The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN)

Ghor province, in western Afghanistan, has been in the headlines in the past few years. Not only was the appointment of its first female provincial governor overturned, there has also been a series of extreme cases of violence against its women. In this unsettling provincial case study, AAN’s Salima Ahmadi takes a closer look at how conservative attitudes and customary practices, combined with insecurity and a failing justice system, result in an environment of near-constant violence against Afghan girls and women, where perpetrators literally get away with murder. (Written in cooperation with Ehsan Qaane and Sari Kouvo).

Women’s leadership: too soon for Ghor?

On 28 June 2015, Sima Joyenda (1) was appointed governor of Ghor province. Joyenda was one of two female governors introduced by the National Unity Government (the other one being Masuma Muradi, governor of Daikundi). On 4 July 2015, a week after Joyenda’s appointment, the Ulema Council in Ghor sent an official letter demanding her resignation. The letter was written and signed by Ghor’s former Ulema Council Head, Mawlawi Esmatullah Nadim, and stated: “Considering Sharia provisions, the current chaotic situation in Ghor and the will and opinion of the people, the governor of Ghor should step down from her position and respect the will of Ulema. The Ulema will not be obedient to a female governor.” (The letter can be found here). The council’s spokesman, Mawlawi Haidari, on his social media account, called women “incomplete” (see here and here). Tolo News quoted another of the Ulema Council members, Mawlawi Muhammad, saying: “We expect the government to introduce a male governor, noting that a woman cannot be a prayer leader for men,” from which he concluded that neither could women govern a province. Senator Muhammad Dawud Ghafari from Ghor province also opposed her appointment and said that: “A woman cannot manage one million people. There is conflict in Ghor; no one listens to a man, much less to a woman.” In response to these positions, there was also pushback by activists and certain clerics who described the opposition to the female governor’s appointment as being “against Islam and against the will of the people.”

The aggressive protests and pressure from religious figures, local officials and armed groups continued, and, on 17 December 2015, Joyenda was replaced by Ghulam Nasir Khaze, a man with close connections to Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah (see here). Joyenda told AAN that she had been removed because she was a woman and “the conservative people in Ghor do not want a woman in a leadership role” (although she later hinted that the opposition may have also been due to her stance vis-à-vis land grabbing). After her removal, she was reappointed as deputy governor of the country’s capital, Kabul, but she refused the post.

Increased reporting of violence against women in Ghor

Joyenda’s appointment and her subsequent removal did result in increased attention on the plight of women in Ghor province. According to Latifa Sultani, gender coordinator at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), this increased attention resulted in more reported cases of the violence faced by women in the province.

Masuma Anwari, who heads Ghor’s Department of Women’s Affairs (DoWA), said that in 1394 (2015) her department registered 90 cases of violence against women, 30 cases more than during the previous year (see here). The rise in reported cases seems to have continued into this year: in the first five months of 1395 (corresponding roughly to April-August 2016), 50 cases had already been reported to the DoWA, 17 of which were of suicide, rape or self-immolation (see here). More cases may have also been reported to the departments of the interior ministry, the judiciary and the local office of the AIHRC (although the extent to which the reports to the different institutions overlap is unclear).

An increase in reported cases does not necessarily signify an increase in cases of violence, as there has been – and continues to be – considerable under-reporting of violence against women. But it does suggest an increased awareness that violence against women is a crime that needs to be addressed by the state authorities. This trend is likely to continue now that a female attorney general, specifically responsible for violence against women, has been appointed to Ghor province. Nagina Ghori is the first senior female attorney general in Ghor’s history. Women’s rights activists welcomed her appointment in July 2016. As noted by Farida Nasiri, a women’s rights officer at the provincial office of the AIHRC: “A female attorney increases our hopes that cases of violence against women will be properly addressed in the future” (see here). Like former governor Joyenda, Ghori will face many challenges, including widespread reluctance to see her bring to light extreme cases of violence against women. Several recent high-profile cases illustrate how a conservative culture, insecurity and the failure of the formal justice system often force girls and women to live with extreme violence and allow their perpetrators to literally get away with murder.

Recent cases of violence against women: The stoning of Rukhshana (25 October 2015)

On 25 October 2015, 19 year-old Rukhshana was stoned to death for alleged adultery (see here ) in Ghalmin, a village not far from Feroz Koh, the provincial capital of Ghor (previously named Chaghcharan – see here). Tolo News reported that Rukhshana’s father had married her off to a disabled man at the age of 13. She had not accepted the marriage, however, and had run off with her childhood love to Saghar district. There she was arrested by security forces and handed over to her parents. Her father then married her off to another man but she ran away again, this time to Murghab district.

A local commander, Mullah Yusuf, who had apparently asked Rukhshana’s hand for his brother several times, allegedly captured her and handed her over to a group that was identified by the media as Taleban (see here). (2) According to Tolo News, the men told her father: “If you give us five million afghani, we will give back your daughter. Otherwise we will kill her.” When her father refused to pay the amount, one of the members, Mullah Hashem, ordered the stoning.

The two-minute video of her death went viral on social media, showing a teenage girl placed in a hole in the ground and surrounded by a group of men who hurled stones at her until she died (a link to the video can be found here and here). After Farkhunda’s murder in March 2015 in Kabul (see AAN’s reporting here, here and here), this was another brutal murder of a woman, to which the public reacted with outrage.

During the parliament’s plenary session on 4 November 2015, female MPs strongly condemned the stoning of Rukhshana. They said that, given the presence of the Afghan judiciary, no one should be tried in an arbitrary court (mahkama-ye sahrayi, lit: desert court). Fawzia Kufi, the head of the Wolesi Jirga’s Women’s Affairs Commission, criticised conservative male MPs who had opposed the passing of the Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) law in 2013. Kufi said, “If parliament had approved the EVAW law, the culprits would have feared punishment and Rukhshana would not have been stoned to death.” She argued that MPs who had called the EVAW law anti-Islamic should be held responsible for the increase in cases of violence against women. Another female MP, Gulalai Nur Safi from Balkh province, noted:

The stoning of a young woman in Ghor province in such a barbaric way is an inhumane act and is against Sharia law. Forced marriages compel our women to escape from their houses. When the EVAW law was on the parliament’s agenda, most of our male MPs were against it and said that this law was against Islam. I do not think that killing a woman in such a barbaric way is according to Sharia. I wonder how Sharia and conservative MPs would interpret this act of barbarism.

In response to the demands of the predominantly female MPs and women’s rights activists, the government sent a delegation to Ghor to investigate the case. The delegation, however, was led by Mawlawi Balegh, a prominent member of the National Ulema Council and adviser to President Ghani on religious affairs, who, according to a New York Times article, had justified Rukhshana’s stoning in a Friday sermon. He said: “If you are married and you commit adultery, you have to be stoned … the only question is whether this was done according to Sharia Law, with witnesses and confessions as required.” The other members of the delegation were representatives from the Attorney General’s Office, the National Directorate of Security, AIHRC and the interior ministry. The delegation and local authorities assured the victim’s family that justice would be done and the perpetrators would be arrested. The committee did not release a formal report, and, despite the fact that the police reportedly identified 28 suspects related to her murder, none of them has been arrested at the time of writing. Joyenda, the former governor of Ghor, told AAN that the government had been unable to arrest the men who killed Rukhshana, as it has no control over the area where the stoning took place.

The victim’s family has since received death threats from the armed group who carried out the killing and has moved to Feroz Koh, after the government proved unable to protect them.

Recent cases of violence against women: The burning alive of child bride Zahra (12 July 2016)

On 12 July 2016, in an unusually shocking case, Zahra, a 14 year-old girl who was four months pregnant, was tortured, stabbed and finally set on fire by her in-laws, after she refused to work in a poppy field. When she was taken to the central hospital in Ghor, doctors found that 90 percent of her body had burn wounds. She needed serious treatment, which was not possible in Ghor. The AIHRC and women’s rights groups, with the help of the newly appointed female attorney, Ghori, urged the government to help transfer her to Kabul; Ghori made all the arrangements and Zahra was transferred to Esteqlal Hospital in Kabul, where she died on 17 July 2016.

Zahra had been married off a few years earlier, at the age of eleven, to settle a dispute about a bride price payment. Wida Saghari, a women’s rights activist, told AAN that after Zahra’s mother had become paralysed, Zahra’s father, Muhammad Azam, took a new wife. At the time, he promised his new in-laws 500,000 afghani as the bride price (see here for more background on the customs surrounding bride price). Since Azam was a poor man and could not afford to pay this sum, his in-laws demanded that he settle the dispute by giving three of his daughters as well as a (smaller) sum of money. According to Saghari, “the victim’s father had no other option but to give his daughter to settle the matter through the practice of baad.”

Baad, or the giving of a girl to another family to settle a dispute, is a common practice, particularly in the more remote and rural areas of Afghanistan. Girls who are given in baad often face a lot of violence and hostility from their new families. A survivor of baad from Nangarhar told AAN: “From the day a girl is given as baad, she is given into slavery and is never treated like a normal member of the family. She is often abused and beaten by the in-laws. Zahra was also the victim of baad. She could not withstand the abuse and died.” (There are also men who oppose the practice of baad. For instance Khan Wali Adel, a civil activist from Paktia province, protested against the practice by putting up a tent on the Darulaman Road near the parliament. He kept up his protest for six months (until 19 October 2016). His protest stemmed from the fact that years ago two of his sisters had been exchanged in the practice of baad and that recently his father had wanted to take ten girls from another tribe in revenge for the killing of his brothers (see here). He told AAN that his own sisters were treated badly by their in-laws and he did not want to let his father ruin the future of ten other innocent girls.)

After losing his daughter, Zahra’s father pledged to seek justice in Kabul. On 17 July, supported by women’s rights activists, he set up an advocacy camp for Zahra and other victims of violence against women, in Allauddin Park, in the Karte-ye Seh area of Kabul. (see here) The group put forward three key demands to the government: the transfer of Zahra’s case from the provincial court to Kabul, the arrest and transfer of the culprits to Kabul, and a public trial. They said that until the government arrested the culprits, no funeral would be held for Zahra. The fact that the case received extensive coverage from both the national and international media put pressure on the government to respond to the protestors’ demands.

According to one of Zahra’s relatives, Zahra’s father in-law and mother in-law have indeed been arrested and are being detained in Pul-e Charkhi prison in Kabul. However, the main culprit, Zahra’s husband, is still at large. A local source from Ghor told AAN that the governor, Ghulam Nasir Khaze, and the provincial council head, Fazl-ul-Haq Ehsan, are not cooperating with the husband’s arrest: “Zahra’s husband is at home; he has not escaped anywhere because he is being protected by the local authorities.” According to the local source, when civil society activists from Kabul approached the governor, he said that no one had issued an arrest warrant, so how could he, the governor, arrest the husband. On 10 August 2016, twenty-five days after Zahra’s death, she was laid to rest on Bibi Mahro Hill (see here).

Earlier, Zahra’s father had told Tolo News: “They [the victim’s in-laws] have power. The court works in their favour. The police headquarters and the provincial council office are also in their favour. Whatever they say will be done by the judicial organs.” The fact that provincial courts are often directly influenced by prominent warlords or local government officials explains why a victim’s family would demand the transfer of their case to the capital. Moreover, according to a representative of AIHRC: “Five districts of Ghor province are insecure and the government’s presence is weak, so delivering justice and guaranteeing a fair trial there is hardly a possibility.” The attorney general, Ghori, also wanted Zahra’s murderers to be prosecuted in Kabul. She was certain that due to family ties, local officials would prevent Zahra’s in-laws from being punished.

Victims’ families thus demand the transfer of cases to the capital in the hope that law enforcement will be better there and women’s voices will be heard. The transfer slows down the prosecution process, but increases hope for justice to be delivered.

Other reported cases of violence against women from Ghor province

On 31 August 2015, Ghor’s primary court ordered the public lashing of a woman and a man for committing adultery. The couple received 100 lashes after the primary court of Ghor had ruled that the young couple were unmarried and had had unlawful sexual relations (see here and here). When asked later, Atta Muhammad Faruqi, a primary court judge, said that the penalty was in line with article 130 of the Constitution and article 1 of the Penal Code. (3) Moreover, he said, “the couple confessed four times before the court that they had a sexual relationship” (see here). Abdul Hai Khatib, who was the governor’s spokesperson at the time said: “They had relations a long time ago, but were arrested only early this month. Their punishment is based on Sharia law and will teach others a lesson” (see here).

On 20 November 2015, a 26-year old woman named Shirin Gul, who was accused of running away from home, died after a public lashing (see here). Shirin Gul was originally from Herat province; she had gone to Shahrak district in Ghor to visit her uncle’s family. There, she was accused of running away from home. Details are scarce, but the former governor of Ghor, Sima Joyenda, said that the girl had received the lashings from armed men in public, after which she died of her injuries: “Although the police chief of Shahrak district denies this, the victim’s father says his daughter died of the lashings.” The interior ministry launched an investigation into the crime (see here).

In late July 2016, Gharib Gul, a 6-year old girl was reported to have been married off to a 60-year old imam in Obeh district of Herat, in exchange for a goat (see here). This was such an extreme example of child marriage that it caused a public outcry. The people of Gehr village in Herat, where the wedding took place, asked the imam to leave the place; he was eventually arrested in Feroz Koh, in neighbouring Ghor province (for more details see this report). Women’s rights activists in Kabul and Ghor demanded justice for Gharib Gul and called for the prosecution of the old man, saying that “an example has to be made of a 60-year-old cleric who marries a six-year-old girl.” After the outcry by women’s rights activists, Sayed Abdul Karim, the cleric, was sentenced by Ghor’s provincial court to seven years in prison while the victim’s father received a four-year term (see here).

On 25 August 2016, Reyhana, an 18 year-old girl originally from Feroz Koh district in Ghor, was killed by her in-laws in Badghis province. When Reyhana was only three years old, her father had found her a spouse named Abdul Ghafur. “Ba naam kardan-e dukhtar” is another customary practice of early marriage, where a girl is promised in marriage at birth, or at an early age, to a specific man. She is not sent to her in-laws until she reaches a certain age (sometimes the girl is the legally required age, which is 16, sometimes she is married off well before that). Reyhana’s father died when she was fourteen years old. At the age of 17, she was sent to her in-laws in Jund district in Badghis. During the nine months of her marriage, her in-laws abused her badly because she did not become pregnant, according to the women’s affairs department head in Ghor who told AAN the details of the case. When Reyhana went to Feroz Koh to visit her mother, her family tried to file a case against her in-laws with the local courts, but they were told they had to go to the court in Jund district. When Reyhana tried to stay with her parents in Ghor, her powerful in-laws took her back to Jund. Here she was left helpless, as she had no relatives to help her register her case. Unemployment and poverty prompted Abdul Ghafur, Reyhana’s husband, to travel to Iran and seek employment there. “Seven days after Ghafur left for Iran, Reyhana was decapitated by her in-laws and her dead body was sent to Feroz Koh,” according to the head of the women’s affairs department. Reyhana’s mother in-law, sister in-law and brother in-law were the main suspects in this murder (Dari report here). The case was registered with the AIHRC and the DoWA’s office, but there has so far been no attempt to prosecute the in-laws.

The limits and importance of trying to change the law

This provincial case study from Ghor illustrates the challenges women and women’s rights activists face when trying to promote equality and increased respect for women’s rights in Afghanistan. Women’s active participation in society and girls’ rights to decide about their own bodies and lives remains fiercely contested. Legal changes that seek to promote equality and women’s rights, although they often remain on paper only, are still important tools for those who want to fight for equality and rights, as they can contribute to gradual changes in the justice system, institutions and in people’s minds. But these laws are also vehemently – and sometimes violently – contested.

The challenges are compounded by ongoing conflict and poverty: conflict enables those with power to intimidate and kill with impunity, while poverty contributes to the upholding of customs that treat girls and women as commodities. These challenges demand an intense struggle by the government and women’s rights groups to expand awareness programmes – to educate women, and their families, about their basic rights and protections under the law – to more remote places. Such awareness programmes, on women’s rights and the laws that protect women, should also focus on local mullahs who are influential at the community level.

On a positive note, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, together with the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, took the initiative in January 2016 to demand that all marriages be registered in the family courts and that marriage certificates be provided. According to Delbar Nazari, the Minister of Women’s Affairs, registration will start in Kabul city and its four provincial zones, from where it will expand to the provinces (see here). It is meant as a measure to help decrease, and ultimately overcome, violence against women in Afghanistan (see here). Based on statistics released by AIHRC in 2012, “Eighty per cent of Afghans have marriage certificates that are not registered in any court.” It is hoped that marriage registration in the courts will help push back the proportion of forced marriages and child marriages (in which women and girls are often particularly vulnerable to violence and mistreatment). This may be a small step forward, but it is another step towards providing women and girls with greater legal protection against violent exploitation and abuse.

Edited by Sari Kouvo and Martine van Bijlert

 

(1) Sima Joyenda, an ethnic Aimaq, was born in 1971 in Feroz Koh district of Ghor province (at the time it was still called Chaghcharan), where she attended primary and secondary school. Joyenda was a delegate to the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 and the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003. She was a candidate in the parliamentary elections in 2005, but did not win a seat in the Wolesi Jirga. After her unsuccessful election campaign she got her Bachelor degree in Law and Political Science at Kateb University in Kabul. In 2010, she ran again in the parliamentary election and was elected as MP for Ghor province. In June 2015, President Ghani appointed Joyenda to replace the former governor of Ghor, Sayed Anwar Rahmati. She was replaced on 17 December 2015, after continued protests by the religious figures and reappointed to the position of deputy governor of the capital, Kabul, which she refused (see here ).

(2) For more details on the complicated background of this group, see recent AAN reporting here. AAN’s Borhan Osman has found that the perpetrators of this and other acts of violence was an armed group that has been alternately linked to the Taleban and the Afghan government, and has been largely operating as a criminal gang:

[The group] had previously been referred to as Taleban, a pro-government force or merely an illegal armed group. For example, when the Murghabi network fought Mullah Ahmad Shah’s men in the Gorken area of Charsada district in July 2015, local officials hailed them as an uprising loyal to Shah Wali. The ANSF joined the Murghabi network in the battle for Gorken, an important Taleban stronghold. However, in another incident in the same year, in October 2015, when Faruq, Taj Muhammad and Abdul Rahman Muzammil stoned to death a 19 year-old girl named Rokhshana for alleged adultery, local people and officials said they were members of the Taleban. This description was then picked up, largely unverified, by both the local and international media.

(3) This means the primary court chose to try the case based on legal articles that allow a judge to turn to Hanafi jurisprudence in cases where there is no specific applicable law. In this case, however, there was an applicable law: Article 427 of the Penal Code, which applies to adultery and has a more lenient sentence.

The number of migrants, many of them Afghan, in Serbia has been steadily growing in the second half of 2016. More people continue to arrive, while departures have largely stagnated due to Hungary and Croatia tightening their border controls. As a result, Serbia is faced with a growing number of people on its soil who do not want to stay, but are unable to leave – despite trying very hard. Some enter the asylum system (or indicate that they might do so in the future) and are housed in government-run centres, while others are camping out in central Belgrade. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert and Jelena Bjelica visited the main unofficial locations where well over a thousand people are trying to keep warm, dry and healthy, while winter is coming and the chances of continuing their journey to western Europe seem slim.

The situation in Belgrade; a large squat in the middle of town

In early November 2016, AAN spent a week in central Belgrade, speaking to aid workers and to migrants in the main location in Belgrade where they are now camping out – three rows of deserted buildings, which used to be the customs warehouses, located behind the central bus station. Living conditions in the buildings are dire. The main building is a large concrete shell with a leaking roof. The windows high up in the walls are broken and let in cold draughts, but not enough fresh air to counteract the thick smoke from the many small fires lit for cooking and to try to keep warm. It is difficult to breathe. Other people have found rooms in smaller buildings in the vicinity or have set up tents in the porches of the warehouses. Some even sleep outside to escape the smoke and noise at night, but with winter coming, they will not be able to do so for very much longer. At peak times, there are well over a thousand people (according to the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees, with the Serbian acronym KIRS) living, sleeping and passing through this small patch of the city that is only a stone’s throw away from normal life. Indeed, the warehouse area doubles as a guarded parking lot, so during the day the area is often full of cars. There is also a small makeshift bar where some migrants who have money go for a daily lunch of scrambled eggs, and a ‘Chess Club’ which is frequented by the KIRS employees.

The squat was overwhelmingly populated by Afghans and Pakistanis, with a sprinkling of Iranians and Bangladeshis, and one lone Nigerian. There were no women in the squat. Among the Afghans, AAN mainly encountered men from the east (Nangarhar, Jalalabad and Kunar) and Kabul city and its surroundings (Paghman, Parwan). On one day, there were also two new arrivals who were from Bamyan and who clearly stood out. (1) In general, there seemed to be a regular trickle of new arrivals, mainly coming from Bulgaria (a handful per day), but the main crowd was made up of men and boys who had, by then, spent several weeks and sometimes months in Serbia. Many of them had started out staying in parks and garages, sometimes spending periods in one of the government-run centres, after which they had gravitated towards the squat. Inside the squat, most migrants had organised themselves into small groups, usually of around four to ten people, who seemed to pool their resources in terms of cooking and organising their living spaces. The larger warehouses had been divided into makeshift ‘rooms’ often demarcated by wooden beams and derelict furniture. The lucky ones had managed to secure actual rooms in abandoned houses next to the warehouses, or one of the area’s guardhouses. None of the buildings had heating or electricity.

The main building is a large concrete shell with a leaking roof. The windows let in cold draughts, but not enough fresh air to counteract the thick smoke from the many small fires lit for cooking and to try to keep warm. The larger warehouses had been divided into makeshift ‘rooms’ often demarcated by wooden beams and derelict furniture. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

On different days, the inhabitants of the warehouses complained to AAN about different things. One morning, several men mentioned how difficult it was to sleep, as some of the squat’s inhabitants played loud music, danced and got drunk at night. Other nights, people barely slept because of rumours that the police was on their way to conduct a raid. Commissariat staff said that they visited the building each morning at 6 am to do a headcount (which may have been the reason for the panic, as their blue coats can be mistaken for a uniform). As the weather turned, complaints focused around the cold and the heavy smoke. Serbia has cold winters and heavy inland snowfall, and in the first week of November the temperature at night started dipping below freezing.

Hot Food Idomeni, an NGO made up of volunteers that had originally started work in the Idomeni camp in Greece, distributes food at the squat at lunchtime, parking its van between two of the warehouses and handing out around 1,200 hot meals per day. Many migrants queued more than once in order to receive double or triple portions – a practice that was encouraged by the volunteers, who distributed until the food ran out (at the time of the visit Hot Food Idomeni was the only organisation in the city still distributing food to migrants that had to fend for themselves). Estimates of the squat’s population varied from 800 to 1,500 people. According to a Commissariat’s head-count on one of the days, there had been around 1,300 people in the warehouses in the early morning (of a cold and rainy night) and around 500 during the lunch distribution.

The NGO Hot Food Idomeni distributes food at the squat once per day at lunchtime, parking its van between two of the warehouses and handing out around 1,200 hot meals. Many migrants queued more than once in order to receive double or triple portions – a practice that was encouraged. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

Most of the squatters that AAN met appeared to be stuck. They had spent far longer in Serbia than they had ever meant to, but were having trouble continuing their journey. Most of them had tried many times to get into Hungary through the increasingly difficult border crossing, but had failed; others were now trying to see if they would have more luck entering Croatia. Several of them had been duped and then dumped by their smugglers, and most of them had run out of money.

The population of the squat is fluid, which is a reflection of how migrants try to navigate the various official and unofficial options available to them. Many of the men and boys in the squat had, at some point, spent time in one or more of the government-run facilities. Some of them were still registered there and dipped in and out of the squat. This trend of going back and forth between the different modes of accommodation (from asylum centre to squat or park) was already noticeable in summer, when many people who were housed in the Krnjača asylum centre travelled back and forth between the camp and the city, spending their days in the centre of Belgrade where they could socialise, contact local NGOs for aid or advice, and seek to reconnect with their smuggler’s network (or find a new one). Now, however, the back-and-forth is complicated by the fact that single men are increasingly being housed in government-run centres that are located at the country’s borders. However, many of the men in the squat still seem to dip in and out of the government-run camps.

The ‘Afghan Park’ is in central Belgrade, just a few blocks away from the squat, continued to be a hub of migrant activity. It is close to the main bus station where many Afghans are dropped when they first arrive in Belgrade and where many Afghans gather, to socialise, connect with aid organisations and await news from their smugglers. It is also the gathering location for many of the attempts to illegally cross into Hungary or Croatia. When AAN revisited the park in early November 2016, it was particularly busy at dusk. Also, the tables at the hamburger shop were covered in extension cords, making them into crowded mobile phone charging stations. For further details on the ‘Afghan Park’ see this earlier AAN report on the changing role of smugglers on the Balkan route.

The tables at the hamburger shop in the ‘Afghan Park’ were covered in extension cords, making them into crowded mobile phone charging stations.

Local NGOs mentioned that they were seeing a greater proportion of underage migrants in Belgrade. Gordan Paunović from InfoPark, for instance, estimated that possibly up to one third of the male migrants currently in Belgrade could be between 14 and 18 years old (when they were still involved in food distributions in the park in September 2016, they said they would observe between 250 and 300 minors among a crowd of approximately 800). Although this number seems high, AAN did meet a considerable number of boys who seemed clearly younger than 18 in the squat and the park (and even a few children younger than ten years old). For example, AAN met three boys who said they were 12, 13 and 14 years old (and did indeed look young), milling around in the crowd in the ‘Afghan Park’. They told AAN they had arrived the day before, were travelling in a group of eight from the Paghman district in Kabul and had been on the road for four months. They were waiting to, as they called it, “hit the game” (in Persian, game zadan), slang for trying to illegally cross the border.

Serbian policies; how the squat came into being

Serbia sees itself as a transit country – which is also how migrants view the country. In late 2015 and early 2016, over a million people travelled through the western Balkans on their way to Europe; a ‘humanitarian corridor’ provided certain nationalities – including Afghans – transportation to the outer fringes of the European Union (the so-called ‘Balkan corridor’). The closure of the Balkan corridor in February 2016 and the adoption of the EU-Turkey deal, that allowed Greece to return to Turkey all new, irregular migrants arriving after 20 March 2016, was supposed to stem the flow of migrants, but there is still a steady trickle into the region, including into Serbia, mainly via Bulgaria.

When the Balkan corridor closed, Belgrade made it clear that it did not intend to host everyone who happened to be passing through, but with the ever-tightening border controls in Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Croatia, the outflow of migrants has been stagnating. The Serbian authorities, as a result, are faced with a growing number of people who are unable to leave. With winter coming, it has become increasingly difficult to turn a blind eye to what is, in essence, a potential humanitarian crisis brewing in the centre of the capital city.

A migrant cooks lunch on the remains of a former warhouse, at the edge of the squat. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

However, the capacity of the Serbian authorities to deal with the growing numbers is limited. According to figures provided by the Serbian government and quoted by UNHCR, there are currently around 6,200 migrants in Serbia, mainly from Syria, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Local NGOs, however, estimate that the total number of migrants in the country is probably closer to 9,000 (Reuters, see here, mentions a figure of 10,000) and growing. The Serbian government aims to house all migrants in government-run centres, but the current total capacity of its centres is around 4,800 beds. Many of the centres were originally set up to accommodate the large numbers of migrants passing through the Balkans corridor and are now hastily being refurbished to make them fit for a longer-term stay.

The existence of the squat in the abandoned warehouses has largely been caused by the ambivalence of the Serbian authorities, which has left migrants confused as to what is expected of them and how they will be treated.

During AAN’s earlier research visit to Belgrade, in June 2016, there was still an informal policy in place that allowed both registered and unregistered migrants to stay in the main asylum centre just outside Belgrade, Krnjača. Although not everybody made use of this opportunity – some were afraid they would be fingerprinted or otherwise registered and that this would endanger a future asylum case in Europe – many migrants did spend some time here. Others mainly spent the night in the ‘Afghan Park’ and the surrounding covered parking areas (For details see here).

When the demand exceeded the capacity of Krnjača’s asylum centre, migrants were transferred to other camps which are all far from Belgrade – cutting their all-important links with city’s centre where smugglers could be contacted. Krnjača became a place for vulnerable and registered migrants only. The decision to tighten the accommodation rules coincided with a clear change in tone by the authorities. In mid-July 2016, when Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić announced the establishment of combined police-military teams along the borders with Macedonia and Bulgaria, he specifically singled out Afghans and Pakistanis, saying that their chances for asylum in the European Union were “almost nil” and that “Serbia cannot be a parking lot for Afghanis [sic] and Pakistanis whom nobody wants to see, let alone admit into their country.” He made clear what the new lines of policy would be: “Whoever asks for asylum in Serbia will be received in a reception centre and whoever does not, will be removed from Serbian soil according to the law.”

Main entrance of the main warehouse in the squat. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

The authorities also moved to disrupt the provision of assistance to migrants who were not housed in government-run centres. The city parks department ploughed up both parks where migrants had gathered throughout 2015 and 2016 in what appeared to be an attempt to make them inhospitable for both people and aid distribution (see AAN previous reporting here). People were forced to spread out. Initially, in summer, local NGOs put the estimated number of people sleeping outside between 450 and 600, but with the borders closed for those wanting to leave and new people still arriving, and the accessible government-run centres largely far from Belgrade, the number staying in the open air, garages and vacant buildings steadily rose.

In August 2016, people started sleeping in the porches of the deserted customs warehouses behind the city’s central bus station (for pictures posted on 13 August 2016, see here and here). According to the owner of a makeshift bar that is located in one of the warehouses, the migrants gradually broke into the empty warehouses around early September 2016 and by early October, people were sleeping inside them (see this photo from the InfoPark Facebook page posted on 9 October 2016, which shows people in the interior of the warehouse).

As part of an effort to push migrants to either enter the system or leave, the Serbian authorities have continued to try to limit or close down the distribution of assistance to migrants except for at the government-run centres. On 4 November 2016, a working group set up to “deal with the problems of migrants,” led by the Ministry of Labour, issued an open letter (available here) which stated that “assistance and support in the form of food, clothing, footwear, encouraging migrants to reside outside the designated permanent asylum centres and transit reception centres are no longer acceptable, this particularly on the territory of the Belgrade city.” The letter was clearly aimed at the organisations assisting the inhabitants of the squat and the migrants who gather in the ‘Afghan Park’. The larger international aid organisations largely complied with the order, while the smaller, more activist NGOs continued their engagement with and assistance to the people in the squat.

The situation in the squat is untenable: there is no heating or electricity, no toilets or showers (only a few garden hoses with cold water). This space between two warehouses was used a rubbish dump and public toilet. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

On 10 November 2016, the Serbian authorities tried to clear out the squat, in a coordinated operation that managed to persuade some migrants to leave, but otherwise left the situation largely unchanged. Approximately 60 policemen (consisting of gendarmerie, the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit and the Intervention Brigade) surrounded the main warehouses at around three or four in the morning. Members of KIRS, UNHCR and several aid organisations were also at the scene. The police apparently did not try to round up the migrants by force, but when they were asked to board the waiting buses – that were presumably going to take them to the camps, but how could they be sure? – some of them started running. A few men climbed onto the roof of the main warehouse in an effort to escape and fell through the fragile structure, resulting in one breaking his leg, another one breaking his arm and several other, more minor injuries. In the end, UNHCR managed to persuade 109 migrants to board the buses to go to the camp in Preševo, near the Serbian–Macedonian border. Praxis, an organisation that provides legal aid to migrants, later received confirmation that all 109 men had arrived in the Preševo camp and were in the process of being registered. The police told the migrants that they would return, but they have so far not done so.

Declining options: Trying to ‘hit the game’

The aim of most Afghans in Serbia is to cross the Hungarian (or Croatian) border and enter into the EU, but this has become increasingly difficult. Not only has Hungary erected a fence along the full length of its border, but a new law that came into force in July 2016 means that the Hungarian police can now automatically ‘push back’ anyone who is caught within eight kilometres of the border – without registering their data or allowing them to submit an asylum claim. (Asylum applications now have to be logged in the transit zone, which only a very small number of asylum-seekers are allowed to enter, each day; for details see here). The Hungarian Helsinki Committee — a non-governmental watchdog organisation that protects the human rights of asylum-seekers considers the practice a clear breach of international law (see here ), while Amnesty International has described Hungary’s system as “blatantly designed to deter [asylum seekers] from entering the country.” Human rights organisations have moreover raised the alarm that the ‘push-backs’ are currently carried out by a mix of police and vigilante groups, and particularly the latter seem often to be very violent. It is however hard to tell: the fact that no data is registered means that there are no official figures, and most reporting tends to be from migrants themselves who are often not able to tell the different uniforms and insignias apart.

Many of the boys and men in the squat had indeed tried to cross the Hungarian border, many of them multiple times. Their stories indicate that the border itself is still permeable, but that the increased patrols, backed up by laws that allow immediate expulsion, have made it much more difficult to successfully transit through Hungary. As one of the young Afghans living in the squat told AAN:

I was caught close to the fence. We had just crossed the border. Others were caught while they were up to their necks in water. They [the police/vigilantes] let them stand in the water. When they caught us, they pepper-sprayed and beat us. My friend here could not see out of one of his eyes for days.

Another young Afghan (17-years old), whom AAN met while he was being helped by an aid worker to arrange his transfer to one of the government-run camps, told AAN:

I have been in Serbia for a little over a week. I crossed the border into Hungary once. We crossed through a hole in the fence, but then we lost the rest of the group. We were in a small group of eight or nine and we couldn’t find the others anymore. One of our group had injured his eye on a branch. So we slept in the open air that night and the next morning, we turned ourselves into the police. We were expelled. The rest of the group was caught three days later, somewhere in Hungary. They told us, “You were lucky that you were caught earlier. We had to walk much further.”

Several Afghans mentioned the dogs that the border guards now use and how they feared them. As one of them said: “Hungary is fully closed now. It’s impossible to cross. They have dogs. We are all terrified.” One Afghan showed pictures on his phone that are making the rounds of a young man with serious dog bites.

Several Afghans mentioned the dogs that the Hungarian border guards now use and how they feared them. One Afghan showed pictures on his phone that are making the rounds of a young man with serious dog bites. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

A young Afghan from Kunar, who is living in the squat, related how he had recently ‘hit the game’ to try to cross into Hungary, but had not even come close to the border. He had however been bothered by the Serbian police:

I spent twelve days in an old house near the border. The [Serbian] police came. They took 10 euros per person each time. If you didn’t pay, they would deport you. We were there with 34 people. They came many times. UNHCR also came to the old house and we told them about the police. They [the police] came every day and every night, usually around midnight. Yesterday, I returned by train when I realised it wasn’t going to happen … I have been in Serbia for four months. I paid the smuggler 1600 euros to get from here to Austria.

There was a general sense that the smugglers had become much less reliable. This is likely related to the fact that, now the borders are closed, it has become significantly more difficult for smugglers to deliver on their promises. Many of them had also been paid to organise trips to western Europe that were negotiated when the Balkans corridor was still open (and the smugglers’ job practically ended in Macedonia).

The increased desperation of many migrants makes them more vulnerable to exploitation. Several people reported that the smugglers had demanded – and received advances – and then failed to deliver; in some cases, they had not even attempted to organise a border crossing. As one of the Afghans in the squat said: “The smugglers have all abandoned us. They are hiding from us. And all of them are asking for more money.”

A young Afghan from Logar province (17 years old), who had arrived in Belgrade four months ago, said he had tried to cross the border twelve times and was going to try for the thirteenth time the following day. He told AAN his parents had decided to send him, the eldest of three brothers, away because he was an easy target for insurgent groups’ recruitment. His parents had arranged the journey with a smuggler from Nangarhar, who promised to take him to France and had agreed that he would pay him back once he arrived – an arrangement that seems to hold great risks for exploitation. The boy left Afghanistan around six months ago and had been on the road for two months, one of which he spent in Bulgaria. He estimated that his debt to the smuggler is around 4,500 US dollars; he was lucky, he said, to cross the Serbian-Bulgarian border four months ago when it was still only 600 euros; the current, inflated price is up to 1,500 euros).

An interesting new phenomenon appears to be migrants posing as smugglers. Some migrants have spent so long in the country and have learned so much about the geography, the situation at the border crossings and the ways smugglers operate, that they are able to convince others they can provide these services. Several of the fake smugglers are apparently very young, which allows them to also operate in places where underage and other vulnerable migrants are given priority (such as the Asylum Info Centre or the Miskaliste social centre). Others have tried to infiltrate volunteer teams helping migrants in order to more easily reach their prospective clients (in one case, this was discovered when the victim complained to the organisation that he did not get the promised service).

The migrants are anyway a vulnerable community when it comes to reliable information. Many are desperate and running out of options. There is a plethora of rumours and sources of confusion – some seemingly intentional, possibly spread by smugglers to keep hopes up or to keep people dependent. The fact that the government’s policies are opaque and often contradictory does not help.

Declining options: Demanding that the border be opened (three marches)

Some of the rumours were fuelled by wishful thinking. In early November there was a persistent rumour in the squat that the border with Hungary would be opened soon for those stuck in Serbia (apparently there had been an article on an Urdu-language website, but it is also possible that smugglers were passing around misinformation). During AAN’s visit, we were constantly asked if we had any news as to when the border would open (or whether it was really true that it would). Some migrants thought Hungary would be forced by the EU to allow migrants to pass through its territory, as conditions in Serbia declined and winter set in, while others expressed bewilderment as to why the EU would try to keep its borders closed. As one Afghan said, in a comment that was echoed by several others: “But Germany invited us to come. Merkel herself said, ‘We need 5000 people,’ and opened the borders. Why invite us, if you don’t want us to come?” Although not exactly accurate (German Chancellor Angela Merkel had said Germany would be able to cope with the huge influx of refugees that came to the country in 2015, which was seen as the start of her so called ‘welcome policy’), this may have been a narrative stressed by smugglers to persuade people to invest in a journey to Europe.

At peak times, there are well over a thousand people living, sleeping and passing through this small patch of the city that is only a stone’s throw away from normal life. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

The rising desperation among particularly the Afghan and Pakistani migrants, and the belief that Europe will not stand by idly while they suffer, has resulted in several marches on the border in an attempt to force the neighbouring countries to let them through. The first protest march took place on 22 July 2016, just after the Serbian authorities had ploughed up the two parks and had stopped allowing undocumented men to stay in Krnjača camp. Around 300 Afghans and Pakistanis, with no place to go, gathered in the ‘Afghan Park’ and started a march towards the Hungarian border. After they arrived, they set up camp and continued a hunger strike that they had started in Belgrade (details can be found on the Facebook page of InfoPark, in the posts dated 22-26 July 2016). Hungary obviously did not open the border, but KIRS did (temporarily) start providing accommodation again for those who did not want to ask for asylum in Serbia, but who needed shelter.

On 4 October 2016, the migrants organised a second march to the Hungarian border (see here and here). This time it was organised from the squat and involved around 350 people, but due to bad weather, the march ended some 30 kilometres outside Belgrade. The involvement of activist NGOs such as No Borders, was emphasised – negatively – by the Serbian press, especially in the nationalist and populists newspapers, such as Vecernje Novosti (Evening News), for instance, in this article “Anarchists triggered move of migrants from Belgrade.”

A third march took place on Friday 11 November 2016, a day after police ‘raided’ the squat. In the days before, while AAN was present, there had already been talk of another march; the panic caused by the raid probably helped solidify the plan. A group of between 120 and 150 migrants, again mostly from Afghanistan and Pakistan, started the march – this time to the Croatian border (see here). Police followed the group along the highway connecting Belgrade and the border. This protest was again helped by the No Borders group, which among other things provided the migrants with banners (see here). Two days later, on Sunday 13 November 2016, the migrants reached the Serbian-Croatian border and were stopped at the Serbian border town of Šid. According to Reuters, the migrants said they would wait until the border with Croatia was opened and refused to be accommodated in the reception centre in Šid. The group later returned to Belgrade by train on Tuesday 15 November 2016, when it became clear the border would not open.

A third march to the border took place on Friday 11 November 2016. In the days before, while AAN was present, there had already been talk of another march; while a young boy cuts tomatoes in the foreground, other inhabitants of the squat discuss whether to go ahead with the march or not. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

Declining options: on Hungary’s waiting list

Apart from crossing the border illegally with the help of smugglers and hoping that the borders will again temporarily open, as was the case in late 2015 and early 2016, there is another option to travel onwards: by being legally allowed into Hungary through one of Hungary’s transit zones.

The transit zones were established after the Balkan corridor closed in the spring of 2016, when migrants gathered at the Hungarian border in the hope of still being allowed in. Two transit zones, at the Horgoš and Kelebija border crossings, were established and designated as no-man’s land (“a legal fiction” according to a lawyer AAN met at the border in June 2016). By July 2016, over 1500 people were camping out in the open air, waiting for their turn as the Hungarian authorities started processing asylum requests, mainly of Afghans and Syrians. Hungary has steadily decreased the number of cases it processes per day. In September 2016, it went from 100 per day to 50, and then to 30. In late October 2016, the number was further decreased from 30 per day, seven days per week, to 20 per day, five days per week (ie a maximum of 100 per week, down from originally around 700 per week). Hungary claims this is not a quota, but simply a problem of capacity, but eyewitnesses say that most people working in the containers at the transit zone have run out of things to do by noon.

The number of people staying at the border, in appalling conditions, has gone down significantly. In September 2016, the authorities managed to persuade most of them to move to the Subotica centre, not far from the border, from where they now await their turn. There is a system of waiting lists that supposedly emerged as early as April 2016 and that is managed by ‘community leaders’ from among the migrants themselves. The lists are supposed to contain all Afghans who are staying in the various centres (and apparently many who are not) and are passed on to KIRS which then posts the names of those whose turn is imminent, so that they can make their way to the transit zones. (It is unclear whether other nationalities, for instance the Syrians, have a similar system).

The various aid workers seemed to think the waiting list system worked, but there were some grumblings from the migrants. As one of the inhabitants of the squat noted:

I gave my name for the list three months ago when I was in the camp. In the camp the person who is in charge for this takes everybody’s name. Who that was? It was an Afghan called [name deleted]. Now he is in Horgoš [in the transit zone]. He is now the person in charge there. He decides whose turn it is and he carries out the interviews. Yes, he is a refugee himself. … He sometimes harasses people or gives a turn to whoever he wants.

Another Afghan living in the squat recounted how he realised this route would not work for him: “I went to the camp in Subotica once… After that, I went to [the transit zone in] Horgoš. I was there for three days, illegally. I was not on a list. So when I saw I wouldn’t get through, I came back again.”

The chances of entering Hungary through this process are slim. The process, first of all, gives priority to families with children and unaccompanied women, not single men (who include the majority of Afghans in Serbia). This means there are a lot of men competing for very few slots. Secondly, the system at the transit zones is not actually designed to allow people into Hungary; it merely provides an opportunity to lodge an asylum claim. These claims, according to Hungarian law, can be dismissed without considering the merits of the case, often within a day, according to Human Rights Watch, because Hungary has declared Serbia a safe third country – so far, the only EU country to do so (incidentally, Human Rights Watch disagrees).

In practice, according to an activist working in Hungary, most asylum seekers appeal the decision to refuse their case and as long as the appeal is pending, they are usually not sent back. (Also, Serbia also often resists taking the migrants back. Hungary insists the transit zone is no-man’s land, whereas in reality, according to Serbia, it is already Hungarian soil). After spending some time in the transit zone in limbo, some of the migrants are finally allowed into the country to await the outcome of their asylum case in one of the reception centres – after which most of them leave and continue their journey to western Europe.

Declining options: entering the system

Many of the men in the squat were debating whether they should follow the government’s instructions and be housed in one of the government-run centres. Migrants in Serbia can enter into the Serbian asylum system – and give their presence a legal or semi-legal status – by expressing their intention to ask for asylum, either at the border, at one of the country’s police stations or in one of the asylum/reception centres (see here).

They are then given an official letter assigning them to an asylum or reception centre and instructing them to register their actual asylum request there within 72 hours. Migrants themselves refer to these papers as “police papers.” Although anyone should be able to register their wish for asylum, many of the Afghan men AAN spoke to said this was very difficult. “I went to the police station many times,” said one man, “but they don’t give documents to single men – unless they’re Syrians.”

The registration, even if successful, does not necessarily prevent expulsion (most probably as the paper is not considered a valid reason to stay, after the 72 hours have expired). Several of the squat’s inhabitants had stories of friends who were forcibly expelled. “Ten days ago, four of my friends were deported to Macedonia from Preševo [camp],” one Afghan told AAN. “They had to pay 400 euros to come back to Serbia. I know one man who has been deported nine times so far.” Another young Afghan told AAN: “Some of us have police papers, but we will be deported anyway. They [the police] do raids and take people. They don’t come inside [the squat], but they take people from outside, at night. One guy had a police paper three times, but they ripped it up [every time] and said it had no meaning.” Or as another one commented: “At night the police sometimes come to raid us [in the squat]. They take five or six people and take them to the Macedonian border. They don’t come with many, maybe about six policemen, and they take the people away in a way that the others in the squat don’t notice.…But even if they deport us, we just come back. It just costs money every time. From Macedonia to here now costs around 300 euros.” (2)

Photo: Martine van Bijlert

An aid worker confirmed that the police did indeed regularly visit the squat and would round up groups of migrants, but according to him, they were taken to the police station to be registered, rather than forcibly expelled. But in the fog of rumours, changing policies and government threats that in the end everybody will be forced to leave, many of the men were scared that they would be ‘pushed back’ into Macedonia, if they agreed to go along with the authorities and be settled in one of the camps.

Most of Serbia’s government-run centres were originally designed to function as transit and reception centres. They were hastily set up when the Balkan corridor was open, providing aid and short-term shelter for migrants on their way to western Europe and were not meant to be used as long-term housing. One of the larger camps, Preševo, is the first and most recent one to have been upgraded to a fully-equipped facility, but the fact that it is located on the border with Macedonia in the south (which has been the main expulsion destination), makes it particularly unattractive for many migrants who see going there as a step in the wrong direction. This is exacerbated by the fact that the authorities have, in the recent past, used some of the buses that were supposed to transport migrants to the Preševo camp, to expel them, into Macedonia, instead.

Those who had spent time in the government-run centres generally complained about the conditions. As one of the Afghans told AAN, “I went to the camp in Subotica once, but the floor was dirty and the single men had to sleep on the floor. There were heaters, but they weren’t turned on.” Some of the men AAN spoke to actually tried to argue that their living conditions in the squat were better than they had been in the government-run centres (they may, however, also have been trying to make the best of a bad and inescapable situation, or to justify a choice they had made for different reasons). This was best summed up by an Iranian, who was living in a tent on the porch of one of the warehouses:

The situation here [in the squat] is better than in the official camps. We left our country because we don’t want to be detained and controlled. So we don’t want to be detained and controlled here either… I left Iran around six or seven months ago: I travelled from Iran to Turkey, then to Athens (by plane), then to Macedonia. I’ve been in Serbia now for three months. First I slept in garages and in the park. Then the police took me and brought me to Šid [reception centre], then to Principovac [reception centre], which isn’t even really a camp. If I have to sleep in a tent, I’d rather sleep in a tent here [in the squat]. Then they brought me to the closed camp in Preševo [near the Macedonian border]. We are all afraid of Preševo – it is too far away and feels like a prison. So I escaped and I came here. In my country I have no freedom, so I don’t want to be in a camp like that. Would you want that?

This was best summed up by an Iranian, who was living in a tent on the porch of one of the warehouses: “The situation here is better than in the camps. … If I have to sleep in a tent, I’d rather sleep in a tent here [in the squat].” Photo: Martine van Bijlert

Several of the younger boys described how their life in Serbia, and on the road in general, had been so much worse than it had ever been in Afghanistan. They did not, they said, want their parents to realise the hardships they were going through.

The chances of being granted asylum in Serbia are largely untested, as so far relatively few have tried this route. (3) But the chances that many will be accepted currently seem very low, as Serbia’s asylum authorities tend to automatically apply the ‘safe third country’ concept, dismissing all who have entered Serbia from Macedonia or Bulgaria, unless they can prove those countries are not safe for them (more details here). This means that for many of the Afghan men in Serbia, there is no real benefit in entering the asylum system, other than being provided with shelter, while there are clear perceived risks: the fear that registration in one country will preclude their chances of acceptance in the EU in the future and the persistent indications that those in the camps run the risk of being expelled. As a staff member of one of the international NGOs told AAN:

There is a gap between the point of view of the government and that of the migrants. The authorities mean well, even if they have a hidden agenda, and sometimes a lack of empathy. They want to take all the migrants and dispatch them to the camps. But migrants don’t want to be in closed camps – or even in open camps. Many are afraid to register, as they confuse it with an asylum request. There is a deep condition of mistrust… And the Commissariat doesn’t really know what to do. I think they feel naked in front of the problem.

What will happen now?

The Serbian government has drawn up a Response Plan for the period October 2016–March 2017, “in case of increased inflow of migrants to the republic of Serbia.” The plan is based on several assumptions: that the uncontrolled transit of refugees and migrants has been halted (which is correct), that the number of migrants illegally entering Serbia will drop considerably (which is debatable), the number of refugees and migrants entering and leaving Serbia on a daily basis will not exceed 30 (this does not seem to be the case: the numbers entering are much higher and those leaving lower) and that most refugees and migrants will not perceive Serbia as a country of asylum (which is correct, but many of them are now faced with the reality that they cannot leave). Based on these assumptions, the government’s prognosis is that a total of 12-13,000 people will pass through Serbia during the six-month period and that around 5000 people will be staying in its centres at any one time during winter, for a period of two-three months each – without specifying how these people will travel onwards, or to where they are supposed to leave.

Last year during winter, the situation was also bad, but there was more of a through flow of migrants; the Balkan corridor was still open and for the groups who were no longer admitted into Croatia (which from February 2016 onwards included Afghans – more details here and here), ­there was still a reasonable, though declining chance of successfully crossing the border into Hungary illegally. This winter, however, the outflow seems to have come to a virtual standstill.

The situation in the squat is untenable: there is no heating or electricity, no toilets or showers (only a few garden hoses with cold water). Most inhabitants suffer from body lice; some have scabies too. The Serbian authorities, supported by international NGOs, have decided to clear everyone from the squat (which is anyway scheduled to be demolished to make way for a high-end, infrastructure project, the Belgrade Waterfront – a few adjacent buildings where migrants were staying were already taken down in October 2016). The government’s short-term aim is to house all migrants in one of its asylum, transit or reception centres in order to control the situation; aware of the poor sanitation and the possibility of deaths, it does not want a humanitarian crisis in the centre of the capital city. Its ultimate aim, however, is to see the migrants leave, whether through onward journey to Europe, return or their countries of origin or deportation – which is why a considerable number of migrants are likely to try to continue to stay out of the system. They do not want to stay in Serbia, but more importantly they do not trust the authorities’ efforts and motives.

Graffiti with Eid congratulations on the outer wall of the main warehouse. Photo: Martine van Bijlert

Most migrants AAN spoke to said they were determined to continue their journey and ultimately arrive in Europe (several of them bragged that it was “Europe or death”). Almost all of them had already spent large amounts of money, and many of them had been forced to spend even more as their journey onwards became increasingly difficult – and were as a result determined to make the investment ultimately pay off. At the same time, there was a growing realisation that even those who did reach Europe were by no means guaranteed to stay there (several Afghans had stories of friends who had been returned to Bulgaria from western Europe – and who had made their way back into Serbia, trying to again reach the EU).

The Afghans and other migrants in Serbia thus find themselves in limbo, unable to go on and, with winter coming on hard, soon not able to even stay in a squat which at least keeps them out of a system they do not trust.

 

(1) In fact, during this whole visit to Belgrade, AAN barely encountered any Afghan women, as most of them were staying in the government-run centres and the cold weather probably made it less attractive to venture into town. Once, we ran into a couple with a newborn baby in the ‘Afghan Park’ in the early evening. They had arrived in Serbia a few weeks earlier (before the baby was born) and were staying in the asylum centre in Krnjača. Even the women’s corner in the migrants’ social centre in Miksalište, where women can sit separately and use the toiletries and make-up, was empty on the day we visited.

(2) Although most migrants used the word ‘deportation’, strictly speaking, in most cases what they were talking about were forced expulsions, given that the cases had not been considered or ordered by a court.

(3) In the first nine months of 2016, a total of 8,954 people expressed the intention to ask for asylum in Serbia (3,859 of them were Afghans), but most did not go through with the procedure. In the same period, only 789 people actually registered with the Serbian Asylum Office; only 540 asked for asylum and only 144 were interviewed. There were 29 successful applicants in the first nine months of 2016; six of them were Afghans (more details here). The Serbian authorities are, however, slowly coming round to the reality that some of the migrants may stay; local municipalities are starting to draw up action plans that incorporate the possibility of migrants seeking and getting asylum and staying on in the municipalities.

This report is based on field research conducted between 4 and 10 November 2016 to assess the migrants’ situation in Serbia before the onset of winter. AAN visited the squat daily at different times, where we conducted a large number of informal conversations and (participatory) observation, as well as a smaller number of unstructured interviews. AAN additionally visited the other relevant sites (the Afghan Park, Miksalište, the Asylum Information Centre) and met with staff and volunteers of the main NGOs working with migrants and with UNHCR and conducted several informal conversations with KIRS field staff. The language proficiency of the researchers (Serbian and Dari) and their familiarity with both the Afghan and Serbian context greatly contributed to a rapid and in-depth gathering of information, as did the fact that this was a follow-up research trip.

For the findings of the AAN’s earlier research trip that took place in June 2016, see this report on the opening and closing of the Balkan corridor; this report on the situation for Afghan migrants in Serbia; and the report on the rise of the smuggling networks.

The Islamic State, holed up in a few districts in eastern Afghanistan, has suddenly popped up in a faraway western province, Ghor – at least according to provincial officials. They blamed IS for the massacre in October 2016 of more than 30 civilians. Digging deeper into the incident, AAN’s Borhan Osman found that the IS claim was false: The gang responsible were criminals and had historical links to both the Taleban and parts of the central government, but was not part of IS. A closer look at the incident reveals a far stranger, but no less worrying tale than was reported.

 “IS is gaining support and challenging the Taliban in Afghanistan,” the BBC reported on 26 October 2016, citing Ghor governor Naser Khazeh and adding that “Analysts say the IS militants in Ghor are former Taliban fighters.” The BBC was not the only media outlet who repeated the local officials’ version of events without cross-checking. Officials had said a group of Islamic State (IS or Daesh) militants had rounded up about 30 civilians who were collecting firewood near the provincial capital Feroz Koh (recently re-named from Chaghcharan) and killed them in revenge, after one of the group’s commanders had been killed by local pro-government forces.

Yet, there is no credible evidence of an actual IS presence in Ghor or of links between IS and the particular group that killed the villagers. Indeed, the actual loyalties of the murderers are too complicated to be directly tied to any single entity. The murders do, however, tie in to long-standing tribal grievances and have links to central government politics. To understand who the group behind the Ghor massacre was, one needs to look into what exactly happened, as well as, more broadly, the context into which the group emerged and why officials labelled them as ‘Daesh’.

What happened?

On the afternoon of 25 October 2016, as local residents told AAN, a group of about two dozen armed men from Murghab Valley, to the north of Feroz Koh, sneaked into the Kasi area which is eight kilometres from Feroz Koh city and stole three herds of sheep. To ensure they could safely carry the sheep to their stronghold, about 30 kilometres further north, they took the shepherds with them. They also took anyone they encountered along the route, so the local community would not discover what had happened until they had gotten out of the area. From similar incidents in the past, the shepherds understood they would be taken as hostages to a point where the armed men were able to flee to an area outside government control, and then released.

In the past, such cattle-rustling had normally been carried out without violence to shepherds or residents as they did not resist. This time, however, a young armed man from a family with members in the intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), tried to stop the theft. He fired at the gang and was then killed in the subsequent shoot out. His father and uncle found out about the killing and rushed out for revenge. Another fire-fight ensued. One and half hours later, the two older men ran out of bullets and were shot dead; in another version of the events, they were stoned to death by the armed group. However, before succumbing to death, the brothers killed the most notorious of the two commanders of the group, Ghulam Faruq, along with another known member of the group, Abdul Shakur.

One of the gang’s survivors, commander Qari Rahmatullah Karim, angered by the death of Faruq and the wounding of his son in the attack, returned to the fields and hills behind Kasi and kidnapped more villagers who had been out farming or collecting wood, amounting to a total of more than 30 hostages. One man who managed to escape told AAN that he and some of the other hostages ran after realising their captors were more aggressive and hostile than they had been in previous episodes of cattle-rustling.

The gang forcibly walked the remaining hostages for more than one hour into the mountains, to the Jeleng area and then shot them. The shooting happened within sight of two Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) check posts located on the hilltops of the nearby Shah Tigh area. Residents have blamed the ANSF of doing nothing to stop the massacre. Although the residents and local officials have given different casualty numbers, all agreed that at least 26 people were killed and several more wounded. Kasi residents and the ANSF recovered the bodies the following morning on 26 October 2016.

Who were the victims?

The victims were all resident of Kasi, a cluster of villages, locally identified by their tribal affiliation. They belong to the two closely connected Khudayar and Sultanyar clans from the Chahar Aimaq tribe, who, according to popular belief, are the indigenous inhabitants of Ghor. Kasi is home to about one quarter of the total number of Khudayar and Sultanyar, and is the tribes’ northernmost (and furthest) habitation from Feroz Koh. They are also scattered through several neighbourhoods in and around Feroz Koh, making up a significant part of the city’s residents. The two tribes contribute a remarkably large number of civil servants to local government and are on the whole doing better economically than the average Ghori. Known for their passion for education and having a high literacy rate, they are considered the ‘elite tribes’ of Feroz Koh in particular, and Ghor generally. However, those murdered on 25 October 2016 were mostly from the poorest of Kasi villagers. Some had been collecting firewood for the approaching winter, while others were tending sheep or working on farms.

The two tribes had created a ‘community protection force’, which the locals refer to as khezash-e mardomi (popular uprising), in 2012, after some of its members working in the government were killed by illegal armed groups. A specific incident that spurred the idea of creating the community protection force was the killing of a young judge from Kasi named Qazi Qurban Karimi in May 2012. According to local residents AAN spoke to, the judge was abducted from the centre of Feroz Koh by the same group led by Faruq and Rahmatullah and was beheaded, despite his family paying a huge ransom for his release.

The khezash-e mardomi has been patrolling the villages inhabited by the two tribes, with one of the squads particularly assigned to protect Kasi. It seems to have been a community-initiated initiative, but on the payroll of the NDS. The number of the militia had gradually shrunk from its initial peak of over 100-150 to 20-30 people. The downsizing came after NDS cut their salaries following the establishment of the two ANSF check posts in the Shah Tigh area in 2015. The check posts were established with the chief aim of preventing intruders coming from the north, especially the Murghab Valley, but residents complain they have not been effective.

Who were the culprits?

The local authorities linked Faruq and Rahmatullah to the killings from the beginning. However, they were not the only actors behind the carnage, nor was their gang an isolated group of militants. The group had been part of a wider network that has been operating around Feroz Koh for more than five years. This network is based in and stems from the Murghab Valley (which is actually a series of seven valleys, most of which belong to the Feroz Koh district, but whose borders overlap with Dawlatyar, Lal wa Sarjangal and Charsada districts). The valley is home to about 8000 families, according to estimates by local government officials.

The armed group rooted in the valley is referred to by residents of Feroz Koh as the ‘Murghabis’, which is also used as a shorthand for all residents of the valley who are together taken as a ‘tribe’. The godfather of the Murghabi network was a mujahedin-era commander, the most powerful warlord in the valley, General Ahmad Khan Murghabi, who was killed in October 2014 by the Taleban after years of close relations with the movement. Ahmad Khan fought the Soviets in the 1980s as a Jamiat-e Islami commander and later served as the commander of the army corps in Ghor during the initial years of President Karzai’s interim government, approximately between 2002 and 2004. During this time, Murghabi notables ran the local government administration while the general served as their chief strongman. The Murghabis were violently driven out of power by a rival tribe, the Rezayis, with its own militia in June 2004.

Murghabis have, for decades, rallied behind Jamiat and voted for its candidates in recent elections, including for Dr Abdullah in the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections. The valley is described by some as the Panjshir of Ghor province because it is such a Jamiat stronghold and many Ghoris believe Dr Abdullah and Balkh acting governor Atta Muhammad Nur have been protecting the Murghabi elite and ‘their interests’ in recent years. One particular case of patronage relevant to the Kasi massacre and mentioned by local residents was the release of Qari Rahmatullah Karim, the man who ordered the killings, from government detention in spring 2014. The reason for putting him in detention is not known. Former Ghor governor, Sayed Anwar Rahmati, and members of parliament from the province have publically accused other MPs and provincial council members of helping gain the freedom of Qari Rahmatullah.

When the Taleban rose as a strong insurgency in Ghor in about 2010, the strongman of Murghab, General Ahmad Murghabi, gradually developed friendly relations with them while continuing to present himself as pro-government and despite, AAN was told, still being on the government payroll (possibly – and this would be legitimate – as a member of the ‘active reserve’). Sources in the local government told AAN General Murghabi regularly visited and received financial and logistical support from senior provincial officials and leaders of Jamiat-e Islami in Kabul, including the late Marshal Qasim Fahim, vice-president to Hamid Karzai. However, his men acted more as anti-government than pro-government forces (see for example, this report from summer 2010). Using the effective impunity guaranteed by the general’s political links, his men carried out attacks in and around Feroz Koh centre, including against civilian targets.

For example, in the incidents listed below, residents of Feroz Koh as well as local officials, have no doubt about the involvement of the Murghabi network:

In 2011, according to widely circulated reports among Chaghcharan/Feroz Koh residents, Murghabi’s men killed four traffic police near Ghalmin allegedly for drinking alcohol. In summer 2012, as mentioned earlier, they, according to the widespread belief among local residents, kidnapped Qazi Qurban Karimi the judge from the Kasi village and murdered him. The same year, in spring, the Murghabi group, according to local residents of Chaghcharan, broke into the office of a Bangladeshi NGO that was granting small loans to community members. In the pre-dawn attack inside the city of Feroz Koh, they killed the director of the office, who was a Muslim from Bangladesh. The NGO suspected the attack was criminal, rather than political.

In April 2013, Rahmatullah’s comrade, Faruq, a serving Afghan National Army soldier, attacked a convoy of ISAF Lithuanian forces based in Feroz Koh, wounding two of their soldiers. That attack was his claim to fame. He was detained and investigated, but later freed (it is not known how). That attack put him right on course for joining the Taleban. By that time, according to Taleban sources in Pakistan, Qari Rahmatullah had visited Quetta and pledged allegiance to the Taleban. Faruq was referred to by his comrades and the wider Taleban as a ghazi (a heroic fighter against foreign invasion), a title that quickly echoed among residents of Murghab. Mullah Ahmad Shah, then the Taleban deputy shadow governor of Ghor (presently military chief for four provinces including Ghor), supervised the Murghabi network’s integration into the movement. The group’s leader, General Murghabi does not seem to have officially become a member of the Taleban, (although Taleban sources did refer to him as a former member). Indeed, he never ceased his relations with government officials and, according to several sources who discussed his interactions, he continued to receive a red-carpet welcome in both Feroz Koh and Kabul from government and Jamiat notables.

The Murghabi armed group turned out to be too problematic for the Taleban, as they were unable to act as disciplined and good subordinates. The commanders carried out arbitrary attacks and acts of banditry that were hard for deputy shadow governor Mullah Ahmad Shah to tolerate. According to elders in Kasi and government officials in Feroz Koh, the Murghabi commanders regularly stole livestock from areas close to Feroz Koh, justifying their theft as war bounty from ‘pro-government people’. They also carried out attacks that showed a more criminal motif than insurgent. For example, according to Charsada residents, Faruq and his group kidnapped two local businessmen in separate incidents on their way home from Feroz Koh in early 2014. One was freed for a ransom of 500,000 AFN (about 7,700 USD); the second was killed despite the paying of a ransom.

The most important incident that precipitated the divorce of the Murghabi network from the Taleban came in July 2014 when Qari Rahmatullah and Faruq murdered 16 people in the Badgah area, near Kasi, as they were travelling on the Ghor-Kabul highway to a wedding. The majority of the victims were Hazaras from the Lal wa Sarjangal district of Ghor and included the groom, the bride, two other women and a child. People familiar with the Murghabis explained the killing as driven by a deeply-engrained hatred of Hazaras among the Murghabi gang. They pointed to one commander named Mullah Abdul Rahman Muzammil as someone who provided anti-Shia ideological motivation for the killing. He is currently in the government’s detention in Kabul and recently sentenced to death for his role in the July 2014 killing. The Taleban movement condemned the killing and distanced itself from the perpetrators. Following that incident, the Taleban disowned the Murghabi group. But the rupture became public only after the two sides started to fight each other in the wake of the assassination of General Murghabi, in October 2014.

A few months earlier, in the summer of the same year, 2014, the government had tried to raise local militias to stand against the Taleban and it was General Murghabi who covertly turned the tide against the Taleban. He did so as a result of the pressure and, reportedly, financial and political overtures from government officials, according to people present in meetings between the provincial authorities officials and the general in Feroz Koh. He tried to rein in his men and to turn them against Taleban shadow governor Ahmad Shah, but appears to have either miscalculated his clout or mishandled the effort. His attempt to bring Qari Rahmatullah and Faruq to heel came at a time when the two were actually poised to outgrow him in influence after having served as leading Taleban commanders in the valley. General Murghabi was subsequently killed in October 2014 by Taleban shadow governor Ahmad Shah’s men, but many observers in Ghor believe his own commanders (including Faruq and Rahmatullah) helped in the assassination. Taleban sources said Murghabi had embarked on an initiative to form a popular uprising against the insurgents and was plotting to assassinate Ahmad Shah; so, the latter’s men killed him pre-emptively.

Despite the widely-held belief that some of General Murghabi’s own commanders had helped in his assassination, his son Shah Wali managed to detach the Murghabi commanders from the Taleban and instead set them on a path to avenge the general’s killing. They attacked Ahmad Shah’s village in the adjacent Charsada district, setting his home on fire and forcing his family to retreat to Faryab. They almost cleared the valley of Taleban. More than a dozen people were killed in fighting between the two sides in the weeks following General Murghabi’s death. The fighting risked dragging two tribes, the Murghabis and shadow governor Ahmad Shah’s tribe, the Malek, into a continuing dispute as both drew support from their respective local bases. Elders from other tribes in nearby areas intervened to prevent the conflict blowing up into a wholehearted tribal conflict.

General Murghabi’s son, Shah Wali, was backed in his campaign against the Taleban by other Murghabi commanders, including Ghulam Faruq, Qari Rahmatulah Karim, Taj Muhammad, Mullah Abdul Rahman Muzammil, Abdul Shakur and Alauddin. Shah Wali also inherited the respect and status of his father among Jamiat-e Islami notables and provincial government authorities. When visiting Feroz Koh in 2015 and 2016, he was given a special escort by the provincial police during his meetings and tour of the city, according to people in the local government.

Shah Wali and his commanders were hailed from that moment onwards by the then governor of Ghor, Sayyed Anwar Rahmati, as a popular uprising. But although they had fought the Taleban, this had actually been an act of personal revenge and the commanders had hardly done anything to prove it was a popular uprising that served the government’s interests. On the contrary, they had been, for years, a source of persistent banditry, kidnappings, livestock theft, hostage and ransom-taking, as well as occasional murder. Moreover, although in their fight against the Taleban, the Murghabi commanders received logistical support and reinforcements from ANSF and the respect Shah Wali received appears authentic, his commanders, according to local officials in Feroz Koh, had for years, also been extorting money, food and fuel from senior civil servants, as well as from security officials in the provincial capital. According to one witness, a security official last year dispatched a truckload of foodstuffs and an oil tanker to the Murghab Valley to Faruq and Rahmatullah and when asked why he was doing so, replied that he was forced to so by the Murghabi network. From talking to several officials government employees in Feroz Koh, it seems they feared a direct threat to their lives if they did not comply, at least to some extent, with the Murghabi commanders’ demands for supplies.

It was these same commanders who were branded as Daesh by the provincial officials following their murder of Kasi villagers on 25 October 2016. Rumours that the group had links to IS stemmed from the very development which had earned them the title of a popular uprising group – their break in autumn 2014 with the Taleban. The Murghabi network was therefore being labelled as both Daesh and a popular uprising force at the same time.

How did a ‘popular uprising’ morph into ‘Daesh’?

Rumours that the Murghabi commanders had announced their allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) emerged in the months after the death of General Ahmad Khan Murghabi in October 2014. It is unclear on what grounds these rumours were based. All that local officials and residents could point to now is that some of Shah Wali’s commanders have reportedly been bragging that they had developed relations with IS in Syria. Apart from this, there has been no solid evidence that confirms the rumours or makes it clear what they can be traced back to. According to sources in the local government with knowledge of the Murghabi commanders, the latter’s reported proclamation of allegiance with Daesh, if true, was not a result of the development of mutual relations between the two, but of the Murghabis merely adopting the brand, as it served them well in their campaign for revenge against the Taleban. Local government officials at the time did not take the alleged claims of links to IS seriously. The Murghabi network did not show any change in behaviour or tactics suggesting they had actual links to IS, nor are there verifiable reports of the group having raised IS flags in the areas under its control. The commanders’ rumoured announcement of allegiance indeed came months before IS announced its extension to ‘Khorasan Province’, which meant there was as yet no ‘official’ representative of the group present in the region with whom they could have connected.

After the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) emerged as an IS franchise in 2015 for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, the Murghabi commanders, according to a couple of sources, tried to seek the endorsement of ISKP leaders. One account told to AAN by second-hand sources said that the Murghabi commanders had dispatched about two dozen fighters for training to Nangarhar in July 2015; several were killed and the others returned home. A Taleban source familiar with the insurgency in Ghor said the Murghabi commanders had, at least once, met and received funds from an ISKP recruiter in Pakistan, but the source did not believe the relations between the two developed into any sort of operational link. There also seems to be no evidence that ISKP accepted them as a local cell.

It is possibly this uncertainty about the affiliation of the Murghabi armed group that led to contradictory descriptions by local residents and officials during 2015 and 2016. While the group was squarely described as belonging to Daesh following the killing of the Kasi villagers on 25 October 2016, it had previously been referred to as Taleban, a pro-government force or merely an illegal armed group. For example, when the Murghabi network fought Mullah Ahmad Shah’s men in the Gorken area of the Charsada district in July 2015, local officials hailed them as an uprising as a force loyal to Shah Wali and the ANSF joined (http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/10/local-group-expels-taliban-ghor) the Murghabi network in the battle for capturing Gorken, an important Taleban stronghold. However, in another incident in the same year, in October 2015, when Faruq, Taj Muhammad and Abdul Rahman Muzammil stoned to death a 19 year old girl named Rokhshana for alleged adultery, local people and officials said they were members of the Taleban. This description was then picked up, pretty well unquestioningly, by local and international media. In another incident involving Faruq and his men in winter 2016, in which he tried to kidnap a rich police official from Kasi, the attackers were referred to merely as Murghabi bandits. (Faruq was wounded in that incident.) In its last attack before the killing of the Kasi villagers, when it kidnapped five Hazara students in early September 2016, the group was referred to by the provincial authorities sometimes as Taleban and sometimes as a criminal gang. (1)

If the Murghabi network had had actual relations with Daesh, they should have stopped their gangsterism and acts of plundering, something they only intensified after their supposed announcement of allegiance in 2014. The Murghabi commanders also continued trafficking drugs in the areas under their control, specifically the Murghab Valley, which has long been an important trafficking route between the north, specifically Faryab and Sar-e Pul provinces, and the southern hub of opium production and sale, specifically Helmand (more detail in this previous AAN dispatch). A real affiliation with ISKP would also have meant a departure from their previous targeting pattern driven only by criminal and economic incentives. Instead, there has been no shift of tactics to show a new political and ideological affiliation.

What further leads one to doubt any sort of formal relations between the Murghabi network and IS(KP) is the total absence of references in the rhetoric of ISKP to a presence in Ghor. The Murghabi network, or a supposed Ghor cell for that matter, have never featured in ISKP propaganda, despite its constant desire to show it is expanding its territory. Moreover, there was no comment from IS or ISKP in reaction to the news of the 25 October killings when officials declared Daesh had perpetrated the carnage. (2)

Aftermath: Trying to clear ‘Daesh’ from the Murghab Valley amidst government discord

Following the carnage in Kasi, deep anger boiled up against the Murghabis, not just the bandits but the whole tribe – not just from the Khudayar and Sultanyar tribes who had seen ‘their’ people murdered in Kasi, but from residents of Feroz Koh generally. Thousands of people marched in Feroz Koh on 26 October 2016 to demonstrate against the killing and participate in the funerals. The dominant feeling described by participants to AAN was a desire for immediate revenge. This prompted influential local leaders to try to calm the protestors down. One of these leaders was General Mohayuddin Ghori, commander of the 207 Zafar Army Corps based in Herat, who earned popularity among Ghoris during his career in the army since the 1980s (during Dr Najib’s era). Speaking to the protestors, he vowed to avenge the killing to the last drop of his blood. In the meantime, he urged the people not to act independently and to coordinate their plans with the government forces under his leadership.

Apart from the carnage of 25 October 2016, there has been a general ill-feeling among the urban ‘tribes’ of Feroz Koh towards the Murghabis that has built up gradually over the last several decades. The recent killing refreshed old resentments. Local elders said the October mass killing was reminiscent of another aggression against the Khudayar and Sultanyar in the late 1980s or early 1990s that was even more atrocious – on both sides. Residents recalled that the Murghabis, angered by the killing of a notorious bandit named Abdul Khaliq (reportedly a relative of General Ahmad Khan Murghabi) by a Khudayar elder, pillaged the villages of the Khudayars and Sultanyars, including in Kasi. In revenge for Abdul Khaliq, the Murghabis killed more than a dozen men and abducted and later ‘forcibly married’ 15 to 20 women and girls. The incident left a deep-seated feeling of antipathy towards the Murghabis.

The old grudge and the new anger following the killing of the Kasi villagers in October 2016 has been directed, not just at the perpetrators, but at the entire Murghabi population. Even those hailing from Murghab who live in Feroz Koh have found themselves a target of growing resentment. Some Murghabis went into hiding following the massacre. They reportedly included well-known people with official positions and political clout in Feroz Koh. Those who were seen as having supported the Murghabi network in their incursions into the city suburbs, such as the residents of Ghalmin, an area that connects Feroz Koh to the Murghab Valley, are now also perceived as accomplices, according to people who took part in the demonstrations following the killing.

On 30 October 2016, as the three-day funeral ceremonies for the dead ended, hundreds of armed people from across Ghor started to gather in Feroz Koh under the command of their local commanders and warlords with the aim to attack the Murghab Valley. Their mobilisation coincided with a build-up of various ANSF units for a ‘clearing operation’ targeting the valley and its vicinity. Government officials and locals reported the mobilisation of about 1,500 men, almost half of them independent militias led by warlords. A source involved in the logistics for the operation said that, while the militias came with their own weapons and motorbikes and some brought their own food (slaughtered sheep and bread) and blankets, food and blankets from the government were also distributed. On the ANSF side, General Ghori was officially assigned to lead the operations, including being in overall command of the independent militias whom he urged to act in tandem with the ANSF. Special forces and commandos were also dispatched from Kabul to take part in the operations, but were put on reserve. Additionally, the Afghan Air Force was also reported to be taking part in the operation, dubbed Khashm-e Feroz Koh (the wrath of Feroz Koh).

However, a week after the onset of the operation, Sultanyar and Khudayar elders complained that the government was not fully determined to actually send its forces into the Murghab Valley. The combined forces arrived at Ghalmin, at the entrance to the valley where, on 6 November 2016, they were described as being in a state of standstill. While the target of the operation was apparently the armed groups from the Murghab Valley allied with Qari Rahmatullah, the Taleban also seemed to have mobilised their fighters to attack the ANSF. The movement’s media published reports of clashes in Ghalmin saying that “puppet forces” were trying to enter the Murghab Valley. For the Taleban, an extension of government control into Murghab would mean a direct threat to their strongholds in Charsada. Some locals reported that the ways from Ghalmin into Murghab Valley had been heavily mined, complicating the combined government forces’ advance.

With the government forces and local militias still lying in the trenches ready to attack the Murghab Valley, two issues are looming large: the lack of clarity about who the enemy is and a deep disagreement within the government on how to curb this network that has long haunted Ghoris, and to assure them that the government is indeed working hard to deliver justice.

The absence of a clearly defined enemy complicates the local conflict and politics and risks turning this into a festering tribal dispute, with all involved bent on settling scores. People who closely witnessed the mobilisation of the popular militias said that the target of the operation was the population of the Murghab Valley in its entirety and that the militia commanders saw all Murghabis as complicit in the attacks, both recent and historical, by Murghabi armed men against other residents of the province. One journalist who talked to a security official in charge of overseeing parts of the operation said the official implied that the ambiguity about the nature of the enemy was deliberate. According to the reporter, the official hinted that it was clear to everyone that Murghabis as a whole should be targeted.

The government blessing given to the participation of independent militias only exacerbates the already fragile security situation of Ghor – particularly given the abundance of weapons and warlords who run their fiefdoms with income from extortion and drug trafficking and whose private militias well outnumber ANSF in the province.

Taming the Murghab Valley, as seems to be the aim, is not going to be easy. Murghabi leader Qari Rahmatullah has been busy in recent days rallying residents of the valley to the defence of the tribe. According to some observers in Feroz Koh, the Murghabis have mobilised a force of around 1000 armed men. A Murghabi figure close to the late General Ahmad Khan, , has reportedly taken a leading role in this mobilisation. He used to be based in Feroz Koh running his personal business and has long been seen as a key figure in facilitating the flow of resources from Feroz Koh to the Murghabi network. General Ahmad Khan’s son, Shah Wali, is reportedly also actively supplying his tribesmen with weapons.

The possibility of the aftermath of the massacre escalating into another episode of violent score-settling along tribal lines, is underlined by the fact that the Murghabi commanders have again targeted the Sultanyar and Khudayar tribes. On 4 November 2016, the Murghabi network kidnapped 10 Kasi villagers from their farms in the Kutos area near Kasi.

Internal rifts within the national unity government and apparent partisan interests have cast shadows over the government’s ability to respond to the carnage in a way that satisfies the growing grievances of Sultanyar and Khudayar. Soon after the killings, Abdullah and Ghani separately and without coordination sent compensation packages (consisting of 100,000 Afghans for the dead and 50,000 Afghanis for the wounded) to the families of the victims. The compensation money in Abdullah’s name was seen as a move to try to defuse resentment against the Jamiat-backed Murghabis. The partisan politicking intensified after the mobilisation of forces for the Khashm-e Feroz Koh operation. According to a source present in a meeting of senior security officials in charge of coordinating the operations in Feroz Koh, on 31 October 2016, it was reported that Dr Abdullah (or his office) had called General Ghori three times in 24 hours to discuss calling off the operation, or at least minimising its e. (3)

Following the start of the operation, President Ghani visited Feroz Koh on 4 November 2016 and participated in a meeting with Sultanyar and Khudaray elders. He vowed that the government would avenge the death of the people and that the operation would go on until it had “eliminated the enemy.” However, the lack of a tangible advance towards the Murghab Valley despite the strong show of force upon launching the operation, and the new incident of abduction of the Kasi villagers on the same day as President Ghani’s visit, Koh has deepened local misgivings about the government’s willingness to stop the Murghabi network from their attacking Feroz Koh residents. Kasi elders questioned how the Murghabi armed men could infiltrate the village and safely take away the hostages to Murghab Valley, despite the presence of more than 1500 forces at the gates of the valley, in Ghalmin. Talking to AAN, several of them suspected there were people within the government and security forces who were helping the Murghabi network, thus allowing them to continue their atrocities and keep the urban tribes under pressure.

Why call the Murghabi network Daesh?

When local officials labelled the Murghabi network as ‘Daesh’ on 26 October 2016 they would have known exactly who they were talking about. It was well known to officials and Ghoris that the group that perpetrated the mass murder were local bandits, but local officials still called them Daesh. It made their job of explaining how this atrocity had happened on their watch more simple: there was nothing they could have done, indeed they were blameless, since the extremely brutal ‘Daesh’ had been at play. Branding the killers as Daesh also continues to serve as a useful SOS to try to get attention from central government.

Sounding the alarm in such a way is not a new phenomena. (In September 2014, for instance, security officials in Ghazni province announced that Daesh had massacred 60 villagers in the remote and mountainous district of Ajristan. When AAN looked (https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/messages-in-chalk-islamic-state-haunting-afghanistan/) into that incident, it found no signs of IS, but rather an intensification of the Taleban battle against local, pro-government militias. Unable to repel the escalating offensive, the then police chief appeared to have found it useful to cry wolf in order to obtain urgent support from central government and foreign forces.) The residents and notables of Ghor, however, were not impressed with the local authorities’ framing of the Kasi murderers as Daesh. Former governor Qazi Abdul Qadir Alam wrote on social media that labelling the culprits as Daesh was misleading the public and was counter-productive. Addressing local officials, he wrote:

By attributing this small gang to Daesh and the Taleban, you are aggrandising the actual perpetrators … All residents of Ghor are familiar with Faruq and Rahmatullah; they are not Chechens, Arabs or Uzbeks. They come from a specific area of Feroz Koh, and, for the last several years, have resorted to banditry, murders, looting and theft of livestock. Reporters and the media should not distract public attention from the actual culprits by naming them Daesh. … If you call them Daesh, you are creating allies and comrades for them and causing the government to procrastinate about taking action against them, since this government is slow in making decisions against Daesh and Taleban.

The Daesh branding of this group by government officials in Ghor was nothing short of a deliberate attempt to mislead. That the media comfortably went along with the tale was worrying. It also shows the risk of creating ‘realities’ on the ground, when officials and journalists use each other as sources for the same incident, thus corroborating what is in fact not true. Creating a false façade for an atrocity in order to cover up a mess that has been long coming might have seemed like a good plan for local officials trying to escape responsibility for the situation, but the journalist should have checked their facts – particularly as they were so obvious. In the end, such false alarms only complicate. They get in the way of identifying the core problem, as facts become distorted and confused. They also hamper the combatting of the actual threat of ISKP. Indeed, ISKP probably received a propaganda boost from the false claims. It also seems to have given them new ideas, as it only started talking of a ‘presence’ in Ghor after government officials had fabricated it. (4)

Edited by Kate Clark.

 

(1) The students were kidnapped on their way from Feroz Koh to their homes in the Lal wa Sarjangal district. According to provincial officials, the kidnappers demanded the release of Abdul Rahman Muzammil, a commander who had been convicted by a Kabul court of involvement in the killing of the 16 members of the wedding party in 2014 and sent to Pul-e Charkhi prison. During the student kidnapping, one of the hostages was killed, while the remainder were freed about two months after their abduction, in return for the release of several of the group’s members who had been arrested by NDS in Feroz Koh following the kidnapping of the students.

(2) IS(KP) claimed an attack in Ghor on 14 November 2016. An Afghan military helicopter was shot down by armed men in the Murghab Valley, during the operations that started in late October. According to local officials, the helicopter was damaged beyond repair and had to make an emergency landing, but no one was injured. The Taleban, which had been reporting about their response to the ANSF and allied militias’ Murghabi operation in their daily briefs, were the first to claim the downing of the chopper. ISKP’s claim came hours later.

(3) Dr Abdullah’s office has been asked for a reaction but did not respond, despite repeated prompting.

(4) See under footnote 2.

 

Hamid Karzai may have handed over the reigns of power in September 2014, but his influence on Afghanistan’s politics did not end. His calls for a Loya Jirga, as the National Unity Government approached its two-year anniversary, represented a danger to that government. However, political groups and influential individuals, even those who had previously been his closest allies, did not take up his call. Rather, some of his recent comments have met clamorous pushback and the expressions of support he did receive, mainly from people in government, only increased the controversy that surrounds him. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili (with parliamentary reporting from AAN’s Salima Ahmadi and input by Thomas Ruttig) looks at a number of recent incidents, their fallout and what they tell us about Karzai’s political clout.

Ever since he left office in 2014, former president Hamid Karzai has maintained a shadowy presence on Afghanistan’s political scene. In his compound not far from the presidential palace, he frequently meets those who feel belittled by the National Unity Government (NUG), or who have an axe to grind with it, often hosting elaborate luncheons. (The new president, Ashraf Ghani, has abolished such practices in the presidential palace.) There are rumours that the former president has been tacitly conspiring against the NUG (see this July 2016 Los Angeles Times article or this June 2015 Radio Free Europe article, both by Afghan authors), an accusation he has denied. More overtly, he has frequently granted interviews to the international media, opining on a wide range of topics. He told the German news agency dpa there were ‘no tensions’ between himself and his successor Ashraf Ghani, but that he would make his voice heard “when he had the feeling that the country was moving in a wrong direction on essential issues.”

“Death to Karzai”

Over the last few months, Karzai has been involved in a fair share of controversy. The most notable incident took place on 30 September 2016 in the Loya Jirga tent in Kabul, during the commemoration of the fifth anniversary of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani’s death. Rabbani was killed on 20 September 2011. (This year’s ceremony was held ten days after the date itself due to preparations for the signing of a peace deal with Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami, on 29 September 2016; see AAN analysis here and here). Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah and his two deputies, Vice-President Muhammad Sarwar Danesh, several cabinet members, jihadi leaders and other politicians, including Karzai, participated in the ceremony.

The incident took place during the speech of former MP Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf – a key Karzai ally and former ‘jihadi leader’, now head of the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) or Shura-ye Herasat wa Sobat-e Afghanistan (see this AAN analysis ) – which focused on the virtues of the jihad and the mujahedin. A participant stood up and started shouting “Death to the Taleban” and “Death to Karzai.” The tent erupted into chaos. When Sayyaf finally managed to calm the crowd, he said this was “not a gathering for abuse and insult, but of honour and homage.” When another participant loudly demanded that the man be thrown out of the tent for insulting his ‘elders’, things in the tent once again became chaotic. Karzai, flanked by security personnel, mounted the platform and tried to quieten the crowd.

When Karzai later took the stage to deliver his own speech, he was again heckled several times. Karzai urged the crowd to “let them [the hecklers] speak”, saying there was freedom of speech in the country and “the Americans chanted ‘Death to Karzai’ every day.” He went to great lengths to show his respect for Rabbani, apparently in an attempt to mollify an emotional audience. (Karzai succeeded Rabbani as head of state following the 2001 Afghanistan conference in Bonn. Rabbani stood down only after some pressure, including from his Jamiat party’s own ranks.) At the end of his speech, Karzai called the man who had shouted at him to the platform. He hugged him, saying, “This is Afghan unity. Foreigners should know that they cannot divide us.” The man was asked to apologise, which he did, and subsequent speakers, such as Atta Muhammad Nur, a leading Jamiati and governor of Balkh province, said they were sorry for the incident and praised Karzai for his bravery and for handling the incident the way he did.

The incident reverberated throughout the press and on social media. In Afghanistan’s political culture, where leaders and elders are generally shown public respect and where arguments tend to be couched in polite words, this was a rare public insult – showing how emotions ran high with regards to the former president and his statements.

Coming to Karzai’s defence, but not helping

In the days following the incident, several government officials came to Karzai’s defence. One of them was the powerful police chief of Kandahar, Abdul Razeq, who owes his position to Karzai. He became the strongman of the ‘Greater Kandahar’ region following the assassination of Karzai’s brother and Kandahar ‘proconsul’, Ahmad Wali, in July 2011. In an interview on 1 October 2016, commenting on the incident in the Loya Jirga tent, Razeq said, “It was a very bad incident. We no longer allow such things. We will follow up and ask why it happened.” (1) He then went on to criticise the leading mujahedin of the anti-Soviet and anti-Taleban struggle (he did not name names, but it was clear who was meant). In contrast, he described Mullah Omar and Mullah Dadullah as “the best and most deserving mujahedin.” This surprised many, given Razeq’s militant anti-Taleban stance on the battlefield. It strongly suggested that his remarks, apart from being an emotional statement of loyalty to the Karzais, also had an ethnic dimension (although he did also praise the late Jamiat commander, Ahmad Shah Massud). Karzai, Razeq and the two aforementioned Taleban leaders – both now dead – are Pashtuns, whereas many of the mujahedin leaders he implicitly criticised are not.

Next, the office of the National Security Council (NSC), led by Hanif Atmar, released a formal statement on 3 October 2016, hailing Karzai as one of the “effective and honourable personalities of the country’s contemporary history [who], as a former president and national leader, has special respect among the people, the National Unity Government and with current President Ashraf Ghani.” The statement further lashed out at the anti-Karzai sloganeers at the Rabbani commemoration, saying that the Afghan value of respect for elders was being trampled on by “specific circles … hired and paid by foreign intelligence services.” The circles, the statement claimed, had “started a chain of efforts towards the character assassination of our national elders and personalities” and warned that this “will not have good consequences.”

The NSC’s statement specifically mentioned that Karzai had been at the commemoration ceremony as a guest, although, according to a statement by Jamiat-e Islami, he was not an invited one. This statement, that was posted on Foreign Minister Salahuddin (son of Burhanuddin) Rabbani’s Facebook page, among other places, said that Karzai had expressly not been invited to the event, due to a series of controversial comments he had made with regard to the Taleban. (2) When Karzai came to the ceremony anyway, politeness demanded he not be shown the door. Jamiat further requested that the NSC office share details on its claim that specific circles were supported by foreign intelligence services, saying the NSC statement was “unnecessary and not in line with national interests” – thus politely rejecting the accusation that anyone in their ranks had foreign backing. It finally called on the NSC office not to “raise the voice of division and factionalism from the address of national institutions.”

Karzai’s earlier remarks about the Taleban

In the months leading up to the incident in the Loya Jirga tent, Karzai had, on several occasions, made comments that seemed to imply verbal support for the Taleban. While in power, Karzai had often referred to the Taleban as “disgruntled brothers” who had to be brought back into the fold, often hinting that the real enemy was elsewhere. Washington Post journalist Joshua Partlow, in his recently published Karzai biography, quoted the former president as reacting to the fall of a remote town to the Taleban by quipping, “So it was liberated.” (3) Recently, Karzai has become even more explicit. One of his most controversial comments came in response to the requests for the honourable reburial of the remains of Amir Habibullah II (‘Kalakani’), which prompted dismissive reactions in some Pashtun circles (see an AAN’s report here). In a video dating from early September 2016, Karzai responds to a person asking for his views on the reburial by saying: “Was Mullah Muhammad Omar a shah [king] or not? Where is he? Bring and bury him with honour, too.”

Given the fragile security situation and concerns over politicians’ increasing tendency to frame their grievances in ethnic terms, his comments did not go down well with many people. Expressions of outright anti-Karzai sentiments in some sectors of the media and the political arena, especially among Jamiat-e Islami supporters, reflected competing historical narratives about the country’s chequered past and the role of the Taleban. On 7 September 2016, in a speech commemorating the anniversary of Ahmad Shah Massud’s death, Chief Executive Abdullah also responded to Karzai’s comments, saying:

Mullah Omar, unlike Mr. Karzai’s claim, was not and is not the king of Afghanistan and the people had not accepted and do not accept him as their king. Mullah Omar was a criminal and a murderer, and, just like today the Taleban hold sway over parts of the country, at that time too they had occupied parts of the country.

Karzai’s second lot of controversial remarks were made during an interview with the BBC on 24 September 2016, in which he said that the Taleban were “an Afghan force that [can] come and capture a territory” and that the Afghan National Security Forces, also an Afghan force, did not have the right to retake that territory from the Taleban: “If we are all Afghans, why should one Afghan tell another Afghan that you cannot capture this area?”

The remarks prompted another round of anti-Karzai responses. For instance, on 2 October 2016, Hasht-e Sobh’s columnist, Ferdows, wrote that Karzai hurt the sentiments of the entire anti-Taleban constituency, describing this constituency as:

…not only the areas of influence of politicians such as Atta Muhammad Nur, Salahuddin Rabbani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah. The whole urban and law-abiding population of Afghanistan is against the Taleban and Talebani culture. The educated class, democrats, the media, civil society organisations, human rights activists as well as a significant segment of the general public of Afghanistan constitute the anti-Taleban constituency.

In parliament, on 28 September 2016, Ghor MP Sayed Nadir Shah Bahr asked how a political figure who had ruled the country for more than a decade could say that the Taleban had the right to capture any place they wanted, while large parts of the population supported the government’s armed forces? He added that such remarks would weaken the morale of the country’s security forces and asked that the government prosecute Karzai for his sympathy towards the Taleban – a call that was repeated by a few other MPs. Others called on the government to cancel his financial benefits. Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, the Speaker of the House, declared that the security forces who were fighting the insurgents and sacrificing their lives for their homeland, were the true sons of the country and that the Taleban were the enemy.

The Panjshir Young Elites Council (Shura-ye Nokhbegan-e Jawan-e Panjshir), a group of Tajik youths from Panjshir and Shomali, went a step further and issued a statement accusing Karzai of altering the constitution and making the national anthem monolingual, releasing Taleban prisoners (when they should not have been released) and having a hand in the assassination of figures like former Deputy Interior Minister General Muhammad Daud (in May 2011) and even Rabbani, himself (in September 2011). They called for his name to be removed from the title of Kabul’s international airport and launched a social media campaign to that effect (the name of the airport was changed to Hamid Karzai International Airport during President Ghani’s first cabinet meeting). Jombesh-e Islami, the party led by first Vice-President Abdul Rashid Dostum, joined the chorus with a statement on 19 October 2016 that, among other things, seemed to describe Karzai as the original plotter of the extension of the Taleban’s war into the north.

In response to these fierce and sometimes ridiculous denunciations, Karzai sought to clarify his remarks. In an interview with Voice of America, he said:

The question was about air strikes [saying] that you [Karzai] are against US air strikes, while the current government is in favour of them. I told them that I was against air strikes from the very first day of my government and I am still against them. I have said this and have not denied it until today, my position has not changed. Then I was asked, if the Taleban capture some parts of Afghanistan, are you still against that, I said, yes, I am [still] against the air strikes. But if the Taleban capture parts of Afghanistan and establish their government there, I am [also] against that. If I had been in favour of that, I would have accepted the Taleban’s flag [to be raised over their liaison office] in Qatar. I do not want the Taleban to capture parts of Afghanistan. But I am against war. (For details on the argument surrounding the opening of the Qatar office, see AAN’s previous reporting here).

Karzai’s political position

In his September 2016 interview with the BBC, Karzai seemed to have chosen Ghani’s side in the on-going impasse with the National Unity Government. When asked whether the NUG would still be legitimate after the NUG agreement’s original ‘expiry date,’ he said:

The constitution of Afghanistan elects the president for five years, the people of Afghanistan vote for the president for a period of five years. So based on Afghanistan’s election, the term of Ashraf Ghani’s government and presidency is not coming to an end [now]. But the agreement that Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah reached between themselves with the US intervention, [about] their government‘s term, the term of this arrangement that they made between themselves that one be the president and other the chief executive, should at the end of, or during, the two years be reconfirmed by calling a Jirga or [the country] returned to the presiden[tial system].

In a September 2016 interview with German Phoenix TV, he further clarified: “It must be clearly shown again that the responsibility for governing rests with the President.”

Karzai’s comments on the term of the NUG and, implicitly, on Abdullah’s position as chief executive, hit a nerve. The Abdullah camp still considers Karzai an accomplice in what it sees as the pro-Ghani electoral fraud in the 2014 elections. (4) On 18 October 2016, Mandegar Daily, which supports Abdullah, wrote that in 2004 and 2009 Karzai “derailed the elections from the path of integrity and transparency.” It further said that he “turned the elections into an insulting drama of democracy and a demonstration of ethnic inclinations” and that President Ghani and former president Karzai collaborated to “bring a big scandal to the 2014 presidential elections.”

While Karzai has maintained connections with different political, quasi-opposition groups, most of them have not adopted his position regarding the NUG, nor have they rallied behind his call for a halt to air strikes by US forces. Karzai particularly tried to influence Sayyaf’s Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, but it did not embrace his agenda. The incident in the Loya Jirga tent led to a further souring of relations between Karzai and Sayyaf, with Karzai accusing Sayyaf of creating bad press against him. (This occurs after a decade-long close political alliance, as a result of which Sayyaf became the key player in Karzai’s informal jihadi leaders’ council. This council was regularly convened in the presidential palace during crucial debates, the aim of which was for religious leaders to be seen to be bolstering the president’s standing.)

Karzai’s former chief advisor and foreign minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, who accompanied him on his September 2016 trip to Germany, criticised Karzai’s Taleban statements during an intervention at an international conference in Herat. In an interview with an Austrian magazine in September this year, Spanta also admitted that “Karzai’s tolerance vis-à-vis corruption was really very big,” although he maintained that Karzai had not been “the centre of all corruption” in Afghanistan.

Instead of rallying around Karzai, most political ‘opposition’ groups appear to have accepted the current status quo. Some are even taking a mediating role in the continuing rift between the president and the chief executive’s camps, as well as with First Vice-President Dostum, who has been showing growing public discontent with the president. On 31 September 2016, Sayyaf’s CPSA formed a committee led by its member and former Karzai intimus, Muhammad Omar Daudzai, that aimed to persuade government leaders to put aside their differences “for the good of the country.” In one of his latest interviews on 19 November 2016, Daudzai even alluded to possible participation in the NUG, saying, “The government has opened the consultation door since four months ago. It consults [with CPSA], on different levels, on big national issues. If consultation ultimately culminates in participation, there is not any fear [of that]. It is our own country. It is our own government.” Similarly, on 1 October 2016, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi’s High Council of Jihadi and National Parties (Shora-ye A’ali Ahzab Jihadi wa melli) held a press conference in which Mojaddedi and Karzai’s former vice president, Muhammad Karim Khalili, sought to downplay the rift within the NUG. (For more details on the various political ‘opposition’ groups, see AAN’s previous reporting here).

A narrowing appeal

Prior to the NUG’s second anniversary on 29 September 2016, Karzai’s challenges loomed large on the political horizon. He relentlessly pushed for a traditional Loya Jirga, which he hoped to use to his advantage, perhaps in order to stage a comeback as some sort of ‘father of the nation’ figure, should the NUG fail to resolve its internal deadlock or, indeed, collapse. His latest remarks – the ones that were interpreted as pro-Taleban, and those that directly called into question the position of chief executive – prompted a strong backlash, particularly in the circles around the chief executive himself. The clamour that followed the shouts of “Death to Karzai,” seems to have further dented his reputation as a national leader and to have cost him more allies.

Afghanistan’s semi-opposition groups, more often than not, are conglomerates of disaffected politicians hoping to secure government positions, rather than being clear-cut groups with a political programme of their own. As a result, they tend to avoid burning all bridges with the government. In the end, Karzai was not able to exploit the two-year anniversary of the NUG to his own advantage and his rallying cry for the moment looks to be less appealing for the other political groups. However, Hamid Karzai should not be written off too soon. His nationalist, anti-US statements do resonate with sections of the population and elites and, most importantly, political allegiances can change rapidly in Afghanistan. A much-speculated possible adoption of some of Karzai’s allies into the cabinet, on the heels of the recent parliamentary interpellation of ministers, indicates that he might be recasting his outright confrontation to carve out influence within the government. And rather than challenging the whole NUG, he may now be slowly throwing his weight behind one of the two camps.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert and Thomas Ruttig

 

(1) General Razeq’s remarks were largely in response to the speeches at the ceremony, especially by Sayyaf who stressed the differences between the mujahedin and “the Taleban and other terrorists.” Regarding the anti-Karzai slogans, Razeq said:

It was a very bad incident. We no longer allow such things. We will follow up and ask why it happened. First he [Karzai] himself made a mistake to raise these incompetent people and bring them up to this stage. … We know all these mujahedin. They nod their heads and thump on the desks claiming to be mujahed. They are neither mujahed, nor they should nod their head to claim to be mujahed. Mullah Omar was the best mujahed who overthrew the five governments they had established; one had tied a scarf around his head in the western part and controlled five provinces, the second was in the Mazar region, who had worn tie and established a government for himself. Jalalabad was a separate government. One government was in Chahar Asyab and Maidanshahr. Karta-ye Naw, Wazir Akbar Khan Hill and Paghman and “Company” were other separate governments. To see all these [shows] Mullah Omar had a very good government and provided best services to country.

For more details, see also here.

(2) The Jamiat statement, which was posted on Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani’s Facebook page among other places, stated that:

After Hamid Karzai, former president of Afghanistan, recently expressed his position about the Taleban in an interview, a wave of objections and concerns about this position developed in society and was widely reflected in the media and social networks. That is why Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan, realising the sensitivities created among the people, did not invite the former president to the fifth anniversary of the martyrdom of the leader of jihad and resistance, which was attended by more than five thousand people. His name was not included in the agenda prepared by the commission for holding the anniversary, chaired by Vice-President Sarwar Danesh; but Hamid Karzai himself was kind and came in, requesting [that he be given a chance] to deliver a speech, which unfortunately led a number of the participants in the ceremony to chant slogans against him.

Yusuf Saha, Karzai press secretary told AAN that Karzai had received an invitation, but he had not been sure whether the commission organising the anniversary, which was chaired by Vice-President Danesh, or by Jamiat, had sent it. Copies of the invitation have since then been published on social media, see for instance here.

(3) Joshua Partlow, A Kingdom of Their Own: The Family Karzai and the Afghan Disaster, Knopf: New York 2016. Karzai quote from a review in The Economist.

(4) In an address to his supporters immediately following the elections on 8 July 2014, Abdullah said:

During the last days, as we fully believed and believe in the clean votes of the people of Afghanistan, we made our last efforts to separate the fraudulent votes from the clean ones; but the triangle of the Palace [Karzai], the election commission and one election campaign team [Ghani] decided to announce the results. I assure the conscious, right-centric and brave people of Afghanistan that we will never accept the result of this fraud, not for one day, not for one month and not for two months.

The Afghan parliament’s lower house has sacked seven ministers in a new wave of interpellations (estizah). It is not clear who instigated the estizah motions, MPs themselves or Palace intrigue, or who will come out as the winner (the president has told the ministers to stay in their posts and called on the Supreme Court to reverse the MPs decisions). But the affair shows that the long-standing conflict between the two camps within the government is far from over. The estizah affair is compounded by additional rifts within the Jamiat party and the long-standing conflict between the executive and parliament. Thomas Ruttig (with input from Ehsan Qaane and Salima Ahmadi) looked into the various levels of conflicts and concludes that another painful process of appointments – and wrangling over them – could be restarted, further bogging down the government.

Seven ministers voted off

The Wolesi Jirga, the Afghan parliament’s lower house, voted seven members of the cabinet out of office last week. MPs scrutinised 16 ministers in five sessions held every day, an unusual although not unique pace of work (a 17th minister who was on the original list had already resigned for – genuine – health reasons and was exempted). Usually, the Wolesi Jirga only convenes on Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays and struggles to reach a quorum (see AAN analysis here and here), but for these sessions over 200 out of the current 235 MPs participated in each one.

The procedure is called estizah (interpellation) and the power of the MPs to deliver such motions to call ministers to account is enshrined in the constitution. Use of that power, however, has often proved detrimental to government; it has regularly interrupted both the work of the cabinet and parliament itself (which could have devoted its time to more urgent legislative matters). For the National Unity Government (NUG), which took a painstaking two years to establish a full cabinet that finally completed in June 2016, this is the second estizah round this year. The previous motion, against the women’s affairs minister, Delbar Nazari, in July 2016, failed. The government had also managed to get its security minister candidates through parliament relatively smoothly, in April and June 2016, and it had looked as if MPs had become tired of toppling ministers – prematurely, it seems now.

Officially, this time the MPs called those ministers to account who had not been able to spend more than 70 per cent of their ministries’ development budget for the financial year of 1394 (2015). (Afghanistan’s budget consists of two parts, the budget for running costs and the development budget for all other projects and investments.) This was not a first: in 2013, during the last year of President Hamed Karzai’s era, 11 ministers came under estizah for the same reason. However, this time the ministers were voted out of office for this reason (in 2013 all survived). The threshold was different this time: while in 2013, all ministers that had spent 50 per cent or less of their development budgets were summoned, this was now increased to 70 per cent. (1)

On the evening of 12 November, after the first estizah session, in which all three ministers were voted off – Salahuddin Rabbani for Foreign Affairs, Mahmud Balegh for Public Works and Nasrin Oryakhel for Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled – the government intervened for the first time. The president and the Chief Executive invited the MPs to send a delegation to discuss the situation and suggested that they suspend the summoning of the ministers. The MPs accepted the invitation but declined to postpone the estizah sessions.

The president then called an emergency cabinet meeting on 14 November 2016 and turned to the Supreme Court with a query as to the legality of the estizah (see here, here and here). In 2007, then President Karzai had asked the court for a similar judgment, after parliament had fired his foreign minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta after he had unable to block the deportation of a huge number of Afghan refugees from Iran; the court declared the parliamentary decision invalid and Spanta continued in his job. It can be safely assumed that Ghani is hoping for a similar outcome.

The cabinet meeting was attended by both the president and chief executive, the latter after a long absence due to disagreements with Ghani. The president instructed the dismissed ministers to continue their work until the Supreme Court’s verdict. As a result, starting on 13 November 2016, the votes in Parliament were taken in the absence of the ministers concerned.

Ministers who lost the votes of confidence:

• Salahuddin Rabbani, Foreign Affairs (12 November); nominated by Abdullah
• Mahmud Balegh, Public Works, (12 November), nominated by Ghani
• Nasrin Oryakhel, Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (12 November), nominated by Ghani
• Assadullah Hanif Balkhi, Education (13 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Muhammadullah Batash, Transport and Civil Aviation (13 November), nominated by Ghani
• Farida Momand Higher Education (14 November), nominated by Ghani
• Abdul Razeq Wahidi, Telecommunication (15 November), nominated by Abdullah

Ministers who secured the votes of confidence:

• Eklil Hakimi, Finance (13 November), nominated by Ghani
• Sayed Sadat Mansur Naderi, Urban Development (14 November), nominated by Ghani
• Abdul Basir Anwar, Justice (14 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Assadullah Zamir, Agriculture (15 November), nominated by Ghani
• Salamat Azimi, Counter-Narcotics (15 November), nominated by Ghani
• Ali Ahmad Usmani, Water and Energy (15 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi, Refugees (16 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Abdul Sattar Murad, Economy (16 November), nominated by Abdullah
• Firuzuddin Firuz, Public Health (16 November), nominated by Abdullah

(For the exact numbers of votes, see the annex.)

The pressure of the presidency seems to have worked at least partially: the number of the ministers voted out by parliament declined over the week; in the last estizah session, on 16 November, all three ministers survived.

The most important estizah victim in the Dr Abdullah camp was foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani, as he is also the current leader of Jamiat-e Islami. Jamiat is one of the most powerful parties in the country. It is also the main support base for the president’s partner in the National Unity Government, Chief Executive Dr Abdullah, (although there were always some Jamiat leaders who were less than enthusiastic in their support). Salahuddin Rabbani has held the Jamiat lead ever since the assassination of his father, former president Borhanuddin Rabbani, in 2011, although still officially in an interim role.

Apart from these seven ministers, there is an additional need to find three other ones: Border and tribes minister Gulab Mangal has just been appointed governor of Nangarhar province, Information and culture minister Abdul Bari Jehani stepped down for health reasons and the Ministry of Mines and Petroleum is currently being run by the former deputy minister, Ghazal Habibyar-Safi, after the previous minister, Daud Shah Saba resigned in March 2016.

Development budget expenditure as a criterion

Formally it makes sense to measure the performance of cabinet members by looking at the spending of their development budgets, as one yardstick. With the division of the budget of Afghanistan’s government institutions, the spending of the development budget, which is fed both by domestic and external sources, reflects how much money ministries and similar institutions invest in their ‘real’ work, for example, in expanding services for the population in the provinces. (The other part of the budget covers salaries and other running costs only.)

Spending figures, though, are a quantitative – and possibly over-simplified – criterion, as they do not reflect the quality, usefulness or effectiveness of what the money has been spent on. The discussions during the estizah sessions also did not constitute systematic performance evaluations of the ministers by the MPs, which could have been done even in the ministers’ absence. As in former years, ministers who did attend the session cast doubt on the figures used by the MPs. For example, foreign minister Rabbani claimed – albeit in vain – that his ministry had in reality spent 73 per cent of its development budget (which would have safeguarded him from estizah).

Whether or not expenditure of development budgets is a fair or accurate way to measure ministers’ performances, it can be assumed that other criteria influenced MPs’ decisions. The usually outspoken Kabul MP Ramazan Bashardost, a former planning minister, indicated that bribes had been handed out to vote or not vote for particular ministers. When he urged fellow-MPs to “stop exchanging money,” his words also indicated that there were both ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ among them. A pro-Ghani MP told AAN that the president himself had encouraged MPs to vote down ministers who did not spend their development budget and had even proposed a threshold of 80 per cent. As always, these accusations are difficult to pin down (although AAN has tried). If budget spending had been the MPs’ point, Bashardost argued, then all ministers below the 70 per cent threshold should have been fired, without exception.

The multidimensional power-struggle behind the estizah

It is not clear who instigated the estizah motions – MPs themselves or Palace intrigue. There are strong rumours in Kabul that the president was planning a cabinet reshuffle anyway and that a caucus of MPs had intervened on his behalf to engineer it through the Wolesi Jirga. But it was clear that various conflict lines converged over the past week and influenced the outcome of the estizah sessions.

First, the estizah motions represent a new round of the on-going power struggle within the NUG. Ostensibly, Ghani and Abdullah had ended their conflict before the Brussels donor conference. For a long time before that, the NUG had presented an unappealing image of disunity which was harming its chances of securing ongoing foreign funding. Harmonisation was achieved, but only on the surface. The underlying problem remained unsolved: Abdullah’s side complains about Ghani’s management style and tendency to micromanage, versus the Ghani camp’s view that Abdullah and his team block reform. Ghani, so one theory wented, wanted to break out of the impasse by reshuffling his cabinet and weakening Abdullah.

Ghani was, reportedly, particularly unhappy with both foreign minister Rabbani and refugee minister Alemi Balkhi. Both had refused to sign (see here and here) the government’s deal with the European Union on the return – both voluntary and involuntary – of rejected Afghan asylum seekers, on which a number of western governments had made the continuation of development aid before the Brussels conference tacitly conditional.

The unhappiness was not one-sided: Rabbani had opposed the president’s appointment of relatives and allies into key ambassadorial positions. These included Ghani’s uncle Qayum Kuchai as ambassador to Moscow, former finance minister Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, to Pakistan and, particularly, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani as ambassador to Spain, a post held for many years by the long-time aide to late commander Ahmad Shah Massud, Massud Khalili, who was retiring. Appointing Nuristani meant replacing not just an ally, but a close friend of Abdullah with someone from the opposing camp (who had moreover been in charge of the Independent Election Commission during the bitterly-disputed 2014 presidential elections). After these complaints, an MP told AAN, Ghani had asked Rabbani to resign, who had refused and said that he had come from the Abdullah camp and the president could not ask him to vacate his post.

Sources close to the presidential palace and foreign minister Rabbani have told AAN they had the impression that the president was trying to push Abdullah aside in favour of acting Balkh governor, Atta Muhammad Nur. (The New York Times picked up the same rumours, read here, although it also reported that a presidential advisor had rejected the rumours.) The reshuffle, if it happened,  would represent a realignment of the Ghani camp with a different faction within Jamiat, rather than a complete drop of the party. (Playing one Jamiat faction against the other would be similar to former president Karzai’s approach; AAN analysis here.) The same sources, spoke about Ghani’s desire to have nine ministers reshuffled; this was also reflected in some Afghan media,  including in Sarkhat daily, which is considered close to National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar, on 13 November. In this context, President Ghani might not have been unhappy about parliament voting some ministers out of office.

Secondly, the two camps in the government are also competing in parliament to muster majorities, particularly so they can secure votes of confidence for ministers and other appointees they support, for example during estizah sessions. Parliament also has the power to delay laws and, by that, important political projects, as the on-going debate on the electoral law demonstrates. This is further complicated in a house without formal party-based factions, where MPs can switch sides easily.

While Abdullah’s Jamiat party has a relatively stable foothold in the Wolesi Jirga – although nothing close to a majority, the president has even less guaranteed influence, as he lacks an organised power base (such as a party or a movement) of his own. Over the past two years, the president and his allies – particularly Atmar – have worked among MPs to convince a number of them to cooperate with the Palace and to establish what amounts to an informal, pro-presidential caucus in the Wolesi Jirga.

On 14 November 2016, a group of at least 16 MPs (3) collected signatures and asked the speaker of the house to postpone the estizah sessions and urged their fellow MPs to vote for in favour of their proposal. They are ethnically and politically mixed, including both Jamiatis and members of Hezb-e Islami. The most active MPs include Nazir Ahmad Ahmadzai, who is from the president’s tribe in the southeast, as well as a southern, western and another southeastern: Lalai Hamidzai, Muhammad Saleh and Kamal Nasir Osuli. Furthermore, there is Haji Almas, an influential former Hezb-turned Jamiat commander from Parwan province, who is a Tajik and, for now, in the president’s camp. But this group failed in parts of their task, illustrating that the president is still far away from commanding a reliable support base in the Wolesi Jirga.

The debate about whether and when to hold estizah sessions also reflects a continuation of the rocky relations between the executive and legislative branches of government, a legacy of the Karzai years (AAN analysis here), and attempts by parliament to assert itself as an independent body vis-à-vis the presidency.

Inner-Jamiati intrigues

Thirdly, jostling over the still vacant leadership in Jamiat has  influenced the balance between the Ghani and the Abdullah camp in the NUG. Atta – who leads Jamiat in the country’s populous north and large parts of the northeast and who became head of the party’s Executive Council, replacing Ahmad Zia Massud, in 2013 – is said to aspire to the overall leadership of the party, wishing to wrest it away from its traditional leaders. They have traditionally been, on the military side, Panjshiris (Ahmad Shah Massud and his commanders) and, on the political side, Badakhshis (Rabbani and son). Abdullah belongs to the Panjshiri faction.

A number of MPs thought to be close to Atta – including Assadullah Sharifi and Farhad Azimi, both from Balkh – had been campaigning against the younger Rabbani and for close Ghani ally Eklil Hakimi (currently finance minister), AAN was told by sources close to the governor. This would, if true, have been part of a quid-pro-quo between Ghani’s and Atta’s supporters. An MP who asked not to be named, told AAN that a person had come to him “before the voting process started and asked me to give a vote of no-confidence to Rabbani” and later “called me to [tell me to] give a vote of confidence to Hakimi.”

Atta rejected these reports in a statement released on his Facebook page on 12 November 2016, condemning the MPs for their “wrong” decision on Rabbani and assuring Jamiat he would do everything to keep their leader in his ministerial position. Earlier, on 2 November, he had confirmed though that he was engaged in negotiations with President Ghani (which he said Abdullah was aware of), but called claims in the Afghan media that he was about to leave his position in the north “incorrect.” There have been long standing rumours that he aspires to a cabinet post, as a staging post for a possible run in the 2019 presidential election (already in 2014, he tried to assume the role of king maker, see AAN analysis here). Atta’s strategy could be to try to weaken Abdullah and replace him as Ghani’s key Tajik ally.

Bringing in new allies?

The other rumour in Kabul is that Ghani wants to create space for ministers from Hezb-e Islami, after a peace treaty was concluded with its leader in late September. The deal may well have made such rewards necessary, although nothing official has been said. Hezb is the traditional competitor of Jamiat, although the mutual tensions eased in 2014 when the then leader of Hezb’s legalised, non-insurgent wing, Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, supported Abdullah (and lost his cabinet post when Ghani won) and Abdullah chose as his running mate, former Hezb-e Islami intelligence chief Khan Muhammad. The party is already represented in government – apart from Khan there are, for example, two cabinet ministers – but not, of course, from within its insurgent wing. Both Hezbi ministers remained in their positions: Justice Minister Anwar won his vote, while rural Development Minister Nasir Ahmad Durrani was not summoned.

Ghani might even seek to placate his predecessor Karzai by making some of his allies minister. Karzai, over many months, has become one of the major critics of the NUG, pushing for a Loya Jirga to decide the fate of the government and in particular the future of the position of chief executive, and regularly commenting on current events in ways seen as critical of the government. A partial rapprochement, bolstered by cabinet posts, could take some steam out of that uneasy relationship (more on this in a forthcoming AAN dispatch).

A mixed outcome

Politically, the outcome of the week-long estizah sessions was mixed. In terms of numbers, the president and his camp (including for example, Vice President’s Dostum’s Jombesh party) lost four ministers: Balegh, Batash, Oryakhel and Momand. Abdullah lost three: Rabbani, Assadullah Balkhi and Wahidi. (2) However, in terms of clout, Ghani’s key ally, finance minister Hakimi, was saved from sacking (Abdullah has reportedly long wanted his nephew, currently deputy minister of finance, Muhammad Mustafa Mastur, for this job), while the Abdullah camp lost Rabbani (foreign affairs). Murad (economy), another key Jamiati, did survive, however.

EU countries will also have noticed with interest that refugee minister Alemi Balkhi – nominated by the Abdullah camp, but more of an independent – survived. He has proven a difficult partner in talks on migration issues and one not always agreeing with the president.

Next round: the budget

The dismissal of more Ghani allies than Abdullah allies, and the loud protests by most MPs on the second day of the estizah sessions against the government’s attempt to postpone them, made it plain that the president’s work in parliament is not yet where he wants it to be. The circle of pro-presidential MPs still does not command a majority. The Abdullah camp continues to have a lot of influence, but cannot command a majority either. The middle ground – vulnerable to political pressure and plain bribery – is too wide, and it is too lucrative for MPs not to be there.

The estizah sessions may have been a cunning plan that backfired. If the president had indeed intended to reshuffle his cabinet, the estizah possibly came too early. Either way, whether the summonings came at his instigation or the MPs’, parliament has again proved it is unpredictable and has its own will. The president was left having to do damage control yet again.

But even if the estizah had been successful in getting rid of exactly those ministers he considers in the way of his policies, the president would have alienated key partners in the NUG – while possible new allies, such as Atta, would have had demands, too, including on appointments. And there would again be no guarantee that the new people would be more effective than those who are now in positions and who cooperate with the president on his reform plans.

The estizah motions have revealed what everyone suspected, that the internal problems of the NUG are far from over. All the intrigues and rumours that were part and parcel of the latest developments – even if the rumours were false – create further mutual distrust, rather than enhance cooperation. The fragmented character of Afghan institutions (including not only the party-less parliament, but also parties such as Jamiat) results in unpredictability for all sides and continues to produce mixed results. In the end, it is difficult to judge who gains and who loses. Moreover, the bad relations between the executive and legislative branches in an over-centralised presidential system, part of the Karzai legacy, continues to stand in the way of smooth political work.

There is more to come, and probably very soon. If overruled by the Supreme Court on behalf of the president, an unhappy parliament might block the budget for the 1396 (2017) fiscal year which it has to vote on next week. That has been threatened already by one MP, Zazai Watandost, speaking to AAN earlier this week (and publicly repeated by influential eastern MP Haji Qadir). It will also be very time-consuming to again fill the vacant cabinet positions. Appointments have been the main bone of contention between Ghani and Abdullah, and there is no reason to believe the two men will suddenly be able to agree on new appointments without rancour or endless delay.

Edited by Kate Clark

 

(1) The new threshold had been set in the Wolesi Jirga’s plenary session on 2 November 2016, after the representatives of its 15 permanent commissions failed to agree on one in a joint meeting in the second half of October.

Only four ministers escaped estizah by spending more than 70 per cent of their development budgets: Minister of Commerce and Industries, Humayun Rasa from Abdullah’s team; Minister of Interior, Taj Mohammad Jahed from Abdullah’s team, who secured his position after the fiscal year in discussion (1394/2015) had ended; Minister of Women Affairs, Delbar Nazari from Abdullah’s team; and the Minister of Haj and Endowments, Faiz Muhammad Usmani. The Ministry of Defense does not have a development budget.

(2) Out of the women ministers, Oryakhel and Momand were voted out, but Salamat Azimi, the Jombesh-affiliated Minister of Counter-Narcotics survived. Usually, women are particularly vulnerable to votes of no confidence.

(3) This group of MPs included: Engineer Zikria, Nazir Ahmad Ahmadzai, Hashem Rahmani, Saheb Khan, Kamal Nasir Osuli, Eqbal Safi, Muhammad Reza Khoshak Watandost, Obaidullah Kalimzai, Masuda Karokhi, Haji Almas Zahed, Munawar Shah Bahaduri, Saleh Muhammad Saleh, Sayed Muhammad Akhund, Qazi Abdul Rahim, Lalai Hamidzai and Haji Abdul Majid.

 

Annex: The estizah votes

No. Ministers Positive Negative Blank Invalid Results

1

Foreign Minister 58 140 6 3 Dismissed

2

Labour and Social Affairs Ministers 56 144 5 2 Dismissed

3

Public Works Minister 33 164 5 2 Dismissed

4

Finance Minister 85 112 2 5 Remained in his position

5

Minister of Education 68 131 3 2 Dismissed

6

Minister of Transport 51 142 6 5 Dismissed

7

Urban Development Minister 135 59 2 5 Remained

8

Justice Minister 95 101 1 4 Remained

9

Higher Education Minister 63 131 3 4 Dismissed

10

Telecommunication Minister 49 147 3 2 Dismissed

11

Agriculture Minister 131 62 4 4 Remained

12

Counter-narcotics Minister 72 114 9 6 Remained

13

Water and Energy Minister 60 115 23 3 Remained

14

Minister of Refugees 105 90 3 3 Remained

15

Minister of Economy 114 81 4 2 Remained

16

Minister of Public Health 170 28 2 1 Remained

The International Criminal Court’s Office of the Prosecutor has said it will “imminently” be taking a decision on whether to request authorisation from judges to commence an investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan. The Taleban could be investigated, among other offences, for murder and intentionally attacking civilians, while Afghan government forces, and the US military and CIA could be investigated for torturing security detainees. As Kate Clark and Ehsan Qaane report, this next step towards US citizens possibly being called to trial in The Hague has arisen just as Donald Trump, a man who believes in torture, has been voted into the White House.

The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) released its 2016 Preliminary Examination Report on Afghanistan (released annually) on 14 November 2016. The report says that the OTP had determined there was a reasonable basis to believe that, at a minimum, the following crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction had occurred:

• Crimes against humanity and war crimes by the Taliban and their affiliated Haqqani Network;
• War crimes of torture and related ill-treatment by Afghan government forces, in particular the intelligence agency (National Directorate for Security) and the Afghan National Police;
• War crimes of torture and related ill-treatment, by US military forces deployed to Afghanistan and in secret detention facilities operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, principally in the 2003-2004 period, although allegedly continuing in some cases until 2014.

The Preliminary Examination also said that thresholds of admissibility had been reached, ie the alleged crimes are under ICC jurisdiction, are sufficiently grave, are not being addressed by domestic or other legal bodies (although this is “subject to further information that could be provided by the relevant national authorities in the course of the preliminary examination or any subsequent investigation”) and there are “no substantial reasons to believe that the opening of an investigation would not be in the interests of justice.”

The Taleban

There is a reasonable basis, the OTP said, to believe that the Taleban and the Haqqani network have committed war crimes (murder; intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, humanitarian personnel and protected objects; conscripting children; and killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary – all of which, it said, “were committed on a large scale and as part of a plan or policy”) and crimes against humanity (murder; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty and persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political grounds and on gender grounds, all “allegedly committed as part of a widespread and/or systematic attack…” – for full quote, see paragraphs 206 and 207 of the report.)

In terms of admissibility, the Taleban and Haqqani network’s crimes passed the gravity threshold. As to whether domestic courts are dealing with suspected war criminals, the OTP pointed to the almost complete lack of any investigation or trial of alleged war criminals in Afghanistan (1) and to the 2009 Amnesty Law which provides amnesty to everyone who committed war crimes, including those who, in the future, reconcile with the Afghan government (see also this AAN report). It was noticeable, in this respect, that the government recently also granted immunity to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his armed men in the context of the peace agreement signed with Hezb-e Islami on 29 September 2016. (2) Amnesty for war crimes in domestic legislation can be interpreted as unwillingness by the state to prosecute.

The NDS and Afghan police

Multiple sources, the OTP said, including the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), UNAMA and a presidential fact-finding commission in 2013 have reported on the prevalence of torture in Afghan government detention facilities. The OTP estimates 35 to 50 per cent of conflict-related detainees “may be subjected to torture” and says there is a “state of total impunity.”

There is a reasonable basis to believe, the OTP said, that Afghan authorities have committed the war crimes of torture and cruel treatment; outrages upon personal dignity pursuant to article; and (this is new in the OTP’s reports) sexual violence. Naming the Afghan intelligence agency the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, Afghan Border Police and the Afghan Local Police (ALP), it says available information suggests the alleged crimes were committed on a “large scale.” Although there is no indication that they were committed “as part of any plans or policies at the national level,” in some cases, it said, there were plans or policies at the level of facility, district or province.

The US military and CIA

The information available, says the OTP, provides a reasonable basis to believe that during interrogations of security detainees and in conduct supporting those interrogations, members of the US armed forces and the CIA:

… resorted to techniques amounting to the commission of the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, and rape… Specifically:

Members of US armed forces appear to have subjected at least 61 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity on the territory of Afghanistan between 1 May 2003 and 31 December 2014. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Members of the CIA appear to have subjected at least 27 detained persons to torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity and/or rape on the territory of Afghanistan and other States Parties to the Statute (namely Poland, Romania and Lithuania) between December 2002 and March 2008. The majority of the abuses are alleged to have occurred in 2003-2004.

Crucially, the OTP says these “alleged crimes were not the abuses of a few isolated individuals,” but rather were part of a policy:

The Office considers that there is a reasonable basis to believe these alleged crimes were committed in furtherance of a policy or policies aimed at eliciting information through the use of interrogation techniques involving cruel or violent methods which would support US objectives in the conflict in Afghanistan.

It notes their use ended when the authorities decided to stop using them, indicating the alleged crimes were ordered, rather than being the work of random individuals.

Unlike the 2015 Preliminary Examination report, for both US and Afghan forces, rape is mentioned in the sections on the use of torture in the interrogation of security detainees.

As to civilian casualties caused by the international military, something which many survivors and the families of those killed hoped would be taken up by the ICC, this now looks unlikely. Civilians can be lawfully killed during conflict. (3) As the OTP said, “[A]lthough these operations resulted in incidental loss of civilian life and harm to civilians, in most incidents the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the military forces intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.”

There were a few incidents where lack of information meant the OTP could not determine whether harm done to civilians amounted to war crimes. If the judges (the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber) authorised an investigation, it said, and depending on whether this matter passed selection and prioritisation criteria, they could be looked into further. However, it is unclear if even these incidents of civilian casualties, if investigated, would be considered potential war crimes or whether they would meet the gravity threshold of admissibility.

The evidence 

The OTP does not go into the evidence, so the following is very much the authors’ initial take on possible investigations.

The Taleban regularly and publically claim to have committed what are, in effect, war crimes, as in a recent example, the deliberate attack on the German Consulate (a civilian target) in Mazar-e Sharif last week. (The attack killed four and injured more than one hundred civilians living nearby.) UNAMA routinely reports such incidents in its Protection of Civilians reports. In the first six months of this year, for example, it found the Taleban had claimed 51 attacks which deliberately targeted civilians or civilian locations. AAN has itself investigated such incidents claimed by the Taleban (see for example, here and here). Both in their codes of conduct (layhas) and public declarations, the Taleban allow or have ordered the commission of war crimes; these include the targeting of Afghan civilians working with the government and foreign organisations, justice sector workers and journalists with certain media organisations (see here and here) and in the early days of the insurgency also schools, teachers and NGO workers.(4)

There have been multiple reports on the use of torture by NDS, in particular, but also by the Afghan police and ALP (see here and here). The Afghan government has acknowledged the use of torture in government facilities, but as UNAMA has reported, has failed to take criminal or even administrative action against torturers, creating effective impunity. AAN has also reported regularly on this issue (dispatches also contain links to the major investigations by UNAMA and AIHRC: see for instance here, here and here). (5)

In 2001/2002, the US administration of George Bush decided, in its handling of ‘war on terror’ detainees, to forgo the Geneva Conventions, including common article 3 which, among other things, bans torture and “degrading and humiliating treatment.” The president claimed the ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ he authorised did not amount to torture, although the OTP clearly believes otherwise.

The US’s use of torture against security detainees was systemic (although not every detainee was tortured) and there is a wealth of documentation about how decisions were taken and the misgivings of many in the military and the CIA about its use. The torture has been detailed by human rights organisations; the US government (see a list of investigations up to 2008 put together by the International Center for Transitional Justice); Congress, looking at both the military and the
 CIA; journalists (for example, here and here) and former detainees. Methods used included being deprived of sleep for days, waterboarding, food deprivation, being continuously shackled, being forced to kneel or stand in painful ‘stress positions’ for extended periods, being beaten, kicked, soaked in cold water, being stripped and sexually humiliated, and being forced to listen to music loud enough to deafen for hours at a time.

Media headlines (for example, here and here) about the ICC report have mainly focussed on the possibility of Americans being in the dock for war crimes. The US is not a member of the ICC. Bill Clinton signed the Rome treaty that established the court in December 2000, but George W Bush renounced the signature in May 2002 saying he feared Americans would be unfairly prosecuted for political reasons. However, Americans could still be prosecuted for alleged crimes committed in Afghanistan because it is a member. The Rome Treaty came into force in Afghanistan in May 2003 and only crimes committed after then are admissible (some of the most egregious and best-documented US torture cases, including three deaths in custody took place before then). However, there could be investigations into earlier alleged of torture by the CIA of detainees in Poland, Romania and Lithuania, given, the OTP said, there was a nexus to the Afghanistan conflict. The Rome Statue entered into force in Poland and Romania on 1 July 2002 and Lithuania on 1 August 2003.

Trump-era practices?

The interrogation practices which could now be investigated by the ICC as incidents of torture were eventually outlawed in the US. In 2005, Congress banned the techniques which Bush had authorised and, in 2009, Obama passed an executive order restricting interrogators to using only techniques authorised in the Army Field Manual; that order was codified into law by the Senate in 2015. Obama called waterboarding torture and his attorney general, Eric H Holder, said the country was owed “a reckoning” for torture carried out after the September 11th attacks. However, in the end, Obama decided not to conduct a broad criminal investigation into Bush-era officials saying, “We need to look forward, as opposed to looking backward.”

However, the new US president-elect is again officially championing those techniques. Like Bush, Trump believes torture ‘works’. As AAN has reported, he has praised waterboarding, saying, “I like it a lot. I don’t think it’s tough enough.” Even if it did not work, he said, he would authorise it because “they deserve it anyway for what they do to us.”

There may be other supporters of torture in the new Trump administration. Two men being suggested as possible secretaries of state are Newt Gingrich, former Senate speaker, who said of waterboarding, “under the normal rules internationally it’s not torture” and John Bolton, former Bush-era ambassador to the United Nations, who criticised Obama for saying the US state had used torture as it would be “aiding an effort to establish liability for the top political leaders up to and including President Bush and [former] Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld.”

The name of Jose Rodrigues has also come up as a future director of the CIA. Just after the 9/11 attacks, he was appointed chief of staff of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Centre and was later promoted to director of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. He was a key player in creating the CIA’s torture and rendition programme and in trying to cover up it up; in November 2010, after photographs showing detainees being abused at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were published, he ordered the destruction of video tapes showing detainees being water-boarded. Rodrigues could have been charged with misleading investigators or obstructing justice, but in 2010, the Department of Justice decided not to put him on trial.

Like Trump, Rodrigues has spoken of the need to go beyond the methods of torture signed off by Bush. “Enhanced interrogation techniques are well known to the enemy and we would have to come up with something else,” he told The Daily Beast, although he declined to tell the paper what that might entail. As anti-torture laws were passed during the Obama years, practicing torture again may not be as easy as it looks, although see here and here for legal analysis of what the new president’s options might be.

Trump has also said he wants to expand the ‘war on terror’ detention camp at Guantánamo Bay (with five remaining Afghan inmates, along with 55 others). Such a move would increase the potential for abuses to take place as inmates do not enjoy the same legal protections as those on mainland America and it is far more difficult for lawyers and journalists to scrutinise.

Conclusion

The ICC has been under fire for ‘only investigating Africans’ (that was the reason, said three countries, South Africa, Burundi and Gambia, why they were withdrawing from the ICC earlier this month. (6) In January of this year, Georgia became the first non-African country that the OTP received Pre-trial Chamber authorisation for to investigate – in this case, alleged war crimes committed during the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict over South Ossetia. Afghanistan could be the second. Even if it does, however, building cases against specific individuals, especially in a war zone, will be difficult. With its new report, the ICC may be one step closer, but it is still many steps away, from bringing Americans or Afghans accused of committing war crimes in Afghanistan to trial.

 

(1) The OTP mentions two possible exceptions: the pre-Amnesty Law conviction of Abdullah Shah, an Ettehad-e Islami commander for murders committed during the civil war in Kabul and “reportedly two senior members of the Haqqani Network… prosecuted and convicted by a national primary court in August 2016 for an unknown alleged conduct.”

(2) The OTP mentions Hezb-e Islami only in the context of the list of groups fighting the Afghan government.

(3) Civilians can lawfully be killed as ‘collateral damage’ during conflict. However, they cannot be targeted, combatants must take precautions to avoid causing civilian harm and if civilian harm is expected from an attack on a military objective, this must be proportional to the military gain.

(4) In the Taleban’s 2006 code of conduct, teaching in government schools was deemed illegal and punishments were harsh. Teachers were to be warned and if necessary beaten: “…if a teacher or mullah continues to instruct contrary to the principles of Islam, the district commander or group leader must kill him.” Education was allowed, but only in a mosque or similar institution, using jihad or Emirate-era textbooks and by someone with religious training. Schools were to be closed and if necessary burned. Any contract with an NGO, in exchange for money or materials, had to be authorised at the highest level, by the leadership shura. The 2006 code of conduct described NGOs as “tools of the infidels.” These instructions and descriptions were dropped in the subsequent codes of conduct of 2009 and 2010 (more on this here).

(5) A day after the OTP released its 2016 Preliminary Examination Report on Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Council, led by President Ghani, finally publically announced its commitment to the Rome Statute and other related matters, including prohibiting the recruitment of child soldiers into the Afghan National Security Forces, prohibiting civilian casualties, eliminating torture and bringing reform to the judiciary so that it can adjudicate international crimes. Additionally, the National Security Council stressed its commitment to cooperate with the ICC. Prior to this, in in January 2016, Afghanistan had established an inter-ministerial committee to look into how the country could interact with the ICC. The committee was tasked with developing a regulation to manage Afghanistan’s interaction with the ICC. That regulation is now in operation with the AIHRC in charge. A year ago, the OTP complained about the lack of Afghan government cooperation. In this month’s report, it said Afghanistan was preparing to share the “required information” with it.

(6) South Africa, Burundi and Gambia were joined on 16 November 2016 by Russia which said it was formally withdrawing its signature from the Rome Treaty, a day after the ICC published a report classifying the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 as an occupation.

If Hillary Clinton had won Tuesday’s race for the White House, the world would now have a good sense of who her top officials would be and what her foreign policy would look like. With a Secretary of State-turned-president, Afghanistan could have expected business to carry on pretty much as normal. With Donald Trump coming into office in January, however, nothing is certain. The US is Afghanistan’s main backer in terms of funding and foreign troops and also has a substantial continuing influence on government policy. Whatever readers may think about the US role in Afghanistan, any major or sudden shift in US policy would be bound to have huge repercussions. So, despite AAN being the Afghanistan, not the America, Analysts Network, senior analysts Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark have had a first attempt at working out what the Trump presidency might mean for Afghanistan.

Foreign policy was not exactly a key issue in the election campaign and Afghanistan – where America is fighting its longest war ever – barely featured at all. It got one (factual, rather than policy) mention in the first Clinton v Trump televised debate (see video in this article) and failed to make it into the second and third  debates at all. Associated Press has tried to find a reason why this happened:

The next president will face a new set of tough choices on Afghanistan early in his (…) term, including whether to increase or reduce U.S. troop levels and, more broadly, whether to continue what might be called Obama’s minimalist military strategy. The difficulty of these choices may explain, at least in part, why Trump and Clinton have been largely silent on Afghanistan.

The most striking mention of Afghanistan probably came when Trump campaign spokeswoman Katrina Pierson appeared on CNN in October 2016 and, speaking about 2007, said: “Remember, we weren’t even in Afghanistan by this time. Barack Obama went into Afghanistan.” Perhaps, she mistook the ‘surge’ for the 2001 invasion. During a campaign event in September 2016, Trump also used Afghanistan rhetorically, comparing it favourably with US inner cities – said: “You can go to Afghanistan. You can go to war-torn countries and you will find that it’s safer than being in the middle of some of our inner cities.” (The numbers were unpacked and found wanting on the BBC’s programme on statistics in the news.) (1)

The president-elect and his camp’s lack of foreign policy experience and, apparently, knowledge or memory of the continuing US ‘mission’ in Afghanistan is frightening. He has not spoken about Afghanistan much, but what he has said is picked through below. There are a few caveats. Firstly, Trump has made some strong, but often superficial and sometimes contradictory, statements about a whole range of foreign policy or foreign policy-related issues. Some of these were also later retracted, or toned down – such as blocking Muslims from entering the US (see the BBC’s collection of “30 things Donald Trump believes”).

Also Trump will not be ruling alone, of course, and US presidents have far less direct power than leaders in many other systems (the constitution aims to check, balance and, in many cases, delay presidential powers). Also, although Senate, House of Representatives and president will all soon be Republican, many elected Republican politicians did not support his candidacy, so that may also curb his power to act. On the other hand, as Newsweek argues, for example, “the views of Congressional Republicans may not even be relevant, given the executive’s dominance of foreign policy.”

Much of what Trump does, as well, will depend on who he appoints to key positions. About this, there is, as yet, little clarity. The influential blog, Politico, has some names but says that, first, “Trump’s divisive campaign may make it difficult for him to attract top talent, especially since so many politicians and wonks openly derided the president-elect over the past year,” and, secondly, that his transition team has stepped up identifying candidates, but holds its cards very close to its chest.

Reading Trump

There is a compilation of the ‘positions’ of the Trump-Pence campaign on its official website (2) in bullet-point form, entitled “Foreign Policy and Defeating ISIS.” Under the sub-heading “Donald J. Trump’s Vision”, a number of principles can be found, culminating in the following: “Advance America’s core national interests, promote regional stability, and produce an easing of tensions in the world.”

Peace, the website says, would be “peace through strength.”

The title shows that the war against the Islamic State (IS, ISIS or Daesh) is Trump’s priority, apparently equal to all other foreign policy issues. Although the emergence of Daesh did galvanise Obama into getting involved more fully in Syria and (again) in Iraq, and to sign off (an increasing number of) airstrikes against the group’s Afghan-Pakistani chapter, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) (AAN analysis here), in Afghanistan again, the outgoing president’s foreign and Afghanistan policies have encompassed far more than just addressing the Daesh threat. Obama has also massively increased the drone war in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, (although not all targets are suspected Daesh fighters). Trump, however, has repeatedly said the US military under his presidency would “quickly and decisively bomb the hell out of ISIS.” However, Trump was also speaking more about the Middle East here, rather than Afghanistan; he linked bombing ISIS with stopping Syrian refugees entering America (elsewhere he has promised to kick out any Syrian refugees who were already in the US). Although military lawyers would be unable to sign off anything that broke Geneva Conventions, Trump’s sentiments are clear.

In general, Trump wants to “rebuild our military, enhance and improve intelligence and cyber capabilities.” The US media expects that military spending will increase under Trump, so much so that, in March 2016, the investment magazine Fortune was already recommending the defence industry as their best buy: “Here Are the Stocks to Buy if Donald Trump Becomes President.” On 11 September 2016, there were reports that the shares of large armament companies had risen by up to over ten per cent.

On the other hand, Trump also wants to save money on some other aspects of military spending. He finds NATO a “rip-off” because US allies pay too little of its budget, although, in general, he was “all” for the alliance. He also announced a desire to collect “reimbursements” from countries protected by US troops (he singled out South Korea, Germany and Saudi Arabia. He has also been quoted as saying that his government would not automatically come to the aid of the Baltic states in case of a Russian attack. (He, though, tried to reassure Poland.)

This brings us to Afghanistan. If Trump does not want to risk American soldiers’ lives even for NATO allies, then why for Afghanistan? There are indeed some tweets from his official account – some though from 2013 – suggesting he is in favour of dropping US support to the country:

Let’s get out of Afghanistan. Our troops are being killed by the Afghanis [sic] we train and we waste billions there. Nonsense! Rebuild the USA.

And:

It is time to get out of Afghanistan. We are building roads and schools for people that hate us. It is not in our national interests.

Interviewed live on CNN in October 2015, he again said completely different things in almost one go: “We made a terrible mistake getting involved there in the first place.” And: “I’ve never said we made a mistake going into Afghanistan.” He also asked whether US troops were “going to be there for the next 200 years?” – only to descent partly into incomprehensiveness: “At some point what’s going on? It’s going to be a long time.” And:

OK, wouldn’t matter, I never said it. Afghanistan is a different kettle. Afghanistan is next to Pakistan, it’s an entry in. You have to be careful with the nuclear weapons. It’s all about the nuclear weapons. By the way, without the nukes, it’s a whole different ballgame.

On his website’s foreign policy part, there is no trace of Afghanistan. ISIS is featured and “nuclear Iran,” which he called “the single gravest threat, national security threat” in a campaign speech (quoted here) and “the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism.” He said the 2015 international deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme could lead to a “nuclear holocaust” and, in a speech to the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC in March, declared that his “Number-One priority” would be to “dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.” He later did concede it would be hard to destroy a deal enshrined in a United Nations Security Council resolution and, in August 2015, retracted his threat to “rip up” the deal, adding that he would “police that contract so tough they don’t have a chance.”

Although Afghanistan is, in the terminology used on Trump’s website, among the “fully operational” Daesh branches “in 18 countries,” ISIS in Afghanistan only gets a specific mention as the birthplace of both the father of the perpetrator of the June 2016 Orlando gay night club killings (the father was also said to have “supported the oppressive Taliban regime”) and the young Afghan refugee who attacked train passengers in Germany in July this year. In other words, Afghanistan features as a place where migrants come from who could have ISIS connections and might end up killing Americans in America.

‘Nation-building’, torture, Guantánamo

The Trump foreign policy ‘positions’ do contain an ambition to “end the current strategy of nation-building and regime change,” another hint – as in his tweets – that he sees a lot of the US spending in Afghanistan as futile. Whatever one might think of US spending in Afghanistan ­– and it can rightly be criticised for waste and its contribution to systemic corruption in the country – the US is by far the largest spender on the Afghan armed forces and government. Without US financial support, it is difficult to imagine the state, in its current form, surviving. The US also plays a political role, for example as wedding broker between Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah after the bitter Afghan presidential run-off, and mid-wife to their National Unity Government agreement in 2014. US ambassador Mike McKinley, Secretary of State John Kerry and occasionally Barak Obama by telephone have also continued to provide ‘marriage guidance counselling’ to the two Afghan leaders. Would the government still be standing without that pressure and cajoling?

Also likely to drop from any US agenda under a Trump presidency is support for democracy and democrats, and human rights and their defenders. For example, Trump told CNN that he believes the situation in both Libya and Iraq is “far worse” now than it ever was under Muammer Gaddafi and Saddam Hussain and that he would not pressure Turkey’s President Erdoğan over his crackdown on civil liberties. He has also praised the autocrat Russian president, Vladmir Putin, as a strong leader, “far more than our president has been a leader,” “a talented person” who had “great control over his country.” One hundred Republican ‘security leaders’ said, in an open letter published in March 2016 (more of whom below), Trump’s “admiration for foreign dictators such as Vladimir Putin is unacceptable for the leader of the world’s greatest democracy.”

On torture and the fate of the war on terror detentions camp at Guantánamo Bay, Trump has also taken extreme positions. Unlike Obama, he wants to keep the detention facility there, where there are five remaining Afghan inmates open and has even talked about adding to the inmates there, including US supporters of ISIS. He has praised the use of torture. He said, for example he liked waterboarding, eventually outlawed by President Bush in 2006 as potentially illegal and ineffective, “…a lot. I don’t think it’s tough enough.” Even if it did not work, he said, he would authorize it because “they deserve it anyway for what they do to us.”

In September 2016, a groups of former US military commanders, special representatives and ambassadors to Afghanistan as well as think tankers – including some with Republican and others with Democratic leaning – wrote to an open letter they called “Advice to the next U.S. president” to both candidates suggesting to stick to the “enduring partnership with Afghanistan” in the magazine The National Interest (full text and signatories here). They argued that:

The very enormity of that U.S. investment to date, and the value of Afghanistan in the broader struggle against jihadi extremism, argue strongly for trying to sustain—and build on—the progress we have collectively achieved so far.

The new president would have, they continue, “an opportunity to settle Afghan policy onto a more durable, more effective, and less demanding course… for a long-term American—and coalition—role in the country that avoids the recent pattern of nearly annual reassessments of whether the United States should stay, militarily and as a major donor,” “publicly-announced withdrawal timelines” and “unconditional” commitment – although referring to the 2015-2024 “decade of transformation.” At the moment, from what Trump has said, the experts’ thinking would seem to be a long way from his ‘natural’ response to the 16-year US involvement in the country.

Another collective statement, this time to the possibility of a Trump presidency from one hundred senior Republican ‘security leaders’, came in the already mentioned March 2016 open letter. They said Trump was unfit to be commander-in-chief and that he was “fundamentally dishonest.”

His vision of American influence and power in the world is wildly inconsistent and unmoored in principle. He swings from isolationism to military adventurism within the space of one sentence.

His advocacy for aggressively waging trade wars is a recipe for economic disaster in a globally connected world.

His embrace of the expansive use of torture is inexcusable.

His hateful, anti-Muslim rhetoric undercuts the seriousness of combating Islamic radicalism by alienating partners in the Islamic world making significant contributions to the effort. Furthermore, it endangers the safety and Constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of American Muslims.

Some personnel issues

Given Trump’s inexperience, The Washington Post and The Guardian suggest that the new president might just leave the job “to select personnel and coordinate policy” to his Vice-President Mike Pence whom the Post calls “at the very least a known quantity, [as] a former member of the House [of Representatives…] and a straight shooter” or “delegate foreign policy to Republican insiders such as Stephen Hadley, George W Bush’s national security adviser who is rumoured to be interested in reprising his role.” (3)

The Daily Beast has reported that when it comes to security positions in particular, Trump is already having trouble building a transition administration:

Team Trump is struggling to fill numerous key slots or even attract many candidates because hundreds have either sworn they’d never work in a Trump administration or have directly turned down requests to join, multiple current and former U.S. officials with direct knowledge of the transition efforts told The Daily Beast. Team Trump didn’t expect to win until the campaign’s internal polling a month before the election signaled a possible victory. That’s when senior Trump officials went into overdrive, trying to build a bench of experienced national security candidates with top secret clearances willing to work for a Trump presidency—and they met resistance across the landscape of experienced [Republican] national security professionals.

Those men who signed the anti-Trump letter, The Daily Beast contended, would not be offered jobs in the new administration.

Those who are known to be onside with Trump include retired Navy commander and campaign security adviser, Jeffrey D Gordon, who served for four years as a spokesman under Defence Secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates and General Michael T Flynn, a former Democrat who ran the Defense Intelligence Agency under Obama from spring 2012 to autumn 2014 and was Trump’s “top military advisor” during the campaign. Flynn had been a contender for the vice-presidency, although it finally went to Pence. Politico calls Flynn “Trump’s favorite general”; The New York Times writes that, “No one else on Mr. Trump’s national security team comes with the pedigree of General Flynn.“

This includes a number of tours in Afghanistan when he served as director of intelligence in the following units and organisations: in Combined Task Force 180 that directed all Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations in the country (until July 2002), at the Joint Special Operations Command, US Central Command (CENTCOM; June 2007 to July 2008) and the joint staff of ISAF and the US Forces-Afghanistan (from July 2008 to June 2009) and for all ISAF (from June 2009 to October 2010) when he spoke out publicly about how poor US human intelligence in Afghanistan was. Since then, however, he has moved away from the mainstream. In 2014, he was sacked as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, according to the White House because of ‘leadership issues’, but according to Flynn himself because of “the stand I took on radical Islamism and the expansion of al-Qaeda” vis-à-vis a “politicized” intel system. He tweeted that “fear of Islam is rational” and has said, “We are at war with a radical component of Islam and the way I believe it is that Islam is a, is a political ideology based on a religion.”

Other names coming up for senior positions, according to Politico, include Republican politicians such as Tennessee Senator Bob Corker or current chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich for Secretary of State and Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions for Secretary of Defense. Jeff Sessions was in charge of talking to the media in Trump’s defence plans (see here). Trump is also reported to be eyeing former US ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, famous for his deep dislike of the UN.

There is also talk in Washington about a more familiar figure to Afghans (he introduced Trump at an event, but maybe that was because he was chair of the hosting board (a video of that here)…:

…Zalmay Khalilzad, an ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq and the United Nations under President George W. Bush, may be in line for a position. Khalilzad, who introduced Trump before a foreign-policy speech in Washington in April, did not rule out serving in a Trump administration in a recent CNN interview.

Afghan reactions

In Afghanistan, the country’s two leading politicians, President Ashraf Ghani and CE Abdullah (press releases here and here), have, as is diplomatically usual, congratulated the winner. Both, in not too different words, emphasised the US’ importance as a “strategic partner“ to Afghanistan, particularly, as the Ghani statement put it, in the development of the country and fighting terrorism. Two former intelligence chiefs, Amrullah Saleh and Rahmatullah Nabil, were a bit more open in expressing what many Afghans hope for – that, in Nabil’s words, the US would “tackl[e the] save heaven/supporter of terror [i]n Pakistan.“

Former president Hamed Karzai, who continues to speak out on political issues and is sometimes suspected of continuing to harbour political ambitions (see for example here), joined in the congratulations quickly, although Trump, in a 2013 tweet when Karzai was refusing to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement said, “Can you believe that ‘President’ Karzai of Afghanistan is holding out for more, more, more and refuses to sign deal. Tell him to go to hell!” After the Trump win, Karzai tweeted that he hoped for “change in the US policy towards Afghanistan and the campaign against ‪#terrorism. Focus on sanctuaries beyond #Afghanistan.”

Afghanistan has always also had a US Republican fan base which believed the Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld ‘war on terror’ was exactly what the country needed, only more of it – to smash the Taleban militarily and, even more so, make Pakistan give up supporting them. So, there also currently illusions might prevail.

The Taleban, unsurprisingly, asked Trump to withdraw “all US forces” from the country as the “most important” issue. Their statement continued (via direct quote from Pajhwok’s Pashto service):

Our message to America’s the new president is that he should draft government’s future policy in a way that does not mute the independence of other peoples in the world and does not seek [US] self-interest through other nations’ destruction and detention, so that the whole world can be in security and ongoing crises can find an end.

Hazards for Afghanistan

Issues that may rebound on Afghanistan from a Trump presidency would include his openly hostile attitude towards Muslims and Muslims coming to America and his dislike of the Iran nuclear deal. Whether or not he could or, in office would still want to dismantle that deal, is not clear, but if he did, that would constitute a real hazard for Afghanistan, increasing the danger of a war in the region.

Trump’s strong element of isolationism is deeply relevant to Afghanistan. If that element prevails, Afghanistan might lose both military support and financial transfers. This, as the ‘experts’ letter to the future president quoted earlier argues, would mean, in practice, that the 2001-16 one trillion dollar US investment in Afghanistan would have to be written off. That might be difficult, particularly as cutting support would be at odds with his criticism of Obama’s withdrawal from Iraq and if it looked like the US was turning tail and fleeing the Taleban. Trump, keen to promote an image of the US becoming “strong again” surely would not want that. However, given what he has said on ‘nation-building’ and ‘ungrateful’ Afghans, it is not impossible to imagine such a withdrawal of support. A reduction in spending looks even more possible. Given that Afghanistan is more dependent on US largesse than almost any other country, what Trump finally decides will be his Afghan policy will have a large influence on the country’s fate.

 

(1) Trump was not the first to pull off a bad comparison. In 2010, a high-ranking NATO official in Kabul stated that “Here in Kabul and the other big cities [in Afghanistan…], the children are probably safer (…) than they would be in London, New York or Glasgow or many other cities.“ He later said the comparison “wasn’t very well put.“

(2) Be prepared to prove that you are not a robot when accessing the website.

(3) The man serving as the Trump transition team director for presidential appointments, William Hagerty, does not seem to have any specific Afghanistan-related background. He was an economic adviser to President George H Bush and transition team director of Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign in 2012.

 

 

 

Afghans make up more than a quarter of the inmates ever held at Guantánamo Bay, the largest national grouping among United States ‘war on terror’ detainees taken to Cuba. Most were picked up in the early years of the US-led military intervention when US forces carried out mass, arbitrary detentions of Afghans. In a major new report, AAN’s Kate Clark looks at the Afghan experience in Guantánamo, honing in on the cases of eight of the longest-serving Afghan detainees. Five are still in Cuba, while three were transferred to the United Arab Emirates in August where they are believed still to be in some form of detention. She finds the Afghans’ documents to contain outlandish errors of fact, bad translations, testimony obtained under torture, fantastical allegations and cases based on hearsay and unverified intelligence reports.

Reading through the files of the eight Afghans still in Cuba at the start of 2016 is to enter a Kafkaesque world. None of the eight were detained on the battlefield – six were handed over by Pakistan or Afghan forces and two were detained after tip-offs from unknown sources. Instead, intelligence forms the basis for all the detentions and that intelligence is threadbare.

The US military gets dates wrong, provinces wrong, mixes up non-belligerent groups and jihadists and reaches back to make ahistorical allegations – assuming bin Laden had set up al Qaeda a decade before he did, or deciding association with Hezb-e Islami in the 1980s (when it was part of the mujahidin fighting the Soviet occupation and, incidentally, America’s favourite faction) is proof of malign intent in the 2000s. Three of the detainees had associations with the mass, quietest, missionary organisation Tablighi Jamaat; the US holds that as proof of terrorist intent, even though the organisation is anti-jihadist, believing that now is not the time for fighting (jihad), but for preaching (dawa) and persuading Muslims to live better lives.

Thousands of Afghans (the exact figure is unknown) were detained in the early years of the US-led intervention. The 220 Afghans taken to Guantánamo (the total population of all nationalities was 781) included some Taleban, but the vast majority were non-combatants. They included men who had opposed the Taleban or were part of the new post-2001 establishment, old men with dementia or physical ailments and minors, including two boys who had suffered gang rape by a commander. There was also at least one Shia Muslim.

To determine why a particular Afghan was arrested, when looking at the case files, it often makes more sense to look at his personal circumstances than try to work out what links he might have had to the Taleban or al Qaeda: what factional or tribal conflicts was he involved in, did he have enemies who were allies of US forces or the CIA, was there an opportunity for an informer to make money?

In five of the cases, money or personal enmity appear to have been behind their detentions. This was a common feature in the early years of the US-led military intervention as the US military and the CIA sought to hunt down ‘remnants of the Taleban’ when remnants, in terms of forces offering resistance, did not exist (it would be some years before an insurgency took off in Afghanistan).

Haji Wali Mohammed, for example, a money changer in the central money market in Kabul, was captured by the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, in January 2002 and handed over to the US. He believes the ISI turned him over to the US because a tribal jirga had earlier ruled that he was owed money by an Afghan ISI informer. The US has accused Wali Mohammed of being a financier of both the Taleban and al Qaeda, although his files contain no evidence of him having any role beyond that of a publically-known money changer at a time when the Taleban were in power. Another man detained at Guantánamo, Kamin, an imam from Khost, looks to have been captured and handed over to US forces by the 25th corps of the Afghan army, a Khalqi communist militia originating from his home district. (The militia later escaped demobilisation under the DDR programme because of its close links to US forces. It subsequently became the Khost Protection Force, a CIA-allied militia which still operates and stands accused of abuses, including of detainees).

Many of the allegations against the eight Afghans featuring in the report are strange. Hamidullah, for example, who comes from a prominent Hezb-e Islami family in Kabul, was handed over by the NDS in what looks to have been a case of factional enmity; the Afghan intelligence agency was then controlled by Hezb-e Islami’s historical enemies, Jamiat-e Islami. The US military accused Hamidullah of working to bring former king Zaher Shah back to power in 2002 and of plotting with the “extremists” of Mahaz-e Milli (the National Front led by Pir Gailani, now head of the High Peace Council) against the Karzai government. Mahaz was always known as the most moderate of the mujahedin factions, monarchists who were dismissed by hardliners as ‘Gucci guerrillas.’ It has not fought since 1992. The US also alleged Hamidullah had plotted with Hezb-e Islami, the Taleban, various figures in the (pro-intervention) Jamiat-e Islami establishment, like MPs Mullah Ezat and Haji Almas, and the Iranians.

These sort of ‘alphabet soup’ accusations are common in the files. These were the allegations made against Kamin, the imam picked up in Khost city in 2003, for example:

It is assessed detainee is a key member of the Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) and/or the Al-Qaida Network. Detainee has participated in weapons trafficking, explosives training, operational planning, and attacks against US and Coalition forces in support of the Al-Qaida network. Detainee is affiliated with Al-Qaida, the North African Extremist Network (NAEN), Taliban, and Jayshe-Mohammed (JEM) terrorist Organizations and leaders; further more detainee has admitted ties to the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). 

Neither ACM or NAEN, despite their appearance, are actual organisations or exist anywhere outside US intelligence reporting. Nowhere is it explained why or how one man could be affiliated with so many groups. From intelligence and legal perspectives, such allegations of multiple, overlapping memberships of disparate (Afghan, Arab and Pakistani) organisations make no sense. Usually, chains of command form the basis for trying to understand an enemy like al Qaeda or the Taleban, and for making a case as to whether war crimes have been committed. Moreover, in Afghanistan where membership of an armed group is usually based on a solidarity grouping (clan, ethnic group or former comradeship), such lists are nonsensical. All the eight Afghans are accused of having been members of at least two groups.

The gap between allegations and evidence

Getting information on the detainees in Guantánamo has been a long, hard struggle given the Bush administration’s desire for secrecy. Transcripts of military review boards were finally published in 2006, after a two-year battle by the Associated Press using Freedom of Information Act requests and litigation. In 2011, WikiLeaks also published secret assessments of the detainees, revealing much of the sourcing on which US allegations had been based. Many assertions, it turned out, were based on weak, or indeed non-existent evidence. There was a heavy use of hearsay and double hearsay (X said Y said Z was a terrorist) and testimony from those who had been tortured. Six of the eight Afghans under study have said they were tortured in ways which match the methods the US military and CIA are known to have used. There is corroborating evidence (from the Senate report on torture or in testimony presented in court) for the use of torture in two of these cases. Accusations by fellow detainees, including those made under torture, are also accepted as evidence.

Unverified and unprocessed Intelligence Information reports (IIRs) are cited both in the military reviews and in court. One former intelligence officer described IIRs as a “generalized reporting vehicle that collects unprocessed and unverified summaries of claims made to U.S. intelligence agencies, usually by foreign sources.” The FBI has described them as raw intelligence reports which usually bear cautions such as: “WARNING: THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED.” The US military also uses summaries, rather than the actual transcripts of interrogations – which may have been lost or never made. It is easy to see how mistranslations, misunderstandings and incorrect inferences could creep in, given that these are summaries, not verbatim transcripts.

The US military also uses also strange, associational notions of suspicion. Bostan Karim, a seller of plastic flowers from Khost, is said to have “admitted” to meeting Jalaluddin Haqqani, of the ‘Haqqani network’. The encounter turned out to have been a, presumably obligatory, meeting of all the shopkeepers in Khost at a time when Haqqani was the pre-eminent commander in Khost: all the shops in the bazaar were closed for the event. At one of Karim’s review boards in Guantánamo, the military goes on to say that Haqqani had formed an alliance with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar which was being supported, guided and funded by al Qaida and the Jamat Ulma Islami [sic] which the US refers to as “Pakhtoon tribe” (it is a Pakistani political party) which “regularly recruited from a mosque in Abdabot [sic], Pakistan,” and “[a]fter Friday prayers, members of the organization solicited for volunteers to fight in the jihad.” It does not say which jihad they were recruiting for or what any of this had to do with Bostan Karim.

No way to plead one’s innocence

Once sent to Cuba, detainees found there was no way to persuade anyone that they were not combatants. In 2001, the Bush administration had believed America was facing a uniquely dangerous enemy and the old rules could not apply. It took unprecedented and unusual measures – keeping all details of the detentions secret, not applying the Geneva Conventions (including the minimum protection given by common article 3), withholding protections given to those suspected of crimes, and using torture in interrogations. This meant those arriving in Cuba were left unprotected by any of the usual measures (whether criminal or military) which aim to safeguard individuals from arbitrary detention by the state.

The administration eventually set up military review boards to try to prevent detainees seeking redress through the federal courts. These review boards never managed even to clean out the obvious factual mistakes in the files, let alone question substantive accusations. There was a presumption that detainees were guilty unless they could prove themselves innocent, but they were not told the specifics of the allegations against them and nor were they allowed to call witnesses or have lawyers.

Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of AAN’s study is that the civilian courts in the US completely failed to hold the executive to account. Supreme Court decisions in 2004 and 2008 ruled that detainees could seek redress through habeas corpus petitions made in the federal courts. One of the oldest human rights, a habeas petition forces the state to come to court to justify its detention of an individual. However, in the cases of the three Afghans under study who have made habeas petitions, the courts accepted evidence that would have been unacceptable in criminal trials (this was usually admitted on grounds of ‘national security’). Judges have accepted hearsay and evidence kept secret from the petitioners and their lawyers and allowed the government to repeatedly delay proceedings in ways which lawyers told AAN off the record they thought were deliberate.

Money changer Wali Mohammed, for example, had to wait for three years for a judge to rule on his case, as the government sought to re-open the record and present more evidence (some of it secret). In other cases, judges have accepted the testimony of those who have been tortured; they have weighed up whether testimony could be classed as voluntarily given if was made to a different US agency from the one which carried out the torture, or after a period of time had lapsed between torture and confession.

Federal courts have thus generally accepted the state’s evidence and its interpretation of evidence, without much question. Bostan Karim, the plastic flower seller from Khost, for instance, was turned over to the US by the ISI in 2003. The ISI claimed he matched the description of an al Qaeda terrorist and had a broken satellite phone in his possession while passing the border, which they claimed was used as a detonator for IEDs. Karim’s judge took this allegation at face value – as the US military had done before him – even though at the time, before a mobile phone network was established in Khost, satellite phones were in common use by those who could afford them. The judge accepted Karim’s possession of the phone as proof of terrorist intent.

Some end, for some, in sight

It seems likely that now, after between nine and fourteen years in detention, most of the remaining Afghans in Guantánamo will finally be released. A newish body, the Periodic Review Board, which has a mix of military and civilian officials, has been reviewing the case files of all the detainees still incarcerated. In the last year, all eight of the remaining Afghans have had their cases re-assessed. Six of them have been deemed safe for transfer (ie sent from Guantánamo to another country with security guarantees; this is not yet freedom). One was told his role with the Taleban had been “limited” and that he had been “misidentified as the individual who had ties to al-Qaeda weapons facilitation” – as he had contended all along. Another was told there was a “lack of clear information regarding his involvement with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban.” The other four were judged to pose no risk to the US, or a risk that could be mitigated. In August 2016, three of the men were transferred to the United Arab Emirates, where they were put into a ‘de-radicalisation’ programme. Afghan and US officials told AAN it is not clear how long they will have to stay there and whether they will be allowed, eventually, to return to Afghanistan.

One of the Afghans looks likely to remain in indefinite detention, however. In September 2016 the Periodic Review Board decided to keep Muhammad Rahim in detention. The ISI had captured him in 2007 and handed him over to the CIA, saying he was a close associate of Osama bin Laden. The CIA then ‘rendered’ him to Afghanistan where he was tortured, the last ‘participant’ in the CIA’s global rendition programme. Rahim was subject to eight sessions of sleep deprivation including three which lasted for more than four days and one for almost six (138.5 hours). The interrogation resulted in no useful intelligence. Still, Rahim was transferred to Guantánamo and the CIA told the world they had captured bin Laden’s translator.

The US has classed Rahim as a ‘high value’ detainee, which means much of the substance of the allegations against him is classified, even from Rahim himself. He has had no opportunity, even in the limited ways open to other detainees, to defend himself. His lawyer, Carlos Warner, has complained that, while the state can say what they like about his client, he cannot even say why he thinks he is innocent, because to do so would be to reveal classified information. Warner has written extensively about what he calls the unconstitutional abyss that lawyers find themselves in, when trying to represent detainees in Guantánamo.

… this is a system where as counsel I usually cannot share the Government’s allegations with my own client. I cannot investigate the charge because I cannot share the allegations with the subject of the investigation. Imagine trying to get to the bottom of a bar fight that resulted in a death. I can’t tell my client who was killed or why the Government says he’s involved. I can’t even tell him when the assault occurred or in what bar the assault took place. I certainly cannot interview or cross-examine his accusers. Moreover, I can’t visit the bar or talk to any other witness to the fight. I am also prohibited from speaking with the coroner or any of the investigating officers. Sometimes, the Government will say “we have important evidence about your client regarding our allegation, but we can’t tell you what that evidence is.” Sometimes, the Government just tells the judge without telling or notifying me at all. All of my communications with my client are observed and recorded. All of my legal correspondence is read and inspected by the Government. Guantanamo has been referred to as “Kafka-esque,” and that reference is right. “Catch-22” also aptly describes the legal malaise that is currently called Guantanamo habeas corpus. Nothing in my legal training prepared me for this endeavor.

Rahim’s is the only one of the eight cases where the US accusations somewhat coherently point to an Afghan working with the al Qaeda leadership before the fall of the Taleban. Proof that he played a role after the collapse of the Taleban regime, however, is far less evident. We cannot see the evidence against him, but scrutiny of court documents shows the nature of the evidence against him. It is similar to the other cases: Rahim’s own testimony and that of two other detainees (one of whom has also said he was tortured) and unprocessed and unverified intelligence reports. Given what we know about the evidence used against the other detainees, it cannot be assumed that the secret evidence against Rahim is either accurate or true.

Most of the last Afghans in Guantánamo may soon be out, although not yet back and living freely in Afghanistan. Yet there has been a huge cost in lives wrecked. Hamidullah, the ‘Mahaz-e Milli extremist’ has requested not to be returned to Afghanistan or Pakistan. Those who told US forces he was a terrorist are still in power and he fears for his safety if he goes home; he asked the Periodic Review Board to send him to any other Muslim country. Other detainees have suffered depression or other mental health problems. “Prison usually damages people,” said Shayana Kadial, the lawyer for Kamin. “[M]ost of our clients leave not angry but rather broken and depressed.”

The Afghan experience in Guantánamo shows the perils of arbitrary detention. The miscarriages of justice are clear, but the consequences go beyond the harm done to individuals and their families. The early mass arrests – often accompanied by torture by US forces and Afghan allies of US forces, as well as looting and extortion – was one of the main reasons driving some Afghans to become insurgents. Arbitrary detentions, therefore, helped re-kindle a war which Afghans thought was finally over and one which they, and the US, are still now embroiled in. For the US, the costs have been high too; eight years after promising to shut Guantánamo down, President Obama is still struggling with what to do with America’s ‘war on terror’ legacy.

 

Download Executive Summary here.

Read the full report here.

 

 

 

In the first nine months of this year, over 5,000 Afghans voluntary returned to Afghanistan from Europe. The recent signing of an agreement between Afghanistan and the European Union to allow deportations of those who have not been accepted as asylum seekers means the numbers of Afghans returning from Europe will rise. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Fazal Muzhary have been looking into the fate of recent returnees, who may have gone heavily into debt to fund their trip, and hearing from two young men who have just returned from Norway after trying to bicycle their way to a life in Europe.

This dispatch is part of a joint migration series by AAN and the Kabul office of the German foundation Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).

In early October 2016, Afghanistan signed four new readmission agreements, with Germany, Sweden, Finland and the EU. (2) These new agreements are a response to the large influx of Afghan asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, with over a quarter of a million Afghans arriving in Europe in this period (see AAN earlier reporting on Afghan migration here and here). Germany, one of the main countries pushing for a deal, received the bulk of the influx, with 180,000 asylum applications by Afghans in 2015 and 2016.

The agreements were partly in response to the trouble European countries faced in getting the Afghan authorities to cooperate with the deportation of failed Afghan asylum seekers. The agreements have widely been interpreted as a signal that European countries intend to significantly accelerate the rate of forced and voluntary returns.

Voluntary and forced returns

On 24 February 2016, a group of 125 Afghans arrived in Kabul from Germany (see here). This was the first group of voluntary returnees from Germany, after Europe’s ‘migration crisis’ in 2015. Germany hosts the highest number of Afghan refugees after Pakistan and Iran (for the number of Afghan refugees in Germany for the last 13 years, see here). Apart from having their trips back to Afghanistan paid, the German government – in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) – also provided each of the 125 returnees with 700 Euros to help with their reintegration. Around 70 Afghans from this group continued their journey to their home provinces; IOM also covered the cost of this second stage of the trip, as well as accommodation in guesthouses in Kabul ahead of the journey.

The rate of voluntary returns from Europe has been steadily increasing. Between 2003 and the beginning of 2016, IOM facilitated over 15,000 voluntary returnees from countries including the UK, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, France, Belgium and Australia, in other words, on average, a little over a thousand individuals per year. In the first half of 2016, over 4,000 voluntary returns including 440 families were assisted by IOM. In this period, the highest number of voluntary returns was recorded from Germany (51 percent) followed by Greece (26 percent) and Turkey (10 percent). The majority of the returnees belonged to the age group of 19-26 (40 percent, out of which 87 percent were male) followed by 27-40 (21 percent, out of which 74 percent were male).

In terms of the Afghan government’s stance when it comes to repatriations of Afghans from Europe, its focus so far had been on trying to prevent mass forced returns (or any forced returns at all). Recently, however, after a long negotiation process with the EU, the Afghan government had been forced to accept a series of readmission agreements in which it committed itself to readmit Afghan nationals who are found to have no legal basis for remaining in an EU member state (for more details see AAN reporting here). Although the agreements contain no indication of numbers (other than that it says that there will be no more than 50 non-voluntary returnees per flight in the first six months), an earlier leaked memo stated that “more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be returned in the near future.”

The Afghan government does not appear to have a policy in place to deal with this potential influx of returnees from Europe, many of whom will have exhausted their economic means during their journey to Europe and their families may well have gone into debt or sold economic assets, such as land, to help send them (see previous joint AAN and FES study on this issue here http://aan.af/2452WyK). Although there seems to be a document called the Comprehensive Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme, (AAN has not seen the document, but an advisor with the refugees’ ministry mentioned it in a conversation), it is yet to be incorporated into the Strategic Solutions for Afghan Refugees programme, a regional multi-year initiative, which aims to help facilitate voluntary returns and sustainable reintegration, while at the same time providing assistance to host countries. The programme, moreover, would need to be funded and implemented by IOM, or another agency.

The government and the refugees’ ministry may also be overwhelmed with returnees from another quarter: already this year (figures from early September 2016), more than 225,000 Afghans have returned from Pakistan and 245,000 people become IDPs this year. This means that, already, over one million people are anticipated to be ‘on the move’ internally and across borders in 2016 (see UN Humanitarian Flash Appeal from September 2016 here). The returnees from Europe, who, so far, have come in far more limited numbers and get help from IOM, do not seem to have been a priority and the Afghan government seems to have relied on the fact that they are already receiving some support from their temporary hosts in Europe. But as their numbers rise, the issue will become more pressing.

This is particularly relevant, as public opinion will probably not respond favourably. Many Afghans believe their government is not doing enough to persuade European governments, as well as Pakistan and Iran, to allow Afghans to stay, as long as the country is still in conflict and the economy weak. Although forced returns from Europe have been limited, they are likely to pick up in the near future. Voluntary returns, already at an all-time high, are also likely to sharply increase (particularly as pressure grows in European countries). The concerns are what will happen to those returning in the near future, whether voluntary or forced.

AAN spoke to two recent returnees from Europe – Muder Khan from Khost province and Rahmatullah from Samangan – who spoke about the individual experiences of those who have tried their luck in Europe, but end up being returned home.

The travel to Europe: taking the Arctic route

Both of these returnees were young men who had travelled to Norway via Russia in the autumn of 2015. This was at a time when Afghans overtook Syrians in terms of numbers of arrivals in Norway. They travelled via what the Reuters news agency has referred to as ‘the Arctic route’. According to Reuters, almost 22,000 people sought asylum at Norway’s borders in the first ten months of 2015, including 7,858 from Syria and 4,079 from Afghanistan – with a record number of arrivals at the most northern frontier of 196 per day in November 2015 (compared to 10 arrivals throughout the whole of 2014). The Norwegian directorate of immigration even sent a tweet warning in November 2015 that single Afghan men who have legal papers to stay in Russia, risk being sent back to Afghanistan if seeking asylum in Norway (see here).

Muder’s story

Muder Khan, a man in his late twenties from Khost province, made use of the so-called ‘bicycle loophole – a legal loophole that allowed people to cross the remote Arctic Russian-Norwegian border by bicycle (described in a Guardian article here). He had found a smuggler in Gul Bahar business centre in Kabul and left money with a friend, who was charged with paying the smuggler once he safely arrived in Norway. He then first travelled to Russia on a 40-day tourist visa arranged by the smuggler and then crossed the border with Norway by bicycle, again on advice of the smuggler. This northern route, across the Arctic Circle, was much less busy and faster than the Balkan route was in 2015 and 2016. He recollected the journey he undertook in October 2015 in his interview with AAN:

I left Afghanistan for Europe in October 2015 and arrived in Norway in November 2015. Initially, I wanted to go to Germany… but in the end, my target was just to get to Europe and to find a safe place. First the smugglers told us that the way through Ukraine would be easy, because we could fly to Moscow and from there go to Ukraine and from Ukraine to Europe… I had a 40-day Russian tourist visa with me. When the Russian soldiers stopped us in Belgorod [near the Russian–Ukrainian border] they asked us where we were going. The smuggler had advised us to tell them that we were going to a wedding party. But the Russian border guards still detained us. We were held for three days and three nights; then they released us. When we got back to Moscow, the smuggler told us that the route through Norway was much easier and that we could easily get to Europe from there.

I spent ten days in Moscow, after I returned back from the border with Ukraine. After that we went Murmansk where we stayed for a few days. After ten days the Russian soldiers [probably referring to Federal Border Service guards] provided bikes for us and from there we biked onto Norwegian soil. The Norwegian soldiers [at the other side of the border] welcomed us. When we showed them our documents, they took our passports and after checking them they took us to a city.

Rahmatullah’s story

Our second interviewee, Rahmatullah, is a Shia Muslim from Samangan province whose family lives in Karachi in Pakistan. He chose to leave Afghanistan via the Arctic route in mid-September 2015. He said he was, “too afraid of the smuggling route through Iran,” hence had chosen the route via Russia. He shared the following story with AAN:

I wanted to go to Europe through Russia. First I went to Moscow by plane. From Moscow we went to Murmansk by plane and from there I got into Norway. I arrived in Norway in October 2015. I had not decided to go to Norway in the beginning. I wanted to go to Austria and that was also what I had agreed with the smuggler. But when we got to Moscow, I found out that some of my friends tried to go to Austria through Ukraine and had faced a lot of problems. These friends told me not to go to Austria. And then the border was also closed.

Refusal, deportation and arrival

Both men received a negative response from the Norwegian government after which both claimed they were detained (see here for an overview of Norwegian asylum procedure and here what happens if the asylum claim had been rejected). Rahmatullah did not give any details on how he was arrested by the Norwegian police, but he told AAN that he spent two weeks in detention, before he was sent back to Afghanistan:

After I got a negative response from the Norwegian government, the police put me in jail. The reason they gave was that whoever receives a negative response from the Norwegian government, tries to flee the country. They thought I would escape from Norway. Therefore they did not let me out of the jail at all. After that, I hired a lawyer for my case. An Afghan and three Norwegians helped me to pay for the lawyer who worked on my case. When the police put me in jail, they told me that they would deport me in two weeks. My lawyer sent my documents to the UN, but since there was too much workload on the UN workers, they could not deal with my documents. The lawyer told me that after I was sent back to Afghanistan, he would still follow my case. I was deported on 21 June 2016. Since then I have been in touch with my lawyer. He said he is still trying [to get him back to Norway].

After a month in detention, the Norwegian government also sent back Muder Khan. He told AAN the following story of his arrival to Norway and stay in the country:

When we got onto Norwegian soil, for the first three to four months, the police treated us well, but later they put us in small rooms; there were 15-20 people in one room and the rooms were very cold. Other people who were with me in Norway had their applications rejected very quickly, but I only got my answer after eight months. The reason they gave for the rejection was that, since I am living in Khost province, which is not a secure province, I should better move to Kabul city.

This is not a surprising answer. “The courts in Europe accept that many are in danger in their home provinces, but they argue that these people can be safe in Kabul,” Liza Schuster told AAN. Schuster is a lecturer at the City University of London, who has researched what happens to Afghans post-deportation. (See also her recently published article, in which Schuster questions European court decisions, and argues that Kabul is not safe for people to be deported back to the city).

Muder Khan explained to AAN how he was returned to Afghanistan, without making it fully clear whether he was deported or returned willingly. This is what he told AAN:

After I got the rejection, they put me in jail for a month [he is referring to a centre for deportees or asylum centre as the jail]. The jail cells were small. I was kept in the cell from eight in the evening till nine in the morning. After I spent one month in jail, the Norwegian government deported me [NB he used the English term and it was not clear if he meant the return was voluntary or force]. They didn’t ask me anything or say anything or promise anything. I thought: even if I resist and say that I don’t want to go back to Afghanistan, it will not change the decision of the Norwegian government. So I kept silent and they sent me back to Kabul.

Muder Khan was sent back on 3 September 2016, ten months after he arrived in Norway in November 2015.

Both men had spent a small fortune to pay for their travel to Europe. Rahmatullah, a cook who had worked for international media companies in Kabul since 2010, paid 17,000 US dollars to reach Norway. Since he returned in June 2016, he lives in Kabul on his own, while his family is still in Karachi. He has no job and no money to pay his debts. He told AAN:

I am not happy with my life, because I cannot freely walk in the city as other people can [he is referring to threats he said he received from locals in Samangan, because he worked with international organisations as a cook]. I am waiting for the response from my lawyer, I hope he will help me get back to Norway. If nothing happens I may go to Karachi and join my family. I don’t feel safe here and I don’t want to stay here.

Muder Khan worked as an interpreter and contractor with the American military in Khost and as a project supervisor with MEC, earning 600 US dollars a month. He paid 13,000 US dollars for his trip to Norway. He is in Kabul. He told AAN he cannot go back to Khost province:

I am going from one friend to another [staying in their houses]. I have no job at all. Currently I am in debt for 7,000 US dollars to my friends who helped me. I also sold a car to finance my trip to Europe.

Support for those who return

Those who choose to return voluntary with IOM assistance generally receive several benefits, as opposed to those who do not join the scheme. A facilitated return often includes travel costs and in-airport support with check-in and arrival (deportees get this too), a medical assessment before travel, including basic treatment and referrals, temporary accommodation in Kabul and onward transportation to the provinces, information provision and counselling, often a small cash grant to address the most immediate needs during travel and on arrival (clothing, communication etc), and more extensive post-arrival counselling services, if required. Finally, to ease the reintegration, voluntary returnees can receive additional support in the form of training, business start-up funds, job referrals, and schooling and living cost assistance. These programmes are designed to allow returnees to finish their education, to learn a skill (like carpentry), start small business, or find a job to help ease their reintegration.

Both Rahmatullah and Muder Khan said there was little help on offer. Muder Khan, for example, said:

The Norwegians paid me 350 US dollars for travel expenses in Afghanistan. The police who deported me told me I can also submit an application [for a reintegration grant] to the Norwegian embassy to provide me with 1200 US dollars, but I have not submitted it yet… The Afghan government did not support me and I have no budget to start a business with, but still I am looking to find a job.

Rahmatullah, it seems, got his 1200 US dollars grant from the Norwegian government immediately:

When the Norwegian police deported me to Kabul, they gave me 1160 US dollars. The Norwegian government also paid the expenses for a hotel in Kabul where I stayed for 14 days. The Afghan government did not give me anything; instead the Afghan police at the airport insulted me by using abusive words against me.

The size of the assistance grant depends on the governments that are sending back the migrants. For example, the UK government pays only 100 pounds to returnees, the German government around 700 Euros and the Finnish around 1000 Euros. The grant money is intended to help people get through the first couple of weeks or months after their return.

However, many people, like Rahmatullah and Muder Khan, have sold their belongings and borrowed a lot of money from family and friends, or moneylenders. After being forced to return to Afghanistan, if they are not plugged into a support network, they risk facing serious challenges. According to Schuster, “Those without networks face destitution, or worse, and are often forced to risk trying to return to the dangerous provinces [they had left in the first place].” Her research on what happens post-deportation found that, for these reasons, 80 percent of those who are deported, are likely to migrate again. Schuster, believes deportation represents a crisis that must be resolved. In a recent co-authored article (“What happens post-deportation? The experience of deported Afghans” with Nassim Majidi, Migration Studies journal) she argues:

If someone is deported before debts can be repaid, and if they are unlikely to be able to repay it post-deportation, there is a strong incentive to re-migrate, even if that means increasing the original debt. Debts, whether to family members or to more formal lenders, cannot be written off and those lenders recognize that their best chance of repayment is through financing re-migration.

Although, according to Schuster, most undocumented Afghans in Europe work in the shadow labour market, making minimal daily wages, for Afghans this still represents more money that many of them could make in Afghanistan. The chance of landing a job in Europe is thus considered insurance that they would be able to pay their debts and financially support their families.

Some European governments believe that media campaigns would change the way Afghans think. The German government, for example, has channelled money through the refugees’ ministry in an effort to try to stem the mass exodus of Afghans, with a social media and billboard campaign (from March 2015) (see here). It uses graphic images and messages aimed at discouraging those wanting to leave, such as, “Don’t go. Stay with me. There might be no return!” The number of Afghans leaving the country, however, continued to increase in the second half of 2015, and coincided with the opening of the Balkan route (see AAN report here).

The relatively unsuccessful media campaign resulted in a change of narrative of some donor countries, which started to consider re-shuffling the development aid towards the provinces which were sending the highest numbers of migrants to Europe to try, not only to prevent migration, but also help returnees to reintegrate. However, the Afghan government’s policy, which until recently was exclusively focused on defying readmissions, requires some fundamental reshaping and rethinking. Afghanistan has just received a pledge of 15 billion US dollars for the next four years at the Brussels conference on Afghanistan (see AAN recent reporting here), but with the government, and in particular the refugees’ ministry in denial of the problem, and not ready to cooperate, it seems that Europe would be a driver of the reintegration process itself.

 

 

(1) In the past 15 years, Afghanistan has signed memoranda of understandings on returns and readmissions with several EU/Schengen member states. These allow the countries to return or deport Afghans who failed in the asylum application. Including with France (2002), UK (2002), Netherlands (2002), Denmark (2004), Switzerland (2005), Norway (2005), and Sweden (2006, until 2009).

The EU and Afghanistan signed the readmission agreement on 2 October 2016 after a year of negotiations and several last minute hurdles – including, on the Afghan side, refusals to sign and an attempt to involve parliament. President Ghani and Dr Abdullah both backed the agreement, while Minister for Refugees Balkhi said Afghans migrants should be allowed to stay, regardless of whether their claims for asylum were accepted or not.

See AAN recent reporting here.

 

The failure to implement its own agreement and the continuing rift within the National Unity Government has served as a platform for political opposition groups across the spectrum to voice their criticisms of the government. In the past, Afghanistan’s political opposition has been made up of various councils and fronts, often associated with prominent powerbrokers and former government officials. This is still the case, but they have been joined by popular protest movements, such as the Enlightenment Movement. AAN’s Ali Yawar Adili and Lenny Linke (with input from Thomas Ruttig and Obaid Ali) look at who is who in the opposition and how each of them is positioning themselves vis-à-vis the government.

In many countries, a healthy political opposition is seen as crucial to keep governments in check and to provide the electorate with a possible future alternative. In Afghanistan, however, political opposition groups have struggled to coalesce around an ideology or shared interests. Rather ‘opposition’ groups have often formed like bubbles in the political churn, rising and falling, functioning as temporary instruments for prominent individuals who wish to maintain their profile, as they sit out periods without government positions hoping for high office again. The 2014 elections, if they had ended with an undisputed winner might have brought that pattern to an end, with the supporters of one strong candidate in government and the supporters of the other in the opposition. The opposite was true.

The bitter disputes of the summer of 2014 over who had won resulted in a government of national unity. The government was created under an agreement that divided the country’s political power between the two contenders on the basis of parity – at least on paper (see AAN’s previous reporting here).

The National Unity Government agreement did, somewhat bizarrely, establish the position of an internal ‘leader of the opposition’ within the executive – seemingly in addition to the position of chief executive:

…with the goal of strengthening and expanding democracy, the position of the leader of the runner-up team, referred to in the mentioned document as the leader of the opposition, will be created and officially recognized within the framework of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the basis of a presidential decree. The responsibilities, authorities, and honours of this position will be spelled out in the decree. After the formation of the national unity government with the presence of the runner-up team on the basis of this agreement, this position will act as an ally of the national unity government.

The idea, however, was almost immediately dropped and Dr Abdullah, the leader of the ‘runner-up’ team, simply became the chief executive (CE), as construed in the NUG arrangement.

Almost all political groups and figures had backed one or other of the two candidates in the 2014 presidential election. Given the patron-client politics dominant during elections in Afghanistan, they had hoped to reap the benefits of supporting the overall winner and to secure good jobs in the upcoming government. In the end, with no clear overall winner and the formation of a national unity government, there were simply not enough jobs for everyone and prominent politicians on both sides saw their hopes of high office dashed. Many felt marginalised by the leadership of the NUG and decided to form or join new political groupings. Whether they could be called opposition groups, though, is debateable.

Councils of the ‘jobless’

Afghanistan, with its presidential system, has a relatively weak parliament that lacks strong political parties. As a result it has no effective parliamentary form of political opposition. The groupings formed outside the parliament thus often become vehicles for members to influence and exert pressure on the government. Many opposition groupings emerge after a sufficient number of politicians and prominent figures have felt themselves moved to the periphery of power. Some political figures joining ‘the opposition’ seem resigned to the fact that they can no longer hope to be awarded a government position to their liking. For others, joining a political group is a bid to be co-opted by the government (and given a job) by showing themselves capable of causing more trouble outside the government than inside.

But Afghanistan’s highly differentiated political elites struggle to unite. This can be seen after previous elections and indeed, all the way back to the formation of the mujahedin government. Not only has this made it difficult to form opposition groups in the first place, but they tend to have trouble ‘staying together.’ Much of Afghan politics is elite-based with personal interests superseding ideology or the interest of any alliance or group in the long run. Afghan citizens have learned to be wary of these often-ephemeral groupings. As Hasht-e Subh wrote, “Some of the coalitions have endured less than 24 hours. For instance, when [in 2009 presidential election] Anwari and Zia Massud accepted to be the running mates of Gul Agha Shirzai, the coalition fell apart even before it dawned.”

In the first year of the NUG, ‘marginalised’ political figures started forming opposition groups outside the government. They started to come together in a series of informal meetings to exchange ideas and explore options for collaboration. Sebghatullah Mujaddedi’s High Council of Jihadi and National Parties (CJNP) was the first to emerge. “Some people from the eight political parties that are together here today, came together,” Mujaddedi said, on 27 August 2015, the day of the council’s inauguration, “they had discussions and talks and finally came to the conclusion that there was no [other] option but to unite.” About six months later, on 18 December 2015, a second council emerged. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, along with other prominent jihadi leaders, proclaimed the Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA).

Beyond announcing their existence, actually establishing these councils (creating organizational structures, agreeing agendas etc) proved time-consuming. The chairman of the CJNP was elected almost a year after the council was formed. “[A]dequate trust had developed in this period,” said the head of the secretariat. The leadership council of the CPSA (further described below) took five months to sort out.

Mujaddedi’s Council

The High Council of Jihadi and National Parties (CJNP) brings together jihadi figures that had supported President Ghani during his election campaign. (1) Their support for Ghani was, as Hasht-e Subh’s Shahriar put it, the only thing members of this council had in common when they first got together. Many of the council’s prominent members of this council actually serve in key governmental positions or are very close to the government, signalling that CJNP was never going to be a real opposition to the government. This was also reflected in the council’s aims, which according to Mujaddedi, were “to fight corruption, bring peace and to support the good work of the government and oppose any wrongdoings of the government.” This was clearly no declaration to challenge the government, but rather to support it while monitoring its actions. Even softer were the words of another CJNP member, Muhammad Karim Khalili, former second vice-president and leader of the largely Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, who actually sounded like he wanted a government job. The council would assist the government, he said, “at critical moments, and ensure the National Unity Government was not alone.”

Prominent council members include the president’s special representative for good governance and reform (a post on a par with a vice president position) Ahmad Zia Massud and two other presidential advisors, Qutbudin Helal and head of the mujahedin faction Hezb-e Harakat Islami, Sayyed Hussain Anwari (until his death on 5 July 2016). Khalil has a protégé, Muhammad Sarwar Danesh, serving as vice president, while his son, Muhammad Taqi Khalili is Afghan ambassador to Azerbaijan. The son of Anwari, Sayyed Khaliluh Anwari, and Ahmad Zia Massud’s son, Zubair Massud, are both working as advisers to the National Security Council. Two other council members, Pir Sayyed Ahmed Gailani and Khalili, initially unable to secure positions in the government, were both appointed by President Ghani as head and deputy head of the High Peace Council (HPC) soon after the CJNP was established. Mujaddedi seems to be the only prominent member of the CJNP who has not been offered any high-ranking governmental post (yet). (The only post he reportedly coveted, the head of the HPC, was given to his fellow council member, Gailani). (2) His son, however, Esmatullah Mujaddedi, is adviser to the National Security Council on Islamic affairs (see here). The CJNP, then, has acted, in practice, not as an opposition group, but rather as a vehicle for promoting its members to government jobs.

Sayyaf’s Council

The Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) is mostly made up of former cabinet members in the Karzai government and supporters of Dr Abdullah’s bid to be elected as president. (3) Like Mujaddedi, Sayyaf at the inauguration of the CPSA said they had been driven to form the council by the current situation of the country. He demanded that a Constitutional Loya Jirga be convened, the electoral law reformed, parliamentary and district council elections held as scheduled, and reforms in the security and economic sectors made.

Sayyaf and Jamiat-e Islami stalwart, Yunus Qanuni, former vice-president and fellow member of the CPSA, stressed the need to implement the political agreement of the NUG in full, without spelling out how they would respond if this did not happen. Instead, Qanuni elaborated the council’s plans for the coming four years: active participation in the upcoming parliamentary and district council elections and the introduction of a candidate for the presidential elections of 2019.

Although the demands are more concrete, as with Mujaddedi’s CJNP, there seems to be little threat of a true opposition to the government here either. Many members of CPSA hold government positions, have close relations to the government or have factional comrades that do so. CPSA member Abdul Hadi Arghanidwal, for example, is leader of Hezb-e Islami Afghanistan; his deputy, Khan Muhammad, is first deputy to chief executive Dr Abdullah.

Other prominent members of CPSA include many former ministers: Muhammad Umer Daudzai and Bismillah Khan Muhammadi (both interior), Abdul Rahim Wardak (defence), Zalmai Rasul (foreign affairs), Wahid Shahrani (mines), Ismael Khan (energy and water) Sadiq Mudaber (former director of the office of administrative affairs) and Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi and Fazl Hadi Muslimyar, speakers of, respectively, the lower and upper houses of the parliament. Most of these men were part of the Karzai government and were backers of Abdullah in the 2014 elections; they can be expected to support at least the chief executive’s wing of the NUG.

The close affiliation with Abdullah of many of its members might, in part, explain why the council took such a mild position during the recent public rift (see AAN report here) between Abdullah and Ghani in 11 August 2016. Abdullah publicly criticised the president’s unilateralism in appointments as well as his disinclination to meet Abdullah one-on-one to discuss “fundamental issues.” President Ghani hit back, implicitly accusing the rival camp of blocking government reforms. While this provided opposition groups with an opportunity to weigh in and challenge the NUG as a whole (see an AAN report here, Sayyaf’s council spokesman Massud Tarashtwal only said, “We believe Afghanistan is greater and more important than both the president and the chief executive (…) [we want the government] not to keep the nation in frustration anymore.” The comment seemed to signal that the CPSA did not want to put the NUG under even more pressure by subjecting it to targeted criticism.

Ahadi’s New National Front of Afghanistan

A third political grouping, which calls itself Now-e Melli Jabha (the New National Front), was formed by Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi on 14 January 2016. More than other groupings, it has presented itself as an opposition force. During the inauguration ceremony, Ahadi called the government “a failure” and demanded new presidential elections before 2019 (read a short report here). The New National Front is a coalition of various small political parties: the Afghan Millat Party, Adalat wa Tawseha (Justice and Development), Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami (Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan) and several other lesser known parties. (4)

Not all members of these individual parties endorsed Ahadi’s Front. For instance, on the day of the New National Front’s inauguration, some members of the Afghan Millat party including secretary general Abdul Qayum Arif, refused to back the initiative (see here). (Party leader Astanah Gul Shirzad told AAN, “A few individuals made irresponsible statements on behalf of the Afghan Millat party. Their duties have been suspended.”) Member of Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami, a party that had supported Ghani’s camp in the 2014 presidential election (read an AAN report on Harakat here), also told AAN that they were not backing the Front. Abdul Hakim Mujahed, a prominent member of the party, said, “We supported Ghani in the presidential election and we still stick to our commitment.” Haji Zabiullah Tarakhel, the head of the political committee of Harakat, dismissed the dissent and told AAN that all the members of the high council of Harakat had agreed to back Ahadi’s front; the members who refused to back the front, he said, might have done so because they held government jobs.

Despite dissent within the member parties, the New National Front was arguably the most outspoken opposition group during the recent rift between Chief Executive Abdullah and President Ghani, thereby living up, to some extent, to its promise to be “a true opposition.” In a statement on 23 August 2016, the Front called the NUG a failed experience that had to be gotten rid of, saying, “As it completes its two years, it is time for Afghanistan to have a new start.”

In fact, since its establishment, the Front has repeatedly targeted both the legitimacy and efficiency of the NUG arrangement. For instance, during the inauguration on 14 January 2016, Ahadi had said, “People want a change in the government and our constitution allows us to hold early elections. No one can argue that this is a legal government.” In another interview with Tolo News in February 2016, he did not see any chance for the current government to be sustained, saying that the only solution was early elections, as the law allowed them. Then, in an interview with BBC Persian on 30 March 2016, Ahadi questioned the legitimacy of the political agreement and termed it a violation of the constitution, saying that people had only accepted the formation of the NUG with the expectation that it would demonstrate efficiency, thus ignoring the “procedural illegitimacy.”

Green Trend

Rawand-e Sabz-e Afghanistan (Green Trend of Afghanistan) is a somewhat older opposition group. It was established by Amrullah Saleh after his resignation as NDS director in 2010 and had its first public appearance on 5 May 2011. In this documentary, Saleh lists fighting “armed extremism,” providing opportunity for the youth to emerge as a new cadre, and advocating on different national issues as the movement’s main goals. (For more background, see AAN’s previous reporting here.

Saleh, a Jamiati, supported Dr Abdullah in the 2014 presidential election. He has held no permanent official government position since his resignation in 2010, but he co-headed the fact-finding commission investigating the 2015 fall of Kunduz and was recently appointed to an ad hoc committee to work on the introduction of electronic ID cards. These two positions suggest that he has maintained close connections at least with Abdullah’s faction of the NUG.

Saleh, like acting Balkh governor and fellow Jamiati Atta Muhammad Nur, was very vocal in his support for fellow Jamiati Abdullah during the recent NUG rift. On 16 August 2016, Saleh said, “We [the chief executive and his backers] do not have any plan to become opposition. We consider ourselves the owner of the system [NUG] in Afghanistan; our demand is that in the history of Afghanistan we should prove that we stick to our signature [on the political agreement] and our word.”  So, while Saleh and his Green Trend are critical of the NUG’s performance, he seems to consider himself a backer of Abdullah’s camp, rather than an opposition to the government.

Protest movements

Over the past year, new powerful protest movements have emerged, adding a new dynamic to Afghan politics. These movements have been driven by a socio-political activism among young Afghans, which is unusual for the Afghan political landscape and is creating a class of new political leaders, some of them unrelated to the old parties. Driven primarily by security concerns and the government’s failure to protect the country’s citizens, as well as grievances over real or perceived discrimination, these movements have heavily criticised the NUG and in some cases called it illegitimate. These movements include Junbesh Tabasum (the Tabasum Movement) (5) (see AAN’s previous reporting here) which was mobilised for a large protest in Kabul against the beheading of seven Hazara travellers; the Rastakhiz Dadkhahi (Uprising for Justice) (6) which demanded government action regarding the abduction and killing of civilians along major highways in the north; the Aggrandisement [Honour] and Interment Commission, which demanded the proper burial of Amir Habibullah II (7) and Junbesh-e Rushnayee (the Enlightenment Movement) (more on this movement below). All four movements appeared to emerge suddenly and, unlike those discussed above, the organisers are largely from outside government circles.

These protest movements have been very outspoken in their criticism of the NUG. The Uprising for Justice during its protest in Kabul on 17 June 2016) called the NUG an “incompetent government” that had failed to “fulfil its responsibilities properly,” which was the cause of “public anger and aversion against the National Unity Government.” In addition to its advocacy against the kidnappings, the Uprising for Justice, which is predominantly Tajik, has accused the NUG of excluding its members from government based on identity politics. For instance, in its resolution, the protesters called the division of power and the government’s policies ethnically-based, saying,”The great Tajik community is not represented in the government leadership and decision-makings” and repudiated those who claimed to be representing them in the NUG as “demagogic and vote-selling people.”

Among these protest movements, the Enlightenment Movement, which was formed to protest the government’s decision to reroute an important power line from Turkmenistan, has emerged as the most powerful in terms of challenging the NUG (see AAN’s reporting here. It has held several large gatherings, including the 16 May 2016 demonstration in Kabul and the 23 July 2016 demonstration that was attacked by suicide bombers, leading to the death of more than eighty people (see AAN’s reporting here).

The movement, angered by the government’s failure to meet its demands, announced a new round of “indefinite protest” that would start on 27 September 2016, this time in front of the United Nations offices, in Kabul, as well as other places in Afghanistan and abroad. It chose to protest in front of the UN, it said, because the UN had “stayed silent” (the movement apparently expected the UN to take a position on their demands) and also “to remind them of their commitments to human rights norms, democratic values and rules.” The protests were called off at the last minute, after a series of requests and discussions, involving the UN and several civil society organisations. (8) On 26 September 2016, the coordinating arm of the Enlightenment Movement announced it would “enter into negotiations with the government, under UN supervision,” reiterating that it would continue with its civil resistance if the negotiation failed to yield results.

Protest movements connecting to government opposition

Demonstrations are not uncommon in Afghanistan, but usually they are small and inconsequential. Now that the new protest movements have proved they can assemble large crowds, they have been recognized as capable of challenging the NUG. As a result, the protest movements have gained momentum beyond the causes that had initially triggered them; they have become sounding boards for a wider discourse – albeit still vaguely formulated – about justice, equality and de-monopolisation of political power.

As part of the strategy to maximise pressure on the government, these movements have, at times, tried to reach out to other opposition groups as well – including the councils that are largely made up of the old elites of jihadi and other party leaders and former ministers. On 14 July 2016, for instance, members of the Enlightenment Movement announced they had met with Qanuni, the deputy leader of the CPSA, to try to find “common ground on common issues” ahead of the 23 July 2016 demonstration. The movement signalled that it would continue to meet “other personalities to raise with them the position of the Enlightenment Movement.”

There has, however, so far, been no sign of the Enlightenment Movement and the CPSA (or any other opposition groups) coalescing around a political agenda aimed at specifically targeting the NUG. Apart from rhetorical support, other political groups have not espoused the movement’s demand that the power line be routed through Bamyan. This shows how the political groups continue to diverge and branch off when it comes to actual policy positions. (9(

Other opposition to NUG: Karzai’s circle and voices from the parliament

While no explicit protest movement or opposition group has formally coalesced around former President Hamid Karzai, he and his political circle have certainly presented themselves as an opposition to the NUG. During the formation of the CPSA, Karzai apparently attempted to influence the group, according to a member of the council who told The New York Times, “President Karzai and his team tried to manipulate the council in their own favor. They were willing to use the position and influence of the jihadist leaders and political figures to topple the national unity government. This was their will and prime demand.” However, the CPSA’s senior members, like Sayyaf, refused to yield to Karzai’s insistence that a traditional loya Jirga be included in the council’s political agenda, putting a strain on relations between the two. Their relation deteriorated even further after Karzai reportedly accused Sayyaf of contributing to the anti-Karzai atmosphere that was apparent at an event commemorating Burhanuddin Rabbani’s death on 30 September 2016 (a participant chanted “death to Karzai”). Karzai has also complained that Sayyaf has been the main opponent of traditional loya Jirga and that he had established the CPSA specifically to undermine him.

Ahead of the NUG’s second anniversary on 29 September 2016, Karzai again relentlessly called for a loya jirga to be held to “restore legitimacy and confidence in the NUG.” On 16 August 2016, in an interview with Radio Azadi, he said, “If a Loya Jirga is not convened, it will cause problem for our land and increase discontent.”

Opposition to the NUG has also come from within the parliament – where individual MPs have spoken out against the NUG as an illegitimate government. Some of them have demanded the abolishment of the chief executive position. Others blame the NUG for the current state of affairs in Afghanistan and at least one MP has called for a loya jirga.

The National Unity Government’s response

Due to the political infighting between the Ghani and Abdullah camps, it has been difficult for the government to have a unified response to the groups and movements whose interests and actions now reinforce each other (see AAN’s analysis on the NUG rift here. However, sporadically, Afghanistan’s leaders have individually spoken out against the demands of opposition groups. For example President Ghani, during his Eid ul-Fitr prayer address on 6 July 2016, said:

The supreme interests of our country are the common ground on which all forces loyal to the country, whether they are inside the government or in the opposition, stand in one front. Opposition does not mean pulling up the system by roots.

He also warned that, “whoever attempts to live without system or to dig a well for the system, they themselves will fall into the well.”

Earlier, Vice-President Sarwar Danesh called the demand for early elections or a traditional Loya Jirga “against the constitution” and said that therefore neither of these demands “present a logical and practical solution.” He also warned that undermining the NUG would give rise to extremism and violence. In his Eid ul-Fitr message on 5 July 2016, Danesh urged the opposition groups and circles to “pursue the realisation of their goals, programmes and plans through democratic channels and participation in the next parliamentary and presidential elections…”

On 12 July 2016, Abdullah made an implicit distinction between those who demanded reforms, which is also a demand of his camp, and those who asked for an end to the government through early elections or a traditional Loya Jirga: “A number of political figures have distanced [themselves] from the government because electoral reforms have not been carried out, but a number of others abuse [this situation] under the name and pretext of meeting the demands and wishes of people, while they do not have any belief or trust in bringing reforms.”

Conclusion

Most healthy political systems rely on robust constitutional oppositions. Yet, the opposition groups in Afghanistan are still not particularly coherent or convincing. With the councils, there is the sense that offers of government jobs can easily cause them to disintegrate. Moreover, they lack large-scale popular backing and the sort of internal coherence which would enable them to effectively pressure the government. While they appeared to have concrete demands towards the National Unity Government ahead of its second anniversary on 29 September 2016, that moment has now passed, with no action taken and the government still intact.

The various protest movements, in particular the Enlightenment Movement, look to be a very different political animal. They appear to be more coherent and can mobilise significant support, but so far they have not been able to change government policy. The Enlightenment Movement, after it failed to get the TUTAP electricity line to pass through Hazarajat, has fallen back on calls for accountability and transparency in government. These protest movements, led by non-elites with popular support and a strong ethnic dimension to mobilisation, are thus not yet filling the gap in providing checks to the government’s policies. Even in the light of what appeared to be a very fragile government, ahead of the September ‘deadline’, so far no effective ‘politics of opposition’ in Afghanistan have emerged that could effectively pressure the government.

Edited by Kate Clark

(1) On 12 July 2016, Abbas Basir, head of the CJNP told AAN that the Council comprised of the following parties and figures: 1) Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan led by Muhammad Karim Khalili, 2) National Liberation Front of Afghanistan led by Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, 3) National Islamic Front of Afghanistan led by Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailani, 4) Islamic Movement of Afghanistan led by Sayyed Hussain Anwari, 5) Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan led by Abdul Hakim Munib, 6) Islamic Party of Yunus Khalis (Hezb-e Islami Khales) led by Haji Din Muhammad, 7) Right and Justice Party led by Hanif Atmar, 8) Hezb Qeyam Melli (National Uprising Party) led by Zmariyalai Ahadi, 9) Taghir and Tahawol (Change and Transformation) Trend led by Qutbuddin Helal, 10) National Linkage Party led by Sayyed Mansur Naderi, 11) United Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami Mutahid) led by Wahidullah Sabawun, 12) Alliance of Hezb Islami Councils, 13) Ahmad Zia Massud, deputy head of Jamiat-e Islami, and 14) Jamiati commander from the Shomali and former head of Kabul Police, General Jurat.

(2) In April 2012, Mujaddedi resigned in protest from all his positions – as senator, head of the Conflict Resolution Commission and member of the High Peace Council (HPC) – when Karzai did not appoint him to head of the HPC. He was elected as chairperson of the 2013 Consultative Loya Jirga that was held to approve Afghanistan’s Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States. His deteriorating health may be a reason why he is staying out of the government.

(3) On 27 May 2016, the following positions and bodies were announced: 1) Sayyaf, head of the Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan, 2) Muhammad Yunus Qanuni, deputy chair of the council, 3) Sadeq Mudaber, head of the secretariat, 4) Muhammad Ismael Khan, head of the defense and security committee, 4) Muhammad Umer Daudzai, head of the political and international affairs committee, 5) Zalmai Rasul, head of the elders and influential people committee, 6) Abdul Khaleq Farahi, head of the financial committee, 7) Muhammad Gulzai, head of the communication committee, 8) Massud Tarshtwal, head of the press and cultural affairs committee and spokesperson for the council, 9) Abul Wahab Erfan, head of the ulema and clergies committee, 10) Sayyed Neamatullah Sadat, head of the provincial affairs committee, 11) Abdul Majid, head of the election and parliamentary affairs committee, 12) Basira Sultani, head of the women’s affairs committee.

(4) 28 June 2016, Wahidullah Ghazikhail, spokesperson for the New National Front of Afghanistan told AAN that the front was comprised of 19 political parties and 64 members of parliament. However, despite several attempts to follow up, the New National Front did not share details on these parties and MPs, so AAN was unable to verify the claims.

(5) Junbesh Tabasum emerged during the 11 November 2015 demonstrations in Kabul after the beheading of seven Hazara travellers – known as Zabul Seven – who had been taken hostage in the southern province of Zabul a month earlier. The protests focused on the failure of the government to protect the roads and to rescue the hostages. The movement was named after one of the seven victims, a nine-year-old girl named Tabasum who turned into the main symbol of protests (see AAN’s reporting here)

(6) On 31 May 2016, the Taleban forced around 200 passengers to disembark several vehicles in Angur Bagh area of Kunduz province. The Taleban killed 13 passengers, took 30 others with them and released the rest. This triggered a series of protests in Kabul against the kidnapping and the government’s failure to act. The first protest was held in Shahr-e Now Park in Kabul in which the protestors blamed “the Taleban, the fifth column and the government’s negligence” for the incidents in the north. On 1 June 2016, President Ghani called the kidnapping and killing in Kunduz “banditry,” saying the “bandits deserve the harshest punishment under our religion, law and custom.” After several meetings with political figures, members of parliament, intellectuals and civil society organisations, the protesters formed a movement they called “Uprising for Justice.” On 9 June 2016, Atta Muhammad Nur, acting governor of Balkh province, gave his firm support to the group and vowed “to stand on the side of my justice-seeking people and to no longer allow kidnapping to turn into political ransom-seeking.” The protest culminated in a larger demonstration on 17 June 2016 in Kabul in which the protestors wanted to move towards the presidential palace and Sapedar Palace (the chief executive’s office), but police prevented them. This resulted in a clash between police and protesters.

(7) Another movement whose activities led to a bloody scuffle is the Honour and Interment Commission of Amir Habibullah Kalakani. The commission was established in February 2016, with the aim to honour and rebury the remains of Amir Habibullah. On 11 August 2016, the Commission told AAN they had two options: “The first option is to have the National Unity Government to issue a decree and hold an official ceremony, the way it was done for the reburial of Daud Khan, the late president of the country. Amir Habibullah Kalakani, as a king of this country, also deserves this ceremony. The second option is honour and reburial by the people… The reburial by the people will be a protest burial and in that gathering, people will decide whether to continue to support and cooperate with the National Unity Government, or not. These things have been communicated to the government and the government is responsible for any consequences.” After a scuffle involving armed men from Jamiat-e Islami and Junbesh-e Milli over the burial site (see AAN’s previous reporting here (https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/who-was-king-habibullah-ii-a-query-from-the-literature/)), the remains of Habibubllah Kalakani were finally buried on Shahr Ara Hill, Kabul, on 1 September 2016.

(8) As the Enlightenment Movement was preparing for its protest, the Civil Society and Human Rights Network, which is a coordinating body of civil society organisations in Afghanistan, on 19 September 2016 called on UNAMA to mediate between the government and the movement. It also urged the Enlightenment Movement to postpone the planned 27 September demonstration. On 25 September 2016, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission also called on the movement to postpone the demonstration and enter into negotiation with “relevant government agencies.” On the same day, UNAMA hosted a meeting with “representatives of the Hazara community.” The attendees were senior members of the People’s High Council (the coordinating arm of the Enlightenment Movement) and some Hazara civil society activists. The primary focus of the meeting, according to a UN statement was to discuss the findings of UNAMA’s independent investigation into the 23 July 2016 attack. However, other issues were also addressed. While welcoming, “the willingness of all sides to engage in dialogue,” UNAMA also called for the postponement of planned demonstrations. In response, the presidential palace issued a press release, saying that, “from the very outset of the civil demonstrations on Bamyan electricity, the National Unity Government… has always been ready to discuss the demands raised by the people.”

On 26 September 2016, the People’s High Council, in its statement, postponed the planned demonstration and said it would, “enter into negotiation with the government under the UN supervision.” The movement reiterated that it would continue their civil resistance if the negotiation failed to yield any results. However, sources within UNAMA told AAN the organisation has not committed itself to any mediation or supervision of the talks. With the meeting, UNAMA had apparently sought to encourage the movement to directly negotiate with the government.

While negotiations were attempted, they did not seem to go well. On 29 September 2016, the People’s High Council said, “The government, by setting new preconditions and illogical procrastinations, apparently does not seem to be sincere in moving to negotiations and it is likely that the talks will not yield [any] result.” Ahmad Behzad, an MP from Herat and one of the senior members of the people’s high council, travelled to Brussels to represent the movement at the demonstration organised by diaspora sympathisers in front of the Brussels conference on 5 October 2016.

(9) Besides the prevailing heterogeneity across the various groups, Sayyaf and Mujaddedi’s councils, in particular, also suffer from lack of solid internal cohesion, rendering them unable to have unified positions. Daudzai, who is the head of political and international relations committee of Sayyaf’s council, has, on many occasions, called for early presidential elections, although the CPSA has never endorsed his position. Likewise, Khalili, who is a member of Mujaddedi’s council, supported the demands of the Enlightenment Movement from the beginning, while rest of the council backed the government.

(10) Jawid Kuhistani, a political commentator, reported on 18 July 2016 that President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, American Ambassador Michael McKinley, Commander of Resolute Support Mission John Nicholson, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Tadamichi Yamamoto and European Union Ambassador Michael Skjold Mellbin had a meeting at the presidential palace on 14 July 2016. In the meeting, according to Kuhistani, they concluded, among other things, that the NUG would serve for five years; the political agreement and reforms should be implemented; and the opposition groups should be advised “not to pose any challenge to the government.” Since then, American and European Union ambassadors, as well as General Nicholson, have been meeting key political figures from the opposition groups. For instance, General Commander of Resolute Support Mission met Daudzai on 19 July 2016 (see here) and Sayyaf in Paghman on 21 July 2016 (see here). US ambassador Peter Michael McKinley and his deputy met Sayyaf in his office on 16 July 2016 (see here) and Daudzai on 24 July 2016 (see here). EU ambassador Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin met Daudzai on 27 July 2016. (see here)

Weddings are hugely expensive affairs in Afghanistan, with excessive costs for wedding halls, lavish meals and usually a bride price. The bride price is the money paid by the groom’s family for the bride to her family. It is a contested tradition that is viewed as having no foundation in Islamic law and does not appear in the new draft marriage law. It is also not to be confused with the dowry (mahr) which should be given to the bride in case her husband dies or divorces her. High bride prices can lead to debt for grooms and their families and early marriage to unsuitable men for the daughters of poor men; fathers of many daughters, however, may benefit from the practice. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary investigates the tradition and finds that current, local attempts to curb high bride prices are proving more successful than previous attempts by the state.  

Wedding Negotiations and Bride Price

Almost all weddings in Afghanistan start with matchmaking. The groom’s family initiates a marriage proposal and it is up to the bride’s family to agree or not. When the families have agreed to the marriage the real negotiations around the wedding and the bride price start and usually take place at the house of the bride-to-be. The negotiations about the actual wedding and its costs, including food and catering, clothes for the bride’s relatives and payment for the imam, who drafts the marriage contract and performs the ceremony, can be quite quick. However, the negotiations about the bride price can be lengthy. The couple are nowadays often consulted about the marriage proposal, but they have a very limited role in the wedding and bride price negotiations and have to accept what their families decide (for detailed information on marriage practices in Afghanistan see: here).

The father of the bride, or in his absence her oldest brother, specifies how much he would like to receive from the groom’s family for his daughter. The amount is often based on family credentials, education, skills, age, beauty and the reputation of the girl, as well as recent bride prices within the community. It is the groom who is expected to raise the money for the wedding and the bride price, but the groom’s family usually pitches in. As a consequence, the decision to accept or reject the wedding costs and the bride price becomes a family affair. The price tag for the wedding, especially in Kabul, can easily top 10,000 USD; a small fortune in a country where the gross domestic product per capita in 2015 was 623.90 US dollars (see: here). Even if the actual wedding costs are less in rural areas, the overall costs are pushed up by the bride price. Social media provides some examples of current bride prices in different provinces (see: here):

Maidan Wardak: 400,000 to 800,000 afghanis (5,900 to 11,800 US dollars);

Nangarhar: 100,000 to 500,000 afghanis (1450 to 7,245 US dollars). Not all communities in Nangarhar have a tradition of asking for a bride price.

Loya Paktia (Khost, Paktia and Paktika): 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 afghanis (14,500 to 17,390 US dollars)

Farah: 800,000 to 1,500,000 afghanis (11,800 US dollars to 21,733 US dollars);

Faryab: 66,000-135,000 afghanis (10,000 to 20,000 US dollars (see: here)

Kandahar and Helmand: 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 afghanis (14,590 to 43,468 US dollars) (see: here).

Bride Price versus Dowry

Bride price is known as walwar in Pashto-speaking areas and toyana and sherbaha in Dari-speaking areas. It is an Afghan tradition with no foundation in Islamic law (see: here) and does not feature in the draft marriage law. According to the draft marriage law and the civil law (1), the only payment that can be requested by the bride’s family is the Islamic dowry (mahr), which should remain the property of the bride for the duration of her marriage (2). Bride price and mahr are not the same: the bride price is a payment that the father of the bride receives, while mahr is the groom’s financial pledge to his wife. According to Islamic (sharia) law, women who enter into a marriage contract are entitled to receive mahr and it is intended to provide security for her and her children in case the husband dies or requests a divorce. According to Hanafi jurisprudence fiqh), a wife is allowed to use the mahr in any way she sees fit as it is her property – this means that she can also return it or share it with her husband or their extended family. Mawlwi Abdullah Haqyar, head of the Islamic and Culture Department of the Sharia Faculty at Kabul University, noted that “mahr is an Islamic matter and a gift from the groom to the bride, it remains the property of the bride. This is the financial obligation that a husband has to his bride.” The draft marriage law and Islamic law provide limited instructions regarding the size of the mahr or the timing of the payment; this is left to families to decide (3).

Community members interviewed by AAN said that mahr was almost never implemented as Islamic law prescribes, even if people are aware of the law. In fact, when parents of a bride and groom negotiate wedding arrangements, they often use the word mahr when they are actually talking about the wedding price. Sayed Wali (name changed at the request of the interviewee) from Ghazni said, “On the day of my engagement in 2011, my father and brothers decided on a sum of 800,000 Pakistani rupees [about 9,230 US dollars[ to be given as mahr to my future wife. The money was paid directly to her brother and after the wedding, when I asked my wife about the mahr, she told me that she did not receive a penny of the 800,000 [Pakistani] rupees. Instead, she told me that her brother had used the money to arrange the marriage of his son.” This practice was also confirmed by interviews with two mullahs from Ghazni province who explained that it is a widely accepted fact that the father of the bride takes the bride price money but calls it mahr.

The Complex Social and Financial Effects of the Bride Price

The bride price is a huge burden on grooms and their families, but is also a vital source of income for the families of brides, in particular poorer ones. If a father only has daughters and no sons, he will often rely on the bride price as a source of income, as he cannot rely on the income a son would bring. When a daughter is married, she moves into her husband’s household and has less contact with her parents and little opportunity to support them. The bride price is considered to be the daughter’s contribution to the economy and wealth of her parents’ household. Its importance is exemplified in one of AAN’s interviews by a story of a poor man in Ghazni who demanded 10,000 US dollars for his daughter, which helped him to feed his entire family for almost four years.

Bride price also drives child marriage in Afghanistan, as research in 2013 by the Women and Children Legal Research Foundation showed. Getting a high bride price was a major reason given by parents for marrying their girls off young. Other economic factors also counted, including giving girls in lieu of debts and exchanging girls, so that neither family had to pay the bride price. Although article 70 of the civil law specifies the minimum age for marriage is 18 years of age for men and 16 for women, girls under the age of 15 make up three per cent of all married women according to Afghanistan’s periodic report under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Article 28 of the law on the Elimination of Violence against Women states that those who force girls to marry under the age of 15 should be imprisoned for at least two years and the same article states that the marriage of an underage girl can be cancelled at the request of the girl. However, the implementation of these laws is difficult given Afghanistan’s traditional society. This is particularly true when the economies of entire families depend on underage marriages.

Parents who chose to or are forced to marry off their underage daughters often ignore factors such as the age or any disabilities of the future son-in-law. Daughters might even get married off to men whom their families have never seen before. An AREU study on marriage practice in Afghanistan from 2007 cited the example of Aziza, a girl in her mid-teens who was married to a 60 years old man. Aziza explained, “my father was sick and my family could not afford to pay for his treatment. Therefore I saw no other way out than to marry the old man who was willing to pay the bride price demanded by my family.”

As a result of the high prices for weddings, hundreds of young men have been forced to go to Iran, Pakistan, or the Gulf countries to find work, often under precarious conditions, to try to earn enough money to pay for their wedding and the bride price (4). This also affects many young women who are not able to get married and have to stay at their parents’ houses for longer than usual while their future husbands are working abroad to earn the bride price. For instance, Muhammad Nabbi from Khost province told AAN, “I had been to Saudi Arabia, where I worked as a driver for seven years. During these years, my fiancée had to wait and remain with her parents.” Niamatullah, 23, from Ghazni province, explained to AAN that he had spent four years in Iran in order to earn money to get married in Afghanistan. In summer 2013, just before he was about to return to Afghanistan, he fell from the third floor of a building where he was working. He suffered a broken neck and severe spinal cord injuries and had to spend most of his earned money on medical treatment. In order to still be able to get married he said, “I sent my younger brother to Iran to work and borrowed money from my relatives for the wedding.”

Young men who cannot go abroad to earn money try to find the necessary financial resources within Afghanistan. Most borrow money from relatives; others mortgage or sell land. In many cases, the families of brides are also willing to accept some of the bride price in kind through land titles, houses or cars. In 2014, Yar Muhammad from Mutakhan district in Paktika province transferred his 20 jeribs of farmland to his brother-in-law as payment for the negotiated 1,800,000 Pakistani rupees (17,176 US dollars) bride price. Yar Muhammad was left with only a few jeribs of land to use as a source of livelihood. In the long term, the mortgaging, selling or transferring of property can significantly affect the economic situation of the groom’s family, which often leads to resentment towards the bride and her family(see: here). In some cases, the pressure to pay high bride prices has caused young men to commit suicide (see a report of Mehwar Daily published in December 2012, here) . Similarly, depression and other psychological problems, family disputes, suicides and fleeing homes have been reported among those young men and women who were not able to get married because they were unable to meet the demands for the bride price (see for example: here).

In some cases, the bride price also results in women not being able to get married. This is viewed as shameful for the women, as is getting married at an old age. For example, Nasima (name changed) was 50 years old when she finally married a 60 year old widower in another village of Andar district. Prior to her marriage, she lived with her elder brother at her parents’ house where she had a sad life, “My nephews and niece would always taunt me about why I did not marry at young age, and they would sometimes not allow me to eat the food that my brother would bring. I was so fed up with my life at my brother’s house,” she said in an interview with AAN. Life was so difficult for her that she said she would agree to marry anyone who asedk her, even if he had disabilities or was an old man. The widower, who married Nasima, had a daughter and three sons from his previous wife. After a few weeks of marriage, life again became bitter for her. “My married life is not like those girls who got married at a younger age because my husband taunts me from time to time about why I did not get married at a young age,” she said. “My stepsons treat me as if I am their servant and insult me by telling me I am an old woman.”

Historical examples of government efforts to regulate wedding costs and prohibit bride price

High wedding costs and bride price are not a new phenomenon and there are several examples in Afghan history of governments’ attempts to curb costs. In the 1921 Marriage Law, expenditures for the wedding itself were limited, the mahr was fixed at 30 afghanis (at the value from that time period) and bride price was prohibited. The law was widely criticised by Islamic scholars who considered these reforms as intervening in their domain and curtailing their powers. The scholars accused King Amanullah Khan of endorsing laws that were contrary to Islamic law. Later legal initiatives, including those from 1934, 1960, 1970 and 1977 focused on limiting wedding costs, but without explicitly forbidding bride price. A law from 1949 states that the bride may not demand a bride price, but she can demand mahr. However, the 1960, 1971, and 1977 laws did prohibit bride price.

In 1978, communist President Nur Muhammad Taraki issued decree number seven, according to which the bride price for a young girl was set at only 300 afghanis (roughly an equivalent of 30,000 Afs now or about 450 USD). The decree, however, was unevenly implemented and, was rejected by more conservative parts of society (see here and here). Others, however, took advantage of the decree: officials and government supporters in rural areas harassed families with unmarried daughters, telling them that they were obliged to marry their daughters to them as they were offering the required 300 Afghanis. According to 55 year old Khudai Nur in Andar district of Ghazni, the parents who refused were threatened. These developments, related to decree number 7 and the behaviour of officials and government supporters, played an important role in convincing the population to rise up against the communist regime. The anti-communists, for example, used the decree as one of their propaganda subjects to encourage the population to stand against the communist government (see here). Religious leaders at the time said that the decree was un-Islamic because in Islam there is no specific amount of mahr; although a minimum is given, a maximum is not prescribed. Haqyar, a member of the Kabul University Sharia faculty, stated that the communist regime also insisted on a minimum amount of mahr to be paid, but that the decree was perceived as an enormous disrespect to women, “as people would not even sell an animal for 300 Afghanis.”

Other examples from that time, however, also showed that communities were not opposed to regulation as long as they were consulted. For example, according to Mawlawi Muhammad Qasam, the head of a tribal shura in Sar Roza district of Paktika province, an agreement was made by local tribal elders in the post-communist period (30-35 years ago) to set bride price at 10,000 Afghani. Such local agreements have also been attempted more recently.

Provincial efforts to reduce bride price

In recent years, ulama and tribal elders have come together in southern and south-eastern provinces to informally ‘regulate’ bride price.

According to Mawlwi Muhammad Qasam in Sar Roza district of Paktika, the tribal elders made a new decision in 2010 that bride price should be around 300,000 Pakistani rupees (3,000 US dollars); this was considered a reasonable amount for the people of the area.

A similar decision had, as noted above, been taken in this district in the 1990s when the elders decided that the bride price should be around 150,000 rupees (1,500 US dollars). However, by 2010, this agreement was no longer adhered to and bride prices had become as high as 1,000,000 rupees (10,000 USD), in addition to other wedding expenses, in some parts of the district. The 2010 agreement included attempts to limit the number of guests to only 20 and to provide clothes for only up to four women. The local communities, particularly the youth and the poor, have welcomed this initiative.

Elders in the provincial capital, Sharan, as well as in Yusufkhel district of Paktika province decided in January 2010 that the exact amount of bride price should be 230,000 afghanis (3,333 US dollars). The tribal elders also suggested limiting the number of wedding guests and reducing expenses. In the past, the bride’s parents were expected to provide sets of clothes for 80 to 90 guests; now they should only provide them for up to ten women and only three wedding cars should be used. Violators of the rules could be fined by the tribal elders. These rules have been implemented both in the provincial capital Sharan and in the neighbouring district of Yusufkhil, according to Abdul Hai Sahibzada, head of a reform council in the province.

According to a UNAMA 2010 report on Harmful Traditional Practices (see: here), elders in Faizabad district of Jawzjan province decided to reduce the bride price from 400,000 afghanis (5,796 US dollars) to 200,000 afghanis (2,898 US dollars). According to the same report, in Samangan province’s Khuram and Sarbagh districts communities decided to reduce the bride price from 10,000 to 4,000 US dollars. The report also stated that in Sabari district of Khost, communities had agreed that a bride’s family should not ask the groom to buy jewellery worth more than 5,000 US dollars. It also points out that the Taleban in Tagab district of Kapisa province set the bride price at 3,800 US dollars. While these measures appear to have been successful attempts to reduce the bride price, they did not spread to other districts or provinces in the north or east.

In Andar district of Ghazni, on 23 August 2013, there was another initiative: tribal elders in most of the western and central villages of the district issued a declaration consisting of 19 articles, in which they decided that the bride price should be 350,000 afghanis (about 5,017 US dollars), only four cars should be used on the wedding day and that the bride price, which is referred to as mahr in the written declaration, should be used to purchase goods to furnish the new home of the bride. Overall, the declaration stressed that both sides were not allowed to incur huge expenses. Based on the declaration, if anyone violated these rules, there would be a fine of 200,000 afghanis (about 2,900 US dollars). At the same time, in the western area of Andar, the local Taleban fighters supported the implementation of the reduced bride price andalso played a role in convincing the tribal elders to set the rules. Furthermore, the Taleban said that if someone resisted these changes, they “would deal with that person.”

Positive and negative effects of local initiatives 

Positive effects of these local initiatives to regulate wedding costs and bride price were reported to AAN. For example, Sahibzada, the head of a reform council in south-eastern Paktika, explained that the tribal agreement he had been part of deciding on had resulted in a major rise in the number of weddings in the district from a few to a hundred weddings a year. He said that now there were fewer unmarried young men and women, and fewer young men had to go abroad to earn money in order to get married.

The reduction of the bride price, however, had unintended negative consequences. Based on interviews with local residents in Khost province, the reduction in the bride price to 220,000 afghanis (about 3,000 US dollars), in the Lakani area of the provincial capital, resulted in people coming to Lakani from other parts of the province in order to find local girls that they could marry to their sons for a lower bride price. This angered the people of Lakani, “People thought it was a sort of market place, where the girls were sold for cheap,” one Khost resident told AAN. Although unwilling to abandon the reduced bride price altogether, it was unacceptable to the Lakani people that outsiders were taking advantage of the situation. So, after a few weddings with ‘outsiders’ had taken place, residents decided that if someone from another part of Khost province wanted to marry a girl from Lakani then they would be charged the higher bride price customary in their district of origin, while the bride price for the local families would remain at the reduced sum.

When the initiative to reduce bride price found its way to Ghazni province, people in Qarabagh district initially welcomed it, and also decided to set a standard lower bride price. However, in Andar district, the idea was challenged first by local mullahs and then by tribal elders. For example, when people in late 2012 and early 2013 came together in western Andar district and decided to set the bride price at 350,000 afghanis (about 5,057 US dollars), two famous mullahs, one from Alizai village and another from Shado village, resisted. They told the community that the reduction of bride price was a violation of the rights of the woman to be married. Interestingly, one theory was that these mullahs resisted the new rules because they themselves have many daughters and a few sons, which means if the bride price were reduced they would be able to earn less money. When the first mullah, from Alizai, resisted the new bride price policy the Taleban visited him and thereafter he no longer resisted. However, the Taleban reportedly did not approach the mullah from Shado village.

While these attempts clearly indicate that communities are interested in some form of regulation to reduce and possibly even in the long-term abolish the bride price, the implementation, in particular in conservative communities, seems to hamper these efforts.

Conclusion

Wedding costs and especially bride price are deeply rooted customs in Afghan society, and bride price, in particular, has important economic consequences for the families of the bride and the groom. Efforts to regulate bride price through legislation or national policies have tended to remain poorly implemented, or when implemented, contested. The most notorious efforts to regulate bride prices were adopted during the Taraki government and contributed to the downfall of that government. Local initiatives seem to have been more successful in their implementation, which may not be surprising as they, when successful, are local solutions developed to solve what is perceived as a local problem. However, as noted above, local solutions have also had unintended negative consequences. A possible conclusion of this is that national initiatives to reduce bride price and wedding costs need to be well anchored within local decision-making structures and local realities.

Edited by Lenny Linke, Sari Kouvo, Jelena Bjelica and Kate Clark

 

 

(1) The draft marriage law came into force in 1977 and articles 56 to 267 focus on family issues. However, the civil law and the Shia Personal Status Law (SPSL) are both silent on bride price. Article 121 of the SPSL, however, clearly states that the bride’s father pays for the goods the bride brings with her to her husband’s house (jahizia). It also states that if the groom or his family send the goods to the bride or her family, they remain the groom’s property. This means the bride’s family is not allowed to receive money for the purpose of buying jahizia.

(2) The 2015 draft marriage law approved by the parliament appears to return to previous attempts to explicitly abolish bride price, but requires the payment of mahr according to Islamic law. The law also regulates other wedding expenses. According to this news story, the law prescribes that the number of wedding guests cannot exceed 500 and limits the food cost to no more than 400 afghanis (5.80 US dollars) per person. Wedding hall owners who allow more than 500 guests per wedding will face a penalty of 30,000 afghanis (434,68 US dollars) for their first offence and will have their permits rescinded if it happens again. However, though the parliament passed the marriage law in April 2015, at the time of writing this dispatch, it had not been ratified by the president and had not been sent to the Ministry of Justice to be published in the official gazette. So far, AAN is not aware of any examples where these limits were enforced or where penalties were issued.

(3) According to the Hanafi school of law, which is the most prevalent one in Afghanistan, the minimum amount of mahr should be 10 darham (a currency during the prophet, Muhammad’s times), while the maximum is not defined. However, this interpretation as well as mahr as a requirement for a nikah (the legal contract between a bride and a groom in an Islamic marriage), is disputed even among Afghan Islamic scholars. Mawlwi Abdullah Haqyar, head of the Islamic Culture Department of the Sharia Faculty at Kabul University, notes, “It is [the] responsibility of the couple to decide on [the] amount of mahr, and no one else, but the girl to be married, can choose or decide on mahr.” According to him, mahr is not a condition or principle of nikah. “This means, if the couple accept each other in [the] presence of witnesses, whether the mahr is specified or not, the nikah is perfect.”

At the same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that some mullahs in Kabul and other provinces have not accepted a nikah as valid unless it included stipulations regarding mahr. In fact, some of these mullahs insisted on re-marrying already married couples in order to provide them with a valid nikah that included the amount of mahr. While the amount of mahr needs to be indicated in a nikah, Islamic law and its practice does allow for a wide array of payment options such as cash, jewellery or property and it does not have to be paid in full immediately. Here, while not agreeing that mahr has to be a part of the nikah, Mawlwi Abdullah Haqyar, head of the Islamic Culture Department of the Sharia Faculty at Kabul University agrees that “there are two types of mahr: musma and mesl (both are Arabic words that are commonly used in Afghanistan). Under the terms of musma, the amount of mahr is decided at the time the nikah is prepared, but the groom can either pay the amount immediately or at a later point. Under the condition of mesl, the mahr is not decided (and not paid) on the day of the nikah signing, but if the wife later asks her husband for mahr then the husband should pay. In this case, the amount is decided based on the mahr paid to the wife’s married sisters or other close female relatives.”

(4) There are some other traditions and practices common before, during, and after a wedding which could be considered a big burden on the groom. Again these practices and traditions are different in every region. For example, in most of the Pashtun-dominated parts of Ghazni province the groom agrees to provide additional goods during bride price negotiations. These goods can include flour, rice, firewood, cooking oil, clothing, cattle to be slaughtered and served to guests on the wedding day, money to pay the imam and cooks for the wedding. These costs vary, based on the number of wedding participants and the size of the bride’s family. In most of the central and northern provinces practices are different. For instance, in Balkh province, the groom is expected to purchase jewellery, pay the wedding hall costs, hold a pre-marriage party called shirini khuri, purchase two special wedding clothes outfits for the bride, prepare a 30-50 kilogramme cake for the wedding day and make a big invitation after the wedding which is called takht jami.

 

With its publically claimed attack on Afghan Shia mourners in Kabul on the eve of Ashura, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was clearly attempting to add a toxic sectarianism to the Afghan conflict. The attack, which killed 19 people, followed two other ISKP attacks, on a political demonstration by (largely Shia) Hazaras in July in which 80 people were killed and on a security convoy of the Canadian embassy that killed 14 Nepalese guards, in June. In the wake of these attacks, AAN’s Borhan Osman assesses both ISKP’s strength and operational capacity in Kabul and its desire to ferment sectarianism.

On the evening of 11 October 2016, at least two attackers wearing police uniforms and equipped with grenades and machine guns opened fire on Ashura mourners in Kabul’s Kart-e Sakhi shrine, the most popular gathering place in Kabul for mourners marking Muharram, the martyrdom of Imam Hussein. The second attacker, who apparently fled the shrine after joining the first attacker in shooting, fought the security forces in a nearby (Sunni) mosque in Kart-e Chahar. There were no casualties to civilians here as the mosque was not being used, at the time. Witnesses said the attackers in Karta-e Sakhi “indiscriminately shot everyone they faced. They wouldn’t even spare women and children.” The interior ministry said the second attacker was killed in the firefight early in the morning of 12 October 2016. Initial reports had suggested there were several attackers who entered the crowd in Karta-e Sakhi, and that they were holding hostage some of the mourners, but those accounts were never confirmed with any solid detail. The ministry put the number of the dead at 16 and the wounded at 54. They included children and women. UNAMA, condemning the attack, said 19 people had been killed and dozens wounded. Also on 12 October, the actual day of Ashura, an explosion, again targeting Shia mourners in the usually relatively safe province of Balkh, killed 14 people and wounded 28. A bomb had been attached to an electricity pole close to the Ashura procession in Balkh district centre.

Nobody claimed responsibility for the Balkh explosion. The Kabul attack, however, was claimed on 12 October by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in two separate statements. ISKP said the first attacker was called Ali Jan and in a statement with picture, said he had been armed with an explosive belt, hand grenades and a gun. A second statement pictured the second attacker saying he had attacked Afghan forces (sic) protecting the Ashura processions in Kart-e Sakhi. The statement said the attack on Afghan forces happened half an hour after the attack on the mourners and claimed the assailant had killed 30 members of the Afghan security forces. The Taleban condemned the attacks.

ISKP’s Kabul cell, a growing threat?

 ISKP has, over the last year, claimed more than a dozen attacks in Kabul. Half of them were untraceable to any actual incident and thus remain empty claims. Some were claimed by both the Taleban and ISKP, but with the latter often providing more convincing detail. One of the initial attacks was a small bomb which exploded outside the largest and oldest place of worship for Shias in Kabul in the lead-up to Ashura in 2015. One person was killed and several wounded in the blast in Chandawal, in the centre of the capital. The bulk of ISKP’s (claimed) attacks in Kabul, however, have taken place since summer 2016. Several of these attacks are noteworthy for their deadliness, political implications or complexity. They are discussed chronologically below:

Assassination of MP Sher Wali Wardak, 5 June 2016

The MP was killed by a bomb planted inside an electricity meter box on a wall outside his home in the west of Kabul. He was former education minister Faruq Wardak’s brother. Both the Taleban and ISKP claimed the attack, and both gave equally imprecise descriptions. They both said the MP had been killed by a bomb that struck his car, implying it struck him as he was driving. None of the statements mentioned the actual placement of the bomb. The Taleban’s claim remains a puzzle as to what made Wardak a particular target for them. A normal, even a prominent, politician or member of parliament is not typically on the Taleban’s hit-list. Unless the movement has a specific reason against someone of Wardak’s type, they would not usually send someone to Kabul for killing him or her. Also, when it targets such a person, the claim of responsibility would usually describe the specific reason; this was something that was missing from the statement about Wardak.

There is always the possibility that Wardak was the victim of local grudges and therefore his killing might have been the act of a particular local Taleban group, rather than the movement’s central command. Wardak and his brother Faruq have been active and well-known in their native district, Saidabad. They have been engaged in negotiations with the Taleban to facilitate the opening of schools in Taleban-controlled areas and were also involved in the negotiations (and possibly a deal with the Taleban) in the release of their father a few years ago from the insurgents’ captivity. Moreover, using their influence in the government, the two brothers were helping get the release of Taleban prisoners from their area held in Kabul and integrating them back into society, sometimes by providing them with jobs in the government. Unlike many members of the elite, they kept an active relationship with their constituency back home, even with the Taleban and Taleban-supporting part of the community. With such a role also came expectations and demands from the local Taleban. It might be the grudges or demands from a part of the local Taleban that made Sher Wali Wardak a target. This was also suggested by the then Afghan intelligence chief, Masud Andrabi, who said in his briefing to parliament that the agency had identified the culprits as a Saidabad-based Taleban group.

What makes ISKP’s claim equally plausible, however, is the existence of IS sympathisers in the area where Wardak lived and was killed. Charahi Qambar, where the attack took place, and the neighbouring Company area have long had Salafi cells. Some of them have been engaged in armed activities inside and outside Kabul in recent years. There is increasing evidence that these cells have aligned themselves with ISKP (see below). Wardak, a prominent politician living in the reach of the ISKP cell with loose personal security, would have been an easy target. Even in the case of Wardaki Taleban being behind the attack, some role for the ISKP cell can not be ruled out given that members of this cell had earlier, while part of Taleban command and control, fought in provinces neighbouring Kabul, such as Logar and Maidan Wardak, where they still probably enjoy connections.

Attack on member of Kabul provincial council, Mawlana Ataullah Faizani, 20 June 2016

Faizani was wounded in an attack either in his car or at home (details are unclear) in the Chilsetun area of Kabul. In this case too, both the Taleban and ISKP claimed the attack. As was the case with Sher Wali Wardak, Faizani did not stand out as a particularly obvious target for the Taleban. ISKP, though, has a much looser and broader range of potential targets, which includes anyone working in the government or legislative bodies. ISKP’s claim referred to Faizani as a murtads or apostate (no other details given). The group could have been referring to his origins in a Sufi-oriented family. He seems a likelier target for the violent Salafis of ISKP than the Taleban.

Nepalese Gurkhas, 20 June 2016

On the same day as the attack on Faizani, a suicide bomber struck a minibus carrying Ghurkas employed by the Canadian Embassy for security duties in Kabul. At least 14 of the guards were killed in the attack in the Banayi area, east of Kabul, making this one of the deadliest attacks on foreigners in Afghanistan. The Ghurkas were travelling between their accommodation in the east of Kabul and the embassy when came under attack. This attack, too, was claimed by both the Taleban and ISKP.

After any attack, releasing the name and photo of the attacker and other details about the attack are the most essential elements of making a claim credible. In this instance, ISKP provided the more convincing details. While the Taleban released a brief and vague statement without details, ISKP provided what appeared to be sufficient elaboration. It named the attacker as Irfanullah, a resident of Pakistan’s Bajaur tribal agency, which contributes a sizeable number of fighters to ISKP, and published his photograph. ISKP’s radio channel, Khilafat Ghag (Voice of Caliphate), gave extra information about the bomber’s background and training. Western officials with knowledge of the technical details of the attack said the type and structure of the explosives used had not been seen before in attacks in Kabul, further pointing to a hand other than the Taleban. They described the suicide vest used in the attack as being built in ‘claymore style’, which directs shrapnel into a single direction, instead of bursting in all directions. This kind of vest has appeared mostly in Iraq, but has been extremely rare in Afghanistan. The uniqueness of the explosives also raised concerns that ISKP may be getting more regular operational links with the IS Syria than previously thought.

What makes ISKP’s claim of this attack and also, somehow, the two previous ones more credible was an admission, in private, by a Taleb of fabricating claims in order to prevent publicity for their rival. A Taleban source dealing with claims admitted to AAN that they had falsely claimed the two first attacks. Fearing that a more active “Daesh” would provide an excuse for the continued “occupation” of Afghanistan by foreign forces, he said the Taleban had made the claim to deter public attention from ISKP. The source talked explicitly about the movement’s claim for the attack on the Gurkhas and implicitly about the two previous attacks listed above.

Attack on Hazara demonstrators, 23 July 2016

On 23 July, ISKP conducted the most massive of its attacks in Kabul. It struck Hazara demonstrators of the Junbish-e Roshnayi (Enlightening Movement), killing 80 of them in Kabul’s Deh Mazang Square. Unlike the previous incidents, the Taleban did not dispute ISKP’s claim this time; it condemned the attack. ISKP published the names and pictures of the two suicide bombers and justified the attack as ‘revenge’ against Shias fighting in Syria for the Assad regime. In addition, the ISKP statement said the attack was aimed at “cleaning the world from the sherk [idolatry] of the rawafidh [a derogatory term ISKP and other Salafi jihadist groups use to refer to Shias, meaning ‘rejectionists’]”. The Taleban, who referred to Shias as “brothers” in their statement, were castigated in a fatwa by an ISKP mufti. It claimed that Shias were undisputed infidels, even in the view of Hanafi ulama whom the Taleban follow, and that whoever doubts this or the right to kill them are, in turn apostates. The fatwa came up with this unorthodox conclusion by cherry-picking quotes from Hanafi ulama, heavily distorting them and then using them out of context.

ISKP’s recruitment in Kabul

These attacks, especially the ones more certainly looking to be the act of ISKP, indicate that the group has an operational presence in Kabul that is beyond the ‘nascent’ stage. The group seems to have gained the capability of carrying out fatal attacks on an occasional basis in the capital, although not at a sophisticated level yet. Sending two bombers to blow themselves up in a crowd of civilian demonstrators, or two attackers dressed as police and equipped with hand grenades and guns, plus suicide belts, into a mourning crowd, or carrying out an attack on foreign security contractors in a minibus do not require a high level of complexity. However, the execution of such attacks does need some level of confidence and precision of planning, as well as adequate logistics and surveillance. These attacks are also an indicator that the group has recruited a certain number of dedicated and experienced fighters in the capital. While it is difficult to gauge how large the ISKP membership and support base in Kabul is, there are clues as to the group’s growing appeal among certain quarters of the city’s young population. (More on this in a forthcoming piece.)

Over the past eighteen months, AAN has been consistently hearing stories of young men from Kabul having adopted the IS ideology and joining its ‘battlefields’ in Nangarhar, Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq and Syria. According to information AAN has received, there are probably at least three cells based in different major neighbourhoods of the city. The oldest of these cells – the current affiliation of which with ISKP is inconclusive, but highly likely – was set up by Al Qaeda and has been operating in the capital since at least 2009. It was members of this cell which were captured in 2011 and accused of plotting to assassinate President Karzai, after they had recruited one of his personal bodyguards. One of the arrested ringleaders was Dr Emal Habib Asadullah, a medical professor and director of microbiology at Kabul Medical University. He is said to have radicalised and trained many students in the university, including female students.

Despite the arrests, the cell did not disappear. Its continuing presence has long been known to the security agencies in Kabul. While Habib is still in detention, another key leader of this cell, AAN was told Dr Abdul Hamid Mashal was freed in spring 2015 after four years in detention (no further details available). Following his release, he left for Syria along with a few dozen of his young followers, most of them from Kabul. While he is still alive, most of the young men who joined him have been killed in fighting. It is believed this cell, or parts of it, had shifted its allegiance from al Qaeda to IS before its freshly released leader left to Syria to fight alongside the group. While the switching of sides is not fully definitive from the information AAN has received, the behaviour and ideology of some of the members that remained in Kabul seems to point more to IS than al Qaeda. Some of these remaining members were also arrested during raids by Afghan Special Forces in the city last winter. However, the cell appears to be far from finished. The defection of this cell to ISKP, if proved, would supply IS with veteran Salafi jihaidsts with extensive experience of operations inside Kabul.

The other two cells appear to be relatively new and information about their joining ISKP suggests a more conclusive picture. One is based in the west of Kabul and is made of Salafi fighters who previously fought under the Taleban (in the post-2001 insurgency). Members of this group used to alternate between their base in Kabul and the ‘battlefield’ in Logar, Wardak and Kapisa. Before joining ISKP, the group did not run its own independent operations, but used the Taleban’s resources to carry out attacks, mostly outside Kabul. However, it recently developed its own command and control structure and has started focusing on operations in Kabul. It was members of this group that distributed IS propaganda materials openly in a mosque in Company area after the Eid ul-Fitr prayers in July 2014. As reported earlier by AAN, young half-masked men distributed CDs containing speeches of IS leaders, videos of its battles and bomb-making instructions following the crowded prayers of Eid. Around the same locality, when gunmen entered a Sufi mosque and opened fire on worshippers in March 2015, suspicions primarily fell on this group. The gunmen killed 11 worshippers before escaping to safety in the dark of the evening. Sufi leaders, who share some of the same neighbourhoods with the Salafis had previously held bitter debates with the latter. The debates had sometimes evolved into violent encounters.

The third cell is the newest and has no previous experience of armed activity. Spread across the northern neighbourhoods of Kabul, which are mainly home to residents of provinces north of the capital, this cell is also made of young Salafi radicals. Members of this cell are connected to wider Salafi currents in the capital and were initially inspired by the non-violent Salafi leaders. AAN has been informed about young men from this cell having left for Syria and others having spent months in Nangarhar fighting for ISKP. Family elders, in some cases, reportedly tried to de-radicalise their youngsters through facilitating discussions with ulama, but have failed.

In total, these three cells seem to have a strength of active members perhaps in the dozens, rather than hundreds, but they do appear to enjoy a wider support base from which they can recruit from.

ISKP unleashing sectarian havoc  

What has sharpened concern among Afghans is perhaps not ISKP’s capability, but its willingness to inject sectarianism into the conflict in Afghanistan. In recent decades, compared to most conflicts in the Muslim world, Afghanistan has stood out for the absence of such fratricide. ISKP, during the short period since its emergence, has, however, showed no hesitation in stepping into this un-mined area. While the Ashura and July 2016 attacks in Kabul are the most remarkable examples of sectarian violence by ISKP, the overall sectarian trend that is emerging since the group’s advent has been much wider. Over the eighteen months, there have been a number of attacks and assassinations targeting Sufi, Hanafi and Shia entities. Salafis have also had their share of victims, in what appear to be revenge attacks.

Last year, in the lead up to Ashura, three bomb attacks targeting mourners in Kabul took place, including the already mentioned Chandawal attack, which was the only one that ISKP publicly claimed and the only one that caused casualties. Two other small explosions went off near a takiakhana (a Shia place of mourning) in Qala-ye Fathullah, and another in front of a takiakhana in Dasht-e Barchi. None were reported by the mainstream media, national or international. The March 2015 attack on the Sufi mosque in Company went unclaimed, but appeared also motivated by sectarianism. In two other instances claimed by ISKP, two Afghan Hanafi ulama engaged in disputation with Salafis were shot dead Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. One of them, Mawlawi Ghulam Hazrat, was hugely popular among anti-Salafi Hanafis for his bold sermons and public debates against ‘Wahhabism’. The other, Mawlawi Nasim Hanafi, was relatively less known. As is the case with most of the Afghan ulama living in Pakistan, both were strong supporters of the Afghan Taleban, and thus the motive of their assassination could also be intertwined with politics. They had been openly calling ISKP members khawarij (a sect that rebelled against the fourth caliph and was takfiri, ie naming fellow Muslims apostates for committing major sins). IS in Iraq and Syria in its Arabic magazine An-Nab’a, justified the killing of the two ulama because they were “apostate Taleban leaders.” However, they had no formal links to the movement. The Taleban, in a statement, blamed the assassinations on elements “who want to stir sectarian hatred” among Afghans. The statement referred to them as independent ulama. On social media, the overall sense among many religious readers was that these ulama were shot dead either by people directly linked to ISKP or by Salafi supporters from the various Salafi networks active in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but originally from Afghanistan.

Salafis, seen in some local contexts by anti-Wahhabi mullahs as a support base for ISKP, have had their own share of casualties. In February 2016, a renowned Salafi preacher in Jalalabad, Sheikh Rahmat Shah, was assassinated by two gunmen riding a motorbike while on his way from mosque to home. Rahmat Shah was teaching at the famous Salafi madrasa of Naranj Bagh and was the younger brother of Jalalabad’s best known Salafi leader, Sheikh Ahmad Shah. He was also delivering sermons on a private FM radio that airs teachings of Salafi ulama. (For more on this Salafi network, see the author’s paper, Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism. Afghanistan’s new generation of Islamic activists). The madrasa and family did not accuse anyone directly for the killing, but Salafis from across the spectrum (including those in ISKP) pointed to what they called the enemies of tawhid (their short hand for Salafim, meaning the monotheists, or believers in the oneness of God). In a speech, the brother of the deceased, Ahmad Shah, called the murder an act of those “who want to pit some ulama against other ulama,” understood to be referring to Salafis versus Hanafis. Overall, in the Naranj Bagh madrasa, the feeling that Rahmat Shah was a victim of a sectarian attack was unchanging following his death. The madrasa itself was also attacked on 11 October 2016, the same day as the Ashura attacks in Kabul. Unidentified men threw grenades into the madrasa’s premises after dawn in an incident that went unreported by the media. In another instance, a young Salafi imam from Hesa-ye Awal Kohistan district of Kapisa was shot dead while praying in his mosque in August 2016. He was also a member of Hezb-e Islami, but was more known as a Salafi preacher and activist. His followers on social media also blamed those who were “against the tawhid school of thought,” again framing the murder as a sectarian killing.

Implications

While assessing the rise of sectarian violence combined with the surfacing of ISKP as a group passionate about injecting sectarianism into the Afghan conflict and against the backdrop of what appears to be its growing ability to carry out attacks in Kabul, several implications stand out:.

• Fermenting sectarian hatred would complicate the Afghan conflict with new motifs and grievances, and put it onto a more unpredictable trajectory. If a sectarian tone did become ingrained in the violence, it would be hard to easily reverse it. Any ‘sectarianisation’ of the Afghan conflict would carry long-term consequences for the stability of Afghanistan. It is relatively easier to recover from political violence once there is a political settlement and reconciliation. However, it is harder to recover from sectarian strife, as it shatters the community’s social cohesion.

• By standing prominently for a sectarian cause, ISKP is trying to cater to all those fanatics who have long missed a militant organisation with this explicit aim. This is, potentially, an untapped ‘market’. If ISKP manages to attract such extremists, it could considerably boost its membership and support base, especially among the educated urban youth.

• ISKP as an organisation has struggled to expand beyond the four districts in Nangarhar, remaining, so far, a limited threat. A possibly larger threat is the broader radicalisation that provides a permissive environment and recruitment pool for groups such as ISKP. (The last two points will be discussed in a future piece.)

• ISKP’s emergence as the first militant group to openly challenge the Taleban’s virtual monopoly over the insurgency has opened the ground for various regional actors (groups and states) with an interest in shaping the conflict in ways different from what the Taleban have permitted. That challenge to the Taleban’s monopoly has, itself, lowered the bar for tactics in the conflict since ISKP has a much wider set of targets in its sights.

ISKP’s sectarianism is worrying. Yet it is unlikely that it can single-handedly drive the conflict in a sectarian direction. There are many other, reassuring factors which would hopefully prevent the war morphing into the sort of violent religious schism seen in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Pakistan. The main parties of the conflict, the Afghan security forces and the Taleban have convincingly spoken out against sectarianism. The record of the Taleban, during their rule in the late 1990s, was mixed but certainly better than might have been expected from a government comprised of Sunni mullahs (see three AAN pieces written after the 2011 Ashura bombing in Kabul, here, here and here). The movement, post-2001, has partnered with foreign groups with sectarian ideologies, but have, themselves, invariably stayed away from violence that could stir sectarian hatred, effectively making it one of their red lines. AAN knows of generous funding offers to the movement from the Arabian Gulf to embark on anti-Iran and anti-Shia projects in Afghanistan. However, the movement has consistently turned such offers down.

Moreover, the Afghan population generally and religious leaders, big and small, from both major sects have traditionally emphasised the value of co-existence, making it more difficult for fringe actors to tear apart the social cohesion. Sectarian violence has remained a taboo during the Afghan conflict through modern history. The instances of sectarian violence have represented more the very occasional exception than the rule. For any group with a solid vision to rule this country, promoting sectarianism is to play with fire.

 

Edited by Kate Clark

 

 

 

 

A little over a year after the temporary fall of Kunduz city to the Taleban, the city has become a battleground again. On 3 October 2016, the Taleban entered during a massive assault from three directions. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), supported by US forces and air power, are battling to recapture the areas they lost, with territory still changing hands. The attack was very similar in tactics to the one last year and was largely staged from the very same areas – despite reassurances by the government that the situation was in hand and despite the many ANSF ‘clearing operations’ (that indeed failed to clear these areas). AAN’s Obaid Ali explains the persistent vulnerabilities that brought the city very close to being overrun by the Taleban for a second time.

The Taleban attack Kunduz city again

On 3 October 2016, the Taleban started their assault on Kunduz city – a little over a year after the city fell in September 2015. The assault was staged from three directions. The first attack started in the early morning, around 4:00 am, from the western areas of Zakhel, Khakani, Bagh-e Sherkat, Kota-ye Gert and Qahwa Khana. These areas are located in the city’s first police district and are only a few kilometres away from the city’s symbolic heart: its main square where several government buildings are located. Insurgents from Chahrdara, the district flanking Kunduz city to the west and southwest, supplied fighters for this front. Chahrdara has been one of the Taleban’s strongholds for the past few years and played a crucial role in last year’s attack on the city. Once Kunduz city’s security cordon had been breached on this side, the Taleban overran the first police district’s head quarters which is located around two kilometres northwest of Kunduz main square, and started moving towards the city’s centre.

The second assault followed shortly after from the east of the city, from an area known as Charkh Ab, which it is around two kilometres away from the main square and situated on the Kunduz-Takhar highway that runs east from the city. As recently as in September 2016, the Taleban had blocked this highway for several weeks (read report here). The Taleban coming in via Charkh Ab were supported by insurgents not only from their strongholds around the Kunduz-Takhar highway which they had established in the past few months (Dokan-e Adam Khan, Kata Khel and Char Sari), but they also received reinforcements from the Aqtash area of neighbouring Khanabad district, which has been mostly under the control of the Taleban since April 2015. From this location the Taleban moved closer to the Kunduz main square, through Khowja Mashad and Nowabad where the militants fought the government security forces.

Once the insurgents had successfully entered the city from the west and east, the third assault was conducted from the northern direction – from the Kala-ye Gaw and Bala-ye Hissar areas, only a few kilometre away from the main square, where the insurgents had built up a strong presence since Kunduz’s first fall in September 2015. This front was supported by fighters from Gortepa, another Taleban stronghold that has been under the group’s control since April 2015.

The initial assaults were quickly followed by explosions inside the city. The first improvised explosive device (IED) went off on University Street, in the first police district, followed by two others on the key road leading to Kunduz airport, south of the city.

According to local sources, the Taleban already had their fighters inside the city in advance, to pave the way for the attacks by providing intelligence to the incoming forces, plant the IEDs and create a chaotic environment within the city. The other objective of the fighters, locals said, was to spread propaganda and (mis)information about the Taleban having arrived in the city’s centre. This put the local government forces on the back foot and prevented them from taking effective and immediate action.

The local government, surprised and disoriented by the complex attack and without a strategy to handle the situation, found itself engaged in several battles inside the city at the same time. Video clips released on social media show police check posts, which presumably could have fought off the attacks, surrendering to the Taleban without resistance. A clip recorded in Qawa Khana, for instance, shows seven Afghan National Police (ANP) policemen who had surrendered and handed their weapons to the Taleban. The men were interviewed by a Taleb who asked their names, places of birth and reason for surrendering the check post. The policemen, who were clearly under psychological pressure, answered that they surrendered because of a lack of government support. The purpose of such was to damage ANSF morale on the ground.

At the time of publication, street fighting had been ongoing in several parts of the city for the past nine days, ever since the Taleban entered. Civilians are caught up in the fighting and many have no access to water or electricity. Residents are often trapped in their houses, too scared to venture outside to try to find what they need. According to Moalem Shams, a resident of Kunduz, all shops and markets are closed and prices for any food still available on the informal market have skyrocketed. The main roads leading to northeastern Takhar and southern Pul-e Khumri in Baghlan – escape routes during the previous siege of Kunduz –have been blocked by Taleban checkpoints for the past few days.

What is notable is this: the areas from where the insurgents started their assault had been vulnerable for a long time. Moreover, when the Taleban overran the city in 2015 their forces came from exactly these areas – Zakhil in the west, Kala-ye Gaw in the east and Bala-ye Hissar in the north (read our previous analysis here). This leads to the question: why was the city still this vulnerable?

Why was Kunduz City still a vulnerable target?

After the fall of the city to the Taleban last year (read our previous analysis here and here), the ANSF conducted several waves of clearance operations in areas largely under Taleban control. But they failed to address the basic vulnerabilities of Kunduz city: even after the operation, Taleban fighters were still present in the villages around the city, or they simply moved back in again as soon as the ANSF retreated.

Moreover, in the past few months the Taleban stepped up their activities again and started regularly establishing checkpoints on the Kunduz-Takhar highway – the only overland route to Badakhshan. This made it dangerous for passengers to travel. Mobile checkpoints appeared in Charkh Ab, Qabr-e Golistan, Lodin and Bagh-e Mir, all villages located only a few kilometres to the east of the city. At these checkpoints Taleban fighters stopped and searched vehicles with the aim of detecting and detaining ANSF and government employees.

For instance in May 2016, the Taleban kidnapped a local police official (see short report here) and abducted passengers from several buses close to the entrance to Kunduz city. Reports suggest that up to 50 passengers were kidnapped and that dozens of them that were identified as members of the government were killed (see reports here and here). The Taleban confirmed the incident, claiming they had detained 26 individuals who were members of the security forces.

Following these incidents, public pressure on the ANSF to keep the highway open and secure the surrounding areas increased and kept the ANSF busy. The security forces started focusing on the areas around the Kunduz-Takhar highway at the cost of leaving areas close to the city unattended to. This may have blinded them to the mounting presence of Taleban around Kunduz city.

Towards the end of the summer, the Taleban increased its pressure on the Kunduz-Takhar highway, engaging ANSF in different parts of this crucial supply route. On 17 August 2016, the Taleban launched a massive attack against ANSF check points on the highway, which caused serious problems for the people travelling between Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces (read a short report here). The only remaining route connecting Kunduz to the northeast was now through Khanabad district. To block this route too, the Taleban conducted a large-scale attack on Khanabad. On 20 August 2016, the Taleban stormed Khanabad’s district centre and took control of it for a day and half (see report here) before being pushed out again.

The Kunduz-Takhar highway remained blocked (read more here and here) for two weeks, until on 3 September 2016 Muhammad Qasem Jangalbagh, Kunduz police chief, declared the highway had been reopened after a clearance operation. The temporary cutting off of the highway affected the whole northeast. Supplies were stuck either in Kunduz or in Takhar and the prices for goods shot up due to the lack of transportation and fears that the highway could remain blocked for a long time.

The continued Taleban presence in southern Kunduz had also long made the Baghlan-Kunduz highway insecure for government officials and ordinary passengers and when the assault on the city started, the Taleban made use of their strategic presence. On 4 October 2016, the Taleban attacked and overran an ANP checkpoint in Jar-e Khosk on the Baghlan-Kunduz highway and blocked the road for reinforcements from Kabul. This negatively impacted the ability of the ANSF to swiftly move in reinforcements or to move them across the northeastern and southern parts of the province.

The Taleban had carried out a similar strategy in the run-up to the first fall of Kunduz city in 2015 (read our previous dispatch here and our analysis about the Taleban strategy to position themselves along major northern highways, here). Last year’s siege, with its very limited and late support for the forces that did stay to fight, had deeply affected the ANSF’s morale. Gholam Faruq, an ANP policeman, told AAN before the Taleban assault on Kunduz city, “My parents advised me that in some instances it is better not to fight the insurgents, because if you get caught or besieged, there will be no reinforcements.” During the latest fighting, Afghan National Army (ANA) service members complained to a local journalist that only ANA soldiers were fighting and that the high ranking officers had all retreated to safe places, like Kunduz airport (see more here).

Why did the government’s clearing operations not work?

After the collapse of Kunduz city in September 2015, the ANSF conducted several battles to try to regain the district centres that had come under Taleban control. These operations largely focused on the districts of Dasht-e Archi, Qala-ye Zal, Imam Saheb and parts of Khanabad. The operations took longer than expected and the district centres of Dasht-e Archi and Qala-ye Zal changed hands, between the ANSF and the insurgents, a few times even – after the ANSF clearance operations.

A few weeks after the government retook control of Kunduz city in 2015, security officials claimed that Taleban’s stronghold in Dasht-e Archi had been destroyed; Gen Murad Ali Murad said all insurgents in Dasht-e Archi had been “eliminated.” In March 2016, the provincial police chief said Qala-ye Zal was cleared of insurgents. However, the government’s control over these districts did not last long and in June 2016 both districts fell into Taleban’s hands again (read our analysis here).

The military operations had also done very little to improve the overall security situation in the province. Even though by the summer of 2016, after several waves of clearance operations in the districts, there was little or no tangible progress, security officials still continued to assure the population that they would stabilise the province and push the Taleban from Kunduz. On 26 August 2016, during a visit to Kunduz, Chief of the Army Staff Qadam Shah Shaem warned the insurgents that they would face the same fate that Daesh had faced in Nangarhar and promised to conduct another large-scale operation. There was, however, no sign of such an operation and if there are any plans to do so now, the Taleban assault on Kunduz city has left little space for them to be implemented.

According to local journalists, the ‘never-ending’ clearance operations in Dasht-e Archi, Qala-ye Zal and parts of Khanabad districts may have actually contributed to the destabilisation of the province. The operations left the security forces overstretched and with insufficient energy to monitor Taleban movements and conduct operations around Kunduz city. It prevented them from establishing permanent strong bases that could have stopped the Taleban from getting so close to the provincial centre. The ANSF’s engagements in Dasht-e Archi and Qala-ye Zal districts left space for the insurgents to expand and exercise their power around both strategic highways and to position more of their men strategically around the provincial capital, without attracting too much attention from the ANSF.

The attack on the city, and the subsequent street-to-street fighting – neither of which could be credibly denied – forced high-ranking security officials to visit the site of the Kunduz battle. On 6 October 2016, Taj Muhammad Jahed, the minister of interior, flew to Kunduz to meet the local security commanders. Taleban shelling, however, disrupted his meeting (see report here) and the minister left for the airport.

The latest attack seems part of a consorted effort by the Taleban to show that their insurgency is strong enough to again overrun a provincial capital, even after another change in the leadership. This is illustrated not only by this second assault on Kunduz, but also by the recent massing of forces for other fierce attacks, including on Lashkargah in Helmand, Tirin Kot in Uruzgan and Farah city. The fall of another provincial capital would mean a huge boost for the morale of their fighters. Even the ability to threaten such a fall, in multiple places at the same time, must make the fighters feel like they are part of a movement that is gaining in strength.

It is worrying that the attack on Kunduz seems to have taken the government by surprise again, after repeated assurances by security officials that the situation was in hand. This shows, not only a continued vulnerability to attack and collapse, but also a lack of awareness about where the main vulnerabilities lie and an inability to effectively respond. The fact that the Taleban could simply replicate its previous strategy – to encircle the city and to cut the reinforcement and supply routes – is worrying, since the government, and the international military, have been keen not to see the city fall again. Although the city did not fall, it is unclear when the fighting will end and how much it will affect the lives of ordinary people. It has become hard to get accurate and detailed accounts of the battle, since many sources have either fled or their phones have run out of battery power since the electricity was cut. After nine consecutive days of street fighting, the Taleban still hold areas in the east and west parts of the city.

Finally, after a year of negotiations and some last minute hurdles – including on the Afghan side refusals to sign and an attempt to involve parliament – the European Union and Afghanistan have reached a ‘readmission’ agreement on how to return Afghans who have travelled to Europe and failed in their claims for asylum. President Ghani and Dr Abdullah both backed the agreement, while Minister for Refugees Balkhi said Afghans migrants should be allowed to stay, regardless of whether their claims for asylum were accepted or not. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica explains what happened in Kabul in the run-up to the signing (with parliamentary reporting from AAN’s Salima Ahmadi) and explains what the agreement actually says.

The readmission agreement, optimistically titled Joint Way Forward, was supposed to be launched during a high-level, ministerial dialogue in Brussels on 3 October 2016, during which the EU would also announce an 80 million Euros assistance package for migration-related activities. The launch of the agreement – or declaration, as the Afghan government now insists on calling it (1) – was planned to coincide with the run-up to the Brussels Conference, a high-level aid pledging event. This was supposed to showcase Afghanistan’s willingness to cooperate on taking back Afghans who have failed in their asylum claims and to pre-empt potentially difficult discussions during the conference around continuing development aid for Afghanistan up to 2020. (2) This plan ran into difficulties when it became clear that both the minister for refugees and the minister for foreign affairs did not want to sign the document, after their deputies had finished negotiating it – to great concern and exasperation among European diplomats.

Many European countries have seen a large influx of Afghan asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016, with over a quarter of a million Afghans migrating to Europe in this period (see AAN reporting on Afghan migration here and here). Germany, one of the main countries pushing for a deal, received the bulk of the influx, with 180,000 asylum applications by Afghans in 2015 and 2016. Various European countries had trouble trying to deport failed Afghan asylum seekers and getting the Afghan authorities to accept them back and the EU wanted a commitment from Afghanistan that it would cooperate, as matter of principle. The organisers of the Brussels conference moreover feared that failure to negotiate a readmission agreement with Afghanistan could highjack important discussions at Brussels on aid and would leave member countries reluctant to publicly commit to future funding. So when in the run-up to the conference, it became clear that the key document, the Joint Way Forward, as well as a several bilateral readmission agreements might not be signed at all, the EU and its member states, as well as the presidential palace, all of whom were keen to make the Brussels Conference a success, engaged in a flurry of diplomacy to still get the document signed in time.

The main controversies

President Ghani’s position has always been that Afghanistan should take care of its own citizens. He has repeatedly reassured his EU counterparts that Afghanistan is obliged to accept the readmission of Afghans whose asylum applications have been rejected (see here  and here). Refugees Minister Sayed Alemi Balkhi, however, had a different opinion. Balkhi has repeatedly said he believed “all asylum seekers who have reached their countries of destination” should be recognised without any kind of discrimination (see for example his speech at the 66th Session of the Executive Committee of UNHCR ). By this, he appeared to mean that Afghans arriving in Europe should be granted protected status and not be treated differently from other nationalities, such as Syrians and Iraqis. He also repeatedly argued that forced expulsion was not an acceptable solution for Afghanistan (see for instance here).

As a result, Balkhi has been a difficult man to negotiate readmission agreements with. He has often gone public, showing himself as the ‘guardian of the people’s interest’, most recently in his address to parliament. His position was that a lot of people had sold everything to take the perilous journey to Europe and, if returned, would be left with almost nothing in Afghanistan. He was not impressed by donor promises of assistance linked to such agreements, and according to an advisor at the ministry of refugees, Balkhi has repeatedly pushed back against suggestions by EU member states that future aid could be conditional on Afghanistan’s cooperation in taking migrants back.

The public position of the Chief Executive Abdullah’s camp was that they were in favour of the agreement described in the Joint Way Forward. Javid Faisal, Dr Abdullah’s deputy spokesperson, assured AAN on 21 September 2016 that both wings of the national unity government fully supported the agreement, saying “We know the issues related to migration that Europe is dealing with.” The position held by both the president and the chief executive, he said was that all returns should be on a voluntary bases, that no more than 50 Afghans per flight could be sent back to Afghanistan, that vulnerable categories could not be returned to Afghanistan and that all returnees should be financially supported by the EU. The Joint Way Forward agreement, however, specifically also includes forced returns. Indeed, this was already agreed at the time of Faisal’s interview.

The official line, however, was cooperative and Abdullah himself is said to have been constructive in the various negotiations. It was notable, though, that the two ministers (Rabbani and Balkhi) who could have signed the agreement, and refused to, were both Abdullah appointees and that the ministers and officials the president relied on to ultimately resolve the impasse were all his own appointees (for more background on recent trouble within the National Unity Government, see this recent AAN analysis).

Under international refugee law and international human rights Law, it is not illegal to deport people who have failed in their bids for asylum, (3) provided cases have been judged equitably and the home country is not so dangerous that there is a general ban on returning everyone. At the moment, only two countries are judged to be in this category: the UNHCR had issued non-return advisories for Syria (dangerous for everyone) and Libya (dangerous for foreigners). There is, on the other hand, no legal requirement for Afghanistan to take back its citizens.

An intense week of last-minute negotiations in Kabul

The text of the Joint Way Forward was initialled in Kabul on Monday 26 September 2016, less than a week before the intended ministerial dialogue, by the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan, Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin, and three Afghan counterparts: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasir Ahmad Andisha, Deputy Head of the National Security Council Faizullah Zaki and Deputy Minister of Refugees and Repatriation Dr Alema Alema.

The official signing of the document by Minister Balkhi and EUSR Mellbin had been planned for Thursday 29 September 2016, but it proved impossible for the Afghan side to convince Balkhi to sign. This had already become apparent on 28 September 2016, a German diplomat told AAN, when the German ambassador had been asked to come to the presidential palace to sign the bilateral German-Afghan readmission agreement. He spent an hour outside the meeting room, while Ghani and Balkhi had an intense argument about the signing of the agreement. The episode ended with the German ambassador leaving the palace empty-handed, without the agreement having been signed.

Concern in the European capitals was so high that German Chancellor Angela Merkel called President Ghani on 28 September 2016, asking him to ensure the agreements were signed.

The Wolesi Jirga hearings and some last minute politics

In the meantime, parliament had caught on to the fact that this was a hot issue. On 28 September 2016, the ministers of foreign affairs and refugees and repatriation were summoned to the house to answer questions on the issue of asylum seekers in Europe and preparations for the Brussels Conference.

Parliament was inquorate, as it has been at practically every session since the summer recess and in most before that; only 87 MPs had come to hear the ministers. Salahuddin Rabbani, Minister of Foreign Affairs, told the house, “European countries told us: you should either receive our aid [in the form of aid] to Afghan refugees in our countries, or for development projects in Afghanistan; you can choose between these two options. They asserted very clearly that they cannot help Afghanistan in both areas.” He also told MPs that Afghanistan had prepared a statement that it would present at the Brussels conference, making clear under which conditions and how many refugees could be returned to the country. He did not provide any details on the drafted statement – which by that time had already been finalised and initialled – and instead told the house that the document had not been signed yet and that before signing it, the government would consult the parliament.

Minister of Refugees and Repatriation Sayed Alemi Balkhi also told the house that the document would specify how many asylum seekers would be returned from Europe to Afghanistan and concluded that, “There are major national interests at stake here, as well as Afghanistan’s relations with European and other countries. In view of what was discussed here, as the people’s representatives, you should take a decision in line with the national interests.” Speaker of the House Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi concluded the session by saying that the government was obliged to convince the host countries not to forcefully expel Afghan asylum seekers from Europe.

After the unsuccessful attempt to sign the German bilateral agreement and the strong words spoken during the Wolesi Jirga hearing – with the ministers promising the house it would be consulted, possibly even asked to vote, on an already finalised agreement – the planned signing of the Joint Way Forward in Kabul for Thursday 29 September was put off. The part of the government that was convinced of the need to get the agreement signed, not least due to strong European pressure, was now frantically looking for a solution.

The insistence towards EU negotiators that an official agreement would need to go through parliament and Balkhi and Rabbani’s promises to parliament that it would be consulted seemed aimed at trying to prevent the agreement being signed at all. As parliament rarely has the needed quorum to vote on matters of substance, relying on it for confirmation was doubly unlikely: MPs were hostile to forced returns and, anyway, there are not enough MPs present to be effective on anything.

Resolving the impasse

The first step towards finding a way through this tangled web was to call a second parliamentary hearing, in an attempt to better explain the position of the government and change the MPs’ mood. So on Sunday, 2 October 2016, at the request of the government, the Brussels Conference was again put on the agenda of the Wolesi Jirga. This time, in addition to Rabbani and Balkhi, Minister of Finance Eklil Hakimi (a driving force behind the Brussels conference and de facto co-organiser of the event) and Deputy Head of the National Security Council Faizullah Zaki (one of the three Afghan officials who had initialled the agreed text of the Joint Way Forward) presented it on behalf of the government. This time, the ministers urged the MPs to be patient and at times even defended the EU’s position.

Balkhi, for example explained the need for a new document by referring to earlier Memorandums of Understanding between Afghanistan and various European countries, saying that: “The past documents and MoUs with European countries did not foresee the current problems of these countries, so they had no stipulations regarding the recent policy changes.” (4) This, incidentally, seems to have been a previously agreed talking point within the chief executive’s camp. For example, Faisal had earlier told AAN that, even though Afghanistan has a readmission agreement with the EU, that was signed in 2002 by President Karzai, it was not applicable to the current migrant situation in Europe.

Finance Minister Hakimi again told the parliament that no document had yet been signed on deporting failed asylum seekers, but added that, “partner countries do expect us to cooperate with them on the refugee issue […] The EU countries cannot deal with the refugee crisis alone.” He concluded by saying: “If Afghanistan does not cooperate with EU countries on the refugee crisis, this will negatively impact the amount of aid allocated to Afghanistan. Germany cannot provide aid money and deal with the refugees at the same time.”

Foreign Minister Rabbani reminded parliament that in 2015 the EU had already requested Afghanistan to cooperate on the refugee issue, and added that at the end of the Brussels Conference there would be joint statement between Afghanistan and EU countries “on the deportation of refugees whose cases have been rejected.”

So while the MPs were now being told there would indeed be an agreement on deportations, Balkhi kept insisting that the new document was “a statement, which has less legal weight than an agreement.” He added that “Germany is insisting on this kind of statement.”

One of the issues that was raised in the hearing was the report that the Afghan government had been forced to agree to a deal that would allow the deportation of at least 80,000 Afghans from the EU (see The Guardian’s article here). (5) Balkhi assured the house that this was a rumour and the government had not signed any document that would allow this to happen. He added that all migrants would be individually processed and would have the right to appeal in court. NSC Adviser Zaki confirmed Balkhi’s statement and said that, based on the declaration, deportations would only concern “those who have had their cases assessed and rejected by three courts.” He added that it was expected that no more than 7,200 Afghans would be returned home in the first six months of the agreement.

Speaker Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi expressed the house’s support for the activities of the government undertaken so far concerning the Afghan migrants in Europe.

After the ‘political massaging’ of the MPs, who did not insist on voting on the declaration, Deputy Minister of Refugees Dr Alema Alema – a family friend of the Ghanis who had been asked to help resolve the impasse – quietly signed the Joint Way Forward in a low-key event at the presidential palace on 2 October 2016. George Cunningham, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation, signed for the EU (for the brief, official EU statement see here). The German–Afghan bilateral agreement on readmission was signed at the same time by Dr Alema and the German ambassador, while two other bilateral agreements on readmissions, with Finland and Sweden, were initialled by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasir Ahmad Andisha and the two ambassadors.

What the final document says

The final version of the Joint Way Forward, like its earlier versions, lays out its aim as:

…to establish a rapid, effective and manageable process for a smooth, dignified and orderly return of Afghans who do not fulfil the conditions in force for entry to, presence in, or residence on the territory of the EU, and to facilitate their reintegration in Afghanistan in a spirit of cooperation.

The signed agreement is a back and forth between the positions of both sides. It states that, “Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to readmit its citizens who entered into the EU or are staying on EU territory irregularly […] after due consideration of each individual case by member states.” (emphasis added). It stipulates that, “Afghan nationals who are found to have no legal basis to remain in an EU member state […] can choose to return voluntarily,” but also that, “Afghan nationals who choose not to comply with such a decision on a voluntarily basis will be returned to Afghanistan, once administrative and judicial procedures with suspensive effects [ie legal procedures that suspend a deportation] have been exhausted.”

The agreement says that special measures will be taken to ensure that vulnerable groups (unaccompanied minors, single women and women-headed families, the elderly and seriously sick people) will receive adequate protection, assistance and care throughout the return and reintegration process. Family unity will also be respected.

Regarding the mechanics of return, the agreement stipulates that every Afghan returning to Afghanistan on a voluntary or non-voluntary basis must be in possession of a recognised valid travel document. It specifies that the Afghan authorities will ensure that a passport or a travel document is issued within four weeks following a request made by an EU member state (or if a member state has evidence of the person’s nationality, within two weeks). If travel documents are not issued within these time limits, member states may issue a travel document (ie a laissez-passer). It seems that EU negotiators were well aware of, and unwilling to depend on, the lengthy Afghan administrative procedures, which can sometimes take several months. A humanitarian worker in Serbia, for instance, told AAN in June 2016 about the case of an Afghan minor who wished to return and who had been waiting for more than eight months for travel documents because of confusion as to which Consulate was responsible.

For the return of Afghan migrants, according to the agreement, the EU may use “scheduled or non-scheduled flights to Kabul airport (in existing designated facilities) and any other specified Afghan airports as mutually agreed, including joint flights returning Afghan nationals from several EU member states.” In terms of numbers, it said, “The EU member states understand that there should be limitation to the number of non-voluntary returnees to 50 per flight in the first six months following the signature of this declaration.” Additionally, the EU member states agreed to send details of returnees on non-scheduled flights to the Afghan government at least three weeks ahead of time. The document somewhat accommodates the government’s request for a new terminal for the returns, in exchange for agreeing to the readmission regime, although in rather vague terms, saying that, “both sides will explore the possibility to build a dedicated terminal for return in Kabul airport.”

The agreement further stipulates that, “EU Member States will sign bilateral and multilateral agreements with Afghanistan within the framework of the Joint Way Forward and will negotiate the technical and financial terms of repatriation after Afghanistan receives the data from each country and conducts a needs assessment” (no more details given). As mentioned before, new Finnish, Swedish and German bilateral readmission agreements were also negotiated in parallel with the Joint Way Forward. All bilateral agreements, so far, have come with financial commitments.

Finally, the EU agreement states that, “the return programmes and reintegration assistance are separate from and irrespective of the development assistance aid provided to Afghanistan.”

The ‘way forward’

The current document provides a basis for EU member states to accelerate both the voluntary and involuntary return of Afghans who have not been granted asylum. Critics of the agreement point out that the door is now open for the EU to send back large numbers of Afghans – many of them with large debts and after having spent long years on the road and in bureaucratic limbo – to a very uncertain future. They also point out that Afghanistan is not a safe country, disagreeing with the EU’s insistence that at least some parts of the country are safe enough.

There are obvious concerns on the Afghan side that the EU will not uphold its part of the agreement, in terms of ensuring support for the returnees’ successful reintegration and making sure they are not deporting people back to misery or a life of fear. This is particularly important as the deportation of failed asylum seekers from Europe comes on top of the current forced return of huge numbers of Afghans from Pakistan, and to a lesser extent, Iran. There are also obvious concerns on the European side, that Afghan cooperation will remain reluctant and random, and that public support within Afghanistan will be very thin indeed.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert and Kate Clark.

 

(1) A diplomat involved in negotiations told AAN that the Europeans were told that, if Afghanistan were to sign an agreement, it would have to be first approved by parliament. This is the reason why the government refers to it as a declaration, not an agreement.

(2) Relevant decisions relating to EU-Afghanistan readmission agreements and the current EU-Afghanistan readmission agreement, the Joint Way Forward

The Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) between EU and Afghanistan, which was initialled in July 2015 in the presence of President Ghani, states in article 28 that the parties agree to “increased cooperation on migration with the possibility to conclude a legally binding readmission agreement.”

The EU Action Plan on return from 9 September 2015, as communicated by the Commission to the European Parliament and the European Council called for the EU to engage in high-level political dialogues with relevant countries, including Afghanistan, as requested by the European Council on 25-25 June 2015.

On 1 December 2015, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission Mogherini and the Afghan Foreign Minister Rabbani agreed to launch a High-Level Dialogue on Migration.

In March 2016, a leaked EU non-paper on Afghanistan described “possible leverages” across EU policies to enhance returns. The paper estimated that more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be returned in the near future (which is what The Guardian article, referred to previously, based its numbers on).

The EU Council Conclusions on external aspects of migration from 23 May 2016, noted, “the Council […] is committed to enhanced and more effective cooperation on return with key countries of origin and transit, in particular with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.”

The Council conclusions on Afghanistan from July 2016, urged “the Afghan Government to cooperate on the return and readmission of its nationals, in full respect of their human rights and in accordance with international obligations and commitments.” The document further stated: “This is the central and essential element of the Joint Way Forward, which addresses the growing pressure of irregular migration in parallel to Member States’ initiatives and agreements aimed at achieving further cooperation on readmission. The EU would support this through reintegration assistance, to help create a conducive environment that can offer Afghan citizens opportunities within the country.”

For a timeline on the general EU response to migratory pressures see here. For the EU’s statement on the EU-Afghan dialogue on migration on 4 October 2016, see here.

(3) The presumption is that anyone who enters another country without permission (visa, passport, work permit etc) can be deported. The exception is if a person lodges a claim for asylum and is judged to be a refugee or given a status on humanitarian grounds. There is no entitlement to enter other states or to stay there.

(4) In the past 15 years, Afghanistan has signed memoranda of understandings on returns and readmissions with several EU/ Schengen members, including France (2002), UK (2002), Netherlands (2002), Denmark (2004), Switzerland (2005), Norway (2005), and Sweden (2006, until 2009).

In addition to bilateral readmission agreements, the EU passed the Afghanistan return plan in November 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime and the establishment of the interim administration, led by President Karzai, which stated:

The return of Afghans shall first and foremost take place at their freely expressed wish based on their knowledge of the situation in intended places of return and any options for continued stay in the European Union. Afghans, who do not have protection needs or compelling humanitarian needs justifying prolongation of their stay in Member States, but who nevertheless, after the passage of reasonable time, continue to refuse to avail themselves of a voluntary return programme, may be subjected to forced return by those Member States wishing to do so.

The plan was based on a partnership with the relevant Afghan authorities and explicitly said: “The Commission and the EU Presidency shall establish the relevant information exchange with these authorities, and the Council Special Representative in Afghanistan shall in cooperation with the head of the Commission representation in Afghanistan ensure acceptance of the plan by the Afghan authorities.”

President Karzai endorsed this plan.

In 2005, in a joint declaration “Committing to a new EU-Afghan Partnership” signed in Strasbourg on 16 November 2005, both parties agreed to “share a common commitment to facilitating the process of voluntary return of refugees…[this] includes cooperation on programmes supporting the repatriation of Afghan nationals from the European Union.” President Karzai signed this document.

(5) The Guardian article refers to the leaked restricted EU memo from March 2016 that discusses “possible leverages” to enhance returns. The document states that despite a positive trend in asylum application acceptance rates, “more than 80,000 persons could potentially need to be returned in the near future.” The Telegraph had a longer article based on this memo when it was first leaked in March 2016. Earlier AAN migration reporting referred to the leaked document here.

The Afghan Government and the EU will co-host the Brussels conference on 5 October 2016. A couple of side events will take place on 4 October, and a high-level dialogue on migration is scheduled for 3 October. Around 70 countries and 30 international organisations will come together in the Belgian capital to review the achievements and vision of the Afghan government and renew their commitments to Afghanistan. This is the eleventh international donor conference on Afghanistan, since 2001. Ahead of the gathering, AAN answers some key questions about the conference and Afghanistan’s foreign aid dependence.

1. What is the Brussels conference about?

The Brussels conference is an international donor conference where the Afghan government is expected to share its vision and track record on reform, and where the international community is expected to signal sustained political and financial support to peace, state-building and development in Afghanistan (for more details see the Afghan Government’s official website on the Brussels conference and the EU announcement).

The President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, and the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, will open the conference, and the Chief Executive of Afghanistan Dr Abdullah Abdullah will conclude it. The event will be co-chaired by Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs, Neven Mimica, European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Salahuddin Rabbani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and Eklil Hakimi, Minister of Finance of Afghanistan.

At the conference, the Afghan government will present reports assessing its performance to date, as well as documents outlining its plans. The assessments will include a list highlighting the National Unity Government’s achievements and a report on the so-called SMAF benchmarks (relating to the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework agreed in 2014. (For more details see the answer under question three).

The government’s plans include its new five-year strategy, titled the Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANPDF) that replaces the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) that expired in 2013. It will also present its fiscal strategy and its vision for budget reform and its development priorities, including on poverty reduction and social inclusion.

There will also be five new National Priority Programmes (NPP): the Citizens Charter Programme, which will replace the National Solidarity Programme; the National Women’s Economic Empowerment Programme; the National Urban Development Programme; the National Infrastructure Plan; and the National Comprehensive Agriculture Development (the documents will be uploaded here). For the next four years the government envisages eleven National Priority Programmes (NPPs): five new ones and six that will be ongoing. This is a major decrease from the original 22 NPPs (more about this under the question three). The government describes the eleven NPPs as “outcome focused thematic programmes” that will guide the government’s resource allocation and will guide ministries towards “collective problem solving.”

The Afghan government is also expected to propose a downsized set of 22 benchmarks, or what it calls “refreshed commitments.” In 2014, the Afghanistan government and the international community agreed to thirty-nine commitments under the SMAF (for details see here). After the government presents its progress against these 39 commitments at the conference, some of which have been achieved, it will suggest a new set of 22 commitments for the forthcoming period.

International financial commitments made at the Tokyo conference in 2012 were projected until 2016, and so the Afghan government will be seeking new funding pledges. It is expected that at the Brussels Conference, the Afghan government will secure commitments until 2020. The Afghan government is seeking the same level of annual assistance as in Tokyo (around 3.9 billion US dollars per year) for the next four years.

2. What are the donors’ expectations of the Brussels conference?

As co-host, the EU is probably the donor with the highest expectations. Ambassador Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin, the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan, told AAN:

We hope that the Brussels conference on Afghanistan will signal two key changes in the international approach. The first pivot is to change the narrative from winning the war to winning the peace. The second pivot is to have regional actors take more responsibility for Afghanistan’s peace and stability.

Ambassador Melbin explained that the there would also be a shift in the international approach towards Afghanistan: “In 2014, we had the triple transition which could not bring a fragile Afghanistan towards peace and stability. We are now finalising a triple decision package: a conditions-based force level presence, the Warsaw summit and the Brussels conference to finance security and development until 2020.” He added that: “More of the same will not create new results. We must avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. The triple decision package gives Afghanistan four more years to stabilise, while Brussels will help align our collective political, security, economic, development and regional efforts towards building the conditions for a lasting peace in Afghanistan.”

Next to these major expectations stands the fact that very few European donors have declared their contributions yet. For many donor countries, the key issues remain: the elections, the peace process, regional cooperation, mutual accountability and aid effectiveness. And on these issues, the Afghan government has only very modest achievements to report. Another major concern for many donors is related to aid effectiveness and the continued Afghan demands for increased on-budget support, given the persistent budget under-spending by the government and rampant corruption in the country. Some countries are pushing for greater conditionality on their aid disbursement and are requesting more result-oriented language in the conference communiqué. These misgivings, alongside the desire to have a successful yet substantive conference, mean that many commas and brackets in the joint communiqué are still being discussed.

The peace deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami (see AAN analysis here) and the limited progress on electoral reform (the electoral decree has apparently been passed, although not yet gazetted, and the selection committee for the Electoral Commission appointed) will presumably be presented by both sides as proof of progress. There is a general assumption that international support will remain at the current or near current level (3.9 billion US dollars a year).

3. What were the previous international conferences on Afghanistan about?

The Brussels conference is the eleventh high-level, international conference co-hosted by the Afghan government and international actors since the 2001 US-led intervention in Afghanistan.

The first international conference on Afghanistan was organised in Bonn in December 2001. Here, Afghan and international representatives agreed on the provisions of the interim authority, which was tasked to organise an Emergency Loya Jirga (see this dispatch by AAN’s co-director Thomas Rutting, who helped organized the jirga) and a Constitutional Loya Jirga within 18 months after that (see Ruttig’s account of this event here).

In January 2002, the Tokyo conference on Afghanistan saw the international community pledge over 1.8 billion US dollars to rebuild Afghanistan in 2002, and over 3 billion US dollars for the years after (see AAN’s Kate Clark reporting here).

Then following what some called the end of the Bonn process, the Berlin conference on Afghanistan was held in April 2004. At this conference the participants welcomed the newly adopted Afghan constitution, noting the “substantial progress” achieved since the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Multiyear commitments were made for the ‘reconstruction and development’ of Afghanistan totalling 8.2 billion US dollars for the fiscal years 1383 – 1385 (March 2004 – March 2007), including a pledge of 4.4 billon US dollars for 1383 (March 2004 – March 2005).

In January 2006, at the London conference, a first set of benchmarks were adopted based on what was called the Afghanistan Compact. This overarching conference document identified three areas of activities: Security; Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social Development. Under each of these thematic areas, a number of benchmarks and target timelines were defined. Additionally, key principles of aid effectiveness between the international community and Afghan government were agreed, including to, among other things, to, “increase the proportion of donor assistance channelled directly through the core budget, as agreed bilaterally between the Government and each donor” (see annex two of the Afghanistan Compact available here). In April 2006, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), involving the government of Afghanistan and its international supporters, was established and tasked with the strategic coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS).

In June 2008, at the Paris conference, co-hosted by the French Government, the Afghan Government and UN, the international community pledged an additional 21 billion US dollars to Afghanistan. The conference reaffirmed the Afghanistan Compact as the agreed basis for cooperation, as well as a new commitment to support the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for 2008-2013. However, some participants at the Paris conference voiced their concerns saying that “international donors had to radically change their mind-sets about how to promote development and security in Afghanistan.”

In 2009, after the Den Haag international conference, co-hosted, as in Paris, by tripartite chairs, the communiqué emphasised that “effective, well-funded civilian programmes are as necessary as additional military forces and training programmes.” The participants agreed to significantly expand the resources and personnel devoted to civilian capacity-building programmes, and pledged to improve aid effectiveness, in line with the June 2008 Paris Declaration.

In 2010 there were two major international conferences, in addition to the Lisbon NATO summit where the plan for a phased handover of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan security forces (inteqal) was announced.

At the 2010 London conference on Afghanistan, it was agreed that Kabul would gradually take over responsibilities for running the war and running the country, over the next five years (see also previous AAN reporting).

In July 2010, as agreed in London, the Kabul conference was held at which mutual progress on commitments was reviewed. Under the motto ‘Afghan owned and Afghan led’, President Karzai launched 22 National Priority Programmes grouped in six clusters and asked for 15 billion US dollars in pledges (see also AAN previous reporting here; here; and here).

While new programmes and agreements have been negotiated ahead of every new conference, progress has remained elusive, as noted by AAN’s Thomas Rutting in 2010:

A glance at the recent international conferences exhibits vague and unknown progress, even by the rough statistics. For example, in 2006 the government of Afghanistan introduced the Afghanistan Compact at an international conference in London. The Afghanistan Compact was a comprehensive plan to address some of the basic and fundamental social development and governance priorities of the Afghan government and its people. However, right after two years of the Afghanistan Compact, another plan was introduced at the Paris Conference and that was the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Again two years down the line, Afghanistan sees almost no significant signs of the implementation of the ANDS on the ground. It is worth mentioning, that the Comprehensive Strategy concluded at the Hague Conference last year too has remained unachieved so far.

In Lisbon, on 20 November 2010, the nations that contributed troops to ISAF issued a declaration (Lisbon Declaration on Afghanistan) announcing what they called ‘Afghanistan’s Transition’ – the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces and their replacement by Afghan ones. This transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership was to begin in early 2011 “following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision” and aimed to have the ANSF “lead and conduct security operations in all provinces by the end of 2014” (see also comments by AAN’s Thomas Ruttig ahead of the Lisbon summit here, a discussion of the phased handover here for an overview on NATO summits on Afghanistan see AAN reporting here).

In July 2012, Afghanistan’s donors pledged 16 billion US dollars for the country’s economic and development needs at another international conference in Tokyo (see a UNAMA report here http://unama.unmissions.org/donors-conference-tokyo-pledges-us-16-billion-afghanistans-development and a slightly more critical reporting by AAN here). The Tokyo pledges were made in response to the Afghan government’s strategy document titled Towards Self-Reliance; a strategy for “sustainable growth and development” through the National Priority Programs (NPPs) seeking to focus on economic growth, revenue generation, job creation, and human development. The conference further agreed on a new set of benchmarks in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF).

Although, according to Afghan Ministry of Finance figures, 57 billion US dollars had already been disbursed in development aid between 2002 and 2010, with very varying results, the pledges and money continued to come to a country with very weak rule of law, virtually no mechanisms to control corruption and growing insecurity in large parts of the country. (For more details, see also AAN’s e-book Snapshot of an Intervention. The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance 2001–2011 and a recent SIGAR report Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan)

In December 2014, the tenth international conference on Afghanistan was held, again in London. This time the then new Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, presented a new reform programme entitled “Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership.” The conference was not an explicit pledging event. Moreover, the National Unity Government had not been able to do much by that point, as it had been unable to agree on its cabinet. The conference communiqué thus simply stated that “the International Community reiterated its commitment, as set out in the Tokyo Declaration, to direct significant and continuing but declining financial support towards Afghanistan’s social and economic development priorities through the Transformation Decade.” (See AAN reporting on London conference here). Ghani’s government at the Senior Officials Meeting held in September 2015 introduced a new document, the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), which consolidated both its new reform agenda and the previous TMAF benchmarks, laying out a set of a 39 benchmarks.

4. What else is happening in the margins of the Brussels conference?

On 4 October 2016, there will be two official side events. The first, a high level event entitled “Empowered women, prosperous Afghanistan,” will include two panels. The first panel, “Promoting Afghan Women’s Rights,” will focus on the political and human rights dimensions of Afghan women’s empowerment, in particular the efforts to support women’s participation in political decision-making, including peace talks, the security and justice sectors, and the Government’s commitment to implement the National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (NAP 1325). Ongoing efforts to protect and enforce women’s rights will also be discussed, including progress on the implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) law (new AAN analysis is forthcoming, past dispatches on this controversial law can be found here, here and here). The second panel, “Socio-economic Empowerment of Afghan Women,” will discuss the importance of women’s participation in the economy. At this panel, the Afghan government will launch its National Action plan for Women’s Economic Empowerment (NAPWEE), which focuses on providing economic opportunities for poor rural women. The event will feature a high-level opening session, including speeches from President Ashraf Ghani and Irina Bokova, Director general of UNESCO.

A second high-level event on 4 October will be on “Regional Integration and Prosperity.” This event, which is on invitation-only, is expected to set next steps for regional economic cooperation projects that can attract the resources of Afghanistan, regional partners and the wider international community, and to get regional countries more engaged in Afghanistan.

An EU-Afghanistan dialogue on migration will take place on 3 October 2016 – over a quarter of a million Afghans migrated to Europe in 2015 and 2016 (see AAN reporting on Afghan migration here, here, and here). At this high-level event, it is expected that Afghan government and the EU will agree on the Joint Way Forward agreement on migration. However, the outcome document is still being discussed with the main sticking points at the time publication, not yet agreed. If the document is not signed before Brussels, this may well result in additional pressure on Afghanistan and rather strong language at the conference from some of the donor countries, who may well abstain from further development aid pledges, until the readmission agreement is signed.

In-addition to the official events, there will be several side events hosted and organised by various civil society organisations. For example, Transparency International will launch a ‘TI Scorecard Report’ on the performance of the Afghan government on its anti-corruption commitments over the last two years, to help, it says, set priorities for the next three years. 

5. How has the Brussels conference been reported on in the Afghan media?

In the Afghan media, much of the reporting on the Brussels conference has focused on the National Unity Government’ achievements (or lack of achievements) and the strategies it plans to present at the conference. There has also been criticism on the government’s failure to curb corruption, improve security, and create jobs.

Much of the recent reporting in the Afghan media was informed by the Minister of Finance’s briefing to the Wolesi Jirga on 19 September. It focused on the government’s new Afghanistan National Development and Peace Framework that would be presented in Brussels, as well as the five new national programmes (see for instance here).

A day before, Tolo News quoted the spokesperson of the Ministry of Finance, Ajmal Abdul Rahimzai, as saying that the “Afghan government is trying to become self-reliant and to end reliance on international aid through increasing its revenue.” Tolo News also quoted some MPs who had argued that Afghanistan would not become self-reliant, nor would it receive international aid in the future, if it failed to present proper plans at the Brussels Summit.

There were expressions of doubt over the sincerity of the National Unity Government, describing the presented achievements and plans as only window dressing, aimed at attracting international aid.

On 22 September 2016, Tolo News, for instance, quoted Sayed Ishaq Gillani, head of Hizb-e-Nuhzat Hambastagi Milli party, “Fighting is going on in many parts of the country, corruption has not been eradicated and they [the government] do not have anything to present to the Brussels Summit. They have to respond to the people’s questions, [but] how they want to convince the people is not known.” Ahmad Wali Massud, head of the Massud Foundation, was quoted as saying, “For two years they have not done anything and the country is going into crisis. Because of the Brussels Summit they say that we will do this and that. But I am sure they will not do anything as they have not done [anything so far].”

On 25 September 2016, Mandegar Daily wrote:

Nowadays, the presidential palace is taking measures and showing that it is striving for betterment of the situation; inter alia, there is attention to implement the political agreement, the electoral law is being discussed, the peace agreement is signed with Hekmatyar and then campaigns are carried about all of these. Also, there are talks of increase in revenue and that the government has prepared five documents to present to the Brussels conference, as well as there are talks of programmes and plans at the national level, but at the end nothing will be done in practice.

Mandegar Daily went further, saying that “preparation of a long list of achievements that is going to be presented at the international conference at the time while such achievements have not been made in the country at all, [is aimed] to maintain his [President Ghani’s] hold of power and to deceive the public opinions at the national and international level.”

Ahead of the Brussels conference, the media listed unfulfilled promises made by the president and his government. For example, on 21 September 2016 Hasht-e Subh daily wrote that while the president is meeting the Western standards when it comes to strategies and programmes, “the reality is that the dossier of Mr Ghani’s unfulfilled promises is thick.” And on 6 August 2016, Hasht-e Subh wrote, “The government has to start the electoral reform as soon as possible, and to form a commission to draft amendments to the constitution and to publish the parliamentary and district council election calendar. When these actions are taken, the government’s stand in the Brussels conference will be strengthened.”

Comments on the Brussels conference by politicians and MPs indicate that they mainly see the conference as a token of continued engagement that could bring good governance about and a source of continued financial aid to Afghanistan. As for the nature of the aid, some members of parliament believe international donors is now going to commit money to major infrastructure projects. “The international community will provide infrastructure aid to Afghanistan,” said Abdul Qadir Zazai, an MP from Kabul, on 18 September 2016, on Tolo News, “if the Afghan government succeeds to convince the international community at the Brussels Summit.” Nisar Haris, a member of the Meshrano Jirga (upper house), said, “We have not received [such] aid to build our infrastructure over the past 15 years.”

For more background see AAN’s thematic dossier bringing together some of AAN’s recent reporting on the main conference topics.

The peace deal signed today by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e Islami, and President Ashraf Ghani, has been hailed by the Afghan government as the first major peace achievement of the last fifteen years. However, expectations should be tempered. Given Hezb-e Islami’s almost total absence on the battlefield, the deal is unlikely to significantly lower the current levels of violence. It is also unlikely to inspire the Taleban to follow Hezb’s example, considering the completely different trajectories and aims of the two groups. Even so, says AAN’s Borhan Osman, Hekmatyar’s outsized ‘jihadi credentials’ could present a challenge to the legitimacy of the Taleban insurgency and his eventual return to civilian life can only be expected to leave its mark on Afghanistan’s politics.

How did this peace deal come about?

The agreement is the climax of six and half years of negotiations which included dozens of meetings between the two sides. It was a turbulent process, fraught with interruptions and breakdowns only to be followed by resumptions. Contacts with US officials were initiated even earlier, in 2008. That year, the Hezb-e Islami faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (often abbreviated as HIG: Hezb-e Islami-ye Gulbuddin) published its outline for a peace plan and two years later it handed over a 15-point plan to the government (see this AAN analysis).

Despite the long trajectory, it was not until spring of this year that a deal finally looked imminent. The negotiations that culminated in the current draft agreement started in March 2016, and in April, HIG dropped its most substantial condition for an agreement, the withdrawal of foreign troops; chief negotiator Karim Amin called the full withdrawal of foreign troops a goal, rather than a condition for an accord. In May 2016, a draft agreement between the two sides was initialled by Amin and HPC chair Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani (AAN analysis here).

In the following month, however, the fate of the agreement was thrown into uncertainty, precisely at the time that Hekmatyar was supposed to endorse it. HIG claimed the breakdown was because the government had added new demands, most importantly the explicit acceptance of the Afghan-US bilateral security agreement, which provides the legal foundation for the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan in the post-2014 period. However, according to members of the HPC and western diplomats closely following the process, it was HIG that had added new conditions to the draft. HPC deputy chairman Mawlawi Ataullah Salim told a parliamentary session in July 2016 that HIG delegates had presented these additional conditions directly to President Ghani, bypassing the HPC. These conditions included a specified timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops, representation of HIG in the election commission and a share in government.

Talks resumed in August 2016 with none of the mentioned extra conditions making it into the draft agreement in the form of a commitment.

There was also a brief hitch earlier this month when HIG claimed that the deal was to be signed on 10 September but that circles around Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah were trying to sabotage it. During an Eid ceremony on 11 September, President Ghani seemed to be alluding to this when he said that the peace deal with HIG would go ahead and that “unjustified hurdles” were not acceptable, although he did not clarify who was trying to put up such hurdles. There are indications that Abdullah’s camp was indeed not happy with the text of the agreement and wanted to change it, but on 19 September Abdullah publicly backed the deal. Two days later his powerful ally Atta Muhammad Nur, the acting governor of Balkh and head of Jamiat party’s political council, followed suit. This was the first time that both partners in the National Unity Government publicly voiced a consensus about the peace deal. President Ghani and Hekmatyar had already approved the final version of the draft and the agreement was then made ready for an initial signing ceremony of the draft on 22 September 2016.

HPC chair Gailani, who was initially supposed to be the only one to sign the draft agreement, insisted that NSC chair Hanif Atmar co-signed, presumably in an attempt to raise the profile of the event and to properly showcase the achievement of the HPC, it first major one since it was created in 2010. There were two other signatures from the government side. The first was Mawlawi Salim, who had taken part in the current negotiations, since coming into the HPC as one of the six new deputies appointed in February 2016 following a re-shuffle. More importantly, he is a member of Jamiat-e Islami who had also negotiated with the Taleban on behalf of Ahmad Shah Massud’s forces in the late 1990s. Salim’s co-signing seemed aimed at illustrating the support of the Abdullah and/or Jamiat camp for the agreement (Jamiat’s rivalry with Hezb-e Islami dates back to even before the anti-Soviet struggle of the 1980s, although Abdullah’s choice of Hezb-e Islami stalwart, former intelligence chief Muhammad Khan, as his running mate in the 2014 elections already indicated an easing of tensions). Another HPC deputy, Habiba Sarabi, read a short joint statement after the signing, in an effort by the government to emphasize the inclusiveness of the process, at least on its side, both in terms of gender and ethnicity.

What was the signing ceremony like, did Hekmatyar attend?

The actual agreement was signed on 29 September 2016 in front of a packed audience of senior Afghans during a lengthy ceremony in the presidential palace that was broadcast live on Afghan TV. President Ghani signed in person, while Hezb party leader Hekmatyar spoke and signed in a pre-recorded video (see the video here). The other speakers were again picked to portray a broad consensus and included Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, Pir Gailani and former minister and female senator Seddiqa Balkhi. The ceremony on 29 September was attended by a much larger and broader crowd than the earlier signing of the draft. Political leaders from across the spectrum as well as dozens of Hezbi-e Islami members and heavyweights participated. Among the influential figures in attendance were former president Hamid Karzai, prominent ‘jihadi’ leader Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf, Jamiat’s most powerful man and Balkh governor Atta Muhammad Nur, Hazara leader and Abdullah’s deputy Muhamad Mohaqiq and Wolesi Jirga speaker Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi.

Hekmatyar, in his 36-minute long speech, had something to say for all the different parties in power and in conflict, with varying tones. His message was full of veiled references. He frequently touched upon those he blamed for establishing a monopoly of power with the support of foreign forces and for pushing others from power. He returned to this theme five times in his on-script speech. His message was thus less conciliatory than one would have expected at such an occasion. Calling those he chastised a small clique (tolgey in Pashto), he left little doubt as to whom he was referring to (he has used the same term in past messages, interviews and articles to refer to his longstanding political rivals Shura-e Nezar/Jamiat-e Islami). He further condemned them as having invited the foreign forces to invade Afghanistan, and then having joined them in a war against their own nation. He urged them to correct their course of action and to compensate for their mistake. He lambasts the opponents of peace as having been “bought by foreign forces” and using war as “a tool for obtaining power and resources.”

Hekmatyar further explicitly asked the Taleban to follow his example and to enter into Afghan-led talks with the government, even if as an experiment for few weeks that should be observed with a ceasefire, while asking the government to be the first to take action by releasing Taleban prisoners. Then, turning to the first person plural, he came with a suggestion that diametrically contradicted the essence and spirit of the agreement he just signed. Suggesting to the Taleban to test the workability of direct talks, he went on to say: “If [the talks] did not yield a result, then nobody can stop us from jihad and armed resistance. Whereas we need the permission and agreement of others to enter the cities, we do not need such permission and agreement to climb the mountains.” He, however, did not spare the Taleban either from his harsh language, hinting that for those who fight with foreign weapons, their decision to end a war will also be dependent on their foreign supporters. “In their fight, 999 of those who are killed are Afghans, only one is occasionally a foreigner. We tell them that such fights are not the act of the wise, nor of the faithful mujahedin.” He also blamed the Taleban for providing the US with an excuse to extend its military presence in Afghanistan by overrunning Kunduz city last year.

In his message, Hekmatyar made it clear that he would continue his struggle for the full withdrawal of foreign forces, now through political means, as the Iraqis had done through a parliamentary decision. He commended the peace agreement as a desired step towards changing the tradition of gaining power through violence and hailed the successful negotiations as an outcome of intra-Afghan talks with no external mediation.

President Ghani in his speech also called the agreement an achievement, stressing that it upheld the entire constitution, and that the negotiations had happened inside Afghanistan and had been led by Afghans. Dr Abdullah hailed the deal as historic, and emphasised, in a somewhat defensive tone, that not a single right of the people had been compromised in the agreement.

What does the agreement say?

The text of the agreement contains specific commitments for both parties, but in practice it mainly boils down to a list of what the government will give or do in return for HIG to stop its military activities and fully respect the laws of Afghanistan. The government, for example, commits to requesting the United Nations and other countries who put HIG leader, members and/or the organisation on their sanctions list, to lift these sanctions. The most controversial provision was added to the draft in the last round of negotiations after August and relates to the issue of impunity. Article nine of the agreement now says that the government “provides guarantee for the judicial immunity of the leader and members of Hezb-e Islami concerning the party’s past political and military actions.” The government also commits to recruit HIG members and commanders eligible or interested in joining the Afghan National Security Forces. It also commits to help the return of 20,000 families of refugees living in the Nusrat Mena, aka Shamshatu, camp in Pakistan, by securing international aid for the programme. Personally, for Hekmatyar, the government commits to provide financial resources and security for him to choose two or three places of residence. It also commits to grant him a honorary status through a presidential decree in appreciation of his struggle “for peace and freedom of Afghanistan.”

On the part of Hezb-e Islami, the agreement requires the group to formally declare a permanent end to war, observe the constitution, ensure a permanent ceasefire and “stop all military movements and activities and dismantle its military structures.” This is the only solid commitment HIG has made, besides that it will announce the severing of all links and stopping any kind of support to “terrorist groups and illegal armed organisations.” The two commitments are stipulated in article 18 and 19 respectively.

Hekmatyar, according to chief negotiator Amin, will not appear publicly until he has been removed from the United Nations and various governments’ sanctions lists. It is unlikely there will be major hurdles to the delisting process, given that representatives of the international community were on board during the negotiation process, and that the United States embassy in Kabul, the US forces’ commander in Afghanistan and UNAMA have all welcomed the agreement. But it will be a time-consuming process and HIG will first have to prove it has indeed ended all military activities, dismantled its military structures (the mechanism of which is to be decided by a joint HIG-government commission), and severed relations with terrorist groups and illegal armed organisations. (see also earlier AAN analysis here).

How significant has HIG been on the battlefield?

Hezb-e Islami has been a fading insurgent group in recent years. This was already apparent in autumn 2009 when this author – who was then a journalist – visited Kapisa province. A member of a HIG fighting group guided him deep into a green valley in Tagab, just northeast of Kabul, to meet his comrades. “Hezb-e Islami runs 80 per cent of the current jihad against the occupation forces,” he claimed while on the way to the valley. “But the media and foreigners talk only about the Taleban as the prime enemy. They know that Hezb-e Islami is so popular that if they talk about it every day, the whole nation will rally around Hezb.” In a village dotted by fields separated by mud walls and orchards of pomegranate trees, two men wearing their Kalashnikovs over green camouflage jackets emerged from a walled field on a motorbike to guide us to the location of our meeting. One of them was Fazl Hadi, the local commander, who was still only in his late 20s. He had recently taken command after his father had been killed fighting French troops deployed to Tagab district.

At the site of the meeting a crowd of villagers gathered. Among them were about ten people who said they were armed and actively taking part in the fighting, but everyone in the crowd identified themselves as Hezb-e Islami mujahedin. They were from three generations, men over 40 who had fought the Soviets, their children who were contributing to insurgency operations against French and Afghan government troops, and a third generation of smaller children. The older men brought out Hezb banners, flags and pictures of Hekmatyar from the 1980s and 1990s, and even weapons from that era. Putting them on show on the ground of an old fort, the crowd shouted, “Long live Hekmatyar!” and “Long live jihad!”

It may have seemed like a convincing show of strength, but speaking to Fazl Hadi, it became clear that, rhetoric aside, this was a weak faction getting weaker. He complained about the shortage of resources and a near-absence of central command which could supply his fighters and provide reinforcements. He lamented that unfriendly Taleban increasingly encircled them. Two years later, he had moved permanently to Peshawar and his group had ceased to exist. By that time, in late 2011, Kapisa, which used to be a Hezbi stronghold, had slid towards Taleban control and gradually, in the years that followed, so did the other HIG redoubts, such as Kunar, Baghlan and Wardak.

Most of the HIG ‘fronts’ have since evaporated in a process of continued attrition, mainly due to the absence of an efficient organisation and lack of resources. Individual Hezbi fighters joined all parties of the conflict across the spectrum: community-level, anti-Taleban militias such as the Afghan Local Police or other iterations of government-linked militias such as, the US and German-sponsored Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme (CIPP) in Baghlan in 2010 (see AAN reporting here); the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF); the Taleban; and even the Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP). Many other fighters just returned to normal life. As a result, there are currently hardly any active armed groups of Hezb-e Islami left on the battlefield which are dependent on and loyal to Hekmatyar.

HIG did, however, continue to claim attacks. The last confirmed HIG attack that made it into the news was a suicide attack which killed two civilian contractors with the International Security Assistance Force in February 2014 in Kabul. Since then, there have been somewhat random claims published on the HIG website of small-scale attacks on ANSF targets in a few provinces. These claims, however, have not been confirmed by independent sources.

What impact will the peace deal have on the insurgency?

Given Hezb-e Islami’s almost total absence on the battlefield, expectations that the peace agreement with Hekmatyar will result in an immediate noticeable drop in the current level of violence are misguided. The HIG leader will not bring many fighters and will probably not be able to convince those who have continued their armed struggle against the state under other flags to lay down their arms. Even in Hezb’s prime stronghold, the Shamshatu refugee camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, that has been managed by Hezb since the 1980s with the Pakistani government’s consent, Hekmatyar has increasingly struggled to keep it free from the influence of other militant groups and prevent young men defecting to them. His men have particularly had trouble stopping young militants enlisting with the Taleban. In some cases, such youths and their families have been punished and banished from the camp.

Despite the scarcity of Hezb-e Islami fighting forces on the battlefield, the agreement signed in Kabul on 29 September 2016 may still have some practical importance for peace. While the agreement will likely fail to change the minds of broad sections of the Taleban movement, it might influence some in their ranks, as well as supporters among ordinary people, who have kept their respect for Hekmatyar because of his ‘jihadi’ credentials – provided he will be able to defend joining the government without it being seen as a sell-out of his ‘jihadi’ past.

Hekmatyar’s decision to ‘come in from the cold’ might feed a discussion among the Taleban about stopping the fight against the government altogether, a discussion that very few from the pro-state, Islamist spectrum have engaged in (the one major exception has been MP and mujahedin factional leader, Abdul Rabb Rassul Sayyaf, who has several times challenged the Taleban in strong words to prove that their fight against the government is Islamic (see an analysis here).

Hekmatyar’s potential to sway minds among insurgents and their supporters, if he chooses to, stems from his outsized role in promoting the narrative of jihad for over 40 years. From exile, he fed the minds of probably thousands of followers (not all necessarily Hezbis) through his prolific writing and media interviews. He has authored more than 70 books on religion, politics and jihad. His anti-‘occupation’ position and his tirades against the government over the past 15 years have granted him a distinct constituency in Afghanistan and admirers from across the jihadist spectrum throughout the region. During the current insurgency, he (and HIG as a whole) was undoubtedly the second key contributor, after the Taleban, to crafting a very vocal, anti-state narrative. Hekmatyar’s rhetorical war was always much louder than Hezb’s actual presence on the battlefield. As long as he managed to feed that unabated, anti-state narrative, he continued to play a role, even if he did not have many fighters on the ground.

Hekmatyar’s turnabout seems to have indeed hit a nerve with some in the Taleban movement. Activists and mid-level cadres have scathingly condemned the deal and Hekmatyar personally. They have criticised him for “underselling” his jihad at a particularly bad time, as the national unity government, in their eyes, struggles for survival. However, his ‘jihadi credentials’ and continuing appeal to some in the movement have perhaps contributed to the Taleban’s official silence on the matter and lack of an outright condemnation. (1)

Among the political (non-fighting) Islamists inside the country, Jamiat-e Eslah, for example, commended the deal and welcomed the return of Hekmatyar. (For a profile of Jamiat-e Eslah, read this AAN paper). Eslah, which describes itself as a social movement rather than a political one and has a strong following among young people and includes former Hezbis as senior members, would obviously support any development that brings in more Islamist forces and may make the government more Islamic.

What might be the effect of a possible large-scale return of refugees from HIG-controlled camps?

One of the provisions in the deal is a government promise to mobilise international support for the voluntary return of 20,000 families from the HIG-controlled refugee camps in Pakistan. Families in the Shamshatu Camp, which hosts, according to the UNHCR, some 38,000 inhabitants, are likely to benefit most from this program – if it is indeed implemented. The camp is predominantly inhabited by Hekmatyar loyalists, and was the main hub of HIG recruitment during the current period of insurgency.

However, there are Hezb supporters in other camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, too. Hekmatyar’s son Habib ul-Rahman has visited several of these camps in recent months and held gatherings which called for assistance from the Afghan government and the UN to facilitate their repatriation to Afghanistan and/or stop Pakistan’s crackdown against them. A HIG-linked assisted repatriation programme will obviously be a valuable asset for Hekmatyar to earn the support of potential returnees who are not already linked to the movement and this could broaden his support base after his return to the country and, possibly, the political field. This is particularly the case as life in Pakistan for Afghan refugees has become extremely difficult in recent years and is still getting tougher (AAN has a forthcoming dispatch on this subject).

The envisaged return of families will include thousands of HIG-affiliated (as well as non-HIG) youth, who have been vulnerable to, or already caught up in, a process of radicalisation in the camps’ environment. In Shahmshatu particularly, and in other refugee camps to a lesser extent, the youth have been brought up in a political, cultural and educational environment conducive to militant ideas where the armed struggle against the Afghan state was often presented as a legitimate jihad. Schools in Shamshatu, all of which are run by HIG, as well as madrasas, mosques and cultural gatherings have been replete with militant sermons and sloganeering. Witnesses from Shahmshatu have related to this author how, during the last few years, many young people from the camp were joining Taleban ranks, after HIG had effectively ceased to run an organised front in the insurgency.

The careful reintegration of these parts of the HIG grassroots into Afghan society, if they do indeed return, is perhaps no less important than the integration of HIG’s remaining fighters. It is to be hoped that those who have been influenced by radical ideas based on disinformation, will change when they see the reality in their country.

Even those who do not return under the repatriation programme, including the supporters and sons of senior Hezbis, may see the Afghan state in a more positive light once Hekmatyar declares his support and possibly takes part in it. The remaining refugees may also be able to breathe more freely, assuming that, by the departure of Hezbi leaders from the camp, HIG will lose much of its tight control over life in Shamshatu. The agreement envisages the provision of land (in townships) for the returnees to settle on, but even if they are settled in specific townships, they will ultimately have more freedom of movement than they had in the Pakistani refugee setting. Returning to Afghanistan and living within Afghan society could reduce their chances of adopting extremist ideas or being recruited for insurgency by other groups, but it could also go the other way. The return of radicalised youth and the possible inclusion in the government of militant leaders, who have not clearly distanced themselves from their previous rhetoric, could further radicalise the discourse and limit Afghanistan’s space for debate.

Could the HIG deal inspire a similar deal with Taleban?

One common theme in the speeches during the ceremony on 29 September 2016 was the repeated call on the Taleban to follow the example of the peace deal with Hezb-e Islami, which everyone praised as a success of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owed process. But, could the HIG deal really inspire such a deal? To answer the question it is useful to look at why the two groups opted for violent opposition against the Afghan government and its foreign backers in the first place. The fundamental grievance that drove both Hezb and the Taleban to oppose the post-9/11 political order in Afghanistan was the same: both were excluded from the Bonn Conference that laid out the roadmap for the current political system. (2) Jamiat-e Islami, a staunch rival of both the Taleban and HIG, came to dominate the post-2001 Afghans state. However, the new administration and its American military backers treated the Taleban and Hezb-e Islami differently.

Taleban leaders – including those who had withdrawn from the fighting – were detained, tortured and killed by US-led coalition forces and their local militia partners. Taleban commanders, who were leading peaceful lives in their communities, as well as assumed or real sympathisers of the movement, were taken from their homes and sent to Bagram or Guantanamo prisons. Tribal elders were also targeted as part of a crackdown that particularly focused on the Taleban southern heartland. Only a handful of Taleban managed to get security agreements with figures in the new administration to enable them to live peacefully in Afghanistan after 2001.

Hezb-e Islami also saw many of its people detained, although again there were many who had only fought or had family members who had fought against the Soviet occupation of the 1980s (when incidentally, the US favoured the faction for weaponry and funding). However, senior members of Hezb-e Islami largely escaped detention. A notable exception was Hekmatyar’s son-in-law, Ghairat Bahir. US agents and Pakistani security forces detained him in Islamabad in 2002, along with his driver, Gul Rahman, and he was secretly rendered to Afghanistan and tortured by the CIA in the ‘Salt Pit’, north of Kabul. Bahir was finally released from Bagram in May 2008. His driver, Gul Rahman, did not survive CIA custody; he froze to death in the Salt Pit. No one was prosecuted for his killing. (More details here)

Hekmatyar did condemn the US ‘invasion’ in January 2002 and call for armed struggle against it. At the same time, however, there were attempts by Hezb-e Islami, from the very beginning, to become part of the new political settlement in Kabul. This included an open meeting of more than a hundred senior Hezbis in Wazir Akbar Khan in Kabul to try to launch a political movement in April 2004. The Jamiat-controlled NDS arrested dozens of those at the meeting, including former intelligence chief Wahidullah Sabawun (a future presidential advisor on tribal affairs and leader of the later legal, registered Hezb-e Islami party) and three men who would go on to become provincial governors, Juma Khan Hamdard, Delbar Jan Arman and the late Bashir Baghlani. They were, however, soon released. It was not till 2005, after the international powers had gradually dropped their initial reservations that Hezb-e Islami was allowed to formally register as a political party, but Hezb has seen many of its cadres absorbed into the state. They have served at every level of government: governors, ministers and now one of the deputies to the chief executive.

Hekmatyar is the only HIG leader who was listed by the UN sanctions committee (although a few Hezb commanders have been listed by the US), but his listing in 2003 was made on the basis of his association “with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban,” rather than for his role in HIG militant activities. In contrast, the Taleban had most of its senior members listed, starting from 1999.

All of this had a clear effect on the trajectories of the two groups. The Taleban, more firmly and violently excluded from the new polity, regrouped cohesively to mobilise for an armed struggle and gradually became the most effective insurgent organisation, while Hezb played both sides of the conflict line. As time passed, the differences in the paths taken by the two organisations only became starker. The Taleban grew more confident that they could win militarily and therefore readied themselves to fight a longer war. Hezb, on other hand, opted for the political option and over the years dispatched more and more of its members to Kabul, while keeping up some military pressure.

The two groups also had different, distinct goals. HIG pinned its hopes on gaining power by joining the existing political system, with no demands to change or revamp it. At one point, during the 2014 presidential elections, Hekmatyar endorsed the candidacy of HIG’s head of the political committee, Qutbuddin Helal (see also this AAN analysis). In contrast, the Taleban have consistently prioritised their military struggle and made the cessation of their fight conditional on the full withdrawal of foreign troops and a reset of the post-Bonn setup. Meaningful negotiations for an end to the war have never materialised, initially because of the US’s veto and later because the Taleban were never presented with a serious reconciliation offer in their (always officially denied) contacts with the government and themselves came up with no workable proposals either. The military campaign has thus remained the Taleban’s choice by default and desire. With their continued military build-up coupled with occasional successes, the movement (especially its fighters) currently seems to have an appetite for nothing short of a military victory. Overly high hopes that the Taleban might follow HIG’s example ignore the diverging trajectories that have long set the two organisations apart.

What impact may the deal have on politics in Afghanistan?

Hezb-e Islami is a curious organisation in that, for more than a decade, it has simultaneously maintained both a fighting wing and a legal, political wing. Senior Hezbi leaders have been able to find their way into government, as governors and ministers. Engineer Muhammad Khan, one of Dr Abdullah’s deputies, currently holds a post that is the fifth most powerful in the national unity government’s hierarchy (after the president, his two vice-presidents and the chief executive). The Kabul-based Hezbis have long legitimised the same state that Hekmatyar has kept condemning as a puppet of the Americans and that he has declared jihad against.

This means that, in terms of political weight, Hekmatyar will bring very few new or influential politicians. He does not come as the representative of a political force that has been excluded, which means that his return does not make the current political setup significantly more inclusive. Even the small minority of prominent Hezbis that were left with Hekmatyar have not been living tucked away in the mountains or isolated from Kabul politics. Apart from Hekmatyar himself, all the seniors from his close circle have, for years, been meeting with Afghan politicians, government officials and western diplomats and were always available on request.

Rather than leading a force that was hitherto absent from the political landscape, Hekmatyar comes alone. He could, however, unify the disparate Hezbi factions and personalities currently scattered among various power camps. Moreover, his return to the fold of the state will certainly strengthen the role of jihadi forces in it. This may, on one hand, make the state more legitimate in the eyes of Islamists and jihadists – a consequence the government and its international backers are probably hoping for. But in the eyes of those who have long felt despair and ager at the presence of warlords accused of gross abuses in the higher echelons of the state, this peace deal just gives yet another alleged war criminal impunity for his crimes (the legal instrument is the Amnesty Law of 2010). It may, therefore, have the opposite impact on the legitimacy of the government.

All in all, it is a strange peace deal. The most significant part of it is, of course, himself. He has no army to bring home from the trenches, but has, in the past, proved able to rally huge political support around himself. Hekmatyar has been one of the most charismatic leaders – for good or ill – in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, with an intensely loyal following. His Hezb-e Islami has been, and still remains, one of the most cohesive movements in Afghanistan. As he returns to a widely changed political environment, the question will be, after twenty years in the wilderness, what clout does Hekmatyar still have?

Edited by Thomas Ruttig, Kate Clark and Martine van Bijlert.

 

 

ANNEX. Who is Hekmatyar?

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was born in the late 1940s in Emam Saheb district of Kunduz province, where his parents had moved from Ghazni and where he also attended school. He is a Kharoti, from the Ghilzai confederacy of Pashtun tribes. In 1970, he started studying at Kabul University’s Engineering Faculty, but never graduated as he fled to Pakistan in 1972 after violent clashes between Islamist students (organised in the Jawanan-e Musalman (Young Muslims) movement, the predecessor of both Hezb-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami) and leftist students of Kabul University, and a crackdown on the Islamist activists by the king’s government. Hekmatyar had been a co-founder of the movement that came into being to stand against the vocal leftists on the campus. In 1975, he was part of an unsuccessful Islamist uprising planned in several provinces against the now Republican regime of President Muhammad Daud in coalition with the Parcham faction of the leftist Hezb-e Dimukratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan (PDPA).

Hekmatyar’s activism during these years was formative for his future role as one of the leaders of the anti-Soviet mujahedin in the 1980s. He founded Hezb-e Islami, splitting off from the united Islamist movement, in the second half of the 1970s, with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e Islami as his inspirational sources.

During the struggle against the Soviets, starting in 1979, Hezb received the lion’s share of funding handed out to the mujahedin by western and Arab governments through Pakistan’s intelligence services, the ISI. After Kabul fell to the mujahedin in 1992, Hekmatyar was selected as Prime Minister of the post-PDPA unity mujahedin government that quickly broke apart. Hekmatyar became a key player in the brutal power struggle among mujahedin factions and former PDPA militias that continued until the Taleban ousted them in 1996. During this period, his forces regularly rocketed Kabul, in an indiscriminate use of force that killed many civilians. The Afghanistan Justice Project (AJP) in its report documented specific cases of abuses and killing of civilians by Hekmatyar’s forces. The AJP report noted that, “while Hezb-e Islami is frequently named as foremost among the factions responsible for the deaths and destruction in the bombardment of Kabul, it was not the only perpetrator of these violations.” Even so, the report notes:

[T]he sheer magnitude of civilian casualties and wanton destruction resulting from bombardment during 1992-95, provides strong grounds for asserting there was excessive force. The continuity in the pattern of casualties throughout the campaign, with no evidence of any serious Hizb-i Islami attempt to alter its tactics to focus more effectively on military targets, indicates that Hizb-i Islami failed to take adequate measures to avoid civilian damage. Some of the episodes of bombardment occurred without any accompanying land offensive, or obvious urgency in possible military targets. This applies most particularly to the massive August 1992 bombardment, during which front lines remained static and it seemed that the bombardment was merely a reassertion of opposition. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, one to two thousand people were killed by rockets in three weeks in August, and eight to nine thousand wounded. During that period, Hikmatyar’s forces fired most of the rockets that struck civilian areas of Kabul. Inflicting severe damage on civilian areas, as happened in August 1992 and in the absence of immediate military objectives, is the clearest case of indiscriminate use of heavy weapons.

Hekmatyar ceased shelling Kabul only after concluding a power-sharing deal with his main foes in 1996, head of state and Jamiat-e Islami leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and his defence minister Ahmad Shah Massud, whose forces then ruled most of the capital. Hekmatyar was re-appointed as prime minister under President Rabbani, but a few months later, the Taleban ousted both of them from Kabul.

While the Taleban ruled, Hezb-e Islami was largely in a state of military dormancy with Hekmatyar living in exile in Iran in relative obscurity. Most of the other mujahedin factions, which had been fighting each other in the bitter 1992-96 civil war, re-grouped as allies forming the anti-Taleban United Front (aka Northern Alliance). Hekmatyar’s commanders largely reintegrated into normal life and a minority were absorbed into Taleban ranks.

After the intervention of the US-led coalition forces in late 2001, Hekmatyar, having been excluded from the political process laid out in Bonn, declared jihad against the coalition forces and the government they supported. This opposition to the post-2001 political order earned him the title “amir of two jihads” among his supporters who considered this the country’s second jihad. His party’s role in the armed struggle, however, was increasingly eclipsed by the Taleban, who made up the bulk of the insurgency, pushing Hezb into a distant second. Some Hezb leaders returned to Kabul during this period and registered Hezb-e Islami as a legal political party in 2005, after distancing themselves from the party’s insurgent wing. This political faction gained significant representation in government and parliament and became one of the entry points for the later negotiations between Hekmatyar and the Afghan government.

 

 

(1) While the Taleban officially kept silent on the matter, one article did appear on its website which criticised Hekmatyar’s deal as a crime. The article was written by a young ideologue, who usually publishes on pro-Taleban websites rather than the official website of the movement. He is not a member of an entity within the Taleban structures and is considered more of an independent ideologue sympathetic of the Taleban. His ideas are not necessarily endorsed by the movement. The article titled “The Concept of Peace in Islam” makes no explicit mention of Hekmatyar and cannot really be taken as the Taleban’s official position, even though it was published on their website. Generally, not everything that is published on alemara, the Taleban website, reflects their policy or official line of thinking. The movement’s media operations have the flexibility to accommodate ideas of its supporters and sympathisers that may diverge from or contradict official positions.

(2) Although Hekmatyar’s son-in-law Humayun Jarir took part in the Bonn conference, he came as a member of the independent political group that called itself the Cyprus Group. The two other representatives of the group were Jalil Shams, who later served as the minister of economy under Karzai (2006- 2010) and Azizullah Ludin, who later headed the Independent Election Commission and the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption in the Karzai government. The three representatives came from different political backgrounds. Jarir was not invited to the conference as a representative of Hezb and he did not speak for the party at the conference. In 2010, he organised an event in the Maldives (funded by Afghan businessmen, according to Jarir) bringing together former Taleban, Hezb-e Islami members and Afghan government officials as well as members of parliament. The initiative appeared to be his own idea, rather than something related to Hezb. There are reports that Jarir is close to circles in the Iranian government and that the Maldives event, and that even his participation in Bonn, was facilitated with Iran’s support

 

Armed groups pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) have tried to establish a foothold in five of Afghanistan’s provinces, but only in Nangarhar have they succeeded. There, IS Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghanistan-Pakistan franchise of the Islamic State, landed on fertile ground with a fragmented insurgency, bickering provincial elites, a tradition of Salafi networks and a host of local and foreign militant groups. In this second of three dispatches on the Islamic State group, AAN’s Borhan Osman chronicles events in Nangarhar in the years leading up to the emergence of ISKP in the east of Afghanistan.

The first dispatch in this series looked into who pioneered ISKP, its fights on different fronts, its peak and its failed attempts to establish itself outside Nangarhar. The third dispatch will look into the group’s propaganda, ideology and the appeal of what it represents as Salafi jihadism in Afghanistan.

 

ISKP’s battle for Nangarhar, a summary

ISKP in Nangarhar emerged publicly in May 2015, but had its first clash with the Taleban in December 2014. Within a month of its public emergence, it had captured most of the territory of eight districts, becoming the dominant insurgent group there. After being fought back by the Taleban and pounded by US air strikes, ISKP’s territory had shrunk mainly to four districts. These four districts remain heavily contested. Unlike in other provinces where ISKP was eliminated quickly, ISKP managed to hold onto territory and has proved reasonably resilient in Nangarhar for the last one and a half years.

 The group’s tactics have been beyond the pale, even by the standards of the current Afghan conflict, which can be very brutal. Beheadings and public executions have become ISKP’s trademark, with victims including elderly civilian men. It has also forced tens of thousands of families from their homes which its fighters chose to settle in, and forcibly closed schools and even clinics. ISKP has turned Nangarhar into its national headquarters. This year, it has remained confined there, and on defensive. For more details, see the previous part of this series.

 

In February 2015, months before IS-related activities were reported in Nangarhar, groups carrying IS flags were already making inroads elsewhere in the country, in Helmand, Farah, Logar and Zabul. AAN had then warned that the east, Nangarhar in particular, was more likely than other areas to become a hub for the IS local franchise. There were different reasons for this which, together, turned fears into reality.

The emergence of ISKP in Nangarhar has to be seen against the backdrop of the weakened position of the two prime actors who should deter ISKP encroachment, the government and the local Taleban. The weakness of these anti-ISKP forces was coupled with the vitality of two pro-ISKP forces: small militant groups lacking fixed loyalties and the Salafi militants fighting in the ranks of the insurgency. Both are abundant in Nangarhar. It was a combination of these four factors which helped ISKP take root in the province. As for local communities, in essence, they are neither necessarily a hostile nor a friendly fifth actor. However, they have been consistently undermined in recent decades and had become too divided to stand as a bulwark against a new and extremely brutal armed group, which has unleashed  a campaign of beheadings and has blown up elderly people with explosives.

Each of these elements deserves some elaboration in order to explain the context in which the ISKP threat unfolded in the province.

The abysmal condition of the Nangarhari elite and local administration

ISKP emerged and grew in a political-military vacuum that had plagued Nangarhar for years. The two main military-political forces which maintain a binary control over most of Afghanistan, the Afghan government and the Taleban, were both in disarray. While these two actors may be hostile to each other, they are both equal enemies of ISKP. Had either of them been more powerful in Nangarhar, it would not have been so easy for the new group to establish itself.

On the government’s side, public frustration with provincial political elites, caused by unaddressed rampant corruption, coupled with a failure to deliver services effectively, is felt across Afghanistan. As a result, in Nangarhar as elsewhere, the political elite has been increasingly confined to their palaces. In the countryside of the province, the sense of alienation from provincial leaders appears to have been particularly strong. As reported in detail by AREU’s David Mansfield, the political and security situation in Nangarhar has been in consistent decline since late 2011. Political elites have been busy jockeying among themselves for power, leaving the rural population at the mercy of insurgents. Inevitably dragged into power politics, officials in the local administration seems to have been largely paralysed by the never-ceasing competition among the ruling families. The political infighting absorbed the will and energy needed for combating the expanding insurgency.

In addition, the security sector in Nangarhar was affected not only by local political turbulence, but also by the changed posture of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in confronting anti-state armed groups. From 2013 onwards, when the ANSF took over the lead role in combat from international forces, they have mostly been on the defensive. The gradual drawdown of international forces led to shrinking government territorial control and, by 2014, most parts of the districts along the Spin Ghar mountain range to the south and east of Jalalabad had been almost totally left to insurgent groups. The ANSF only kept a nominal presence in the district centres. According to a local government official, the government helplessly watched the situation deteriorate, with no hope of regaining control over the lost territory. Ironically, these districts contribute a very high proportion of soldiers to the ANSF serving in other parts of the country, while their own home areas were left with no security or state control. The near-absence of government control in those districts meant the ISKP did not have to confront one of the two potential key opponents when trying to establish a foothold in the province.

Local politicians, absorbed by their internal power struggles in Jalalabad and Kabul, failed to notice the descent of the countryside into insurgency and failed to flag up the havoc being wreaked in their constituency.

A fractured insurgency

The near-absence of the government in southern districts of Nangarhar would normally leave the Taleban to fill the void, as is the case in most other parts of the country. However, this did not happen in Nangarhar where the insurgency was arguably the most chaotic compared to other parts of Afghanistan in the years prior to ISKP’s emergence.

Compared to the relatively close-knit structure in its southern heartlands, fighters in parts of the east, Nangarhar particularly, have always been hard to rally under a single command. According to Taleban sources familiar with the movement’s operations in the east, Nangarhar has never had a well-disciplined insurgency. While there has been an abundance of people willing to fight, most commanders have sought a quick rise to fame and seniority who competed for positions which pitted them and senior leaders against each other. There was fighting for power, for example, between Mawlawi Kabir, the senior-most commander in the east, and his subordinate, the Nangarhar shadow governor, Anwar ul-Haq Mujahed. The latter was reshuffled to Khost in 2009 as Quetta found him not sufficiently obedient to Kabir. He was later relieved of all positions. Mawlawi Kabir was also subsequently removed from all his duties around 2012, partly due to his autonomous style of leadership, but also partly because of his inability to finely consolidate the eastern insurgency. (1)

In the districts as well, the insurgency in Nangarhar had long been characterised by loose networks trying to override each other’s rule. Taleban shadow governors in most of the southern and south-eastern districts had constantly have had to struggle to exert control over their fighters. While this had been the case since 2007, the fragmentation became even deeper from 2012 onwards. (2) Chains of command were often blurred. When there were complaints among the local population about the fighters, it was difficult to find out who was in charge.

Under the cover of this messy insurgency, fighters engaged in criminal activities, much more so than in other provinces. For example, this author has recorded widespread cases of unexplained killings of ordinary individuals, assassination of influential local elders and ransom-driven kidnappings in the southern districts of Nangarhar from 2013 to late 2014. Testimonies from local inhabitants to the effect that the violence was gradually becoming more tumultuous match assessments by international organisations monitoring security in the field. Detailed data from one of these organisations show a consistent and sharp rise in incidents of insurgent activities turning into criminal violence in Nangarhar. According to this mapping, Nangarhar consecutively topped the list of provinces with regard to violent crimes from 2011 to 2014, with incidents skyrocketing in 2014. The increase in insurgent-related criminal activities in Nangarhar was coupled with a corresponding decrease in the presence and operations by ANSF and international forces over the same period. (Although not exactly the same – the decrease in pro-government military operations began in 2012 – the two periods do overlap for the most part.)

The Taleban in southern and south-eastern Nangarhar not only provided a loose cover for various militant groups who actually had their own control and command systems, but also suffered from an internal lack of cohesiveness. In this province, even within the Rahbari Shura-based Taleban network, fighters sometimes followed their own rules and methods. In interviews on ISKP’s radio Khelafat Ghag, some of the local fighters who later defected to ISKP have revealed that they kept a clandestine network of the mowahedin (Salafis) within Taleban groups. While these fighters and commanders had individually been known as Salafis, the fact that they maintained a network within the Taleban structure was not known. They revealed that they would covertly act as they wished, ignoring their commanders. They talked about targeted killings, killing spies whom their “corrupt commanders” would usually fail to punish because of political considerations or connections; they even spoke about purging the ranks of the ‘mujahedin’ of those members who had been working in tandem with “the apostate spies,” a reference to (pro) government people. They also complained about being mistrusted and constantly monitored by their non-mowahedin comrades. The defectors also described how the Salafis, in return, monitored their group leaders for “illicit activities”. (More on the Salafis further down).

The internal fragmentation of the insurgent networks in Nangarhar meant the Taleban, by far the strongest anti-government force in the rest of the country, were unable to function as an alternative to the government. There is often a binary pattern of control – either the state or the Taleban controls territory and other actors are unable to capture territory for themselves. This also means there is usually no truly ungoverned space, places where there is no ‘rule of law’. In areas under Taleban control, a shadow administration usually supplants the government, as the insurgents establish their own mechanisms of governance, security, law and, in some places, even service delivery. (3)

The Taleban in Nangarhar, however, as government forces lost territory, were unable to stand as a force that could keep a semblance of order and serve as a shadow government. This had a direct impact on the fate of the movement’s battle with ISKP in this province. In Helmand, Farah, Logar and Zabul provinces, emerging pro-IS groups were defeated relatively easily by the Taleban. In Nangarhar, the two sides remain stuck in fighting without a decisive victory for either.

A pool of diverse militant groups to recruit from

Most importantly for ISKP, they found in Nangarhar’s southern and south-eastern districts, a pool of small militant groups from which to recruit. A glance at the profiles of several dozen ISKP members in Nangarhar show that it did draw from these various small groups, which are mapped below. This diversity is not seen elsewhere in Afghanistan. These groups, Afghan and foreign, followed their own modus operandi. They either used Nangarhar as their operational base, or temporarily settled there in transit to other places. The groups included some originating from the Afghan Taleban under nominal Rahbari Shura command, although not all were really loyal to it, as well as various Pakistani groups and branches of international organisations, such as al-Qaeda.

There has been a total of 13 groups operating in south and south-western Nangarhar, simultaneously or at some point, in recent years:

Afghan groups:

1. The mainstream Taleban under the leadership council’s (Rahbari Shura or ‘Quetta Shura’) command

2. The Tora Bora Jihadi Front (operating mostly in the three districts dominated by the Khogiani tribe, namely Khogiani, Sherzad and Pachir wa Agam. The Tora Bora Front was officially dismantled and integrated into the mainstream Taleban in October 2015. In 2008-2009 at its peak, the Front was the second largest insurgency network in Nangarhar. Read more about it here

3. Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (mainly active in Chaparhar, Kot and Sherzad districts)

4. Salafi groups, nominally under the chain of command of the mainstream Taleban, but, in practice, operating outside it (present mostly in Chaparhar, Kot and Bati Kot districts)

5. Fedayi Karwan, a semi-autonomous, mysterious Taleban group within the Afghan Taleban (in Khogiani and Sherzad districts)

6. Mysterious units of Siahpushan (plural: black-clad and masked) fighters. It has remaimed unclear, even to the local population, whether they belonged to the mainstream Taleban, were part of a Salafi network or were independent groups. The Siahpushan have mainly been active in southern districts (Khogiani, Pachir wa Agam and Shirzad) since 2013. They acted, both as the Taleban’s internal disciplinary force, punishing fighters found to be too moderate, and as a group intimidating less supportive communities into backing the insurgency.(4) Read here  them in an AAN piece from 2014.

Among the foreign groups, the following have been the most notable:

1. Al-Qaeda (on the move, mostly between Khyber Agency, in Pakistan’s FATA, and Kunar, without a particular area of focus in Nangarhar)

2. The Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistani (TTP) under Mullah Fazlullah, which operated mostly in southern and eastern districts

3. Lashkar-e Islam, a group based in Khyber agency of Pakistan, operating mostly in Nazian and Achin districts. It had, for a long time, enjoyed friendly relationships with the local political elite and some government officials in Nangarhar, before recently allying itself with ISKP.

4. Jamaat ul-Ahrar, a group of Mohmand Agency-based militants that broke away from TTP in summer 2014. It is mostly active in Lalpura, Goshta and Momand Dara districts

5. Junud-e Khorasan, a much smaller TTP splinter group that emerged in early 2014 from the Mohmand Agency-based Taleban, operating mainly in the same districts as Jamaat ul-Ahrar. This group has not been much heard about since early 2015.

6. The Amr bil ma’ruf Wa Nahi An Al-Munkar, a Salafi-oriented group originally led by Haji Namdar from Tirah, in FATA, (assassinated in 2008 by TTP), operating in Nazian and Achin

7. The pro-Pakistani government group, Ansar ul-Islam, founded by a Sufi-oriented Afghan pir, Saif al-Rahman, and later taken over by an Afridi mullah from Tirah Valley from where the group emerged; it spilled over at times into Nazian and Achin – reportedly with the support of the Afghan Taleban. The group was severely undermined by the TTP during a series of clashes in the spring of 2013, an offensive led by then commander of TTP for Orakzai agency, Saeed Khan, who later became the leader of ISKP.

The presence of these groups in Nangarhar is the result of several phenomena and developments. Most notable are the already mentioned absence of government control and the chaotic nature of the Afghan Taleban’s shadow governance. Others are that the province borders the militancy-ripe tribal areas of Pakistani and military operations by the Pakistani army which pushed militants from FATA into Nangarhar. There are a number of unofficial crossing points, not controlled by either government, many of them open year-round, which makes Nangarhar an easily accessible refuge for Pakistani militants.

The Tirah Valley, which encompasses parts of Khyber and Orakzai agencies, has long been the main crossing path for local and foreign militants to or from the South and North Waziristan agencies. In 2014, Tirah was flooded with insurgents fleeing the Pakistan army’s (selective, anti-terrorist operation codenamed Zarb-e Azb in North Waziristan. The subsequent relocation of some of these militants to Khyber forced the Pakistani army to launch a follow-up, ‘cleansing’ operation there. According to the Pakistani army’s spokesman, Major General Asim Bajwa, the operation in Khyber chased  the militants onto the Afghan side of the border (to Nangarhar). Other Pakistani officials have said Tirah and surrounding areas hosted 2500 fighters in winter 2015. Many of the groups that originally operated in the neighbouring tribal agencies (Khyber and Mohmand, in particular) had at some point already spilled over into Nangarhar in retreat. These Pakistani groups and (especially in the early years) al-Qaeda fighters would also use Nangarhar to reach other parts of Afghanistan. From the Pakistani tribal agencies, and possibly also urban centres, they would pass through Nangarhar to continue east and northwards, to Kunar, Nuristan and even Badakhshan, travelling through insurgency-controlled terrain in all these provinces.

The influx of these militant groups into Nangarhar challenged the Afghan government to the point where the situation remained utterly beyond its control. At the same time, some officials considered the possibility of turning the existence of these various groups on Afghan soil, particularly the Pakistani ones, into an opportunity, by supporting them to continue to fight the Pakistani government. Other officials seem to have comforted themselves by assuming that the Pakistani militants were less prone to become a threat to the Afghan government than the Afghan Taleban. One Afghan government official told AAN the presence of various Pakistani-originated groups was even seen as a tool to undermine the control of the Afghan Taleban. “Amid the widespread turmoil,” he said, “the dominant thinking in the government was that no matter who operates under whatever name and brand, the important thing is that they do not explicitly raise an anti-government flag or swell the ranks of the [Afghan] Taleban.”

The small foreign and Afghan groups, often lacking fixed loyalties, as well as units belonging to larger networks such as the TTP – which started to disintegrate following the death of its then leader Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013 – provided a potentially fertile recruitment ground for ISKP. Members of smaller and loosely structured groups are far more accepting of a new, incoming brand than fighters belonging to a powerful and dominant network. Smaller networks might also be looking for relevance, finding in IS an attractive international, jihadist brand and hoping also to tap into its famous abundance of resources. The same motivations would also be applicable to disenchanted members of local groups competing for resources or trying to settle scores.

Members from almost all of groups listed above, which were still active in Nangarhar, defected to ISKP as it pushed deep into Nangarhar. From the Quetta Shura Taleban, the most remarkable defection has been a former shadow provincial governor, Gul Inam Sirat, who came to ISKP along with several of his commanders. They switched back to the Taleban in April 2016, after almost a year with ISKP. There were also small scale defections from the Tora Bora Jihadi Front. Fearing that groups still loyal to the Front would join ISKP in larger numbers, its leader, Anwar ul-Haq Mujahed. was forced to dismantle his faction under pressure from the Rahbari Shura, in October 2015. It merged fully with the mainstream Taleban. While most groups like Tora Bora contributed only small numbers to ISKP, some joined ISKP wholesale. A case in point is Lashkar-e Islam which has partnered with ISKP, fighting alongside it, in a near merger. Another possible case of collective defection is that of the mysterious Siahpushan ‘units’. Since ISKP has emerged, the siahpushan have totally disappeared from the scene. According to sources which have been part of the local support network for the Afghan Taleban and therefore well aware of insurgency dynamics, the most likely explanation for the siahpushan’s disappearance is their merger with ISKP. Similarly, the Salafi groups operating under the Taleban banner have also disappeared, only to re-emerge under ISKP.

Salafis provides a local foundation for ISKP

Nangarhar has a long history of Salafis being active in its religious-educational fields. During the past decade, Salafis have been present in the ranks of the insurgents, as well. Afghan Salafis generally (and beyond Nangarhar) often did not have a good footing within the Taleban, given the latter’s staunch adherence to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. These relations have, at times, been confrontational, particularly during Taleban rule in the 1990s.

During the insurgency period, two factors contributed to a reduction in the distance between the two groups. The first is an increased tolerance by the Taleban of Salafism. This author, having talked to Taleban both during the years of the ‘Emirate’ and the insurgency finds the current level of acceptance of Salafism unprecedented. The second factor is what could be called jihadi pragmatism. In areas with a significant Salafi presence, such as Kunar, Nuristan, Nangarhar and Badakhshan, the two groups have little other choice but to work together. The Taleban movement, in order to keep its monopolistic control of the insurgency while gaining local support, had to absorb fighters from the ‘unorthodox group’ in such areas. For the Salafis, the easiest and most practical option for participating in the insurgency was to accept the Taleban’s leadership, and fight in the movement’s ranks because, alone, they were not numerous enough.

This cooperation has not always been smooth. The Taleban have expelled some staunch Salafis from their ranks in instances where their adherence to Salafism negatively influenced the movement’s reputation. For example, they disarmed two Salafi commanders in Farah – Abdul Malik and Abdul Raziq (aka Mehdi) – as they were making local communities uneasy by preaching Salafism, while fighting in the insurgency. That led to pitched battles between them in May 2015, with the Salafis having come under the flag of IS. Similarly, in the most prominent case, the Taleban demoted and later stripped of all authority its former deputy chief of military commission, Abdul Rauf Khadem, after his distribution of Salafi books in the south, where people are highly sensitive to Salafism. Khadem also pledged allegiance to ISKP to lead the first Afghan cell for the group.

In the eastern provinces, where Salafis constitute a considerable part of the religious landscape and enjoy influence in local communities, the alliance between them and the Taleban has had a mixed fate. In some instances, such as the Qari Zia ur-Rahman network in Kunar and the broader Salafist network, Jama’at al-Da’wa ila-al-Quran wa-Sunnah (JDQS), Salafis seamlessly became the backbone of the Taleban in their areas. They remain an integral part of the Kunari Taleban till today. In other cases, such as in the southern districts of Nangarhar (notably, Kot, Bati Kot and Achin) and most remarkably Chaparhar, the relationship between the two have been fraught with distrust.

Upon the officially formation of the Khorasan chapter of IS, most of the local Salafis in Nangarhar within the Taleban, who were already sceptical of the movement , swiftly pledged allegiance to ISKP. Thus, they became an indigenous base for ISKP, which ISKP needed to have a chance of becoming acceptable locally. Although, even in Nangarhar, not all the Salafis have supported ISKP, the bulk of them did join the new group. In places like Chaparhar and Kot, these groups joined ISKP en masse. By mid-June 2015, altogether eleven out of the 14 Taleban delgeys (a unit of 20-30 fighters) only from Chaparhar had defected to ISKP, according to local residents and people with good knowledge of the internal developments of the insurgency in Nangarhar. Most of them were known to have had Salafi tendencies. Some of the delgeys were former Hezb-e Islami who had tacitly held on to their loyalty to Hekmatyar; in Nangarhar, being Hezb and Salafi has not been mutually exclusive. In Bati Kot and Achin districts, more than half of the Taleban groups with a known Salafi ideology defected to ISKP. (Achin never had that many Salafi groups, though.)

Defections from the Taleban in Nangarhar and Kunar (as reported in a previous piece, considerably changed the composition of ISKP, which before, had consisted solely of Pakistani militants who would not have found an easy foothold in these areas without the guidance of local fighters.

It seems also that many of the, so far, non-violent, scholarly Salafis came out with moral support for the group. That was partly so in Nangarhar, but more prominently in Peshawar where the alma mater madrassas of many of the eastern Salafis are located; some of the Peshawar-based Salafi leaders have at times served as recruiters for ISKP.

The fifth factor: a breakdown of social structures

A fifth force to be reckoned with in determining the possibilities of an external group gaining foothold in a specific area is the local community. In a normal situation, the community would remain hostile to an external, predatory armed group. However, in times of conflict characterised by the absence of a central authority and the rule of competing armed groups, local communities are not necessarily hostile to the encroachment of a new armed group. How they react to both new and ‘sitting’ insurgent groups, depends on how strong they are.

In recent years, in a number of locations in Nangarhar, local communities have led uprisings against the Taleban when their behaviour was considered beyond the pale. The Shaikhan sub-tribe of Shinwari, which makes up most of the population in the Dur Baba district, for example, has managed to convert their district into an insurgency-free zone, chiefly thanks to strong social-tribal solidarity that has served as a bulwark against militants of all sorts.

In contrast, the Shinwari community in other districts, such as the largest Shinwari district, Achin, as well as in Deh Bala and Nazian showed no signs of the sort of internal social bond that could have stood up to the various militant groups. The Shinwari community in these districts seems to have merely watched as the behaviour of predatory militants went from bad to worse, culminating in their grouping under ISKP. Exploiting the unresponsiveness of the community, ISKP, after repelling the Taleban in July 2015, oppressed  the population in ways not seen before in Afghanistan. The group forced many residents of the district’s Mamand valley to leave their houses and abandon their belongings as war bounty and murdered dozens of villagers, including by blowing up 11 of their elders by placing explosives beneath them in a field. ISKP got away with this brutality without seeing any strong response from the community, the majority of whom were forced to leave, while others remained behind to live with the group. The community, already in disarray, could not stand against ISKP; it had been left completely vulnerable to such savagery. Those tribal elders who did stand with the Taleban to drive the ISKP out did so under the control of the Taleban. Theirs could not be classified as a community-driven initiative.

The roots of the passivity of the Shinwari community in Achin, Deh Bala and Nazian should be sought in the near total breakdown of the social structure of the tribe in these districts. The same is also true, to some extent, for the Mohmands in Kot and Bati Kot (which have a relatively mixed tribal structure, but is dominated by the Mohmands). However, the Shinwaris, being on the border with Pakistan, have been the gatekeepers to the Mohmand districts and one can argue that the areas dominated by Mohmands have been overwhelmed by the spillover of militants from the Shinwari districts. The erosion of the traditional power structure among the Shinwaris is in large part due to a power struggle within the Shinwari elite, the tribal elders.

Shinwari elders do acknowledge that the tribe’s communal solidarity has declined hugely compared to the pre-war era, when the whole tribe would rally behind their recognised and uncontested leaders. The conflict has gradually shattered that unity ever since it started from the late 1970s. Today, there are simply too many ‘leaders’ trying to speak for the tribe, meaning the Shinwari are virtually leaderless, as none of them exert uncontested authority or have sufficient popularity to lead the whole. In interviews with AAN, many of the ‘first tier’ leaders blamed each other for the woes the tribe has suffered during the past decade. They were only sometimes self-critical, for not acting in the best interest of the people and not showing the leadership qualities traditionally cherished. The blame game was accompanied by accusations that (other) tribal elders had jockeyed for state power and resources (in addition to the resources provided by the US military under its counter-insurgency programme), in pure self-interest. Under the cover of fighting militants, some leaders had even allied with the US military in what, sometimes appeared to involve bombing their fellow Shinwaris, under the so-called Shinwari Pact.

This ‘pact’ goes back to late 2009, when the US military reached out to a number of Shinwari tribal elders from the Sepai sub-tribe with a proposal to mobilise their tribesmen to stand against the insurgents. The Sepai maleks (tribal elders) agreed, in return for money, weapons and development projects. The outreach by US forces was inspired by one of the Sepai maleks, Malek Niaz, who had risen up against a group of militants, mostly Afridis from Khyber Agency, that year. Niaz’s men reportedly killed a dozen militants (whose affiliation remains unclear, but were suspected of being Lashkar-e Islam) and captured 14 others. The captured men were handed over to US forces in Jalalabad. It was Niaz’s efficient move that the Americans hoped to support and turn into an uprising. Niaz was joined by other tribal elders, all exclusively from the Sepai sub-tribe, in signing the pact. This development reportedly endeared him and the other signatories, such as Malek Usman) to the local and central administration, specifically to then minister of interior Hanif Atmar and Nangarhar governor Gul Agha Sherzai.

Allegedly in partnership with governor Gul Agha Sherzai, the Sepai tribal elites started to exploit their elevated position with the government and US military in order to extort local resources, specifically casting their eyes on large pieces of land. Niaz ordered his tribe to occupy a huge 15 square kilometre piece of desert land – what the Shinwaris call razgha – a direct encroachment on pasture claimed by another Shinwari subtribe, the Alisherkhel. When the Sepais started to establish camps on the razgha, fighting erupted between the two sub-tribes. The ANSF was deployed to avert escalation but was accused by each side of favouring the other and even of killing tribesmen. At one point, in October 2011, after the Sepai lashkar (a tribal militia) had attacked a compound hosting a meeting of senior provincial officials and damaged a US helicopter, the dispute also drew in US air power. It killed dozens of Sepai tribesmen. According to reports, the attack was a result of dissatisfaction among some Sepai tribesmen over a proposal requiring both sides to disarm and vacate the land. (Read more about this dispute in an earlier AAN dispatch from October 2013.)

After two years, the partnership between foreign forces and Sepai maleks, as well as support to them from the governor, gradually evaporated. But that happened only after both sub-tribes, which include all the residents of Achin, had paid a huge price. The waste of lives and money to no avail badly undermined the power and status of the Sepai maleks. The Alisherkhel, for their part, feeling overwhelmed by the rival sub-tribe’s support by government and foreign forces, resorted to calling for support from the militants of Khyber Agency, including Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-e Islam fighters. The same fighters were later wooed by the Sepai maleks, using them for defence against the Afghan as well as the Pakistani Taleban, the TTP. Both the Afghan Taleban and TTP had, in one way or another, found a helping hand from some part of the tribe. By 2014, militant groups, including TTP, Lashkar-e Islam and Afghan Taleban, had become a force to reckon with for the tribal elders, whose own authority had been undermined by the infighting. Compared to 2008-2009, when most of the Shinwari land was insurgency-free, the area sank into an abyss of chaotic militancy. In April 2016, there was bitter consensus among the dozen tribal elders that AAN talked to from Achin and Nazian about the key role of the community’s own leaders in allowing various militant groups to gain a foothold in the Spin Ghar district.

Some of the leaders interviewed by AAN also provided names of influential individuals who had facilitated the arrival and settling of specific Pakistani militant groups into different parts of the Shinwari land. In essence, some of those who were blamed in this way did not contest the claims, but instead tried to justify their actions.

As in the fight over the razgha, the intensification of chronic disputes over land, in which tribal elders played a huge role, has also contributed to the diminishing of the traditional power structure of the tribe. While intra-tribe land conflicts have a centuries-old history among the Shinwaris of Spin Ghar, they have rarely reached a point where external forces were invited to intervene. However, that is what happened in the self-destructive feud over the razgha. Ironically, this would be the very place that would later turn into a headquarters for ISKP: the Mamand Valley in Achin.

Shinwari leaders who once befriended militants for their defence against other militants or rival sub-tribes have equally suffered from the recent surge in violence. One of the ‘second-tier’ Sepai maleks, Muhammad Yunus, who once sheltered Lashkar-e Islam fighters, was among the 11 blown up in summer 2015 by ISKP for siding with the Afghan Taleban. Alisherkhels’ villages in southern Mamand have become an undisputed ISKP turf with most of the tribe’s leaders and tribesmen leaving their homes and properties for the militants to live in. The two most prominent members of the Sepai elite have fared no better. Malek Niaz was forced to leave his huge fort so that it could be turned by ISKP into a command centre. It was subsequently bombed to ashes by the US air power in the summer of 2015. (Niaz died in February 2016 and his family was unable to bury him in his native Mamand because it had become ISKP stronghold.) Malek Usman, too, settled in Kabul and several of his family members were killed or wounded in a January 2016 suicide attack at his home in Jalalabad. The attack happened as he was celebrating the release of his son who had been held hostage by Pakistani militants. Usman has no doubt that the suicide attack was carried out by a segment of the same Mohmand Agency-based militants who had kidnapped his son. He had previously received threatening messages from these militants. For the release of his son, he had reportedly sought the help of the Afghan Taleban.

The intra-tribal infighting that devastated the Shinwaris’ resistance against local and foreign predators is a far cry from how communities have normally stood resilient against external threats in Afghanistan. Traditionally, communities in Afghanistan have had a solid social structure with internal centres of power enabling them to navigate their way through conflict. This social structure, when intact or at least partially preserved, includes mechanisms for self-defence. However, recent experiences from the current period of insurgency shows that, if unable to defend themselves through their own armed force, local populations will work with whatever they consider the lesser evil to save themselves as best they can.

Usually, in Afghanistan, in order to prevent total anarchy and establish some sort of order and security, communities have worked, for example, with Taleban groups, which are often made up of local men – although they do not ‘represent’ the community. Communities have found ways to influence the actions of these groups, pushing their demands by pressing the armed group for workable compromises (See this report for an example of how community demands drove changes in Taleban behaviour with regard to education.) Unless accepted (and supported) by local communities afraid of a greater evil, the insurgency would not have been able to take such deep roots in the wide swathes of the country where Taleban networks are now in control.

For communities, the main survival mechanism during conflict are strong internal power structures, according to which the population rallies around recognised leaders, and collective decisions can be made which have to be followed by everyone. Communal solidarity becomes the key to the community’s power. Such a solidarity was lacking among the Shinwaris, who became the prime victims of the violence unleashed by militant groups, the worst of them ISKP.

The Shinwaris paid a particularly high price for losing their internal solidarity since several other factors came together to make what unfolded in the Shinwari areas inevitable. A negligent government and feckless politicians on the one hand, the absence of the dominant non-state actor that usually fills the state’s void with a shadow government on other hand, and the influx of small militant groups and of radical Salafis all worked together to create an ISKP dystopia in the Shinwari areas of Nangarhar province.

 

Edited by Ann Wilkens, Thomas Ruttig and Kate Clark

 

(1) Mawlawi Kabir has recently come back to the senior ranks of the Taleban, as a member of the Rahbari Shura, in 2015. Read more about him in an earlier piece on the Taleban leadership here.

(2) The chaotic state of the insurgency in the east has hardly been paid sufficient attention by the media, the government or its international backers. Among the research community too, it had not been studied seriously until the emergence of ISKP. Some studies may even have contributed to the poor understanding of the nature of the eastern insurgency by consistently portraying it as more organised and effective compared to the south. See for example this report (page 10) from 2013 and this (page 866) from the same year. Contrary to these findings, it seems the insurgency in the eastern provinces generally, and in Nangarhar particularly, has had a relatively more fragmented and unpredictable command and control system.

(3) For example, the Taleban have recently been involved in constructing bridges and paths using taxes from villagers in a number of provinces, including Nangarhar, Baghlan, Kunduz and Ghazni.

(4) AAN reported spottings of siahpushan in Khogyani in August 2014  and in Nuristan in 2012. It seems the siahpushan were not synonymous with another group, Fedayi Karwan, (which the above-linked dispatch suggests was the case).

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander in Shajoy district, Zabul province, Haji Gul Agha, has been killed in a Taleban ambush, along with four of his men. AAN’s Fazal Muzhary had been researching Gul Agha’s record as his was an interesting example of locals managing, with great difficulty, to get rid of an abusive ALP commander and replace him with a man who was capable and respected. This was to be a dispatch on how they managed to do this. It is now also something of an obituary for Haji Gul Agha.

More than 200 tribal elders from different parts of Zabul province came to Hilal Chena village in Shajoy district to attend Haji Gul Agha’s funeral. They were joined by officials, including Daud Gulzar, advisor to the president, and Daud Asas, advisor to Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, and Zabul MP Hamidullah Tokhi. The government has started an investigation into the killing, but it seems, (details given by the district governor) Gul Agha had been driving his car when the Taleban ambushed him at about eight in the morning in the Kalakhel area, which is about three kilometres to the northwest of the district centre, on 18 September 2016. He and four of his men were killed. The Taleban have said they carried out the attack.

The district

Shajoy, a vast plain of a district, is strategically important. Bordering Ghazni province to the north and Zabul’s provincial centre, Qalat, to the south, it lies on Highway 1 which connects Kabul with Kandahar and Afghanistan’s south and west. Because of Highway 1, Shajoy also functions as a centre for several other districts of Zabul as well. This is a green, fertile district and most people are farmers, owning orchards of apples, grapes, apricots and mulberries, vineyards and cultivating wheat and other crops. The district is particularly famous for its grape and raisin production.

The district is also important for the Taleban, who use it as their main transit (and supply) route between Pakistan and Uruzgan and Ghazni provinces. Taleban fighters crossing from the south to Loya Paktia also go through Shajoy. In terms of territorial control, the Taleban control most of the district’s rural areas while the government’s control is limited to the district town and the highway. The government forces generally do not venture out into the rural areas, the ‘Taleban territory’.

The district has contributed some senior Taleban figures. Mawlawi Jabbar, who comes from Shajoy, is a former Taleban commander and current member of the Taleban leadership council in Quetta. He is the main military commander of Taleban fighters for Shajoy district. He does not come to the district himself, but gives order to the fighters from Quetta. Since he is not in Afghanistan, he has deputised responsibility for operations in Shajoy to Mawlawi Abdullah Habib and Mullah Qodus respectively as his first and second deputies. The Taleban shadow governor for Shajoy is Mullah Muhammad Ali Qismat. All of these Taleban are Tokhi by tribe.

On the government side, the main influential figure against the Taleban is MP Hamidullah Tokhi, who is known in the area as a good friend of the Americans. Although, not from Shajoy district, his tribal relations and his role as MP, linking locals with the government in Kabul, makes him influential. He generally has support among the Tokhi, parts of the young population and among people who have more interaction with the government, particularly those who are in need of his help in Kabul. Although, the main Taleban supporters in this district are also Tokhi, they are generally found among people with a religious background, students of religious madrasas or imams. The main tribes in Shajoy district are Tokhi and Kharoti; other small tribes include Taraki, Andar, Sulemankhil, and Hotak. Most of the ALP forces are Tokhi. (1)

The ALP

In the various districts of Afghanistan where the ALP operates, people’s experience of it has been mixed: in some places, it protects people, contributing to stability; in others, it behaves as a predatory militia, with locals powerless to protect themselves or get abusive commanders removed. In Shajoy, residents have seen both types of ALP.

The ALP was established in 2011 in the northwest of the district, in Chena (also known as Hulan Rabat), a spread-out area with around 3000 families living in more than 500 villages. Its first commander was Muhammadullah. He had joined the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the early years of former president Hamid Karzai’s administration and before coming to be ALP chief in Shajoy, had worked as police chief of Siori district, also in Zabul. He and his family apparently did not support any of the jihadi parties in the fight against the Soviets in 1980s. He is Tokhi, originally from Chena area, but has lived most of his life in Zabul’s capital, Qalat.

Muhammadullah got the job because of his good relations with both American special forces and certain provincial officials. According to Shajoy district governor Wazir Khan, the Americans at the time suggested him to Zabul Police headquarters as ALP commander for Chena. His appointment was not made in accordance with regular procedures. According to a Human Right Watch report from 2011, the Ministry of Interior and US Special Operations Forces should have ensured ALP members were nominated by a functioning shura in the area. A US official interviewed by Human Rights Watch said shuras were critical for ensuring the ALP did not replicate the problems with earlier ‘local defense forces’, which had been unrepresentative and disconnected from local communities and prone to predatory behaviour. “There have been many attempts to establish similar programs,” the official said. “The key is a functional representative shura… If a shura is recognized as representative then we begin [the ALP process].”

American Special Operation Forces, at the launch of the ALP in Shajoy, assured the population there would be accountability for the ALP through the district chief of police and that the elders could report any issues to him (see PRT reporting here). The PRT commander at the time, Lt Col Andy Veres, said, “The program leverages the experience of familiarity with the local community, the approval process of elders and the village shura, proper equipment and training from the Ministry of Interior, as well as a command structure under the District Chief of Police.” Obviously this system did not work.

Local residents and the district governor told AAN the appointment of Muhammadullah had not followed these procedures. He was simply introduced by the Americans. There had been no shura to consult, nor was one established, and there was no vetting of his forces. Such flouting of the rules happened in other provinces, as well, with similar outcomes, as detailed in this USIP report).

The importance of political backing

Muhammadullah’s relationship with American special forces began when he was with the ANP, first in Shajoy and later as police chief of Siori district. There, his relations with the US military developed as the Americans closely worked with him and consulted him on operations. The American soldiers thought that, as he was from Chena area, he would be a reasonable choice for ALP commander there. There were, however, early indications that his appointment might be problematic.

While serving as district police chief in Siori, Muhammadullah killed four people whom he said were Taleban fighters, with the help of Americans – at least that is what locals said he told them after he was appointed in Shajoy. One resident of Chena said Muhammadullah bragged about how they had thrown the bodies into a well. He reportedly also killed an ANP officer in Siori. According to Shajoy district governor Wazir Khan, the man had an argument after Muhammadullah refused to approve the officer’s request to take a post in another district. They scuffled and Muhammadullah beat the officer on the head with a stick. This resulted in a serious injury and the officer died after five days in hospital.

Multiple sources told AAN that Hamidullah Tokhi, who at the time was a Kabul-based MP, also played an important role in Muhammadullah’s appointment. Since Tokhi had good links with the Americans, his support was important. Several residents of Chena said that Hamidullah Tokhi had supported Muhammadullah’s appointment in early 2010 in order to secure votes for himself in the upcoming 2010 parliamentary election. He did indeed get most votes in the province, but was disqualified by the Electoral Complaints Commission (and then reinstated as MP by the Supreme Court in early 2011, (details here).

In the summer of 2013, Ghulam Sakhi Roghlewanai became police chief of Zabul and also started building relations with Muhammadullah. Local residents told AAN Roghlewanai had received considerable revenues from his links with Muhammadullah. For example, one source told AAN about a checkpoint Muhammadullah had set up on Highway 1 where his men would charge trucks, as well as untaxed cars that had been imported for spare parts and were being transported in shipping containers. One source claimed that the then-police-chief of Zabul received a monthly cut of around 7000 USD, while another said it was 200,000 Pakistani rupees (a little under 2000 USD).

The support of such influential figures made Muhammadullah a strongman in the area, who could not be easily removed.

Behavior of ALP forces under Muhammadullah

On paper, Muhammadullah had an ALP force of 180, for which he received accommodation and food allowances. When a new district chief was appointed in Shajoy in 2012 and asked Muhammadullah to present all his policemen, he presented only 80. When Muhammadullah realised the new police chief – whom he formally reported to – might create problems, he asked provincial officials to help replace him. He also told the Americans that if the police chief continued in his post, he would not work with them anymore. According to locals, the new police chief was replaced within 18 days.

There were also consistent reports of abuse by Muhammadullah. When he arrested people accused of having links with the Taleban, he would often beat them and then ask the victim’s relatives to pay 200,000 Pakistani rupees for their release (roughly 2000 USD). On one instance, in the summer of 2014, his forces arrested three persons (Nurullah, son of Abdul Rahim from Sarwar Qala, the son of Pir Muhammad from Ahmaq village, and Ezatullah from Akhundzadakhel village). When relatives asked for their release, Muhammadullah told them he would move them to Qalat for further interrogation. However, they were never moved to Qalat, but instead were killed. AAN was told Muhammadullah’s forces first severely beat the men and then, later on the same day, killed them. Most of the reported incidents of abuse happened after 2013, after the US soldiers based in this district left.

Muhammadullah unfortunately acted as a role model for his forces. They were given a free hand to beat civilians and extract money from them, without fear of repercussion. ALP forces were responsible for several cases of abduction, extortion and murder. For example, in 2012, ALP men abducted two girls, one from Lower Jafar village and another, the daughter of a butcher, from the district centre. In 2014, an ALP man abducted a girl from Bazargan village. She had been engaged to him in the past, but he had been unable to pay the bride price. Once the man abducted her, Muhammadullah forced her parents not to ask for anything in terms of bride price or wedding celebration. Another ALP man abducted a girl from Tauskhel village who was engaged to a man from Sautkhel village. When the parents and relatives of the girl complained to Muhammadullah, he threatened them and forced them to accept 25,000 rupees (a little under 250 USD) as compensation. Locals said Muhammadullah himself had also taken a girl, from Khwazak village, and married her as his second wife.

The misbehaviour of the ALP was not limited to the abduction of girls and women. They also forced people to provide them with bread and other food and pay a sum of money twice a year, which they claimed they needed to buy firewood. They also forced people to fix a light bulb on top of their houses, so that the streets would be lit at night and the ALP could see people’s movements. House owners who failed to do so – the area has no electricity and not all people could afford a generator or solar power system – were forced to pay 2,500 rupees (24 USD). If the house owner refused, he would be beaten and if he complained that the fine was too much, the ALP would tell him to pay double. (Sources also told AAN that ALP men were responsible for robberies and breaking into people’s houses, but did not provide any exact examples.) Last, but not least, according to three sources, in the spring of 2015 in Seh Bandi area, some ALP men asked a Kuchi man named Nur Muhammad to give them a sheep because the commander had asked for it. The Kuchi told them he would go and see the commander himself first, but the ALP did not let him visit Muhammadullah and killed him on the spot instead. They took three sheep. After they killed the Kuchi, the ALP people fired shots so they could pretend the man was killed during a fire-fight with the Taleban.

Security-wise, the situation in Shajoy was poor during Muhammadullah’s time as ALP chief. Taleban fighters carried out numerous attacks on ALP posts, which resulted in the killing of many ALP men and policemen. According to Shajoy’s district governor, the Taleban fighters, in particular, attacked the ALP posts in the villages of Manda, Se Bandi, Syedan, and Lilizi in Chena area. The bad security situation in Chena area also affected the atmosphere in the district bazaar and the regular reports of attacks and ALP/ANP casualties affected morale.

Sources gave several different reasons for the bad security situation. First of all, the mistreatment by ALP forces contributed to the area destabilising. For example, when the ALP men asked people for money, they would feel angry and disrespected. Some of the people then joined the Taleban, while others tacitly supported them.

Others said that Muhammadullah actually did not want the situation to improve, because the worse the situation, the more support he could get from the government, which he could then use for personal gain. For instance, AAN was told, if there was an attack in which a hundred bullets were fired, Muhammadullah would report the loss of 500 bullets to the local government. If there was an attack, people said, he did not seriously try to control the situation and would send only a few men.

Local people’s complaints

ALP abuses and general insecurity galvanised the local population to take action, but their initial efforts came to nothing. According to local sources, people repeatedly complained to officials in Qalat. They did so quietly because they feared repercussions from the ALP back home. People also raised the problems with a high-ranking delegation sent from Kabul in early 2015. The delegation was comprised of Zabul MP Abdul Qadar Qalatwal, head of the president’s complaints commission Asadullah Wafa, representatives from NDS, IDLG, MOD and presidential affairs, and head of Zabul Provincial Council Atta Jan. Qalatwal also said the delegation met residents of Chena area. He told AAN, “The main complaint of the local residents was that the ALP forces abducted young girls and forcibly married women. Also, they complained that the ALP men were forcing them to pay money and provide them with food.”

Asadullah Wafa, who headed the delegation to Zabul, also recalled the complaints about the misbehaviour of the ALP, but said he could not remember any details as it was already more than a year ago. He said the delegation completed its report and submitted it to the presidential office, but did not follow up on whether the people’s complaints were dealt with.

According to local residents, nothing happened – mainly because Muhammadullah still had the backing (although it was already waning) of Provincial Police chief Ghulam Sakhi Roghlewanai, MP Hamidullah Tokhi and Zabul governor Muhammad Ashraf Naseri. According to Provincial Council Chairman Atta Jan Haqbayan, however, the government did not act because there was no suitable person to replace Muhammadullah and they feared the area could fall into Taleban hands.

The appointment of a new commander; the role of the people

Since Muhammadullah had strong supporters, it was difficult for locals to get him removed. But over time, the ALP commander did lose support. The American special forces left the area in the autumn of 2013. The ALP district police chief’s relationship with Hamidullah Tokhi also weakened, as there was no immediate election and he became less important for the MP. Police Chief Roghlewanai, another supporter of Muhammadullah, was replaced in early 2015. Also, as complaints increased, Tokhi started to fear for his image, according to locals who spoke to AAN.

The new police chief for Zabul province was General Mirwais Nurzai, who is from Farah province. He was with the border police in Kandahar and then, for two months, the police chief of Farah province. After he was appointed, he sent members of the provincial council to Shajoy to observe the situation. Based on their findings, he decided, in the summer of 2015, to remove Muhammadullah from the ALP and appoint him as ANP police chief of Shajoy, instead. This, however, did not improve the situation. As Shajoy police chief, Muhammadullah still controlled the ALP and during the four months he worked in this position, he carried on with his old behaviour. For example, once, after the Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers killed a Taleban commander around October 2015, several people from Shajoy bazaar went to the condolence ceremony. When Muhammadullah learned about this, he arrested several shopkeepers, some of whom he sent to Qalat jail. Others he released, after they each paid him 30,000 rupees (285 USD).

After this, the people from Chena area, who had been suffering from ALP abuses for so long, decided it was the right time to act. Along with the shopkeepers who had had money extorted from them, they went to Qalat and demanded Muhammadullah be removed from the district. The chair of the provincial council said: “After this incident, we told the Zabul police chief that Muhammadullah did not have the ability to improve the situation in Shajoy and that it would be better to remove him from the district completely.” As a result, the Zabul police chief and the provincial council members started seriously thinking about an alternative to Muhammadullah.

Choosing a new ALP commander

Officials in Qalat began consultations with provincial council members and tribal elders from Shajoy, particularly from Chena area. According to the head of the provincial council, Atta Jan Haqbayan, the provincial council members decided to choose someone from the area who had lived there and who would understand the situation. But it was not easy to find an alternative to Muhammadullah. No one from the area was keen to take up the responsibility, and it was difficult to identify someone with sufficient local support. After consultations with local people, finally, the officials, with the help of the provincial council members, chose Haji Gul Agha, another Tokhi from the Chena area, who was in his mid-50s – so seen as elderly.

Haji Gul Agha was born in Hilal Chena area and grew up mostly in his own village. He and his brothers are mostly busy with farming, owning many orchards and a large amount of farmland in Hilal Chena. Haji Gul Agha had no links with any political parties and had good connection with the tribal elders in the area, a tribal elder who requested not to be named said. Like his predecessor Muhammadullah, Gul Agha was also uneducated, but he had the benefit of having lived in the area all of his life and was, according to the locals, a respected man. Gul Agha had been involved in solving local disputes long before the ALP forces were introduced to Chena, and had often gone to meet officials in Qalat to complain about the ALP. According to one villager from Chena, “People know Gul Agha as a problem solver. He resolves problems and disputes with the help of other elders in the area.”

Gul Agha initially refused, as he remembered the problems that occurred in the time of Muhammadulah and was not sure the people would support him. He told those who asked him to take the job that he doubted he would be able to control the situation and change the behaviour of the ALP forces. It took three meetings with tribal elders from the area to convince Gul Agha to accept the position.

Gul Agha finally agreed in September 2015, but with several conditions: he wanted the local community to support him as ALP chief; he wanted the elders to make sure the young men from the area joined the ALP and; he asked the elders to advise him and share information on militant activities. After the participants of the meeting accepted these conditions, he was introduced to the Zabul police chief, who officially confirmed his appointment and gave him a written order to start his work as ALP commander. The official approval of his position by the police chief, the governor and the provincial members soon followed. The Zabul ANP chief changed the district police chief at the same time and Muhammadullah was fired from his post.

According to residents in the area, Gul Agha did not need the job to get rich, as he was already wealthy, but he accepted it because of the elders’ repeated requests and encouragement. They admitted he was not a fighter, as he was not as young or energetic as his predecessor, but his deputy, Bakht Muhammad, was. Bakht had worked as deputy of Muhammadullah and there had been no reports of misbehaviour by him. He is also from Chena and a relative of Gul Agha. Meanwhile, the ALP chief himself functioned more as a tribal elder, discussing issues with the other elders and trying to find solutions for any problems.

Reform and ALP behaviour

When Gul Agha took charge of the ALP, the local people not only supported him, but also agreed to certain rules. For example, if anyone in the area abducted a young girl, they agreed that the ALP commander, with the help of the tribal elders, would detain the person and make him pay 2,000,000 rupees (more than 19,000 USD) to the parents of the victim and make an apology.

According to Haqbayan, the situation in the area improved considerably after Gul Agha took over the ALP, largely due to cooperation and information-sharing of the local population. He also said no abuses had been reported after the appointment. When AAN asked MP Qalatwal about the situation, he said, “When people do not call me to complain about the situation, it means they are happy.” A local imam in Qalat told AAN an old man from Shajoy bazaar had described the situation as “as peaceful as during the realm of King Zahir Shah.” Exaggeration aside, local residents had not reported any dissatisfaction with the new commander.

One of the reasons the situation improved was that Gul Agha identified the ALP militia men who had been responsible for past mistreatment and dismissed or fired some of them. He also appointed new leaders to different areas. For example, he replaced one policeman, Khanjari from Sarwar Qala, and placed him under the command of someone he trusted, named Babo, so he could no longer ask anyone for money. In another example, Gul Agha disarmed and fired three ALP men who had robbed people and who were based at an ALP post in the area called Haji Sahib Qala. One source said the new commander even sent newly recruited ALP militias to Qalat for training, which helped change their behaviour. He also stopped the previous practices of asking locals to provide bread and food, forcing them to place a light bulb on their houses and demanding illegal money.

The changes brought by the new commander and the improved behaviour of the ALP forces seem to have encouraged people to support the ALP. In other parts of the district, people also said they no longer feared going to Chena area. A resident of Janda area from Ghazni province in a meeting during last Eid ul-Fitr told the author that local people in his area were also talking about the new situation and improved behaviour of the ALP in Chena.

According to the district governor, the rate of Taleban attacks and casualties went down. Speaking before Gul Agha’s killing, he said that, other than an attack on a police post on 9 August, 2016, which left two ALP men wounded, there had been no attacks on ALP posts after Gul Agha was appointed mainly because local people were cooperating with Haji Gul Agha and sharing information about the movement of Taleban fighters.

Conclusion

Numerous reports have been written about the ALP abusing local people in different parts of the country. Several themes emerge as to why this can happen. As in Shajoy, by-passing local shuras and not consulting locals is often a short-cut to disaster. The backing or involvement of senior officials may also strengthen the hand of those ALP who misuse their power and enjoy effective impunity. An abusive ALP can often result in worsening insecurity which, in turn, can pave the way for militants to connect with the local population, carry out attacks on government institutions and inflict considerable casualties on government forces. Abusive, unaccountable ALP forces can badly erode support for the government.

The residents of Shajoy were lucky, for a time. A confluence of factors, most importantly the rearranging of local power relations, both locally and in Kabul, meant that, suddenly, their demands for change were heard and acted upon. This may be difficult to replicate in other areas, as most ALP commanders are well-connected with senior officials inside the government. The case of Shajoy also illustrates, however, the positive impact a well-respected commander, who has the support of the community and who consults with local leaders, can have in an area.

We will never know how Gul Agha would have fared in the long run, given the many pressures on any ALP commander. For now, local people are worried. “His death has had an adverse effect on the community,” said one resident of Chena. “People are disappointed. They wonder who will fill this vacant post. The worry is that it would be difficult for any newcomer to maintain the situation as peacefully as Haji Gul Agha did.”

The district governor told AAN that, for the meantime, Gul Agha’s deputy, Bakht Muhammad, would be leading ALP forces in the area. A decision on a permanent successor, he said, would be taken after consultation with the tribal elders who had helped in the appointment of Haji Gul Agha. Officials who came from Qalat for the funeral also assured locals they would consult them on Gul Agha’s replacement. Local people would be given the chance, the district governor told AAN, to choose whoever they thought might be able to control the district and the ALP.

Haji Gul Aghan, son of Munir Akhundzada, from Hilal Chena village, Shajoy district of Zabul, is survived by two brothers, three sisters, four daughters and a son.

Edited by Martine van Bijlert, Borhan Osman and Kate Clark

 

 

(1) In case readers were wondering, the main mujahedin factions in Shajoy in the 1980s were Harakat-e Enqilab-e Islami and Hizb-e Islami. Harakat was generally more influential in the district due to the dominance of mullahs in the province who generally supported Harakat. The main Harakat commander in Shajoy was Hassan Khan (Tokhi), who at the time had more than 500 men (he die two years ago). During the civil war in 1990s, Shajoy witnessed factional fighting between Hizb and Harakat fighters in the Chena area, in particular between Hassan Khan and Hizb commander Rohullah Khan (both Tokhi); but the fighting was only for a short period because local influential figures managed to stop it. Right now, Hizb-e Islami still has supporters in Chena, but they are not involved in the ALP programme, as they have been in some other provinces.

Another famous figure from the district is Mullah Salam Raketi (Sulmankheil), the former Taleban commander and now member of parliament, who also ran for the 2009 presidential election and is based in Kabul.

(2) American Special Operation Forces, at the launch of the ALP in Shajoy, had assured the population that there would be accountability for the ALP through the district chief of police and that the elders could report any issues to him (see PRT reporting here). The PRT commander at the time, Lt Col Andy Veres, said, “The program leverages the experience of familiarity with the local community, the approval process of elders and the village shura, proper equipment and training from the Ministry of Interior, as well as a command structure under the District Chief of Police.” Obviously this system did not work.

The recent reburial of King Habibullah II – aka Habibullah Kalakani aka derogatively Bacha-ye Saqao (The Water Carrier’s Son) – that stirred up controversy and violence was another reflection of Afghanistan’s increasingly ethnicised politics. Competing narratives about historical events and the legacy of historical figures reflect deeper, underlying societal and political cleavages, both between ethnic groups and between conservatives and modernisers. To provide much-needed context, AAN’s Thomas Ruttig (with contributions by Ali Yawar Adili) has searched the literature for historical background about the person at the centre of this controversy.

A ceremony, a standoff and a reburial

On 1 September 2016, scuffles broke out in Kabul’s Kolola Pushta neighbourhood. Shots were fired and people wounded. According to reports, one of the wounded later died. Those involved in the clashes largely belonged to two different ethnic groups – Uzbeks and Tajiks – who were at loggerheads over where King Habibullah II (1) and his associates, who had been executed in 1929, should be reburied.

In the morning, a memorial service held at Kabul’s Idgah mosque had been attended by a number of state officials and politicians. After that, around one thousand people – many of them armed – carried the coffins with Habibullah and his associates’ mortal remains (2) which had been unearthed earlier from a mass grave at the foot of Tapa-ye Maranjan (where Afghanistan’s former Pashtun rulers have their mausoleums), towards Shahr Ara Hill, west of the city’s central Shahr-e Now area. That’s when they ran into the opposing side.

The main objection of the Uzbek party was that they consider Shahr Ara Hill part of their “history and identity” – and that another place had been assigned to the burial party (who had asked for Shahr Ara first) but which was overruled by the crowd on the day itself. First Vice President Abdulrashid Dostum, an Uzbek, sent forces to block them, most likely militias of his party, also some of them armed. (Afghan TV stations showed that on live broadcast.)

After a long and tense standoff, a delegation of Tajik leaders went to Dostum and found a compromise: The reburial would go ahead on Shahr Ara Hill but its historical name would be preserved, princess Shahr Ara’s tomb there would be renovated by the government, and a religious school would be constructed elsewhere “at an appropriate site” and named after Habibullah Kalakani. Habibullah II’s mortal remains were then buried on Shahr Ara Hill around midnight, still on the day of the scuffles.

The initiative to provide Habibullah II and his lieutenants with a proper grave, on one hand aimed to posthumously restore his dignity. But it was also a clear attempt by the armed and politicised Tajik leadership – which includes well-known commanders from Habibullah Kalakani’s area of origin north of Kabul – to create another hero and rallying point for their ethnic group. (Their biggest and most recent hero is Ahmad Shah Massud, whose death is remembered every year on 9 September.) The by now familiar display of civil war paraphernalia (mixed civilian and military clothing and an open display of guns and knives) in the reburial procession showed that it was clearly intended as a display of force. The organisers had more in mind than simply setting the historical records straight, but rather aimed to send a clear message in the context of fresh grievances against what is seen as an increasingly Pashtun-dominated government. (More here about the NUG crisis.) (3) Also the vice-presidential leader of the Uzbek party is a member of that unbeloved government.

A historical hill

According to a number of sources (this one, for example), an aunt of Emperor Babur, Shahr Bano Begum, had created a garden on the hill known as Bagh-e Shahr Ara (The Garden Adorning the City). It is one of a number of Moghul gardens in the city – and beyond, established along the centuries-old Grand Trunk Road linking Kabul and Delhi – many of which, by now, have disappeared. (4) Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur, his full name, was a descendant of the Turco-Mongol dynasties of Chengiz Khan and the Timurids. Expelled from his native Ferghana valley, he conquered Kabul in 1504 and made it his capital. (Later, he was also buried there, in what now is known as the Babur Garden.) From there, he went on to conquer India where he established the ‘Moghul’ dynasty. One of his daughters, Shahr Ara, is also buried on Shahr Ara Hill (it is not clear whether the garden there was created before or after her death). After suffering damage and neglect during the recent wars, the Shahr Ara garden was rehabilitated and turned into Park-e Zanana (women’s park), a rare space in the city for women only (more here).

Afghanistan’s Uzbeks see themselves as descendants of Babur and his dynasty, which ruled over a large empire known for its splendour and cultivation for more than three hundred years. (5)

Habibullah Kalakani – from brigand to king

Habibullah II – or Habibullah Kalakani, as he is widely known after his area of origin, Kalakan, north of Kabul – was the first and only non-Pashtun to sit on the Afghan royal throne. (6) He took over power after a military assault on the Afghan capital on 17 January 1929, deposing reformer-King Amanullah. Amanullah, who represented a long-ruling Pashtun dynasty, had ruled since 1919 but was already weakened by other uprisings and the increasing resistance to his modernisation attempts that had been inspired by Turkey’s leader Atatürk.

Habibullah’s enemies, at the time, derided him for his relatively humble origins and called him Bacha-ye Saqao (Son of the Water Carrier) and “Bandit King.” Habibullah II had indeed been a bandit before he ascended the throne and, if one can believe his autobiography, took pride in this, even referring to himself as “the Bacha.” (7) When the ex-brigand from Kalakan was crowned by the Pir of Tagao, a Naqshbandi leader from the Tajik-majority areas north and northeast of Kabul (who also had crowned Amanullah), he received the sobriquet of Khadem-e Din-e Rassul-e Allah (Servant of the Religion of the Messenger of Allah).

Habibullah’s father, Rashid, whatever his original profession, worked as a gardener in the vineyard of Muhammad Hussain Khan in Kabul’s Qala-je Murad Beg neighbourhood. This Hussain Khan, a Safi Pashtun from Kohistan, was first made khan of that area – of which Kalakan is a part – by Amir Abdul Rahman Khan (1880–1901) and became Amir Habibullah I’s treasurer in 1904 (mustaufi al-mamalek). Details of Habibullah Kalakani’s early life come from a semi-documentary novel titled Eyar-i az Khorasan (A Brigand from Khorasan) by Khalilullah Khalili (1907–87) He was Hussain Khan’s son and became sha’er ul-shu’ara (poet laureate) at the Afghan court in the 1960s. (8)

Habibullah was born in 1890 in Sara-ye Khoja in the Kalakan area of Kohdaman, on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush mountains, just north of Kabul. According to Tajik historian Kamoludin Abdulloev, who turned Khalili’s book into a web-based biographical note, Habibullah was illiterate. He “had not even finalised his education at the madrassa” and helped his father with the work in the vineyard. He was also a murid (follower) of the Sufi Naqschbandi Pir of Gulbahar named Shams-ul-Haq Mujaddedi Kohestani.

The young man joined the army and, according to Leon Poullada (see FN 3), served in a model unit under the command of Turkish officers which had been called into the country under Amanullah’s father, Amir Habibullah (who ruled 1901–19). After Amanullah took over the throne in 1919 due to his father’s assassination, Habibullah fought in the short Third Anglo-Afghan War in that same year. Ironically, this was under the command of General Muhammad Nader Khan who, in October 1929, would topple him and later have him executed.

According to Abdulloev, Habibullah – together with many of his ham-watanan in predominantly Tajik-inhabited Shemali, Kohestan and Kohdaman – sympathised with the anti-Soviet struggle of the Basmachi movement north of the Amu Darya border. He also assumes that Habibullah had contacts with refugees who had come to Afghanistan (Russian historian Vladimir Boyko estimates around 200,000 in 1929). In early 1922, Habibullah joined a 140-strong unit of mainly Panjshiri ‘volunteers’ that fought the Soviets near Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, led by a Mawlawi Abdul Hai.

In those first years of his rule, Amanullah – the only ruler at the time of an independent Central Asian Muslim country – harboured aspirations to become the leader of the whole region. He also sympathised with his colleague Muhammad Alam Khan, the Amir of Bukhara, who had been deposed by the Soviets in 1920 and fled to Afghanistan a year later, where he was given accommodation not far from where Habibullah Kalakani’s father worked. Meanwhile, the supporters of the Amir of Bukhara continued a guerrilla war in his home country. So it can be assumed that the ‘volunteers’ that Habibullah joined, had gone with King Amanullah’s blessing.

Not after long, however, Amanullah stopped his support for the Basmachi because he did not want to ruin vital relations with the Soviet Union (and possibly because he considered the Amir of Bukhara as a potential competitor for the lead role in Central Asia). Abdul Hai, the leader of the ‘volunteers,’ was arrested upon his return to Afghanistan, as was Habibullah who had returned to Kalakan. He soon managed to escape and became a highwayman – “half soldier, half bandit,” as Abdulloev put it.

In 1924, Habibullah is said to have joined the Mangal uprising in the Khost area, led by a Mullah Abdullah, better known as Mulla Lang (the Lame Mulla). According to Afghan historian Nazif Shahrani the uprising was triggered by a dispute over a child marriage, which Amanullah had abolished. The uprising was suppressed in January 1925 and Mulla Lang was captured and executed in Kabul. After that, Habibullah spent some years in Peshawar where he was said to have worked in a tea house (although other sources say he owned it). Other reports say that he was involved in robbery and did some jail time in Parachinar in British India. In 1928, he returned to Afghanistan.

According to Abdulloev, upon his return Habibullah attracted the attention of anti-Amanullah circles, particularly the supporters of Amanullah’s uncle Nasrullah. Nasrullah had been nayeb us-saltana (viceroy) to Amanullah’s father Habibullah I and heir apparent, but was deposed and arrested by Amanullah after his father’s assassination and accused of having been behind it. Nasrullah died while detained in the Kabul palace in 1920. Abdulloev obviously believes that Habibullah Kalakani’s later victorious raid on Kabul was not of his own making alone.

Back in Afghanistan, Habibullah Kalakani is said to have offered his services to Amanullah first who, in November 1928, was facing another uprising, this time by segments of the eastern Shinwari tribe about taxation. Amanullah, facing army desertions, accepted Habibullah’s offer, made him colonel and sent him weapons through an intermediary. But again, Habibullah joined the rebels. (9)

The two 1929 opponents: Habibullah II on a 2016 poster… Source: Twitter

 

‘Social revolutionary’ or ‘fundamentalist’?

The new king ruled as Habibullah II. With this name, he puts himself in line with Amanullah’s father, the murdered Amir Habibullah – or Habibullah I – in a side-blow at Amanullah, as some sources suspect that Amanullah supporters were behind the assassination. (10) When in power, Habibullah II immediately revoked Amanullah’s progressive reforms. (11) He made Sharia the only law of the land, ordered that men should not shave and should wear the turban again, and women the hijab (under Amanullah this had been banned for government officials’ wives). He decreed that women should not to leave the house without a mahram, closed girls (and many other) schools and banned the teaching of “kafir languages” to Muslim children (these rules are quoted from his newspaper Habib ul-Islam, here). He also called home the first group of Afghan female students who had been sent to Turkey. He abolished the ministries of education and justice because, US historian Vartan Gregorian writes, he considered them unnecessary and an infringement of the authorities of the clergy. His fighters had free reign to loot and kill, and even in the foreword of his ‘autobiography,’ his rule is referred to as the “Reign of Terror.”

Some authors call Habibullah a “fundamentalist” for his anti-reform course. French author Olivier Roy, for instance, in his standard work Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (1990), calls him the “candidate of a fundamentalist coalition,” because non-Tajik ‘tribes’ and wide segments of the Islamic clergy supported him (or, more precisely, opposed Amanullah). Gregorian writes that Habibullah saw himself as a representative of the “true faith,” which had been compromised by Amanullah’s innovation. This assessment was shared by a number of Afghans when the issue of reburial came up recently; they accused Habibullah II of ‘Talebanish’ policies. (12) In an interesting contrast, some contemporary Soviet authors celebrated Habibullah II as a “social revolutionary,” as he had toppled the “feudal” Pashtun aristocracy. They probably had not forgiven Amanullah for his support for the Basmachi and the Amir of Bukhara, although officially relations were cordial.

… and Amanullah the reformer-king, with Queen Soraya.

 

Regional repercussions

After Habibullah’s take-over of Kabul, emigrants from Soviet Central Asia who had been unhappy about Amanullah’s appeasement policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, took his side. Some of the most important surviving Basmachi leaders were in Afghanistan as they had been viciously pursued by Soviet troops. These included Ibrahim Bek, an Uzbek from eastern Bukhara, who had come in 1926 and the Turkmen Junaid Khan who had crossed over in 1928 and was now living in Herat. Both declared their support for Habibullah II and supported him with fighters. But, they also profited from Habibullah II’s support and were able to invigorate their rebellion on Soviet territory (see, for example, this 27 May 1929 Chicago Tribune report).

In Afghanistan, Habibullah sent Ibrahim’s men to fight the Hazaras who still supported Amanullah, mainly because his 1919 decree abolishing slavery in 1919 had particularly improved their lives (see here). When, in 1929, Amanullah supporters marched into Northern Afghanistan and took Mazar with Soviet support, 900 of Ibrahim Beg’s and Junaid Khan’s fighters were mobilised to bolster Habibullah’s deputy and minister of war, Sayyed Hossain (who was executed with him later). In the last days of Habibullah’s nine-month reign, Boyko writes, Ibrahim functioned as a quasi-chief of the garrison in Khanabad (in today’s Kunduz province), then capital of Qataghan province.

… and from king to an unkind death

Habibullah’s rule soon came under threat, as the Pashtuns tribes had revolted against Amanullah and not in support of him. They were against a non-Pashtun on the Kabul throne; the Suleimankhel even proclaimed their leader the new monarch in Ghazni. Amanullah’s former minister of war, Muhammad Nader Khan, who had quit this post in 1924, returned from exile and challenged Habibullah II as early as March 1929 to seek legitimacy not only from the religious clergy (which he had received) but also from the tribal chiefs. Habibullah responded by arresting all members of Nader’s family and putting a bounty on his head. Under these circumstances, Nader and his brother Shah Mahmud (a later prime minister who Habibullah left as governor in Gardez) were able to mobilise the tribes one by one, starting in the southeast. Months of fighting started, with changing luck on both sides, but in September the tribal forces started to beleaguer Kabul.

Habibullah II finally fled to Jabal us-Seraj on 12 October 1929. Pursued by Nader’s troops, he surrendered a few days later, with Nader’s assurance that his life would be spared. Instead, on 1 November 1929, he and 13 of his closest allies were shot dead, then stoned and publicly displayed at the gallows and later unceremoniously buried. Nader, who as Nader Shah had become the new ruler, later said that he had forgiven the ‘Bandit King,’ but that the tribal leaders supporting him had demanded that the ‘traitor’ die. (13)

Habibullah II’s relatively quick overthrow was also a heavy blow, if not the death stroke, for the Basmachis in Soviet Central Asia, as it deprived them of their hinterland. Nader Shah, after a short period (during which Ibrahim was assistant governor in Mazar-e Sharif), turned against them on Afghan soil and began pushing them over the Amu Darya border in 1930.

Surrogate conflicts?

Some wonder why the reburial and rehabilitation of a ruler long dead still has the potential to stir such strong emotions when the country is struggling with more acute problems, from its ailing economy to the on-going war. It is because competing narratives about historical events sometimes are also put into current political context.

The scuffles around Habibullah II remains and his reburial place broke out not long after Afghanistan’s independence day. On that day, plenty of portraits were shown at official ceremonies across the country of the man he had toppled – reformer-King Amanullah. It was Amanullah who, as a result of the short Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, had returned the country to full independence. (As a result of a series of treaties in the nineteenth century, it had formally been independent, but its foreign relations had been under the control of the British Viceroy in India, in exchange for significant British subsidies.) The war resulted in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of Rawalpindi, which was concluded on 19 August 1919 and has since been celebrated as the country’s independence day.

But not everyone shares the narrative of the reformer versus the anti-reformer. Hashmat Mosleh, a former advisor to President Burhanuddin Rabbani, for example, juxtaposes Habibullah’s religiously motivated resistance to what he considers Amanullah’s secular, Westernising modernisation. In a recent op-ed for the al-Jazeera website, he stated:

For the Tajiks and the religious people of Afghanistan, Kalakani was a devout Muslim who opposed the secular policies of the “[W]esternised” Amanullah. He led an Islamic rebellion against Amanullah, who had unveiled his wife and ordered Afghans to wear [W]estern clothes.

This statement also indirectly puts the historical figure of Habibullah Kalakani into a modern context, as it also can be read both as a reference to the mujahedin’s struggle against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s (that also was legitimised as a modernisation project), but also as a side-shot against the current president, with his Western-backed reform agenda.

As Afghanistan’s politics become increasingly ethnicised again, ethnic divides tend to supersede political conflicts. On one hand, the current president is accused of aiming at establishing a “donor-friendly Ghilzai Pashtun administration.” On the other hand, Pashtuns from tribal Paktia now also demand a state funeral for the last communist president Najibullah (murdered in 1996, when the Taleban took Kabul), who was born in their province – although they had fought his regime (a media report here). In 1929, the tribal contingents that helped Nader Khan overthrow the ‘son of the water carrier’ had come from their area, the Afghan southeast – a fact still widely referred to with pride there. The same ethnocentric impulse seems to be behind former President Karzai’s impromptu reply to a question about the Habibullah affair when received by fellow Afghans on a trip abroad, where he asked back, ironically or not, “Mullah Muhammad Omar also was a king, wasn’t he?” (shown in this video).

The supporters of Habibullah II, in turn, contrasted the obstacles they faced to the 2009 state reburial of former president Muhammad Daud (1973–78) who also was a Pashtun (see media reporting here) which they allege shows that the state favours that ethnic group. Finally, in the eyes of some involved in this controversy, the Tajiks-versus-Pashtuns constellation during the end stage of Habibullah II’s reign resembles the current one between the two feuding camps in the NUG (see AAN analysis here and here) – which is in fact about access to power. The conflict over Shahr Ara Hill has additionally pulled in the Uzbeks who, through Dostum, are part of the unbeloved government.

As these examples show, conflicts over historical issues interpreted as ethnic conflict still have a strong mobilising effect. But often they camouflage factional conflicts over power or even deep societal cleavages, like the one between modernisers and conservatives which has shaped much of Afghanistan’s history in the twentieth century.

Apart from the sources cited in the text, the author also used Ludwig W. Adamec’s famous Who’s Who of Afghanistan (Graz, 1975) for the compilation of Habibullah Kalakani’s biographical details.

 

(1) [amended on 18 September 2016: I use Habibullah “II” – a European terminology – as a shorthand, to distinguish from Amir Habibullah (I) and in order to avoid ethnicising. Habibullah from Kalakan also refers to Amir Habibullah I, by distancing himself from his predecessor Amanullah. More about this further down in the text.]

(2) Media reports have varied on how many coffins there were. A photo on the Daily Mail website shows 16 coffins. Louis Dupree wrote in his seminal work on Afghanistan that 17 of Habibullah’s lieutenants had been executed together with him (Afghanistan, 1980 edition, 459). Historical photos however show 13 people at the gallows, including Habibullah (see here, with names added in Dari handwriting, from the British Museum collection).

(3) Recent grievances include President Ghani’s perceived sidelining of the former (Tajik) mujahedin who had supported Abdullah in the 2014 elections and expected to be rewarded (see for example Ismail Khan’s statement here). Since 2015, leading former mujahedin commanders had frequently gathered to make their voice heard and demand more say in the government, for example, after a US airstrike targeted a local commander’s weapons depot in Parwan, after they felt the government had blundered during the Taleban’s capture of Kunduz and generally vis-à-vis the Taleban threat.

(4) According to Soma Mukherjee, Royal Mughal Ladies and Their Contributions, New Delhi 2001 (p 208) several female members of Babur’s family had gardens created in Kabul. There were originally eight or nine gardens in the city. See also Farzana Moon, Babur: The First Moghul in India, New Delhi 1997. Babur had also commissioned Idgah mosque, Kabul’s second largest.

(5) The often-nomadic Turkic and Mongol tribes mixed when they came to Central Asia, both among themselves and with the local, mainly Iranian, population. Some of the tribes made their (Turkic) Chaghatay dialect the standard language at the court and in (Turkic) literature. It later morphed into Uzbeki. Others, like Babur, preferred Persian but were often bilingual. Contemporary Uzbeks call Babur’s line the Gurkani, which goes back to the Mongol word for “son in law” (this refers Timur, aka Tamerlan, and Chengiz Khan, of whom Timur was – metaphorically – the son-in-law). Babur actually was kicked out of his fiefdom around the Ferghana, Samarkand and Bukhara by another Uzbek tribe, the Shaibani.

(6) The only other non-Pashtun head of state of Afghanistan was Prof Borhanuddin Rabbani, who served first as interim president and then as president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) between 1992 and 1996. After the Taleban conquest of Kabul, he formally kept this position, but resided elsewhere (in Taloqan, Faizabad and Dushanbe subsequently). He returned to Kabul after the Taleban regime was toppled in 2001, initially expecting to be reinstalled but ultimately vacating the position in favour of Hamed Karzai in December 2001. Like Habibullah Kalakani, he was a Tajik, but from Badakhshan.

(7) In academia, Habibullah ‘autobiography,’ titled “My Life: From Brigand to King” (first English version 1936, London), is not considered an original source (for example by Leon Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1973, and Nazif Shahrani). The foreword claims the text is a translation by a “Persian-knowing scholar” of the original notes of a surviving companion of Habibullah Kalakani, one Jamal Gul, who had supposedly been together with him since childhood and was now “roaming about in Europe as a Man of no Country.” The text is told in the first person singular, and the translator remains anonymous (he claims he did not want to “uselessly intrude and confuse the essential story” but admits that he introduced “some Latin phrases here and there . . . for the accommodation of difficult Oriental expressions into more familiar European terminology”). The book, however, is fully English in style and reads like a thrilling adventure story rather than an autobiography. (The author has used the 1990 edition by Octagon Press in London.)

(8) Quoted from a biographical note on Habibullah by the Tajik historian Kamoludin Abdulloev (in Russian) who uses Khalili’s book (which we do not have access to and cannot say when it was first published). For this book, Abdulloev calls Khalili “Habibullah’s biographer.” Khalili was Habibullah Kalakani’s junior by 17 years. He must have known him in the latter’s early 20s, before he joined the army around 1919. Khalili – whose father had been executed under Amanullah – also held positions in Habibullah II’s government.

(9) According to Poullada, this was a result of a blunder by Amanullah: He cites an informant whom he interviewed in 1967 in Kabul, who recounted how Habibullah had called Amanullah over the phone and had pretended to be the King’s interlocutor. He told the king that he had ‘the bandit’ and his men surrounded – to test the king’s reliability. When Amanullah ordered him arrested, Habibullah revealed himself and turned his weapons on the king. The story may well be a folk tale; what is clear is that a few months later, in mid-January 1929, Habibullah Kalakani’s men seized Kabul. By that time, Amanullah had already fled and put his half-brother Enayatullah in his place; he only ruled for a few days.

(10) Poullada, Dupree and Fraser-Tytler – all authors of standard works about Afghanistan – do not rule out a possible role of Amanullah or Amanullah supporters in his father’s killing.

(11) [amended on 18 September 2016: Amanullah also revoked some of his own reforms earlier, in 1924 and – in a last ditch attempt, already facing Habibullah’s and others’ revolts – in late 1928. The latter came after a new set of reforms he suggested after he returned from his long trip to Europe (he also visited Egypt). But he tried to stick to core reforms – in the legal field and in education, including girls’ education.

(12) This is somewhat unfair to the term, as US scholar James Caron – a Pashto speaker and currently at SOAS London – showed in his chapter “Taleban, Real and Imagined,” in the 2012 book Under the Drones, edited by Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews. He argues that “taleb” in the early twentieth century referred to a “romantic countercultural social type,” a critical voice who performed poetry at “taleb parties,” while often mocking the rich (and ogling girls).

(13) General Nader Khan became the new king, Nader Shah. He ruled from 1929 to 1933, until he was assassinated himself. Nader Shah followed a course of “selective modernisation” (a term used by US historian Vartan Gregorian in his 1969 standard oeuvre The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan) by trying not to repeat Amanullah’s mistake of antagonising the conservatives. As a result of his killing of Habibullah Kalakani, other uprisings occurred in Kohestan, now against the new king; the biggest was in 1930, under a leader named Purdel (Dupree, 460).

What do a 16-year high school student, a middle-aged aviation engineer, a 29-year old tenth-grader in night school and a 45-year old doctor in the Afghanistan National Border Police have in common? Not just that all of them come from the western region (Badghis or Herat), but all of them were also competitors in the first-ever Short Film Festival that focused on the effects of armed conflict on children. The festical was held on 3 September 2016 in Herat city. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica takes a closer look at the ten selected directors/screenwriters and their films, and dwells on this different representation of Afghanistan.

About the festival

The Herat Short Film Festival had called for submission on the topic “effects of armed conflict on Afghan children.” (1) The submission criteria were tough. The films, varying in length between two to ten minutes, had to make a visual or oral reference to at least one of the following themes: the effects of conflict on family life, attacks on schools or healthcare centres, the devastating impact of unexploded ordnances and improvised explosive devices on children, and recruitment of children by parties to the conflict. (2) Another condition of registration was that the films had to include at least one female as either director, narrator, scriptwriter or lead character. A total of 32 short films were submitted.

Around 220 film aficionados, critics and partners attended the one-day event, which featured mostly young filmmakers from Herat and Badghis provinces, including women and members of the disabled community. There were children in the audience too. “The festival gave me a chance to know there are many children who are suffering from hard work and who are affected by the armed conflict,” Said Kayhan, a primary school student who attend the film festival, told the UN.

Four judges – from UNAMA, civil society and the AIHRC – reviewed the films and selected the two winners. Certificates were also presented to the best director, actor and actress, child actor and actress, cinematographer and editor. Additionally, the festival audience voted for the Best Film in the People’s Choice Award category.

Ten selected films

UNAMA selected ten films to be released online (three of them are currently available here on UNAMA’s Facebook page). (3) The selected films represent a wide variety in stories, experiences and artistic expression, with some participants still being surprisingly young. The ten selected films prove that despite the conflict, creativity is still very much alive.

Empty space (Jay-e Khaliha) by Mahbuba Barat

The Best Film, Best Script and Best Director awards went to Mahbuba Barat, a 16-year-old high school student from Herat, for her film Empty Space. The film depicts the story of a young boy who desperately wants to continue his education, but is forced to quit school and become the sole breadwinner of the family, after his father’s conflict-related death. In this five-minute art piece, Barat skillfully uses scenes from Herat’s streets and closes the film with an effective and painful cinematic metaphor of a pen thrown in the dirt.

She said “I found the festival theme very strong and useful, and therefore I was motivated to make a short film about the effects of armed conflict on Afghan children.”

Barat has been involved in Cinema and Theater from a very young age, since 2010, and has several previous art works on her name. Her first production was a theater piece (Zang-e-Seda), which won the second prize at a Theater festival in 2013. After that, she directed Bud & Nabud (Was and Wasn’t), Mah-e-Maqbul-e Man (My Beautiful Moon), Madaram (My Mother), and Mohajeratha (Emigrations).

Empty space is available to watch online, here.

Duty bound (Wazifa Shenas) by Dr Naser

Duty Bound is about the heartache and dilemmas faced by a border police commander, when members of an armed group threaten to kill his son unless he releases their detained compatriots. The short film is multi-layered and includes a story of friendship between two boys: the commander’s son and his young friend. In a moving finale, the two boys, who both lose a leg to an IED placed in a school bag, share one pair of tennis shoes.

Dr Naser is a 45-year inhabitant of Herat province. He won the award for Second Best Director and Scriptwriter. His first experience in cinema was as an actor in Marz Bannan (Border Police). Dr Naser is a doctor in the Afghan National Border Police. The many incidents he witnessed that have affected and harmed children, motivated him to make this film.

Patrimony (Miras) by Amanullah Nusrat

Patrimony tells the story of two brothers; one who is studious and the other who prefers to play with guns. The father of this family sees the young son who is a fighter as the honorable one, compared to the one who is more of an intellectual. The films highlights the importance placed on patrimony and on fighting for the country and shows how this affects families and impacts children by forcing many of them to choose violence over education.

Amanullah Nusrat, the 45-year-old director of the film, is an aviation engineer by profession. He has been involved in film industry for a decade as a director, script writer, editor and cinematographer. He has directed ten long and short films in his career. He also competed in a SABA TV competition on environmental protection in 2015, where he won second prize.

Patrimony is available to watch online, here.

Our World (Jehan-e Ma) by Ahmad Wahid Omid

Our World depicts how conflict disrupts the normal lives of people, as it forces them to flee their country to look for safety and to restart a new life elsewhere.

The director of the film, Ahmad Wahid Omid, is 27 years old. He also directed Qafas (Cage). He has been involved in the film industry since 2009 and has produced up to ten short films, mainly about peace, environmental protection and migration. He has won several prizes, including first prize in the 60 second international film festival in Pakistan in 2015 for his earlier film Vision. The short film he showed in Herat, Our World also competed in the Vancouver Short Film Festival on Migration this year. The results will be public soon.

For Peace (Bara-ye Solh) by Mohammad Yaser Barakzai

For Peace is an animation film depicting the need for peace. It shows airplanes bombing the country. When after a while they suddenly notice two children with balloons, instead of dropping bombs, they end up dropping flowers. For Peace was produced last year and originally not intended for this festival as the producer thought the theme of his animation might not be strong enough, even though the animation work is good. He entered just before the deadline closed and was picked as one of the best ten films.

Mohammad Yaser Barakzai, 25-year old, is a 12th-grade graduate who is currently working as an IT technician. He has produced nearly 35 different animation films, since 2012. The themes of his animation vary from social issues, women issues to TV commercials, and peace.

Cage (Qafas) by Ahmad Wahid Omid

Cage is a two-minute silent film directed by 27-year old Ahmad Wahid Omid. It is a beautiful cinematic metaphor told through impressive shots of flying kits and the story of a young boy, disabled by polio, who daydreams. The film depicts the harm and suffering caused by the conflict in Afghanistan, showing how it affects access to health care – in this case through the interruption of polio vaccination programs.

Cage is available to watch online, here and here)

Hidden hell (Jahanam-e Penhan) by Abdul Karim Akbari

Hidden Hell depicts how difficult life is for Afghan families as a result of the ongoing conflict. In this case the family loses its main breadwinner, which in turn severely impacts the mother’s health. The film shows how the mother’s death leaves the child with no support from either the government or other community members.

Abdul Karim Akbari, the scriptwriter of Hidden Hell, is 29-year old night school tenth-grader. He has been involved in film making for over a decade and has competed in two other festivals, one by the Lincoln center in Herat and the other by a local NGO on peace. Akbari has acted in several short and feature films and has directed movies before.

Hero of Life (Qahraman-e Zendegi) by Omid Haqju

Hero of Life shows how difficult life is in times of conflict, especially for disabled people.

Omid Haqju is a 22-year old journalism student. He has been involved in Cinema since 2014. He has taken part in several films as an actor. Hero of Life is his first artwork as a director and screenwriter. Like many other Afghan, Haqju himself was affected by the armed conflict, which motivated him to make a film showing its severe impact on Afghan children.

Headlines (Sarkhat-e Khabarha) by Sohail Fakuri

Headlines depicts the everyday life in Afghanistan, where people, including children, are continuously exposed to news about the conflict: insurgency attacks, the fall of a districts, suicide bombings. They have no option but to continue their lives and face the challenges. The film shows the wish of all to see peace and portrays the continued existence of the positive sides of life, such as smiling children.

Sohail Fakuri, a 13-year old sixth-grader, directed the movie. He has had roles in more than ten long and feature films. He also has skills in film editing.

New Generation (Nasl-e Naw) by Behzad Askarzada

The short film New Generation depicts the fact that the conflict is ominous and that the new generation needs to be aware of its effects and consequences. This generation is, the film argues, more aware of the severity of the conflict than the generations before them and know that they need to work harder to overcome the challenges so they can have a future free of conflict.

A 38-year old, Behzad Askarzada, the author and the director of the film has been involved in the local film industry for the last 15 years. He has directed many feature and short films, including TV commercials about peace, effects of drugs, human rights, and disarmament, and has long-standing experience with theatrical performances.

Different representation

The interesting thing about the festival was that it brought together people of different ages, professions and preferences to creatively express themselves with regard to an issue that affects them all, either directly or indirectly. In the current turbulent situation, the collection of stories provide a mosaic of experiences on how the armed conflict continues to affect, not only on children, but society as a whole.

As UNAMA noted in its press release:

The festival provided an important opportunity for Afghans from all walks of life to exercise their cultural rights with courage and innovation. Many of the films reflected personal experiences or told the story of those closest to the writer. The films provided a creative and unique collective voice to children facing conflict across the country. Conducted under volatile conditions in Afghanistan, this Festival also offered an important avenue to inspire civil society, and particularly youth, to advocate and address human rights through a media platform.

It is remarkable to see and listen to these stories told by ordinary people in a truly artistic language. In particular, a scene from Patrimony comes to mind. The father is lecturing his studious son, admonishing him to be more like his weapon-loving brother. He tells his boy, who is about ten-years old: “This weapon is our patrimony. This [was handed] from my grandfather to my father, and from my father to me. And after me to my son. Today I am proud of my son. The weapons will never leave Afghanistan.” A moment later, in a pathos-filled closing, the weapon-loving son kills his intellectual brother by accident, while cleaning the kalashnikov.

A documentary is currently being produced to highlight the journey of the filmmakers, the production process and their personal experience in participating in the festival itself.

 

(1) The film festival was jointly organised by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), with support from Afghanistan’s Department of Information and Culture, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), civil society and the local media and arts community in the Herat city.

(2) The armed conflict in Afghanistan has been increasing in intensity, in terms of complexity, geographic scope and levels of violence, with particularly harsh consequences for children, UNAMA noted in the film festival’s press release.

In the first half of 2016, the United Nations documented 1,509 child casualties (388 deaths and 1,121 injured), according to its regular six-months protection of civilians report. According to this report children accounted for 85 per cent of all civilian casualties caused by Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs) – the second leading cause of child casualties. The UN further documented 46 incidents affecting access to education; 64 incidents affecting access to healthcare and 34 instances of children recruited and used by parties to the conflict.

(3) Danielle Bell, director of Human Rights Unit in (UNAMA) representative of UN OHCHR told AAN, “UNAMA’s aim was to raise awareness and bring attention to the issues of armed conflict facing children in Afghanistan as seen by local film makers in western region, many of whom are children and youth themselves.” Bell, who participated in the Herat event, added that UNAMA organised the film festival “to facilitate and encourage the exercise of cultural rights by male and female entrants of all ages, to provide a forum to recognise and celebrate achievements of short film makers and to encourage and facilitate female participation in society and cultural life.”