces. Further, after the Soviet military intervention in 1979, the central government lost control over many rural areas, and its opponents, the mujahedin, who controlled these areas, expanded poppy production. As Fariba Nawa, an Afghan author, put in her 2012 book Opium Nation:

“It was in the 1980s with the help of the American government that Afghanistan became a major producer of opium. Ronald Reagan’s government looked the other way when Mujahideen guerrillas encouraged farmers to plant poppy and used those profits to buy weapons to fight the Soviets.”

Picturing drug burning and eradication

 Manual eradication of poppy cultivation has been singularly unsuccessful in Afghanistan. Only very small percentages of the crop are generally eradicated. For 2015, no more than the eradication of two per cent of the country’s overall production could be verified by UNODC (which represented already an increase of 40 per cent compared to 2014). And even those eradication efforts are surrounded by rumours alleging that only the small farmers are ‘robbed’ of their harvest and that, in some cases, big landowners pay compensation to those small farmers who ‘allow’ the eradication to show compliance with government and international efforts.

Afghan farmer thanking God for a good harvest. © Alessandro Scotti 2006

Similar rumours surround the sensational drug burning ceremonies, where it is often alleged that what is burnt are not drugs but some other, cheap substance. (8) Confiscated drugs have a huge value and it would not be surprising if they were re-channelled into the market.

Drug burning ceremony near Kabul, Afghanistan. © Alessandro Scotti 2006

Posters have also often been a way in which governments and anti-drug agencies have sought (to be seen to be trying) to prevent and combat drug production and use, even though their efficacy is limited. The exhibition in Basel has a slideshow with such anti-opium posters. From a cultural point of view, they are interesting and often unintentionally funny. The opium poppy is often personified and shown as acting by itself, without a human actor needed. It is imbued with mighty power, able to overwhelm human beings and even countries. The combination of skulls, skeletons or much feared animals are superimposed on the drug, which takes on the power of death or of wild animals (see examples below).

Anti-Opium posters from Afghanistan. The slogan of the top one (Kabul, Afghanistan, 1996) reads: “Save the sons of our beloved country from the pernicious jaws of drug addiction” in Dari and Pashto.

Although eradication has been largely ineffective, Afghan film director Siddiq Barmak did run into trouble with it when he shot his movie “Opium War” set in the opium fields of Afghanistan. (The film became Afghanistan’s official submission to the 2009 Academy Awards, ie the Oscars – see its poster below.) The main characters are two US soldiers who crash their helicopter in the Afghan desert and find themselves at the mercy of a family of Afghan opium farmers. Barmak, according to Time magazine, wanted to create a realistic setting, but had to obtain special permission from the Afghan government to plant a field of opium poppies. Nevertheless, Afghan eradication teams came twice attempting to destroy the film set. At the 2008 Rome Film Festival, Barmak’s film won the Golden Marc Aurelio Critics’ Award for Best Film – very much to the point, as the prize’s eponym, the Roman Emperor, was a heavy opium user himself.

Legal – Illegal

Today, the illegal opiate market, its production areas, trade routes and consumption are monitored and analysed by UNODC. In 2014, the illegal production of opium in Afghanistan was 6400 metric tons – (80% per cent of the world production. For 2015, UNODC predicts there will have been a fall to 2,700 to 3,900 tons. However, as AAN has reported, “one year’s result is not a trend” but rather represents one of the occasional lows that in this case was mainly caused by crop failure and market fluctuation.

There is also a global market for legally produced opiates, which is monitored and controlled by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Governments provide estimates of their annual requirements for opium for medical and research purposes. Subsequently, the INCB fixes production quotas that are then allocated to various countries, which in turn guarantee strict controls to ensure that their opium cultivation is secured and that no black market will develop.

In 2014, the main countries producing legal opium were Australia, France, India, Spain, Turkey and Hungary. The legal production of opium for morphine extraction in 2014 was some 7,000 metric tons. Over time there have been suggestions, from within Afghanistan and from non-Afghan organisations, that Afghanistan be given a part of this quota. But the impossibility of controlling the production in Afghanistan stands in the way of such a step.

A pragmatic approach

In contrast to some other countries, Afghanistan’s opium culture is largely based on a business oriented approach. In contrast to southeast Asia, no myths or legends about its origin or history have developed, but there is keen awareness of the value of the crop and price developments across the country and beyond. Various species of papaver somniferum have been developed according to their properties and qualities: pest resistant, water-intensive or not, for early or late harvesting, adjusted to the climates of the different growing areas, for mountainous areas or the lowlands, irrigated or not. This pragmatic approach is highlighted in the Basel exhibition.

It is particularly interesting that, in contrast to the opium and drug wars in other historical periods or currently in other countries, dealing and trading in Afghanistan is relatively peaceful, and crosses ethnic and religious boundaries without many disturbances. While some of the fighting in Helmand and other provinces, past and present, has been caused by conflicts over poppy growing areas, drug routes and taxation of the drug economy, the level of violence is much lower than in for instance Mexico and, in previous decades, Colombia. There, the competition between different networks over markets and trading roots has taken on the dimensions of a civil war. In Afghanistan, in contrast, drug related fighting is part of a wider pattern of conflicts that have – as shown above – boosted the illicit drug economy. The drug trade is also run exclusively by Afghans, at least up to the national borders. Seizures of opium and heroin often come about as a result of competing interests, as traffickers have infiltrated the security apparatus or buy protection from the state. Almost without exception, they are solved without the use of violence.

The exhibition “Opium” can be visited in the Museum der Kulturen (Museum of Cultures) in Basel, Switzerland, till 24 January 2016 (more information here).

All illustrations in this text have been taken or are shown at the Basel exhibition and are used with the kind permission of the organisers.

 

(1) Kenneth Pomeranz and Steven Topik, The World That Trade Created, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

(2) The statistics can be found in the regular reports of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime – the latest is here. AAN has analysed the latest general trends here and has recently also written about the appearance of crystal meth on the Afghan drug market, which seems to constitute a new trend in Afghanistan’s drug production and use (AAN reporting here).

(3) Nathan Allen, Opium Trade, Boston: Lowell, 1853, p 6; Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, “Afghanistan’s Opium Production in Perspective”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1 (2006), p 21-24.

(4) Sources: “Erste Medizinkonzepte zwischen Magie und Vernunft, 3000-500 v. Chr.”, in: H. Schott (ed), Die Chronik der Medizin, Chronik-Verlag, Dortmund 1993, pp 16-33 and Csaba Nikolaus Nemes, “Der Mohn in der bildenden Kunst und Literatur (Opium, Mithridatica, Theriak, Laudanum, Morphin und Heroin)”, University of Heidelberg (p 27).

(5) Katja Mielke, “Opium as a economic engine: Drug economy without alternatives?” in: Wegweiser zur Geschichte: Afghanistan, Potsdam: MGFA 2007, 207; Jonathan Goodhand, “From holy war to opium war? A case study of the opium economy in North Eastern Afghanistan”, Central Asian Survey (2000), 19(2), 270.

(6) Zheng Yangwen, The Social Life of Opium in China, Cambridge University Press 2005. China itself was ‘opened’ up for the opium trade by force, through the so-called Opium Wars (1840-42 and 1856-60) at the initiative of the British East India Company which had earlier taken over poppy cultivation in Moghul India. After the Opium Wars, China became a major producer, with a peak output of 41,000 tons in 1906: at that time, this was 85 per cent of world production and amounted to more than six times Afghan production in 2014.

In Moghul India, between 1773 and 1797, the British East India Company, replaced the indigenous syndicates. Up to the end of the first half of the 19th century, around 280 tons were produced annually, but by 1858, opium was being exported from India to China in an amount that roughly equalled Afghanistan’s 2014 production of 6400 tons, as Alfred W. McCoy writes in his contribution to the exhibition’s publication.

At its peak in the late 19th century, Bengal’s opium production stretched for 500 miles along the Ganges River Valley, with over a million registered farmers growing opium poppy exclusively for the Company on some 500,000 acres of prime land. From their factories in Patna and Benares in the heart of opium country, British officers directed some 2,000 Indian agents who circulated through the opium poppy districts, extending credit and collecting opium. … Not only did opium solve the fiscal crisis that accompanied the British conquest of Bengal, it remained a staple of colonial finances, providing from six to fifteen per cent of British India’s tax revenues during the 19th century.

(7) The pomegranate and the poppy pod were often used as symbols of fertility in ancient Greece, Mesopotamia, Turkey etc, because of the many seeds they contain. An opium pod contains up to 2000 seeds and more.

The word ‘opium’ itself might have travelled from east to west, with opium poppy being called apiphena in old Sanskrit scriptures (here) which later became afyun in Greek.

(8) Large quantities of illegally produced drugs that are confiscated by the police are often burnt in highly publicised ceremonies. The sacks or plastic bags supposedly filled with the drugs are piled onto wooden logs, petrol is poured over them and the pile is lit, after which the bonfire starts, creating a thick black smoke. Representatives from embassies, the United Nations and the press are often invited to witness this destruction through fire. Until today, such burning ceremonies are celebrated in Myanmar, Thailand, Pakistan, China, Iran and also in Afghanistan. These ceremonies are meant to produce iconic pictures of success in the ‘war on drugs’.

 

Dear friends and readers,

Here at the Afghanistan Analysts Network we would like to wish you all a Happy New Year. May it be filled with good surprises and may it bring peace, in Afghanistan and in the wider world, closer.

We will be here, together with you, closely following what is happening and hoping for a good year. The AAN team

Many find the arrival of fall and the beginning of winter depressing, but Landai, a traditional food feast in Afghanistan, makes the season something to look forward to. In certain ways, the anticipation of Landai can be compared to the way people around the world prepare for Christmas, with happiness; with one major difference, that Landai has no narrowly fixed date. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary, looks at how Landai­ – which is both the name for the procedure of drying the sheep and lamb’s meat, and for the meat that results from it – can bring happiness and connect communities.

The preparation for Landai (1) usually begins when the weather starts getting colder, the farming activities have been completed for the year and the preparations for winter have been taken care of. In Andar district, which is the coldest part of southern Afghanistan, this starts around the 15th of the Afghan month of Aqrab, which corresponds to around the first week of November. Depending on the weather, Landai can take place any time until the end of December. This is the time when people are collecting firewood and going to the bazars in the cities to buy what they need to get through the winter. It is also the time when most of the work on the farms and in the fields is finished. Landai then is a time to enjoy a break from the hard work during the past seasons and to celebrate the completion of the farming year. It is festive event in which everyone in the family and the community takes part.

The preparation process of the specialty

The tradition of Landai emerged when communities, especially in remote locations, needed meat supplies when there was too much snow in winter for them to reach the bazar and purchase fresh meat and other supplies. It is the name for the special way of slaughtering a big sheep or lamb (and in some areas also a cow) that has been especially fattened and selected for this preparation. After slaughtering the animal, the children and women of the household are tasked with plucking the hair from its skin by hand, so that all hair is completely removed without damaging the skin. Once this step has been completed, the men of the house singe the skin, burning any remaining hairs. In the past, people would do this over an open fire using bushes of twigs, but nowadays the use of gas burners for this task is more common. The reason for the plucking and singeing is to save the skin. Not only does the skin help facilitate the drying of the meat and protect one side of the Landai meat against bacteria, it also makes up several kilograms that because of the special preparation can also be eaten. After the singeing the meat has already become half-cooked and the skin often becomes a crispy layer on top of it.

After the skin of the sheep has been prepared this far, the women and children gather around the workspace, while picking bits and pieces of the crispy roasted skin of the meat to snack on. They cut the meat into smaller pieces and salt them to facilitate the drying process. For the meat to dry quickly and evenly, each family designates a cool and dry space with a small window for ventilation and hangs the meat on wooden bars or ropes. On clear and cold winter days, some members in the communities string ropes across their courtyards and temporarily hang the meat outside. It often takes about a month for the meat strips to dry throughout, but it is not unheard of that some people start eating the meat before it is fully dried. However, it is only once the meat is fully dried, in the middle of winter, usually towards the end of January and the beginning of February, that people start to really appreciate it.

The Landai meat, either on its own or as part of a prepared meal with rice, is known to provide strength, warmth and comfort during the whole winter. Traditionally, it was the favourite food for the men who remove snow with snow shovels; a labour that takes a considerable amount of physical effort, with the people involved needing high-energy food.

While the Landai preparation mostly focuses on the dried meat, the families usually use the other parts of the animal as well. The next step for the women of the house is to cook the fat tail of the sheep in a big pot. This sometimes only takes place on the third day after the slaughtering of the animal and the preparation of the salted meat. The women cut the large fat tail into several pieces and put it in the pot; usually some left over meat pieces are also added and later given to the children of the house. When the fat has rendered and crystallised, the women keep it in a pot to use throughout the winter as cooking oil. The remnants of the sheep tail, known as Spinki or Speedey, are served to the guests who stay for longer after the Landai feast, as an addition to their breakfasts.

Landai – a community celebration

After the killing of the animal, the boys of the house are tasked to go around the village and inform the villagers that they are invited for dinner on the occasion of an animal having been slaughtered for Landai. Among the most important guests would be the imam of the village, who is usually the first to be invited. In the evening when the guests arrive, they are served roasted meat, feasting on those parts of the animal that were not used for the Landai.

A rule for the invitation of the villagers to a Landai feast is that anyone who has slaughtered a sheep has to invite all those who had invited him last year for their feast. Inviting and sharing this event within the community is very important. Therefore when the animal has been slaughtered and the meat is cut into pieces, the head of the family consults with his wife and other family members to draw up the list of guests. During the discussion, the family carefully considers all those who had invited them last year to ensure that nobody is left out.

Landai and its traditions and invitations are common throughout Afghanistan, but each area has its own variations. In Andar district of Ghazni, it has a special significance for newly married couples. The recently married girls receive special invitations from their parents. The invitation is for the girl, her husband and sometimes also her in-laws. A day or sometimes a week before the slaughter of a sheep for Landai, the brother of the recently married girl comes to tell his sister and her in-laws that they are invited to the special Landai event. While normal Landai feasts are already often a big affair, the newly married girl’s arrival at her parents’ house often takes place in the form of a special ceremony. The parents of the girl take one or two cars with female relatives who then accompany the newly married couple to the girl’s home village. Upon arrival, she is welcomed by the whole extended family in her parents’ house. She is expected to bring dry fruit, which is considered to be the first gift after the wedding. Therefore, those girls who got married during the fall and at the beginning of winter are considered particularly lucky, because their first return home as a newly married wife coincides with Landai, which doubles the girl’s joy and happiness and that of her family.

Not only newlyweds can look forward to an invitation, also women who married long ago receive special invitations from their parents. When they receive the invitation, they quickly try to finish all the house work of the next few days before their departure. This might include washing all the dirty clothes, bathing the children and getting them ready for the trip, but there is also another ritual that needs to be competed. The night before the invitation, women preparing to travel to Landai mix water with henna powder and decorate their hands, as well as those of their daughters, symbolising that the invitation is as happy an occasion as the day of Eid. The women also get the children excited about the visit to their grandparents; they share stories of happiness with their children, preparing them to meet their relatives from other villages, and tell them they will enjoy the days in the house of their mother’s parents. There, the children will have a chance to play with their cousins and other children from the village, allowing the parents some time to catch up on news and gossip.

Landai is also a special time for the men of the household, especially if they are the son-in-law of someone; the parents-in-laws, concerned that their son-in-law be happy with their daughter, will usually treat him very well. Landai invitations are not one-sided and there is an understanding that the families will visit each other. When men take their wives to her parental house, they are equally welcomed by their in-laws, sometimes even more happily, as it is an occasion for all to hear new stories from the more distant family members and to share new ones with them. The women that visit their home village usually stay for a week, or even two, after the Landai feast is finished to enjoy time with her parents, siblings and children.

Change in trends of Landai compared to the past

Landai still presents one of the highlights during the fall and winter season, but there have been several changes over the past decades. For example, in the past the Landai would take place in early December, but now it is moving more and more to late December. This might be because of the recent changes in the climate, as the Landai meat needs continuous cold and dry weather conditions, which seem to arrive later and later. This has also affected the time when the Landai meat is ready; in the past if an animal was slaughtered in November, the dried meat would be available in or around the end of December. Now it is usually available in January, or even February. Also, in the past when a sheep was slaughtered, the women would clean the lungs of the sheep, cook them and serve them at the dinner to all the guests, but now people usually forgo this, maybe as it is no longer seen as an “acceptable” dish. They also now serve a variety of other food, such as rice, vegetables and fresh fruit, which can be more easily purchased in the bazar, on the Landai feast table.

Landai is still an occasion for people to come together; greetings are exchanged and the hosts and other guests inquire about everyone’s health and exchange good wishes. The conversation is of course often about current affairs. In the past, this often focused on the harvest or on local issues. In the 1990s, when the drought had hit Andar district, as well as other parts of the country, many of the discussions were about the benefits of digging wells and installing water pumps. Nowadays conversations are often about the fighting between the Taleban and the government and about national-level political developments, which tends to result in lively discussions among the guests.

The feast also travels abroad

While families, especially in remote areas, often still need the Landai meat to survive the winter, its reputation as an Afghan speciality and delicacy has caused it to be used more widely. Often the joy over Landai is shared with close relatives living in the cities inside Afghanistan or, further away, abroad. Whenever the people living away from home call their relatives, they ask about the Landai and often hope to receive some. Over time a trend has developed that anytime someone travels during winter, either to the Gulf countries or Europe and the US, villagers will provide them with pieces of dried Landai meat to deliver to relatives living abroad.

Landai thus has a special place in the heart of many rural Afghans; because it is a delicacy, but also because of the memories it brings back. While most Afghans of course look forward to joyful weddings, the two Eid festivals in the Islamic calendar, the ceremonies of giving names to newly born babies, engagements, graduations of students, the return from Hajj and many other festive occasions, the occasion of Landai is also a major highlight of the year. As with every tradition, it has undergone changes and it has adjusted to the declining security situation and the political changes, but it continues to bring joy and happiness, bringing families and communities together.

 

(1) In Pashto the tradition is referred to as Landai, while in Dari it is pronounced Landi. As this dispatch focuses on the particular traditions in Andar district of Ghazni province, it has followed the pronunciation as used in this location.

Helmand, in southern Afghanistan, is a strategic goal for the Taleban, who have launched more attacks there than in any other province of Afghanistan this year, making a slow pincer movement towards the provincial capital, Lashkargah. The lure of Helmand goes beyond its opium economy, with the Taleban pursuing a long-term strategy to expand their reach into the south, writes AAN’s Borhan Osman in this op-ed published on the British Guardian’s website on 26 December 2015. We republish this here with the kind permission of the Guardian.

The Taleban have launched more attacks in Helmand than in any other province of Afghanistan this year, defending their territory in remote districts and ferociously pushing the war into government enclaves.

Control of Helmand was won over the past decade by thousands of British and American troops, and with their departure in 2014 the government’s hold began to slip. Insurgents were quick to take advantage.

They spent the year making a slow pincer movement, closing in from north and south towards the provincial capital, Lashkargah. Over the past seven months, Taleban forces overran some of the most hard-won rural bases in southern Afghanistan, losses that went almost unnoticed in the media.

The battles have occasionally stirred up a flurry of media interest when the names resonate with bereaved families and veterans, places like Musa Qala and Sangin. But the overall shift has been little noticed or discussed. Kabul can only claim full control of three of Helmand’s 14 districts, including the provincial capital. One district – Nad Ali – is split between government and insurgent control, and the remaining ten are either completely lost to the Taleban, or heavily contested, even if they still boast a nominal government presence.

The losses are due as much to poor leadership of the Afghan army and police as to Taleban strengths. Corruption, desertion, “ghost soldiers” whose salaries are claimed by fraudulent commanders, and other problems have hampered efforts to stem the Taliban advance. But there is no question that the insurgent movement has poured resources into Helmand.

Their focus can be explained partly in economic terms. Afghanistan produces most of the world’s opium, and Helmand is the biggest single centre for production in the country, so whoever calls the shots in the province can get a sizeable share of drug business.

The drug business was always an important source of funding for the insurgents, but it has become more so as opportunities for extortion and skimming from foreign forces started drying up, and wealthy Gulf donors began redirecting their cash to militant groups fighting closer to home.

But the lure of Helmand goes beyond its opium economy. The Taliban have put it at the centre of a long-term strategy to expand their reach in the south. They see it as a stepping stone to other areas and hope to make Helmand the first province they “liberate”, Taliban sources say. They even dream of turning it into a safe haven for leaders based in Pakistan. That would make their insistence that the whole leadership is on Afghan soil a reality.

To move top commanders, the Taliban would need to feel confident about holding core territory while driving Afghan security forces from the province and protecting their leaders from any raids. That would have been almost impossible when 60 Nato spy blimps were scattered across the province, watching fighters from the sky. There is now only one, Reuters recently reported.

It would still be difficult, but Helmand boasts good exit routes across the border to Pakistan or through neighbouring Nimruz province to Iran, and strong supply lines to other parts of Afghanistan. All the provinces surrounding Helmand have a strong Taliban footprint, with most of the adjacent districts already under insurgent control. That makes it easy for them to move in reinforcements, and difficult for government forces to besiege all of Helmand.

The Taliban can also count on the sympathy of the Ishaqzai tribe, who constitute a sizeable part of the province’s population.

The current Taliban leader, Akhtar Mansour, and many in his close circle, are Ishaqzais and the tribe was alienated by the US forces and their Afghan allies in the early years after the fall of the Taliban regime.

The Taliban’s hopes of securing full control of Helmand may be overly optimistic for now, because the loss of Lashkar Gah would be such a devastating blow to morale and confidence that US and UK forces are likely to provide considerable support for some time to come.

The Taliban are also struggling with internal splits about leadership and whether to undertake peace talks, which could undermine their focus on the fighting in Helmand.

But if the government forces cannot rein in their own problems with corruption and attrition, it will still be hard to stop – much less reverse – the Taliban momentum in Helmand, and possibly beyond. And if the insurgents can consolidate even the advances they have made so far, it will be enough to make the province an important base for them and a heavy drain on government troops and resources for Kabul for many years to come.

Find the original article here.

 

Rahmatullah Nabil, the chief of the country’s intelligence service, submitted his resignation on 10 December 2015. This now leaves two of the Afghan government’s four major security positions filled by acting officials (the second vacancy, for more than a year, is the defence minister’s position). Nabil’s position had presumably become untenable, after he publicly criticised president Ghani’s efforts to re-engage Pakistan and relaunch peace talks with the Taleban during his trip to Pakistan. The resignation highlights the political cleavages in Afghanistan’s political elite about the approach to peace talks and Pakistan’s role in them. AAN’s co-director Thomas Ruttig takes a closer look.

Afghanistan’s latest appointment problem has been lingering for almost two weeks. On 9 December 2015, the chief of the National Directorate for Security (NDS), Rahmatullah Nabil, who had not accompanied President Ashraf Ghani on his trip to Pakistan, went public with a scathing head-on criticism of Pakistan. In a Facebook post, Nabil implied the neighbouring country’s continuing support for Taleban insurgents had played a crucial role in the Taleban’s latest battlefield victories in his country. He did so while his boss, the president, was at that very moment trying to secure Pakistani buy-in for a new round of direct talks with the Taleban. The publicity that has surrounded the resignation amounted to a direct criticism of the president’s course on ‘reconciliation’ with the Taleban through Pakistan – an approach that is also being encouraged by the US and China.

Ghani’s previous attempt towards talks with the Taleban, in late July 2015, had broken down after the leak of their founder-leader Mullah Muhammad Omar’s death, which the Taleban leadership had kept secret for several years. As a result of the leak, the Taleban had pulled out of the talks (more detail in this AAN analysis).

Road to peace through Pakistan?

Nabil, apparently angered by the Taleban attack on Kandahar airfield early on 10 December 2015 that resulted in a many civilian casualties, wrote on his Facebook page that “at the very same moment that [Pakistan’s Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif repeated how Afghanistan’s enemies are also Pakistan’s enemies, our innocent compatriots were killed at Kandahar airport, in Khaneshin [a southern Helmand district that was temporarily taken over by the Taleban], Takhar and Badakhshan.” (The original post in Dari can be found here; a partial English translation is quoted here). He likened the “1000 litres of blood” of “innocent compatriots” spilled in the recent fighting to the colour of the red carpet that had been laid out for the Afghan delegation in Pakistan and slammed approaching Islamabad for support for talks with the Taleban as “kneeling down” in front of the neighbouring country. He ended his diatribe with the remark: “Gratefully, I wasn’t in this.”

The next day his letter of resignation was not only on the president’s desk, but also on those of various Afghan media organisations, where it was widely quoted. A copy was also, again, posted on his Facebook page (see here; a partial translation can be found here). In the letter, Nabil refers to the history of “open intervention by hostile states, particularly Pakistan, in Afghanistan’s internal affairs that have led to an upsurge in security threats.” He further thanked President Ghani for the trust he had placed in him. Citing the reasons for his resignation, he said there had been “a lack of agreement on some policy matters” in recent months and that the president had imposed unacceptable conditions on the way he did his job, which put him under impossible pressure and forced his resignation.

Nabil’s track record

Nabil, a Pashtun from Wardak (see AAN bio here), was originally appointed by President Karzai in July 2010. As the first non-Panjshiri to head the agency, he was initially seen as a transition candidate but his professionalism and reform-mindedness won him some acclaim under both governments (read our previous analysis here). After his reappointment in the NUG, he had, because of this background, been widely considered a Ghani ally. However, he was, in fact, the only member of the cabinet nominated as a consensus candidate of both Ghani and CEO Abdullah.

Nabil, on the other hand, had come under massive criticism from the public and in parliament when his agency seemed unable to handle the growing security challenges, in particular during the Taleban’s latest wave of attacks. The final report of the Fact Finding Delegation – tasked by the president to assess the reasons behind the temporary fall of Kunduz into Taleban hands in late September 2015 – identified intelligence failures as a major cause (more background here). Ironically, the commission was led by Nabil’s predecessor Amrullah Saleh, who had been sacked together with the current head of the National Security Council (NSC) Hanif Atmar (then interior minister), by President Karzai after Taleban were able to fire a few rockets near the assembly place of the 2010 Peace Jirga (see here and here). (1)

The fall of Kunduz was followed by several other events: the successful penetration of Kandahar airport on 9 December 2015 by Taleban commandos disguised in Afghan army uniforms; the fall of another district centre in Helmand, Khaneshin, on the same day, and the immediate threat to other district centres, including Sangin and Marja and to some extent Washer and Gereshk. (In Marja, Taleban are currently reported to be only half a kilometre from the district governor’s compound, while government troops are holed up in a compound outside the town. In Sangin, Taleban have laid siege to the district administration, while some areas of Washer and Gereshk are under immediate threat.)

Nabil’s NDS was also held responsible for recent misinformation claiming that the new Taleban leader Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur had been killed in a shootout in a meeting in Pakistan – which Ghani then personally chose to refute.

Inner-elite conflicts

Nabil’s double barrage was a direct affront to the president. If he had not resigned, Ghani probably would have had little other option than to fire him. As the head of state, constitutionally empowered to set the country’s foreign policy, he would have found it difficult to maintain a key official who publicly was contradicting him on a key strategy towards one of his main policy goals: ending the war in order to allow the growth of Afghanistan’s economy and the reduction of the country’s dependence on external resources. The palace statement, however, said the president had not considered “changes in the leadership of the security institution at this time”.

But although few will argue with the president’s wish and the country’s need for peace, doubt is widespread about whether the ‘road through Pakistan’ is the one that will lead to peace in Afghanistan, given the continued involvement of at least parts of Pakistan’s security establishment with the Afghan Taleban insurgents. Ghani, during this Islamabad visit, did not come up with many new ideas for the peace process. In his speech, he instead reiterated an appeal to “all movements that resort to arms [to] convert themselves into political parties and to legitimately participate in the political process” and to “reduce and renounce violence”. (The use of the verb “to reduce” appears to be new, and seems to point to the possibility of a gradual process.) New was Ghani’s suggestion of “a mechanism of verification” on how “the networks of terror coordinate” in the region through “the Istanbul Process in association with regional mechanisms of security cooperation” (full speech transcript here) – but this would require, among other factors, that the Pakistani government was keen on disclosing its intelligence service’s links with the Taleban.

Why now?

Nabil’s criticism did not entirely come out of the blue. In his resignation letter, he claimed that “over recent months” the working environment had become difficult for him, as he disagreed with a number of policies which undermined the environment of trust and that the pressure on him had mounted.

The NDS chief had earlier this year objected to a memorandum of understanding on intelligence sharing between his NDS and Pakistan’s intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The MoU had been agreed during a meeting in Kabul between Ghani and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz in May 2015. Nabil had, reportedly, refused to sign the MoU, after which a deputy had to step in. The signing of the MoU caused massive opposition, including from allies of former president Karzai (his former spokesman called it “sleeping with the enemy” in a contribution for al-Jazeera), but also within the Abdullah part of the NUG. The MoU had to be retracted, officially for “revision.” The reports about the Afghan government’s disunity over the MoU have now come up in Pakistani media again.

Rumours that Nabil’s resignation had been orchestrated at the behest of Pakistan (sources claimed to have seen a letter indicating a Pakistani request that the NDS be “cleaned”) were rejected by Kabul officials. Pakistan had however reportedly objected to the NDS running “operations into Pakistan, targeting Taliban leaders and cultivating contacts among militants opposed to the government in Islamabad,” as an American newspaper put it.

The more surprising is Nabil’s choice of timing for his public criticism and subsequent resignation. He might have seen the writing on the wall and chosen to pre-empt any actions from the government – but, as he admitted in his resignation letter, policy disagreements and, as a result, pressure on him to resign had been building over a longer period. He almost appeared to want to inflict maximum damage on Ghani – and on a policy strongly backed by the US.

Nabil’s resignation further points to systemic problems in the Afghan political set-up. First, it reflects how difficult it is for the president to navigate between the need to end the war with the Taleban and the deep-seated mistrust among Afghanistan’s elites, and population, towards Pakistan – regardless of whether the ‘road through Pakistan’ approach is promising or not. Second, it shows that Ghani has not managed to convince even key players within his government about his approach towards Pakistan and the peace process with the Taleban. This is at least partly due to a pervading lack of transparency on key policy decisions (already flagged in this March 2015 AAN analysis) and the tendency to continue Karzai’s ‘kitchen cabinet’ style, although largely with new personnel.

Although Karzai, Ghani’s predecessor, had also unsuccessfully tried to travel down this road (AAN analysis here and here), he and his current political allies argue that Ghani’s course risks bringing Afghanistan’s foreign policy “under the thumb” of Pakistan. However, it cannot be denied that in the quest to end the Afghan war, despite all the risks and misgivings, it is not a matter of “whether” to involve Pakistan, but rather of “how much” and “how.”

Third, beyond the Pakistan-related controversy, Nabil’s resignation shows how fragmented Afghanistan’s ruling elites are and how difficult for them it is to unite behind a single political approach. This makes institutions, even the NDS, vulnerable to ethno-political manipulation, another point raised by Nabil in his resignation letter (the original letter is here). (2)

Finally, Nabil’s resignation adds to the shakiness of the leadership of the Afghan security apparatus while, at least indirectly, strengthening the role of the one security institution that still has an unchallenged boss, the National Security Council (NSC) under Hanif Atmar (as opposed to the NDS and the two other security ministries). The head of the NDS must be approved by parliament, as he is a member of cabinet, but this is not the case with the head of the NSC.

A haemorrhaging government?

The position of permanent defence minister approved by parliament is vacant; (3) the interior minister (according to some) may be on his way out; (4) and an attorney general has been neither appointed nor approved. Apart from all this, the head of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) may also have resigned. The IDLG, as the policy-making institution for the sub-national levels and with its influence on appointments in provinces and districts as well as on related legislation, is extremely powerful in centralised Afghanistan.

Pajhwok news agency quoted a palace source on 13 December 2015 who claimed that IDLG head Ghulam Jilani Popal had resigned and had left for the United States “after developing differences with the unity government.” The report was swiftly rejected by the president’s office. An IDLG spokesperson confirmed that Popal had indeed left for the US, but said he was on an official holiday that had been approved by the president. (A formal letter describing his approved leave has since been circulated on social media.) It is thus unclear whether Nabil’s resignation may have been the beginning of the haemorrhaging of the national unity government – which the government denies – or whether certain circles in and around the government are trying to make the situation look worse than it is.

Meanwhile, Ghani – in coordination with CEO Abdullah – appointed the NDS’ deputy chief for operations, Massud Andarabi, a northern Tajik, as acting head. Andarabi has the rank of major general and comes from the district of Andarab in Baghlan. It will be interesting to see whether the interim solution might, again, turn into a permanent one. The Abdullah camp, that has long complained that all security agencies are currently led by Pashtuns (even though Interior Minister Ulumi is an Abdullah nominee), may well be in favour of keeping him. Whether that happens or not, the national unity government so far fails to speak one language when it comes to key policies like peace talks and relations with Pakistan. This will make a breakthrough – with Pakistan’s help, through the revived Qatar office (where a new chief mediator has been appointed in November) or UN or third-party mediation – even more difficult to achieve.

 

(1) Both subsequently claimed they had resigned; see for example here.

(2) The quote, in its English translation reads, “I also struggled to keep the NDS away from politics and ethnic orientation . . ..”

(3) After the first two candidates for the position of defence minister had withdrawn, parliament rejected the next two choices of the national unity government. The last rejected candidate, Massum Stanakzai, has since continued as acting interim minister, even though he has long overstayed the legal period allowed.

(4) The interior minister, Nur-ul-Haq Ulumi, survived a vote of no confidence by parliament in early November after the Taleban victory in Kunduz. But, as a former communist general, he continues to be disliked even among those who nominated him for the position, the Abdullah camp. (Ulumi has distanced himself from his political past and joined Abdullah’s coalition-building efforts early on, in 2007, while he was an outspoken member of parliament between 2005 and 2010.)

Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami, one of the formerly most important mujahedin parties (tanzim) that had kept a low profile after 2001, is more visibly returning to the Afghan political scene. With a publicity campaign, it is presenting itself as the party of the religious scholars, with a history distinct from other Muslim Brotherhood-inspired tanzim, and offers itself as a possible bridge for peace talks with the Taleban. With its measured criticism of the national unity government (NUG), it sounds like a voice of moderation in an atmosphere where calls to dismantle the NUG thrive. AAN’s co-director Thomas Ruttig looks at Harakat’s latest initiatives and its special relationship with the Taleban (with a contribution by Fazal Muzhary).

 

With a poster campaign and a series of large in-door gatherings, a political party is trying to rekindle public attention that, in the 1980s, once was described as the largest mujahedin party (tanzim) in the country: Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami-e Afghanistan (the Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan). (1) Harakat, a Sunni tanzim founded in late December 1979 or early 1980 in Peshawar (none of its current leaders seem able to recall the exact date in that turbulent time after the Soviet invasion over Christmas 1979) had been largely invisible during the years after 2001. This is already its third relaunch within that period, and also the broadest-based so far.

Harakat defines itself as “a party of the religious scholars and tribal elders”, claiming a distinct social base among the ulema, the upper echelons of the country’s Islamic clergy. One line repeatedly came up in AAN meetings with Harakat leaders in November 2015: “There should be no gap between the arg [the palace] and the menbar [the platform in the mosque from where the imam preaches].” The same slogan had been used by Ashraf Ghani during his 2014 electoral campaign; it came from ulema supporting him, among which there were Harakat members. With this, it offers the government – attacked by the Taleban as un-Islamic due to its Western backing – and particularly the Ghani camp – that felt it had a deficit given the then candidate’s Western educational and professional background, compared with Abdullah and some other mujahedin candidates ­– religious legitimacy.

Harakat first created real public attention, however, in August this year when it held a gathering to commemorate the death of Taleban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar. It did this together with the Afghanistan Ulema Coordination Council which is close to the party. (2) With a lethal series of Taleban bomb attacks still very much on Kabulis’ minds, this sparked a wave of outrage and demands for a crackdown on ‘Taleban sympathisers.’

Officially, peacetime Harakat has been back for a number of years. In 2002, Ahmad Nabi Muhammadi, son of the party’s founder-leader Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, an Islamic cleric from Logar province, returned to Afghanistan, established himself as leader in his father’s place (who passed away earlier that year) and registered the party under the slightly changed name of Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami wa Melli-ye Afghanistan (Islamic and National Revolution Movement of Afghanistan). However, he was soon ousted from his office and replaced by a former advisor to his father, Maulawi Muhammad Sayyed Hashemi. Hashemi put himself forward as a presidential candidate in 2009 but finally withdrew in favour of Hamed Karzai’s second bid. This party did not re-register in 2010 under the new Political Parties Law. Instead, Muhammad Musa Hotak, a former minister in mujahedin and Taleban governments and an MP after 2001, re-registered Harakat under its original name in early 2011.But it has not really played a very visible political role so far.

Now, however, for the first time since 1994, most surviving leaders of Harakat as well as of a party closely related to it, calling itself Khuddam ul-Forqan (Servants of Provenance), (3) have re-joined hands. For some weeks now, the party has rented a number of gigantic billboards at main roads in Kabul, displaying a poster with an array of portraits. Largest looming are those of the party’s late founder, Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, its current leader Mawlawi Qalamuddin – former head of the Taleban notorious ‘religious police’ (amr b-il-maruf) who later ‘reconciled’ with the Karzai government – and former leader Hotak, now one of Qalamuddin’s deputies. Qalamuddin’s right hand is raised in a pointing gesture symbolising strong leadership. A little smaller that of late Mawlawi Nasrullah Mansur is shown who had been Muhammadi’s deputy during the fight against the Soviets but split off during the 1980s, setting up his own Harakat party called Harakat-e Nawin-e Inqilab-e Islami (New Islamic Revolution Movement). Mansur was assassinated in 1993. (4) The picture is completed by 24 other members of the party’s current leadership, all male and many of them clerics as well.

Harakat poster with the party’s leadership. C/o Hakarat.

 

Why the relaunch now?

The party’s relaunch, as emphasised by three Harakat leaders AAN talked to separately in November in Kabul, seems to be driven by various motives. They include disappointment about the poor performance of the national unity government (NUG) of President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Dr Abdullah and a feeling of having been left out of the government. Although it supported Ghani during the 2014 electoral campaign, the leaders complain that their party has neither received high-ranking government positions (they admit that Ghani had not promised them such) nor been consulted when those posts were distributed – a promise, they say, Ghani had made. Hotak, one of several dozen advisor-ministers – a position of symbolic value given to him by Karzai, for tribal affairs, in his case – seems to be their highest-ranking government official.

In a statement published in Pashto in early November after its largest gathering of members and sympathisers, with 3,000 claimed participants, Harakat laid out its current political position. It criticises the government’s inactivity, corruption and lack of respect for the law; demands the holding of parliamentary elections according to the constitution (for which it is too late already) and a reshuffle of cabinet and provincial governor positions to bring in people “who are up to the job”; speaks out against the allegedly “illegal long-term presence” of foreign forces in the country and against “unnecessary irresponsible armed people and militias at their side”; and demands instead the strengthening of the country’s “[regular] armed forces”.

Abdul Hakim Mujahed, the (widely unrecognised) Taleban envoy to the United Nations during their emirate regime who now heads Harakat’s political committee, called the NUG’s very name a euphemism by saying: “We cannot even call it a national unity government.” But, he insists, his party worked “in the framework of the constitution,” believed in “elections and the peaceful change of governments” and the presidential system, as the country’s political parties were not mature enough yet. It also was against widely discussed plans of a transitional government or a loya jirga – unless the government is forced to “declare its failure” itself. Hotak said his party was still a part of the “Team Ghani”, that is, on the president’s side in the NUG, which it had joined during the 2014 electoral campaign. Leadership member Habibullah Fouzi, also a former Taleban diplomat, stated “Neither [ex-president] Karzai, nor anyone else can call a loya jirga; only the government can do this.” Mujahed concluded that “the best idea would be to allow the government to complete its term – but this depends on the government. Better a bad government than one that collapses.”

With its measured criticism, the Harakat party tries to sound more moderate than various other jihadi leaders and factions, including supporters of former president Karzai, who have lined up for a more profound change, that is, outrightly replacing the government and those lobbying for a rearmament of former mujahedin against the Taleban menace, boosted by the ANSF’s poor performance during the two-weeks’ takeover of Kunduz by the Taleban, or advocate to replace the underperforming NUG with a new transitional set-up, through a ‘traditional’ loya jirga and/or new elections. Mujahed called this “dangerous for Afghanistan.”

A short history of Harakat

Harakat was initially established as an umbrella organisation of the anti-Soviet mujahedin. But two groups, Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Islami, left the alliance after only two months, in early 1980. Harakat started its own armed resistance against the Soviets from its main base in Miran Shah in Pakistan, initially financed by money collected among the Afghan diaspora in Karachi, as Mujahed told AAN. Harakat became one of the Peshawar Seven, the only anti-Soviet parties recognised, armed and financed by their Pakistani hosts (with Western and Arab money), freezing out smaller groups, including secular nationalists and Maoists.

Its strong ulema base set Harakat apart from most other Sunni tanzim. Particularly Jamiat and Hezb, led by late Borhanuddin Rabbani and by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar respectively, had emerged under the influence (and considered itself) as the Afghan branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. Both were, in the eyes of the Harakatis, not sufficiently rooted in traditional madrassa education: Rabbani was a university teacher (for Islamic law) and Hekmatyar an engineer; both came from an urban environment. In contrast, Harakat emerged from an autochthonous, rural and traditional Islamist movement that included the above-mentioned Khuddam ul-Forqan. This party, which came into being in 1964 under the then new Afghan constitution introducing elements of a parliamentary democracy, centred around one of the most prestigious madrassas of the country, Nur ul-Madares al-Faruqi in Ghazni’s Andar district.

After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the fall of the leftist regime in Kabul in 1992, both Harakat factions (of Nabi Muhammadi and of Mansur) reunited and joined the mujahedin government. When, in 1993, Rabbani abolished the three-month rotation at its head (as agreed upon among the Peshawar Seven leaders) in an attempt to establish himself as permanent president, a number of tanzim leaders left the government. Among them was Harakat’s Nabi Muhammadi. He ordered all other party members to leave their positions in the cabinet and as provincial governors. One year later, when the new Taleban movement emerged to end the inter-factional wars that had broken out among the mujahedin, Nabi Muhammadi dissolved his party and urged all members to join the Taleban. That way, Harakat provided a large number of fighters to the new movement at that point. Taleban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, officially declared dead earlier in 2015, belonged to Harakat during the struggle against the Soviets. Harakat leader Nabi Muhammadi, according to Mujahed, urged the Taleban to “establish a new coalition government” of mujahedin, but they did not heed the advice.

Harakat’s special Taleban relationship

The late Harakat leader’s alliance with the Taleban in the 1990s is the basis for a special relationship between the movements that lasts to the present. Many of the current Harakat leaders have been high-ranking Taleban officials. With previous years’ debates about how to negotiate with the Taleban, they have become more vocal. Many prominent leaders of the current Harakat also had been appointed members of the High Peace Council (HPC) by then president Karzai in 2010. They include Qalamuddin, Hotak, Mujahed, Fouzi and Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, a former governor of Helmand and now member of the Senate.

In its new set-up after the relaunch, without directly saying so, it presents itself as a bridge and possibly even as the still missing ‘moderate Taleban party’ which – the government and its Western allies hope – could be joined by ‘reconciled’ Taleban after a peace deal. This becomes more important as attempts to establish such a ‘moderate’ Taleban party, based on pro-talks dissidents like former Taleban finance minister Agha Jan Motasem, have so far failed to materialise.

In the AAN interviews in Kabul, all Harakat leaders emphasised “peace” as the party’s and country’s priority. “We want to gather the ulema to unite the people” behind a peace process, Fouzi told AAN. Hotak said that “a serious peace process, whether with [the help of] the UN, Pakistan or China” must be started. The Harakat position paper talks of an “Afghan-owned and Afghan led process in the context of the Islamic teachings and the constitution of Afghanistan.” Fouzi stated that “the government should trust us to talk to the Taleban as we are closer to them” than other political forces are – therefore Harakat’s demands for a reshuffle of government posts, at least on the provincial governors level. Hotak elaborated on that by saying that if the governors were “too young, they won’t be listened to by the Taleban”. Mujahed added: “Without peace and reconciliation, all other systems will fail.”

Interestingly, Harakat is also critical of President Ghani’s course to closely involve Pakistan in Taleban talks. “May God get us and the Taleban rid of Pakistan”, leadership member Sher Muhammad Akhundzada, who is close to former president Karzai, was quoted as saying in August. A member of Harakat’s ulema council asked the Taleban “to leave the traitorous and hypocrit[ic]al] country of Pakistan.” Also it cannot be ruled out that long-standing plans of the new government to reorganise and reduce the number of members of the HPC might be another driver inducing Harakat to feel the need to project its political importance and influence. Otherwise, many of its members might be among those losing these positions.

Some headwind for the new Harakat

In Kabul, not everyone is happy about Harakat’s re-emergence. Some of the party’s street posters were defaced, and an inhabitant of Logar – the province where its historical leader was born – doubted that Harakat will gain much popular traction there. Its leader Nabi Muhammadi, he recalled, had once – when in Peshawar during the jihad – declared that he would not return to the province even when the war was over, as he could not “bear its climate.” Such statements can have a long lifespan in a country like Afghanistan.

Both traditional and social media were largely quiet about Harakat’s re-entry to the political scene, apart from some TV reporting. This might in part be a result of the Harakat leadership’s undeveloped public relations. Harakat has no spokesman or printed publications; it only maintains a – not very active – Facebook page (the latest post is more than a month old) and nor does it maintain a dedicated website. The party’s statements are not widely distributed and, when the author asked for them, needed to be laboriously retrieved from outdated computers operated by some leaders in their HPC offices. Clearly, Harakat and the young generation, including the modern neo-Islamists, are transmitting on different channels. It remains to be seen whether high-tech works more effectively than traditional networking.

Apart from that, various groups that had split from the traditional Harakat continue to keep themselves apart and, despite some Harakat grandees telling AAN the opposite, are unlikely to join the mainstream soon. One party, Hezb-e Sa’adat-e Melli wa Islami-ye Afghanistan (National and Islamic Prosperity Party of Afghanistan), led by Maulawi Muhammad Osman Salekzada, a northerner, has officially been registered for almost a decade now and has little incentive to give up its independence, although it leads an existence at the political fringes. A newer, unregistered party, called Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami-ye Mardom-e Afghanistan (Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan’s People), has political differences with the Harakat mainstream over the national unity government (NUG). It is much more critical of the NUG, advocating the need to replace it with an interim government, and closer to ex-president Hamed Karzai. Its leader, Abdul Hakim Munib, was the first ‘reconciled’ former Taleban official appointed to a high governmental position, as governor of Uruzgan province (2006-07) under Karzai. Also one part of the former Harakat (Mansur), led by relatives of the slain original leader, has remained with the Taleban movement and the insurgency (more background in this paper) and still commands significant support in parts of Harakat’s regional base, namely Logar and Paktia.

Even more significantly, the Khuddam ul-Forqan party now is showing signs of a split. Over the decades, first within Harakat and later within the Taleban, it had successfully maintained its political autonomy and cohesion. While Mujahed told AAN that the party no longer existed, its spiritual leader Amin Jan Mojaddedi (5) just toured parts of southeastern Afghanistan to reassert his support. On 14 November 2015, he arrived at his madrassa, the Nur ul-Madares in Andar, to take part in a graduation ceremony for students of the madrassa. There, he received a red carpet welcome. Hundreds of men stood in line to greet him, including local mullahs and current and former students as well as Taleban fighters; most of those Taleban fighters were alumni of Nur ul-Madares.

Although Mojaddedi stated that he did not visit “for political purposes”, he reiterated Khuddam ul-Forqan’s existence and “neutrality”. In a sideswipe to those former Khuddam who have sided with the government in Kabul (and are unable to travel to this region) he added: “If I was taking sides with anyone I would not be here.” Mojaddedi also visited a number of Taleban-controlled villages in Andar and Qarabagh districts, extending his trip from the initially planned three days to one and a half weeks. Apart from his security guards, taken from his headquarters in Kabul, a group of 15 to 20 Taleban fighters armed with heavy weapons escorted him while he commuted to different villages. The trip was not only a show of his personal influence, including of support among Taleban fighters, but a challenge to the new Harakat leaders and their claim to be able to build a bridge for talks with the Taleban.

 

(1) The other major Sunni tanzim – sometimes called the Peshawar Seven –were Hezb-e Islami (Hekmatyar), Hezb-e Islami (Khales), Jamiat-e Islami (Rabbani), Jabha-ye Nejat-e Melli (Mojaddedi), Mahaz-e Islami wa Melli (Gailani) and Ittehad-e Islami (Sayyaf). To avoid misunderstandings: there are two Harakat’s, Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami which is a Sunni former mujahedin party (tanzim), and Harakat-e Islami, a comparatively smaller Shia tanzim. I use Harakat as a short-hand for the Sunni tanzim here.

(2) Unofficially, the council is the ulema branch of Harakat. Party leader Qalamuddin, however, said he strives to keep it as broad-based as possible, even extending membership to Shia clerics.

(3) More background about this further down in the text and in this 2010 paper of mine for AAN.

(4) There are many Mansurs in the past and present political scenes in Afghanistan, including current Taleban mainstream leader Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur, who reportedly killed commander Mansur Dadullah from a Taleban break-away faction, and late Nasrullah Mansur of Harakat. These three are not related to each other. This name – not a surname or family name that is transferred from father to child, but a takhallus, more like a nickname – is chosen by the person himself. Mansur means “the victorious” and therefore is popular. On the other hand, some have started using their takhallus in Western style; those family members of Nasrullah Mansur who have stuck with the Taleban (more about this in the text) have adopted the Mansur takhallus to flag the relationship, including Abdullatif Mansur, one of the Taleban negotiators in Murree (Pakistan) this summer.

(5) Amin Jan Mojaddedi had re-launched the party in late 2001 in Pakistan, then together with Mujahed, Fouzi and others. In Andar, the district where his madrassa is located, he is known as Hazrat Saheb, a title also used by former interim president and chairman of the Afghan senate Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, who belongs to a another branch of the Mojaddedi family that traditionally leads the Afghan part of an international Sufi brotherhood, the Naqshbandiya.

The first methamphetamine seizure in Afghanistan was recorded in 2008, a minor capture of four grams in Helmand province. Now, seven years later, some 17 kilograms of methamphetamine, popularly known as ‘crystal meth’, were seized in the first ten months of 2015, in 14 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics warned about the growing number of methamphetamine users, while the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan called for amendments to the current narcotics control legislation to address the low penalties for trafficking. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica visited the only forensics drugs laboratory in Afghanistan and sought to learn about this new drug phenomenon in the country.

Situated in a northern neighbourhood of Kabul, state-of-the-art forensics drugs laboratory of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) is an unlikely setting in a war-torn country. Its six high-tech labs are equipped according to the latest international standards, including a sophisticated instrument that can determine the molecular structure of sampled drugs. (1) The head of the lab, Dr Khalid Nabizada, proudly showed AAN the new German-funded building and equipment and explained that, together with his five-man team, he used to work out of a container-turned-lab in the well-guarded CNPA compound before they moved into the new building in May 2014.

The lab also features a prominent display cabinet of drug samples that have been examined by Nabizada’s team. It showed drugs one would expect to find in Afghanistan: opium, hashish, morphine and heroin. But there were also several samples of methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs, like ecstasy and MDMA (methylenedioxyphenethylamine). These synthetic drugs are central nervous system, amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), recreationally used for their euphoria-like (‘rush’ and ‘high’) effects. (2) They have recently entered the Afghan market and seem to be spreading around the country.

According to Dr Nabizada, the number of methamphetamine samples analysed in the CNPA lab had clearly increased, indicating an increasing prevalence of the drug. Where in 2011 the CNPA received only samples of 16 cases, in 2012 samples of 99 cases tested positive for methamphetamine. In 2013, the number remained relatively steady, with 93 cases, in 2014 this increased to 146 cases, to finally reach 206 cases in the first ten months of 2015.

This also tracks with an increase in methamphetamine seizures. Since the 2008 seizure of four grams in Helmand, the amount of seized methamphetamine has significantly increased. Drugs seized by CNPA mobile detection teams are sent to Nabizada’s lab for weighing. In the glass-walled weighing room (which is according to the highest international standards, as it allows the arrested person to witness the procedure while sitting in the room next door), Nabizada and his team carefully weigh each seizure, taking samples from each batch, before they store it in the adjacent well-guarded drugs evidence room. The amounts weighed by Nabizada’s team have been on the increase: from 2.6 kilograms in 2012, 4.9 kilograms in 2013, 4.1 kilograms in 2014, to a record high of 17 kilograms in the first ten months of 2015.

According to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) 2012 Afghanistan Drug Report,  the CNPA lab received methamphetamine seizures from six provinces in 2012: Herat, Farah, Faryab, Kandahar, Balkh and Kabul. The largest seizure was from Faryab province, 530 grams of methamphetamine; the second-largest seizure, in Kandahar, was 240 grams.

In 2015, the spread of seizures also increased: the 17 kilograms of crystal meth was seized in 14 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces (Badghis, Baghlan, Balkh, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Kapisa, Kunduz, Nimroz and Parwan).

Local or regional chemistry skills?

The seizures show that in Afghanistan two types of methamphetamine are in use, crystal (in Dari called shisha, which means “glass pane”) and tablets. The tablets were mainly captured in Kabul and Kunduz and probably originate from Central Asia, which is an emerging ATS market, according to the CNPA lab experts.

By far, most of the meth, or shisha, is seized in the western Afghan provinces. Between March 2009 and March 2013, according to the Afghanistan Drug Report, around 92 per cent of methamphetamine samples analysed by the CNPA forensics laboratory were seized in western Afghanistan, namely in Herat, Farah and Nimroz province, all close to the Iranian border.

It was believed, until recently, that the crystal meth seized in Afghanistan originated mainly from neighbouring Iran. Iran is indeed among the leading producers of crystal meth in the region and the fourth-largest global importer of pseudoephedrine, a precursor chemical used for methamphetamine synthesis. As reported by the Guardian, 375 meth labs were dismantled and 3,500 kilograms of meth seized by Iranian authorities in 2013 (see the Guardian story here). Afghanistan, however, was also listed in the 2011 ATS Global Assessment as among the countries with “unusually high requirements of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.”

Already in 2010 Pakistan’s authorities had reported the seizure of 12 kilograms of amphetamine that they claimed originated from Afghanistan, but it was only in September 2013 that CNPA’s mobile detection teams actually discovered and dismantled a methamphetamine lab in Nimroz. (3) Additionally, the Global Synthetic Drugs Assessment 2014  cautioned that since some ATS laboratories have been dismantled in Central Asia “there are concerns regarding the spread of manufacture to Afghanistan.”

The lead character of the US crime television series Breaking Bad explained the secret of making crystal meth as “basic chemistry.” According to a CNPA lab expert, seven to eight recipes exist for cooking crystal meth. The easiest, and cheapest, is done with ephedrine (or cough syrup), iodine and red phosphorous. “If you have ephedrine, it costs almost nothing,” he said.

Interestingly, according to Dr Nabizada of the CNPA lab, the meth seized in Afghanistan is “of incredible purity; 90 per cent and over; absolute pure crystal.”

Lagging law enforcement and sentencing

The 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances was the first global attempt to prevent misuse of central nervous system stimulants and to limit their use for medical and scientific purposes.

Despite these attempts to control it, crystal meth emerged as a new and commonly abused drug on the bourgeoning rave scene in the USA, Europe and East Asia in the 1990s, mainly due to its ability to elevate the mood and increase alertness, concentration and energy. Many countries, as a result, sharpened their penalties for crystal meth possession, supply and production, in some cases awarding up to life imprisonment for the latter offence.

However, in Afghanistan penalties for possessing and selling crystal meth are rather light. The current Law against Intoxicating Drinks and Drugs and their Control (see the law in Dari here and an unofficial UNODC English translation here) has penalty provisions for amphetamine type stimulants that are the same as those for cannabis. (4) Additionally, the threshold for considering the trafficking of methamphetamine to be a major crime, and thus to be processed by the Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF), is the possession of 50 kilograms or more, the same as for cannabis. To date, the CJTF has dealt only with one methamphetamine case. The case concerned a person caught in Kabul in April 2013 with 3.5 kilograms of pure crystal meth, which, strictly speaking, was way below the legal threshold. But it was also the single largest crystal meth seizure ever in Afghanistan and, by international standards, an unusually high amount. The person was sentenced to 15 to 20 years imprisonment, according to the Special Bulletin of the Supreme Court.

The CNPA has been leading an effort to amend the legislation to include much harsher penalties for the trafficking of methamphetamine. The proposal includes a penalty of up to 10 years in prison for the trafficking of more than 100 grams of methamphetamine, and six to nine months, plus a fine, for the trafficking of up to five grams. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics also warned, in its 2012 Afghanistan Drug Report, that the sentencing provisions for methamphetamine trafficking were “inadequate to address the seriousness of the crime” and suggested revising the law in line with international conventions and sentencing guidelines so that it would be “in line with the threat posed by the substance.” However, at this point it is unknown when the parliament will discuss the proposed amendments to the law.

The drug for rich kids

The number of meth drug users appears to be on the rise, as MCN warns in its 2013 national drug report (see also reporting by Reuters in 2013). Data, however, is very patchy. The 2015 Afghanistan National Drug Use Survey estimated that there were between 70,000 and 90,000 amphetamine-type stimulants users, which is a relatively low number (well below 1 per cent of the population). (5)

“There is no accurate data on use and prevalence of crystal meth in Afghanistan, but reports from drug treatment centres and some other sources have recorded a large number of the meth users in the western part of the Afghanistan, specifically in Herat. However, the drug is easily available in most of Afghanistan,” Dr Raza Stanikzai of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) told AAN. He said that although some treatment centres provide counselling treatment sessions to meth users as a part of the regular drug treatment provided to opium or heroin drug users, there are no treatments tailored to crystal meth available in the country. (The most effective treatments for methamphetamine addiction are behavioural therapies, such as cognitive-behavioural therapy, a former UNODC drug demand reduction expert told AAN.)

To date, street use of crystal meth has only been reported from Herat, Dr Stanikzai says. In other urban centres, although available, crystal meth is not used in public. The price of 20 US dollars for a dose, in contrast to 1.5 US dollars for a dose of heroin, suggests that crystal meth use is mainly reserved for the rich strata of the population and, therefore, unlikely to be widely used in public.

An additional problem is that, when asked, users usually say they have a problem with “crystal” – using a Farsi slang word for the drug – rather than “methamphetamine.” However, a type of high purity heroin is also called “crystal” among drug users. “This adds a degree of confusion to the registration, as treatment centres do not have the means to test for the presence of methamphetamine and cannot be certain of the substance the patient used,” noted the 2013 Afghanistan Drug Report.

Looking ahead

The growing number of crystal meth seizures and the indications of an increase in use in Afghanistan are worrying, given the country’s already heavy dependence on the opium economy. Afghanistan continues to be the world’s leading opium producer and cultivator (see AAN reporting on 2015 opium cultivation). With the already high prevalence of opioid use – estimated between 1.3 and 1.6 million Afghans (see 2015 National Drug Use Survey available here) – the country does not need a new drug on the market. Crystal meth prevalence is still dwarfed by Afghanistan’s opiate production and consumption, and it may never find its way into all pores of the society in the way that the opium economy has. Nevertheless, the production and trafficking of meth could add another complicating layer to Afghanistan’s already complex narco-economy.

So far there is no strong evidence to suggest that crystal meth is entirely indigenously manufactured, but this may change. Heroin is currently locally produced, whereas ten years ago it was not. If an increasing number of meth labs were to be detected in Afghanistan, this would be an alarming signal. Afghanistan could for instance follow the example of Myanmar, once a leading opium cultivator and heroin producer, which replaced labour intensive opium cultivation with synthetic drug production. Together with Thailand and China, Myanmar is now a leading producer of synthetic drugs in South East Asia.

Such a scenario for Afghanistan would involve a transformation of the nature of the country’s drug economy, resulting in changes in local drug networks and possibly even a ‘generation shift’ within it (in Myanmar, for instance, the new generation of drug lords only embraced synthetic drug production after opium cultivation was successfully phased out). But it is also quite possible that meth trade and production simply will add to the already considerable list of illicit sources of income. It is yet unclear who is likely to benefit.

 

(1) The laboratory is equipped with the latest analytical instrumentation including Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry (GC–MS), High Performance Liquid Chromatography (HPLC), Raman Spectroscopy, and Fourier Transform–Infra Red Spectrophotometry (FT–IR) – and may be more sophisticated than many forensic drug labs in Europe. Details about the lab can be found on the page 88 of the 2013 Afghanistan Drug Report.

(2) Amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) are a group of substances comprised of synthetic central nervous system stimulants, including amphetamine, methamphetamine, methcathinone, and ecstasy-type substances (eg MDMA and its analogues). Internationally, the production, distribution, sale and possession of methamphetamine is restricted or banned in most countries.

Methamphetamines and amphetamines were discovered in the late nineteenth century and are used for the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), obesity and narcolepsy. During the Second World War they were used by both the Allied and Axis forces to keep pilots awake during night raids. In the 1950s, amphetamine became known as a weight-loss drug and in the 1970s was widely used as a recreational drug.

The latest available UNODC estimate suggested that the retail value of the global illicit methamphetamine market in 2008 was around 28 billion US dollars.

(3) “The evidence from the dismantled labs suggests there were attempts to make crystal meth in Afghanistan – in particular the traces of red phosphorous found in the labs, which is usually used for cooking the meth. There is also anecdotal evidence that Iranians trained Afghans in meth production, although this has not been confirmed,” a CNPA lab expert told AAN, on the condition of anonymity.

(4) Article 47: Punishment for Trafficking of Substances or any Mixture Containing Substances listed in the Tables of this law, prescribes the following sentences for: More than 250 grams up to 500 grams, imprisonment for more than one month up to three months; More than 500 grams up to 1 kilogram, imprisonment for more than three months up to 1 year; More than 1 kilogram up to 5 kilograms, imprisonment for more than one year up to three years; More than 5 kilograms, in addition to three years imprisonment, for each additional 500 grams imprisonment for three months.

(5) As reported in the 2013 Afghanistan Drug Report, according to the Ministry of Public Health records the highest number of methamphetamine users in 2012 in Nimroz, Kunduz, Jawzjan and Farah provinces. The four provinces together made for 96 percent of all registered methamphetamine users countrywide.

Even in times of war, people still need to buy food and other essentials and shopkeepers still need to sell. But when frontlines shift and military masters change – due to insurgency, uprising or rising government power – how can shopkeepers react to try to survive the situation? Indeed, how can they try to find benefit or manipulate frontlines and road closures to their advantage? AAN researcher Fazal Muzhary has been collecting the stories of shoppers and shopkeepers in the Andar district of Ghazni, especially those living in Taleban-controlled territory, and finding how the political economy of a district can shift during conflict.

In 2009, Taleban fighters closed down the main bazaar in Mirai, Andar’s district centre, ahead of the elections (see here). They said the closure would only be for the election day to stop people from voting. However, the bazaar never completely reopened. Some shops would occasionally open for people living in nearby villages and government officials living in the district centre, but generally, custom fell away. Most of the bazaar has now been closed for more than five years. Shops that had been under construction remain unfinished and abandoned. This has been a significant set-back for Mirai, which had seen a rapid expansion in the last years of the Taleban regime and early years of President Hamed Karzai’s government (between 1998 and 2004).

Mirai and Andar generally are important: the district lies on the Kabul-Kandahar highway and the Taleban have used it as a place to launch attacks on military convoys and other targets; it is also on one of the gateways to Ghazni city. For Mirai, even before the 2009 elections and the closure of the bazaar, there had already been economic decline.(1) This was not just due to the struggle for control over the area between Taleban and government forces, but also rivalries between local businessmen. The prolonged conflict in the area provided some locals with a cover to settle old scores and new blood feuds and for manipulative business dealings. Merchants running shops in villages in Taleban-controlled areas, without even being pressured by the Taleban, provided the insurgents with free fuel and food. In return, these traders expected, and in some cases even encouraged, the Taleban to instigate insecurity and so divert customers to their shops and make it too dangerous for residents to go to the bazaars in the main towns of the district, such as Mirai.

These arrangements were often successful and benefitted both these particular shopkeepers and the Taleban. They also presented the insurgents with an opportunity to show off their power and limit access to the main government-controlled population centres. They were able to strategically divert business to towns or shops under their influence in return for in-kind and financial support from the shopkeepers. The Taleban impact on local communities, therefore, has not just been through directly bringing insecurity, but also through affecting the political economy.

The district centre of Mirai was not the only bazaar which the Taleban have stopped access to. They also effectively shut down the bazaar in the town of Mullah Noh Baba (named after a local shrine) which lies on the Kabul–Kandahar section of Highway One, which cuts through the far west part of Andar district (more of which later).

The Andar Way Of Advancing Business In Taleban-controlled Areas

 One shopkeeper to benefit from the shutting of the Mirai bazaar was Haji M*, who lives in the village of Nazarwal, about eight kilometres to the south of Mirai. Local villagers told AAN he had supported Taleban fighters when they first returned to the area in the summer of 2004 by giving them fuel for their motorbikes and top-up cards for their mobile phones. Locals appreciated what they called his generosity in providing land for a madrassa and some living expenses to students. Even people in remote villages in the north and eastern parts of the district would talk about how popular and thriving the business was in the shop of Haji M’s. Since 2004, it had grown from being a small village shop to the largest general store in the area.

As the local community praised Haji M’s generosity, he would proudly tell them he could meet most of their demands and they should not bother traveling to Mirai for their purchases. He would even boast how he alone had managed to close down the Mirai bazaar because his store was so good. However, in reality, all of his success was due to the presence of the Taleban fighters in the area and their assistance in manipulating the economic environment. Haji M encouraged the Taleban to block the road to Mirai to prevent villagers going there, and to tell them to use local shops instead. The majority of local villagers had no choice but to go to his store.

However, in late June 2012, the Taleban were pushed out of Haji M’s village in the wake of the 2012 ‘Andar uprising’ which saw some central areas of Andar change hands (the uprising was sold by the government as a ‘popular uprising’, but was actually more complex and murkier, involving Hezb-e Islami and the creation of a (rather predatory) Afghan Local Police (ALP) force. AAN tried to uncover the complexities in a serious of reports (see here, here and here).

With the uprising, Haji M lost his business monopoly, as the Taleban were no longer able to control the movement of the villagers. It was now supporters of the uprising (in Pashto referred to as patsunian) – some of whom later became members of the ALP, while others continued to fight the Taleban independently – who were now asking Haji M to provide them with free fuel. When he refused, they arrested him and took him to their security check post nearby, where he was beaten and accused of supporting the Taleban. A relative of Haji M told AAN the patsunian asked the businessman for money and when he refused to pay, they beat him again. Other sources familiar with the incident stated that the patsunian also questioned Haji M about how and why he had been able to afford to provide free fuel and monetary support to Taleban, but deny the same assistance to the uprising. According to local villagers, the supporters of the uprising were trying to make Haji M confess that he had assisted the Taleban because support their aims and beliefs.

Access to Mirai Remains Problematic

The 2012 uprising initially raised hopes among the local population that Andar district centre bazaar in Mirai would be reopened, but these hopes were rapidly crushed by the supporters of the uprising themselves. At first, when the ALP and patsunian took control of the villages that used to be in Taleban hands, several stores reopened and locals started to again travel to Mirai to do their shopping. In the first year of the ALP’s presence in Mirai, the bazaar functioned normally and only in a few cases did the ALP question shopkeepers from Taleban-controlled areas about their links to the Taleban.

However, about a year later, the ALP turned into an abusive force. Its fighters started harassing both customers and shopkeepers, who for the most part lived in the Taleban-controlled villages. The ALP were trying to find additional resources to sustain themselves because they were reportedly no longer satisfied with the limited support they received from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and international military forces. With harassment on the rise, shops were forced to close again as the number of shoppers dwindled.

Coming back to Haji M: when the ALP finally released him days after his arrest in 2012, he decided to leave Nazarwal and move to the northern part of the district, which was still controlled by the Taleban. The ALP members kept his shop closed for two years and allowed most of his stock to spoil. In 2014, he decided to return to his village and restart his business. Although the ALP did not prevent him from returning and did allow him to reopen his store, his business has never returned to the same level as when the area was under Taleban control.

Scenarios of Other Affected Businessmen

About seven kilometres to the west of Mirai, in Alizai village, we find another shopkeeper, Nabi*, also assisting Taleban fighters in exchange for their support for his business. Unlike Nazarwal village, Alizai has remained under control of the Taleban. Nabi has been providing top-up cards, fuel and food to the Taleban fighters since they first returned to his area in early 2004, mainly supporting them in exchange for their blocking the road to the Mirai bazaar and essentially forcing locals to come to his shop. Over time, however, Alizai village became the main base of a group of Taleban fighters in the area and therefore also the target of several night raids and military operations by ISAF soldiers and US Special Forces. Although business declined during the period of the night raids and military operations. Alizai village remained the primary market for the villages in the surrounding area, therefore allowing Nabi to continue to benefit from his arrangement with the Taleban in the longer run.

Other businessmen have not been so lucky – or so canny. One man, a vet who had been operating in the Mirai bazaar since the 1990s, had to close his business when the Taleban closed the bazaar in 2009. He did not dare reopen his practice because the Taleban had warned all shopkeepers not to return to the Mirai bazaar. Even if the vet had managed to reopen his practice, the majority of his customers would still have been too afraid to travel to Mirai. The vet, along with other businessmen and service providers, cut their losses and moved their shops and practice to a bazaar in the town of Chardiwal, about six kilometres to the east of Mirai along the Ghazni-Paktika road. Chardiwal, unlike Mirai, does not have any government officials in residence and has been under Taleban control since 2009. Chardiwal presented a good alternative for most locals who used to frequent the Mirai bazaar and therefore also for many businessmen. Having to switch business to another bazaar, however, came at some cost, in terms of moving stock, cultivating a new customer base and, in some cases, competing with other similar businesses already operating.

A similar dynamic played out in the case of Mullah Noh Baba, where the town’s virtual closure due to frequent attacks on NATO supply convoys along the Kabul–Kandahar highway led to a rival bazaar in nearby Kalakhel experiencing a boom and expansion. It is located in a Taleban-controlled area. As the road through Mullah Noh Baba continued to be the focus of Taleban attacks, local customers, who had always been caught up in the crossfire between Taleban fighters and government forces, felt it was safer to go to Kalakhel village. While the lack of security in Mullah Noh Baba was a push factor, the merchants of Kalakhel also actively promoted their bazaar as a safe alternative.

According to a doctor who was working in a nearby clinic, the main instigator behind the final closure of the Mullah Noh Baba bazaar was a merchant in Kalakhel who provided fuel, top-up cards and shelter to the Taleban fighters. Zaman* who is one of the richest men in the area and owns a large store in Kalakhel reportedly received support from the Taleban in diverting customers. The former small town of Kalakhel has been thriving since the closure of Mullah Noh Baba bazaar with locals opening several new stores, pharmacies and car workshops in order to meet the demands of the new customers.

We see then shopkeepers like Zaman from Kalakhel village and Nabi from Alizai village, both areas still controlled by the Taleban, able to manipulate the security situation to ‘grow’ their businesses at the expense of shopkeepers in government-controlled areas. However, as seen in the case of Haji M, Taleban support can also ruin a businessman if and when pro-government forces retake his particular area.

ALP Rent-Seeking Behaviour

The conflict between the insurgency and the government in Andar has not been the only factor influencing the local economy as the ALP has also learned how to profit from the local communities.

In the early days of the ‘Andar uprising’, supporters would only ask locals in the villages under their control either to provide food or pay money. However they later started to arrest suspected people or people coming from Taleban-controlled villages to the bazaar and would then release them for money. (For more, see previous AAN dispatches: here and here)

In late May 2014, for example, a local Taleban commander, Rohullah, who had supported the ‘uprising’ and later joined the ALP, arrested Mullah Faiz Muhammad from Tut village, which is in the far southeast of Andar district, when he visited Mirai, accusing him of supporting the Taleban. Commander Rohullah detained and beat the mullah; he was able to later buy his freedom for 180,000 Pakistani rupees, the equivalent of 1,800 US dollars. In early June of the same year, ALP members detained another mullah in Mirai, the imam of a local mosque, under the pretext of interrogating him, again about his alleged relations with the Taleban. Such detentions and extorted payments for release resulted in a widespread frustration among locals, especially after customers, concerned about these developments, stopped coming to the bazaar. Shopkeepers in the Mirai bazaar once again decided to close their remaining businesses.

A local businessman also related to AAN how Chardiwal, which represented an alternative to Mirai, also saw a similar fate due to continuous fighting between the Taleban and the ALP. Since early 2014, Chardiwal bazaar has seen several attacks from the Taleban on ALP posts nearby and on Afghan government supply convoys passing through the town. These attacks stopped locals shopping in the bazaar. At the same time, ALP members would occasionally come to the town and arrest anyone they said they suspected of working with the Taleban. Sometimes they just detained individuals for ransom –some arrested individuals were reportedly killed when their families were not able to pay up, for example, according to a shopkeeper in Chardiwal from Shamshai village, on 3 September 2014, ALP members arrested an 18-year-old boy from Shamshai on charges of spying for the Taleban and later killed him. Such incidents left the local population upset and scared as they felt these arbitrary detentions could happen to anyone.

According to a local pharmacist, the number of customers from the villages in the area coming to Chardiwal had increased steadily between 2009 and 2013. Simultaneously, the rents for shops rose from 300 US dollars to 600 US dollars per year. However, as a result of the Taleban attacks on the Afghan National Army (ANA) and ALP and the predatory behaviour of ALP fighters, customers soon decided to also no longer go to Chardiwal. By this time they had abandoned both Mirai and Chardiwal. Instead, they chose to shop in the small town of Ibrahimzi, which is about six kilometres to the northeast of Chardiwal and twelve kilometres to the northeast of Mirai. Locals, discussing this with AAN, speculated about whether the pressure on them to go to Ibrahimzi had also been brought about by businessmen there supporting Taleban fighters to persuade them to ‘divert’ business. Several sources in Chardiwal, however, said the shift was mostly down to the bad behaviour of the local ALP. Since mid-September 2015, Chardiwal has returned to its previous status as the main bazaar town in the area because the ALP and ANA soldiers, as well as the Taleban fighters, have become less prominent.

Politics, security, economy

The various cases from Andar district indicate that areas are not always just contested because of the desire to control territory, but that secondary aspects such as control over the local economy can be equally important. Although the dynamics noted above focus primarily on political and security dynamics between the Taleban, and the government and ALP, it is the businessmen and the local communities who are primarily affected by the changes with regard to shifting access to particular bazaars. While certain businessmen have been able to benefit from the presence of the Taleban, the majority of merchants and especially customers have had to bear an added burden. It costs time and money for both traders and customers to travel to a new bazaar, given that prices are often higher and transport costs have to be factored in. The presence of the ALP and its activities have further victimised local residents, not just directly, but also in terms of the market place. When considering the deteriorating security situation in other parts of the country, one can only wonder if similar trends can be found elsewhere in Afghanistan and what could be done to prevent local economies from being hijacked by conflict actors or manipulative businessmen.

* Name changed for the protection of the individual.

 

(1) According Christoph Reuter and Borhan Younus (“The Return of the Taliban in Andar District: Ghazni,” in Giustozzi, Antonio (ed), Decoding the New Taliban: insights from the Afghan field, Hurst & Co: London, 2009, p204-6), Andar saw its first Taleban attacks in 2003, relatively early on in the insurgency. As more attacks took place in Andar and elsewhere in Ghazni province, the reaction of the government armed forces become increasingly more violent and indiscriminate, as “the government reacted in the usual way, capturing anyone they found near the attack site. … When the Taliban attacks intensified in the spring of 2005, men of former ethnic Tajik militias from north and northeastern Afghanistan, now incorporated in police and army, were sent into the area to curb the Taliban insurgency. This initiative curbed the insurgents’ activities somewhat, but the public turned further against the government.”

During search operations, government forces also looted money and valuables in reaction to Taliban attacks on the ANSF. “In Mirai village, virtually the backyard of the district headquarters, where the militias-turned-security forces were based, they sawed the people’s grape vines. This was widely considered as a revenge action in the heart of Taliban land by former Northern militias, whose gardens and grape orchards were destroyed in the same way by the Taliban in the late 1990s (in Shamali).”

Climate change is already having a severe impact on Afghans’ daily lives – but this challenge is often over-shadowed by what seem to be more-urgent problems: war and the economic crisis. Therefore, the reports submitted by the Afghan government for the Paris climate conference starting today, 30 November 2015 (and President Ashraf Ghani speaking in the early afternoon) provide a concentrated picture of the challenges arising from this phenomenon. At the same time, there are doubts that Afghanistan’s institutional strength and capacities are sufficient to cope with the evolving impact of climate change. Furthermore, the mid-term growth-based development aims of the government, at least in part, run contrary to the needs for long-term environment protection and climate change adaptation. A primer by AAN’s co-director and senior analyst Thomas Ruttig and guest author Ryskeldi Satke. (*)

“Afghanistan is ranked among the most vulnerable countries in the world to the adverse impacts of climate change. . . . As a result of climate change, it is anticipated that the incidence of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods, and droughts will likely increase. . . . Between 1990 and 2000, Afghanistan lost an average of 29,400 hectares of forest per year, at an average annual deforestation rate of 2.25 per cent, which further increased to 2.92% per annum between 2000 to 2005. . . . With these climatic changes the foundation of the country’s economy, stability, and food security is under threat.”

These striking statements are taken from major documents the Afghan government has submitted for the United Nations conference on climate change that will open in Paris today, 30 November 2015 – the twenty-first annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). With its 195 signatories, the UNFCCC is the only existing widely legitimate international convention on how to tackle global warming. (1) Every participating country must submit two documents – a so-called Initial National Communication to the UNFCCC, a kind of status report about the national climate situation (Afghanistan’s is here), and the Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (Afghanistan’s position paper is here) – in the run-up to the conference.

The gravity of Afghanistan’s situation is made strikingly clear by a short glance at the maps (p 41) in the 2014 synthesis report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – ­the most important report on the subject. These maps show that Afghanistan is part of a region that stands out for having the second-highest rate of rising temperatures and is expected to have a net loss of annual precipitation. According to these models, and cited in Afghanistan’s Initial National Communication for Paris, the country’s “mean annual temperature is projected to increase by 1.4 to 4.0°C by the 2060s, and 2.0 to 6.2 degrees by the 2090s.” As a result, the Afghan reports for Paris warn, by 2060 “large parts of the [country’s] agricultural economy will become marginal without significant investment in water management and irrigation.”

While the Paris conference’s focus on greenhouse gas emissions is rather narrow, the documents submitted by the Afghan government provide valuable insights into the gigantic challenge that the country is facing, but which are usually crowded out by the attention to the war with the Taleban, the political deadlock in the National Unity Government (NUG), the economic crisis and its fallout, and the mass exodus of young Afghans. This challenge is the changing climate that already has started to affect the lives of many Afghans and will continue to do so increasingly drastically in the decades to come, if no measures are taken.

Briefly put, even if Afghanistan had peace and a highly effective government tomorrow, it would still face a daunting task: to adapt to the effects of the worldwide climate change.

Afghan climate change: Lacking data, striking indications

The empirical data on how exactly the climate is changing in Afghanistan is rather scarce, though. The systematic gathering of data and on-the-ground research in the country that boasted of having “the most advanced meteorological monitoring in the region” before 1979 had been disrupted by decades-long wars. Nonetheless, the effects of climate change are clearly visible, both in Afghanistan and in the region.

The strong earthquake in May 2014 that caused a massive landslide burying a newly-built part of the village of Ab-e Barik in Badakhshan’s Argo district and many of its inhabitants clearly showed how a combination of climate change, conflict and weak governance exacerbate the vulnerability of local populations to natural disasters. The landslide was not the first one in the area but official warnings came too late (pointing to weak government oversight and lack of disaster risk reduction); the destroyed part of the village was built on visibly vulnerable hill slopes (a result of the lack of land for construction and of local government neglect); the slopes were additionally prone to landslides because of the destruction of the top soil by ploughing lalmi (rain-fed) land for cultivation (as a result of overall lack of agricultural land, an effect of unchecked population growth and settlement). Lastly, the main road over which relief should have come had been destroyed by previous flooding (lack of government capability to respond and conflict-related underdevelopment of the infrastructure).

The flooding that destroyed the road to Argo was what people called a “100-year-flood.” In its course, over April and May 2014, flash floods that hit 123 districts in 27 of the 34 provinces, washed away roads and crops, killed over 160 people, destroyed 6,800 homes, displaced 16,000 and affected altogether 125,000 people, according to UNOCHA. The rainfalls that caused the devastating floods were two to three times higher than normal annual averages for the area.

Despite the lack of a final assessment of the damage of the two earthquakes of October and November 2015 in Badakhshan (the first one alone affected more than one quarter of all districts in country, killed more than 300 people in northern Afghanistan and Pakistan and destroyed about 7,000 homes), it can be assumed that climate- and conflict-related degradation of the environment exacerbated the damage.

“So far we do know that the climate change impact is observable in the tributaries of the Amu Darya river in the Wakhan corridor,” Professor Benjamin Orlove from the University of California, also a member of the working group advising the University of Central Asia’s Mountain Societies Research Institute, based in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, told one of the authors in an interview. He is referring an observable decreased water flow in the Amu Darya and its tributaries, which form much of the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. A 2011 study found that 76 per cent of the sampled alpine glaciers in the Hindu Raj, a mountain range in Northern Pakistan, and the Wakhan of Afghanistan “have retreated since 1976”; the speed of this retreat was characterised as “rapid.” The melting of Afghan and Pakistani glaciers combined with the heavy rains during the 2014 spring and summer seasons translated into that year’s heavy flooding in Afghanistan.

Orlove also interpreted heat waves in southern Pakistan and India during spring and summer 2015, which together claimed close to 5,000 lives, as a sign of changing climate in the region.

According to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), “more than 6.7 million Afghans have been affected by disasters and extreme weather events such as drought, earthquakes, disease epidemics, sandstorms, and harsh winters” since 1998. The latest poverty status update for Afghanistan, compiled by the government and the World Bank and published in October 2015 (based on the latest available data from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessments of 2007/08 and 2011/12), reports that

In 2007-08, 36 percent of the population in Afghanistan was poor, that is more than one in every three Afghan person was living on levels of expenditure insufficient to satisfy basic food and non-food needs. Four years later, in 2011-12, the poverty rate in Afghanistan remained substantially unchanged despite massive increase in international spending on military and civilian assistance, and overall strong economic growth and labor market performance. . . .

Another government report stated that a “high proportion of Afghanistan’s 27 million people face chronic and transitory food insecurity.”

A new start for research after 2001

Climate-related research and environment-related institution building in Afghanistan have started to catch up again over the past one and a half decades, both to its former capacity and international standards. Afghanistan joined the UNFCCC in 1992, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2013 and became a party to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1995 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) in 2002. These commitments to address environmental and climate-related issues have also given Afghanistan access to UN funding and technical support.

In 2003, UNEP in cooperation with the then Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Environment of the Afghanistan Transitional Authority and a broad array of international and Afghan governmental and non-governmental organisations, produced the first “post-conflict environmental assessment” for Afghanistan. With support of the UN and bilateral donors, Afghanistan’s National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) was established in 2005. In the same year, Afghanistan’s first environmental law came into force; its current version is from early 2007. In 2008, under a NEPA lead, the assessment of Afghanistan’s environment was updated in a new report.

Britain’s DFID (Department for International Development) and the government of Estonia funded the Afghanistan Environmental Data Centre (AEDC) operating in beta mode, with support from Kabul University’s Department of Geography and NEPA. Afghanistan’s Environment Strategy is covered under Afghanistan National Development Strategy for the period of 2009 to 2014.

NEFA also is involved in awareness raising and education on environmental issues. On its website, it has an almost 100 page-long document on “Environmental Education in light [sic] of Holy Quran” (in Dari: here). Among its successes is its declaration of a number of protection areas and national parks (see AAN reporting here) and its reported compilation of the first list of protected species in Afghanistan which, however, cannot be found on its own website.

In 2012, NEPA and UNEP launched a climate change initiative – the first of its kind in the country – in four particularly vulnerable provinces, Badakhshan, Balkh, Bamyan and Daikundi. This six million US dollar program was mainly financed by the Global Environment Facility “improved water management and use efficiency; community-based watershed management; improved terracing, agroforestry and agro-silvo pastoral system [ASPS]; climate-related research and early warning systems; improved food security; and rangeland management.” (2)

The hydro-meteorological database is also growing again. Today, the Ministry of Transportation that had set up Afghanistan’s pre-war weather stations – the first ones were installed in selected locations around the country in 1953 (3) – again oversees data collection and monitoring through its Department of Meteorology (maps p 92 here). According to UNEP, in 2014 under Afghan Meteorological Authority (AMA) at least 140 weather stations were operating countrywide. Additionally, a number of Afghan ministries and projects gather climate-related observations.

Furthermore, several international foundations and international and national NGOs, individually or within consortiums, are addressing the issue of climate change, or ecology and environmental protection more broadly, as part of their work plans. Five international and national development agencies – Afghanaid, ActionAid, Concern Worldwide, Save the Children and UNEP – have come together as the Afghanistan Resilience Consortium “to provide a coherent and coordinated response to Afghanistan’s urgent needs and vulnerabilities to natural disasters and climate.” This consortium collaborates with the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, NEPA, the ministries of rural rehabilitation and development and of education as well as provincial, district and community development councils in Badakhshan, Bamyan, Balkh, Ghor, Jawzjan, Samangan, Sar-e Pul and Takhar provinces. The German Heinrich Boell Foundation and Madera, a French NGO operating in Afghanistan since 1988, are working with communities and other stakeholders on natural resource management and in other fields. The Boell foundation  states on its website: “there are already conflicts about the distribution of resources, about fertile lands, grazing grounds and water today. These are likely to increase the more affected Afghanistan will become by the effects of climate change.” Furthermore, the above-mentioned Mountain Societies Research Institute provides research fellowships for Afghans to conduct on-the-ground research on sustainable development in mountain areas.

Large donors like DFID and World Bank are also increasingly incorporating environmental protection as a criterion for their projects and dedicate funding to environmental protection and conservation activities. As Afghanistan has limited funds, it is important that donors mainstream environmental protection as part of their projects.

These examples show that efforts are being undertaken in Afghanistan to start the debate and action on climate change in the country. But environmental awareness is still lacking, both among the population and the authorities. The destruction of the country’s remaining forests continues unabated, because of multiple factors, from the lack of alternative fuels to profit interests of the wood smuggling and land mafias (read examples from the Afghan media from Helmand here and from Badghis here). The government states in its Paris documents:

Between 1990 and 2000, Afghanistan lost an average of 29,400 hectares of forest per year, to an average annual deforestation rate of 2.25%, which further increased to 2.92% per annum between 2000 and 2005. Forest now occupies less than 2% of county’s total area.

Forestry Cover Change Over 30 Years in Afghanistan (Source: Afghanistan Initial National Communication to UNFCCC, p.16)

In another example, Hasht-e Sobh, a Kabul-based independent daily, reported about a recent seminar that brought together non-governmental activists and government officials on the subject of protected species. Both sides complained that Afghans would “mercilessly” hunt all birds, including protected ones, during their migration period, and that police reacted with incomprehension when asked to intervene.

The number 1 problem: drought – from frequent to permanent

In its “initial national communication” to the UNFCCC, the Afghan government identified seven sectors that are particularly vulnerable: “water resources is the most vulnerable sector followed by forestry and rangeland, agriculture, health, biodiversity, energy and waste.” In the same document, it cites an EU report according to which, in general, “regular cycles of around 15 years are observed, during which one would expect 2-3 years of drought conditions. In recent years, however, there has been a marked tendency for this drought cycle to occur more frequently than the model predicts, and since 1960, the country has experienced drought in 1963-64, 1966-67, 1970-72 and 1998-2006.” The period from 1998 to 2005/6, the Afghan report further states, “marked the longest and most severe drought in Afghanistan’s known climatic history” but the country “currently [is] in the grips of the most severe drought in living memory” again.

Such a pattern had already been predicted in 2009, by the Stockholm Environmental Institute. In a report also quoted in Afghanistan’s statement to the UNFCCC 2012 meeting  it stated:

The climate models suggest that Afghanistan will be confronted by a range of new and increased climatic hazards. The most likely adverse impacts of climate change in Afghanistan are drought related, including associated dynamics of desertification and land degradation. Drought is likely to be regarded as the norm by 2030, rather than as a temporary or cyclical event.

According to a 2007 environment assessment by the Asian Development Bank, effects of desertification and drought were particularly observable in the country’s arid north, west and south. This includes the Harirud valley in the western Herat province, the most fertile one in Central Asia, as Daud Saba, Afghanistan’s mining minister and a former governor of that province, told AAN. Similarly, Orlove has already found that climate change will be a cause for internal mass migration in the Central Asian Ferghana valley and may aggravate social tensions within the densely populated area.

Already by late 2000, the penultimate year of the Taleban, Herat had become home to 68,000 IDPs, distributed over six camps, as one of the authors observed then. Most were nomads fleeing a combination of fighting and drought in Badghis (one of the most backward and vulnerable provinces in the country), which had cost them 75 per cent of their harvest and half of their flocks.

In those years, the term Afghan “hunger belt” was coined. It comprised parts of western and large parts of northern Afghanistan, where more than three million people (more than half the population in that region) were dependent on food aid and stretched through the central Hazarajat to parts of southern Afghanistan. During a visit by one of the authors to Kandahar during that period, sheep killed by heat stroke were found along the main road linking the airport with the city. Most of the population of Reg and Shorabak districts, in the very south of the province, was displaced into camps, including to Zhari and Maywand districts of Kandahar, as their herds of camels and other animals had perished due to lack of water. Some were reportedly airlifted out by the Taleban with helicopters after all the animals had died and they were stranded in the middle of the desert (see a contemporary assessment here). The majority of these drought-induced IDPs were never able to return to Reg or Shorabak, because drought conditions there did not improve for more than seven years. Although some IDPs continued to request assistance to facilitate a return, a UNHCR assessment deemed this as unsustainable.

In Badghis, the situation has also not changed fundamentally over the past decade. In 2014, still, a newspaper article put the province in an Afghan “hunger belt” where “grain has become the only currency that matters” in “its fourth year of a drought, which has destroyed the rural economy” and where “people have been reduced to selling their daughters for grain.” And Maslakh, the biggest IDP camp in Herat in 2000 (named after the old slaughterhouse in which it was situated), is also still there, AAN heard from UNHCR Kabul. (The latest figures from 2014 gave 3,648 families, with altogether 17,933 people living there.) The IDPs in Maslakh and those from Reg and Shorabak  likely can be categorised as climate change refugees.

In 2011, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that an estimated three million people have been affected by severe drought in that year throughout 14 provinces of Afghanistan. In 2015, the warmest year ever recorded worldwide, the droughts in Afghanistan remained on the same level as in the previous years, according to UNEP.

How strong are adaptive capacities?

UN conventions on climate change also enable Afghanistan to “identify and communicate urgent and immediate adaptation needs of Afghanistan to the effects of climate change.” Already in 2009, the Afghan authorities calculated that the country’s National Adaptation Plan to climate change would require 10.785 billion US dollars over the next ten years. For the Paris conference, the requirements were increased to 17.405 billion US dollars.

At the same time, Afghanistan’s capacity to adapt to challenges associated with climate change is clearly limited. According to its government’s own assessment, it not only lacks the necessary data basis but also human and institutional capacity and expertise as well as basic environmental awareness, both within its government institutions and among the general population. Under these circumstances, the danger is that funding, such as that being channelled through the UNFCCC, could not be used efficiently or might be diverted into corrupt channels. On the content side, the latest available assessment of the country’s adaptive capacity, published in 2009, concluded that aid for climate-change-related programmes remains marginal due to concentration of “efforts on emergency response together with high-priority development issues that include education, health and basic infrastructure, amongst others” (p 57). Currently, as it does every two years, UNEP is updating its country assessment, due to be released next year.

A strategy dilemma: Development versus environment

NEPA also says in its communication to Paris: “At present, [the Afghan government] does not have a National Strategy on Climate Change including the mitigation strategy.” This was repeated recently by Environment Watch Afghanistan, one of the few local NGOs that focuses on Afghan ecology, in an under-reported press conference – and then promptly denied by a government representative. Indeed, as Afghanistan’s Paris documents state, “the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) with its Vision 2020 aims for environmentally sustainable development” but “does not emphasize ‘climate change.’ . . . [The Afghan government] does not have a national climate change policy or strategy.”

Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s position paper for Paris with its action plan already comes with a price tag of over 17 billion US dollars for the decade between 2020 and 2030 (the period covered by the UNFCCC). It will be presented by President Ashraf Ghani, when he joins almost 150 other world leaders at the Paris conference today (30 November 2015). Since Afghanistan’s contribution to global warming is low, being one of the lowest emitters globally, the expectation is that it may receive pledges against its national position paper, including funds for equipment and required technical resources, the UNEP country director for Afghanistan, Andrew Scanlon, told AAN.

As the energy chapter of the funding-oriented action plan shows, Afghanistan has joined those developing countries and emerging economies (including the so-called BRIC countries Brazil, Russia, India and China) that have pitted their development goals against the struggle to curb greenhouse gas emissions. They argue that industrialised countries’ hydrocarbon-based development over past centuries has given them an advantage and that other countries must be allowed to catch up using the same means. As a result, the Afghan government stated that while, so far, “Afghanistan has very low relative per capita GHG emissions . . . there would be lower costs and a clearer development path for Afghanistan if it pursued development using mainly fossil fuels, as other countries have.” The projections – again in Afghanistan’s Intended National Contribution (p 2) – do not bode well for the country’s environment:

The current growth of transport sector both road and air, will increase demand on diesel and gasoline from 1.2 million tons in 2010 to 12 million tons in 2030, and aviation fuel from 1.0 million tons in 2010 to 22 million tons in 2030. Parallel with the economic development and changing lifestyle of people, waste volume generated in cities is projected to reach 3.1 million tons annually by 2030, compared to 1.4 million tons in 2010. 

But there are ways to at least alleviate the impact of these possible developments on the climate – and both the immense follow-up costs for the Afghan health system and the country’s environment – that could be implemented today. These include a simple change of law, namely an update to the quality standard for car fuel, which is still based on a Soviet standard from the 1970s; a curb on the import of at least the most out-dated second-hand cars; better traffic regulation in Afghanistan’s main cities; or – more long-term – the construction of a stable energy base built on solar and water power and a phase out of diesel generators. Already in 2010, a review of environmental studies had put Kabul among the ten most-polluted cities in the world.

 

(*) Ryskeldi Satke is a contributing writer and researcher with news organisations and research institutions in Central Asia, Turkey, EU and the US. Currently, he is based in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). Contact e-mail: rsatke at gmail.com.

(1) The UNFCCC goes back to the so-called ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This convention set out a framework for action aimed at stabilising atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The UNFCCC, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, now has a near-universal membership of 195 parties. Annual Conferences of Parties (COP) review the convention’s implementation. At COP3, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, which ran out and was not followed-up at COP15 in Copenhagen. At COP17 in Durban, the Green Climate Fund was created, the basis for the Paris conference, where participants, for the first time in over 20 years of UN negotiations, aim to achieve a legally binding and universal agreement on climate, with the aim of keeping global warming below 2°C.

Naomi Klein, meanwhile, one of the most relevant activists worldwide, captured the Paris conference dilemma in one tweet: “response can be ‘historic’, a ‘major step forward’ *and* catastrophically inadequate all at the same time.”

(2) ASPS is a collective name for land-use systems, implying the combination or deliberate association of tree or shrub vegetation with cattle farming in the same site. (See: Ricardo Russo, “Agrosilvopastoral Systems: A Practical Approach toward Sustainable Agriculture”, Journal of Sustainable Agriculture, 07/1996.

(3) In a contemporary article of 1969, German researcher Hermann Flohn, says, “until 1940, there were only foreign-installed weather stations,” including by the USSR. He also mentions a hydrological yearbook for the Kabul River valley for 1960 to 1964. He lists 14 stations in Afghanistan (p. 210), criticises however that “the precipitation stations . . . all lie in the valleys and basins, [and therefore] cannot be in any way taken as representative of the higher areas.” (Hermann Flohn, “Zum Klima und Wasserhaushalt des Hindukush und der benachbarten Hochgebirge”, Erdkunde  23 (1969), 205-15).

The commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, has said the deadly air strike on the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Kunduz in the early hours of 3 October 2015 was “a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures.” The US military investigation, moreover, found that several personnel closely involved in the attack had not followed US rules of engagement. Given that these rules incorporate key principles of the Geneva Conventions, not following them effectively means the attack breached the laws of war. Several battlefield-level personnel have been suspended. However, the failures in command which led to the attack on the hospital appear to have gone much higher. AAN’s Country Director Kate Clark takes a closer look.

After the attack on MSF hospital on 3 October 2015, which killed at least 30 people and injured at least 37 others, the US military conducted an investigation. The main – vetted – findings were presented during a press conference held in Kabul and relayed live to the Pentagon press corps on 25 November 2015. The US military said a redacted version of the investigation’s report would be released, but did not say when.

During the press conference, General Campbell said the US military had “learned from this terrible incident” and that he had “already directed some immediate changes to ensure we learn and apply the right lessons from this incident.” His spokesman, Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, said three times that “we are determined to learn the right lessons” and repeated that they were “committed to ensuring that this does not and cannot happen again.” (For a full transcript of their remarks see the end of this dispatch.) However, a closer look at the findings of the investigation and the US military’s response – as well as what was left unsaid – shows that the ‘mistakes’ were of a far more serious nature than Campbell would have us believe and that the lessons the military now intends to learn, have in fact long been standard operating procedure. The question remains whether the disregard of these procedures was intentional.

What went wrong – on the ground and in the air

Late on 30 September 2015, said Campbell, following the Taleban’s capture of Kunduz city (see AAN reporting here and here), “U.S. SOF [Special Operations Forces] and their Afghan counterparts moved from the airfield into the city and established themselves in the provincial chief of police, or PCOP, compound.”

On the evening of 2 October 2015, the Afghan SOF commander asked the US SOF commander for close air support for a clearing operation that night, including of the NDS headquarters which they believed was occupied by Taleban. The US SOF commander agreed to have air support on standby. By that time, Campbell said, US SOF and their Afghan allies had been engaged in heavy fighting for “nearly five consecutive days and nights.”

Campbell said the AC-130 aircraft designated to provide close air support actually launched more than an hour before it was due to leave, after receiving an emergency call to protect troops under fire. In the end, this particular aircraft was not needed and it proceeded on to its initial mission. However, the early take-off meant the crew had not received a normal mission brief for the NDS headquarters attack and had not secured “crucial mission essential related materials, including the no-strike designations which would have identified the location of the MSF trauma center [the hospital].”

No explanation was given as to why the aircrew had not already known about the hospital. Kunduz is a small city and the MSF hospital was a highly distinctive building – large, in the shape of a cross, and the only one lit up at night in a city without electricity because of its use of generators to keep the intensive care unit and operating theatres working. The US had used air assets every day since 29 September. Yet, Campbell would have us believe, this particular crew did not know about the hospital from earlier sorties which did have accurate lists of ‘no strike designations’.

Campbell further said the investigation had found the electronic systems on board the aircraft had malfunctioned, preventing the transmission of video, email or other electronic messages. He said this prevented “the operation of an essential command and control capability.”

He also said the aircrew had thought that, in the vicinity of Kunduz, they were being targeted by a missile (he gave no further details) and had moved away from what he called the aircraft’s “normal orbit to an orbit approximately eight miles from the mission area.” He said “this degraded the accuracy of certain targeting systems which later contributed to the misidentification of the MSF trauma center.”

The investigation determined, said Campbell, that the US SOF commander, who was still at the Provincial Police headquarters in the city, had given the “correct coordinates of the NDS headquarters building, the intended target of the Afghan SOF” through his joint Terminal Attack Controller or JTAC (an officer specialised in targeting). However, when the aircrew entered the coordinates into their fire control systems, Campbell said the coordinates produced the wrong location; they correlated instead to “an open field over 300 meters from the NDS headquarters.” This mistake happened, said Campbell, because the aircraft was several miles beyond its normal orbit and its sensors were degraded at that distance.

Alarm bells apparently did not ring for the aircrew when the coordinates led them to an empty field. Instead, according to Campbell, they visually located the “closest, largest building near the open field” whose physical description “roughly matched” that of the NDS HQ. It was the MSF trauma centre. (However, according to the US military’s map produced at the press conference, the NDS headquarters was actually nearer to the empty field – 329 metres away – than the MSF hospital was – 402 metres away.)

The crew also ignored what Campbell called other “contradictory indicators,” for example, “once the aircraft returned to its original orbit, the aircraft’s grid location system correctly aligned with the NDS facility instead of the open field.” Yet the crew remained “fixated on the physical description of the facility, and at that point, did not rely on the grid coordinate.” They also did not “observe hostile activity at the MSF trauma center” which, given they were supposed to be giving close air support, should also have been noticed as strange.

Campbell said the person who authorised the attack, the US SOF commander, had remained at the police headquarters compound and “was beyond the visual range of either the NDS headquarters or the MSF trauma center as he monitored the progress of his Afghan counterparts.” This indicates he was monitoring the progress of partners who had presumably been expecting close air support for their clearing operation on the NDS headquarters. Yet, neither the Afghans nor the US commander seems to have been surprised or alarmed when the air support did not turn up as planned.

Campbell further said:

“The report found that, under the circumstances, the U.S. SOF commander lacked the authority to direct the aircrew to engage the facility. The investigation also found that the U.S. SOF commander relied primarily upon information provided by Afghan partners and was unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building at the MSF Trauma Center.”

And most damningly:

The report also determined that the personnel who requested the strike and those who executed it from the air did not undertake the appropriate measures to verify that the facility was a legitimate military target.

As AAN understands it, standard operating procedure has been for air strikes to be signed off by a one star general. For voluntary strikes like this one, where the strike is not in response to an emergency call to protect troops under attack, the bar for authorising a strike and ensuring civilians will not be harmed, is particularly high. Did the SOF commander on the ground have the seniority to authorise this air strike or had the rules of engagement been relaxed to allow more junior officers to authorise strikes? Also, were the normal checking procedures followed to ensure this was a military target was being attacked and there was not going to be disproportionate harm to civilians? Such procedures are always important, but are vital when launching air strikes in a built up area.

What went wrong – further up in the system

The failures extended beyond those immediately involved in the operation. Campbell said that, one minute before launching the attack, the aircrew transmitted to their operational headquarters at Bagram Airfield that they were about to engage the building and “provided the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center as their target.” The headquarters failed to “realize that the grid coordinates for the target matched a location on the no-strike list or that the aircrew was preparing to fire on the hospital.” In other words, whoever had the task of checking to make sure air strikes do not target a protected site failed to carry out their job. Under the laws of war – the Geneva Conventions and other laws which protect civilians and reduce suffering during conflict – hospitals, medical staff and their patients enjoy special protection (for more detail, see here). It is for this reason that medical facilities give their coordinates and identify themselves to the warring parties in a conflict.

What Campbell called the “confusion” at Bagram was exasperated, he said, by the lack of video and electronic communications between the headquarters and the aircraft, caused by the earlier malfunction and “a [mistaken] belief at the headquarters that the force on the ground required air support as a matter of immediate force protection.” Headquarters staff, it seems, had not remembered/realised/been told that the mission of the AC-130 had changed.

Campbell did not describe the attack itself, but other reporting has showed that it was concerted. Survivors described the plane circled round again and again, making five passes in all. Munitions leveled much of the hospital and killed and injured at least 67 people, staff, patients and caretakers. Survivors described “massive explosions, sufficient to shake the ground”, “coming in concentrated volleys”, with attacks aimed at the main hospital and also at those trying to run away.

The duration of the attack according to the US investigation was 29 minutes. MSF, however, based on its record of mobile phone calls and text messages sent to Resolute Support and the Pentagon, among others, to try to stop the strike, said it lasted closer to an hour. Campbell said MSF had called a SOF officer at Bagram twelve minutes after the strike started, but it took the command 17 minutes to discover the error and by that time, the AC-130 had already ceased firing. It is unclear, and unexplained, why it took so long.

Also left unexplained was why the Afghan authorities have been so adamant and so consistent in their version of events, that this was a correctly targeted strike, intentionally made on the hospital because they said – and MSF has denied – there were active Taleban fighters there and they were coming under fire from them.

What really went wrong

In conclusion, Campbell summarised the blame like this:

… the approximate cause of this tragedy was a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures. In addition, the report found that fatigue and high operation tempo contributed to this tragedy. It also identified failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident.

However, rather than a simple string of human errors, this seems to have been a string of reckless decisions, within a larger system that failed to provide the legally proscribed safeguards when using such firepower. There were also equipment failures that compounded the problem but, again, if the forces on the ground and in the air had followed their own rules of engagement, the attack would have been averted.

The US SOF commander, according to Campbell, had relied primarily upon information from Afghan partners and, Campbell said, had been “unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building and the MSF Trauma Center.” The word ‘distinguish’ is key, as under the laws of war, the commander had a duty to distinguish between civilian and military targets. If he was unable to do so, he should not have ordered the strike. The aircrew had also recklessly assumed they were homing in on a legitimate military target, while choosing what was in essence a random building that happened to be near the coordinates they had received and one, moreover, from which there was no hostile activity. These are not errors, but rather reckless decisions which failed to distinguish between civilian and military targets and failed – again a legal obligation – to take “all feasible precautions” to protect civilians. 

There are also questions surrounding whether the SOF commander’s use of airpower was justified by US mission parameters. (1) When asked about this, the US military spokesman, General Shoffner said, “Under these circumstances, US assets can be used to support Afghan forces if they request air support. Ultimately that decision is in the hands of a [sic] U.S commander.” He was pressed again:

Q: Do I understand your answer to mean that no, this is not the proper circumstance under which to use combat power? Is that what you’re saying?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

This was one of several times Shoffner answered by saying some US individuals had not followed the rules of engagement. He made the same reply when asked whether the aircrew had ever expressed “any concern or question the validity or legality of the target they were about to strike” and “whether, given “there were so many problems with systems and with comms and with identifying targets… that attack [was] allowed to proceed?” He also gave the same answer to a question asking whether the attack had been ‘proportional’, given, the journalist said, “every U.S. servicemen from basic training all the way through and prior to deploying must … review the basic laws of war, including proportionality and distinction.”

When asked about taking precautions to protect civilians, Shoffner said:

The investigation found that — that the actions of the aircrew and the special operations commander were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officers’ recommendations on this matter have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition and I won’t comment on that further.

The legal duty on parties to a conflict to take precautions to protect civilians is, however, systemic, not just at the individual level. Campbell admitted that “failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident” included “the nature of the planning and approval process employed during operations at Kunduz City and the lack of a single system to vet proposed targets against a no-strike list.”

This means that, after all these years, precautions – on the ground, in the air, and within the higher command – were still not adequate to ensure civilian and military targets were distinguished. Procedures to ensure that protected sites were not attacked were not followed. The chain of command and communication did not function when MSF’s designated point of contact in the US military tried to urgently stop an illegal and deadly operation.

Campbell promised to learn lessons from the ‘tragedy’ of 3 October 2015. However, the US military had already learned such lessons from many ‘mistakes’ over many years of catastrophic air strikes, which killed hundreds of Afghan civilians in the years after 2001. Starting from around 2008-2009, the US command realised those deaths were undermining America’s military and political mission in Afghanistan, after which, successive commanders of ISAF and US forces repeatedly tightened the rules of engagement, especially with regard to air strikes.

Over the years, the US learned not to rely on Afghan intelligence, because it was often mistaken or mischievous. It learned to take special care when strikes were voluntary, ie not launched to protect troops in imminent danger on the ground. Even when air power was used to protect ‘troops in contact’, it was increasingly used judiciously with the aim of not harming civilians disproportionately. Those rules of engagement succeeded in massively bringing down the number of civilians killed in airstrikes . Many would argue (2) they also actually brought US forces into line with the laws of war.

It appears that what happened on the night of 3 October amounted to a throwing away of the rule book.

In general, says the US “Department of Defence Law of War Manual” rules of engagement “reflect legal, policy, and operational considerations” but are always “consistent with the international law obligations of the United States, including the law of war.” States use them, says the Manual, to implement “their law of war obligations during military operations.” The failure of US forces to follow their own rules on 3 October is, then, more serious than General Campbell made it sound. The attack on the MSF hospital involved not only violations of the US military’s rules of engagement but breaches of the laws of war: US forces failed to distinguish between civilians and military targets, failed to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and launched an indiscriminate attack. (3)

According to General Campbell “those individuals most closely associated with the incident have been suspended from their duties, pending consideration and disposition of administrative and disciplinary matters.” But the problems went higher than that – to those planning, vetting targets and to Campbell himself who has command responsibility for ensuring that both the rules of engagement and the laws of war are respected.

Have the rules of engagement been ‘liberalised’?

During the late ISAF years, keeping civilian casualties down had become a central part of the military command, particularly under General John Allen (see AAN reporting here who was both commander of ISAF and Enduring Freedom, the separate US counter-terrorism mission which also answered to the same rules. This was during the surge years when the US and ISAF was actively battling the insurgency with offensive strikes and kill/capture operations. However, not only had the rules of engagement become very strict, (4) but General Allen had also made it a personal priority that they were implemented effectively. A senior officer whose sole responsibility was mitigating civilian casualties sat in the command centre and answered directly to Allen who had also ordered that he be notified, day or night, of any incident. All incidents and ‘near misses’ were investigated by a team which carried clout, and lessons learned were actively fed back into procedures to improve them. Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan were given ‘scenario training’ on applying the rules of engagement and officers were sacked for breaching them. During this period, ISAF and the US military were more open to discussions, allegations and feedback from NGOs, the United Nations and civil society: transparency, the military held, would help reduce the numbers of civilians needlessly being killed. Those working in this field have noticed a new secrecy surrounding such matters.

In addition, when it comes to US forces in Afghanistan, the dividing line between the two military missions currently operating has been blurred: US forces are interchangeably used for the NATO Resolute Support non-combat mission and the US military counter-terrorism, partially combat, Freedom’s Sentinel mission. Campbell is the commander of both missions. As AAN has reported, this blurring has led to confusion as to who answers for what and what may be permissible for particular forces, depending on what mandate they might be under that day.

The ‘unlearning’ of lessons of the past has appeared to coincide with a possible “liberalisation” of the rules of engagement during the battle to retake Kunduz (according to a senior US military officer speaking to AAN). The hospital strike was not the only legally questionable strike that night, according to Washington Post reporting. Two other strikes on 2/3 October that thankfully only hit a house and a factory, both empty, were also reportedly requested by Afghan forces to locations where they said they were under pressure from Taleban. According to residents in the area interviewed by the Post, there was, however, no longer an insurgent presence. These strikes seem to have been ordered with the same recklessness and disregard for the obligation to distinguish civilian from military targets.

What happens next?

Campbell told the Kabul and Pentagon press corps, “Matters regarding individual accountability will be managed in accordance with standard military justice and administrative practices for joint commands. I have decided to refer some of the recommendations to the command of U.S. Special Operations Command for his review and action, as appropriate.” So far, only those “closely involved in the strike” appear to have been singled out for suspension.

It is a familiar pattern in the US military, and other organisations, to let junior staff carry the blame. However, from what Campbell told the press, the failures went far higher than just those on the ground and in the air, and went to those in the highest command who were responsible for the planning, vetting and setting the parameters of the campaign.

Campbell claimed that the investigation was independent because it had been carried out by US officers not under his command. However, he is both commanding and adjudicating officer and this is an internal investigation from an organisation with an abysmal record on holding its own accountable, particularly senior officers. It is not surprising that the calls for an independent investigations continue. Human Rights Watch has said a criminal investigation is necessary, while MSF continues to call for an independent international investigation mandated by the UN. Its director, Christopher Stokes, said:

“The US version of events presented today leaves MSF with more questions than answers…

The frightening catalogue of errors outlined today illustrates gross negligence on the part of US forces and violations of the rules of war.”

It is clear that the Afghan government will not press for greater accountability. Unlike President Karzai, who was outraged when Afghan civilians were killed, President Ghani and CEO Abdullah would like more US military involvement and have been reluctant to criticise their US allies. A Afghan government statement said it was confident the US investigation had “been conducted in a thorough manner and will reveal measures that can be taken to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future.” Most earlier statements by government figures, moreover, had falsely accused MSF of hosting Taleban fighters. Even now, in the government’s statement, President Ghani is still largely blaming the Taleban for the hospital attack: “‘Such mistakes can and should be avoided, but it is also a painful demonstration of the cost of war being brought upon us by terrorist groups and enemies of Afghanistan.’”

The seriousness of the actions and failures revealed in the US military’s investigation were great, major enough, it seems, for the command to release the report on the eve of one of the quietest days in the US Calendar – Thanksgiving. They must have hoped it would be a good day to bury bad news.

 

(1) The journalist was referring to the fact that the US officially has a ‘non-combat mission’ in Afghanistan. As AAN has reported, the US’s declared non-combat mission in Afghanistan has long actually been, in part, a combat mission. The US under its agreement with the Afghan government has a ‘train, assist and advice’ role, although the agreement says “US military operations [in support of Afghan operations] to defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates may be appropriate.” Self defence is also always permitted whether or not the mission is combat or non-combat. In this instance, however, US troops were not under fire and the strike was ordered to protect Afghan forces against the Taleban, not al Qaeda.

(2) See for example, Human Rights Watch’s 2008 report “Troops in Contact” which looked at the US military’s use of airstrikes in Afghanistan to protect ground troops, and the deaths and injuries done to civilians in those attacks:

The cases described here raise concerns as to whether the attacking forces acted in accordance with their obligation under the laws of war to exercise “constant care to spare the civilian population” and take “all feasible precautions” to minimize loss of civilian life. This obligation requires that combatants do everything feasible to verify that targets are “military objectives,” and not civilians; that the means and methods of warfare are chosen to minimize civilian loss; and that the expected civilian loss is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected. Attacks that do not meet these requirements must be cancelled or suspended.

 (3) The International Committee of the Red Cross’ online database cataloguing the 161 rules of customary international humanitarian law includes the following (original legal citations can be seen online): 

Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.

Rule 11. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. 

Rule 12. Indiscriminate attacks are those:

(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective;

(b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or

(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law;

and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.

Rule 15. In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.

(4) See for example the ISAF commander’s Tactical Directive (‘directive’ is another term for rules of engagement) of 30 November 2011 which includes the order:

Presume that:

Every Afghan is a civilian until otherwise apparent;

All compounds are civilian structures until otherwise apparent;

In every location where there is evidence of human habitation, civilians are present until otherwise apparent.

 

ANNEX

Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Campbell via teleconference from Afghanistan 

News transcript 

General John F. Campbell, commander, U.S. forces in Afghanistan; Captain Jeff Davis, Director, Defense Press Office; Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communication, Operation Resolute Support, Afghanistan

GENERAL JOHN CAMPBELL: Well, good evening and good morning back in Washington, D.C. I received a report of the U.S. national investigation into the strike on Doctors Without Borders, MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan on October 3, 2015. Let me start by offering my sincere condolences to the victims of this devastating event. No nation does more to prevent civilian casualties than the United States, but we failed to meet our own high expectations on October 3.

This was a tragic, but avoidable accident caused primarily by human error. It was important that the officers investigating the incident had the requisite seniority and independence to conduct a thorough and unbiased inquiry. For that reason, I requested an outside investigative team.

U.S. Central Command supported my request and sent an army major general, independent of U.S. forces-Afghanistan, to lead the investigation. He was assisted by two brigadier generals, one from the Army and one from the Air Force, also outside from my command.

The report included specific findings relating to systems, processes and personnel, and I’ve already approved some of the findings and recommendations. Based on the recommendations, I’ve already directed some immediate changes to ensure we learn and apply the right lessons from this incident. In addition to the U.S. national investigation, a NATO and Afghan partner combined civilian casualty assessment team, or CCAT, also conducted an investigation.

The findings of both reports were generally consistent. I personally briefed the NATO secretary-general, General Breedlove SACEUR, President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah on the results of the CCAT. NATO will release the CCAT report in the coming days. Also, earlier today, I briefed MSF on the results of the U.S. national and CCAT investigations.

Recommendations dealing with systems and processes will be managed within this command and adopted consistent with current operations. Matters regarding individual accountability will be managed in accordance with standard military justice and administrative practices for joint commands. I have decided to refer some of the recommendations to the command of U.S. Special Operations Command for his review and action, as appropriate.

I won’t discuss individual cases because our system requires fairness and the discretion of individual decision-makers. I can tell you that those individuals most closely associate with the incident have been suspended from their duties, pending consideration and disposition of administrative and disciplinary matters. Because I am still in the process of reviewing the investigative report and investigating officers report, I will defer any questions today to my spokesperson, Brigadier General Shoffner, as mentioned earlier.

That said, I’m able to provide an accounting of the events of October 3rd, 2015.

The report determined that the U.S. strike upon the MSF trauma center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan was the direct result of human error, compounded by systems and procedural failures. The U.S. forces directly involved in this incident did not know the targeted compound was the MSF trauma center.

The medical facility was misidentified as a target by U.S. personnel who believed they were striking a different building several hundred meters away where there were reports of combatants. The report also determined that the personnel who requested the strike and those who executed it from the air did not undertake the appropriate measures to verify that the facility was a legitimate military target.

It’s important to place events leading up to this tragic incident in context. On the evening of September 27th, Kunduz City was suddenly attacked by a significant force of Taliban and associated insurgents. By the evening of September 28th, local Afghan forces quickly withdrew, leaving the Taliban in control of most of the city. On September 29th, MSF sent the coordinates of their trauma center in Kunduz to multiple recipients within the U.S. and NATO chains of command.

Those coordinates were received and distributed by this headquarters to subordinate headquarters. The United States special operation forces and their Afghan counterparts were rapidly deployed to a camp adjacent to the Kunduz airfield in the early morning on September 29th. By that evening, they were forced to defend the Kunduz airfield from a Taliban attack.

U.S. SOF maintained defensive positions at the airfield throughout the night, until the early morning on September 30th. Later that day, U.S. SOF and their Afghan counterparts moved from the airfield into the city and established themselves in the provincial chief of police, or PCOP, compound. Between the time that the team was established inn the PCOP compound and the time of the incident on October 3rd, U.S. and their Afghan SOF partners repelled heavy and sustained enemy attacks and conducted multiple defensive strikes in Kunduz.

By October 3rd, U.S. SOF had remained at the PCOP compound longer than intended in continued support of Afghan forces. As a result, by the early morning hours of October 3rd, U.S. SOF at the PCOP compound had been engaged in heavy fighting for nearly five consecutive days and nights.

During the evening of October 2nd, Afghan SOF advised the U.S. SOF commander that they intended to conduct a clearing operation that night. This included a former national director of security, or NDS, headquarters building they believed was occupied by insurgents. The Afghans requested U.S. close air support as they conducted their clearing operation. The U.S. SOF commander agreed to have the support on standby. He remained at the PCOP compound during the operation and was beyond the visual range of either the NDS headquarters or the MSF trauma center as he monitored the progress of his Afghan counterparts.

The report found that from this point forward multiple errors occurred that ultimately resulted in the misidentification of and the strike on the MSF trauma center.

First, the AC-130 aircraft designated to provide close air support in Kunduz city launched 69 minutes early, in response to a troops-in contact situation.

This type of emergency requires an immediate response. But the result was that the aircraft launched without conducting a normal mission brief or securing crucial mission essential related materials, including the no-strike designations which would have identified the location of the MSF trauma center.

Because this AC-130 aircraft and crew were ultimately not needed for the initial troops in contact mission, they were diverted in flight to provide close air support to the U.S. SOF commander in Kunduz. During the flight, the electronic systems onboard the aircraft malfunctioned, preventing the operation of an essential command and control capability and eliminating the ability of aircraft to transmit video, send and receive e-mail or send and receive electronic messages. This is an example of technical failure.

In addition, as the aircraft arrived in the vicinity of Kunduz, the aircrew believe it was targeted by a missile, forcing the aircraft to move away from its normal orbit to an orbit approximately eight miles from the mission area. This degraded the accuracy of the certain — this degraded the accuracy of certain targeting systems which later contributed to the misidentification of the MSF trauma center.

I’d like to refer you to the chart now in order to show you key locations as I describe the events. To give you some scale, the distance from the top to the bottom of this graphic is approximately 1,000 meters. The U.S. SOF command on the ground was located at the provincial chief of police compound, depicted by the green dot in the upper right of the chart.

Through his joint Terminal Attack Controller, or JTAC, the U.S. SOF commander provided the aircraft with the correct coordinates to the NDS headquarters building, the intended target of the Afghan SOF. The green 1 depicts the location of the NDS compound. Again, this was the building that the U.S. SOF commander intended to strike. But when the aircrew entered the coordinates into their fire control systems, the coordinates correlated to an open field over 300 meters from the NDS headquarters. The yellow 2 on the chart depicts the location of the open field.

This mistake happened because the aircraft was several miles beyond its normal orbit and its sensors were degraded at that distance. The investigating officer found that the aircrew visually located the closest, largest building near the open field, which we now know was the MSF trauma center. The MSF trauma center is depicted by the red 3 on the chart.

The physical description of the NDS headquarters building provided by the Afghan SOF to the U.S. SOF commander roughly matched the description of the MSF trauma center as seen by the aircrew. At night, the aircrew was unable to identify any signs of the hospital’s protected status.

This second chart shows the MSF facility pre-strike. This is what the aircrew was able to visualize, although it would have been seeing the facility at night. According to the report, the aircrew concluded, based on the JTAC’s description of a large building near a field, that the MSF trauma center was the NDS headquarters.

Tragically, this misidentification continued throughout the remainder of the operation, even though there was some contradictory indicators. For example, once the aircraft returned to its original orbit, the aircraft’s grid location system correctly aligned with the NDS facility instead of the open field. However, the crew remain fixated on the physical description of the facility, and at that point, did not rely on the grid coordinate. Also, the investigators found that the aircrew did not observe hostile activity at the MSF trauma center. These are examples of human and procedural errors.

The report determined that as the operation proceeded, the U.S. SOF commander, through the JTAC, requested the aircraft to engage a building that the aircrew mistakenly believed was the NDS headquarters.

The report found that, under the circumstances, the U.S. SOF commander lacked the authority to direct the aircrew to engage the facility. The investigation also found that the U.S. SOF commander relied primarily upon information provided by Afghan partners and was unable to adequately distinguish between the NDS headquarters building at the MSF Trauma Center.

According to the report, one minute prior to firing, the aircrew transmitted to their operational headquarters at Bagram Airfield that they were about to engage the building. They provided the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center as their target. The headquarters was aware of the coordinates for the MSF Trauma Center and had access to the no-strike list, but did not realize that the grid coordinates for the target matched a location on the no-strike list or that the aircrew was preparing to fire on the hospital.

This confusion was exasperated by the lack of video and electronic communications between the headquarters and the aircraft, caused by the earlier malfunction and a belief at the headquarters that the force on the ground required air support as a matter of immediate force protection.

The strike began at 2:08 a.m. At 2:20 a.m., a SOF officer at Bagram received a call from MSF, advising that their facility was under attack. It took the headquarters and the U.S. special operations commander until 2:37 a.m. to realize the fatal mistake. At that time, the AC-130 had already ceased firing. The strike lasted for approximately 29 minutes.

This is an example of human and process error. The investigation found that the strike resulted in the death of 30 staff, patients and assistants and the injury of 37 others. U.S. Air Forces Afghanistan is currently working hand-in-hand with MSF to identify the injured and the families of those who lost loved ones in order that we may offer appropriate condolences.

Based upon the information learned during the investigation, the report determined that the approximate cause of this tragedy was a direct result of avoidable human error compounded by process and equipment failures. In addition, the report found that fatigue and high operation tempo contributed to this tragedy. It also identified failures in systems and processes that, while not the cause of the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, contributed to the incident.

These included the loss of electronic communication systems on aircraft, the nature of the planning and approval process employed during operations at Kunduz City and the lack of a single system to vet proposed targets against a no-strike list. We have reviewed each of these failures and implemented corrections as appropriate.

We have learned from this terrible incident. We’ll also take appropriate administrative and disciplinary action through a process that is fair and thoroughly considers the available evidence. The cornerstone of our military justice system is the independence of decision-makers following a thorough investigation such as this one. We will study what went wrong and take the right steps to prevent it in the future.

As I said in an earlier statement, this was a tragic mistake. U.S. forces would never intentionally strike a hospital or other protected facilities. Our deepest condolences go to all of the individuals and families that were affected by this tragic incident. We will offer our assistance to Doctors Without Borders in rebuilding the hospital in Kunduz.

Doctors without Borders is a respected humanitarian organization that does important life-saving work, not only within Afghanistan, but around the world. Alongside our Afghan partners, we will work to assist and support them in this critical role that they play in this country.

Again, thank you very much time — thank you very much for your time. I will be followed by General Shoffner as he will take your questions.

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILSON SHOFFNER: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, and good morning to those of you joining us from Washington, D.C. I’m Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, the spokesman for Resolute Support and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan.

Regarding the investigation, what we’ve said from the beginning is that we are determined to ensure this investigation is both thorough and transparent. The fact that we’re even doing this press conference today is unusual, but as Secretary Carter has said, we are committed to ensuring full accountability on this incident.

This investigation is an important step, but it is only one step in the overall process. U.S. authorities may determine that additional investigations are required, and if so, that process will take additional time. We also have to ensure that due process for anyone who may be involved in this process.

In an effort to be transparent, we are going to share everything that we possibly can at this point. Once the investigation is redacted, the full report will be posted to the U.S. Central Command website and we’ll provide you a link to that at the completion of this press conference.

At this time, I will take your questions and Lynn O’Donnell, let’s start with you.

Q: Thank you.

Talking about suspensions — (inaudible) — and followed the due process, et cetera. It sounds like a lot of — violations — multiple violations of the rules of law here dressed up as human error. There is a chain of command, there has to be a point of responsibility. Where does the buck stop? Does it stop with General Campbell, who took his authority directly from the President — Are we looking at him being forced or even a matter of honor offering his resignation?

The other thing that interests me about this is that Afghan officials have said all along that the hospital — they specifically referred to the hospital as they command and control center for the insurgents. So you know, when did the NDS come into this? In the process of making the decision whether or not to continue with the attack, when does the NDS come into this?

And in terms of — you know, I think like a contradiction. So I’m just wondering what impact will this whole incident have on the level of trust between U.S. NATO and Afghan forces going forward? Because you have to work very closely going forward.

GEN. SHOFFNER: To the first part of your question, the investigation found that some individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

In terms of what happens next, as I said, the investigation itself is an important step in the process, but it is just one step toward full accountability.

Based on his findings, the investigating officer made several recommendations. General Campbell has decided to retain some of those recommendations at his level and he has referred others to the commander of the U.S. SOCOM for his review and action as appropriate.

The individuals most closely associated with the incident have been suspended from their duty positions. I won’t comment on the recommendations that have been made while those reviews are underway, and I won’t comment on individual cases that are underway, as we have to allow for due process for those involved and we must allow for the independent review by the decision-makers involved.

To the second part of your question, I won’t speak for Minister (Stanikzine ?), but I will point out that on the civilian casualty assessment team investigation that was done, that wasn’t just a U.S. investigation. It was a NATO investigation. The members of the team consisted of coalition partners, U.S. and non-U.S. It consisted of seven Afghans that were appointed by President Ghani.

On the civilian casualty assessment team, and I need to point out the purpose of that was different from the 15-6. It was intentionally narrow in purpose. It was designed to determine the basic facts and then to validate whether or not these civilian casualties had occurred. It did that. And the results of the civilian casualty assessment team report informed the 15-6 investigation.

As to your final statement or your final question, we remain committed to working with our Afghan partners to help them build sustainable security in Afghanistan.

Thank you.

Q: (inaudible) — New York Times.

Can you tell us how many individuals were suspended? And also, was — was General Campbell himself interviewed by the investigators?

GEN. SHOFFNER: All I can tell you is that some individuals have been suspended from their duty positions. I can also say that U.S. authorities may direct additional investigations to determine whether further actions are warranted regarding actions of specific individuals that were involved.

Should additional investigations be required, those will be made public once complete and redacted. Again, we have a responsibility to ensure due process for those involved.

Q: And General Campbell, was he interviewed by the investigators?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I won’t comment on General Campbell’s position, as he is reviewing some of the recommendations that have been made in his capacity as the appointing officer for the investigation.

COL. LAWHORN: (inaudible) — on one — (inaudible) — at this time, Roger, can you hear us at the Pentagon?

CAPT. DAVIS: We — we hear you just fine. Can you hear us?

COL. LAWHORN: Yes.

GEN. SHOFFNER: Yeah, we’ve got you. Go ahead.

Q: Hello. This is Bob Burns from Associated Press, General.

Question for you about — you referred to the rules of engagement were violated. Aside from reaching the point where there were a combination of human error and other malfunctions, was the basic decision to use air power under these circumstances justified, given the noncombat role that the U.S. assumed at the end of 2014? In other words, there are very limited, narrow circumstances under which is the use of force is permitted, and did that — did this fit that circumstance? thank you.

GEN. SHOFFNER: Under certain circumstances, U.S. assets can be used to support Afghan forces if they request air support. Ultimately, that decision is in the hands of a U.S. commander. I won’t get into the specific rules of engagement on that, but I will tell you that we are determined to learn the right lessons from this.

We’re committed to ensuring that this doesn’t happen again. We will evaluate all the recommendations in this report and use them to improve our systems and our processes. We take all reports of civilian casualties seriously and we review each one of them thoroughly.

General Campbell has already directed a thorough review of our planning process as well as our targeting process. This will take place at all echelons of command and we’ll conduct a thorough examination of how we develop and how we use no-strike lists.

Q: General, a very quick follow-up from Bob Burns. Do I understand your answer to mean that no, this is not the proper circumstance under which to use combat power? Is that what you’re saying?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

Q: Jim Miklaszewski from NBC News. General, Doctors Without Borders, which has proven to be a pretty reliable source in regard to what happened there in Kunduz, said that they made at least two phone calls, one just prior to and one during the airstrike, to the Pentagon. And we’ve been told that that information was relayed from Joint Staff to the NMCC that they were under attack.

Did that information ever reach the operators there in the battlefield?

GEN. SHOFFNER: What I’d like to do is, to better answer that question, just briefly review the sequence of events leading up to the issue at hand. Approximately 12 minutes after the firing commenced, Doctors Without Borders called to report the attack. Unfortunately, by the time U.S. forces realized the mistake, the aircraft had stopped firing.

It’s important to remember that this was a complicated and a chaotic situation. The AC-130 had already been shot at by a surface-to-air missile. U.S. personnel at the time were focused on doing what they had been trained to do. That said, chaos does not justify this tragedy.

Let me be very clear. We did not intentionally strike the hospital. We are absolutely heartbroken over what has occurred here and we will do absolutely everything in our power to make sure that it does not happen again.

You mentioned Doctors Without Borders. We have great respect for the important and life-saving work Doctors Without Borders does in Afghanistan and around the world. We’re committed to working with them. We’re committed to helping them, as General Campbell mentioned, rebuild the hospital and provide condolence payments for those affected by this terrible tragedy.

We appreciate their dedication toward easing the suffering of those affected by conflict and we will do everything within our power to enable their efforts.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s take one last one from the Pentagon before we lose their connection.

So Pentagon, go ahead.

Q: General, just a couple of quick follows up — follow-ups. Did the flight crew aboard the AC-130 ever express any concern or question the validity or legality of the target they were about to strike? And if there were so many problems with systems and with comms and with identifying targets, why was not — why was that attack allowed to proceed?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I’ll tell you that the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

CAPT. DAVIS: Tom Bowman from NPR.

Q: General, Tom Bowman. A couple of questions.

When was the MSF called, looks like less than halfway into this attack and it took 17 minutes, you guys say, for the commanders to realize they made a mistake. That’s almost half the amount of time of the attack itself. Why did it take so long? Did you ever get an answer to that?

And also, if there’s no fire coming from the hospital, no clear threat, why would they think this was a legitimate target?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Well, the investigation found that the medical facility was misidentified as a target by U.S. personnel who believed that they were striking a different building several hundred meters away where there were reports of combatants. I think it might be helpful to put this in context. At the time of the incident, U.S. and Afghan forces in Kunduz had been fighting for five days when the incident occurred. Both U.S. and Afghan forces had reports of Taliban throughout the city of Kunduz.

Again, we are determined to learn the right lessons and we’re committed to ensuring that this does not and cannot happen again.

Let’s go to a question here in Kabul.

COL. LAWHORN: We’ll take the questions here in the room. We’ll just — (inaudible).

Q: (off-mic)

GEN. SHOFFNER: So General Campbell has already directed that all U.S. personnel in theater receive training on targeting authorities and on the rules of engagement. General Campbell has also directed that we conduct a comprehensive review of our planning process, as well as our targeting process at all echelons of command. He has directed a thorough examination of how — what we develop and how we use no-strike lists.

Q: May I continue?

GEN. SHOFFNER: You may, please.

COL. LAWHORN: Do you have a follow-up?

Q: You want to continue that kind of close air support to the Afghan forces in the future?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Again, I will state that we remain committed to working closely with our Afghan allies as we assist them in their efforts to build sustainable security for this country.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s go to — (inaudible) Washington Post.

Q: Yes. (inaudible) — Washington Post. A few hours before the MSF strike, an NDS building and buildings surrounding were actually struck by U.S. airstrikes. So the location was totally known. How do you — how do you account for this discrepancy a few hours later? The coordinate shift, and as you say, the MSF hospital was mistaken for the NDS building when just a few hours earlier, there had been an attack, had been — (inaudible) — there and had a strike in that area.

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that the U.S. special operations forces commander did rely on information provided by the Afghan partners on the location of the NDS compound. However, the investigation determined that those grid coordinates given by the Afghan forces to that NDS compound were correct.

And let me comment on — just a minute on how we came to that conclusion. The investigative team went to great lengths to ensure a full and impartial accounting of the facts and the circumstances. They were driven by the need to be thorough, not by a timeline. Investigative team consisted of three general officers and a dozen subject-matter experts.

They spent a full three weeks completing their report. They visited the Doctors Without Borders site. They visited other sites within Kunduz. They interviewed over 65 witnesses. And they compiled over 3,000 pages of documentary evidence.

They also visited and engaged with each echelon in the chain of command. We stand by their findings and recommendations. And we support the process by which they conducted the investigation.

COL. LAWHORN: Let’s go to — (inaudible) — and — (inaudible).

Q: (inaudible)

(inaudible) — asking for — (inaudible). Do you share the — (inaudible)? What was — (inaudible) — response — (inaudible)?

GEN. SHOFFNER: I’m sorry. Could you repeat the first part of your question?

Q: (inaudible) — asking — (inaudible) — investigation — (inaudible). What was your response?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Thank you.

General Campbell did meet with representatives from Doctors Without Borders. When he met with them, they provided their initial review. General Campbell read and considered that initial review. He also gave it to the investigative team. They read it and they considered that as they wrote their report.

I’ll also point out that the findings of the U.S. national investigation, the 15-6, were consistent with that of the CCAT, the combined civilian casualty assessment team. So again, we’re confident with those two investigations coming to the same conclusions, we’re confident in those findings.

Q: (inaudible)

Are you going to allow an international independent investigation? General Campbell is the commanding officer and apparently also the adjudicating the officer. And it seems the investigation team was all American — also the forces involved in the attack were all American. Is there any problem with that? While you say it’s not an intentional strike, that in no way abrogates the laws of the rule of war.

Every U.S. servicemen from basic training all the way through and prior to deploying must be — must review the basic laws of war, including proportionality and distinction. Even if you had struck the proper place, do you think that the attack was proportional?

And in terms of – its not just rules of engagement, in terms of the basic laws of war why would more training make things better?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigative team has completed a thorough investigation. And we’re confident with the facts and the evidence collected.

With regard to your question on the rules of engagement, the investigation, the investigation

Q: laws of war, not rules of engagement, laws of war

GEN. SHOFFNER: I can tell you what the investigation found, and the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did not follow the rules of engagement.

With regard to your question on proportionality, the investigation found that the actions of the aircrew and the Special Operations Forces were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officer’s recommendations on this have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition. I cannot comment further on that part as that matter is under review.

Again, we did not intentionally strike the hospital, and we are absolutely heartbroken over what has happened here.

Q: What about an independent investigation?

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigative team has completed a thorough investigation —

Q: I mean, an independent international investigation. MSF has called for it, and the investigation panel has been activated. The U.N. mandated procedures in this — in this situation when there’s a humanitarian problem. They’re ready to go but they need the Americans and the Afghans to say yes, and it seems that you have said no.

GEN. SHOFFNER: We believe the investigation completed was full and impartial, and we stand by the findings and recommendations, and we support the process by which it was conducted.

Q: Sorry. How can it be impartial when your commanding officer and your adjudicating officer and the people investigating are in the same organization as the people that attacked?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Again, General Campbell has decided to refer some of the recommendations to the commander of U.S. SOCOM for his review and action as appropriate.

CAPT. DAVIS: All right. Let’s go here to this gentleman.

Q: (off-mic). This is not the first time that U.S. airstrikes caused civilian casualties previously even the U.S. forces bombarded the ANA compound — (inaudible). How do the U.S. assure — (inaudible) — that will not occur again?

GEN. SHOFFNER: We’re determined to learn the right lessons from this and we’re committed to ensuring it doesn’t happen again. The civilian casualty assessment team process that I mentioned is part of this headquarters procedures whenever we have an indication of civilian casualties or an allegation of civilian casualties.

It provides us the means of looking into it very quickly to determine if further investigation is needed. If further investigation is needed, as it was in this case, that will be done and we’ll use that investigation as the basis for adjusting our systems and procedures so that this does not happen again.

We have time for one more question.

COL LAWHORN: (off-mic) Jessica?

Q: Afghan special forces are saying that they relayed to U.S. special forces that they were firing coming from the building, so when the building was hit, presumably Afghan forces would have seen whether the firing was continuing or not. So what kind of messaging was passed between the Afghan special forces and U.S. special forces at the time. And if they continued to report that there was firing from the building when in fact the wrong building had been attacked – can it be trusted as a partner when carrying on these kind of strikes?

GEN. SHOFFNER: Well, I can tell you that the investigation found that U.S. Special Operations Forces commander did rely on information provided by the Afghan partners. The investigation also found that that information was correct. As I stated earlier, the investigation found that some of the U.S. individuals involved did violate the rules of engagement and we’ll take proper action on that —

Q: (off-mic) precautions, international humanitarian law that you have to take precautions with civilians. Was that also violated (off-mic) because it looks like your systems were not working. These systems were set up in order to protect civilians the — (inaudible).

GEN. SHOFFNER: The investigation found that — that the actions of the aircrew and the special operations commander were not appropriate to the threats that they faced. The investigating officers’ recommendations on this matter have been referred to the proper authorities for disposition and I won’t comment on that further.

That’s all the time I have for questions, but before I depart, I want to emphasize we made a terrible mistake that resulted in unnecessary deaths. We have been committed from the beginning to a transparent and thorough investigation, and we will do everything possible to prevent this from happening again. This investigation was an important step in this process, but it is just one step toward full accountability.

And finally, we would never, ever do anything to harm innocent civilians.

Thank you.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Taleban movement has entered its third decade with infighting threatening its – up till now ­– remarkable unity. The killing of Mansur Dadullah during clashes between Taleban factions in Zabul on 12 November 2015 highlighted the scope of this unprecedented discord. Dadullah had been deputy leader of a newly-formed, breakaway faction of the Taleban. That faction, under the leadership of Mullah Muhammad Rasul, is not the only group opposing the new Taleban leader, Akhtar Muhammad Mansur; there are other Taleban heavyweights opposing, if not openly challenging, him. AAN’s Borhan Osman maps the various Taleban factions that have emerged in the wake of the revelation of the death of the movement’s founder Mullah Omar. He concludes, however, that although the rifts have irreversibly broken the historic image of the Taleban as a unified group, they are, so far, a long way from posing an existential threat to the movement.

Sourcing unless specified comes from interviews with interlocutors within or close to the different Taleban camps that AAN has spoken to during the past four months.

The Taleban have long taken pride in a unity which made them stand out from almost all other major political-military groups active during the decades of conflict in Afghanistan. Born in conflict and a key warring party ever since, the Islamic Movement of the Taleban (as it first called itself) has gone through many turbulent times in the 21 years of its existence, but it has always stuck together. This ended in July 2015 when news of its leader’s death became public knowledge.

One day after the Taleban confirmed the death of Mullah Muhammad Omar – when they also announced that his then ‘deputy’ Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur had taken his place – three (active or former) members of the highest decision-making body, the Rahbari Shura (Leadership Council), openly declared their disagreement with the succession. They accused the new leader of having engineered the succession so as to get himself ‘selected’.

Mullah Mansur’s ‘crowning’ as amir ul-mumenin (commander of the faithful) was, in many ways, merely a formalisation of his actual position in the movement. As official deputy to an increasingly mythical (dead or before that secluded) leader, Mansur had already been running the Taleban, albeit in Omar’s name, for about five years – since Omar’s other and more senior deputy, Mullah Abdul Ghani (aka Baradar), had been locked up by the Pakistanis in February 2010.

Mansur has a long record with the Taleban. While not one of the founders of the movement, he had several portfolios when they were in power, most notably Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism. Very early on in the insurgency, in summer 2003, his name appeared in the 10-member shura announcing the comeback of the Taleban movement. In the following years, he led the insurgency in Kandahar province, a portfolio he kept after 2007 when, according to his official biography, he became one of the two deputies to Mullah Omar. After Baradar’s arrest and several months of confusion, Mansur was appointed by Mullah Omar as his (only) deputy and the news was made known to rank and file through an audio tape, according to Taleban sources AAN has talked to. As chairman of the movement’s Rahbari Shura and because of Omar’s absence from real life, Mansur gradually took over as the movement’s de facto leader. By 2013, he had marginalised a number of his political opponents and was pushing others to the margins.

When Mansur was announced as Omar’s successor on 31 July 2015, it was obvious that all those he had pushed aside would contest his claim to leadership. Moreover, consultations on who should succeed Omar were swift and conducted with a limited and not fully representative circle of leaders. This also made him more vulnerable to dissent.

Dissent goes on air

The three dissidents – two current members (Hassan Rahmani, Abdul Razaq) and one former member (Muhammad Rasul) of the 18 men strong Rahbari Shura represented a wider camp of Taleban who were critical of the way Mansur had propelled himself into the position of amir ul-mumenin. They complained that many important figures in the movement had not been consulted, that the succession had been decided hastily and that Mansur had manipulated the process. The three made their resentment public by phoning Shamshad TV, a private station based in Kabul. That was an unusual and bold venture for members of a movement that, up till then, had been characterised by keeping its internal debates internal. Many more Taleban notables spoke out subsequently, thrusting the movement’s future cohesion into uncertainty. However, had the discord really to do with the way the succession was managed, and therefore, was it completely unanticipated?

It rather seems as if Mullah Omar’s death revealed what had already been an existing power struggle. Until then, however, it had remained mostly out of public sight, but was known to insiders. For those watching the movement closely, the post-Omar rifts only brought to the surface existing fault lines that had been haunting the movement for some years.

Mansur had managed to build up a coterie loyal to himself and manoeuvred it into top positions in the leadership to consolidate his power. He has been doing this probably since 2010, and increasingly since Mullah Omar’s death in spring 2013 (the time all Taleban camps understood their former leader actually died). Therefore, Mansur is accused by his opponents of nepotism and of giving more power to his fellow Ishaqzais in the movement.

Mansur’s opponents accuse him of unjustly removing or demoting Taleban leaders like Mutasem Agha Jan, (the late) Abdul Rauf Khadem and Abdul Qayum Zaker as part of his efforts to build a movement submissive to him. Mutasem Agha Jan had been instrumental in raising funds for launching the insurgency in its early years (2003-2007) and had remained as head of the important financial commission until 2008. During Emirate rule, he served as minister of finance and had been close to Mullah Omar. He was forced out of the movement in 2009 and survived an assassination attempt in Karachi in 2011. The decision to expel Mutasem was taken by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar; he was removed apparently after being accused of embezzling donation funds. However, Mansur’s critics accuse Mansur of having been instrumental in the decision to push out Mutasem .

Abdul Qayum Zaker and Rauf Khadem were  the head and deputy of the Taleban’s military commission, respectively, effectively the two most important military chiefs in the movement. They led Taleban forces during the ‘surge’ of US forces from late 2009 to 2012. Zaker was relieved of his job by Mansur and replaced by a more loyal person, Sadar Ibrahim, in spring 2014. Khadem was effectively ousted, as a bête noire, apparently for promoting Salafism. Khadem became the first known insurgent commander to defect to the Islamic State, becoming its ‘deputy amir for Khorasan’ and launching the organisation’s first cell in Helmand early this year. Almost immediately thereafter, however, in early February 2015, he was killed in a drone attack. Zaker, who remains a Taleban commander (more on him below), still maintains a network of fighters loyal to him in the south, particularly in Helmand, but has declined to join either Mansur or his open opponents.

The opposition to Mansur and the way he has run the movement has created diverse ‘factions’ within the Taleban. This opposition is made up of scattered leaders, but no single person among them is strong or prominent enough to serve as a rallying point. Mansur’s opponents also face the challenge of lacking access to funding of their own to set up a significant rival faction. That leaves them as something even less than a loose alliance. In their objection to Mansur, they not only entertain varied demands, but seem to hold divergent positions on the issue of succession (who should be appointed as leader and how) and exhibit policy differences on important issues, such as a possible political settlement to end the war. (Some favour a political settlement, others are against it. Some are against the presence of the political office in Qatar and others support it as the key channel). Ideologically, the opposition contains both soft and hard-liners, representing a diversity not dissimilar from the mainstream Taleban. Overall, it is difficult to see in them an ideologically distinct current. Thus, the rifts are often more to do with power politics and personal grievances than defined ideological or political stances.

Mapping the factions

Since the discord does not follow a clear ideological line or a unified agenda, one way to make mapping the factions easier would be to divide them by their similarity in stated or perceived positions to the succession issue, levels of opposition, past affiliations and possible future trajectories. Individuals from the first three camps have been in some sort of informal contacts with the people from or close to the Afghan government during the past few years. Those contacts have not had the endorsement – and may have even been to the dismay  – of Mansur. Contacts by members of the fourth group from the Taleban’s political office in Qatar were approved.

1. The armed opposition: Muhammad Rasul and Mansur Dadullah

Muhammad Rasul (1), the governor of Nimroz during the Taleban regime and a comrade of Mullah Omar from the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, has emerged as the leader of the only group which has taken its opposition to the level of declaring a rival amir. In early November 2015, Muhammad Rasul appeared amid a crowd of fighters and local residents in Bakwa district of Farah to launch his faction (or as he would probably see it, the ‘true’ Taleban) named the Higher Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. He has since also travelled to Shindand district of neighbouring Herat province, where he held a similar gathering of supporters and sympathisers, mostly from the Nurzai.

Along with Akhtar Mansur, Rasul was a member of the first shura formed in summer 2003 that oversaw the launch of the Taleban insurgency under Mullah Omar’s leadership. In recent years, he has had no known position in the movement. He has been joined by three Taleban commanders and a former governor. Two of the commanders, Mansur Dadullah (who has already been killed) and Baz Muhammad, were appointed as his deputies, while the third deputy is the Emirate-era governor of Kabul Abdul Manan Niazi. The third commander is tribal elder-turned Taleb Raz Muhammad, who is based in Shindand district of Herat province.

The first deputy, Mullah Mansur Dadullah, with his power base among the Pashtun tribe of the Kakar in Zabul, was appointed one of Rasul’s two military deputies. Dadullah was the most powerful commander of the group, but was killed quickly after his position in the dissident faction was made public in a clash with ‘Mansur’s Taleban’ which had been brewing anyway.

Multiple sources from Taleban and local notables suggest Dadullah was killed by Akhtar Mansur’s fighters on 12 November 2015 during an offensive against the dissidents in Zabul. A radio communication between an apparently Zabul-based Taleban commander and a government forces’ member leaked on the internet confirmed that he was dead. Rasul’s men have claimed since that Dadullah was only seriously wounded and is still alive. However, given Dadullah’s habit of staying regularly in touch with the media, which put him in contrast with other insurgency commanders, it seems reasonably to assume he would have come out to disprove reports of his death were he still alive.

Mansur Dadullah was a younger brother of Mullah Dadullah, a brutal Taleban frontline commander during the Taleban regime and early insurgency period. The older brother virtually launched the insurgency with the killing of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) engineerin March 2003 – a shocking indication of what sort of insurgency was to come because the ICRC had always been respected by all parties to the conflict. Dadullah was himself killed in 2007 in a US-led coalition airstrike. Mansur Dadullah, also known as Bakht Muhammad and Mullah Akhtar, took over his brother’s network. He immediately accused both Akhtar Mansur – then in charge of the insurgency in Kandahar and possibly, also, just appointed second deputy to Mullah Omar – and Mullah Omar’s first deputy, Mullah Baradar, of having conspired to have Dadullah killed. Mansur Dadullah was subsequently disowned by Mullah Omar in an audio message in late 2007 after he had been charged with brutally killing two veteran Taleban fighters whom he had accused of spying on his brother. Another possible reason for his expulsion might have been revelations that he had been secretly talking to Western diplomats in Helmand.

Mansur Dadullah was detained in 2008 by the Pakistani government and freed in September 2013 and returned to Zabul in early 2015 to revive a part of his brother’s network. (Some contemporary AAN background reports here and here).

The second military deputy to Rassul, Baz Muhammad Haris (not to be confused with the current shadow governor of Farah, Mawlawi Baz Muhammad) is a Nurzai from Farah province and was once probably the most influential commander in Farah. It seems he had been overseeing drug trafficking in the province and got embroiled in a dispute with other Taleban commanders over the distribution of income in 2012. At that time, Akhtar Mansur supported the commanders who summoned Baz Muhammad and beat him up; this marked the start of the hostility between him and Mansur. Baz Muhammad facilitated the November gathering in Bakwa where the rival faction and amir were officially launched. It was attended by many Nurzais in addition to around 200 fighters. However, according to some Taleban sources, most of Baz Muhammad’s fighters deserted him when they realised their leader would be going to become part of a rival faction.

A third commander, Raz Muhammad, has been chosen as the group’s commander for the ‘south-western region’, a possible reference to Herat, Nimroz and Helmand provinces. Also known as Jawed Nangyal, he is the son of former local militia commander Amanullah Khan, who was killed during fighting with a rival militia commander in his home district of Shindand in 2006.(2) Subsequently, Raz Muhammad, a Nurzai, has led his broader family and relatives into the Taleban movement. He mobilised a couple of thousand people for the gathering in his own home district in support of Rasul on 7 November 2015; these included about 200 armed men as well. Raz Muhammad controls most of the Zerkoh area in Shindand.

Also prominent in Rasul’s faction is Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, an Achakzai from Herat’s Gulran district. He was Mullah Omar’s first spokesman upon his emergence in the mid-1990s and also served as governor for Kabul, as his most prominent position, and governor of Balkh province in 1998 as his most notorious. He was put in charge as the governor of Balkh after the Taleban captured Mazar-e Sharfi when the group massacred thousands of people, mainly Hazaras. Witnesses reported him delivering sectarian anti-Shia speeches and urging them to ‘convert’ to Sunni Islam. In recent years, Niazi has not held a specific position in the Taleban, but ran a private business as a property dealer in Pakistan. He acts as a political deputy for Rasul and spokesman for the group.

A fourth deputy in the rival faction has been announced – Sher Muhammad Mansur who is a little-known commander from a well-known family, that of Nasrullah Mansur, leader of the mujahedin faction Harakat-e Nawin-e Inqilab-e Islami during the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s. His family has denied his acceptance of the position, but nothing has been heard from Sher Muhammad himself. Neither has he been seen in any of the gatherings in support of Rasul. He seems more a symbolic addition to the group so that it looks broadly based and representative of Taleban from various areas – in this case from the southeast. Sher Muhammad is from Paktia and his family and faction played a notable role in the Taleban during both its rule and the insurgency era.

To leave space for expanding the faction into an umbrella organisation for all dissidents, Rasul was named acting (interim) amir in the Farah meeting; the group’s spokesman Manan Niazi told AAN the appointment of a permanent amir (for the whole Taleban movement – as the group insists it has not left the movement but rather represents its legitimate leadership) should involve consultation with a wider base. Altogether, Rasul’s ‘High Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’, as it calls itself, apparently enjoys the support of around a thousand fighters, as each leader – Raz Muhammad, Baz Muhammad and most notably Dadullah (or whoever now takes over his network) ­– has contributed a fighting force of between 200 and 400 men. They are mainly distributed in southern and western parts of the country, namely Zabul, Farah and Herat. Dadullah is also said to enjoy some support in Wardak, closer to Kabul.

Dadullah had long acted as leader of his own group with his own spokesman and tactics and was always an uneasy subordinate to the Taleban leadership. He had initially supported Omar’s son Mullah Yaqub as successor; that prospect was annulled after Yaqub, along with his uncle, Mullah Manan, declared their support for Akhtar Mansur in mid-September. Rasul’s faction has also accused Akhtar Mansur of assassinating Mullah Omar, despite Omar’s son and brother – who initially tilted towards the dissidents – insisting he died a natural death. In early September, Dadullah also appeared in a video in early September in the company of around a dozen of his armed men declaring himself amir ul-jihad (leader of the jihad), a title previously unknown in the Taleban movement. In the video tape, he attacked Mansur as an agent of Pakistani intelligence and asked Taleban fighters to join him in the fight against the Pakistani ‘intelligence cell’. In that video, he also mentioned that he had agreed to an ultimatum from Akhtar Mansur’s commanders to leave the area. Taleban sources on Akhtar Mansur’s side say he failed to abide by that initial two-week ultimatum plus two subsequent deadlines. There had been a build-up of force in Zabul from both sides before the first deadline was agreed.

Dadullah had rooted himself in Khak-e Afghan, Daichopan and parts of Arghandab districts of Zabul province. There, his fighters, together with Central Asian militants who had arrived in summer 2014 from North Waziristan, fleeing the Pakistani military operation there, mutually supported each other. The Central Asians, reportedly mostly Uzbeks from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), had grown hostile to Akhtar Mansur after they settled in Zabul. They pledged allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) and openly insulted Akhtar Mansur, according to IMU group’s communication (which AAN has seen). They called him an agent of the Pakistani intelligence services, who had diverged from Mullah Omar’s path and sold Taleban fighters out. The Central Asians had initially arrived in Zabul as family groups (about 400), but most of these families have reportedly fled to other areas, mainly to northern Afghanistan. According to a document AAN saw, the IMU-cum-IS group agreed with Akhtar Mansur’s Taleban to also leave the area by mid-September. That agreement was achieved with the help of local ulama mediating between the two sides and seems to have been separate from the Dadullah/Mansur agreement, although both had the same timeframe.

From February 2015, the foreign militants have taken dozens of people hostage, most of them Shia Hazaras, with the help of Dadullah’s commanders. Some hostages were exchanged for Central Asian militants detained by the government. Others have been beheaded or had their throats slit in killings which were filmed and published, in an effort to push the government for a deal to free remaining Central Asian detainees. One group of eight people was freed on 8 November 2015 by Mansur’s Taleban after they captured the area where the hostages had been held from the foreign militants and Dadullah’s fighters. They found that seven other hostages from the same group had already been killed, their throats cut just a day earlier during the fighting. The victims included two women and a child. This brutal killing stirred an outcry in many parts of the country (see AAN’s account of the mass protests in Kabul here).

The fighting in Zabul looked like a clash that would have happened anyway, regardless of whether Dadullah had joined the new Rasul faction. It resembled more of an offensive by Akhtar Mansur against the Dadullah-IMU/IS alliance than a fight between two Taleban ‘factions’. The offensive took place less than a week after the announcement of Rasul’s declaration of being Taleban amir and was not Mansur’s first massive mobilisation against the Dadullah-IMU/IS alliance. That took place less than a month after he was announced as Omar’s successor in August, before any of the dissidents had taken the shape of a ‘faction’. (See here  for AAN reporting, which includes information about the first escalation in Zabul.) Dadullah’s killing has, however, taken out the strongest and most brutal commander from Rasul’s faction before it had the chance to consolidate – a grave setback for this particular band of dissidents.

2. Prominent members of the Rahbari Shura opposing Mansur, but not in the Rasul camp

Before Rasul declared his own faction, he had been part of the loudest anti-Mansur group which brought together the largest number of anti-Mansur Taleban notables. With Rasul and Niazi going it alone, this other group still includes some of the most well known Taleban figures. Taleban era interior minister Mullah Abdul Razaq and the regime’s governor of Kandahar, then the emirate’s quasi-capital, Mullah Hassan Rahmani, are leading this group. The two, along with Rasul, were the ones who first publicised their opposition to Mansur’s succession on 31 July 2015. The group also includes the Emirate-era deputy foreign minister Mullah Abdul Jalil and erstwhile governor of the Central Bank Abdul Rahman Zahed. Razaq and Rahmani have served as members of the Rahbari Shura in recent years, and Razaq was also one of the early members of the shura overseeing the initiation of the post-2001 insurgency.

This camp had eyes on Mullah Omar’s son Yaqub as a possible new leader of the movement and tried to pit him against Mansur. Reportedly, they pushed him in a bid to become a rival amir after Mansur had installed himself. Yaqub and Manan’s final choice of joining the Mansur camp delivered a fatal blow to that particular plan. This camp is still waiting, though, and has not declared its support for either Rasul or Akhtar Mansur’s, despite the latter’s persistent efforts to court them. They seem to be continuing to assess the two factions’ trajectory before making a decision.

3. An eastern front dismantled in favour of Taleban centralism

Another potential dissident Taleban faction could emerge in eastern Afghanistan. There, Anwar ul-Haq Mujahed, son of late mujahedin leader Mawlawi Yunos Khales (usually known as Hezb-e Islami/Khales, as opposed to Hekmatyar’s), founded the local Tora Bora Jihadi Front in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan in 2007. His stated aim was to fight the US-led coalition forces and the US-supported Afghan government; his father had already declared that the jihad was not over in 2005 before his death. However, in less than two years, Mujahed’s group had merged with the Taleban. After the merger, however, the network kept its name and Mujahed kept in touch with his loyalists, to the dislike of the Taleban leadership who did not want a separate entity within the Emirate kept alive. Therefore, Mujahed was removed from his eastern power base in 2009 to serve as shadow governor of Paktia province and then was gradually marginalised.

Since Mansur’s succession, Mujahed became active in the opposition camp, although seeking not to stir up too much public attention. He has reportedly been blaming Akhtar Mansur for marginalising him. Under pressure of the conflict with the Islamic State-affiliated groups in Nangarhar and with resources flowing from Akhtar Mansur, groups formerly loyal to the Tora Bora front had to completely give up any remaining semblance of affiliation to it and become part of the Taleban mainstream. In a meeting of the front’s commanders with Mujahed in Pakistan on 10 October 2015, it was declared defunct, although Mujahed hinted he would “come back to jihad in a new form.” It is difficult to quantify how many fighters once operated under the front’s name, how many of them fully joined the Taleban and how many stayed loyal to Mujahed. A number of the front’s men have reportedly joined the regional IS franchise, the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan, in Nangarhar.

4. Leaders of the political office

Another grouping that resigned from their positions (but not from the movement) in protest against Mansur’s leadership, or the way he came to be leader, are three senior members of the Taleban’s political commission. The commission serves as the movement’s outlet for external relations and negotiations, but also helps in fundraising, and had been based in Qatar since 2011, two years before it was formally launched. It was set up on Mansur’s initiative. Its head, Tayyeb Agha, was the first to resign on 3 August 2015, he said, because Mansur’s appointment had been made outside Afghanistan and because Mansur had concealed Mullah Omar’s death. He described both as “historical mistakes” in the letter of resignation AAN saw. Two other founding members of the commission, who were instrumental in facilitating the official opening of the political commission’s office in Qatar in 2013, also resigned subsequently. They were Nek Muhammad and Aziz Rahman. (For their bios see here.)

Tayyeb Agha had been one of the closest men to Mullah Omar during both his government and the initial years of insurgency, first as head of Omar’s office in Kandahar and then, post-2001, as his personal secretary. Nek Muhammad was also close to Mullah Omar when he served as head of the education department in Kandahar. During the insurgency years, he was also head of the Taleban’s ‘Education Commission’. Aziz Rahman was secretary to the Taleban’s embassy in UAE (one of the only three countries to recognise the Emirate as Afghanistan’s government).

The three have not spoken of their opposition to Mansur publicly. However, their resignations did clearly signalise discontent with Mansur’s leadership. They have not supported any other faction either. People close to Tayyeb Agha told AAN he preferred unification of the movement around Mansur than around the leaders of other factions. Agha has also suggested he may embark on an independent peace process using his experience and contacts among both the Taleban and foreign diplomats.

Mansur’s men tried hard to bring Agha back to his job, but after months of unsuccessful efforts, the Taleban website announced his replacement on 21 November. Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanekzai, who served as deputy foreign and deputy health minister during the Taleban, who had been one of most active members of the political office has been appointed as its head. Abdul Salam Hanafi, an Uzbek from Jawzjan, and deputy minister for education during the Taleban, has been named as his deputy.

5. The Taleban’s counter-surge commander

Qayum Zaker has been one of the longest standing and most talked about rivals of Akhtar Mansur, well before the summer’s leadership crisis. The two jockeyed for the position of vicegerent when Mullah Baradar – the former uncontested deputy leader of the movement – was arrested by the Pakistani government in February 2010. Mansur finally won out over Zaker, and the latter took over as the most important military leader, ie head of the military commission, in charge of managing and running the fighting. He was pushed out of that post, too, however, officially in April 2014 (when he reportedly ‘resigned’), but actually from 2013. Zaker is still said to wield influence on a sizeable number of fighters in the south, especially in his native Helmand province. Estimates about the fighting force loyal to him vary greatly from a few hundred to a few thousand.

After Omar’s death was announced, Zaker was a natural key contender to be the new amir. However, according to people close to him, he never opted for making a bid for himself. He did walk out of one important consultation meeting about whom to pick as the Taleban’s successor in late July, ie before the announcement of Omar’s death. He did so in protest at the dominant proposal being made by other participants to choose Mansur. He has since sympathised with Mansur’s opponents in private. However, after intensive efforts at mediation by influential religious and political Taleban and pro-Taleban figures from Mansur’s camp, he has maintained a tacit disagreement with Mansur’s leadership while also, reportedly, refusing to join any anti-Mansur faction. The Taleban website ran a statement in his name in August dismissing reports of his conflict with Mansur and saying he was not a member of a dissident camp. However, it seems a part of that letter, was spun by Mansur’s media team, or that his position has become more ‘fluid’ since then. Nevertheless, Zaker’s commanders are apparently fighting shoulder to shoulder with Akhtar Mansur’s shadow governor in Helmand against the Afghan government forces there. There has not been any report of a lack of coordination, or infighting, between the fighters loyal to both.

No large-scale infighting on the horizon

The scale of open factionalism in the wake of Mullah Omar’s announced death is unprecedented in Taleban history. However, the rifts are not large enough to amount to a serious threat to the overall operational capabilities and organisational structure of the Taleban movement. The important measurement is not how many pieces have broken away from the movement, but how large and influential they are.

One huge splinter group bent on actively fighting the mainstream Taleban would be a much larger threat to the movement’s cohesion than a handful of small splinter factions, whether they are militant or non-belligerent. Fedai Mahaz, for example, was one of the very first militant groups that split from the mainstream in 2012. It has been aggressively hostile to Akhtar Mansur and the powerful clique around him. It has also been greatly successful in persistently gaining media attention with claims of attacks, such as the 2014 March killing of a Swedish journalist, and leaking alleged secrets of Mullah Omar’s death or even ‘assassination’ in July this year.(3) As it has little, if any at all, footprint on ground, it has failed to tip the balance either vis-à-vis the mainstream Taleban or the Afghan government.

Mullah Dadullah’s network is the only one so far that has got to the point of fighting with the mainstream. That (in)fighting was also partly caused by Dadullah’s having made an alliance with the Central Asian militants, who had run amok after switching their allegiance to IS.

Although the transition from Mullah Omar to Mullah Mansur was not completely smooth, the Taleban have managed to avoid splitting into two or more large rival factions and seem to be surviving their first change of leadership. This fighting season, Akhtar Mansur fared well with the existing structure; the absence of the dissidents was not felt.

Indeed, most of the dissidents had long ago ceased to play any active military or political role in the movement. They can become a force to undermine Akhtar Mansur’s mainstream if they manage to rally larger support, unite against their common enemy and get access to independent funding. They would also need to be able to incite a sufficient number of fighters to turn against their erstwhile brethren in the Taleban mainstream. The coexistence of several factions appears unlikely given how exclusivist the Taleban have always been. Prospects of infighting happening on a larger scale, however, are, for now, not in sight.

On the whole, Akhtar Mansur’s mainstream encompasses the bulk of the fighters and the Taleban’s traditional structures. His Taleban achieved a huge boost which helped maintain the integrity of the movement when he gave the Haqqani network a place in the highest echelons of the hierarchy. Serajuddin Haqqani, the de facto leader of the Haqqani network, was chosen as one of the two deputies to Mansur. Although that does not mean the Haqqanis have given up their operational and financial semi-autonomy, it cemented their bond with the ‘centre’ in a way stronger than had been seen before.

Having won the support of most of the Taleban networks with the hard power (the fighting force), Mansur has long tried and still tries to deftly manage those with a political legacy or credentials. In the initial weeks after his succession, he faced the opposition of one third of the Rahbari Shura. Five members – Razaq, Rahmani, Rasul, Zaker, Mullah Omar’s brother Mullah Manan, Nek Muhammad and the former member Muhammad Rasul – were then denying the legitimacy of his succession. However, Mansur did not appear deeply bothered. He had already fully sidelined Razaq, Rahmani and Rasul, and partially sidelined Zaker. In the meantime, he was extensively, and successfully, negotiating with Zaker and Manan. Nek Muhammad posed no harm as he resigned from all official positions with the movement so silently. According to well-placed Taleban sources, Mansur is now further consolidating his power over decision making by adjusting the mechanism for promoting his legitimacy, ie reshuffling and expanding the whole Rahbari Shura. The expanded structure includes five people from non-Pashtun ethnic groups, Turkmens, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Mullah Abdul Razaq and Hasan Rahmani have been removed from the shura, while Zaker is considered as a non-member for his regular absence from the shura meetings.

Mansur’s Taleban might not be a fully centralised organisation, but this has always been the case with the Taleban movement. Its structure is characterised by an acknowledged and religiously legitimised (4) leadership and defined hierarchical structure, but, one that is permissive for local operational decision-making and fund raising.

Despite the leadership crisis, there has been no sense of let up in Taleban attacks against the government. Indeed, Mansur’s succession was followed two months later by the movement’s temporary capture of Kunduz, the first time the Taleban had control of a city since its defeat in 2001. Such a symbolic gain on the battlefield will have helped consolidate Mansur’s leadership. Should the Taleban under Mansur continue to run the bulk of the insurgency without letting the existing fissures widen, the movement’s military ability will largely remain unaffected.

 

(1) He is known as ‘Mullah’ Muhammad Rasul, he has not obtained the sort of religious education to qualify as a mullah. He got this title during the Emirate reign when the Taleban used ‘mullah’ loosely for any senior member as an expression of respect, rather than denoting his actual educational background.

(2) Raz Muhamamd Nekzad (his full name) became a Taleb after his father Amanullah Khan Nekzad was killed in 2006 in fighting with another local militia commander, Arbab Basir, who was believed to be close to Ismail Khan, the powerful pre and post-Taleban governor of Herat. Amanullah also fought against Ismail Khan’s forces in 2003 and 2004, leading to him being removed from his governorship to a ministerial position. The sustained fighting made the central government mobilise local militias, some with reported links to the Taleban. Amanullah himself was accused by Ismail Khan’s men as being a supporter of the Taleban.

(3) Fedai Mahaz claims Mullah Omar was assassinated by Akhtar Mansur, but it has given contradictory details about how that happened. The claim was widely circulated by the media a week before the Afghan government announced the news of Omar’s death on 29 July.

(4) Mansur’s leadership has been approved by almost all prominent pro-Taleban Afghan and Pakistani ulama, most of whom are based in Pakistan. Mansur has put increased efforts in keeping the ulama to his side. His picking of Hibatullah Akhunzada, a mullah highly respected by Mullah Omar and many individual Talebs, as his deputy appears to be part of those efforts. Thus, his leadership is religiously legitimised in the eyes of the bulk of the Taleban and its constituency.

The Afghan government, much to its chagrin, has found itself embroiled in a controversy that has direct links to the 2010 Kabul Bank scandal. On 4 November 2015, a small group of high-level government officials presided over the stone-laying ceremony of a new and ambitious township called Smart City. What was meant as a good news story spectacularly blew up in the government’s face, when it turned out that Khalil Ferozi – one of the main perpetrators of the plundering of the Kabul Bank, convicted for embezzlement and money laundering – was both shareholder and guest of honour. Since then it has become clear that the agreement with Ferozi was linked to a loan recovery policy that was both authorised by the Cabinet and backed by the president. The question now is how much the president was aware of the details of the deal and the extent to which corners were being cut, and whether he intends to continue along the same lines. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a forensic look at the affair so far.

I. The Smart City signing ceremony; an unpleasant surprise

Smart City (in Dari alternatingly called Shahrak-e Hoshmand and a phonetic rendition that reads like “Esmart Siti”) was to be built along the Kabul Airport road, next to Shahrak-e Aria – a collection of eye-catching white apartment blocks with red roofs. It is one of several shahraks or townships – literally small cities – that are being built around Kabul to provide housing for a growing middleclass. (An average three-room apartment in Shahrak-e Aria, according to this article, costs 140,000 USD).

The stone-laying ceremony on 4 November 2015 was attended by the Minister of Urban Development Sayed Saadat Mansur Naderi; the president’s Special Adviser on Good Governance (recently elevated to vice-presidential level) Ahmad Zia Massud; and the president’s Legal Adviser Abdul Ali Muhammadi. All three spoke, praising the initiative as an important step forward. Zia Massud described the project as “very valuable,” as it would bring the government a lot of profit, and introduced Khalil Ferozi as one of the shareholders. Legal Adviser Muhammadi explained how the Kabul Bank clearance committee was pursuing different ways to recover the bank’s loans and that this project was the best way to do it. The presence of Khalil Ferozi was treated, not just as a normal occurrence, but as a highly positive sign.

Urban Development Minister Naderi gave details of the project, proudly referring to Smart City as the first shahrak in both the country and the region that would be built according to modern and international standards. It would, according to a post on the ministry’s Facebook page, house 8000 families in three, four, or five-room apartments built according to 15 different “international designs.” The township was to have its own facilities, such as shopping centres, mosques, kindergartens, offices, parks and clinics.

Naderi then presided over the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Khalil Ferozi, who was providing the land for the project, and a representative of the Nabizada Wardak construction company, that would be in charge of the actual building. (1) The officials and other dignitaries who were present at the ceremony (see pictures here) did not seem to think they were involved in anything untoward.

The initial investment in the project, it was announced, would start at 95 million USD, while the total amount of money involved was expected to reach an estimated 900 million USD. It is not clear, though, where the initial sum was going to come from and whether this figure also included the value of Ferozi’s land. Although reporting so far has focused on the two main shareholders – Khalil Ferozi and the Nabizada Wardak construction company – there has been some buzz within Afghanistan’s wider business community, in particular among businessmen with prior links to the Kabul Bank shareholders, about the possibility of joining the project and making some money. The current going rate for real estate, according to one source, is around 1000 USD per square metre, while the cost of building is estimated at 400 USD per square metre. Even if these figures are optimistic, the prospects for profit seem huge – provided that the apartments sell. The government was slated to receive 50 USD for every square metre, in tax.

Although some of the national coverage was initially very bland, and probably based solely on the provided press releases, (2) the story soon broke with scathing headlines. The New York Times and The Guardian opened with respectively “Afghan Businessman Convicted in Kabul Bank Fraud is Still Free to Make Money” and “Afghan government signs huge property deal with shamed ex-banker.”

The rest of the government seemed to have been caught off guard, both by the ceremony and its fall-out. Insiders in the Palace described scenes of stunned disbelief and exasperation when the news broke. The question on everybody’s mind, of course, was whether the president had known about the deal and, and – whether he had or had not – how it could possibly have happened.

II. The problems with the Smart City arrangement

Criticism against the deal was swift and stinging. The collapse of Kabul Bank had been the biggest financial crisis to hit Afghanistan and a major embarrassment for the government, starkly illustrating the entanglement of money, power and impunity. As details of the Kabul Bank scandal emerged, in 2010 and the years that followed, it became clear that the bank’s leadership had over the years plundered the bank through a system of double-bookkeeping that allowed them to give huge illegal loans to the bank’s shareholders, as well as gifts and payments to a large number of politicians. (The lists of shareholders and debtors have been made public; those of the recipients of gifts and other largesse have not).

The total amount of debts owed to Kabul Bank was a whopping 982.6 million USD. Over 92 percent of these loans were handed out to nineteen individuals and businesses, ultimately benefiting twelve individuals. Ex-Chairman Sher Khan Farnod and ex-deputy chairman Khalil Ferozi were among the largest debtors and were both sentenced to five years imprisonment for money laundering and ten years for embezzlement in November 2014 (however, according to Afghan law only the longest prison sentence will be enforced.) The other shareholders and recipients of illegal loans were not prosecuted, although they were instructed to repay their loans. (For an earlier AAN analysis of this “exercise of containment” see here). The shareholders included Mahmud Karzai, brother of former president Hamid Karzai, and Hassin Fahim, brother of former vice-president Qasim Fahim.

Businesses that owe the Kabul Bank money, according to the MEC public inquiry, include Gas Group (121.2 million USD), Pamir Air (88.9 million USD), Zakhira (22.9 million USD), Kabul Neft (21.5 million USD), Hewadwal corporation (15.5 million USD), Gulbahar Towers (16.8 million USD), and Ariana Steel (1.5 million USD).

The Kabul Bank saga cost the Afghan state a lot of money. To prevent the collapse of the country’s financial system and to restore consumer trust, the government provided the bank with an 825 million USD lender-of-last-resort instrument, funded from its central reserve. This money is now slowly being repaid from Afghanistan’s annual budget; for instance in 2014 the government paid approximately $67 million, or 1.35 per cent of the year’s operating budget. Moreover, the New Kabul Bank is still operating at a loss (7.4 million USD in 2013, with an accumulated loss of 46.8 USD million at the end of December 2013 and possibly up to 65 million USD by August 2015). This is being paid for by the Afghan government, as part of its commitment to sell the bank with a clean balance sheet.

Tackling the Kabul Bank case had been one of President Ghani’s campaign promises and has long been upheld as one of the early (and few) tangible of achievements of this government in the much needed fight against corruption. The government in its own September 2015 ‘self-assessment’ document for the Senior Officials Meeting described how “[i]mmediate action on the Kabul Bank case broke the aura of impunity that had surrounded high level malfeasance.”

So to then find senior government officials organising and celebrating the inclusion of one of the architects of the scandal in what was probably going to be a highly profitable partnership, while condoning the obvious flaunting of a prison sentence, was embarrassing to say the least. Moreover, Farnod, Ferozi and their business partners, had squandered large chunks of the bank’s money through big and imprudent investment schemes, including in real estate. So it was also awkward that Ferozi would be allowed to earn back his debts in ways that resembled how he had made them in the first place. And all of this while presumably making a handsome profit, in a shareholder arrangement that seemed to carry no personal financial risk whatsoever.

Apart from the optics, there were obvious legal problems with the Smart City arrangement, as many commentators have pointed out. There is of course the issue that the executive should not interfere with a court’s verdict, by overturning or modifying a prison sentence. Although the president under certain circumstances can pardon a criminal, prison convictions for administrative corruption are exempted (article 350 of the criminal code). Legal adviser Muhammadi – who has since been suspended from his job – argued that Ferozi had not been released, but that he was simply being given a kind of leave that every prisoner is entitled to when needing to take care of private business. However, it is clear from other reporting that Ferozi had already been allowed out of prison for quite a while, at least during the day. (3)

Moreover, according to the procurement law, contractors with the government need to be of clean background and not have been convicted for a crime. There is also some debate whether article 113 of the criminal code applies, which says that a person who is sentenced to “long imprisonment” of more than ten years is not allowed to make contracts with or receive privileges from government institutions, nor are they allowed to manage assets and properties. Ferozi, depending on how one counts, was sentenced to exactly ten years. (4)

The move, of course, left people wondering whether bribes were paid and to whom. Several MPs claimed to have information, although they have not provided details. On 11 November 2015 members of the Wolesi Jirga complaints commission claimed a seven million USD bribe had been paid to allow the project happen and to release Ferozi from jail (the recipients were not specified). Similarly, on 15 November 2015 the Adalat wa Towsea daily quoted an unnamed MP who said minister Naderi had told them in a private chat that Zia Massud and Muhammadi had received bribes from Ferozi of respectively 2.5 million and 1.8 million USD. None of the allegations have so far been substantiated with evidence.

This is, incidentally, not the first time Ferozi has been subjected to a very lenient interpretation of ‘detention’. Under Karzai, both Ferozi and Farnod could often be found in the capital’s upscale restaurants, meeting friends and business partners under the guise of trying to recover their money so they could pay back their debts, even though they had been arrested and were supposed to be detained.

III. How the government reacted

The government’s reaction to the Smart City outcry came in instalments and suggests the president has been uncomfortably caught between the wish to still be seen to be firm and decisive, and the need to tread carefully. The question, of course, is why the caution?

The first formal reaction came from deputy presidential spokesman Sayed Zafar Hashemi on the day after the ceremony. He reiterated the president’s commitment to recovering the Kabul Bank debts and referred specific questions on the ceremony to the three officials involved, thus leaving it to them to defend the arrangement. Minister Naderi sought to reassure critics, by stressing that Ferozi’s activities would be closely monitored and that no untoward deal had taken place: “We are monitoring the project and there is no reason to be worried about it,” he said. Legal Adviser Muhammadi, in an interview on Tolo TV on the evening of the ceremony, argued that Ferozi had been neither forgiven, nor freed, but that this was the best way to recover the Kabul Bank’s money. He then proceeded to explain the mechanism, based on a government directive, through which the debtors were allowed to repay their loans in instalments over a period of one to seven years.

Muhammadi further defended the fact that the government had not simply taken the land from Ferozi, saying there had been no Cabinet instruction to do so and that whoever was ready to hand over their assets would be allowed to invest them. “What would the government do with 68 jerib of land,” he asked. “Why take it, if Ferozi can change it into money?” He added that Farnod, the former Kabul Bank chairman, would also be allowed to do so if found ready. Ali Akbar Zhwanday, president Ghani’s private-sector adviser, when asked by the New York Times, sided with Muhammadi saying that given the country’s economic hardships, allowing Ferozi to work and pay his debts and his hefty tax bill was a good idea. “What is better: for him to die in prison, or to pay back the money?” Zhwanday asked. (5) Ferozi himself also defended the deal, while speaking to Reuters by phone from prison. He said the project had already raised 14 million USD in debt repayments and, if it went ahead, would raise $75 million for the government. “The land belongs to me but if the government wants to sell it, they have the authority. But if they let the company build the township, from the money I earn, I will pay Kabul Bank’s loan back,” he said.

On 7 November 2015, the Palace released a statement containing several presidential decisions. It was framed in legal language and started by staking out those parts of the policy that the government presumably wishes to salvage: it reiterated the government’s commitment to recover the loans by all possible and legal means, and noted that the MoU was signed based on legal advice from the Kabul Bank clearance committee and the good will to expedite the loan collection process. It then described four decisions, based on what it said had been an urgent and thorough review of the project: (a) the court’s verdict on Ferozi is “unalterable and binding;” (b) the MoU is considered null and void; (c) the Kabul Bank clearance committee should review whether Ferozi’s land can be handed over to the Kabul Bank; and (d) the Attorney General’s office should report on the full enforcement of the court’s verdict.

It then took the Palace another ten days to decide whom it wished to hold responsible, at least for the moment. On 18 November 2015, it issued another statement (full Dari text here, English version not yet posted) in which it suspended legal adviser and head of the Kabul Bank clearance committee Muhammadi until further notice and relieved him of all responsibilities relating to the Kabul Bank loan recovery.

The president, in the same statement, tasked a delegation to review the evidence with regard to the “unlawful way” the Kabul Bank loan recovery had been managed; two members are mentioned: Seyed Ghulam Hussein Fakheri, head of the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) and Muhammad Yassin Osmani, member of the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC). (For details on the different ways in which these two organisations, that have had a troubled relationship in the past, have viewed the Kabul Bank case, see here). The statement again reiterated that although the MoU was no longer valid, the process of loan recovery would continue.

IV. The clearance committee and its encouragement mechanism

The inquiry team will probably need to tread carefully, given that both Urban Development Minister Naderi and Legal Adviser Muhammadi have consistently argued that they were implementing a Cabinet-approved government policy – while blaming each other for what went wrong (Zia Massud, incidentally, has remained very quiet). Palace communications further suggest that the Smart City arrangement – and presumably other arrangements that are now slowly coming to light – was directly inspired by a preoccupation with loan recovery which seems to prioritise debt collection over punishment. What is less clear is whether the details of the deal itself were authorised and at what level.

Originally the Kabul Bank receivership together with the Attorney General’s Office were responsible for recovering the squandered loans, but when progress remained slow President Ghani apparently decided to take firmer control and established the Kabul Bank clearance committee (komite-ye tasfiah in Dari). Its establishment in March 2015 was not formally announced, nor does its composition seem to be public knowledge, but a report of the first three-monthly meeting, chaired by the president himself, appeared on the Palace website in June 2015. The report explains that the committee had been tasked with “expedit[ing] inquiry into the case of Kabul Bank based on a specific procedure” and mentions a one-week deadline for those who had not paid their debts in the preceding three months. Those who failed to clear their accounts within that deadline would be banned from leaving the country and referred to the Attorney General for prosecution.

The specific procedure referred to is the so-called ‘encouragement mechanism’. It has been alluded to and explained by legal adviser Muhammadi on various occasions in the media and on his Facebook page. (6) Under this mechanism Kabul Bank debtors were given the opportunity to either repay their loans in full in exchange for a significantly decreased interest rate (around 0.5%), or to negotiate a phased timetable for the repayment (against an interest rate of around 3.5%). Senior economic adviser and former finance minister (now slated to become Afghan ambassador to Pakistan) Omar Zakhilwal appears to have been at the origins of the scheme, but over time Muhammadi became the main person responsible.

One of the main points of contention now appears to be whether the scheme as described could have extended to Ferozi and Farnod, as, unlike other debtors, their obligation to repay their loans with interest and an added-on fine had already been established by the court in their conviction.

Muhammadi, in the meantime, continues to maintain he has done nothing wrong, stating that he simply implemented a Cabinet-sanctioned policy. He has also maintained he knew nothing about the deal with Ferozi, but that, at least, has been proven untrue. After Muhammadi again blamed the minister of urban development Naderi for the deal, the minister hit back on 10 November 2015 revealing that Muhammadi had sent three letters to his ministry, urging him to grant the license for the township. (For more detail, see here). At least two of these letters have since been leaked to the press and at least one of them includes an explicit reference to a contract signed between Ferozi and Nabizada Wardak. (7)

So far Muhammadi has been the only one who has been publicly singled out as being responsible for what the Palace has referred to as mismanagement of the clearance initiative and/or a misinterpretation of the law.

V. Where to go from here

Tackling the continued fall-out from the Kabul Bank scandal is obviously not just a financial matter, it was also symbolically very important. In the run-up to the joint Senior Officials Meeting in September 2015, the Afghan government described decisive action on the Kabul Bank scandal as a “top signalling priority.” During the meeting itself the president said the actions he had taken had made the Kabul Bank “no longer a symbol of impotence, but a symbol of resolve.” This makes it extra painful that the government has now been caught in cahoots with the Kabul Bank defaulters by facilitating the repayment of their loans and fines, and providing opportunities for them to play with new investments and, presumably, amass new wealth practically risk-free.

This has come into even more stark relief with the recent reports that Smart City was not the only possibility being explored to help Ferozi repay his loans. On 18 November 2015, Khaama Press disclosed yet another leaked letter from Muhammadi. In this one he was said to have asked the Ministry of Finance to instruct all government institutions to purchase their gas from Gas Group during the winter season. Gas Group, as mentioned before, was one of the largest recipients of illegal Kabul Bank loans. The company was established in 2006 by Hassin Fahim, brother of the late former vice-president Qasim Fahim, and later taken over by Farnod and Ferozi. (For details see here, p 39-44). According to Muhammadi’s letter, Gas Group had recently resumed operations based on an agreement with the Kabul Bank clearance committee; the revenue from the company’s operations would flow into the account of the Kabul Bank loan department to cover Ferozi’s loans. (An illegible picture of the letter can be found here). A handwritten instruction at the bottom of the letter apparently states that copies of the document(s) should be sent to the Kabul Bank clearance committee and the Office of Administrative Affairs, which – if this is an original addition – strongly suggests that the revival of Gas Group was a move authorised at the highest level.

The government, or parts of the government, seems to have decided that if it is spending money on fuel anyway, it might as well do so in a way that makes the money flow back into its coffers. It is, however, a roundabout way of dealing with the problem. More importantly, it lets Ferozi – and other defaulters – off the hook and gives them privileged treatment. Such a directive to buy only from Gas Group, is, in fact, reminiscent of the monopoly that the Kabul Bank used to have with regard to the payment of government salaries – thus making this government look a lot more like the previous one than it would like to admit.

In terms of which details were known when, it seems highly unlikely that the president was not aware of the Smart City project and the Gas Group plans at all – given the amount of attention he has paid to the Kabul Bank case and his propensity to micro-manage portfolios he considers crucial. It is of course possible that details were held from the president or were misrepresented, or that those involved had misinterpreted the limits of the authorised policy (or misjudged the damaging effect of a festive ceremony). But it is also possible that the president knew and is now trying to separate himself from the most damaging fallout. All in all, the attempts to help revive Ferozi’s businesses seem to illustrate a broader willingness on the part of the government – possibly all the way up to the president – to consider partnerships with tainted businessmen and to welcome their ‘black money’ if they are willing to invest.

 

(1) Nabizada Wardak does not seem to be a well-known company. It has a Facebook page, but the website listed there is inactive. The company is headed by one Abdul Bari Wardak and has been awarded government contracts before, including, in 2012, a contract for the construction of the Doshi to Pol-e Khumri part of the northern ring road.

(2) On the bland side, Khaama opened with “Foundation stone of a modern city laid in Kabul.” Wadsam had “A modern city called ‘Smart City’ to be built in Kabul.” Both articles focused purely on the inauguration, while ignoring the presence of Ferozi. Tolo News, on the other hand, had “Kabul Bank Defaulters Now Partner to Government Projects,” and the next day “Criticisms Spark After Kabul Bank Criminals Allowed To Enjoy Business.” Pajhwok, opened with “Bank fraud convict Ferozi invests a fortune in housing scheme” and explained that Ferozi’s release “had become possible in line with the court decision and his signing of the agreement to pay back the bank loan.”

(3) See for instance this New York Times article,  and also the reporting by US anti-corruption watchdog SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction) in October 2015, noting that:

Despite a presidential order, a special oversight committee, and President Ghani’s claims of taking “decisive action” in holding accountable those responsible for the Kabul Bank theft, Kabul Bank’s ex-CEO Khalil Ferozi was reportedly released from prison this quarter at behest of high-ranking Afghan government officials after serving only a fraction of his 10-year sentence. This was ostensibly done to enable him to more easily liquidate and transfer assets and properties to the government to help satisfy his debts. (p 169-70).

(4) Khalil Ferozi and Sher Khan Farnod were both sentenced to five years imprisonment for money laundering and ten years for embezzlement. However, according to Afghan law such prison sentences run concurrently, so both should serve ten years.

Muhammadi has tried to argue that the real problem had to do with the interpretation of article 113 (and that that, the cabinet’s decision to find creative ways to expedite the return of the embezzled money was still sound and unchanged). He blamed Naderi, saying: “What the Ministry of Urban Planning did was a mistake, not what Ferozi did,” claiming that the ministry should have been aware of the legal prohibitions.

(5) Zhwanday is co-founder, shareholder and ex-vice-chairman of Afghanistan’s Azizi Bank and is another banker with roots in the hawala system. Zhwanday was part of the consortium, MTZ, that in February 2013 made the only remaining bid for the New Kabul Bank. The bid was rejected, according to a finance ministry official, because it was “not consistent with the current banking system.”

When the New Kabul Bank was re-advertised in September 2013, two firms bid on the bank, but neither ended up buying. A new bidding process was announced on 28 October 2015.

(6) See for instance in this article, dated 1 July 2015: “Abdul Ali Muhammadi, legal advisor to the President, said on Sunday that $437 million of the total $987million stolen from Kabul Bank had been recovered, but $578 million remained unpaid. According to Muhammadi, 24 individuals involved with the scandal have cleared their debts with the bank while 21 others have pledged to pay their debts to the bank. He added that the government has developed a persuasive procedure for collecting the money, saying that properties of those who have failed to commit for clearing their debts will be sold for clearing their debts with Kabul Bank.”

(7) A copy of one of the letters can be found here; and an illegible photo of a second letter can be found here. The first letter references a contract between Khalil Ferozi and Nabizada Wardak that was signed on 1 September 2015 (and thus preceded the annulled MoU of 4 November 2015). This is potentially interesting, given that, according to the president’s statement of 7 November 2015, the MoU was null and void because it was “not binding,” failed to “carry the legal weight of a contract” and had an inherently weak legal basis. This leaves one wondering whether this means that behind the annulled MoU, there might still be a contract that the government may want to revive in the future.

(8) Advisers close to the president who have been accused of involvement in the Kabul Bank scandal include, among others, former finance minister and current Economic Adviser to the president Omar Zakhilwal (see here, here and here) and current Senior Good Governance Adviser Ahmad Zia Massoud (see here and here).

The decline (by almost a fifth) in the area of land in Afghanistan planted with opium poppy in 2015 came as a surprise to many. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had been on the rise since 2010, when an opium poppy blight halved opium production and triggered a subsequent hike in opium prices. However, the decline is largely due, it seems, to natural causes – crop failure in the traditional opium-growing heartland of the south – and market fluctuation, rather than anything the government or outside agencies have done. Moreover, the trend was bucked in areas of the north and west, where farmers, especially those living in insecure areas, have been putting more land under poppy cultivation. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica, who has been scrutinising the 2015 UNODC Opium Survey, reports.

The amount of land under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 19 per cent in 2015 compared to the record high of 224,000 hectares in 2014. (1) These figures can be found in the 2015 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Opium Survey Executive Summary released on 14 October 2015. The most significant reason for the drop in cultivation appears to have been repeated crop failures in the south and southwest regions of Afghanistan where, traditionally, most of country’s illicit crop has been cultivated. Poor harvests driven by drought and mono-cropping which exhausts the soil and encourages diseases and pests, especially poppy blight, led farmers to sow less of their land with poppy this year than last (see Afghan opium expert David Mansfield’s analysis here) and previous AAN reporting on this from 2010.

Cultivation in the southern region decreased by 20 per cent. In Helmand alone, reported UNODC, cultivation dropped to 86,400 hectares, from the previous year’s 103,240 hectares apparently and in Kandahar, there was a larger relative decrease in cultivation, of 38 per cent (2).

The opium market in Afghanistan does not necessarily play by the standard economic rules when it comes to demand, supply and prices affecting farmers’ planting decisions. In 2014, for example, UNODC thought that the demand for ready cash from those competing in the presidential and parliamentary elections was one reason why cultivation was so high. Opium is also different from other crops because as well as providing an income, when it is dried it can be stored for several years, so also functions as capital and savings. Nevertheless, price and supply do still matter. One key factor behind the reduced cultivation this year, according to the UN and other observers, was the large amount of opium stockpiles.

UNODC also cited increased eradication of poppy crops this year as having reduced the area under cultivation. 40 per cent more land was reported eradicated – from 2,700 hectares in 2014 to 3,760 hectares in 2105. However, that is still a tiny percentage of the overall area under cultivation.

UNODC Regional Representative for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries Andrey Avetisyan also said there had been better coordination in the most insecure areas, which led to more eradication in 2015. This was especially the case, he said, during “the spring offensive in Helmand’s Sangin district where, after [Afghan army] operations, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan forces eradicated the opium poppy fields immediately.” However, on the seizures side, there has been something of a decline since 2013. The Counter Narcotics Police carried out 3,243 law enforcement operations in 2013, compared to 2,734 operations in 2014 (4) and, by the end of September 2015, had carried out just over 2,000 operations.

A bad harvest

Not only was less land planted with poppy this year, but what was grown had a lower yield. The average opium yield fell to 18.3 kilograms per hectare in 2015, a 36 per cent decline, compared to 28.7 kilograms per hectare in 2014.

Together with the lower opium cultivation, this meant opium production (5) in Afghanistan in 2015 was almost half (48 per cent) of what it had been in 2014; UNODC estimated a 2015 harvest of 3,300 metric tons compared with 6,400 metric tons in 2014.

AAN compared UNODC’s opium yield estimates for the last six years by analysing the data from the annual Afghanistan Opium Surveys in the period of 2009 to 2015. The chart below shows a trend of a gradual decrease in the opium yield over this period. According to a UNODC crop-monitoring expert, the decrease is due to “less rotation of crops in the fields over a period of several years.” This lack of rotation resulted, he said, in poppy plants producing fewer bulbs in 2015 (instead of six to seven on average, this year there were only three to four per plant). UNODC also reported a lower density of crops in the fields. Satellite images clearly show visible patches of soil in some fields that further contribute to a lower yield per hectare. The UNODC expert explained “the decrease of approximately 40,000 hectares could also be [due to] fields left unsown for the crop rotation [being left fallow].”

That lower yield was seen even in Kandahar where (as reported by Associated Press in May 2015), traders had distributed genetically-modified poppy seeds to farmers just before the planting season (in parts of Kandahar and Helmand poppy is planted twice a year). These seeds were supposed to boost the yield and shorten the growth cycle of the plants. According to a UNODC crop expert, the seeds originate in China where legal opium poppy cultivation is undertaken for pharmaceutical use, as is the case in over a dozen countries. “The genetically modified seeds shorten the growth cycle of the plant – to one to two months, instead of five to six months,” the UNODC expert told AAN, “but the resin production is pretty much the same as with the Afghan seeds.” (3)

Average Opium Yield. Table: AAN (based on UNODC Opium Survey Data 2009-2015)

Opium cultivation and insecurity on the rise in the north and west

The national decline in opium cultivation and production was, however, bucked in parts of the north and west. In 2015, farmers in eight provinces (Kabul, Kunar, Baghlan, Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Uruzgan, Badghis and Ghor) sowed more opium than in the previous year. In the north, Faryab and Sar-e Pol had significant increases in cultivation, up by 451 per cent and 70 per cent respectively, while, in the west, Badghis and Ghor’s cultivation increased by 117 per cent and 249 per cent respectively.

Several factors may have been causing this rise. There is a well-documented correlation between insecurity (both physical and human/livelihoods insecurity) and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, including, for example, by David Mansfield. The reason for this is that opium is a low risk crop (unless repeated mono-cropping has led to failed harvests) in a high-risk environment. It is a natural choice for farmers living with an insurgency.

Looking at insecurity patterns in northern and western provinces where the cultivation has significantly increased, AAN compared district level cultivation and security incidents using data provided by UNODC and an independent organisation observing the security situation in Afghanistan. Quantitative analysis confirmed the correlation between increased insecurity and an increase in poppy cultivation, except in the case of Sayyed district of Sar-e Pol province and Lal wa Sarjangal district of Ghor province.

In Faryab’s Qaisar, Gurziwan and Kohistan districts, where the UNODC data showed a significant increase in cultivation, 360 incidents involving armed opposition groups, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and/or criminals in the period from October 2014 to September 2015 had been recorded. The data set shows that these incidents in the three districts constituted a third of all reported incidents in all the 14 districts of Faryab province. As reported by AAN in April 2014, the Taleban had stormed parts of Qaisar district, occupied villages and swept Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) out of their checkpoints. (See AAN previous reporting on rising insecurity in Faryab, in 2014 here and in 2013 here).

For Sar-e Pol province, UNODC recorded a significant increase in poppy cultivation in the district of Sayyad. (6) AAN has previously reported on the Taleban establishing footholds in far-flung areas of Sayyad and Kohistanat districts (see AAN 2015 report here). In Sayyed district, which did not show a significant increase in insecurity, there are indications that the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are themselves involved in cultivation. In a phone interview, a provincial council member from Sar-e Pol told AAN, “This year’s government plan to eradicate opium poppy fields was prevented by the local ALP commander and his sub-commanders, who are supporting the farmers who are growing illicit crop and are protecting them from the government.”

Shifting to the north-western province of Badghis, UNODC data shows three out of its eight districts had a significant increase in poppy cultivation. At the same time, the number of incidents in these districts (Ghormach, Qadis, Ab Kamari) made up a little over half (55 per cent) of the total number of incidents reported for Badghis over a one-year period. The majority of these incidents were related to the armed opposition. (7) The cultivation in Badghis has been steadily on the increase since 2009, reaching a high of over 12,000 hectares this year.

A prominent elder from Badghis described to AAN how farmers had enjoyed “capacity building” in how to grow and harvest poppy in recent years: labourers travelling south to work had brought back skills to their home province. He also blamed the increase in cultivation on the classic dilemma facing farmers in an insurgency-plagued province: try to get non-opium produce to faraway markets (in Herat or Mazar) through insecure areas or wait for the opium traders to come to the door who will buy your harvest from you directly.

In the province of Ghor, a significant increase in opium poppy cultivation was recorded in half of the districts of the province, namely in Chaghcharan, Dawlatyar, Lal wa Sarjangal, Pasaband and Taywara. Since 2012, when Ghor lost its poppy-free status (8), opium poppy cultivation in the province has been steadily on the rise (see previous AAN reports from 2013 here and here). According to available security data, from October 2014 to September 2015, 144 incidents (or 44 per cent of the total number of reported security incidents) in Ghor were recorded in these five districts. (9)

What to plant next year?

Farmers and traders usually wait for the price spike that generally occurs in the autumn before they sell their stocks. By September, however, the farm-gate and traders’ prices of dry opium had already started to increase. The farm-gate price for a kilogram of dry opium was 155 US dollars and the traders’ sale price was 164 US dollars for the same unit that month. Both had increased by 12 per cent compared to the same period in 2014, according to the Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Monthly Report, which is jointly compiled by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics and UNODC Kabul and published in September 2015. If prices continue to rise, this could trigger a new increase in cultivation next year. However, we may see fluctuations in prices in the coming months, says UNODC, given the increased number of security forces along the Tajik-Afghan border who could disrupt regular smuggling routes.

The decline in cultivation and production this year should make no-one too hopeful that this year’s figures represent the start of a downward trend. Opium poppy is an annual crop so trends need to be measured in longer time periods.

Opium poppy also remains easily Afghanistan’s most valuable export crop. (10) The net export value of last year’s opium harvest was estimated by UNODC at 2.7 billion US dollars or 13 per cent of nation’s licit GDP. This figure is especially large compared to other agricultural exports, dwarfing the second most valuable agricultural export – dried fruit and medicinal plants; in 2014, for example, these were worth only 234.7 million USD (according to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries, quoted in the UN Secretary General’s February 2015 report). Opium exports also dwarf Afghanistan’s total legal exports: in 2014, these were valued at just 571 million USD.

Poppy cultivation and opium production may have decreased this year, but, by itself, this gives little reason for optimism. As head of UNODC Avetisyan put it, “One year’s result is not a trend.”

(1) In 2015, the area of opium cultivation amounted to 183,000 hectares.

(2) UNODC warns that due to methodological changes, the actual extent of change (increase/decrease) needs to be taken with caution, especially in Badghis, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Zabul, “which were particularly affected by the shift to the new methodology” (see page 6 of Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Executive Summary).

(3) The price of Chinese seeds is seven to ten times higher than that of Afghan-grown ones. According to the Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Monthly Report in September 2015, the price for a kilogram of Afghan-grown poppy seeds was 39 Afghani (about 0.60 US dollars) in Kandahar.

(4) In 2014, the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan operations resulted in seizures of 4,146 kilograms of heroin, 6,361 kilograms of morphine and 69,169 kilograms of opium. Moreover, a total of 45 heroin-manufacturing laboratories were dismantled (UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan A/69/801*–S/2015/151* available here).

In 2013, the counter-narcotics police had conducted 3,243 operations, seizing 7,157 kilograms of heroin, 23,979 kilograms of morphine, 115,650 kilograms of opium and dismantled 71 heroin manufacturing laboratories. (UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan A/68/789–S/2014/163 available here)

(5) UNODC only reports ‘potential’ opium production per year, thereby acknowledging the limitation in its estimation formula: as it is an illicit crop, getting accurate figures is not so easy.

(6) According to available security records, only some incidents, as few as eight, were recorded in the period from October 2014 to September 2015. Of these eight incidents, two were crime-related, one was initiated by the Afghan National Security Forces, while the remaining five involved the armed opposition.

(7) Statistics based on the data set provided by an independent organisation observing the security situation in Afghanistan for the period October 2014 to September 2015.

(8) A province is defined as ‘poppy-free’ by UNODC when there are less than 100 hectares of poppy cultivation.

(9) Only three incidents were reported in the district of Lal wa Sarjangal in Ghor province in the period October 2014 to September 2015. A safe district, nonetheless, it has shown a rise in poppy cultivation.

(10) 90 per cent of world illicit opiates are still produced in Afghanistan. Opiates are a common name for opium and its derivatives morphine and heroin. It was estimated that 52 per cent of Afghan opium is converted into heroin or morphine within Afghanistan, according to the UNODC Opium Survey 2010.