The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN)

On 8 July 2016, in Warsaw, NATO begins a two-day heads of state summit for its member countries. Afghanistan is the first item on the agenda on day two. From an Afghan point of view this is an important event, the means by which Kabul secures funding for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and troop commitments for NATO’s Resolute Support Mission. However, for NATO, Afghanistan is no longer at the top of the agenda; there are too many other security problems facing the alliance. Ahead of the summit, AAN answers some of the key questions for Afghanistan (with an 11 July 2016 update on the results).  

Update (after the Warsaw summit, in italics): 

At their 2016 summit, NATO member-states decided that Resolute Support Mission led by the alliance will continue beyond its already once extended target date at the end of 2016 and will keep up its funding for the Afghan security forces until 2020 at least (see the summit’s final statement here). An exact withdrawal date has not been set, though. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s stated (quoted here) that “There’s no reason to speculate exactly on how long it [the mission] will continue.“

Tropps levels are supposed to remain the same; currently, according to official NATO figures for July 2016, there are 12,930 foreign troops from 39 countries in Afghanistan. Most of them – 7006 – are from the United States.

The US will reportedly continue to provide the bulk of the troops, although proportionally fewer than before. The US had planned to reduce its current deployment from 9,800 {this includes troops not formally under RS but under the parallel anti-terrorism mission Freedom’s Sentinel) to 5,500 by the end of the year, but just ahead of the summit, President Obama announced a slowdown of the drawdown. According to a White House statement, the US will now keep altogether 8,400 troops in Afghanistan. (A recent report by the AP shows how difficult it is to come to exact US troops numbers in Afghanistan, here.) This means the other contributing nations will have to deploy an extra 1400 troops between them. The exact size of the mission is to be determined in the autumn, Stoltenberg stated.

NATO has also agreed to continue spending 4.5 billion dollars annually for  Afghanistan’s armed forces through to 2020. This includes 3.5 billion dollars from the US and one billion from other allies. (The NATO Secretary General said they had “nearly” gathered the non-US billion for next year.) Afghanistan is also supposed to contribute half a billion dollars annually (it is not clear whether it already has done so), and NATO still insists – rather unrealistically, in its final Warsaw statement – that the country takes full “financial responsibility” for its forces by 2024, the end of the so-called ‘transformation period.’.

NATO’s message was grammatically dubious, but politically clear: “NATO stands resolute towards a secure and stable Afghanistan.”

 

1. What is the background to the NATO summit and how important is it for Afghanistan?

Since 1949, the founding year of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), there have been 26 NATO summits (for details see here) where heads of state of members and partners have met to discuss the various problems facing the alliance. Afghanistan has featured heavily on the NATO agenda over the last decade or so, with its United Nations-mandated and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – a mission that ended in December 2014 and was replaced by Resolute Support, which has a mission to train, advise and assist the ANSF.

At this summit in Warsaw, there will again be a session specifically dedicated to Afghanistan. The meeting is likely to result in a carefully-worded declaration that builds on agreements made at previous summits, in particular those in Lisbon (2010), Chicago (2012) and Newport (2014) and that marked changes in the relationship between Afghanistan and its military supporters.

In Lisbon, on 20 November 2010, the nations that contributed troops to ISAF issued a declaration (Lisbon Declaration on Afghanistan) announcing what they called ‘Afghanistan’s Transition’ – the gradual withdrawal of foreign forces and their replacement by Afghan ones. This transition to full Afghan security responsibility and leadership was to begin in early 2011 “following a joint Afghan and NATO/ISAF assessment and decision” and aimed to have the ANSF “lead and conduct security operations in all provinces by the end of 2014.” (See also comments by AAN’s Thomas Ruttig ahead of the Lisbon summit: here. )

At the same summit, NATO and the Afghan government signed a Declaration of Enduring Partnership in which NATO reaffirmed its commitment to a stable Afghanistan and declared its intention to provide “sustained practical support to Afghan security institutions.” The Afghan government in turn reaffirmed its commitment to carry out its security, governance and development responsibilities, as agreed during the 2010 London and Kabul conferences, to be an enduring NATO partner and to seek to ‘forward regional cooperation’. (1)

Two years later, on 21 May 2012 at the Chicago summit, the ISAF troop-contributing countries detailed in the Chicago Declaration on Afghanistan the roadmap for the security transition and reiterated their commitment to support the Afghan government’s security forces beyond the transition and through what was called ‘the Transformation Decade’, that is, beyond ISAF’s withdrawal (2014 to 2024):

The completion of transition, however, will not mean the end of the International Community’s commitment to Afghanistan’s stability and development. Afghanistan and NATO reaffirm their commitment to further develop the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership signed at Lisbon in 2010 in all its dimensions, up to 2014 and beyond, including through joint programmes to build capacity such as the Building Integrity Initiative. In this context, NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will now deepen their consultations towards shaping the Enduring Partnership.

The declaration provided the contours for the future training and advice mission, gave the annual cost for the Afghanistan security forces an estimated figure (4.1 billion US dollars) and set parameters for the phasing out of support: 

As transition of security responsibility is completed at the end of 2014, NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, which will be of a different nature to the current ISAF mission. (…)

The preliminary model for a future total ANSF size, defined by the International Community and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, envisages a force of 228,500 with an estimated annual budget of US$4.1 billion, and will be reviewed regularly against the developing security environment. (…)  

As the Afghan economy and the revenues of the Afghan government grow, Afghanistan’s yearly share will increase progressively from at least US$500m in 2015, with the aim that it can assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces. In the light of this, during the Transformation Decade, we expect international donors will reduce their financial contributions commensurate with the assumption by the Afghan government of increasing financial responsibility.  

During the most recent NATO summit in Newport, Wales (United Kingdom), on 4 and 5 September 2014, the Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan reaffirmed and laid out NATO’s short, medium and long term commitment to Afghanistan: the Resolute Support mission, NATO’s contribution to fund the ANSF, and NATO and Afghanistan’s long-term ‘Enduring Partnership’. (2)

In Warsaw (see NATO documents here and here), Afghanistan will be seeking a reaffirmation of the commitment to support its security forces, as it will not be able to pay for them by itself in any foreseeable future. As during similar conferences in the past, the Afghan government will need to convince contributing countries that a stable Afghanistan continues to be both important and feasible, and that the country continues to be worth the investment.

High-level international conferences have, for this reason, often been used to nudge the Afghan government to act on issues that have long been lagging. The Afghans, as well the governments that support them – who are faced with the difficult task of defending their continued support to a critical public – will probably use the summit to showcase apparent progress and show an optimistic face. There will probably be exhortations that Afghanistan needs to do more in the field of anti-corruption (while praising the government for the – very – recent establishment of an Anti-Corruption Justice Task Force), electoral reform and addressing the deep-seated issues facing the command and control of its security forces. However, there are no indications that this will lead into serious discussions of conditionality.

2. How prominent will Afghanistan feature? Is there a chance it might be overshadowed by other events?

Afghanistan is at the summit based on its status as the receiver of NATO-led troops and as an Enduring Partner of NATO. Moreover, many member states and partners continue to be heavily involved in the country. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg specifically mentioned Afghanistan in his announcement of the summit on 22 May 2015:

In Warsaw, we will chart the course for the Alliance’s adaptation to the new security environment so that NATO remains ready to defend all Allies against any threat from any direction. We will build on our valuable work with partner nations and organisations to keep our neighbourhood stable. We will stress our long-term commitment to Afghanistan through the Enduring Partnership. And we will further strengthen the bond between Europe and North America on which our Alliance is founded.

On the eve of the NATO ministerial meeting on 14 June 2016, he further stated that:

“Projecting stability is how NATO can work with partners (…) This has to be done in a tailored way in different countries, that’s exactly actually what we do in Afghanistan now. We have ended our combat mission there but we do train, assist and advise, we help the Afghan National Security Forces fight extremism, terrorism themselves.”

At the same time, in the midst of a changing world, Afghanistan sees itself facing the challenge of keeping itself on the agenda. Although for now Afghanistan will probably get what it needs – a restatement, possibly conditional, of NATO’s continuing support – it is likely that the main discussions will focus elsewhere. Other pressing topics include the conflict in Ukraine and relations with Russia, the conflicts in the Middle East, the role of nuclear weapons, missile defence and cyber-security, NATO’s partnership policy and the ‘burden sharing debate’. (3)

3. What will be discussed in the session on Afghanistan?

The session dedicated to Afghanistan will be attended by NATO members, contributing partners to the Resolute Support Mission and Afghan government officials, including President Ashraf Ghani. During this session, NATO member states are likely to review their financial support for the Afghan security forces, with NATO officials aiming to secure financial commitments until 2020 (as the previous round of pledges expires in 2017). NATO officials will seek to convince member states to determine their support to the Afghan security forces based on the ANSF’s needs and the security conditions on the ground, rather than seeking to trim their pledges according to budget constraints. As of February 2016, the capacity of the Afghan security forces, according to figures provided by Resolute Support, includes “approximately 173,000 soldiers, airmen, and Ministry of Defence (MoD) civilians serving in the Army; approximately 154,000 policemen and civilians serving in the Ministry of Interior (MoI); and more than 28,000 MoI Afghan Local Police (ALP) securing villages across Afghanistan” (for details see here). NATO officials will aim to keep these forces at their current level.

The estimated costs, however, have increased – far beyond inflation – and now stand at approximately five billion US dollars per year. This will be a hard sell, given the changing financial priorities in many NATO member states and the stretch on NATO’s resources, including in the east and south of Europe’s borders due to new migration.

The outcome of Afghanistan’s session will greatly depend on the United States’ commitment to maintain its troop levels and financial support. The original Us plan was to reduce US troops in Afghanistan from 9,800 to 5,500 this year. If President Obama goes ahead with this (and there are indications he may not), NATO officials would need to examine what they could still do and what they would have to drop – for example, with regard to the number of ‘training hubs’ NATO maintains. Some senior US politicials including senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham visiting Kabul for American Independence Day on 4 July 2016, have urged Obama not to reduce the numbers, warning that Afghanistan could follow the fate of Iraq if he does, ““If we go to 5,500 this place will fall apart quickly, quicker than Iraq,” said Graham. “If we keep 9,800 there is a decent chance we can succeed.” If NATO allies show themselves ready to maintain their troop levels, this may encourage the US to keep its numbers up. They are “a logical consideration in our decision-making,” one US official told Reuters. It seems unlikely the US president will come out with any definite decisions ahead or during the summit. Apart from anything else, new overall NATO and US commander in Afghanistan, John Nicholson, General John Nicholson, who conducted a comprehensive security review during his first 90 days on the job (not yet public) has yet to make recommendations to the White House.

The summit’s session is also likely to discuss how to ‘ensure the success’ of Operation Resolute Support in the face of a deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan, what contingency plans can be made to counter the rise of Islamic extremist groups with links to Middle East in Afghanistan (Daesh) and the possibilities for more direct assistance to Afghan security institutions and forces. The resumption of a (mandated) combat role by NATO forces is highly unlikely. The US does have this role, based on its own, separate, bilateral accord with Kabul (for details of both NATO and US agreements, see AAN reporting here).

4. Has Afghanistan prepared any documents for the NATO summit?

The Afghan government has prepared a National Security Strategy and a National Security Policy, which it apparently intends to present at the summit.

Afghanistan is supposed to have four major national security documents, that together make up the country’s five-year security planning framework: the National Threat Assessment, the National Security Policy, the National Security Strategy, and an Afghan National Campaign Plan.

The first three documents form the basis of the Ministry of Defence’s National Military Strategy and Ministry of Interior’s Strategy. These, in turn, outline the respective ministry strategies and form the basis for subordinate plans for the deployment of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police (and other branches of the Ministry of Interior).

According to the revamped mandate of the National Security Council in 2010, the NSC was tasked with “produc[ing] draft papers on National Security Policy and National Security Strategy, National Threat Assessments and other topics of cross-government security interest.” At the London Conference, held on 28 January 2010, it was agreed that the Afghan government would established its first National Security Policy and present it at the Kabul conference in July 2010, a couple of months before the NATO Lisbon summit. The Afghan government, at the time, did not present the promised policy.

An official at the National Security Council told AAN that the three basic documents – threats assessment, national security policy and national security strategy – were drafted recently and approved by President Ghani. These are both micro and macro level assessments of the domestic, regional and international security environments and threat levels, and their implications for Afghanistan. The documents aim to represent a change in how the government deals with security-related issues, the official said, in a “structured”, rather than an “ad hoc” manner. They will, supposedly, be presented at the summit.

5. What can Afghanistan realistically expect from the NATO summit? 

It is most likely that the Warsaw NATO summit will follow the three-pronged approach – short, medium and long term commitment – of the last summit held in 2014 in Wales (see here) where NATO’s foreign ministers already agreed to extend NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan beyond 2016. In Warsaw, the heads of states and partners are thus expected to reiterate their support and long-term commitment to Afghanistan – which was already announced by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg – and to provide detail on what this will entail for the NATO-led training, advice and assistance to Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, beyond 2016. So far NATO has indicated it will have a “regional flexible approach” with regard to the continued mission, indicating it now intends to keep bases open beyond Kabul and Bagram.

AAN has reported previously (see here, here and here) on the fudging between NATO’s train, advise and assist Resolute Support mission and the US’s separate ‘can be combat’, anti-terrorist Freedom’s Sentinel Mission. It had become clear that the US had stretched the notion of ‘self defence’ beyond its limits, using it as a rationale for offensive air strikes under the Resolute Support Mission banner and other operations against the Taleban – not just to protect US forces on the ground, but also Afghan allies. This was risky because restrictions on strikes aimed at saving US troops’ lives are far fewer than for an offensive attack, increasing the likelihood, therefore, of civilian casualties. It is also hardly what anyone expected from a mission that, according to Obama himself, was to be a non-combat one. The gravity of this muddling of the missions became clear in the air strike on the MSF hospital in Kunduz in October 2015 when ‘self defence’ was used to justify an offensive strike against a target which US troops were not near by too and did not even have line of sight on. The result of this (and other errors and technical failures) was a bombed hospital.

Obama has now decided to officially expand the parameters of the mission. From early June 2016 onwards, the US commander can order strikes to protect Afghan forces under imminent danger of being overrun by the Taleban; the strikes can be used, not just against al Qaeda and its associates, but also against the Taleban and; US forces can now also work on the ground with Afghan regular forces and not just Afghan special forces (see here ).

All of these issues affect US forces only, as far as we know. Other countries have taken a much stricter view of what train, advise, assist means and believe it excludes combat.

On funding, NATO’s member and partner countries are expected to make, or reiterate pledges for the sustained financial support of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. Reuters recently quoted a US military commander, who said Washington is currently asking its military allies in Afghanistan “to maintain funding for Afghan forces at a cost of nearly 5 billion US dollars a year until at least 2020.” 

6. How has the Warsaw summit featured in Afghan media and the general political discourse?

Reporting on the upcoming summit has allowed various media and commentators to bring in other related or unrelated topics, which they feel should be on the agenda.

Several media outlets, for example, have been reporting criticism of the government for its failure to act decisively against corruption. Tolo News reported on 19 June 2016 that, according to corruption monitoring groups, “the Afghan government’s counter-corruption policies will dominate the agenda at the upcoming NATO heads-of-state summit in Warsaw… the Kabul government will be expected to outline more inclusive anti-graft measures. This will be a condition for ensuring continued international financial and military aid for Afghanistan.” Earlier, on 8 June 2016, Tolo News also quoted criticism by the Afghan Anti-Corruption Network (AACN) against the government’s “ineffective” and “non-existent” anti-corruption policy. It then quoted the response of a presidential spokesperson who said that “If Kabul makes achievements in fighting corruption before the Warsaw Summit, which is scheduled for 8 July, this will remove the stain of corruption from the image of Afghanistan and it will convince the international community to continue assisting Afghanistan.” And indeed, in the following weeks, the government announced and then inaugurated a specialised Anti-Corruption Justice Centre. Also reported were dismissals, investigations and prosecutions of government officials (see for instance here).

Then there are Afghan hopes from the summit. Tolo News has also reported on specific requests that Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defence hopes to make to NATO:

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) on Tuesday called on President Ashraf Ghani to lobby for more state-of-the-art weapons. It wants to boost the Afghan Air Force and strengthen the country’s military intelligence and investigation sectors. This was part of the list of requirements sent to President Ashraf Ghani by the MoD. He is expected to present the list to the Warsaw heads-of-state summit.” Gen Zaheer, the commander of training and education of the national army, in an interview on national television on 24 June 2016, called on the international community to honour its promises to educate, train and equip the Afghan armed forces. He particularly asked for “radars, air to surface missiles, fighter jets, spy planes, bombers and transport planes.”

The media also reported that concerns that weaknesses in ANSF leadership and logistics and the lack of internal cohesion could, however, endanger continued international support:

A number of military analysts have said that poor military leadership will come under the spotlight at the upcoming NATO Warsaw Summit. They concurred that the Afghan government had to tackle the matter seriously in order to address NATO concerns. (…) NATO is expected to pledge $15 billion to the ANSF until 2020 during the Warsaw Summit. But there are fears that poor Afghan military leadership will undermine the interests of international community and could influence its willingness to continue financial aid to Afghanistan. (Tolo News)

On the eve Warsaw summit, military experts have warned that the lack of cohesion between the various sections of Afghanistan’s security establishment required an effective intervention. At this stage the government will be vulnerable to international criticism at the summit. (Tolo News)

The government has also sought to leverage the Warsaw summit in its attempt to get parliament to pass a legislative decree linked to the parliamentary elections (see here and here for more details). State-owned newspaper Anis, for example, wrote on 14 June 2016 in an editorial:

The MPs who (…) rejected the decree should know that the president of the country is decisive and will try to bring reforms in the electoral system in any way possible (…) bringing reforms in the electoral system as one of its priorities and will try to find a solution to this problem before the Warsaw summit. (…) The government of Afghanistan should get the international community’s support by presenting its accomplishments on the pledges made in the coming summit. But, by rejecting the second legislative decree of the president, it is now unknown what the future fate of the parliament will be.

Even the Taleban have commented on the NATO summit. An article, headlined

“Warsaw Summit should not repeat past mistakes” published on the Taleban Voice of Jihad website on 25 June, said:

It is not the first NATO conference regarding Afghanistan. Since the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, America and its allies have held several conferences about Afghanistan. … Since then, instead of resolving the issue, every conference on Afghanistan including the first Bonn Conference has further complicated the Afghan issue. The main reason is that America and its allies are intent on trying to deprive the Afghan Muslim nation from their basic and legitimate rights like independence of the country and establishment of an Islamic system. They want to solve this issue on the basis of their own will and by resorting to the use of force and resource. (…)

NATO should come out from the circle of the use of force and stratagem and ponder over their mistakes. If they want to solve the issue of Afghanistan, they should disband the policy of use of force and occupation. Rather, they should realise ground realities if they ever want the real solution of the issue and accept the legitimate demands of our nation.

Reporting by Jelena Bjelica, Martine van Bijlert, Sudhanshu Verma and Kate Clark.

 

 

(1) The relevant sections in the Declaration of Enduring Partnership are:

NATO re-affirms its long-term commitment to a sovereign, independent, democratic, secure and stable Afghanistan that will never again be a safe haven for terrorists and terrorism, and to a better future for the Afghan people. In pursuit of that goal, and recognising Afghanistan as an important NATO partner, NATO intends to provide sustained practical support to Afghan security institutions aimed at: 

• sustaining and improving their capacity and capability to counter threats to the security, stability and integrity of Afghanistan effectively, and contributing to regional security; and
• doing so with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and leadership, in a manner consistent with and supportive of the Afghan constitution and international law and recognising the sacrifices and the ongoing endeavours of the Afghan people for achieving peace.

 The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to:

• actively carry out its security, governance and development responsibilities in a manner consistent with the commitments made at the London Conference of January 2010 and the Kabul Conference of July 2010 such as combating terrorism, strengthening the economy, addressing corruption, regional security and economic co-operation and respect for human rights, in particular the rights of women;
• be an enduring partner to NATO and provide NATO with the necessary assistance to carry out its partnership activities within the framework of this declaration; and recognise the importance and relevance of broader regionally-owned co-operation, coordination and confidence building between Afghanistan and its regional partners, as exemplified in the Istanbul Statement.

(2) The full three-pronged commitment in the 2014 Wales Declaration on Afghanistan reads:

 In the short term, the Resolute Support Mission. As decided at the Chicago Summit in 2012, at the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, and in the context of the broader international effort to help Afghanistan, NATO Allies and partner nations stand ready to continue to train, advise and assist the ANSF after 2014. This will be done through a new, non-combat mission with a sound legal basis. The mission’s establishment is contingent on the signing of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement and NATO-Afghanistan Status of Forces Agreement. The Resolute Support Mission should ideally, in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan, be supported by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.

In the medium term, our contribution to the financial sustainment of the ANSF. At Chicago, NATO allies and ISAF partners decided to provide support to the ANSF, as appropriate, through the Transformation Decade, on the understanding that the Afghan Government will make an increasing financial contribution to this endeavour. Today, nations renewed their financial commitments to support the sustainment of the ANSF, including to the end of 2017. We also urge the wider international community to remain engaged in the financial sustainment of the ANSF. We will maintain and strengthen the transparent, accountable and cost-effective funding mechanisms we have established since Chicago, including the Oversight and Coordination Body, which will ensure donors can confidently commit this support. Realising the full promise of the pledges made at Chicago on the financial sustainment of the ANSF, which we have reaffirmed today, will require transparency, accountability, and cost-effectiveness of the relevant international funding mechanisms. We encourage the Afghan Government to continue and strengthen efforts to fight corruption. We look forward to working with the Afghan authorities to review the force structure and capabilities of the ANSF to achieve a sufficient and sustainable force. We restate the aim, agreed at Chicago, that Afghanistan should assume, no later than 2024, full financial responsibility for its own security forces.  

In the long term, NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership. NATO Allies remain committed to the NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership, agreed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010. The strengthening of this partnership will reflect the changing nature of NATO’s relationship with Afghanistan whilst complementing the Resolute Support Mission and continuing beyond it. Both the political and practical elements of this partnership should be jointly owned and strengthened through regular consultation on issues of strategic concern. NATO is ready to work with Afghanistan to develop this partnership in line with NATO’s Partnership Policy, possibly including the development of an Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme at an appropriate time.

(3) See analysis by Ian Anthony, director of SIPRI’s European Security Program, (see here and here) (where he discusses Afghanistan under the heading of “Addressing the arc of crises: taking on armed Islamist extremist movements while staying engaged in Afghanistan”). Also, see analysis by the German Federal Academy for Security Policy here.

 

 

After each dark night, a bright morning comes, and after each Ramadan, comes Eid al Fitr. As this year’s long, hot month of dawn-till-dusk fasting ends, the AAN team would like to wish a joyful Eid to friends and readers, to all Muslims around the world and particularly to the people of Afghanistan.

په هره تياره پسې رڼا راځي او په هره روژه پسې کوچنی اختر راځي. دا چې د روژې د مياشتې ګرمې او اوږدې ورځي په ختمېدو دي نو د افغانستان د تحلیلګرانو شبکه د نړۍ ټولو مسلمانانو ته او په ځانګړي ډول د افغانستان خلکو ته د راتلونکي کوچنې اختر مبارکي وايي!!

پس از هر شب تاریک، صبح روشن فرا میرسد و صد شکر که در پایان هر ماه مبارک رمضان، عيد سعيد فطر از راه میآید. شبکه تحلیلگران افغانستان، همزمان با به آخر رسیدن روزهای دراز و گرم ماه مبارک رمضان امسال، حلول عيد سعيد فطر را به دوستان و خوانندگان، به همه مسلمانان جهان و به خصوص به مردم افغانستان، تبريک میگويد.

As AAN has reported before, Afghans celebrate the end of the month-long fast and the arrival of Eid al Fitr in many ways. As well as the customary Eid prayers, special food is cooked, friends and family visited, and, for those who can afford it, new clothes are worn. People remember those who have passed away that year. There might be local wrestling competitions, agey jangawal (egg-fighting) or ghursai (one-legged fighting). In Andar district of southern Ghazni province, reports AAN’s Fazal Muzhary, as in many other places, people celebrate Eid with Afghanistan’s national dance, the attan. People go to the district bazaar, gathering to dance or watch the attan. Enthusiastic youths whirl and jump in a wide circle, dancing to two or three drums which start slowly and beat ever faster.

Researchers focusing on Chechen issues point to clear evidence that many Chechens are fighting in Syria, but roundly reject the notion of a Chechen presence in Afghanistan. In the first part of his special two-parter, Christian Bleuer looked at how Chechens became a battlefield myth for western soldiers and a tool for Afghan and US governments frame their fight as a struggle against foreign militants. In this second dispatch, he looks at the difficulties of identifying a Chechen and at how ‘Chechen’ has become a loose term that can mean different things to different people.

(Mis)identifying Chechens in Afghanistan: a few examples

Chechens (dead and alive) are reported frequently in Afghanistan, but that identification usually falls apart under scrutiny. For example, a United States officer reported the alleged capture by Afghan police of a Chechen in Paktia in summer 2007. But when the identity of the ‘Chechen’ was eventually revealed, although he did turn out to be a citizen of Russia, he was an ethnic Russian from Siberia called Andrei who had converted to Islam (see also this 2007 blog). Or, in another example from 2009, a reporter looking into the role of foreign fighters in the Afghan insurgency quoted a United States Army Major in Paktika stating confidently that Arab, Uzbek, Turkmen and Chechen fighters were entering his area of operation. A suspicious analyst personally contacted the major to confirm the report. The major said he had told the reporter that he and his team were fighting against local Afghans. “I never said the quote that he used,” he said. “I stated that there have been reports that Chechens have been in the area, but that we have no way of verifying this information.”

Documents allegedly identifying Chechens are also occasionally reported, such as a 2005 USA Today article citing a government spokesman in Zabul who stated that recently killed insurgents were positively identified as Pakistani and Chechen, as “documents found on the bodies of the three identified their nationalities.” This may be the case for the dead Pakistanis, but very unlikely for the ‘Chechens.’ If they were carrying a passport, it would be a passport of the Russian Federation; in 1997 the Russian government removed the line in the passport where the Russian citizen identified their ethnicity. Of course, a birthplace is still listed, but in the Cyrillic Russian alphabet and by city only, not by republic or province (so the word ‘Chechnya’ would not be included). As for the unknown number of Chechen Republic of Ichkeria passports issued in 1997, none have turned up in warzones, but rather in asylum applications in Europe. (1)

In January 2011, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA) wire service circulated a fantastic story: fifteen Chechen women in Dasht-e Archi district of Kunduz had married Talebs and were assisting them as experts in the use of suicide vests and roadside IEDs (improvised explosive devices), and as nurses. (2) The source of this information was the interrogation by Kunduz police chief Abdul Rahman Sayedkheli (3) of Taleban Mullah Jamaluddin – leaving open the possibility that these are the words of the police, put into the mouth of a Taleb prisoner. Furthermore, to believe this story, one must assume that fifteen Chechen women – who are also Islamist extremists, trained in suicide vest and IED construction – left Chechnya on their own and travelled all the way to Kunduz to marry Afghan Talebs. This story could be a play on the Russian ‘Black Widow’ female suicide bombers from the North Caucasus region, itself an exaggerated phenomenon. These women – also referred to as shahidka in Russian – (see here) are overwhelmingly vulnerable widows manipulated into putting on suicide vests inside Russia, rather than globe-trotting insurgent and terrorist tactic experts.

In some incidents where foreign militants certainly were to blame, the Afghan government is still quick to name Chechens as the perpetrators. A good example is the February 2015 kidnapping of dozens of Hazaras on the Kabul-Kandahar highway. The governor of Zabul province immediately blamed the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Jangvi and Chechens. But unlike many other reports around the country that named Chechens as the guilty party, this incident generated a relatively large amount of media and public interest. The scrutiny dismantled the government’s initial claims, and it was revealed quite decisively that Uzbeks of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan were responsible. (4) But for other reports of Chechens, there is usually no such fact-checking or scrutiny.

Positive identification of Chechens: ‘racial’ stereotyping

If some Afghan mujahedin had been misidentifying dead Soviet soldiers as Cubans in the 1980s (possibly because Soviet soldiers had darkened their faces for night-time fighting; see the author’s previous dispatch), could contemporary American and Afghan soldiers be doing something similar?

Many, including Russians, think they can identify Chechens and fail badly, as noted in a widely circulated Russian article written by a Chechen titled “How to spot a Chechen.” Basically, ‘racial stereotypes’ (anthropologists prefer the word ‘phenotypes’) such as hair type, facial features, skin colour, etc are not particularly useful as the Chechen population is a diverse group of people who speak a common language. A stereotypical Chechen ‘look’ will fail as a tool of identification. If ethnic Russians have problems identifying Chechens despite sharing a country with them, what chance do Afghans have? Even so, some American soldiers trust Afghans to identify dead bodies as Chechen. One soldier who served in Khost made this claim:

…there are Chechens fighting (and dying) in Khost, Paktika and Paktya and there have been for years. […] How do i know? Because the Afghans know a Chechen dead guy from an Arab dead guy from an Afghan from a Pakistani when they see one, that’s how.

In reality, identification of insurgent bodies in Afghanistan is undertaken in the crudest fashion. The Paktia provincial police chief in May 2007 (see here), for example, needed only the disembodied head of a suicide bomber to be able to declare that “the face complexion revealed he was a Chechen.” An ISAF officer with years of experience in northern Afghanistan wrote this in 2011:

We see it here (Mazar-e Sharif) in the provincial hospital, where dead bodies of insurgent KIAs are brought to. When the bodies are not claimed by family members, they are automatically labeled Foreign Fighters and depending on their faces: Asiatic = Uzbeks; dark-skinned = Pakistani; and Caucasian = Chechens. This is done by doctors as well as police and everybody takes it at face value. (5)

Two other researchers whose works includes studies of both the North Caucasus and Afghanistan agree: corpses on the Afghan battlefield that “appeared Caucasian

[ie ‘white European’] were presumed to be Chechens.” In another similar anecdote, an Afghan-American working for US forces near Khost as a cultural advisor said that local Afghans were referring to lighter-skinned foreign fighters generically as ‘Chechens’, partially because that is what they thought the Americans wanted to hear. Add to this the existence of light-haired and light-skinned Afghans, and it is clear as to why making an identification of a dead or live fighter based on crude racial stereotypes is unreliable.

Russian language in Afghanistan: Chechens, Central Asians and others

Analysis in Jane’s Defence published in November 2001 identified Chechen units, bases and ‘civilian communities’ in Afghanistan as part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. This provides a possible example of how ‘Chechen sightings’ may be the result of linguistic and cultural confusion. As far as language identification goes, the notion that the US military has deployed army linguists and signals intelligence operators proficient in Nokhchiyn mott (the language of Chechens) was completely rejected by a researcher who spent time with the US military in Afghanistan. Outside the US military, in 2013, the terrorism researcher, Murad Batal Al Shishani (an Arab of Chechen descent – Arabic, lacking a ‘ch’ sound, replaces it with ‘sh’ instead), rejected the notion of a Chechen presence in Afghanistan based on the total lack of evidence of the Chechen language being used by any fighters in that country. But like other sceptics, he is convinced of Chechens being in Syria – based on the type of linguistic (and other) evidence found there, that is lacking in Afghanistan.

The use of the Russian language on the battlefield as proof of the presence of Chechens is even less useful. Chechens only comprise 1.5 million people out of Russia’s over 16 million Muslims, and Russian is the dominant lingua franca between and among Central Asians and those from the North Caucasus region of Russia. Hearing Russian spoken or finding Russian language documents in Afghanistan thus does not mean that there are Chechens. However, Afghans have probably been led to assume that Central Asians speaking Russian were in fact Chechens. (6) Documents written in Russian have also been cited as a sign of Chechens in Afghanistan, but researchers familiar with Central Asian militants have instead assigned the papers to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (for example, Russian documents found in the Kabul houses of foreign militants in December 2001).

A survey of publications by researchers with an expertise on the North Caucasus and/or Central Asia (as well as personal communication with them) returns an overwhelming consensus: Afghans and foreign military forces in Afghanistan, as well as some journalists and other researchers, are regularly mistaking Russian-speaking, foreign Muslims for Chechens. In particular, numerous people are mistaking Central Asian fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan for Chechens, while others point also to non-Chechens from the North Caucasus as the source of the misidentification. (7) However, it goes beyond just the use of the Russian language. As two researchers of the Chechen conflict argue, “the ethnonym ‘Chechen’ has in fact been employed to describe almost all foreigners whose identity Afghans were unable to discover or whose language was incomprehensible (ie almost anyone but Pakistanis and Arabs).” (8) Even foreign Uzbeks who can speak local languages have been misidentified as Chechens, as the kidnapping incidents of Hazara bus passengers in Zabul demonstrated.

If ‘Chechen’ has become, for some Afghans, a generic term for unidentifiable foreign Muslims, it has followed numerous, similar, historical linguistic practices (in ethnolinguistics, the ‘incorrect’ names of ethnic groups used by outsiders are called exonyms or xenonyms). For example, the Persian word farangi is derived narrowly from ‘Frank’, the western Germanic tribes in the Rhine region (eventually, the name ‘France’ was also derived from ‘Frank’). Yet farangi and similar names were used throughout the Muslim world and as far as China and Southeast Asia to refer to anybody from western or Central Europe, or even just to European Christians in general. So, for example, a Persian in the 1800s could refer to a Swede, Portuguese, Czech or Irishman as a farangi, and be corrected by a European who would then identify them not as farangi (Frank), but by their actual nationality. However, both are correct in their own linguistic context.

Similarly, arguing with every Afghan police officer or soldier about whether someone is Chechen or not misses the point in a similar way: for Afghans, ‘Chechen’ could just mean ‘foreign Muslim of unknown ethnicity,’ and this use would be correct for them even if the person they are identifying is not Chechen. (9) However, the listener may think they are hearing a reference to ‘Chechen’, meaning native of Chechnya. Similar examples of this are the numerous reports of Afghans in isolated areas referring to American and other coalition soldiers as ‘Russian’ or ‘Soviet’ (shurawi). (10) It is obviously wrong to say that American soldiers are Russians or indeed Soviets, but if in one’s own linguistic and cultural context, shurawi refers to foreign, non-Muslim soldiers, then it is not incorrect – it is just a linguistic and cultural difference in terminology.

Real Chechens in Afghanistan

The first known (sort-of) Chechen to visit Afghanistan as a foreign volunteer was Fathi Muhammad Habib, also known as Shaykh Ali Fathi al-Shishani, in 1982. An elderly electrical engineer, he took on non-combat duties with Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad party. However, despite being ‘al-Shishani’ (‘the Chechen’ in Arabic), he was not actually from Chechnya. Rather he was a Jordanian Arab descended from Chechens who had emigrated during the Ottoman period. (11) More recently, another member of the Chechen diaspora fought in Afghanistan. The online ‘martyr’ tribute to Sayfullah Shishani, an ethnic Chechen from Georgia who died in Syria, mentions that he fought for a year in Afghanistan at some point in the past. Another researcher mentioned that he had seen a tribute to another ‘Shishani’ who died in Afghanistan. (12) On the opposite side to the Islamists, there was a Chechen who fought for Dostum against the Taleban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and who apparently was in Afghanistan out of a motivation to kill ‘Wahhabis’. When asked in 2003, he said he had never seen another Chechen in Afghanistan, “despite his best efforts to locate his countrymen amongst the Talib prisoners.” (13)

These few examples of Chechen foreign fighters are rare exceptions. Comprehensive studies of foreign fighters, their biographies and their ‘martyr’ tributes turn up almost nothing. A study of ‘martyr biographies’ killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2002 to 2006 includes only five citizens of Russia, and based on their noms de guerre they were ethnic Tatars or from Dagestan, not Chechens. (14) Furthermore, a study focusing on foreign fighters in Afghanistan from 1980-2010 completely rejects the Chechen narrative. (15) When Russian citizens do show up in lists of ‘martyrs’, they are in tiny numbers and from other Russian regions – usually from Dagestan and Tatarstan – not Chechnya. (16) As for those captured alive, just as when the eight Russian citizens imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay turned out to be non-Chechens, a list compiled by AAN of detainees at Bagram turned up only a single Russian citizen: an ethnic Tatar.

The expropriation of Chechen identity on the battlefield

Najibullah Qureishi’s documentary footage with Hezb-e Islami insurgents in northern Afghanistan from 2010 included a scene where a single insurgent was pointed out by a fellow fighter who declared, “This brother’s from Chechnya.” There are very few instances of Taleban fighters saying they worked together with one or more Chechens. The most prominent is in a 2009 Newsweek article by Sami Yousafzai. Yet there is reason to believe that even someone who self-identifies as a Chechen may not actually be Chechen. The first reason is that it is often difficult for a Russian Muslim to explain their ethnic identity to Muslims and others from outside Russia. In the Russian North Caucasus region alone, there are Muslims whose ethnicity is Avar, Dargwa, Kumyk, Lezgin, Tabasaran, Karachay, Cherkess, Abazin, Kabardian, Ingush, et cetera. It is easier to just identify out of convenience with the better-known names of ‘Chechen’ or ‘Dagestani’ (which is not an ethnic identify, but rather someone of varied ethnicity from the Dagestan province of Russia).

But convenience aside, there are also insurgents and terrorists who do expropriate the Chechen identity ‘brand’ in order to better promote themselves and project an image of a fearsome and brave fighter. Chechen fighters in Syria have spoken publically of this identity theft. Joanna Paraszczuk, a researcher who focuses on Chechen fighters, reported on this phenomenon:

Meanwhile, Chechens in Syria have also complained that the West — and even other Islamist militant groups in Syria — are trying to claim the Chechen name, “Shishani” in Arabic, because they think this is associated with bravery on the battlefield. 

“The name “Shishani” has become a brand,” one Chechen militant in Latakia said via Facebook. “Lots of people want to be a Shishani, when they are not.”

A reporter asked an American Special Operation Forces officer with an academic and research background on the North Caucasus and Chechnya about the practise of people ‘stealing’ the Chechen identity. He compared these people to Americans who lie and claim to be special forces: “So just as it’s ‘cool’ here to be Special Forces, or to be a Navy SEAL, it is cool in that part of the world to be a Chechen.” The main reasons he gives for the Chechen identity having this sort of value are that Chechens legitimately are good fighters, and that in the early to mid-1990s, videos from Chechnya circulating in the worldwide militant community of Chechens killing Russian soldiers boosted their reputation (as Islamic fighters). He even cites Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan fighters in Afghanistan lying and claiming to be Chechen in order to instil fear in their enemies.

What do Chechens have to say?

Aside from noting that other fighters are falsely claiming to be Chechen, Chechens – both pro-Russian and in the opposition – widely mock the notion that large numbers of their countrymen are in Afghanistan. One 2005 article published in the (anti-Russian) Chechen Press titled “Chechens as a Nightmare” (see here) mocked the “schizophrenic… hallucinations” that turned up Chechens on various battlefields around the world, comparing them to UFO sightings. Citing generals, police and the media, it found examples over several years of people ‘seeing’ Chechens fighting or planning terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Israel, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Iraq, India, China, Mexico and even Arizona (eventually, the Boston Marathon Bombers would provide the first real Chechen terrorists in the US). In most cases, the Chechen sightings were accompanied by bizarre details and ludicrous claims.

A year earlier in 2004, Akhmed Zakayev, the deputy prime minister of the Chechen government in exile also denied claims that Chechens were in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other denials are far more angry, such as one in the anti-Russian website Kavkaz Center which ridicules and condemns the American soldiers and journalists who claim to be identifying Chechens in Afghanistan, stating that “the American Islam-haters speak only lies about Chechen Mujahideen.”

Finally, the (pro-Russian) Chechen president himself, Ramzan Kadyrov, when vigorously denying that Chechens were fighting in Syria, cited the previous false rumours of Chechens in Afghanistan. By 2014, he begrudgingly admitted that there were a few Chechens in Syria, but that they were Chechens who had been born or raised in the West. Of course, Chechens now – in mid-2016 – have no choice but to acknowledge a Chechen presence in Syria, as there are numerous forms of proof, including video. Similarly, there is proof of Chechens fighting on both side of the war in Ukraine (see for example here). Analysts and researchers who have argued that there were no significant numbers of Chechens in Afghanistan have demonstrated that they are perfectly able to acknowledge Chechens on foreign battlefields when presented with evidence (as in Syria). (17)

If there were actually large numbers of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan…

A common sentiment expressed by researchers, analysts, and contractors who work for the US government directly and indirectly is that, if there were truly large numbers of Chechens in Afghanistan, and if the US government and military truly believed this at the levels where the final intelligence products are produced and where funding is allocated, there would be unmistakable signs of this in US government structures and programmes. For example, Chechen would be a prominent and popular language at the Defense Language Institute and other government language schools, the study of Chechen and Chechnya would be given generous funding in various government-supported programs (academic language programmes, for example), contractors would be regularly advertising for Chechen (Nokhchin mott) linguists, and the experts and researchers with long experience studying Chechnya and Central Asia who work full or part-time for the US government and military would not be so dismissive of the idea that Chechens are in Afghanistan. Furthermore, names or at least noms de guerre would emerge from American targeted killings of Chechen terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan (just as they do for Uzbeks, for example). As for US-Russian cooperation, there would be more signs of intelligence sharing, just as there are clear indications of that in Syria, at the moment, and in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11.

Conclusions: ‘Generic’ Chechens

Despite the very small-scale and rare visits of Chechens to Afghanistan in the 1990s, many people eventually came to believe that Chechen fighters were a common presence during that era. The Russian government, being regularly criticised by the US, European and Arab governments for its conduct in its fight against Chechen separatists, saw an opportunity to portray the entire spectrum of the Chechen independence movement to the world as extremists after the Taleban recognised Chechnya as an independent country. The ‘Northern Alliance,’ by the year 2000 heavily dependent on Russian military support, eagerly adopted the Russian view that there were significant numbers of transnational Chechen terrorists in Afghanistan – while Western governments rejected the Russian government view. But then the al-Qaeda attacks on 9/11 convinced the US government to adopt the Russian line on Chechnya in exchange for Russian cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom (for more details see part one of this special two-parter).

From here the myth of Chechens in Afghanistan might have died, as no Chechens were captured or confirmed killed in Afghanistan. However, a renewed insurgency in Afghanistan made regular gains against the Afghan government and ISAF-NATO troops. The Afghan government and its US military backers, in an attempt to portray the insurgency as illegitimate, decided to frame the insurgency as a foreign phenomenon. Afghan and western forces fairly blamed elements of the state and society in Pakistan, but the Chechens were, without merit, added to the mix along with a long list of foreign fighters. Journalists, and even many analysts, did not question the regular statements about Chechen fighters by the Afghan government and by representatives of ISAF-NATO forces, allowing their articles and publications to uncritically disseminate what was at best a mistaken view, or at worst ‘information warfare’ intended to explain the motivations for the insurgency in a manner that absolved the Afghan government and its western backers of blame.

The Chechen myth was also enabled by smaller technical details, primarily the reputation of Chechens in the militant community owing to their successful campaign against Russia (roughly, 1994 to 2000), and the ambiguity of the use of the name ‘Chechen’ as a generic name in Afghanistan. Non-Chechen fighters expropriated the ‘Chechen’ name while Afghan and NATO-ISAF forces often assumed that competent and brave opponents must be Chechen. As for the name ‘Chechen’, it is clearly being used to describe a range of Muslim ethnic groups from the former Soviet Union – including ethnic Russian converts to Islam.

In the context of Afghanistan’s full range of problems, the accidental and intentional misidentification of Chechens is not a major issue. However, it can serve as a symbol of larger, systemic problems: poor intelligence collection and analysis by the US government and military forces and of those of other western allies, the blurring of lines between analysis and psychological operations, lazy journalism, blame-shifting and deflection by the Afghan and US governments, the manipulation of facts to serve Great Power politics (eg, between Russia and the United States) and the lack of critical inquiry by academics, analysts and the general public in the west and in Afghanistan. All of this, taken together, can distract from questions concerning the true nature of the conflict: who are the insurgents and terrorists? Why are they joining the insurgency? What needs to be done to address these problems?

The phenomenon of Chechen misidentification in Afghanistan is just one of many problems encountered when trying to understand the conflict in Afghanistan. Now, as the Afghan government and its western backers attempt to absolve themselves of blame, the alleged large number of ‘foreign fighters’ may well continue to be a tool used in an attempt to manipulate public perceptions. Stories of Chechens in Afghanistan, therefore, will likely persist.

Christian Bleuer is an independent researcher based in Central Asia. From September-December 2015 he worked in Kabul for AAN. He can be reached at Christian.Bleuer@gmail.com.

 

 

(1) In 1997, during the period between the First and Second Chechen Wars, the de facto independent government of Chechnya did print an uncertain number of passports. See: ‘Chechen leader unveils “unofficial” passports – Russian report’, BBC News, 27 November 1997. These passports (adorned with a wolf on the front) were never accepted as official travel documents: ‘Information Concerning the Non-Exhaustive List of Known Fantasy and Camouflage Passports, as Stipulated by Article 6 of the Decision No. 1105/2011/EU (to which a visa may not be affixed)’, European Union, 18 August 2015, 5.

(2) Cited in: ‘Afghan police look for 15 female Chechen militants’, Trend, 31 January 2011; Bill Roggio, ‘Afghan police search for 15 Chechen women aiding the Taliban in Kunduz’, Threat Matrix, 31 January 2011.

(3) Two months later, the BBC posted an obituary for the police chief, noting that he had to contend with hundreds of foreign fighters: Pakistanis, Arabs and Chechens. See: Bilal Sarwary, ‘Sayedkhili: Afghan police chief who took on the Taliban’, BBC News, 14 March 2011.

(4) ‘Afghanistan kidnap video: Hostage beheaded ‘by Uzbek gunmen’, BBC News, 7 April 2015; ‘Afghanistan Hazara kidnapped passengers released’, BBC News, 11 May 2015.

(5) Personal correspondence with former ISAF officer with several years’ experience in northern Afghanistan, October 2011. For another example of ‘body inspections’, see the somewhat less clear example here: Leigh Neville, Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan, New York, Osprey Publishing 2012, 25.

(6) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Shattering the al-Qaeda-Chechen Myth (Part II): Exploring the Links Between the Chechen Resistance and Afghanistan’, Chechnya Weekly 4 (2003).

(7) Guido Steinberg, ‘A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian Groups Further Internationalise the Syrian Struggle’, SWP Comments 31 (2014), 1; Laura Miller, ‘Chechens: Legendary tough guys’, Salon, 20 April 2013; James Gordon Meek, ‘The Secret Battles Between US Forces and Chechen Terrorists’, ABC News, 19 February 2014; Mark MacKinnon Twitter post, 23 September 2013, citing comments by Lawrence Sheets at the 2013 Global Security Seminar; Brian Glyn Williams, ‘From “Secessionist Rebels” to “Al-Qaeda Shock Brigades”: Assessing Russia’s Efforts to Extend the Post-September 11th War on Terror to Chechnya’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24 (2004); Thomas de Waal, ‘Chechens I Used to Know’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 April 2011.

(8) Emil Souleimanov & Ondrej Ditrych, ‘The Internationalisation of the

Russian-Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality’, Europe-Asia Studies 60 (2008), 1215-1216.

(9) I ran this line of argument by other researchers and they agree it is either plausible or likely, though as academics they say it is unproven without archival research and dedicated field trips to Afghanistan.

(10) Some examples: Marty Compton et al, Home from War: How Love Conquered the Horrors of a Soldier’s Afghan Nightmare, Edinburgh, Mainstream 2009, np; Ann Marlowe and Derrick Hernandez, ‘Ain’t Reporting Hell: Sebastian Junger’s Afghanistan’, World Affairs, November/December 2010; Jeff Courter, Afghan Journal: A Soldier’s Year in Afghanistan, Flossmoor, IL, CreateSpace 2008, 150; P.J. Tobia, ‘How I spent my fall vacation…in Afghanistan’, Nashville Scene, 26 March 2009; Tom Bowman, ‘For U.S. Troops, One More Big Push In Afghanistan’, NPR, 30 May 2012. There are numerous other examples of this, mostly American soldiers posting comments on online forums.

(11) Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, ‘Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008), 416.

(12) Personal correspondence in 2011 with anonymous researcher who viewed martyrs’ videos in Arabic.

(13) ‘No evidence of Chechens in Afghanistan’, Chechnya Weekly, Volume IV, Issue 33, 12 September 2003.

(14) Anne Stenersen, ‘Al Qaeda’s Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2011), Appendix A., 187-193. The author notes that the study is Arab-centric, and the compiler of the bibliographies noted that he had not been able to collect all of the Uzbek and Uyghur biographies.

(15) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010’, Orbis 55 (2011), 216-239.

(16) For example, see the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan official list of martyrs for the Hijri year 1432 (ending in November 2011), which lists one citizen of Russia: an ethnic Tatar: ‘O’zbekiston Islomiy Harakatining 1432 hijriy yil (melodiy 2011) shahidlar’, Furqon.com (November 2011). Another IMU martyr tribute in video form paid tribute to a Dagestani Russian named Khattab who died in Kunduz in 2010 (source: video screenshot received via personal correspondence with anonymous researcher).

(17) As one of several examples, see: Brian Glyn Williams, Inferno in Chechnya: the Russian-Chechen wars, the Al Qaeda myth, and the Boston Marathon bombings, Lebanon, NH, ForeEdge 2015, especially chapter 7 (‘The Chechen Ghost Army of Afghanistan’).

 

A delegation from the International Criminal Court (ICC) is planning to visit Afghanistan in 2016, but the government has hesitated about receiving it. It has established an inter-ministerial committee to ensure the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC, is finally translated into local languages and published in the official gazette so that the public can read it. That treaty was signed 13 years ago. The committee has also been trying to ensure the ICC will not be trying any Afghan cases. AAN’s Ehsan Qaane takes a closer look at where Afghanistan and the ICC are on prosecuting war crimes.

Afghanistan deposited its ratification of the Rome Statute on 10 February 2003 and it entered into force on 1 May 2003. Only crimes committed in Afghanistan or by Afghans after this date can be prosecuted by the ICC. Four years later, in 2007, the ICC began a preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan. The process has been very slow, largely because of a lack of resources – including relevant language resources – within the court. However, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC did publish five preliminary examination reports between 2011 and 2015. The first three, published between 2011 and 2013, focus largely on whether crimes falling under the ICC’s jurisdiction, namely war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide had been committed in Afghanistan. The last two reports (2014 and 2015) focus mainly on questions of admissibility – at whether crimes are grave enough for the ICC to be involved, whether crimes are being tackled by Afghanistan’s own judiciary and whether it would be in ‘the interests of justice’ for an ICC intervention (find the reports here).

The Rome Statute, crimes and Afghanistan

The findings of the Situation Analysis Section of the Office of the Prosecutor, published in the preliminary examination reports, show that two types of crimes against humanity and seven types of war crimes have been committed in Afghanistan since 1 May 2003:

• Murder, as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(i) and as a crime against humanity under article 7 (1) (a) of the Statute;
• Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of the fundamental rules of international law as a crime against humanity under article 7 (1) (e) of the Statute;
• Cruel treatment under article 8(2)(c) (i) or outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(ii);
• The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(iv);
• Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, materials, units or vehicles involved in humanitarian assistance as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(iii);
• Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to education, cultural objects, places of worship and similar institutions as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(vii);
• Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years of age into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities as a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(vii); and
• Treacherously killing or wounding a combatant adversary as a war crime under article 8(2) (e) (ix).

A closer look at the crimes and alleged criminals

The ICC can only prosecute individuals, not institutions, as article 25 of the Rome Statute states:

“The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural person pursuant to this Statute. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.”

Indeed, during the preliminary examination stage, the Office of the Prosecutor analyses the available information regarding a situation (or a case) to determine whether there is any “reasonable basis” (article 15, Rome Statute) to launch an investigation into an alleged crime. The Office of the Prosecutor is not tasked with attributing alleged crimes to any individual at this stage. For example, in Afghanistan’s case, the Office of the Prosecutor reports have so far only attributed potential crimes to parties of the conflict, which it sees as:

1) Pro-government forces that include Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and their international partners under the umbrella of ISAF, and, more recently, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM).

2) Anti-government forces such as the Taleban, the Haqqani network and Hezb-e Islami (led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar).

Anti-government forces are accused of all nine of the crimes mentioned above. Pro-government forces have been accused of torture, only. The Office of the Prosecutor singled out the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) (see here), as well as the CIA and the US military.

The ICC examined the killing and wounding of civilians by pro-government forces, but the Office of the Prosecutor said it could not attribute the crime of murder to them:

The information available does not indicate that civilian deaths or injuries caused by air strikes launched by pro-government forces, as well as escalation-of-force incidents and “night raids”, resulted from the intentional directing of attacks against the civilian population. Accordingly, the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities pursuant to article 8(2)(e)(i) has been committed by pro-government forces.

Assessment of admissibility

In order for cases to be admissible for the ICC they need to meet three conditions (Rome statute: see here, articles 17 and 53). Two of these, the Office of the Prosecutor believes, have been fulfilled in the case of Afghanistan and it is looking into the third:

• The gravity threshold

According to available information in public sources and 112 communications which the ICC has directly received from victims and other individuals and organizations, the Office of the Prosecutor confirmed the seriousness and widespread nature of the nine above-mentioned crimes:

Between 2007 and 2014, approximately 37,000 civilian casualties (14,700 deaths and 22,300 injuries) have been attributed to anti-government armed groups, primarily from their use of improvised explosive devices. Many alleged crimes were committed with the aim to terrorise and spread fear among the local civilian population, as a means of control… There are an estimated 5,000 conflict-related detainees in Afghan government custody. The manner in which the crimes are alleged to have been committed appears particularly gruesome and was seemingly calculated to inflict maximum pain. The alleged crimes had served short-term and long-term impacts on detainees’ physical and mental health, including permanent physical injuries. (Related to international forces in particular to USA forces) The information available suggests that victims were deliberately subjected to physical and psychological violence, and that crimes were allegedly committed with particular cruelty and in a manner that debased the basic human dignity of the victims.

• No national prosecution: government unable and/or unwilling

Once a crime covered by Article 5 of the Statute – namely genocide, a war crime or crime against humanity – has been determined as having been serious or widespread in nature, there is no impunity and the most responsible perpetrator(s) must be prosecuted either by a national court or by the ICC. The ICC has complementary jurisdiction over these crimes. This means the country’s judiciary is authorised to address these crimes first. However, if it is unable or unwilling to do so, then the ICC can claim jurisdiction. A member state can transfer its jurisdiction to the ICC by requesting its intervention; alternatively, the ICC can initiate, by proprio motu (Latin for ‘own initiative’), jurisdiction if a member state is unable or unwilling to prosecute the alleged crime (article 13, Rome Statute). The Office of the Prosecutor must establish the unwillingness or inability of the Afghan government to prosecute these crimes before the ICC can launch an investigation.

So far, Afghanistan has not referred any cases to the ICC. Neither have the five preliminary examination reports cited any of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes as having been tried by either a national court or by one of the country’s international partners providing military support to the Afghan government. Only a few cases of torture have been looked into by national courts, but these were mostly administrative enquires rather than criminal proceedings, or considered only lower-level alleged perpetrators; none of the main perpetrator(s) have been subject to investigation.

The Government [of Afghanistan] has instituted only a limited number of proceeding against alleged perpetrators (see here). Despite the scale of alleged ill-treatment in NDS and ANP detention facilities (an estimated 35-51% of conflict-related detainees according to the finding of UNAMA’s detention monitoring program (see here), information provided by the government of Afghanistan to UNAMA indicates that to date the Government has prosecuted only two NDS officials (in relation to one incident), and no ANP officials, for this conduct.

In its fifth report, published in 2015, the Office of the Prosecutor discussed Afghanistan’s Amnesty Bill (see AAN’s Transitional Justice paper), which the Afghan parliament passed in 2007. The Office of the Prosecutor identified this law as a sign of unwillingness on the part of the government to prosecute war crimes or crimes against humanity committed by anti-government forces, notably by former warlords or insurgents who put down their weapons and joined the government after 1 May 2003.

The Law on Public Amnesty and National Stability provides legal immunity to all belligerent parties including those individuals and groups who are still in opposition to the Islamic State [sic] of Afghanistan, without any temporal limitation to the Law’s application or any exception for international crimes (see here).

Additionally, crimes covered by the Rome Statute have not been criminalized by the Afghan government and the country’s judiciary organs are incapable of addressing these complicated types of crime.

The example of Sarwari, former head of KhAD

An example of the Afghan judiciary’s inability to try crimes that fall under the Rome Statute is the case of Asadullah Sarwari, head of the intelligence service directorate (KhAD) during the communist PDPA regime. He was arrested on 26 May 1992 by the mujahedin who had just captured Kabul and accused of ‘plotting against the mujahedin government’. He was tried, however, only in 2005. A judge familiar with the trial said Sarwari was accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes, but as these had never been criminalised under Afghan law, he was tried according to article 130 of the Afghan constitution, which refers to the Hanafi Sharia law of Islam (anyway, when Sarwari committed his crimes, Afghanistan had not signed the Rome Statute so they were outside its temporal jurisdiction). Sarwari was found guilty, but of what crime exactly still remains unclear.

Sarwari’s case also demonstrated how far Afghanistan’s judges are influenced by powerful people. One of the plaintiffs in the case was Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, mujahedin factional leader and president of the first post-PDPA, mujahedin government in 1992, and still a prominent figure. Members of his family were forcibly disappeared or killed by KhAD under Sarwari. According to one of the case judges, Mujaddedi has rejected all punishments for Sarwari except capital punishment. However, the evidence against Sarwari is not strong enough to merit capital punishment. The standoff has led to the case never being resolved. After almost eleven years, it is still ongoing even though the Afghan Criminal Procedural Code states that proceedings may not take longer than eleven months in total. It is also unclear at which stage the case is at the moment.

Another challenge for the Afghan judiciary when trying members of insurgent groups such as the Taleban, is their vulnerability to retribution. Judges and prosecutors are often targeted by insurgents, which, of course, impacts their willingness and ability to try war crimes. After the execution of six convicted terrorists in May 2016, for example (five Taleban, including two members of the Haqqani network, and one member of al Qaeda (see AAN reporting here)), the Taleban threatened the judges and prosecutors. They then followed up with three attacks on Afghan courts and members of the judiciary: against the personnel of the Maidan Wardak Appeals Court on 31 May, against the Ghazni Appeals Court on 1 June and against the Logar Appeals Court on 5 June 2016. During these attacks, a total of 22 civilians, at least half of them judges and prosecutors, were killed and 37 other civilians were wounded.

• The ‘interests of justice’

The third issue considered by the Office of the Prosecutor is whether an ICC intervention would serve justice. According to articles 17 and 53 of the Rome Statute, an intervention in Afghanistan would have to be supported by the victims of the alleged crimes. Although none of the five published reports has said anything about the willingness of victims to have their cases prosecuted, the last report said information to this end is in the process of being gathered and analysed. In the same paragraph, it is also stated that Afghanistan is at a stage where it could turn to the Pre-Trial Chamber, the body in charge of resolving all issues arising before a trial phase can begin which supervises the Office of the Prosecutor in its investigatory and prosecutorial activities. The Office of the Prosecutor must gain authorization to open an investigation. It could now request this as its findings show war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed and there has not been prosecution of alleged criminals by national courts.

The Office [of the Prosecutor] will also continue to gather information relevant to the assessment of whether there are substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice prior to making a decision on whether to seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to open such an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan.

According to articles 15 and 57, once the Office of the Prosecutor feels there is a “reasonable basis” to warrant belief that crime(s) covered in the Statute have been committed and the ICC has admissibility to investigate, the Office must request the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization to open an investigation into the case.

In the last report issued in December 2015, the Office of the Prosecutor mentioned that, following a decision taken in October that year, it intended to send a delegation to Afghanistan to conduct admissibility assessments. The report said the trip had not yet taken place due to, “the non-permissive situation in the country.” According to information AAN received from a source within the Office of the Prosecutor, the ICC asked the government of Afghanistan to issue visas for the members of this delegation, but that this had been delayed – reportedly, because the government wanted time to prepare for the visit and to define its strategy for interacting with the ICC delegation once it arrived in Kabul.

The inter-ministerial committee prepares for the ICC visit

The National Security Council (NSC) decided in January 2016 to establish a high-level, inter-ministerial committee, led by Second Vice-President Sarwar Danish, (1) to investigated the purpose of the ICC visit and prepare for it. It was to consult with international partners who provided military support regarding their position on the ICC request to send a delegation. Apart from defining its strategy for working with the ICC, the committee had two further tasks: first, the translation of the Rome Statute into the local languages, Dari and Pashto, and publication of the translated law in the official gazette and; second, collect all cases relevant to the Rome Statute (if any) that Afghanistan had prosecuted (see here). The inter-ministerial committee established a technical sub-committee consisting of qualified, mid-level officials which had six months (January to June 2016) to carry out these four tasks, at which point they must submit their findings and recommendations for review and approval to the inter-ministerial committee. The technical sub-committee has almost completed its tasks (see below) and is expected to submit its findings to the committee soon.

Cases prosecuted in Afghanistan

A member of the technical committee, who asked not to be named, told AAN on 1 June 2016 that the purpose of collecting information on cases relevant to the Rome Statute that have been prosecuted in Afghanistan was “to show to the ICC the willingness of Afghanistan to prosecute the alleged crimes, which are under cover of the Rome Statute.” He added that it was “impossible to develop the capacity of the Afghan judicial organs in one night, but still we can show our willingness.” His point was that the government is trying to convince the ICC that it is indeed willing, but that the national judiciary have lacked the capacity to effectively address crimes falling under the Rome Statute.

Of the three bodies involved (Attorney General’s Office, Ministry of Interior and Supreme Court), only the Attorney General’s Office has presented a list of cases. It compiled a list of 54 cases of torture (including conflict-related and non-conflict related detainees and prisoners’ cases), based on the work of a special governmental committee that had been established by President Karzai in 2013 as part of the verification of a UNAMA report. The report, published on 22 January 2013, claimed torture had taken place in Afghan detention centres (see the report here). (See AAN reporting here and here. According to a source from the technical committee who spoke to AAN on 30 May 2016, only two out of the 54 cases have been investigated by the Attorney General’s Office, so far. The same source confirmed that the Supreme Court had submitted a letter to the technical sub-committee stating that it could find no cases related to the Rome Statute. The Ministry of Interior has shared no information to date.

Translation and publication of the Rome Statute

13 years after it went into effect in Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally translated the Rome Statute into Dari and Pashto and, on 30 May 2016, sent it to the Ministry of Justice to have it published in the official gazette. This was only decided by the inter-ministerial committee on 23 January 2016. According to the current Afghan constitution, any international treaty or agreement signed by Afghanistan has to be published in the official gazette following approval by the parliament, with the documents being translated into Dari and Pashto. Technically, the Afghan government was obliged to publish the Rome Statute in 2004 at the latest. However, the statute was signed before the current constitution was approved by the Constitutional Loya Jirga on 13 December 2003, so, at the time of signing, it did not require the approval of parliament (which had not yet been established). Nonetheless, it should still have since been translated and published.

Due to the lack of a translated version of the Rome Statute in local languages, even one of the nine Supreme Court judges and the then-acting head of the Attorney General’s Office, Habib Jalal, (this was before Farid Hamidi’s appointment as Attorney General on 7 March 2016) had been unaware of Afghanistan’s ICC membership (this, according to a source at the NSC whom AAN spoke to May 2016, Habib Jalal). In fact, according to a source in the technical sub-committee, one of the reasons for creating the inter-ministerial committee prior to issuing visas to the ICC delegation was to give information to relevant officials about Afghanistan’s obligations under the Rome Statue.

What were the responses of Afghanistan’s international partners?

Once the ICC announced its intention to visit Afghanistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked NATO members involved in Afghanistan about the nature of their relationship with the ICC. Feedback, including that from the US, was overall positive, a source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told AAN. However, when the US and Afghanistan signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (see AAN’s analysis on BSA here), as when it signed the earlier Status of Forces Agreement (2003), (2) Kabul agreed neither to prosecute American soldiers, nor hand them over to a third party for the prosecution of war crimes.

Article 98 of the Statute states that a member state is not responsible for arresting or transferring foreign suspects whose country of origin the member state has an international agreement with banning such an arrest or transfer (3). In other words, Kabul is not bound to violate the 2015 Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and hand over any US national accused of war crimes to the ICC. However, the ICC can still prosecute US soldiers for alleged crimes committed on Afghan territory after 1 May 2003, despite the BSA and the fact that the US is not a member of the ICC. The ICC can still request the US or any of the ICC’s State Parties to arrest perpetrators who are suspected of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, and send them to the ICC detention centre in The Hague.

Developing the regulation for the implementation of the Rome Statute

Part Nine of the Rome Statute, International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance, states that state parties must assist the ICC in any way and at any stage of the investigation, prosecution, trial or implementation of a sentence. Therefore, the newly established inter-ministerial committee has also been tasked with developing a regulation or a law to legalize Afghan interaction with the ICC in its future work. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), a member of the committee, is in charge of this task. Developing a regulation or law on such a delicate matter needs a lot of work – and the subcommittee only had six months to finish its tasks. Hussain Moin, who is in charge of developing the regulation, told AAN on 25 May 2016, that the committee had just started on this task. Due to this, the technical committee decided on 24 May 2016 to submit its findings in a report to the inter-ministerial committee and to ask for more time in drafting the regulation or law.

The inter-ministerial committee decided on 23 January 2016 to develop a regulation, but some members are lobbying for a law instead. AAN was told by someone present at the January NSC meeting that figures such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Salahuddin Rabbani, who are not happy with the intervention of the ICC, want to postpone the ICC delegation’s visit. Approval of a law would require more time than a regulation, as a law requires the approval of the Afghan parliament while a regulation just needs the nod of the Afghan cabinet. The same source said that Rabbani presented three arguments for delaying the visit. The first was that cooperation with the ICC would destroy whatever trust existed between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taleban. At the time, the Quadrilateral Cooperation Group, QCG, on Afghan Peace Talks and Reconciliation was still active. However, this argument lost its strength on 25 April following a presidential speech in which Ghani, while not closing the door to negotiations, said fighting the Taleban had to take priority (see AAN’s dispatch). Rabbani’s second reported argument was that the ICC visit would damage the relationship between the government and its international partners (ie the US) fighting in Afghanistan against the insurgency, who are mentioned in the ICC’s preliminary examination reports. Thirdly, he said it would make the mujahedin more suspicious of the National Unity Government (the two are not mutually exclusive, of course) as they might fear prosecution. It seems there may be a misunderstanding about the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction here. It seems Rabbani may have thought the ICC could investigate pre 2003, Taleban, mujahedin and PDPA-era crimes. Salahuddin Rabbani is now leader of one of the main parties to the conflict during these eras, Jamiat-e Islami, and his late father, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was its leader for decades until his death in 2011.

What is next for the ICC in Afghanistan?

Based on the Office of the Prosecutor reports, war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed on Afghan territory since 1 May 2003. The Office is trying to launch an investigation in order to prosecute such crimes. It believes the crimes are serious and widespread and that the Afghan state has proved unwilling or unable to try them. It is looking into whether an ICC intervention would be in the interests of justice. Before any intervention, it would also have to obtain authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC. For the purpose of an admissibility assessment, the Office of the Prosecutor wants to send a delegation to visit Afghanistan in 2016. However, the government has postponed issuing visas until it has received the inter-ministerial committee’s findings on the consequences of the ICC’s intervention in Afghanistan. The committee had six months to finalize its work. One difficult and time-consuming task remains, which is the drafting of a regulation formalising Afghan government relations with the ICC. With the committee out of time at the end of June, it is unclear as to how this can be accomplished and, consequently, when the ICC might visit Afghanistan.

 

 

(1) The Ministry of Interior, Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Justice, the NDS, Attorney General’s Office, the Supreme Court and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) all have representatives on the committee.

(2) The 2003 Status of Forces Agreement said:

The Government of Afghanistan recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control by United States military authorities over United States personnel and, therefore, Afghanistan authorizes the United States Government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over United States personnel. The Government of Afghanistan and the Government of the United States of America confirm that such personnel may not be surrendered to, or otherwise transferred to, the custody of an international tribunal or any other entity or state without the express consent of the Government of the United States.

(3) Article 98 of the Statute says:

1) The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.

2) The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender, which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.

 

 In 2001, as the United States and other allied military forces attacked Taleban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, numerous soldiers, journalists and Afghans allied to the Americans relayed stories of a fearless and deadly opponent, incomparably worse than any other enemy: the Chechen. Such reports have never gone away, despite no Chechen having ever been captured or definitively identified in Afghanistan during this time. In the first dispatch in a special two-parter, Christian Bleuer discusses the history of Chechens in Afghanistan – both real and imagined – while also analysing the reasons for the many mistaken reports.

A second dispatch will look at how difficult it is to identify Chechens and how the word ‘Chechen’ may just be used to mean ‘unidentifiable foreign Muslim’. It also looks at the appropriation of the name by other jihadi fighters because of the fearsome and brave connotation of this ‘brand’.

On the night of the 14-15 April 2016, American and Afghan military forces attacked what they described as the house of a suspected al-Qaeda operative named Abu Abdullah in Logar’s Kharwar district. Citing an “Afghan interior ministry incident report,” The Wall Street Journal noted subsequently that, in addition to taking two captives, coalition forces killed seven Chechens. The accompanying commentary (see here) uncritically repeated a narrative (1) that has been regularly promoted in the media:

Extremist members of Chechnya’s rebel movement adhere to ideas tied to jihad and the creation of an Islamist state. Afghan and foreign officials say as many as 7,000 Chechens and other foreign fighters could be operating in the country, loosely allied with the Taliban and other militant groups.

Local reporting by Pajhwok News, sourced to the Logar governor’s spokesman, was slightly different, naming the targets as “Taliban Commanders Mullah Saber, Mullah Sabawon and Mullah Bashir,” but also noting the presence of Chechens – in this case, three Chechen women who were allegedly killed. Khaama Press also reported the incident, noting that “[f]oreign insurgents fighting the Afghan forces is not new as scores of militants from Chechnya and other countries are routinely reported killed during the fight with the Afghan forces,” with the caveat that “[t]he anti-government armed militant groups have not commented regarding the report so far.”

Why not ask the Russians?

What was missing from the reporting by foreign and Afghan journalists was any sign of an attempt to ask the Russian Embassy in Kabul about a report that American and Afghan forces had just killed seven Russian citizens. In fact, it does not seem that any media outlet working in Afghanistan has ever done this, despite journalists publishing hundreds of reports on Russian citizens (ie Chechens) fighting and dying in Afghanistan.

There is a way to remedy this, and journalists in Pakistan (see here) did exactly this in May 2011 after Frontier Corps soldiers shot dead five suspected suicide bombers at a checkpoint in Quetta. Pakistani media outlets immediately reported on the incident, citing police officials who claimed that all five (two women and three men) were Chechens. The Russian Foreign Ministry immediately sought answers, and then spoke to Pakistani journalists about the mysterious travellers from Chechnya. The end result was the conclusion that the five travellers were not Chechen and had also not been armed (see here).

The Russian Foreign Ministry identified three of the victims as non-Chechens from Dagestan in southern Russia, and the seven-months pregnant woman who died as Olga Shroeder, a Siberian native who had recently converted to Islam, dropped out of university and married a Dagestani man twice her age. The fifth was a citizen of Tajikistan. This group was certainly suspicious (no Pakistani visas in their passports), and the Russian media quickly identified two of the Dagestanis as ‘Wahhabis’ with ties to militants in the North Caucasus. Olga Shroeder, for her part, was noted for her social media enthusiasm for Sayyed Buryatsky, a now dead half-Russian, half Buryat Buddhist who converted to Islam and made a name for himself as an anti-Russian militant in the North Caucasus. (2)

Speaking to the Russian Embassy, it had been easy enough to determine who they were, and who they were not. And it was quick: the travellers’ ‘Chechen’ identity was revealed as nothing of the sort in under two weeks. In Afghanistan, by contrast, there appears to be an enthusiastic media boosting of reports of Chechen insurgents and terrorists fighting and dying throughout Afghanistan. Reports of Chechens in Afghanistan go all the way back to 1994 and cover every period since then up until the present day.

The first Chechens in Afghanistan

The first Chechens to visit in Afghanistan in any significant numbers were those serving in the Soviet military in the 1980s occupation, of whom 47 died in Afghanistan, with zero desertions to the mujahedin. Later, 170 of these Chechen veterans of the war in Afghanistan would die in the course of the two Russian-Chechen wars (1994-1996, 1999-2000). (3) The most prominent of them was Dzhokhar Dudayev, who had served as a Soviet air force Major General in Afghanistan, leading bombing campaigns against mujahedin in 1986-87 in western Afghanistan. He later became the president of the (unrecognised) Chechen Republic of Ichkeria until Russian forces killed him in 1996.

The next Chechens to visit Afghanistan were the group of men who accompanied the Chechen terrorist, Shamil Basayev, to Peshawar and then on to Khost province in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in 1994. The United States State Department claimed this number to be several hundred and that they had gone on to form a part of al-Qaeda’s 055 Brigade. (4) But according to the Egyptian Abu Walid al-Masri (AKA Hamed Mustafa, an al-Qaeda linked figure who later headed al-Jazeera’s media operations in Afghanistan), Basayev only sent six of his men for training to a camp in Afghanistan where al-Masri was based. Of these, five would die fighting Russia in the First Chechen War. Basayev himself stated that 12 of his men were eventually trained in Khost, but that he had attempted to fly in 50 additional Chechens – all of whom were stopped at the airport in Karachi and immediately deported at Russia’s request. The start of the war in Chechnya in December 1994 ended the travels of Chechens to Afghanistan. The next notable Chechen visit to this region – but not Afghanistan – was in 1998, when Chechen Defence Minister Ruslan Gelayev attended the World Muslim Congress in Pakistan. (5)

Ahmed Rashid very briefly mentioned Chechen fighters in his book, “Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia”, published before 9/11. He did not connect them to the Taleban, however, but rather to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and to then al-Qaeda deputy chief Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kandahar where, according to Rashid, Chechens, black American Muslims and others clustered around al-Qaeda circles. (6) However, intense scrutiny since then (that is to say, after 9/11) has not identified any Chechens or black American Muslims in al-Qaeda at this time in Afghanistan. (7)

Various other claims of a Chechen presence in Afghanistan during the 1990s have been made retroactively (ie, after 9/11), and usually alongside outlandish claims and obviously incorrect analysis – for example an alleged al-Qaeda chemical and nuclear materials stockpile near Herat. (8) A faulty line of reasoning often employed is that tens of thousands of Chechens fled the First Chechen War and therefore Chechens must have contributed considerably to terrorist networks worldwide. This statement from the Middle East Briefing of the Orient Advisory Group based in Washington and Dubai (see here) is a good example:

At the time of the First Chechen War (1994-1996), an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 young Chechen men fled the fighting and took refuge in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt and other ungoverned regions of Eurasia. Over the ensuing two decades, they became a backbone of Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. (9)

This analysis assumes that the young men – or at least a significant proportion of them – who fled Chechnya were not refugees, but terrorists (or soon to be terrorists) who desired to fight in places such as Afghanistan. In fact, many of these men went through refugee screening and the asylum process in various countries (mostly Turkey and Europe), and still live there. A prominent example is the 30,000 strong community of Chechens in Austria (see here and here), who were not lured to foreign battlefields in any numbers until the Syrian conflict commenced. Other Chechens followed traditional, centuries old ties to Turkey and to the Arab world, especially Jordan, Syria and Iraq (where Arabised Chechen communities still live). Reasons for this included: seeking education (secular and Islamic), pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, or the region being simply the easiest place for a Chechen refugee to go (Turkey is very close and there are many Russian-speakers there). (10) Afghanistan obviously held no appeal on any of these grounds.

The Chechen embassy in Afghanistan

It is a later event that most writers cite as proof of Chechens’ large-scale presence in Afghanistan: the recognition of Chechnya’s independence by the Taleban in January 2000 and opening of a Chechen embassy. Two scholars who research Chechnya’s international militant and terrorist connections focused on the perceptions that this event generated: “The importance of this relationship lay with the fact that it heralded the beginning of the association of the Chechens with the extremist ideology of the Taliban within the international community.” (11)

The recognition of Chechnya’s independence did not pass without notice: the Russian government was outraged, and journalists and United Nations personnel in Kabul immediately set off to locate the ‘embassy’. The Russian government had already been involved in Afghanistan for a few years supporting anti-Taleban forces diplomatically and militarily, with weapons and materiel. A few months after the Taleban’s recognition of Chechnya’s independence, the Russia government openly threatened to bomb the Taleban, accusing it of supporting and training Chechen terrorists – accusations that the Taleban denied. (12)

This episode seems clear enough: Taleban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakel stated publically that “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has decided to accord immediate recognition to the government of an independent Chechnya,” and that a Chechen embassy had been opened in Kabul in January 2000. (13) However, recently revealed private correspondence between Chechnya’s foreign minister and president from this time reveal (14) that the ‘Chechen embassy’ was unauthorised and without any support from the official separatist government in Chechnya (soon to be in exile).

The Chechen who opened the embassy was Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who served at the time as a roving Chechen envoy to the Muslim world. A previous Chechen foreign minister (Movladi Udugov) had sent ‘emissaries’ to Afghanistan to make contact with the Taliban in 1998, but nothing came of this visit. Yandarbiyev then visited in 1999 and lobbied Mullah Muhammad Omar for official recognition of Chechnya – which was eventually granted in January 2000. Chechen foreign minister Ilyas Akhmadov was only informed of this recognition when a Russian asked him about it during a public appearance at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. Akhmadov was unprepared for the question, only offering his opinion that it was merely diplomatic recognition, and nothing else. Akhmadov then made a phone call to Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, who only had three minutes to talk as he was fighting the Russians for control of Chechnya’s capital city, in the Battle of Grozny. Akhmadov, at first angry as he thought the Chechen president has sent Yandarbiyev on a diplomatic trip to Afghanistan without informing him, quickly realised that Yandarbiyev was on a completely unauthorised mission. President Maskhadov stated that he was not even sure where Yandarbiyev was, and that he only had a vague memory of him visiting Afghanistan.

This is plausible as the Chechen president and foreign minister were trying to gain diplomatic recognition for their independence from the United States and European countries, not from the Taleban. That is why President Maskhadov had sent his foreign minister to the United States (where he was rebuffed by the State Department (15)). Both Maskhadov and Akhmadov had been the victims of an attempt by Yandarbiyev to push power in the Chechen separatist movement towards the Islamist radicals (the military defeat at the hands of the Russians in the winter of 1999-2000 was the beginning of the trend towards the dominant Chechen moderates being marginalised (16)). As noted by Mark Kramer:

The Chechen president had deep misgivings about the timing of the announcement, which he saw as “playing into Russians’ hands” and tarnishing the Chechens’ standing in the international community. Moreover, he and Akhmadov correctly sensed that Yandarbiyev’s persistent overtures to the Taliban had been designed to marginalize the more moderate elements around Maskhadov. (17)

In the end, the unauthorised Chechen mission to Afghanistan accomplished little for either the moderate or the Islamist elements in the Chechen separatist movement. The Chechen presence was minimal and not entirely cordial. In one anecdote, as noted by Wahid Muzhda (a former Taleban foreign ministry employee), officials from the Taleban Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice rudely lectured the Chechen delegation on how the democratic elections in Chechnya violated Islamic law. (18)

The Russian campaign to connect Chechnya to Afghanistan

A Russian threat to bomb the alleged camps in Afghanistan in 2000, which was made publically and loudly by many Russian government officials, can be interpreted in two different ways. The first is the obvious: the Russian government was angry that a foreign government had granted diplomatic recognition to a separatist force within the Russian Federation, and was concerned that Chechen insurgents and terrorists were being trained in Afghanistan. The second is that the Russians were making so much noise because, as Maskhadov and Akhmadov believed, the Russian government saw this as an opportunity to portray the Chechen separatist government as extremists backed by the Taleban – a foreign Islamist force.

The relations between the Taleban and Russia were already bad, as Russia was supporting Ahmad Shah Massud’s anti-Taleban forces, and nothing changed after the excitement over the Taleban’s recognition of Chechen independence. Between this event and the start of the American-led war in Afghanistan, the only time Chechens in Afghanistan were mentioned prominently (outside Russia), was when Arif Ayub, the Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan, argued (privately) that supporting the Taleban was a threat to Pakistani interests, namely its good relations with Saudi Arabia and China, while citing hundreds of Chechens as being among a long list of foreign fighters serving with the Taleban. (19) By 2002, the Russian government’s top envoy to Afghanistan was claiming that up to 300 Chechen families had been living in the Shahr-e Naw and Wazir Akbar Khan neighbourhoods of Kabul. Yet of this alleged number, there is only one Chechen (an ethnic Chechen from Georgia) who has openly claimed (see here) to have fought as a jihadist in Afghanistan at any time since the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Russia’s attempt to connect Chechen separatism to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda was a failure, as western and Muslim governments continued to condemn Russian abuses in the war in Chechnya, rejecting Russian claims that all of its opponents in Chechnya were terrorists connected to a global Islamist force (20) (note: this was before the Chechen terrorist attacks at a theatre in Moscow in late 2002 and on a school in Beslan in 2004). However, al-Qaeda’s attacks on 11 September 2001 gave Russia an opportunity to reframe its enemies – and it was very successful in doing so. As argued by Zbigniew Brzezinski, “…after 9/11, the Bush administration officials adopted the Russian view that the Chechen resistance was really part of an international terrorist movement, alleging (falsely as it turned out) that Chechen fighters were battling alongside Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq.” (21) The United States secured Russia’s acquiescence to military bases in Central Asia, as well as a broad range of support in its fight against al-Qaeda and the Taleban. (22) In return, the US gave Russia what it wanted: the US government began to make references to Chechens as part of al-Qaeda, while repeating the Russian claim that there were many Chechen fighters in Afghanistan. (23)

The Northern Alliance promotes the Chechen myth

Former Chechen foreign minister Akhmadov has completely rejected the notion that Chechens were with the Taleban fighting in Afghanistan, arguing that the Russian government used its then ally, the Northern Alliance, to make what were false claims:

Putin was trying to make his war in Chechnya look similar to the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Since Moscow had supplied the Northern Alliance for years, it was not problematic [for Putin] to have them regularly “discover” Chechen fighters in Afghanistan. This was a small thing for the Northern Alliance to do to repay their patron but it had a huge impact. Suddenly we Chechens were viewed as America’s enemies. (24)

Brian Glyn Williams, a professor at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, (25) and Russian journalists (26) also cite Northern Alliance (officially: United Front) leaders as promoters of the belief in large numbers of Chechens in Afghanistan. It also was not strictly ( see here) a phenomenon that occurred after the start of the US-led war in late 2001. The earliest sources where Northern Alliance sources tell reporters and researchers that they are fighting Chechens occurred in late May 2000, a few months after Russia loudly claimed that Afghanistan was sheltering Chechen terrorists. In this case, the anti-Taleban Islamic State of Afghanistan government’s embassy in Tajikistan told ( see here) Russian journalists they could confirm a “large group” of Chechen militants in Afghanistan. Later, in October 2000, Massud’s forces claimed they were fighting “Uighurs, Uzbeks and Chechens” near Taloqan, saying they had been flown in from a base near Kabul. (27)

The post-9/11 American discovery of Chechens in Afghanistan

In the early months of Operation Enduring Freedom, US Special Operations Forces and CIA officers were relying heavily on their Northern Alliance hosts for intelligence. As for the belief of Afghan fighters in the identity of their enemies, a New York Times reporter in Afghanistan noted that “The phrase ‘Arabs, Chechens and Pakistanis’ was uttered so often that it seemed to have been drilled into the mind of every alliance soldier.” The same reporter then asked to see the prisoners that the Northern Alliance guards were advertising as ‘Arab, Chechen and Pakistani’, but found that “in fact the group appeared to be almost entirely from Pakistan.” One Canadian journalist who had previously reported from Chechnya was particularly interested in finding Chechens in Afghanistan. But he came to a dead end. American Taleb John Walker Lindh gave him a hurried interview and stated briefly (see here) that he had met Chechens in the past, but that “Here, in Afghanistan, I haven’t seen any Chechens.”

American soldiers and CIA officers, in contrast, were far more gullible, for several reasons. The main reason is that their leaders were telling them they were fighting Chechens in Afghanistan. In late November 2001, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld briefed journalists (see here) on the battle for Kunduz, claiming he would not allow foreign militants and terrorists to be evacuated in any sort of negotiated deal:

And if they’re looking for any kind of conditions whereby the foreigners — there’s Chinese in there, there’s Chechens in there, there’s Arabs in there, there’s Al Qaeda in there — any idea that those people should be let loose on any basis at all to leave that country and to go bring terror to other countries and destabilize other countries is unacceptable.

Notably, Rumsfeld did not mention the many Pakistani fighters who were actually in Kunduz, as Vice President Dick Cheney was, at this time, busy acquiescing to President Musharraf’s request to evacuate Pakistani advisors from there – a request that was granted at the top level of the US government. It was worried that a slaughter of Pakistani ISI officers in Kunduz would worsen Pakistani-America relations yet further and possibly even result in upheaval in Pakistan. (28)

In March 2002, US Major General Frank Hagenbeck commented authoritatively on the Chechen presence while emphasising the foreign nature of the foe in Afghanistan, as Agence France-Presse reported ( see here):

“We know the history of the Chechens. They are good fighters and they are very brutal,” Hagenbeck said.

The general said he has heard of reports out of the Pentagon that a unit of 100-150 Chechens had moved into southern Afghanistan.

Hagenbeck said US intelligence was exchanging information with foreign counterparts to help fight the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but he would not say if there had been any specific exchanges with Moscow over the Chechens.

US General Tommy Franks, the overall commander of the war against the Taleban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan also spoke on the matter (see here) in early March 2002, stating that his forces has killed between 100 and 200 foreign fighters, including “Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks” in the Shahikot Valley in Paktia. Later, he said “The number of nationalities represented in the detainees we have is about 35 and, to be sure, the Chechen nationality is represented among those nations.” Notable is that there were no Chechens represented after detainees were identified (29) (even after detainee numbers increased ten-fold), and that General Franks was in Moscow when he commented on the Chechens. One Russian military affairs analyst, asked about the reports of Chechens in Afghanistan, said there were probably a few there, but that, “sometimes I wonder if the Americans don’t emphasize the presence of Chechens in Afghanistan just to please Moscow.” (30)

Another analyst, the head of the Institute for Caucasian Studies in Moscow, offered a cynical explanation for the sudden American enthusiasm for seeing Chechens everywhere in Afghanistan: they were attempting to discredit any Afghan resistance by painting them as being controlled by foreigners. This may have been the case, but Americans on the ground certainly believed they were fighting Chechens. In CIA officer Gary Schroen’s memoirs of leading CIA and SOF forces in northern Afghanistan in late 2001, a local Afghan told him they were fighting Chechens, something that Schroen did not question, just as he did not question the intelligence provided by Bariullah Khan, a Northern Alliance commander, that in one instance they were up against “a key al-Qa’ida position, manned by Arab, Chechen, and Uzbek IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) terrorists.” (31)

The low-ranking Northern Alliance soldiers themselves also believed they were fighting Chechens. In one small battle, three unidentified insurgents charged Schroen, an American soldier identified as ‘Craig’, and 60 Northern Alliance soldiers, all of whom held the high position on top of a hill. Schroen described what happened next:

Then, one of the Afghans watching the three men steadily cross the open ground shouted, “Chechnya, Chechnya!” The cry was picked up by the others. “Chechnya!” A wave of panic and fear, so intense that Craig could feel it physically, swept through the line of men on the hilltop. (32)

The 60 Afghans and the two Americans then fled from these three fighters after failing to hit them with their gunfire. The three ‘Chechens’ took the hilltop and proceeded to mock the Afghans until the US Army team called in an airstrike on them. They were vaporised in a subsequent airstrike and no identification was made.

Scepticism is offered, but brushed aside

While the Russian government was adamant that Chechens were in Afghanistan, independent Russian analysts were very sceptical. In late 2001 The Moscow Times surveyed (see here) a range of experts and researchers who focus on Chechnya or Afghanistan. When asked if they believed there were large numbers of Chechens in Afghanistan, only one agreed (and he argued that the Chechen embassy in Afghanistan and Putin’s subsequent threat to bomb alleged Chechen camps in Afghanistan was the necessary proof). (33) Chechen separatist media were even more sceptical, rejecting any notion of their compatriots being in Afghanistan, noting the inability of the American or Afghan forces to “produce even one Chechen as proof of the ‘participation of hundreds and thousands of Chechen fighters’ in the war in Afghanistan.” For its part, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) told the media (see here) that, leading up to late 2001, hundreds of Chechen fighters travelled to Afghanistan to join the Taleban and al-Qaeda.

The Russian media was mixed in its support of the (both Russian and American government) narrative of Chechens being in Afghanistan. Newspaper articles did appear, uncritically relaying reports of Chechens being captured or killed in Afghanistan (see for example here and here) but Russian reporters on the ground in Afghanistan were encountering a problem: they could not find any Chechens, dead or alive. For example, Russian journalist Alexander Khokhlov collected many stories, but no proof. Another journalist with long experience reporting on Chechnya, Andrei Babitsky, travelled to Afghanistan in winter 2001-2002 and could find no trace of any Chechens. He noted that “All the Russian journalists in Afghanistan received instructions to find Chechens, but we inspected all of the jails, asked all of the [Afghan] field commanders – in vain.” Carlotta Gall, a journalist with extensive experience reporting on Chechnya, also failed to find any Chechens in early 2002 despite Afghans telling her that they were holding prisoners from Chechnya.

Another Russian journalist, Yuri Kovalenko, asked this question:

How has it happened that among the several thousand foreign fighters taken into prison in Afghanistan, not a single Chechen has been discovered? There are likewise none among the 500 prisoners in the hands of the Americans, including those interned at the Cuban base at Guantanamo…Not one Chechen has been found among the 3,000 fighters imprisoned in the dungeon of Shibirgan…

One US publication, the Terrorism Monitor of the Jamestown Foundation, sought answers (see here) to the Chechen question from the US government for several months, but never received an answer.

Many American news reports from this time are, on average, far less sceptical, in most cases they just relay the claims from the US military, Northern Alliance soldiers or unidentified sources without any sort of confirmation or questioning. In one instance, a source inside Kunduz told CNN that 60 Chechens drowned themselves in the Amu Darya rather than surrender. A quick look at a map begs the question, why 60 Chechens, instead of fighting to the death at the Kunduz airport, would break out of the containment by Afghan and American forces, safely cross the Khanabad River without drowning and hike 40 km to the Amu Darya to commit suicide. The stories from this era all have an element of the absurd, with Chechens vanishing without a trace – as opposed to Uzbeks, Arabs, and Pakistanis.

No Chechens, but the myth lives on

Any notion of a significant number of Chechens being in Afghanistan, not only in 2001 but subsequently, has been comprehensively analysed by one American researcher who focuses on Chechnya, Brian Williams, who makes his case in his recent 2015 book. After regular field research in Afghanistan and over a decade of researching the topic (including visits to Uzbek and Tajik Northern Alliance fighters), he addresses all the claims and roundly rejects the notion of Chechens being in Afghanistan. (34)

By 2013, Williams wrote that:

To date, no Chechen has ever been captured, interviewed, nor has there been any evidence of one being killed in this region. Significantly, no Chechens were ever captured and sent to Guantanamo Bay by Coalition troops. In addition, in all my years of tracking on line martyrdom epitaphs I have never seen one of a Chechen in Afghanistan or Pakistan. (35)

Since then, this author has found one single ‘martyrdom’ mention of an identified Chechen linked to Afghanistan (see here), that of Saifullah Shishani, who died in Syria, but whose epitaph claimed he had, at some unspecified point in the past, fought in Afghanistan. In addition, there is a single instance of Afghan security forces naming a killed Chechen – but in this case (in Baghlan province in May of this year) identified as Chechen only by nom de guerre (‘Omar Chechen’) and no subsequent information or confirmation provided (see here).

As for revelations of foreign detainees in Afghanistan, in 2014 AAN pieced together (see here) the identities of the foreign detainees at Bagram – a long-held secret. Among the names was one single citizen of Russia. However, he was not a Chechen, but an ethnic Tatar, Ikrak Hamidullan (he was subsequently taken to the United States and put on trial in a military court (see here).

The question then is no longer “Are there many Chechens in Afghanistan?”, but “Why do so many people still believe there are in 2016?”

Military Battlefield Reports of Chechens

Working hand-in-hand with many foreign journalists in Afghanistan are representatives of the American and other coalition militaries. Many journalists quote and cite the US military, and on the issue of Chechens many of them just repeat what the military tells them (unlike other controversies where journalistic scepticism is the norm). In ISAF-NATO’s own media departments, and particularly in ISAF press releases, the Chechens live in large numbers. A survey of ISAF press releases (36) in 2010 reveals the following (underlining added):

…combined Afghan and coalition security forces killed more than 20 armed insurgents, including Arab, Chechen and Pakistani fighters.

… Afghan and coalition security force killed more than 20 armed insurgents, including Arab, Chechen and Pakistani fighters, during the latest deliberate clearing operation against Haqqani Network foreign fighters camps… 

… while pursuing a Taliban commander who is responsible for smuggling Pakistani, Chechen and Arab fighters and improvised explosive device materials… 

… Afghan and coalition security force killed more than 20 armed insurgents, including Arab, Chechen and Pakistani fighters… 

Afghan and coalition forces killed 23 armed insurgents, including Arab, Chechen and Pakistani fighters during the operation.

Other military news sources, like the Office of the US Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (see here; or here), or Afghan military and police reports (excerpts here), can be cited saying the same thing.

When non-military news outlets and wire services report on Afghanistan, they regularly cite or quote US military commanders, many of who claim to be fighting Chechens. But American commanders are not the only ones making Chechen claims. For example, in November 2015, The Washington Post relied on a German Brigadier General for information when they reported that Chechens had participated in the recent fighting in Kunduz. A search of news archive results in news stories with the same components: coalition military commanders say they are fighting foreigners, including Chechens.

However, US commanders are not always so certain about Chechens, and occasionally make cautious statements. Reporting (see here) to a US Senate committee in October 2015, the overall commander in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, was pressed by a senator to provide a number for foreign fighters in Afghanistan. He would not – or could not ­– provide a definitive answer, merely repeating “There are reports,” “we have seen reports,” and mentioning “reports” of Chechens in the mix, notably in the north. And in May 2013, one media outlet reported that “[c]lose to 1,000 insurgents, including Arab and Chechen fighters allied with al Qaeda, launched a series of counter strikes against U.S. and ANSF positions in Sangin and Helmand provinces beginning Monday,” though they did note that the American Major General who briefed reporters refused to identify the nationality of any of the foreign fighters.

From academics to analysts: Chechens are everywhere

Analysts, researchers and academics often like to say that journalists’ work lacks rigour. But many researchers with experience in the region have also uncritically reported the presence of Chechens in Afghanistan in various scholarly publications (37) and think tank reports (38) over the last decade. References to Chechens have even appeared in UN reports (39) and made it into documents intended for US lawmakers and government officials to read. (40) None of them make any more than an off-hand reference, and none offer any convincing analysis or evidence. Still, it remains journalists who are on the frontlines of relaying reports of Chechens. From Kunar to Kunduz, foreign reporters regularly report Chechens on the battlefield, with some stating it as fact without any doubts or reservations (see two good examples here and here).

Chechens are fearless fighters; therefore fearless fighters must be Chechen

Numerous American soldiers claim to have fought Chechens in Afghanistan, painting the image of a super-soldier insurgent. One journalist reported on Chechen fighters in Afghanistan, quoting various Special Operations Forces soldiers speaking in dramatic terms:

Chechens are a different breed. They fight till they die. They have more passion, more discipline and less regard for lives. A few of them could have just given up but decided they needed to die. 

What I always appreciated was their lack of tether. They will transplant anywhere. I don’t think they ate or were even clear as to why they fight, wherever it is, but they’re fighting most of the time. It’s just a fire in their bellies. It’s what they do.

The same journalist, however, cautioned that this reputation “may have led many in the U.S. military and intelligence to inflate the Chechens’ true numbers on a battlefield.” Indeed, other soldiers he quoted were not so sure. One admitted that misidentifications were common, while another remarked that “It was a pervasive rumor at the time. But I never saw a Chechen. In fact, I’m not sure anyone did.”

Technical military skills = Chechen

One Special Operations Forces soldier argued that Chechens were notable on the battlefield for their discipline, skill and, strangely, their tendency to wear expensive North Face brand ski jackets. Often, soldiers are certain they are fighting Chechens based on the fact that the foes they met on the battlefield were skilled and fearless and therefore must have been ‘Chechen’, as if only Chechens fighters have these attributes. This trope is even picked up by counterinsurgency experts, who see battlefield combat skills by insurgents as a sure sign that Chechens must be there, fighting in person or at least in an advisory role. (41) As the private intelligence firm Stratfor wrote in a short 2005 analysis: “The Chechens in Afghanistan are the insurgency’s elite fighters.”

Others, like two AAN guest authors (see here), note, much more critically, the habit of soldiers to see Chechens as the source of technical military skills. One of them, Antonio Giustozzi, added elsewhere, “The tendency among US officers was to attribute sniping skills to foreign volunteers, particularly Chechens.” (42) Similarly, a former Force Recon Marine who served in Iraq and Afghanistan somewhat sceptically noted the same, especially in Iraq:

The Chechen jihadist fighter has achieved near-legendary status in the last decade-plus. “Chechen” has become synonymous with “militarily competent jihadist.” Any time coalition forces have met jihadists on the battlefield who maneuver and shoot well, they are presumed to be Chechens. In 2005, the effective insurgent snipers in Iraq were all presumed to be Chechens.

This is not just an idea that is generated and sustained at the lower levels of the US military. It is believed at command levels as well. For example, one soldier argues this:

Having been there, I can say without any reservation that from at least 2007-2008, there was no evidence of Chechens in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Konar, or Laghman provinces despite over 100 reports of their presence often trumpeted by the CJTF [Combined Joint Task Force]. It’s very easy and comforting for commanders to blame every moderately well coordinated and “successful” insurgent attack on mythical “Chechens” rather than local fighters.

Those other, less sceptical, American and coalition soldiers never explain why they believe that, after Afghanistan having been at war since 1979 and Afghans having undergone training by the Soviet, Russian, American, European, Pakistani and other militaries, there should not be an Afghan who can shoot straight. Furthermore, the various accounts by British officers in the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars made it very clear that there was a generous, indigenous supply of Afghan snipers. This is not a skill that Afghans are, by nature, incapable of. (43)

But the idea that only Chechens can shoot straight is not just an American soldier story. This idea extends into the ranks of other ISAF militaries and to Afghan soldiers as well. According to CIA officer Gary Schroen, the Northern Alliance soldiers also believe this. Schroen wrote:

In every battle they had fought with the Taliban, there had been rumours and reports that a group of Chechens was fighting with the Taliban. They were reported to be fanatical, fierce fighters, well trained and experts with their weapons. After one particular tough engagement a few days earlier, a number of dead among the Karzai forces had been found to have been killed by a single shot to the head. This was incredible to the Afghans, none of whom actually aimed their weapons but rather trusted Allah to guide their bullets. They thought that such accurate fire had to be the work of the Chechens. (44)

Of course, this was not the first time Afghans had misidentified their enemy, as the mujahedin of the 1980s relayed stories of fighting a plethora of nationalities from communist countries allied to the Soviets. The most absurd was their 1980 claim that 10,000 Cubans had been deployed to Afghanistan. Two years later, the mujahedin claimed to have had a particularly hard and unsuccessful fight near Paghman against Cubans – who, they claimed, were superior to Soviet soldiers. This led an exasperated western diplomat working on Afghanistan to argue that the mujahedin had likely just fought against elite Soviet airborne troops, and had thought Soviet soldiers who had darkened their faces for night-time operations must have been Cuban. (45)

Deliberate misidentification of Chechens

While high-ranking American officials and military commanders may have played along with a non-existent Chechen presence in Afghanistan to gain the cooperation of Russia, and while lower-ranking US soldiers may be just repeating what they have been told by their superiors or by Afghans, there may be a part of the ISAF/NATO military forces that was deliberately spreading disinformation about Chechens as part of an information warfare campaign. For example, in the summer of 2007 in Helmand, unknown people distributed a pamphlet (see here) to local ‘tribal elders’ that announced:

We criticize the decision of Mullah Mohammad Omar. We don’t accept any other commander. If they continue on this path, we will leave the movement. We only want to carry out jihad against Americans and this is our wish. And we will fight until the end against foreign troops. But the decision of the leadership council in Quetta was a wrong decision. They want to appoint Uzbeks or Chechens instead of a Taliban commander. And Mullah Mohammad Omar, you should know that Pashtuns never want to be slaves. We will not accept a Chechen or Uzbek commander. It is still unclear whether Uzbeks and Chechens are good Muslims. Death is better than accepting their commands. If this happens, we will stop and leave everything to Mullah Omar. 

One of the Taleban spokesmen rejected the veracity of information in the pamphlet, while a more neutral observer, Ahmed Rashid, said,“I think there’s a huge disinformation campaign – probably being carried out by NATO and the Americans – in order to present Mullah Omar in a light in which he is seen as being just a tool of Al-Qaeda and foreigners.”

Distributing pamphlets and trying to control information, perceptions and behaviour in warzones are the responsibility of the US military and CIA Psychological Operations groups. The leaked US military PSYOPS manual describes a tool called ‘Black Products’ that would fit the style of the above pamphlet (see here, Appendix A-1 to A-3):

Products that purport to emanate from a source other than the true one are known as black products. Black products are best used to support strategic plans…. The presumption of emanating from within an opponent country lends credibility and helps to demoralize the opponent by suggesting that there are dissident and disloyal elements within their ranks.

Regarding the US Army, both the 2nd and the 7th Psychological Operations Groups were deployed to Afghanistan around this time, but they do not openly communicate what they are doing, nor does the CIA’s equivalent. The Afghan government could also be responsible for this pamphlet. It is also possible that some Taleban fighters genuinely thought Chechens were being deployed as Taleban commanders, and decided to print their own objections in pamphlet form.

Canada, however, is more open about its information warfare. One Canadian media outlet published an article (see here) on the Royal 22nd Regiment’s operations in Kandahar in 2007, which included these passages:

“The Chechens are hard core. They are the best we face,” said the soldier, a Montrealer who works in a secretive cell devoted to what the Canadian battle group calls Information Operations and what other armies sometimes call Information Warfare. 

“We’re dealing with all kinds of insurgents. With Chechens, Egyptians, Saudis, Pakistanis, guys from the Yemen. It isn’t one group more than the next.” 

“Most Afghans dislike the Taliban, so imagine what they think of foreign fighters,” the sergeant said. “For the foreigners, unlike the Afghans, the war is not about nationalism. The foreigners have an ideology and that ideology is Islamic fundamentalism. They try to use that to control the Afghans.

The American military manual on information warfare clearly includes how to manipulate the media for strategic uses; it is possible that the Canadians here were using a similar playbook.

Afghan government, military and media reports of Chechens

Afghan media outlets are far more active than foreign journalists when it comes to reporting on Chechens. A search of Afghan media outlets, Tolo News for example, in both English and Persian returns numerous reports of Chechens in Afghanistan in the last few years, usually as part of a list of foreign fighters (search returns in English; in Persian). Pajhwok also published regular stories about Chechens in similar fashion. A survey of these articles shows that the sources of reports of Chechens are usually coalition military sources, Afghan security forces and local Afghan officials. The articles cite these officials uncritically, relaying the long list of foreign nationalities – including Chechens – fighting and dying in Badakhshan, Nangarhar, Logar, Faryab, etc. (46) In a two month period in early 2016, the Afghan Ministry of Defence spokesmen were particularly active in informing reporters that Chechens and other foreign fighters were active in Afghanistan. (47)

The narrative is clear: Afghan security forces are fighting a war against a foreign invasion – and Chechens are part of that force.

Surprisingly, it is also possible to find quotes like this from Taleban commanders. In 2011, Afghan officials put Mullah Habib, a Taleban commander in Kunduz, on television sometime after he surrendered, identifying him as an al-Qaeda loyalist. Mullah Habib admitted that his network employed Chechen, Pakistani and Arab fighters, and he repeated the government line (see here): “I have realised that foreigners are working to destroy our country and the war has no benefit. I joined the peace process in the interest our people.” However, the report did not offer the caveat that this Taleb was in government custody and may just have been so compliant due to having been freshly interrogated – or worse – similar to how captured American soldiers in Iraq have condemned American policies and renounced the war in video messages.

This narrative of foreign blame is also emphasised at the highest levels of the Afghan government. In 2006, Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, then the speaker of the Upper House of the Afghan Parliament and the chair of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, blamed the continued war on three factors: the actions of ISAF/NATO troops, incompetent provincial officials and outside interference that manifests in foreigners among the insurgents – including Chechens. Three years later, then Defence Minister Rahim Wardak informed parliament (see here) that “4,000 Chechens, Chinese Muslims and Pakistani fighters had stolen into Afghanistan to carry out terrorist activities.” More recently, both President Ashraf Ghani and Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum have spoken on national TV and to newspapers about the Chechens and other foreign fighters who threaten Afghanistan on the battlefield. In a speech in March 2016, Ghani stressed that the war was being imposed on Afghanistan by outsiders, including Chechens:

The main element in this war is Al-Qa’idah, which is neither an Afghan element nor is Afghanistan the reason of Al-Qa’idah’s war. Another element of the war is Da’ish. It is a matter of pride for us today that Afghanistan is the only country, where Da’ish is on the run. They are escaping from Nangarhar today and Afghanistan will be their grave. We can regard extremist groups from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Xinjiang and other places as the third factor of war in Afghanistan. They also have no attachment to our country. (48)

Dostum and his commanders fighting in the northwest also make similar claims about foreign fighters, blaming Chechens, Uzbeks and Pakistanis. (49) Dostum is rare in Afghanistan – he is an Afghan who has actually been to Chechnya (in late 2015), where he met Chechen President and Putin vassal Ramzan Kadyrov, emphasising that both men were in a struggle against “international terrorism.” It is notable that in late 2001, by contrast, Dostum rejected claims that Chechens were among the many foreign fighters he had captured. (50)

Case studies of the Afghan conflict that aspire to some sort of objectivity and neutrality do indeed reveal an important foreign component to the continuing war in Afghanistan – that being, of course, the various groups and individuals in Pakistan and within its security structures (as well as comparatively small numbers of foreign, non-Pakistani fighters). However, these case studies also reveal important local motivations for why Afghans would become insurgents: anger at the presence of a foreign and non-Muslim, American-led army, predatory Afghan government officials, civilian casualties, local political factional struggles, a desire to boost one’s social standing, monetary incentives, a basic desire to fight, criminal activities, religious and ideological motivations, etc. (51) However, if one wants to blame outsiders (beyond looking at Pakistani state support) for the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan, Chechen and other foreigners become a convenient tool.

The Afghan people

Beyond the Afghan government, military and journalists, there are many Afghans who also believe that Chechens are, or were, in Afghanistan. Speaking to many Afghans about the destruction from the recent years of war, Slavomír Horák, a Czech researcher with a focus on Russia and Central Asia who went to Afghanistan for field research in 2002, found the question of Chechens did arise. Horák was sceptical, and he found that some locals gave a similar narrative: that the Taleban had committed atrocities, but that no Afghan would do such a thing, therefore foreigners accompanying the Taleban were to blame. In one interview, an Afghan said that they could recognise a Pakistani, but that the other foreign fighters who spoke a language they could not understand must be Chechen. (52)

Horák cites a social anthropologist who studies post-conflict societies, and argues that the attempt by local people to blame outside foreigners for atrocities is a form of a truce: they often know exactly who the perpetrators were, but they need to blame an absent outsider for the crimes committed in order to preserve the peace – in combination with the disinclination to blame someone from one’s own group (eg, someone of the same ethnicity). In this line of reasoning, the Chechens serve as a ‘scapegoat.’ (53)

More generally, Afghan denial that fellow Afghans could be responsible for killing Afghans was a feature of the rhetoric surrounding the beginning of the suicide bombing trend in Afghanistan. This was especially true at an early point, when foreigners would be blamed in place of the Afghans who were actually responsible. (54) As one Afghan-American journalist (see here) argued, “I don’t think the Taliban are a primarily Afghan movement. […] …many of the suicide bombers, for example, have not been Afghan. They’ve been Chechens. They’ve been Arabs. They’ve been Pakistanis.” These same viewpoints can be found repeatedly, including on the part of both the Afghan leadership (see here) and the Afghan people (see here ).

This dispatch analysed the phenomenon of Chechens being misidentified and misreported in Afghanistan, including the motivations for doing so (deliberately or accidentally). In the next dispatch, the author will look at the difficulties involved in actually attempting to identify Chechens. After all, they look like other north Caucasians, and Muslims from elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and also can speak Russian. Moreover, ‘Chechen’ is a useful brand; identity theft by those keen to expropriate their terrifying battlefield image is also a factor in this tale.

Christian Bleuer is an independent researcher based in Central Asia. From September-December 2015 he worked in the AAN office in Kabul. He can be reached at Christian.Bleuer@gmail.com.

(1) For example, see the articles cited by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn in the “Chechens in Afghanistan” website: see here. For more recent examples, see: Examples: Rob Taylor, ‘Insurgents increasing in east Afghanistan, but army sees gains’, Reuters, 8 July 2013, (see here); Shamil Shams, ‘Who is fighting in northern Afghanistan?’, Deutsche Welle, 07 October 2015; Omar Al Saleh, ‘On the front line of Afghanistan’s battle with ISIL’, Al Jazeera, 25 January 2016. For an extreme example, see: Bill Roggio, ‘Arab, Pakistani, Chechen, and Uzbek fighters’ spotted in Logar’, The Long War Journal, 30 May 2013.

(2) ‘MID Rossii: troye ubitykh v Pakistane inostrantsev okazalis’ urozhentsami Dagestana’, Kavkazskiy Uzel, 24 June 2011; ‘V Pakistane opoznayut rossiyan, ubitykh politseyskimi: tsel’ ikh poyezdki byla sovsem ne mirnoy’, News.ru, 2 June 2011; Yuriy Syun and Igor Petrov, ‘Said Buryatskiy pozval v Pakistan: Opoznayut ubitykh politsiyey rossiyan’, Kommersant, 2 June 2011,

(3) ‘Chechenskiye «shuravi» 25 let spustya’, Kavpolit, 22 February 2014;

‘Spisok chechentsev, pogibshikh v 1980-kh v Afganistane’, Vaynahi, 13 May 2015.

(4) The 055 Brigade was al-Qaeda’s contribution in the field to the Taleban army.

(5) Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, ‘Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008), 424.

(6) Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, Yale University Press 2000, 136.

(7) The list of Americans of any race or ethnicity in al-Qaeda is well known (as a starting point, see for example: ‘Category: American al-Qaeda members’ on Wikipedia). The only black American to be identified is Sharif Mobley, an-Qaeda suspect imprisoned in Yemen, and he is far too young to have been in Afghanistan at this time. On the very limited phenomenon of Americans in al Qaeda, see: J.M. Berger, ‘Al Qaeda’s American Dream Ends’, Politico Magazine, 23 April 2015.

(8) As an example, see the claim of an al-Zarqawi training camp for Chechens near Herat, accompanied by information about al-Qaeda chemical and nuclear material being stockpiled in the vicinity: Sean M. Maloney, ‘Army of darkness: The jihadist training system in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1996–2001’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 26 (2015), 530-531.

(9) ‘Chechens Re-Emerge as Leading Global Jihadis’, Middle East Briefing, Orient Advisory Group, 13 January 2014.

(10) Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, ‘Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008), 416, 425.

(11) Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, ‘Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 (2008), 424.

(12) Ian Traynor, ‘Russia threatens to bomb Afghan terror camps Russia’, The Guardian, 25 May 2000; ‘Russia threatens Afghan air strikes’, BBC News, 24 May 2000; Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Shattering the al-Qaeda-Chechen Myth (Part II): Exploring the Links Between the Chechen Resistance and Afghanistan’, Chechnya Weekly 4 (2003), 1-2.

(13) Thomas D. Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, American University International Law Review 15 (2000), 869-870.

(14) Ilyas Akhmadov and ‪Nicholas Daniloff, Chechnya’s Secret Wartime Diplomacy: ‪Aslan Maskhadov and the Quest for a Peaceful Resolution, New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2013, np.

(15) Thomas D. Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, American University International Law Review 15 (2000), 881.

(16) See, for example: Robert W. Schaefer, The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus from Gazavat to Jihad, Santa Barbara, CA, Praeger Security International 2010.

(17) Mark Kramer, ‘Preface’, in ibid.

(18) Robert D. Crews, ‘Moderate Taliban?’, in The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, eds, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 2008, citing Wahid Muzhda, Afghanistan wa panj sal sulta-ye Taleban, Tehran, Nashr-e ney 1382 [2003], 55.

(19) He stated in January 2001 that in Afghanistan there were numerous foreign fighters, including 500 Arabs, 500 Chechens, 100 Uighurs, 100 Uzbeks, 100 Tajiks, 100 Bengalis, 100 Moros and 5,000 Pakistanis. See: Tim Judah, ‘The Taliban Papers’, Survival 44 (2002), 74.

(20) See, as one of many examples: Emil Souleimanov & Ondrej Ditrych, ‘The Internationalisation of the Russian-Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality’, Europe-Asia Studies 60 (2008), 1202.

(21) Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, ‘Foreword’, in Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost, New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2010, xiii.

(22) Fiona Hill, ‘“Extremists and Bandits”: How Russia Views the War against Terrorism’, PONARS Policy Memo No. 246, Brookings Institution, April 2002, 1-3; Simon Shuster, ‘How the War on Terrorism Did Russia a Favor’, Time, 19 September 2011.

(23) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Shattering the al-Qaeda-Chechen Myth (Part II): Exploring the Links Between the Chechen Resistance and Afghanistan’, Chechnya Weekly 4 (2003), 1-2.

(24) Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy, The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost, New York, Palgrave Macmillan 2010, 200-201.

(25) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘From “Secessionist Rebels” to “Al-Qaeda Shock Brigades”: Assessing Russia’s Efforts to Extend the Post-September 11th War on Terror to Chechnya’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24 (2004), 26.

(26) Alexander Khokhlov, ‘Zachem amerikantsy skupili v Afgane plennykh chechentsev? Po $8-10 tysyach za golovu’, Izvestiya, 23 July 2002.

(27) V.V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield 2005, 96, citing Sulton Khamadov, ‘Mezhdunarodnyi kontekst-afganskii faktor’, in Religioznyi extremizm v Tzentralnoi Azii: problem i perspectivy, Dushanbe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 2002, 147. For more on allegations that significant numbers of Chechens were based in Kabul, see: Alexander Khokhlov, ‘Zachem amerikantsy skupili v Afgane plennykh chechentsev? Po $8-10 tysyach za golovu’, Izvestiya, 23 July 2002, (see here).

(28) Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, New York, Viking Press 2008, 92; Michael Mora, ‘The ‘airlift of evil’: Why did we let Pakistan pull ‘volunteers’ out of Kunduz?’, MSNBC, November 2001.

(29) For a full list of, and information on, detainees, see: Andrei Scheinkman et al., ‘Detainees: Citizens of Russia’, The New York Times, no date. Cross-referencing these names with the Russian media will reveal all nine as non-Chechens.

(30) Fred Weir, ‘Chechnya’s warrior tradition: Guerrillas from Russia’s longtime nemesis take their fighting skills to Afghanistan’, The Christian Science Monitor, 26 March 2002. A variety on this Russian theme was offered by a military analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center: ‘The West is interested in dragging Russia into the war now as the ground operation is unfolding. The publications that link bin Laden to the Chechen rebels are to demonstrate to the world that Russia and the West are jointly opposing Islamic terrorism.’ See: Nabi Abdullaev, ‘Are Chechens in Afghanistan?’, The Moscow Times, 14 December 2001.

(31) Gary Schroen, First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan, New York, Random House 2005, 139, 331.

(32) Ibid, 281.

(33) See also: Fred Weir, ‘Chechnya’s warrior tradition: Guerrillas from Russia’s longtime nemesis take their fighting skills to Afghanistan’, The Christian Science Monitor, 26 March 2002.

(34) Brian Glyn Williams, Inferno in Chechnya: the Russian-Chechen wars, the Al Qaeda myth, and the Boston Marathon bombings, Lebanon, NH, ForeEdge 2015, especially chapter 7 (‘The Chechen Ghost Army of Afghanistan’).

(35) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘On the Trail of the ‘Lions of Islam’: Foreign Fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1980-2010’, Orbis 55 (2011), 236.

(36) Examples cited: Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs, ‘Afghanistan Command Provides Details of Recent Operations’, Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 16 August 2010; ISAF Joint Command, ‘More than 20 insurgents killed in Haqqani clearing operation’, Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 14 August 2010; ISAF Joint Command, ‘IJC Operational Update, July 10’, Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 10 July 2010; ISAF Joint Command, ‘Afghan and coalition forces disrupt Haqqani operations in K-G Pass’, Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 15 August 2010; ISAF Joint Command, ‘Afghan, international forces disrupt Haqqani and Taliban networks’, Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 23 June 2010; ISAF Joint Command, ‘Afghan, coalition forces round up hundreds in August’, Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System, 1 September 2010.

(37) A few examples on many: Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: ‪A Cultural and Political History, ‪Princeton University Press 2010, 260-266; Kersti Larsdotter, ‘Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37 (2014), 149; Sean M. Maloney, ‘Army of darkness: The jihadist training system in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 1996–2001’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 26 (2015), 525-531.

(38) Seth Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, Santa Monica, RAND 2008, 43; Deirdre Tynan, ‘Tajikistan: An ever-more fragile state in a brittle region’, International Crisis Group, 28 January 2016; ‘Tajikistan: The Changing Insurgent Threats’, Crisis Group Asia Report N°205, 24 May 2011.

(39) Example: ‘Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011) and 1989 (2011) concerning linkages between Al-Qaida and the Taliban as well as other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan’, UN Security Council, 21 December 2011, 12.

(40) Examples: ‘US CENTCOM’s Unclassified Executive Summary: U.S. Central Command Investigation into Civilian Casualties in Farah Province, Afghanistan on 4 May 2009’, United States Central Command, 18 June 2009, 4; John Rollins et al, ‘Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service, 25 January 2011, 8.

(41) David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, Oxford University Press 2009, 55-6, 84.

(42) Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and laptop: the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, New York, Columbia University Press 2008, 151.

(43) A search for ‘jezail’ (the Afghan musket rifle) in any book about the Anglo-Afghan Wars (particularly the first one), will return numerous examples of Afghan sniping skill.

(44) Gary Schroen, First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan, New York, Random House 2005, 281-2.

(45) Associated Press, ‘Cubans fighting in Afghanistan?’, 20 October 1982. See also: Bruce J. Amstutz, Afghanistan: The first five years of Soviet Occupation, Washington, NDU Press 1986, 179.

(46) Examples: Mahbob Shah Mahbob, ‘Panjabi, Chechen fighters sneak into Batikot’, Pajhwok, 23 August 2014; Gul Muhammad Tanha, ‘Chechens, Uzbeks among 15 killed in Warduj’, Pajhwok, 29 October 2014; Abdul Maqsood Azizi, ‘Taliban pressure Daesh commander into fleeing Logar’, Pajhwok, 28 July 2015; Qutbuddin Kohi, ‘Dostum to Taliban: Surrender or face consequences’, Pajhwok, 4 April 2015.

(47) ‘Afghan government vows to eliminate Taliban’, BBC Monitoring Afghanistan news, 19 April 2016, citing Ariana TV, 17 April 2016; ‘Punjabis and Arabs among foreigners fighting in Afghanistan – defence ministry’, BBC Monitoring Afghanistan news, 13 April 2016, citing Khaama Press, 13 April 2016; ‘Afghan morning headlines: Fight against insurgents, security’, BBC Monitoring Afghanistan news, 2 April 2016, citing Ariana TV, 1 April 2016.

(48) ‘Warning to militants, Taleban reject peace talks’, BBC Monitoring Afghanistan news, 8 March 2016, citing speech by Ashraf Ghani to graduates of an Afghan military academy, broadcast on all main Afghan TV channels on 7 March 2016.

(49) ‘Afghan first vice-president may meet Taleban commanders for peace talks’, BBC Monitoring Afghanistan news, 7 March 2016, citing Ariana TV report on 5 March 2016; Ahmad Shah Erfanyar, ‘Gen. Dostum seeks military assistance from Russia’, Pajhwok News, 2 September 2015.

(50) Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Shattering the al-Qaeda-Chechen Myth (Part II): Exploring the Links Between the Chechen Resistance and Afghanistan’, Chechnya Weekly 4 (2003).

(51) I base this on many dozens of studies of the Afghan insurgency. See, for example, the many books, articles and reports collected in previous and the forthcoming Afghanistan Analyst Bibliography: (see here).

(52) Slavomír Horák, Afghánský konflikt, Prague, Public History 2005, 100-101, 136-137, 148. Note: one interviewee said that unidentified people told them that the foreigners were Chechen.

(53) Slavomír Horák, Afghánský konflikt, Prague, Public History 2005, 137.

(54) ‘Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007), UNAMA, 1 September 2007, 64-67.

The new Taleban leader, Mullah Haibatullah, is being closely scrutinised to see if he will try to shape the goals and methods of the insurgency. The question is not just whether he wants to, but if he can. Gone are the days when the amir of the Taleban, by mere virtue of his position, had absolute power. In this second dispatch on the new Taleban leadership, AAN’s Borhan Osman looks at the strength of other members of the leadership, the increasing role of the Rahbari Shura, and assesses Pakistan’s role in decision-making. He argues that Haibatullah will not find it easy to change policy on major issues without the backing of other key players.

The Taleban are mourning their second leader in a year. Any hope that the loss of first Mullah Omar (his death was revealed in July 2015) and now Mullah Mansur (killed in an American drone strike in May 2016), would bring any let up in the fighting have proved vain. So also, has the prediction that a new person in place, intimidated by Mansur’s killing, would embrace the idea of peace talks. Neither has happened, at least, so far. The lack of any obvious substantial impact on the movement of the loss of the second leader invites the question: who is in charge of the Taleban? According to the most popular theory in Kabul, Islamabad is at the helm of the Taleban.

Is Pakistan in charge?

In assessing Pakistan’s role in Taleban decision-making, it is useful to bear in mind that ‘Pakistan’, in this context, may be understood more accurately to refer to the ISI and associated politicians who think the Taleban insurgency is beneficial to their nation. It is questionable whether Pakistan’s actual national interests are served by encouraging war in Afghanistan. That caveat aside, ‘Pakistan’ undoubtedly influences the Taleban in a number of complex ways, and vice versa, and the interests of the two converge in a number of respects. However, as far as Pakistan’s role in Taleban agenda-setting is concerned, examples from the interactions involving Islamabad’s attempts to get the Taleban to talks in recent years show that there are also important ways in which their goals diverge. This has resulted, at times, in tension or even outright animosity.

The Taleban have been using Pakistan as their rear base, supply hub and training and recruitment ‘camp’, with the knowledge of the Pakistani government and its active support for years. While the drivers that triggered the insurgency were essentially internal, (in the form of a violent crackdown on Taleban commanders who had given up fighting and on villagers accused of links with the movement – for detail see here), Pakistan’s backing has been crucial to nurturing it. It would have been virtually impossible for the Taleban to mount an insurgency if they had not had Pakistan to retreat to and resupply in. Islamabad’s thinking, it seems, after 2001, was that it had to offset India’s strengthening role in a country it considers its backyard. The warm relations between the Indian and the Karzai Afghan government and its active involvement in reconstruction alarmed Pakistan, as did the dominance – as Islamabad saw it – of non-Pashtun northerners in the administration.

The Taleban need Pakistan for shelter. Pakistan hopes to use the Taleban as a tool of influence. Yet, this is not just a quid pro quo relationship. There is also an overlap of ideologies in some aspects. The idea of jihad that is so deeply ingrained in the Pakistani state and establishment entailed that a group claiming to be engaged in a holy war against Western ‘occupation’ readily finds a supportive hand from many Pakistani security officials and politicians. This was seen, for example, in the off-the-record comments of a former military official in Islamabad to AAN in January 2014, who likened the Taleban’s fight against United States and NATO forces to the Palestinians’ struggle for liberation against Israel. The Taleban’s desire to fight and Pakistan’s to support its military efforts coincide. However, in other aspects of policy interests and goals can diverge. In the movement’s military aims, there seems little disagreement from Islamabad.

Ups and downs

Although the relationship between Pakistan and the Taleban has largely been symbiotic, it has not always been smooth. During the past 12 years, the Taleban has lost (in the form of death or protracted confinement) 12 of its key leaders and senior members for what is understood to have been not toeing Pakistan’s line. Pakistan has effectively killed two deputy leaders who, consecutively, presided over the re-emergence of the Taleban as an insurgency after 2003, when Mullah Omar was forced by security to give up any day-to-day running of the movement. The former defence minister, Mullah Obaidullah, died in Pakistani detention in 2007, while his successor, Mullah Baradar, has been lingering in detention since 2010, his mental ability and physical health reported as being hugely impaired. Both become victims of what a Taleban official told this author as entertaining “too much [of an] independent and Afghan-centric” vision for the insurgency. Both men were understood to be involved in secret talks with Afghan officials, without Pakistani endorsement or sanction.

The Taleban, since the movement’s beginning, has included diverse elements: those loyal to Pakistan, those who keep close relations with Islamabad for reasons of political pragmatism, and those hostile to Islamabad. Pakistan’s actions against some leaders (in the post-2001 era) and attempts to exert strong and direct influence on the Taleban when in power (before 2001) have added to the number of those hostile to the Pakistani establishment. Depriving the Taleban of some of their leaders has obviously not made Pakistan a better friend in the eyes of the Taleban, but seems to have made its future leaders extremely circumspect about dealing with the country that hosts them. The mistrust of Pakistan among the rank and file seems to have been always on the rise. However, the Taleban are stuck with Pakistan – where else, in the absence of a negotiated settlement to the war – can they go?

Although the Pakistan-Taleban relationship has largely created benefits for both, there have been occasions when Islamabad has tried to force things on the Taleban, which resulted in the latter’s attempts to seek alternatives to its dependence on Pakistan. For example, when it became too difficult for the Taleban to operate a political office free from Pakistani influence on Pakistan’s territory, it decided to open an office in Qatar. Subsequently, it moved many of those involved in its political efforts to Qatar or other Gulf countries along with their families (more on that here). Similarly, when Pakistan started to withhold treatment of wounded Taleban fighters in public hospitals in 2014 partly to decrease very visible signs of caring for the movement, the insurgents shifted their wounded to hospitals inside Afghanistan by creating mobile medical facilities and building their own, in some cases.

In another example, when Pakistan pressured the Taleban to send senior members to the second round of the Murree Process (which ended after the leaking in late July 2015 of the news of Mullah Omar’s death two years previously), Mansur started looking at Iran as a possible temporary base for himself in order to evade Pakistani pressure. Reducing dependence on Pakistan appears to have been one of Mansur’s priorities, especially after he took over as Mullah Omar’s official successor last year. As one measure to achieve more independence, Taleban sources say, he had planned, this year, a concentrated military campaign for capturing larger areas in the south and cutting them off permanently from government control. According to these sources, the military commission had planned to try to capture the remaining parts of Helmand and Uruzgan and put Kandahar under pressure – the latter to deflect attention from the rural areas of the other two provinces. The general aim of this approach would be to relocate senior commanders and training facilities from Pakistan to areas inside Afghanistan.

Perhaps the most intense struggle to control decision-making came with Islamabad’s desire for senior Taleban to show up for ‘peace talks’ with the Afghan government in March/April 2016 held in Pakistan. Whether or not Pakistan wanted real negotiations in good faith is another matter, but they did want the Taleban to show themselves at the table. Mansur did not want this. In late April, a delegation from the Taleban political office in Qatar visited Pakistan on the “urgent request” of Islamabad, according to Taleban sources in Qatar speaking to AAN in early May. The delegates, Jan Muhammad Madani and Shahabuddin Delawar (for bios see here), were told to sit with the Afghan government for direct talks; otherwise, the United States or Pakistani governments would go after the movement’s leaders. In May, this author was also told that the delegates were warned that the US could resort to drone strikes against Taleban leaders if they continued to refuse to talk to the Afghan government.

The Rahbari Shura (the Taleban’s leadership council) apparently treated this warning as just another tactic to put pressure on them, although, of course, Mansur did end up being killed in a US drone attack (on 21 May 2016). One Taleban source from the political office told AAN:

The Pakistanis suggested that we merely meet and talk to the [Afghan] government officials in order to lift the huge pressure Pakistan was undergoing from the internationals [the US]. They said “Go and talk to them, even if you call them names once you sit with them. The important thing is that you sit down with them.” However, the Shura and Mansur wanted to first talk to the Americans and maybe later to the Afghan government.

The Taleban-Pakistan relationship cannot be characterised, then, as just one of puppet and puppeteer. If the Taleban merely took instructions from Islamabad or Rawalpindi, they would have already met more than once with the Afghan government. In other words, theirs is not a linear command-and-control relationship. Instead, the relationship has the appearance of a joint venture or business partnership, from which each party has derived mutual benefit – shelter for the Taleban in return for influence for Pakistan over an armed insurgency on its neighbour’s soil. Each side has depended on the other to a degree, but the cohabitation has also been unequal, uncomfortable and at times downright tense and hostile. On the whole, Taleban and Pakistani interests coincide and Islamabad, as the more powerful player, is able to reduce the Taleban’s room for manoeuvre. On decision-making, however, the Taleban still have some autonomy.

Taleban decision-making then and now: Mullah Omar and his immediate successors

The Taleban have changed a great deal in the two decades of their existence in how they take decisions. A gradual delegation of power has followed their fall from power in 2001, transforming the ‘one-man show’ to a more collective form of leadership.

The movement’s founder, Mullah Omar, led through personal charisma as an absolute spiritual leader. He was given the title of amir ul-muminen (commander of the faithful) in 1994 by an assembly of more than 1000 ulama and clerics in a highly symbolic gathering that involved him putting on the kherqa cloak believed to have belonged to the Prophet Muhammad. Obedience to the amir became a central tenet of Taleban ideology. Omar made decisions singlehandedly and cared little about the wider implications of his decisions so long as he got a green light from those ulama, acting as religious authorities, whom he trusted. He did not listen even to the views of other founding members of the movement once he was convinced his decision conformed with Sharia. A case in point is the blowing up of the Buddha statues in Bamyan in April 2001, where he ignored the advice of several senior leaders and calls from prominent ulama from the Muslim world.

Omar or his office also regularly overruled, sometimes without explanation, the Sarparasta Shura, the cabinet-like council made of ministers and senior officials, who sat in Kabul and was officially the highest decision-making body after Mullah Omar’s office. The decisions the Sarparasta Shura took remained pending until Omar made a final ruling to the extent that members felt their deliberations were an exercise in futility. By contrast, people in Kandahar who obtained Omar’s trust could have a far bigger impact, regardless of whether they had an official position or not. Taleban officials vied for Omar’s trust which was mainly possible through getting direct access to him. Those posted to Kandahar had a greater chance of doing so. Omar’s decisions – which might be subject to casual quiet objections from among the senior members – were seen as wise and righteous by the rank and file.

When the Taleban staged their comeback after 2001, Mullah Omar was forced to change his habit of single-handed rule. He had to start delegating authority more actively to field commanders. The Rahbari Shura, established in 2003, also gradually gained a more prominent role in deciding most issues by itself. After 2001, Mullah Omar’s role was largely confined to the appointment and dismissal of senior members, and sometimes to endorsing potentially controversial decisions, such as his reported giving of a green light to the opening of the political office in Qatar for pursuing peace talks. Still, the spirit of Mullah Omar ruled strongly. While he himself did not actually preside over the insurgency, the people he entrusted as his deputies to run the movement’s day-to-day operations could exercise full authority by invoking his name. Mullah Obaidullah, the former defence minister who initially led the insurgency was the first to do so. When he was arrested by Pakistan in 2007 and, in 2010, died in detention (with the Taleban accusing Pakistan of torturing him to death), Mullah Omar replaced him with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar as deputy leader. He also derived his legitimacy from Mullah Omar. Mullah Akhtar Mansur’s appointment as the sole deputy in 2010 also enjoyed Omar’s blessing. He managed to maintain the fiction of an Omar-derived legitimacy even after Omar died, keeping the death a secret because the idea of a live Omar was so useful.

All three men who effectively led the Taleban after Omar – Obaidullah, Baradar and Mansur – left a deep impact on the way it functions today. Their visions and ways of leadership did not necessarily reflect those of Mullah Omar, but so long as they were seen to have his blessing, their leadership was seen as legitimate. With the news in July 2015 that Mullah Omar was dead and had been for two years, Taleban leaders ceased to be able to invoke absolute obedience merely by virtue of sitting in the position of amir. For the first time, a leader’s actions could be questioned and, for the first time, senior members of the movement went public with their disagreement with the leader of the Taleban, the amir ul-muminen (see here for more).

Institutions and personalities, Mansur and Haibatullah

Mansur (during his tenure as the official amir) and his successor, Haibatullah, neither founding members of the movement, derive(d) their legitimacy, not because they had been chosen by Mullah Omar, but because they had been elected by the Rahbari Shura. Indeed, the crisis over Mansur’s legitimacy was largely a result of how he was selected – namely seen by some to have unfairly by-passed sections of the senior leadership. Before the announcement of Omar’s death, Mansur had already been delegating some power, or at least showing the appearance of doing so. However, he sped up that process when he officially took over as leader in mid-2015. During his 10-month reign, appointments, dismissals, declaration of jihad against rivals and initiation of contacts with external channels all had to carry the endorsement of the relevant Taleban institutions, such as the Rahbari Shura, one of the commissions or the ulama. The empowering of the institutions (generally in the past two to three years), rather than the man in charge himself, was also dictated by the fact that Mansur was consumed mostly with running the movement’s (and his own) foreign and funding affairs.

The new leader, Haibatullah, would seem to have little choice, given his lack of leadership experience, but to rely heavily on Taleban institutions to run the movement. There is speculation among some Taleban circles that, because Haibatullah is a decisive person, he may try to carve out his own style of leadership. However, whether he is able to exert real authority or merely endorse what comes out of the Rahbari Shura remains to be seen. The new leader is seen as a hardliner, but this may not necessarily carry any obvious policy implications. He wholeheartedly endorsed the major policies of Mansur’s era (both when Mansur was the de facto and the official leader), including the approval of sensitive decisions (announcing jihad against a rival or dissident faction and approving, within ‘guidelines’, girls’ education, for example), so it would be strange if he wanted to reverse any of the policy lines he inherited from his predecessor.

Generally, it looks like Haibatullah’s likely dependency on the movement’s bureaucracy will further accelerate the Taleban’s transition into a more institutionalised organisation. The transition to institutional decision-making has also become the only way to maintain what is left of the movement’s unity. Dispersion of authority does carry risks, however. The leader is no longer seen as infallible which makes objection and opposition possible and, if there is open dissent, the leader has no absolute authority to delegitimise the dissidents.

However, the increasing importance of the institutions in the Taleban does not mean the movement is democratising its internal decision-making mechanism. This is not just an issue of the various ranks but even among senior leaders, not all of those who on paper are equal actually enjoy equal authority. Some have more clout than others. Key factors are where they are from, their influence on the ground among fighters and their closeness to previous leaders. Members of the Rahbari Shura (and elsewhere) from Loy Kandahar (greater Kandahar, comprising Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand and parts of Farah) remain dominant, although this might be changing a little. Mansur brought in some ‘northerners’ into the leadership and Loya Paktian Sirajuddin Haqqani to a deputy position; however, the ‘Kandaharis’ still dominate. Leaders with military experience tend to have more influence and those seen as founding members or as having been close to Mullah Omar still have some cache from that.

The key figures in the movement

This brings us to the final part of the dispatch, which is a list of the ten most powerful people in the Taleban aside from Haibatallah, along with their areas of influence and political and/or military clout. At the top of the list are the two deputies of Haibatullah who have come to leadership positions only recently, Mullah Omar’s son, Yaqub, and Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, Sirajuddin. Both have become more important at the broader movement level during the past year because of the leadership crisis that plagued Mansur’s succession. He appointed both men to prevent them creating possible (and potentially powerful) breakaway factions. If Sirajuddin Haqqani, the de facto head of the Haqqani network and a member of the Rahbari Shura for the past few years had opposed Mansur’s leadership, this would have been a serious threat to Mansur. Even if Mullah Yaqub, who is almost completely lacking in organisational and military experience, had joined a rival faction, he would have boosted its clout solely on the strength of his (father’s) name.

The other eight in the ‘top ten’ are veterans of the movement and, with one exception, members of the Rahbari Shura. Apart from Mansur, they have had the biggest say in how the Taleban has been run during his years of official and de facto leadership (2010-2016). Ironically, it is Haibatullah, along with Yaqub, who is the least experienced in running the show.

The 10 most powerful men in the Taleban (not in any order of influence)

1. Mullah Omar’s son Mullah Muhammad Yaqub, Deputy Amir. Yaqub was thrown into the spotlight while still in his late 20s, as news of his father’s death spread in July 2015. His name instantly emerged as someone who would help lend legitimacy or lack thereof to Mullah Omar’s successor. After hesitating for one and half months, Yaqub declared his support to Mansur in mid-September 2015, hugely tipping the balance in Taleban support towards Mansur. His pledge of allegiance and turning down of the suggestions to either spearhead or support a splinter group was hailed among senior cadres as a wise course of action for helping reduce Taleban factionalism. Many commanders and fighters in Loy Kandahar (and beyond) want to see him fill a bigger role in the movement without actually knowing anything about him, apart from the fact that he is the son of Mullah Omar. Based on such expectations, Yaqub was put in charge of military operations for the 15 southern and western provinces under the overall chief of the Military Commission (Sadar Ibrahim) in early April 2016. This appointment was also, in part, a response to increasing concerns by commanders in the south and southwestern region about the non-Kandahari, Sirajuddin Haqqani, gaining a prominent role in the military command, as he was acting as a deputy for military affairs. After his elevation to the position of deputy amir, it is not clear if Yaqub is still in charge of the operations for the 15 provinces, a position he was assigned to in early April.

The limited public exposure Yaqub has had so far has left those who have seen him with the impression that he is a man of principle who tries to keep the unity and other key values that defined the Taleban during the leadership of his father. He has also reportedly studied under the tutelage of Haibatullah in Quetta, which would make him particularly obedient and respectful of his ‘teacher-amir’. He is described by people who know him as unassertive and timid. Beyond this, not much is known about his leadership skills nor indeed whether he has any.

Yaqub has spent his entire adult life in Pakistani madrasas and is therefore not actually in touch with the realities of Afghanistan. He is too young and inexperienced to personally exert greater power in the files and ranks or in the decision-making at higher echelons. However, he reportedly has or has had the support, respect, expertise and loyalty of a number of seasoned commanders and leaders with him. Among these are the head of the Taleban’s Financial Commission, Gul Agha, who enjoyed exclusive access to Mullah Omar in his late years and the late Mansur as a private confidant to both, and therefore known as the gatekeeper for the previous leaders, having or sometimes claiming to have exclusive access to Omar and, later, Mansur. Also among those close to Yaqub are Qayum Zaker, one of most respected commanders in the south, and Mawlawi Shirin, who is in charge of the war for the remaining 19 provinces in the east and north. The former justice minister Nuruddin Turabi who has played an important role in intra-Taleban reconciliation, is another veteran in Yaqub’s camp. It is most likely the advice of these people, along with the name of his father, which has empowered Yaqub to gain an outsized influence. Their support is seen by Taleban members as making up for his deficit in experience. However, it is not certain if all of his high-level backers are with him in earnest or if they see in him a cover behind which they can further build their own influence.

2. Sirajuddin Haqqani, Deputy Amir. He is one of the few non-southerners who has come to have a prominent role at the national level within the Taleban, even though he is not completely acceptable to parts of the movement. His elevation received mixed reactions within the Taleban. While obviously welcomed in Loya Paktia (greater Paktia, ie the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Khost and parts of Logar and Ghazni) as a ‘well-deserved’ appointment, his prominent role in the overall leadership, particularly in the military, has been met with anxiety elsewhere. His ascent has been received with frowning jealousy in Loy Kandahar for being the first non-Kandahari to rise up to the deputy amir position. For many others beyond Loy Kandahar, the widely known affinity of Sirajuddin and his network with the Pakistani military and intelligence service remains a particular source of distrust. This has not normalised even one year into his new position and despite his efforts to care for the movement’s overall good, as shown in his internal reconciliation endeavours. If not for the credentials earned by the Haqqani network on the battlefield – it has carried out some of the largest and most complicated operations during the past decade in southeastern Afghanistan, as well as complex terror attacks in Kabul – it would not have been easy for Sirajuddin to take over as a deputy amir.

Some observers keenly predicted Sirajuddin’s further elevation as Mansur’s successor in the wake of the latter’s death. However, that scenario always looked unlikely given it would have polarised the movement. His appointment could have lead the Taleban towards a fate similar to that of the Tehrik-e Taleban Pakistani (TTP) where an existing power struggle was exacerbated by the appointment of a non-Mehsud/Waziristani. (1) Sirajuddin may tone down his public involvement in running the Taleban military for now. Whether he does or not, however, his role in decision-making on the Rahbari Shura is prominent.

He is described by some Taleban sources as the deputy for military affairs, which is not an official title but describes his role, as having the biggest say among all Taleban in operational planning. This is especially so because of Haibatullah’s lack of military experience. Sirajuddin came to prominence due to his father, Jalaluddin Haqqani’s, long-standing career as a prominent commander first in the anti-Soviet jihad and later as a Taleban figure during the Emirate rule. He has disappeared from the scene in recent years due to illness and old age, leaving the stage to his oldest son, Sirajuddin has proved he can command in his own right.

3. Head of the Cultural Commission, Amir Khan Muttaqi. He runs the Taleban’s media machine and was the Taleban’s information and culture minister and education minister and (a cabinet level post) head of the Edara-ye Umur (Administrative Office). A member of the Rahbari Shura who does not operate very publicly, he is considered a shrewd operator who has strategically positioned himself within the oligarchy. Both his opponents and fans acknowledge that it was he who, very effectively, helped engineer the succession process in favour of Mansur. Critics say he was the kingmaker. Part of Mansur’s success in subsequently consolidating his power lay in Muttaqi’s relentless pro-Mansur campaign in the Taleban media. His team has been doing the same for Haibatullah. He has proved to be an influential figure in the Taleban decision-making in all seasons.

Muttaqi is originally from Paktia, but was born in Helmand and spent most of his time in Pakistan both during the years of anti-Soviet jihad and after the fall of the Taleban. He has no strong footing with either the Loy Kandahar or Loya Paktia Taleban and is mostly seen as someone ‘in the middle’. His area of overall influence lies in shaping the Taleban’s political vision. During the anti-Soviet jihad years, he was a personal assistant to Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi of the Harakat-e Inqilab faction, which provided the core cadre for the emerging Taleban in the mid-1990s, a relationship which played an essential role in his quick elevation in the Taleban.

4. Former communication minister, Mawlawi Hamdullah Nanai. He was one of Mullah Omar’s few confidantes and is widely respected in the movement. During Taleban rule, Nanai served as minister of both communication and public works. He is understood to have been, as one of his recent jobs, as head of the recruitment and outreach commission, which tries to win public support for the Taleban and to persuade government employees and members of the security forces to quit their jobs, or to defect. This commission has, in recent years, become one of the most important bodies as the Taleban movement has increased its efforts to weaken the government side. Nanai has long been engaged in internal reconciliation efforts after rifts among high-level Taleban members began to emerge in 2010. He was instrumental in reconciling Qayum Zaker and Akhtar Mansur around 2013 after the later had refused to give up the position of chief of the military commission. He also actively sought to reconcile the various senior members who were opposed to Mansur’s appointment last year. Hailing from Kandahar, Nanai is mainly influential in security and military areas, rather than in politics.

5. Chief of the Military Commission, Sadar Ibrahim. As head of the powerful Military Commission, Sadar leads the Taleban’s war operations and is the movement’s quasi-defence minister. He was appointed to a similar position first around 2007, but was soon arrested by the Pakistani authorities. He was re-appointed a year and half from his release from Pakistani detention, in spring 2014, after the removal of Mullah Abdul Qayum Zaker from that position (see below). Ibrahim has a career of two decades in the Taleban military. Given the importance of Ibrahim’s position, he remains among the most influential members of the Rahbari Shura. During Taleban rule, he was a front-line commander in Shomali and the northern provinces, with close relations with the then defense minister Mullah Obaidullah Akhund. He is from Helmand.

6. Deputy Chief of the Military Commission, Amir Khan Haqqani. Member of the Mullah Madad Khan (not Jalaluddin Haqqani) family and well-known among Taleban for its contribution to the anti-Soviet jihad and the Taleban military in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, Amir Khan has gradually risen from the position of front-line commander, to his current post. His traditional area of military power has been among the Zabuli and Kuchi Taleban, but in his role as deputy of the military commission, he has gained wider influence in the Taleban ranks and files. He was one of the first commanders in the south to organise the insurgency in 2003 after the fall of the Taleban. Amir Khan plays an active role in the decision-making of the Rahbari Shura. He possibly gained the Haqqani takhalus name because he was a graduate of the Dar ul Uloom-e Haqqania Madrasa in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan (it has many alumni among Taleban commanders and leaders).

7. Former chief of the Military Commission, Abdul Qayum Zaker. As profiled in an earlier piece, Abdul Qayum Zaker was the head of the Military Commission and leading Taleban forces during the ‘surge’ of American forces from late 2009 to 2012. Zaker was relieved of his job by were plagued by turbulence, but he she till remained within the fold of the Rahbari Shura and kept the loyalty of a sizeable force in his native Helmand province. He is known for cherishing Taleban unity and core values and as a hard-liner on peace talks. Given the wide respect Zaker enjoys among the Taleban fighters and commanders, he has kept considerable lobbying power to influence decision-making in the Taleban, although he had been often absent from the shura meetings during the past few years. He is one of the hawkish and militarist members of the Rahbari Shura and is a former Guantanamo detainee.

8. The former Taleban-era operational chief of the eastern zone, Mawlawi Abdul Kabir. During Taleban rule, Kabir was one of the two deputies of the Sarparasta Shura and also head of the eastern zone and governor of Nangarhar. During the insurgency, he has served as the first head of the political commission and later as chief of operations for the eastern region. He was removed from that position around 2012 for acting independently of Quetta, and virtually relieved of all major responsibilities. It has been more than two years, however, since he came back as a powerful member of the Rahbari Shura. He is now not only active in the eastern zone, but also in decisions taken on a national level. He played a key role in persuading eastern commanders to pledge their allegiance to Mansur, and now to Haibatullah. He is originally a Zadran from Paktia, but grew up in Baghlan where his father had settled before the war. Although not an easterner by birth or tribe, perhaps nobody in the Taleban has kept his regional base of influence as has Kabir in the east and, more recently, parts of the north. He did so thanks to his networking skills and for consistently being posted to that region. He is known for his political savviness and smart management skills. His friends say he is not very satisfied with how the insurgency is run and is reluctant to take major responsibilities, and that it is the insistence of the Rahbari Shura that keeps him involved at the higher level. He has been one of the most politics-oriented leaders in the Taleban. He has been critical of the ruthless killing of Afghan civilians by Taleban fighters.

9. The former minister of health, Mullah Muhammad Abbas Akhund. As profiled in an earlier piece, the former health minister till recently headed the parallel Health Commission which negotiates with international health and humanitarian organisations for access to areas under Taleban control. Aims include making sure children are immunised, Taleban wounded are treated, and any mortal remains of fighters are transported home. He has been one of the diplomatic faces of the Taleban for the international community, especially those working in the humanitarian field.

He has turned from being hostile to Pakistan and its intelligence services to one of its friends, developing cordial relations after being appointed by the Taleban as its main liaison with Islamabad around 2012. Abbas was also one of the three Taleban representatives who participated in the Murree talks last year. Abbas had attempted to become head of the political office in Qatar, a bid plausibly supported by Pakistan to put one of its friends in charge of an office which runs external relations. His last botched attempt was when the former head of the office, Tayyeb Agha, resigned in protest at Mansur’s appointment last year (instead his former deputy minister of health during the Taleban era, Mullah Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanakzai was appointed. Abbas is described by some Taleban sources as a stubborn person who has a tendency to impose his views on others. His power to do this is limited, however: he is the only one in this list who is not a member of the Rahbari Shura. He is from Uruzgan and is mostly involved in political affairs.

10. Gul Agha (aka Hedayatullah). He is the head of the very important Financial Commission. He was one of Omar and Mansur’s most trusted people, who virtually acted as gatekeeper to both. He liaised – or claimed to have liaised – between Mullah Omar and the rest of the Taleban leadership between 2008 and 2012. Given his closeness to Mansur, he remained part of the ruling clique until Mansur’s death, although little is known about his personal skills and networks that might make him keep his influence under Haibatullah. Gul Agha is from Helmand.

A third piece in this assessment of the new Taleban leadership will look into other power centres of the Taleban to assess the degree of centralism in the movement.

Edited by Kate Clark

 

(1) The wave of fragmentation in the ranks of the TTP has not ceased since the emergence of rifts over the leadership during the last years of Hakimullah Mehsud which were exacerbated by the transition of leadership after he was killed in 2013 to Mullah Fazlullah. Fazlullah does not come from the TTP core of Mehsud tribals.

 

Had MPs approved the presidential legislative decree ‘reforming’ the electoral commissions, Afghanistan would now be significantly closer to holding parliamentary and district elections. (And the National Unity Government could have claimed to be pushing forward on electoral reform, something required by the agreement that established it.) However, after three days of ill-mannered discussion, MPs roundly rejected the decree. AAN’s Salima Ahmadi, Ali Yawar Adili, Lenny Linke and Kate Clark report on what happened and why – and what could happen next.

The Structure Law, officially called the Law on the Structure, Duties and Authorities of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), is significant as it controls who sits on the two election commissions (note the change of name to the complaints commission (1)). In the past, the commissioners have had a huge impact on who controls and who ‘wins’ elections. They have been blamed for earlier disputed elections, including the e2014 ballot. The National Unity Government, formed as an attempt to smooth over that bitterly disputed 2014 poll, promised electoral reform as a key plank of its founding agreement (full text here). However, the current attempts at reform, like earlier ones, have largely, in the end, boiled down to who controls and who sits on the electoral commissions.

This was the second presidential legislative decree on the Structure Law. An earlier one had been rejected in December 2015 (see AAN reporting here), and the latest was a greatly watered down version with any attempt at actual electoral reform of the commissions having disappeared from the text. The new decree,  as published on the website of Ministry of Justice, would also have allowed members of both electoral commissions to be changed, but it had lost its slightly more diverse set of people who were to sit on the Selection Committee. The committee provides the ‘long list’ of candidates for the two electoral commissions from which the president would make his final selection.

The latest draft of the decree was sent to parliament on 23 April 2016. As AAN has reported, MPs showed little urgency in grappling with the new decree. Preoccupied with other issues and failing repeatedly to get quorums in commission meetings, it took a month and a half for the house to set a date to discuss and vote on the decree (which happened on 11 June 2016). It is also worth noting here that the legality of the current parliament is also in question: according to the constitution, its term expired on 22 June 2015; it was extended by a presidential decree just a few days before that date. Some MPs have argued of their fellows that they have no interest in getting on with elections, although others reject this.

The decree had first to be scrutinised by joint sessions of parliamentary commissions, the specialised committees of MPs that deal with specific issues, such as foreign affairs, security or justice, and discuss and review draft legislation, before it goes to the plenary sessions for discussion and voting (for more information, see this previous AAN dispatch. After two joint sessions of various commissions and still no agreement, a third one was held on 5 June 2016. Eight out of the total 15 commissions were represented and, in the end, all agreed on all the articles of the decree except for one contentious point, an amendment proposed by the Judicial, Women’s Affairs and Legislative Commissions which said that the president would appoint the members of electoral commissions in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The stage was then set for MPs to discuss the amended decree in a plenary session. (For more detail on this, see footnote 2.)

Off to a chaotic start: the debate

On Saturday, 11 June 2016, the long-awaited, presidential decree on the Structure Law was put on the agenda and the Wolesi Jirga erupted into a heated and ill-natured debate. MPs shouted at each other and at the officials of the house, the Administrative Board, trying to stop discussion and insisting they go directly to the vote. When MPs spoke in favour of the decree, others pounded the tables, not listening and trying to prevent others from hearing the pro-decree speeches. MPs like Farhad Azimi from Balkh (see here) declared the decree unconstitutional and a ploy by the government to send such a badly drafted decree that MPs would be forced to reject it and then would be blamed by the public for standing in the way of elections. Pro-decree speakers like Fawzia Kufi from Badakhshan accused anti-decree MPs of being so useless they were trying to block elections because they knew the public would not re-elect them. Still other members, like Abdul Satar Khawasi, from Parwan province who is a member of the Legislative Commission, said no decree was needed and the government’s “empty slogans of reform” should be set aside and they should get on with elections using the old commissioners.

The Speaker of the House, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, however, refused to allow a vote. Instead, insisting that the Rules of Procedures be followed, which require first the presentation of a tasked commission’s report and then gives MPs an opportunity to speak, repeatedly asked the Judicial Commission to present the comments of the joint sessions. In the end, Ibrahimi asked for another (fourth) joint session to come up with a unified position on the decree the following day, 12 June 2016. He then announced the end of the session, despite many MPs insisting no further delay on the vote was necessary.

MPs force the decree onto the agenda again

Two days later, on Monday, 13 June 2016, parliament had been due to question the Ministers of Defence (acting) and Interior and the (acting) General Director of National Directorate of Security (NDS) about increasing insecurity in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces, the assassination of MP Sher Wali Wardak in Kabul on 5 June 2016 and recent abductions and killings of civilians on major highways in the north. (These security concerns had been raised in nearly every session of the Wolesi Jirga for the last month during the free hour discussion.) However, the MPs decided they wanted to discuss and vote on the Structure Law decree instead. Enough MPs’ signatures were gathered and then a majority of MPs voted to do just this. (3) Parliamentary observers thought the rush to vote was motivated by the decree’s opponents who feared a further delay would enable backers of the decree (mostly those supporting the CEO) to gather support inside and outside parliament and the decree would be approved.

The plenary session started with Head of the Judicial Commission Sayyed Hassan Sharifi Balkhabi briefing the house on the fourth joint session of the commissions, which had looked at the decree the day before. He said rapporteurs of all the 15 commissions had been present; representatives of nine had rejected the decree, while six commissions had approved it, after proposing several amendments to the draft law. (AAN has not been able to find out what the amendments were, apart from the one to include CEO Abdullah with President Ghani in the final selection of commissioners.) (For an overview of how the fifteen commissions voted, see footnote 4).

In a bid to pre-empt another chaotic session and also in acknowledgement of MPs’ calls to move swiftly to a vote, Secretary of the House Abdul Rauf Enami announced that only the rapporteurs of the commissions would be allowed to speak. After five of the fifteen had spoken, Speaker Ibrahimi intervened and said it was not necessary to listen to all 15 as it was clear there were two camps among the MPs, those in favour and those against the decree. In fact, the first five speakers had represented both the opponents and proponents of the decree – two spoke against it and three in favour.

The arguments

The five commission representatives who spoke had a variety of views.

Abdul Qader Zazai Watandost from Kabul and member of the Wolesi Jirga’s Commission for International Affairs, presented (see here) the anti-decree arguments as follows: it is against article 79 of the constitution (5) which says the president can only issue legislative decree when there is a pressing need; he said such a ‘pressing need’ could only come when the parliament is in recess and there is a legal vacuum concerning a specific issue. But, Zazai Watandost said, there had been no pressing need to issue this decree when parliament was in recess because an approved law was already in place. He also said the president had to send decrees to parliament within 30 days, but this one arrived after 48 days. Finally, the Wolesi Jirga amendment bringing CEO Abdullah into the selection process represented interference by the National Unity Government leaders in the two election management bodies.

Abdul Sabur Khedmat, MP for Farah and member of the Transport and Telecommunication Commission, said the decree should be rejected because President Ghani had no intention of holding elections, and sending the decree in its current form to the Wolesi Jirga had split MPs and was intended “only to deceive the nation and block the reform process.” He also suggested that, given the current deteriorating security situation, it was not possible to hold free and fair elections. “We want an election,” he said, “but none of the provinces are safe enough to hold elections.”

Daikundi MP Nasrullah Sadeqizada Nili, a member of the Finance and Budget Commission, and a supporter of the decree said, “We have been elected by the people and now the nation wants another election. New elections can be held only after electoral reforms are implemented. The House should approve the decree to enable that reform.” He also said MPs should approve the decree because Afghanistan could not survive without continued assistance from the international community which had set electoral reform and elections as a pre-condition for continuing their assistance.

Abdul Hafiz Mansur, a Jamiati from Kabul and member of Wolesi Jirga’s Central Audit Commission, also argued in favour of the decree, saying that MPs always claim that they want effective electoral institutions, but these could be created only after electoral reforms are implemented. “This decree,” he said, “can be a key to these reforms.” He also urged MPs not to reject the decree blindly.

Fawzia Kufi, Head of the Wolesi Jirga’s Commission for Women’s Affairs, feared government trickery if the decree was not approved: “Part of the government does not want the upcoming parliamentary elections to be held. Probably, there will be no elections held this year or next year but the Wolesi Jirga should not take responsibility in the public opinion for not holding elections by rejecting the decree.” She said “the government may issue another decree when the Wolesi Jirga goes on summer recess in which case it will not be able to play any role [in electoral reforms]. It is better that the Wolesi Jirga now reviews the current decree and approves it with the necessary amendments included.”

Wolesi Jirga MPs reject the decree – apparently for many different reasons 

The decree then went to the vote: of 153 MPs present, 126 raised their red cards to reject the decree and 27 raised their green cards to vote for it (the ‘pro-decree-ers’ are listed in footnote 6). Looking at the result of the vote, it is clear that a significant majority of the MPs were not behind this attempt at election reform and nor were they convinced by the arguments of the political camp that has been pushing for it. Various theories were brought forward about why MPs voted for or against the decree – many saw the vote as a reflection of not just the power struggle between President Ghani and the CEO Abdullah, but also the personal interests of individual MPs, often linked to what they felt would create the best conditions for them getting a seat in the next parliament.

Those who voted in favour of the decree appear to be a rather homogenous group with mostly non-Pashtuns, often affiliated with CEO Abdullah’s camp. The heads of the three commissions (Judicial, Legislative and Women’s Affair’s Commissions) who proposed the amendment to include CEO Abdullah in the selection process for the commissioners are all considered supporters of Abdullah (Qazi Nazir Ahmad Hanafi, Legislative Commission, and Fawzia Kufi, Women’s Affairs Commission) or his camp (Sharifi Balkhabi, Judicial Commission is seen as close to deputy CEO Muhammad Mohaqeq).

As to those who voted against, Head of the Judicial Commission Sharifi told AAN they belonged to three political circles: those connected to current members of the electoral commissions (so, in effect, they were voting against their allies’ replacement), those allied to former president Hamed Karzai (more of which below), and, finally, supporters of the current president – many MPs were under the impression that the Palace did not want the decree to pass, in particular with the amendment to include CEO Abdullah in the final selection process alongside the president.

Another line of analysis stressed personal interests over any thinking to do with either of the two main political camps in the national unity government. An MP who asked to remain anonymous said some MPs had understood the decree to be a punishment against the current electoral commissioners and thought this unfair; this group included, in particular, those MPs who hoped that the current commissioners would support them in the next election. She said that, generally, MPs had voted according to their personal interests – whether they wanted to stay in parliament and whether they had a deal with current commissioners to support their re-election. Similar strands of analysis came from the media. Hasht-e Sobh, for example, wrote, “Some MPs have political and personal motives for opposing the decree on electoral system reform. Some MPs imagine that continuation of the status quo is in their interest.” Mandegar Daily, considered sympathetic to the Abdullah camp, meanwhile, suspected the president’s hidden hand:  

The president’s position is ambiguous in this respect and it is not clear whether he supports reforms to the electoral system or opposes it. Before this, there were rumours that the president is not that willing to bring reforms to the electoral system of the country and tries to either leave it silent or to let it get lost without destiny in the noises in the parliament. (see here)

Another theory posits the influence of former President Karzai behind the MPs’ vote, that he believes the National Unity Government’s term ends in September of this year and a traditional Loya Jirga should be convened to establish a transitional government, after which presidential and parliamentary elections should be held simultaneously (see AAN’s previous reporting here). According to this line of thinking, he would be mobilising to sabotage any chance of holding elections before then. Naim Ayubzada, a member of the Selection Committee who established an election watchdog organisation, Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan (TEFA), for example, said the MPs’ rejection of the decree was premeditated and orchestrated by these political circles, including current members of the electoral commissions who, he said, had wanted to “provoke.”

Reactions to the rejection

The Wolesi’s Jirga’s rejection of the Structure Law decree produced strong reactions from a broad spectrum of individuals, including MPs, the presidential palace, media, election observing organisations and civil society. Some, like MP Fawzia Kufi said the rejection “add[s] to the problems,” and that MPs were there “to help find solutions not add to the problems.” Again, the accusation came that the government had been lobbying for MPs to reject the decree, for example Balkh MP Farhad Azimi. “Today is a black day in the history of the Wolesi Jirga,” he told the media. “MPs received calls from some circles inside the government and were given false promises [of rewards] to reject the decree, which is a shame for the parliament. MPs, without reading the decree or knowing its content, rejected it.” He said those supported by the Palace and Ghani had “raised red cards.” Daikundi MP Assadullah Sadati, who is a member of the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) was also from this camp (see here). He criticised parliament for rejecting this and the previous and decree, which, he said, had contained small steps towards electoral reform.

From outside parliament, there was also criticism of both parliament and the executive. Abdul Ali Muhammadi, former legal adviser to President Ghani, wrote:

The heads of the government are not prepared to fulfil the commitments set out in the [National Unity Agreement of September 2014] and do not want to convene the Loya Jirga to amend the constitution. Therefore, it is not willing to hold presidential and district council elections either. Consequently, the parliament scored a goal in favour of the national unity government! Of course with elections not being held, the term of the parliament is in place, although with serious question about its legitimacy.

Some social media activists called for the dissolution of parliament. For instance, Abdul Shahid Saqeb said:

Today, the Afghan parliament used democratic mechanisms to say “no” to a legislative decree that guarantees democracy. Afghan parliament tried to stymie elections and guarantee the permanent presence of its members in the seats by voting down the decree. This parliament should be dissolved.

Bashir Ahmad Qasani, a journalist working with 1TV, also suggested to the leaders of the National Unity Government that they should dissolve the parliament (see here): “Now that an interest-seeking and mafia majority in parliament blocks reforms to the electoral system, the only sensible political path is to dissolve parliament.” The Afghan election observer organization, Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA), called the Wolesi Jirga’s rejection of the decree “a rejection of election and democracy in the country,” an “irresponsible act” that demonstrated that “that MPs do not value public demands.”

Official reactions

Hours after the vote, however, President Ashraf Ghani’s Office criticised the MPs’ rejection of the decree, describing it as a “regression” in the path of electoral reform: (see here)

The government and people expected respected MPs to propose their amendments if they disagreed with articles of the law, and then approve the law to complete the reform process and speed up the preparations for holding elections.

The CEO’s office has not issued any official statement and his spokespersons have also not posted any statements on their personal social media accounts. However his deputy spokesman, Javid Faisal, said on television that a vote for the decree would have been a vote for electoral reform. However, they were now “working out other legal ways to move the process forward.” He did not elaborate further.

IEC and IECC responses

On 14 June 2016, the IECC held a press conference to clarify its position after the decree was voted down. Spokesman Nader Mohseni said it was technical reforms that were needed, but these had not even been included in the decree; instead it was intended to only serve ‘political interests’. (see here): “It included only the changing members of electoral commissions and therefore provided ground for more interference by foreigners in the national process of election.”(He is referring to paragraph 2 of Article 23 of the draft law that allows for two international electoral experts as non-voting members on the ECC.) He also said, “The aim… was to appoint people affiliated with government factions instead of the current commissioners …[and] not a reform of the electoral system.”

‪On 15 June 2016, the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) also issued a press release (emailed to AAN). It welcomed the Wolesi Jirga’s rejection of the legislative decree as “a positive step towards the lawfulness and independence of the Independent Election Commission.” It said the Ministry of Finance had committed 10 million US dollars to fund the upcoming Wolesi Jirga and District Council elections and also promised, “the Commission will soon share information about the electoral calendar with the people of Afghanistan.” Yet the IEC is already, legally, too late on this. The IEC announced in January that the elections would be held on 15 October 2016 (see here) and reiterated this in a press release it sent out on 15 June 2016 (email received by AAN). Practical considerations aside, the law says the electoral calendar must be published 120 days before election day which, if parliamentary and district elections were to be held on 15 October 2016, would have to have been done on 17 June, at the latest. (7)

The rejection of the decree, of course, leaves the current set of IEC commissioners looking more secure, at least for now – and an election in 2016 in peril even more than before.

What happens next and what is at stake?

All eyes are now on the upper house, the Meshrano Jirga. If senators reject the decree, it becomes void. Even if the Meshrano Jirga approves the decree, it still only has a slim chance of eventually succeeding, as there would still need to be approval by the Wolesi Jirga after a joint commission by both houses to come up with a suitable new version to be voted on. (8)

In December 2015, after MPs rejected the earlier version of the decree on the Structure Law, as well as another decree on the Electoral Law (which had amended and added to the current electoral law, for example, increasing women’s quotas, adding one seat to the Wolesi Jirga reserved for Sikhs and Hindus and instituting voter lists linked to specific locations), senators in the Meshrano Jirga followed suit. They voted down both decrees on 5 January 2016, without even discussing the merits of the amendments. Lobbying of senators for and against the current version of the Structure Law decree has already started. Opponents are calling on the Senate to follow the MPs’ lead. “We thank members of the Wolesi Jirga for rejecting the decree,” said IECC spokesperson Nader Mohseni, for example, “and ask the members of the Meshrano Jirga to decide on the decree considering the sensitivity and intricacy of the issue.”

The government may feel it has another option, asking the Supreme Court for a ruling on the decree instead, under the justification that the parliament is in its last working year when it is no longer legally allowed to discuss electoral laws. (This is an old argument that, in the past, has had various outcomes depending on who wants what.)

Meanwhile, time ticks by. If parliamentary and district elections are to be held, they need new laws. Yet, it will be difficult to sort all this out. This is not a straightforward tussle between clear camps each of whom share common ideologies or goals. The motivations and interests of individual MPs and within the various political camps are extremely varied and murky (is what a person says he wants actually what he wants?). This makes negotiations and coming up with a plan of action that is acceptable to enough of the many players difficult. It also makes it easy to sabotage action.

Yet even if the Structure Law decree had been passed, it would hardly have merited the description of ‘reformist’. Indeed, if elections any time soon are hard to envisage, the prospect of free and fair elections look even more illusory. In light of the upcoming NATO summit in Warsaw in early July and the Brussels conference on aid to Afghanistan in October 2016, national leaders are having to face the hard reality that elections and election reform are still no nearer. They must be wondering what they are going to tell their donors and military supporters.

 

(1) The Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (IECC) would lose the ‘Independent’ part of its name and would become the ECC. The background for this is that some lawyers believe its existence is against article 156 of the constitution which concerns the Independent Election Commission and the constitution has not provided for another body such as the ECC. The Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC), tasked with looking into electoral reform last year, recommended the name change, with the long-term vision that the ECC would slowly be subsumed into the IEC, as the IEC became more professional and built up credibility for itself. This recommendation was adopted in the Structure Law decree. 

(2) After the 2014 presidential election, Dr Ghani and Dr Abdullah negotiated a political agreement to form a government of national unity. A central part in the negotiations was a commitment to electoral reform. Since then, the process of electoral reform has been slow and unsteady. After a protracted disagreement between President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah on who should lead the reform portfolio and what should be its composition and authorities (see here for more detail), the National Unity Government finally formed the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC) as prescribed in the political agreement to review and propose reforms to electoral structures and laws. On 6 September 2015, President Ghani issued two decrees (84 and 85) amending respectively the Electoral Law and the Structure Law. The amendments to the two laws adopted some of SERC’s recommendations (see here for details). However, the Wolesi Jirga rejected both decrees on 21 and 26 December 2015. Following suit, Meshrano Jirga also voted down both decrees, on 5 January 2016.

On 28 February 2016, President Ghani issued two new legislative decrees number (158) and (159) to endorse the Electoral Law and Structure Law apparently approved by the cabinet on 10 February 2016. The two decrees along with the laws have been published in official gazette (issue 1207) on 16 March 2016. A Dari/Pashtu soft copy of the decree and the laws is available on the Ministry of Justice’s website here.

On 23 April 2016, 48 days after the decrees were issued, only the decree on the Structure Law was finally sent to the parliament. (The decree on the Election Law has not yet been sent to parliament for approval.) Initially, it was unclear whether and when the Structure Law was going to be sent to the Wolesi Jirga for approval, as required by the constitution (see here for more detail). It took the Wolesi Jirga more than one and half months (49 days after the decree was submitted to parliament on 23 April 2016) to settle on discussing in a plenary session on 11 June 2016.

(3) AAN was not able to find out how many MPs signed the request to change the agenda. According to the internal procedures of the Wolesi Jirga, the Speaker, or at least twenty MPs, can initiate a change of the agenda if they believe there is a more urgent issue that needs discussion. The proposal, from either Speaker or MPs, then needs to be approved by the majority of the MPs then present.

(4) Nine commissions rejected the decree:

Committee on International Affairs, Committee on Complaints and Petitions, Committee on  Transport, Telecommunications, Urban and Housing Affairs, Water and Power Supply and Municipal Affairs, Committee on Religious and Cultural Affairs, Education and Higher Education, Committee on Health, Sports, Youths and Labour and workers, Committee on Nomads, Tribal Affairs, Refugees and Migration, Committee on Internal Affairs and Security, Committee on National Economy and Committee on Defence and Territorial Affairs

Six Commissions approved the decree and proposed amendments to it:

Committee on Women’s Affairs, Civil Society and Human Rights, Committee on Justice and Judiciary Affairs, Committee on Legislative Affairs, Central Audit Committee, Committee on Natural Resources and Environment and Committee on Finance, Budget, Public Accounts and Banking Affairs

(5) Article 79 of the Constitution states: During the recess of the House of Representatives, the Government shall, in case of an immediate need, issue legislative decrees, except in matters related to budget and financial affairs. Legislative decrees, after endorsement by the President, shall acquire the force of law. Legislative decrees shall be presented to the National Assembly within thirty days of convening its first session, and if rejected by the National Assembly, they become void.

(See AAN’s analysis here)

(6) MPs who voted in favour of the decree were: 1) Chaman Shah Etimadi, MP Ghazni; 2) Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, Speaker of the House from Kunduz; 3) Abdul Rauf Enami, Secretary of the House from Badakhshan; 4) Erfanullah Erfan, Assistant Secretary of the House from Kabul; 5) Farhad Azimi, Balkh; 6) Saleh Saljoqi, Herat; 7) Hafiz Mansur, Kabul; 8) Sharifi Balkhabi, Sar-e Pul; 9) Haji Muhammad Abduh, Balkh; 10) Ghulam Faruq Majruh, Herat; 11) Ahmad Shah Ramazan, Balkh; 12) Shagul Rezayi, Ghazni; 13) Nasrullah Sadiqi Zada Neli, Daikundi; 14) Fatima Aziz, Kunduz; 15) Muhammad Akbari, Bamyan; 16) Dr Nilofar Ibrahimi, Badakhshan; 17) Qazi Nazir Ahmad Hanafi, Herat; 18) Fawzia Kufi, Badakhshan; 19) Jaffar Mahdavi, Kabul; 20) Ghulam Hussain Nasiri, Maidan Wardak; 21) Abdul Wudud Paiman, Kanduz; 22) Samehullah Samim, Farah; 23) Muhmmad Hussain Fahimi, Sar-e Pul; 24) Iqbal Safi Kapisa; 25) Shekiba Hashimi, Kandahar; 26) Sheikh Nematullah Ghafari, Second Deputy Speaker of the House from Helmand; and 27) Masuma Khawari, Samangan. (To see their faces, see this Tolo News video).

Ahmad Behzad, Herat, is also reported as voting for the decree. See Mandegar Daily’s list.

(7) According to electoral law, the IEC has to announce the election date at least 180 days, and publish the electoral calendar at least 120 days before election day. On 18 January 2016, the IEC announced 24 Mezan 1395 or 15 October 2016 as election day. However, so far, no electoral calendar has been published. 17 June 2016 was the deadline for this. AAN contacted the IEC on 17 June when it was unable (or unwilling) to give an exact date for when the calendar would be published.

(8) Article 100 of the Constitution states:

If one House rejects decisions of the other, a joint commission comprised of an equal number of members from each House shall be formed to solve the difference. The decision of the commission, after endorsement by the President, shall be enforced. If the joint commission does not solve the difference, the decision shall be considered rejected. In such situation, the Wolesi Jirga shall pass it with two-thirds majority in its next session. This decision, without submission to the Meshrano Jirga, shall be promulgated once endorsement by the President.

Therefore, even if the Meshrano Jirga approves the decree, it would still only provide a very slim chance for the decree to be finally approved by the parliament.

 

Much has been reported about how Afghan men, mostly young Shias, are being incentivised or coerced by Iran into fighting on the side of the Assad regime in Syria. There has been little study, however, of how exactly they end up in Syria. Said Reza Kazemi (*) has been tracking a 22 year-old Shia Afghan called Musa and discovered a story of going to fight in Syria that is far more complex. Musa’s case highlights how young men, failing to be integrated into their local communities, are becoming more connected to the outside world. It also shows how such dislocated youths can believe that by fighting in Syria they can become men.

This dispatch follows previous fieldwork and AAN publications by Said Reza Kazemi on the problematic behaviour of young people in Herat. The names of people and places in this dispatch have been changed or withheld at the request of interviewees.

It was a pleasant spring afternoon in a shahrak, or informal settlement, on the tree-clad outskirts of Herat city on 3 April 2016 when 21-year-old Jawid received a message from his close friend Musa on his Chinese-made smartphone while chatting to this author. After the ritual of greetings and catching up, Musa and Jawideengaged in what turned out to be a serious conversation:

Musa [online from Tehran, Iran]: Forgive me [halal konen] but I’m no longer going to be around.

Jawid [online from Herat, Afghanistan]: What do you mean? Where will you be?

M: Don’t tell anyone: I’ll be in Syria.

J: Why?

M: Just going there.

J: I don’t know what to say. As you wish… But I beg you: don’t go.

M: Isn’t it good if I become a shahid [a martyr]?

J: You could have continued your schooling and taken your kankur [university entrance test] here. At least you could have tried to get into university here. You could have gone there [to Syria] if you hadn’t succeed with kankur. Or you could have eventually found some work here. So many people go on living here. Of course, it’s good to become a shahid. Not everyone can become a shahid. Of course, I can’t tell you what to do and I can’t stop you going either.

M: That [continuing school] was certainly possible, Jawid. My problem comes from another place, and I can’t talk about it.

J: What problem?

M: The problem lies in my heart.

J: Because of your dad?

M: No.

J: What problem do you have with your heart?

M: Leave it. Bye for now.

J: Well, you must do whatever feels right for you.

M: You know, Jawid, we all die. It has nothing to do with going to Syria. We die wherever we are, once our ’ajal [final hour] comes.

J: Are you serious about your decision?

M: Yes.

J: Are your mum and dad aware of it?

M: No.

J: Nobody’s aware of it! Why don’t you talk to your mum and dad about it? Tell them, or it’ll be very sad for them.

M: I’m going tomorrow. To Yazd [the centre of Iran’s Yazd province, around 270 km southeast of Isfahan], for training. One month of training in Iran and two months of fighting in Syria. Just pray that all will be fine for me at the end.

This conversation between the two young Afghans both reveals and conceals a number of issues. To understand it, it needs to be placed in its context. It highlights, for example, the growing awareness of the outside world among segments of Afghanistan’s younger population, their increased connectivity to worlds both virtual and real and their increasing mobility, both locally and abroad. Following Musa intermittently over the last three years (see previous research here), the author has been amazed at how fascinated Musa has always been with the connectivity provided to him by information and communication technologies, primarily via mobile phone and the Internet.

The socioeconomic circumstances of both Musa’s family and the 8,000 or so inhabitants of his shahrak (a Dari diminutive of shahr, city) are generally low. Most of the residents – where Musa has spent most of his life and which is inhabited mostly by Shia Hazaras and Sayyeds – are daily-wage labourers employed in piecemeal construction work. Musa’s father is a local shopkeeper. Youths like Musa have, nevertheless, managed to purchase Chinese-made smartphones and stay connected via the Internet (see previous AAN research on the growth of new media in Afghanistan here). Many of these young people put pressure on their parents to buy them smartphones.

Like many of his peers, Musa spends much of his time on his phone, either messaging his friends in Afghanistan and abroad, or checking Facebook and other social networking websites. He watches video clips, listens to music and generally surfs the net. It is this connectivity that has made young people like Musa aware of regional and global developments, such as the war in Syria and, more importantly, how to take part in it. However, their use of information and communication technologies continues to be largely uncritical, partly because of the generally low standards of education and upbringing in society (home, school and the broader community). However, even in countries with much higher standards of education and upbringing, young people have been radicalised through the media and joined the Syrian conflict. (1)  Therefore, there is more to youth radicalisation than the use of information and communication technologies. In Musa’s case, he was not radicalised, but his use of such technologies made him increasingly aware about developments outside Afghanistan, including how other young men were fighting in Syria.

The failure of local Afghan communities to integrate their youths

Musa’s connectivity to the outside world eventually led to his desire to travel abroad. His sense of dislocation did not happen overnight, however; it took a while for Musa to gradually become alienated from his local community in the shahrak, particularly from his school and his family.

It began with a life-changing incident at school. The shahrak where Musa has lived most of his life has one public school, and two private schools which compete with each other to attract fee-paying students. Musa used to attend one of these private schools, but was expelled. He came to blows with one of his teachers, following a reprimand for failing to do his homework, which had suffered increasingly due to time spent with his friends late into the night, and on his smartphone.

Despite his father’s pleas, the school stood by their decision and Musa lost a year of studies. In the following academic year, 2014-15, Musa attended a public school outside the shahrak in downtown Herat. He dropped out, however, while in his last year.

Musa’s father, who has four children (two girls aged 24 and 20 and two boys aged 22 and 5), then tried to get Musa involved in life in their local community, but these efforts were also in vain. He tried to engage Musa in the small grocery shop he had been running in the locality for over a decade. Musa was, however, not interested in helping his father there or in a subsequent shop his father wanted to set up for him to run. Musa’s father, relatives and some of his school friends, including Jawid, then tried to draw Musa into one of the few local educational centres that have been providing, among other things, English language and computer literacy courses. Musa attended an English language course for a short while, but soon dropped out. His father’s last move was to draw Musa into local life through marriage, but this effort backfired.

He had gone to a neighbour’s home, asking their daughter – a girl Musa had come to appreciate – for his son. As the author later found out through female relatives, the girl had previously turned Musa down. One reason was that the girl, who studies medicine at Herat University, rejected Musa because he did not have higher education. Furthermore, marriage is an expensive and complicated process of traditions and rituals, making it difficult for parents to settle their restless sons. In fact, many young Afghan men whose parents are not financially secure see migration abroad (such as Iran, Europe or Australia) as a way to find the money for getting settled in life. (2) In Musa’s case, his father had saved and put aside the necessary money, but his son had already been turned down by the girl he loved – one of the reasons for him wanting to pursue a different life path. Musa’s father eventually learned all this from his wife.

The failure of Afghan communities to integrate their young people needs to be placed in a larger historical and cultural context. Figures of authority in a community – parents, educational leaders, religious figures, etc – face a new generation of young men (and women) who often do not share their historical, social or cultural experiences. Most parents in the shahrak have lived most of their lives in Afghanistan’s central highlands region, as well as in intermittent migration in neighbouring countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, with far less connectivity or mobility than their children today have or can appreciate. Youths such as Musa wish to have ‘modern sociability’. This lies in stark contrast to traditional ways of life in Afghanistan in which people, particularly their parents and older generations, prefer to be content with whatever they have in life and living where their ancestors have lived or where they are currently settled, that is on the outskirts of Herat city. Additionally, young people like Musa have lived most of their lives in Herat – an ancient, politically and economically important urban centre with historical and rapidly broadening ties both inside and outside of Afghanistan, particularly with neighbouring Iran and Turkmenistan,  far from their ancestral central highlands, a region that many of them, including Musa, have never even been to. (3)

Handling these generational clashes is difficult for local figures of authority and parents such as Musa’s. In his father’s words:

I tried everything I could to keep him here. I didn’t make him work, besides his studies, as many parents in the shahrak do. I encouraged him to attend an English language course, in addition to his school. But he used to say, even if he studied, he wouldn’t be able to find a job that suited his education because of corruption and nepotism in the country. I told him I would open a shop for him, bring him a wife and help him build a family and a house of his own on a plot of land that I own in the shahrak. But he used to say he didn’t see a future for himself and his family in Afghanistan even if he got married. He was of a different mind. I could never understand him or know what he was constantly doing with his mobile phone. I neither know English nor am I knowledgeable about the internet and things like that. Musa wanted to go, and he did go. The night he was smuggled out of Herat for Tehran about ten months ago, we had our last conversation, but I ultimately failed to convince him, to give him hope of a future in order to make him stay here. He went without my or his mother’s consent.

Getting out of Afghanistan: failed attempt to get to Germany via Iran

In chats with the author before he left, it was clear Musa had not initially intended to go to Syria. He ended up in the war there or, as he told his friend Jawid, he happened to “just be going there.” Musa was connected, through Facebook and other social networking websites, with friends from the shahrak who had managed to get as far away as Austria and Germany, particularly from 2013 onwards. He was also regularly in touch with one of his paternal uncles who had previously got himself and his family smuggled to Augsburg in southern Germany in 2010. The atmosphere of ‘raftan, raftan’ (going, going), as ordinary people say on the streets of Herat, had clearly impacted youths such as Musa, who aspire to achieve a modern lifestyle (see also AAN research on ongoing but recently reduced ‘exodus’ from Afghanistan here, here  and here).

Initially, Musa had to get himself smuggled to Iran via Pakistan and then on to Turkey. From Turkey, he planned, like most other asylum-seekers, to try the Aegean Sea route to Greece and then all the way to Augsburg to his uncle.

It was in the middle of the night in July 2015 when Musa left the shahrak with one of his other paternal uncles and his paternal aunt’s husband for Iran via Pakistan. His companions were going to Iran to find construction work there. Following his return from Iran after about six months, during which he had missed his wife and children, Musa’s other paternal uncle told the author about the hardship and numerous risks they went through along the smugglers’ route to Iran. Remarkably, he said, they were lucky not to have been captured and killed by what he described as “Sunni Daesh [ISIS] supporters” along the Pakistani route via Taftan in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. “The Daeshis suspect that Shia Afghans who go to Iran go on to fight for Assad in Syria. They send their own men to fight for the opposition in Syria; so, they kill any Shia Afghans they catch along the Pakistani route to Iran,” he said (for mobilisation of Sunnis in Pakistan to fight for the opposition in Syria, see here). AAN’s earlier research on Afghan fighters in Syria has also shown how the Syrian conflict has turned into an “odd meeting place” for Afghans fighting on the side of the Assad regime and those fighting for the opposition (see here). Even if Musa only saw Daesh in video clips on his Facebook account on his smartphone before he left, he felt how his journey to Iran could involve threats from Daesh mobilisers and supporters.

Musa and his two companions arrived safely in Tehran after almost a week. They had agreed to pay the smuggler after their arrival (around 30,000 Afghanis each, equivalent to 460 US dollars) through working and earning money in Iran. Many smugglers travel to Iran after obtaining visas from Iran’s consulate in Herat and then take their money from the people they have smuggled to that country, as one Herati in the smuggling business confided to the author in mid-2015. Musa found work as an apprentice in a carpentry shop on the outskirts of Tehran. He wanted to leave Iran for Europe as soon as he could, but could not for lack of money. (4) Musa’s work at the carpentry shop only just enabled him to get by in Tehran. His father would call him and Musa complained to him and his mother about his difficult living conditions in the carpentry shop, which also included household chores such as preparing and cooking food, washing and cleaning – things his mother and sisters had done for him at home and that he had taken for granted until then.

Musa put pressure on his parents to help him get out of Iran as soon as possible, particularly because European states were tightening their laws and considering closing their borders to asylum-seekers, especially those from Afghanistan (see a previous AAN dispatch here). He was keeping abreast of developments regarding asylum-seekers in Europe through his friends as well as by following the media. In particular, he asked his father to provide him with the money by selling his plot of land in the shahrak. However, because his father had not given Musa the permission to leave, he insisted that Musa had to work himself to raise the money if he wanted to go to Europe. (5) His Augsburg-based paternal uncle also refused to support Musa’s trip financially, for the same reason – because his brother (Musa’s father) had not given his blessing to Musa’s departure. The result was that Musa was stuck in Tehran.

Ending up in the Syrian war

Musa ended up in the war in Syria when he felt all other doors – to Europe, Iran and Afghanistan – were closed to him. He could not go to Europe as he was unable to make enough money to do so. Even if he had had the money, by early 2016, a move to Europe would most likely have been futile, as European states had closed their borders to asylum-seekers, especially those from Afghanistan. At best, he would have ended up in Turkey.

Secondly, he had lost face and felt he could no longer return to Afghanistan. That would have demonstrated his leaving had been a mistake and, worse, that he had failed himself. Recent research on Afghan migration has brought up the role of stigma in causing people who have failed in their migration efforts and been deported to try to migrate again. (6) Thirdly, Musa found life in Iran unbearable, as he briefly wrote in another message to his friend Jawid in mid-March 2016:

J: So, you enjoy living in a modern and developed city like Tehran?

M: It’s not like mum and dad’s home. I work hard in the carpentry shop. I feel I’m getting respiratory problems because of the wood dust in the shop. What’s more, my hair has started falling out and I’m beginning to go bald.

There have been increasing numbers of think-thank and media reports about Iran incentivising or coercing thousands of Afghan men to fight for the Assad regime in Syria. (7) Although the role of the Iranian state certainly contributes to young Afghans joining the conflict in Syria (see AAN research here, here and this media report here), it does not tell the whole story about how Afghan youths such as Musa end up there. When young people feel that other doors have been closed to them, they can see participation in the Syrian conflict as their last chance to demonstrate their masculinity or build some form of identity or social status for themselves as fighters. Even if they die, they will be shahids (martyrs). In this way at least they will be celebrated and remembered (see their glorification as fighters and, after their deaths, as martyrs on one of the Facebook pages of the Fatemiyun Brigade here). Musa alluded to this in his conversation with his friend Jawid. Youths such as Musa who end up in Syria should not be seen as passive, powerless or ‘mercenary’, to be dispatched, manipulated and exploited by the Iranian and Assad regimes. Rather they are active agents shaping the circumstances of their lives and their destinies. In-depth, informal conversations with Musa’s family and friends made it clear it was almost entirely Musa’s own decision to go to fight in Syria. He wanted to shape his own life and go his own way.

This does not mean that these young men are immune to incentives offered by Iran to fight for the Assad regime. They receive monthly salaries ranging between 2.5 and 3.5 million Toman (around 50,000-70,000 Afghanis, or 769 – 1,076 US dollars) and residence permits for themselves and their families. The Iranian parliament is also discussing granting Iranian citizenship to the families of Afghans who are dispatched by the Iranian government and ‘martyred’ fighting in Syria (see here). Religion also has an impact on young people such as Musa. According to the author’s conversation with a well-placed member of Sadeqia, the major Shia mosque and religious centre in Herat, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Sistani, whom the majority of Shias in Herat and the wider western region of Afghanistan follow, has declared going to Syria to defend Shia shrines as wajeb-e kefa’i (mandatory within one’s capacity). In fact, Afghans fighting for the Assad regime in Syria are described by Iran as well as by themselves as “the defenders of the shrine and the domain of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist” (modafe’an-e haram wa harim-e welayat). The ‘shrine’ refers to that of Sayyeda Zainab’s shrine, the Prophet Muhammad’s granddaughter, which is located in southern Damascus; the ‘jurist’ is Iran’s highest authority, namely supreme leader Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei; here, it is implied, his authority extends outside Iran’s borders. All in all, joining the war in Syria is a highly complicated decision-making process, in which young men themselves play a significant role, in addition to various structural factors.

Musa’s story also shows the extent of the involvement of Afghans in the Syrian war. Several of Musa’s friends have taken part in (some have died there) or are seriously considering going to fight there. Importantly, his friends have, to a large extent, influenced his decision to go. Two, Rauf and Mohsen (featured in the author’s previous research here), who have also got themselves smuggled to Iran, are contemplating going, but so have far been dissuaded by their families, particularly by their mothers and sisters.

The author has identified three of Musa’s friends and twelve of his near and distant kin and acquaintances who have fought or died in Syria:

– Haidar, Musa’s friend, killed in action in Syria: a large funeral was organised to commemorate his death in Iran. He was buried in the martyrs’ area of a graveyard in Iran thanks to the Iranian residence permit his father Asghar was able to obtain for himself and his family. They subsequently moved from the shahrak, where they are now celebrated, to Iran. This has greatly contributed to the socioeconomic enhancement of his family.

– Asghar, Haidar’s father, was dispatched several times to fight in Syria though he was prevented by his wife from going back to fight in Syria on his last attempt, as the family has already lost its son. He has developed symptoms that could be characterised as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). He is currently living with his family in Iran.

– Gholam, Musa’s friend, is currently fighting in Syria and influenced Musa in his decision to go. He has started making a contribution to the economic wellbeing of his family.

– Zaman, Musa’s friend, was killed in action in Syria. A large funeral was organised for him in Iran and he was buried in the martyrs’ area of a graveyard in Iran. His family moved from the shahrak to Iran as they were granted residency permits by the Iranian government. They are now celebrated by his family as well as by the wider community in the shahrak and in Iran.

– Two maternal uncles, reportedly prominent members and commanders in the Fatemiyun Brigade that is composed of Afghan Shias (for more on the Fatemiyun, see here). One of the uncles had deserted the Afghan National Army a few years ago and went back to Iran. They were already members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have previous experience of fighting for Iran in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

– Three more relatives on Musa’s mother’s side (who are married to sisters of Musa’s mother) are currently fighting in Syria.

– Two brothers of Musa’s eldest sister’s husband, who are religiously oriented, are following the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and are fighting to defend Shia shrines in Syria. They are said, by their Herat-based brother, to believe in either killing or dying fighting the Daeshis. Musa’s eldest sister’s husband is also considering joining the Syrian war.

– The brother of another distant relative of Musa’s, who is also religiously oriented, believes in fighting to defend Shia shrines in Syria.

– Another distant relative of Musa’s is currently fighting in Syria and has reportedly saved the life of a major Iranian commander. He was reportedly honoured by Iran’s political and religious leadership, including Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei (see here  on Khamenei’s meeting with families of Afghans killed in Syria). He is a member of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and had previously fought on Iran’s side in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988).

– Another distant relative of Musa’s, killed in action in Syria, was as old as Musa and also a poor student at school. He had a big funeral and was buried in the martyrs’ area of a graveyard in Iran. His family is now celebrated and this has made an important contribution to the socioeconomic enhancement of his family.

– A close relative who previously fought in Syria is currently in Herat and is planning to go back.

Syria stories

The participation of a growing number of young men in the Syrian conflict has given rise to difficult questions and controversies in the shahrak, and probably elsewhere in Afghanistan, about fundamental concepts such as jihad (holy war), namus (honour), watan (homeland) and shahid/shahadat (martyr/martyrdom). Tensions can be particularly high when families, friends and acquaintances get together and recount what can be called ‘Syria stories’ – stories they have heard either from people they know who are presently fighting in Syria or from those who have returned home from Iran or Syria.

The father of Musa’s friend, Rauf, who is seriously thinking of joining the battlefield in Syria, told the author on 5 May 2016:

Rauf didn’t inform us when he left the shahrak to be smuggled to Iran. We didn’t know where he was for several days until we received his call from Tehran. Then his mother and I became calmer, especially because he went to stay with his brother who is in Iran with his family. After a while, Rauf said he was going to fight in Syria for jihad to defend our religion and our namus. Even if he dies, he says he’ll die as a shahid. I strongly disagreed and shouted at him down the mobile phone. I told him jihad takes place in a person’s watan. I told him you become a shahid fighting for your namus in your own watan. Afghanistan is itself at war. I oppose whatever the Iranians and some of our own Afghan clerics are telling young people such as my son. His mother said she wouldn’t ‘forgive her milk’ if he goes to fight in Syria. She said she would do biabi [shame, disgrace] to the family by leaving the house, running through the streets and alleys of the shahrak, barefooted and without a veil, if her son has goes to fight in Syria (8). So far, we’ve managed to keep him out of there.

Many of the stories from and about Syria are filled with terrifying descriptions of the war in that country. There are tales about young Afghan fighters who have been captured and decapitated by Daesh. Narrating what his brother told him about his experiences in Syria, one of Musa’s relatives, during a family get-together, said that, in one instance, his brother and comrades were besieged, a hellish fight took place and those who could not escape the area faced a horrible end: Daesh members reportedly used their shoe laces to behead them. His brother had, however, managed to flee the area. Several weeks ago, the beheaded body of one of the young local Afghans who had gone to Syria was returned for burial in Mashhad, the centre of Iran’s Razavi Khorasan province which neighbouring Herat. Several relatives of young Afghan fighters say many bodies (most of them decapitated) are never returned; rather they are left to rot in no man’s land in Syria.

There are also stories of how repentant some young Afghan fighters have become after seeing the Syrian war for themselves. In some cases, they have intentionally injured or disabled themselves so they no longer have to take part in armed hostilities and are dispatched back to Iran. They then leave Iran for elsewhere (back to Afghanistan or on to Europe). Additionally, there are numerous stories about how young Afghan fighters killed in the Syrian war are celebrated at funerals attended by crowds of Afghans and Iranians in various cities across Iran. Undoubtedly, part of this is political propaganda by the Iranian government to sustain fighter mobilisation to boost the manpower of the Assad regime. They are then buried in martyrs’ areas in graveyards throughout the country (see, for example, here about the burial in Mashhad and Yazd of nine Afghans who had been killed in Khan Tuman, a strategic village in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo).

There are also many positive tales about these young men. Although they were, in many ways, failures in their own society (or saw themselves as such) and seriously confused about what they were doing in life, they have come to be seen as the defenders of Shia shrines and heroes of the religion within a short time span. They are celebrated as fighters and as martyrs after their deaths. Many have become the main breadwinners and providers for their families. Some have managed to obtain Iranian residence permits for their families. More generally, they gain experience of life and are able to command some level of social respect among their families and communities. This is exactly the point missing in previous think-tank research and media coverage of young Afghan men participating in the Syrian conflict. To these, one should also add many tales of camaraderie among these young Afghan fighters as well as between them and their Iranian and Syrian comrades. Finally, there are also stories of at least a few Afghan fighters who have fallen in love with Syrian women or the women with them and who stay on, possibly to form families if they continue to survive and if the Syrian war is brought to some conclusion – pointing to the down-to-earth fact that normal life can go on even in the midst of a catastrophic war.

Musa in Syria, his family in the shahrak and what his case tells us

The night he left Yazd for Syria on 4 May 2016, Musa finally called to let his parents know that he was going to fight in Syria. In anger over his parents not helping him financially to leave Iran for Germany, he had cut off all contact with his family and friends, both via phone and the Internet, with the exception of close friends such as Jawid. That night he talked to all his family members, namely his parents, two sisters, his eldest sister’s husband and his younger brother. He asked his parents for halaliyat (forgiving him for whatever wrong he might have committed in the past), in case he never returned from the Syrian battlefield. Finally, his parents saw no other way but to give in. His mother said that, after he called, she was not able to sleep for nights and his father had been increasingly pensive. During his last conversation with his family, Musa reportedly told them that his maternal uncles, who are prominent members and commanders of the Fatemiyun Brigade, would intervene so that he would not be dispatched to the frontline, but instead to place him in a non-combat role such as providing first aid and other medical services in a hospital in Damascus. Whether or not his maternal uncles were able to do this is unknown, for there has been no more news from or about Musa since 4 May.

Musa’s story tells us how Afghan communities and government authorities have to deal with a new generation of Afghan youth who are increasingly connected to the outside world and, increasingly, have the possibility of travelling abroad. In Musa’s case, his own community failed to integrate him into local life – although not for lack of trying – and no one was able to prevent him following his own path. In particular, Musa’s father and mother certainly did all they could and acted as responsible and caring parents but they faced a changing situation that was extremely difficult to manage.

Communities should listen to their young people’s needs more and invest in their interests. Even small things can bring about changes. One of Musa and his friends’ interests was playing football. Developing this and other extra-curricular activities (that need not be expensive) can make a difference by making youths such as Musa more interested in their communities. Even organising small, local tournaments can have a big impact (see the author’s previous dispatch on grassroots football leagues and great hopes in Afghanistan here). An adult from the shahrak said he was spending more time playing and encouraging youngsters to play football, because they enjoyed it and because it tired them out so they would not have the energy to spend a lot of time on their mobile phones or the Internet.

Musa and other young people in his situation are desperately looking for ways to make their mark in life and build their own identity and social status. They want hope and a future. Unless they find this in their own neighbourhood and in their society, the temptation to go to places like Syria will remain, even under the worst circumstances imaginable, in order that they might prove themselves.

* Said Reza Kazemi is a PhD student (2013-2016) at Heidelberg University in Germany where he is writing a dissertation on an ethnographic story about the past and present of an Afghan transnational family. He has previously worked as a researcher for the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN).

 

(1) Jytte Klausen, “Tweeting the jihad: social media networks of western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38 (1), 2015: 1-22.

(2) To many young Afghans, migration is a rite of passage to adulthood, marriage and settling in life. See Alessandro Monsutti, “Migration as rite of passage: young Afghans building masculinity and adulthood in Iran,” Iranian Studies 40 (2), 2007: 167-185.

(3) Ute Franke, “Ancient Herat revisited: new data from recent archaeological fieldwork,” in Rocco Rante (ed) Greater Khorasan: history, geography, archaeology and material culture, Berlin/Munich/Boston: Hubert & Co., Göttingen, 2015, 63-88; C.P.W. Gammell, The pearl of Khorasan: a history of Herat, London: Hurst, 2016; Jolyon Leslie, “Political and economic dynamics of Herat,” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 2015.

(4) According to a local money changer in Khorasan Market in downtown Herat in late 2015, one needs around USD 10,000 to make it to a European country like Germany. This was generally the amount he was transferring to individuals who had left Herat for Europe through being smuggled.

(5) Research on migration has shown that migrants who have obtained permission to leave their families and homeland are more successful than those who do not. See, for example, Loretta Baldassar, “Transnational families and aged care: the mobility of care and the migrancy of ageing,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 33 (2), 2007: 275-97.

(6) Lisa Schuster and Nassim Majidi, “Deportation stigma and re-migration,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 41 (4), 2015: 635-52.

(7) Ari Heistein and James West, “Syria’s other foreign fighters: Iran’s Afghan and Pakistani mercenaries,” 20 November 2015, The National Interest; Ali Alfoneh, “Shiite combat casualties show the depth of Iran’s involvement in Syria,” 3 August 2015, The Washington Institute; Human Rights Watch, “Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in Syria,” 29 January 2016; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Afghan refugees in Iran being sent to fight and die for Assad in Syria,” 5 November 2015, The Guardian; Hashmatallah Moslih, “Iran ‘foreign legion’ leans on Afghan Shia in Syria war,” Aljazeera. See also Seth G. Jones, “Syria’s growing jihad,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55 (4), 2013: 53-72; and W. Andrew Terrill, “Iran’s strategy for saving Assad,” The Middle East Journal 69 (2), 2015: 222-36.

(8) This is a typical pattern of behaviour distressed women display and/or are expected to display in Afghanistan’s sociocultural context. See Benedicte Grima, The performance of emotion among Paxtun women, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992.

 

Afghanistan’s electoral reform process, that was supposed to be a precondition for the next ballot, has been excruciatingly slow and has culminated in a watered-down version of its original mandate. The delays mean that it has by now become practically impossible to hold elections this year. The presidential palace, however, continues to insist that both elections – for Wolesi Jirga and district councils – will take place in mid-October, as planned, and has increased pressure on parliament to pass a crucial decree. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert and Ali Yawar Adili take a closer look at the intricacies involved, as the parliament prepares to discuss the decree.

A stalled reform process

When the two rivals in the 2014 presidential election agreed to form a government of national unity in September 2014, elections and electoral reform played a central role in the negotiations. Both were explicitly included in the political agreement signed by the two sides. The commitment to electoral reform was a concession to the Abdullah camp, as was the explicit inclusion that both Wolesi Jirga and district council elections would be held in time to allow for a Loya Jirga (to discuss the post of executive prime minister) within two years. (1)

The main vehicle driving the reform process was the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC), which was mandated by the political agreement. It was established with considerable delay, after the president initially tried to monopolise the reform portfolio by giving it to his second Vice-President Sarwar Danesh, and amid controversies over its composition and authorities (see here and here for more detail). When the commission was finally operational, it prepared two batches of recommended reforms. The first batch of recommendations was partly adopted in September 2015 and the president issued two decrees (84 and 85) amending respectively the Electoral Law and the Law on the Structures, Authorities and Duties of the Electoral Bodies (or Structure Law, for short).

The amendments to the two laws based on the SERC’s recommendations, at the time, included: the establishment of voter lists based on voters’ tazkeras (ID documents); changes in the composition of the Selection Committee for the electoral commissioners of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and Independent Election Complaints Commission (IECC); changes in the composition and tenure of the IEC by decreasing the number of commissioners and staggering their terms of service; changes in the requirements for IECC commissioners; changes in the composition of the Wolesi Jirga (introducing an extra, separate seat for Sikhs and Hindus) and the provincial and district councils (fixing the 25% women’s quota); and the employment of school teachers and other civil servants as temporary electoral personnel. A Dari/Pashtu soft copy of these decrees, that were gazetted but later rejected by parliament, can be found on the Ministry of Justice’s website here.

A second, further-reaching batch of recommendations was presented to the government on 21 December 2015, proposing changes to the electoral system and electoral constituencies, and the establishment of a special electoral court. However, on the same day that the SERC presented its second batch of proposals, the Wolesi Jirga voted down the presidential decree from September that amended the Structure Law. Five days later, on 26 December 2015, the Wolesi Jirga also rejected the second decree amending the Electoral Law. On 5 January 2016, the Meshrano Jirga followed suit and voted down both decrees without discussing the merits of the amendments.

With parliament’s rejection of both decrees, the electoral reform efforts had to start all over again. The Independent Election Commission (IEC), emboldened by the SERC’s setback, said it hoped the president would now stop sending decrees to parliament and on 18 January 2016, the IEC announced the date of the election. The IEC announcement and choice of the date did not, in the first place, seem informed by technical and logistical considerations, but rather seemed aimed at regaining the initiative and to sidelining those pushing for reform.

Two new decrees

On 5 March 2016, exactly two months after both houses of parliament had rejected the previous decrees, the government announced that the president had issued two new legislative decrees. The new decrees were watered-down versions of the earlier ones, with the most important reversals affecting the selection process for the composition of the electoral bodies.

The decrees – 158 and 159, dated 28 February 2016 – endorsed the draft Electoral Law and Structure Law, as apparently approved by the Cabinet on 10 February 2016 (approval number 40). (2) They were published in the official gazette on 16 March 2016 (issue 1207), together with the amended laws, which from that moment onward, had the force of law – unless and until they were rejected by parliament. A Dari/Pashtu soft copy of the decree and the laws is available on the Ministry of Justice’s website here.

According to one of President Ghani’s deputy spokesmen, Sayed Zafar Hashemi, the president consulted members of both houses of parliament before issuing the decree and expected “the parliamentarians [to] cooperate with the government in bringing electoral reforms.”

However, for several weeks after the decrees were issued it was unclear whether the president did indeed intend to send them to the Wolesi Jirga, as required by the constitution. (3) There were indications that the Palace was considering sending the decrees to the Supreme Court for a ruling instead, under the justification that the parliament was in its last working year and no longer allowed to discuss electoral laws – an unresolved debate that has been treated differently every time it was held, depending on the desired outcome. (4) In the decrees themselves, there was also no mention that they were to be submitted to parliament (in the previous decrees – the ones that were voted down by the parliament – article 2 had required the Minister of Justice and the State Minister for Parliamentary Affairs to submit the decrees to the Wolesi Jirga within 30 days after the first session was convened, in accordance with article 79 of the constitution).

The presidential palace argued that the laws were valid and could be enforced and that, in particular, the Selection Committee could restart its work. Amir Hussain Hussaini, chief of staff of Vice President Sarwar Danesh, told AAN on 14 April 2016: “We think the laws are effective because they have been published. The Selection Committee [for the two electoral commissions] can continue its work based on these laws.” Vice President Danesh, when introducing the nominees for the positions of Minister of Interior and Attorney General to the Wolesi Jirga on 4 April 2016, said something similar:

The national unity government, while emphasising the preservation of the spirit of cooperation and harmony between the executive and legislative branches of power, is fully prepared to adopt all necessary measures to hold the elections this year by implementing electoral reforms. In this respect, I should announce that the Selection Committee will hold its first meeting and formally start its work in these days. Expressing thanks to Mr Ibrahimi, respected speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, and Mr Muslimyar, respected chairman of the Meshrano Jirga, who accepted the membership of this committee, I would like to ask them and other respected members of the Selection Committee to fulfil their legal duties at the soonest, so that the new election and electoral complaints commissions are established and, by addressing the technical and financial problems and providing appropriate opportunity, general and fair elections are held in the country and our seventeenth legislative round sets to work in an appropriate political setting.

The Selection Committee, however, had already started working once before, only to have to stop again when the decree underpinning its composition and authorities was rejected. So the committee made it clear they would not begin until the presidential decrees had been endorsed. With this decision, the whole electoral process stalled. Without a Selection Committee, there could be no candidates for the IEC and IECC, and without clarity over who would be in the new IEC (and whether all parties considered the members credible and legitimate), it would be very difficult to credibly start organising the elections.

So, on 23 April 2016, after 48 days, the Palace finally sent the decree on the Structure Law to the parliament. This is the decree that determines, among other things, the composition and authorities of the Selection Committee. The Palace did not send the decree on the Election Law.

All eyes on the parliament

The decision to finally send the decree — one, not two — happened in the midst of a wider, political wrangle in which the president sought to rally parliament in support of a new government security plan and parliament, in response, presented a set of conditions, including the sending of the decrees. Two days later, the president addressed both houses of parliament in a special joint session and asked parliament to pass the decree:

“Esteemed MPs, senators, sisters and brothers, all of our people stress the need for reform and a fundamental change. We are committed to honouring our promises in this regard. Reform of the electoral bodies has started and elections will be held on time. I request both houses of parliament to pass the [electoral] law submitted to them, as soon as possible.”

The parliament has been slow to get to work. It was preoccupied with other issues and plagued by a crippling absenteeism that has left sessions and committee meetings paralysed (most of the time, there are simply not enough MPs present to form a quorum to vote or meaningfully discuss anything).

The Wolesi Jirga is also split on how to deal with the decree they have been sent.

Some MPs and other observers had initially been fairly optimistic. Days after the decree was received, Haji Muhammad Abduh, an MP from Balkh and member of the Judicial Commission, told AAN he believed that, “this time, the decree would likely be approved; the president also called on the two houses to do so” (he, however, also thought there would be changes to the law, but said it was too early to predict what they might be). Naim Ayubzada, the director of TEFA (Transparent Election Foundation of Afghanistan) and member of the Selection Committee, had said something similar on 13 April 2016 (this was before the decree was sent to parliament), when he told AAN that the speaker of the Wolesi Jirga speaker and the Chairman of the Meshrano Jirga, who according to the new law were now also members of the Selection Committee, had indicated they would approve the decrees if submitted.

Now, six weeks later, Abduh is much less optimistic. He was quoted on 3 June 2016 by Tolo News saying that the views of 12 out of 15 parliamentary commissions had been collected and that half of them agreed with the decrees and half of them opposed them. (However, due to the patchy attendance, in particular in the committee sessions, he could easily be referring to the opinions of a handful of MPs only).

The decree has apparently been put on the agenda for tomorrow, 11 June 2016. According to several MPs, there have been concerted campaigns by the opponents and proponents of the decree to get it either rejected or passed. Judging by how such sessions have gone in the past, the meeting could well descend into heated discussions or even a brawl (a trusted delaying tactic).

MPs opposing the decree argue that it should be rejected, because it was not sent to the parliament within 30 days, as stipulated in the constitution. Others oppose the decree on substantive grounds, arguing that the government has failed to bring the needed electoral reforms and that the decree does little else but change the composition of the Selection Committee for the electoral commissions. A third group says they would act (either to reject or amend the decree) because they do not want the president and CEO to monopolise the election and divide the electoral bodies between them.

MP Mawlawi Nazir Ahmad Hanafi, for instance, said that “the presidential decree has two problems; the first is that it only deals with the structure and authorities of the commissions, and [within that] only with the selection [of the commissioners] and working procedure; and the second is that the decree should have been sent within one month of the resumption of the house’s session, but [instead] the decree was submitted to us after almost two months.”

Mawlawi Mir Rahman Rahmani, an MP from Balkh province, said something similar when he addressed the session on 21 May 2016: “Everyone thinks that the Wolesi Jirga has taken the presidential decree on electoral reform hostage. But according to the constitution, the decrees should have been sent to the house within 30 days; they were not sent within this given timeframe. This means that, legally, the decree is not valid and parliament should reject it at once.” He also added that, rather than reforming the election commissions, the only thing the decree did was give legitimacy to the Selection Committee and serve the interests of “a few people.”

Others were of the opinion that, although the constitution had indeed been violated, this did not, per se, invalidate the decree. Muhammad Sarwar Osmani, a member of the judicial commission of the Wolesi Jirga, for instance, told AAN on 24 May 2016, that although sending the decree late “is a violation of the law, the decree is still effective.”

Several MPs argued that the decree needed further amendments, and that, rather than rejecting it, the parliament should be sent a document they could work on. MP Mir Bad Khan Mangal, for instance, told Mandegar that “the decree needs amendments, but according to its principles, the house does not have the right to make amendments to a legislative decree. Instead of the decree, the government should send the draft law on Structure, Duties and Authorities of the Electoral Commission, so that the different views can be included. The legislative decree is not convincing or acceptable to the members of the house.”

Other MPs, however, believe they are in a position to amend the decree and, apparently, several amendments have been suggested, although the extent of support for them is unclear. Such amendments include a stipulation that the members of the electoral commissions should ultimately be appointed, not by the president alone, but in consultation with the chief executive.

The main controversial amendment

Most controversially, the new Structure Law decree has, again, changed the composition of the Selection Committee. The Selection Committee is the body that gathers and vets the applications for the posts of IEC and IECC commissioners and then presents a shortlist of candidates to the president for him to choose from. It is thus a very influential body, as it determines the range of choices the president has in appointing the people who will manage the next election (and who, in all past elections, have been accused of bias and rather sophisticated manipulation).

The IEC and IECC have always argued that there was no need for such a committee at this point, as the term of both electoral bodies had not yet run out. They were appointed in July 2013 by President Karzai and their tenure is supposed to be unrelated to who is in government. The IEC and IECC commissions’ point, therefore, has always been that replacing them was unnecessary, unlawful and harmful to the election process.

In practice, however, the electoral bodies have been changed in the run-up to every single election so far. In most cases, it was the push for electoral reform that was used to make sure this was necessary. It is in this respect useful to remember what has been noted in earlier AAN analyses (here and here ) on the recent ‘electoral reform’ drive:

“What can easily be overlooked in all these controversies about detail is the fact that what MPs call ‘electoral reform’ is actually very limited, aiming primarily at getting rid of the electoral commissioners” and “Although everyone is talking about ‘reform’, the wrangling really boils down to a struggle for control of the electoral bodies and, ultimately, the outcome of upcoming elections.”

The CEO’s camp has always insisted on the full replacement of both electoral bodies, while the president’s camp has shown great reluctance to do this.

What complicated the matter is the fact that the Selection Committee had already been established in December 2015, based on the previous decree establishing the Structure Law, and had started its work. After its first meeting on 31 December 2015, it announced a ten-day period (2-12 January 2016) for the submission of applications. However, when the parliament voted down both decrees, the work of the committee came to a halt and it has been inactive ever since.

The new presidential decree, gazetted in March 2016, changed the composition of the Selection Committee. It replaced the media representative and representative of the Independent Administrative and Civil Service Reform Commission (IACSRC) with the speaker of the Wolesi Jirga and the head of the Meshrano Jirga. The various institutions – the Supreme Court, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution (ICOIC) – are no longer represented by an internally elected member, but by the heads of these organisations. From the previous selection committee, only the two elected civil society representatives have kept their seats. (5)

The ‘new’ composition largely reverses the reform suggestions made by the Special Electoral Reform Commission (SERC). When the SERC removed the heads of the Wolesi and Meshrano Jirga chairs from the original selection committee, it did so because they would likely have an obvious stake in the upcoming elections. The SERC also recommended replacing the heads of the Supreme Court, AIHRC and ICOIC with internally elected members, as they believed the heads might be more prone to government influence.

Some of the civil society organisations involved in the elections have criticised the changes to the composition of the Selection Committee. Habib ul-Rahman Nang, a member of the Afghanistan Civil Society Election Network (ACSEN) said the appointment of the heads of the two houses of parliament and of the Supreme Court “is against article 152 of the Constitution and brings the legal credibility of the committee into question.” Speaking to AAN on 14 April 2016, Jandad Spinghar, head of ACSEN and former advisor to the CEO on electoral reforms maintained that the committee would now be more prone to influence by the government. He said it was a “sort of deal [of the government] with parliament to manipulate the process.” He further criticised the government for disregarding the SERC’s recommendations and for dropping its long-term recommendations package (which included changes in the electoral system).

Shah Sultan Akefi, the former chairman of SERC, specified the three points relating to the Selection Committee, that were in the original reform package and have now been dropped by the government: (a) the government has reverted to the old composition, bringing back the heads of the two houses of the parliament into the committee, with as the only change from the last election, the inclusion of a women’s groups representative; (b) while the SERC had suggested decreasing and staggering the terms of the IEC commissioners (some to three and others to five years, so that not all would be replaced at the same time), the government increased them all back to six years; and (c) while the SERC had reduced the number of IEC commissioners to seven members, the government raised it back to nine.

Changes based on the SERC’s recommendations that were retained include: the establishment of voter lists based on voters’ tazkeras (ID documents); changes in the composition of the Wolesi Jirga (extra, separate seat for Sikhs and Hindus) and the provincial and district councils (25% women’s quota); and the employment of school teachers and other civil servants as temporary electoral personnel.

If the decree is passed

If the decree is passed, the Selection Committee can start its work and it has already indicated that it intends to do so. It will probably announce a new round of applications, given that the previous round was cut short when the decree was voted down. Also, the Selection Committee had received only a small number of applications from women (36 out of a total of 400). Moreover, the new members of the Selection Committee may have friends whom they want to encourage to apply. Members of the Selection Committee have indicated that they are operating under the impression that the president and CEO intend to replace both commissions in full. They will thus send lists for the maximum number of candidates (27 for 9 IEC positions, and 15 for 9 IECC positions).

It is, however, not obvious from the law that any of the commissioners are up for replacement, other than the former IEC Chair, Yusuf Nuristani, who resigned on 26 March 2016. (6) The previous decree had changed both the number of commissioners and the duration of their tenure (at least for some), making a wholesale overhaul of the commission a more likely scenario (how otherwise to decide which commissioners to keep and which to discard and to give the shorter tenures?) At the moment there is no such legal reason for replacing the sitting commissioners. There also does not seem to be a solid political agreement between the president and the CEO on this matter. This means that the discussion on which commissioners are to be replaced, and how many, may still need to be had. Theoretically, although this would be politically very controversial, it seems the president could still choose to replace only Nuristani.

Practical improbabilities

Over the last weeks the government has consistently and increasingly reiterated its commitment to holding the elections, on time, as planned. On 30 May 2016, the presidential office released a statement suggesting practical preparations, discussed during a meeting of the National Security Council that had been chaired by the president:

“‫Reconfirming the full commitment and will of the government to hold the Wolesi Jirga and district council elections, the National Security Council thoroughly reviewed the initial report of the security plan for the elections and gave necessary instructions to relevant agencies to finalise the election security plan. Also, the National Security Council instructed the Ministry of Finance to continue to review the funding required for the election with donors, and to assure them of the commitment of the Afghan government to honour its pledge to pay the election costs. Reiterating the importance of holding elections, the National Security Council instructed relevant institutions to accelerate making the legal plans of the election process‫.

 On 8 June 2016, Vice-President Danesh reiterated the message, when he finally formally introduced nominees for the posts of Minister of Defence and General Director of the National Directorate of Security. He invoked the joint responsibility of the government and the national assembly, the will of the people and the preconditions of the donors:

At the end, I would like to convey to you another message from government. As you are aware, the government, based on its legal duty, is determined to hold Wolesi Jirga and district council elections this year. Holding elections is a joint responsibility of the government and the national assembly. The people of Afghanistan, including all political parties and civic organizations, demand it. The international community has also set the holding of elections and electoral reforms as a precondition for their political and financial commitments at the Brussels conference.

 The security, financial and technical preparations are being completed by the government. A few days ago a letter was sent by the president to the Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon regarding the government’s readiness to hold elections, asking for assistance and support in this regard. Earlier, a UN delegation conducted a review of the general situation for holding elections and presented its report to the UN.

So the key to start elections and electoral reform is in your hands, the representatives of people in the national assembly, to open the way for holding elections and starting electoral reforms by approving the law on the structure and duties of the electoral commissions, in any way and with any type of amendment and addition that you see necessary. The people of Afghanistan are patiently waiting for you to prepare the ground hold elections as soon as possible, by your wise and rational decision.

The government’s insistence that the elections will be held as planned, however, is in stark contrast to the unlikelihood that this is still even remotely possible. These elections are more complicated than the previous ones given that, for the first time, they are supposed to include district elections with their dizzying array of candidates and seats to compete for, and their untested district electoral boundaries. According to the new law, moreover, voters are now supposed to be registered based on their tazkeras, so that the massively fraud-prone voter cards can be discarded. They will also need to be linked to districts, if not polling centres.

Legally speaking, there are two clear timelines in the Election Law. First, the IEC needs to announce the election date at least 180 days ahead of the election, which it did on 18 January 2016 (see AAN’s dispatch here). Second, the IEC needs to publish its electoral calendar at least 120 days before election day. This means that the electoral calendar needs to be published at the latest on 17 June 2016 – ie next week – to still be able to, legally, plan for October elections (let alone practically). (7)

The IEC, however, is in a state of disarray. Donors cut electoral funding in May 2015 (discussed here), with the understanding that they would probably resume their funding once it seemed likely that the elections would indeed take place (based on realistic planning and meaningful reform). The funding cuts forced the electoral institutions to go into ‘hibernation mode.’ The IEC has, since then, announced the date of the elections and suddenly released the withheld 2014 presidential election results, but has done little else. After the resignation of the IEC Chair on 26 March 2016, the commission appears to have become fully inactive.

An end to the reforms?

With the sending of the decree to the Wolesi Jirga and the repeated insistence that it is now up to the parliament to ‘do its job,’ the government seems to have tried to shift the blame and to divert attention both from the absence of meaningful electoral reform and from the sheer improbability of its insistence that the elections will still be held in a little over four months’ time. But the government’s handling of the decrees seems to signify two things: the prioritisation of rushing through electoral preparations, and the boiling down of technical (and political) reforms to a discussion of who gets to influence the composition of the electoral management bodies.

The national unity government – in effect the Palace, but with little push-back from the CEO (who seems focused on a narrow set of issues surrounding the composition of the IEC, IECC and Selection Committee) – seems to have done the absolute minimum when it comes to electoral reform. There are no indications that the proposed changes will help mitigate the problems that have plagued Afghanistan’s past elections (with the possible exception of the decision to no longer use the current voter cards, but in the absence of concrete plans, this may well remain an aspiration only).

So what will happen now? First of all, it seems unlikely that, if parliament does vote down the Structure Law decree again, the president would send a new one. There have already been hints that the Palace may be looking into ‘alternatives’. This was, for instance, hinted at by a presidential deputy spokesperson Dawa Khan Minapal when he told Mandegar Daily on 6 June 2016, that the president had made it clear in a meeting with the heads of both houses of parliament that, if the decree was not approved, he would, with their consent, provide another legal alternative. This seems to imply that the Palace may, after all, ask the Supreme Court for a ruling.

There have also been vague pronouncements by the government that the further-reaching reforms are not completely off the table, and there have been indications that they may take place after the parliamentary and district elections. According to SERC chair Akefi, the national unity government leadership had “in principle” accepted the SERC’s recommendations to change the electoral system, establish a special electoral court and use technology in the electoral processes (in particular, to replace the current system of voter cards that facilitated mass fraud). But because the implementation of these recommendations before the upcoming elections was logistically and technically impossible, the government “would consider these changes for future elections, after the upcoming elections are held.” However, the commitments to do so are paper-thin.

Implementing the twin demands of fundamental electoral reform and speedy elections, in the context of a unity government that is deeply divided on these issues, was never going to be easy. But the pretence that it is still possible to plan and prepare for an election this year seems unhelpful and counterproductive.

 

(1) The relevant passages in the political agreement can be found under A and E: 

A. Convening of a Loya Jirga to amend the Constitution and considering the proposal to create the post of executive prime minister

• On the basis of Article 2 of the Joint Statement of 17 Asad 1393 (August 8, 2014) and its attachment (“…convening of a Loya Jirga in two years to consider the post of an executive prime minister”), the President is committed to convoking a Loya Jirga for the purpose of debate on amending the Constitution and creating a post of executive prime minister.
• After the inauguration ceremony, the President will appoint in consultation with the CEO by executive order a commission to draft an amendment to the Constitution.
• On the basis of Article 140 of the Constitution, the national unity government is committed to holding district council elections as early as possible on the basis of a law in order to create a quorum for the Loya Jirga in accordance with Section 2 of Article 110 of the Constitution.
• The national unity government is committed to ratifying and enforcing a law on the organization of the basic organs of the state and determination of the boundaries and limits of local administration by legal means.
• The national unity government commits to completing the distribution of electronic/computerized identity cards to all the citizens of the country as quickly as possible.
• The above issues and other matters that are agreed to will be implemented on a schedule which is appended to this agreement.

E. To ensure that future elections are fully credible, the electoral system (laws and institutions) requires fundamental changes. Immediately after the establishment of the government of national unity, the President will issue a decree to form a special commission for the reform of the electoral system in accordance with Article 7 of the Political Framework. Members of the special commission will be agreed between the President and the CEO. The special commission will report to the CEO on its progress and the Cabinet will review its recommendations and take the necessary steps for their implementation. The objective is to implement electoral reform before the 2015 parliamentary elections.

For the full text of the political agreement see here.

(2) The decrees are both dated 28 February 2016, but they may have been backdated, as the government did not announce their existence until the very last moment (which was on 5 March 2016, the day the Wolesi Jirga had already been scheduled to reconvene). In the days before the announcement, when the decree was already supposed to have been signed, there were still differing views as to their content and implications. On 2 March 2016, for instance, this Mandegar article quoted Vice President Sarwar Danesh on the composition of the Selection Committee, saying that some members would be replaced, while Abdullah’s deputy spokesperson, in the same article, claimed the new members would simply be added to the existing composition (in the end Danesh was right).

(3) Article seventy nine of the constitution states that: During the recess of the House of Representatives, the Government shall, in case of an immediate need, issue legislative decrees, except in matters related to budget and financial affairs. Legislative decrees, after endorsement by the President, shall acquire the force of law. Legislative decrees shall be presented to the National Assembly within thirty days of convening its first session, and if rejected by the National Assembly, they become void.

The executive, under both Karzai and Ghani, has developed a habit of using the parliamentary recess to pass legislative decrees for laws that appear ‘too complicated’ for the normal parliamentary review and voting process. Supporters argue this approach is covered by the ‘immediate need’ phrase in the article.

(4) The recurring confusion over whether the parliament is still allowed to discuss the laws governing the elecions is based on Article 109 of the Constitution, which states that: Proposals to amend the electoral law shall not be included in the agenda of the Assembly during the last year of the legislative term. At different times this has been interpreted to mean different things. One of the interpretations is that the ban covers the Electoral Law, but not the Structure Law (despite the fact that the two laws used to make up the single Election Law, before it was split by parliament; see here). For recent examples of discussions on the meaning of Article 109, see here and here; for examples of a similar confusion in 2010, see here and here.

(5) The earlier Selection Committee, based on presidential decree 85, was made up of Fahim Dashti from the Journalist Federation representing media institutions, Ahmad Zia Langari from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Zarqa Yaftali representing women’s rights defence organizations, Muhammad Naim Ayubzada from TEFA representing election observer organisations, Lotf-ul-Rahman from the Commission for Overseeing Implementation of the Constitution, and Muhammad Nader Hotak from the Independent Administrative and Civil Service Reform Commission. Only Zarqa Yaftali and Naim Ayubzada have retained their seats on the committee. Fahim Dashti, an Abdullah loyalist and one of the two members of the Selection Committee whose position was completely discontinued, claimed that the amendments had been personally targeted and guided by a political hand (he, in particular, pointed the finger at National Security Advisor Hanif Atmar).

(6) It is not clear if Nuristani’s resignation was a result of an agreement between the two camps and their consequent joint pressure, or if it was indeed his own decision, made “for the sake of the stability of Afghanistan” and to ease the “pressures” on the election process, as he maintains. His resignation, and the praise he received from the government (as well as rumours that he was going to be appointed as Ambassador), may well have been an honourable exit offered by the president’s camp as a concession to the CEO, in return for him backing down on more fundamental reforms.

(7) The electoral calendar sets the timelines for candidate nomination and verification, the campaign period and the various complaints processes, and provides estimated dates for the preliminary and final election results. To get an idea what such a calendar would practically look like, it is instructive revisit the 2010 elections (which was less complicated than the upcoming one, as it included only a Wolesi Jirga election, without the district councils vote).

The 2010 Wolesi Jirga election was scheduled for 8 September 2010. Candidate nomination, at the time, took place from 20 April to 5 May 2010. It was concluded over four months before election day – which would be about now, if the same calendar were followed for the upcoming election. Candidate vetting was concluded on 6 July 2010, ie two whole months after candidate nomination ended, in an election with a lot less candidates than the upcoming one will have.

The TUTAP commission established by President Ghani following massive protests recently decided in favour of the Salang route for a north-south power line. The commission ruled further that Bamyan should get its own 220KV power line by 2019. This is a balanced solution in the midst of crisis, meant to temper ethnic tensions that arose from speculation and political manipulation on the original routing of the power line. Some members of the protest movement have accepted the decision but still question whether it will be implemented; others continue to mobilise. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica and Thomas Ruttig report from Bamyan, with contributions from Ali Yawar Adili, on the issue of the power supply to the province, the national power grid, regional electrical power sharing and the spectrum of opinions throughout the province.   

Electricity-related protests are not a new phenomenon in Bamyan. Civil society activists from Afghanistan’s central highlands organised the first protest in 2009. Esmail Zaki, Coordinator of the Civil Society and Human Rights Network for the Central Region, told AAN that the first protest was held under banners depicting typical Hazarajat shrubs with the slogan, “Please save me.” Bamyan is not connected to a national grid and activists have warned of an inevitable environmental catastrophe should local people be forced to continue using scarce vegetation, such as shrubs and bushes, in a region already prone to erosion, as their basic source of fuel. Therefore, the protests not only reflected a genuine ‘desire for electricity’ but also concerns for the local environment. However, he said, development needs got mixed up with political demands, and “the people who claim they are the leaders of these [May 2016 TUTAP] protests are the same people we were protesting against in 2009.”

Civil society networks in Bamyan province began to protest in 2009 because the province still had no reliable electricity supply, almost a decade into what was supposed to have been a reconstruction-oriented international intervention, that had brought in large amounts of investment. A 2011 Afghan government survey (1) found that “animal dung was the most common source of energy for cooking in Bamyan,” with 45.5 percent of households using it for this purpose, followed by straw, shrubs or grass and wood. In three out of five households, domestic solar power panels usually attached to the roof of a house were most commonly used for heating and lighting.

Dung cakes (chalma) are still widely used in rural areas of Bamyan, here stored in a cave. Photo: Thomas Ruttig.

This situation changed for the better in January 2014, when a New Zealand-financed multi-million off-grid solar power project went online. (New Zealand led the Bamyan Provincial Reconstruction Team until April 2013 and the country continues to finance development projects in the province). With a 1 MW output, this is one of the largest off-grid solar systems in the world (for facts and figures about it see here). It originally supplied clean electricity 24 hours a day to 2,500 of the 3,500 households in Bamyan (with around 33,000 people, according to official Afghan data), businesses and government buildings, including schools and hospitals, in Bamyan’s New City and the towns of Haiderabad and Mulla Ghulam districts. The Norwegian government extended the system for an additional number of households in 2015.

However, while the off-grid solar panels are now providing a basic power supply to the provincial centre, it is still the only source of much-needed electricity to the province. AAN observed, while in Bamyan city, that electricity is not in fact available 24 hours a day; instead it runs from 6.00am to 11.00am and from 6.00pm to 11.00pm. A number of communities in and around the city still lack power (some people, mainly Tajiks and IDPs, still live in caves to the west of Bamyan city); and in the province’s outlying districts, the situation is, of course, much worse.

Many people in Bamyan city complain about how expensive solar electricity is. While Kabul citizens pay 2 Afghanis for 1kV, in Bamyan the price is 16 Afghanis. In September 2015, Ghulam Haidar Sadiqi, the director of Da Afghanistan Bresha Sherkat (DABS), the state-owned electricity company, said that a provincial committee had fixed the rates because of the high maintenance costs of the solar power system and its losses, including damaged batteries and solar panels.

In 2016, Zaki’s civil society network organised five TUTAP-related protests. The protesters demanded that the route of a planned high voltage 500 kV transmission power line, linking the north of Afghanistan to the south, pass through Bamyan instead of the Salang Pass, as previously decided by the Karzai government in December 2013. They based their demands on statements by Hazara political party leaders in Kabul who referred to a study by a German consulting firm that seemed to favour the Bamyan route. In fact, however, the final decision was always to be taken by the Afghan government.

The first of the renewed protests was organised in January 2016 when the network first learned about the TUTAP line not being routed through Bamyan province. During one of the protests, participants placed a giant alekain, a regionally popular kerosene (hurricane) lamp, on a pedestal in the middle of one of the city’s main squares, an artistic reminder for passers-by of the electricity issue. The alekain had also been chosen as the symbol of the TUTAP protest movement organised from Kabul (see an earlier AAN dispatch here). The protesters vowed to take the memorial down only when Bamyan’s electricity problems had been solved, and various representatives among local authorities and the provincial council, who had initially supported the protests, told AAN they did not mind the lamp staying.

The commission’s recommendations and findings

On 15 May 2016, Ghani established the national commission (known to the public as the TUTAP Commission) for reviewing the power line project; he particularly tasked its members to review the cabinet decision of 30 April 2016 to route the north-south power transmission line through the Salang Pass. Ghani also suspended the ongoing procurement process for the companies that would construct the power line. The establishment of the commission, the day before the large protests in Kabul and Bamyan of 16 May 2016 that had already been announced, was intended to preempt the protests, but they were held anyway.

The latest protest took place on 29 May 2016 in the provincial capital, but only 60 people – mainly women – gathered at ‘lamp square,’ to reiterate their demand that the main TUTAP power line be routed through Bamyan. It was a protest against the TUTAP power line commission’s ruling made in favour of the Salang route five days earlier on 24 May 2016. Many protesters, not aware of the 2013 decision, saw the commission’s decision in favour of the route through the non-Hazara Salang region as discrimination against the Hazara population.

The commission’s report presented a balanced solution meant to calm the ethnic tensions that had flared up in Kabul and the central region. The fact that the body was looking at an already approved and financed project, however, left little room for manoeuvre, as changes would have required relaunching the entire project, with new surveys, environmental studies and project documents, delaying the implementation considerably. (2)

The commission, led by Dr Muhammad Humayun Qayumi (an engineer and professor who currently serves as the president’s chief adviser on infrastructure and technology and is the head of the influential Development Council established by Ghani), originally comprised of 13 members. It initially included six Hazaras of different political backgrounds (some also put the Ismaili leader’s son Mansur Naderi, Minister for Urban Development, in this group which would have given the majority of seven) to give the ethnic group that constituted the bulk of the protesters a significant voice.

The six Hazara members appointed by Ghani were:

• Ahmad Behzad, MP from Herat, one of the protest leaders and in the group of those 31 MPs currently boycotting parliament (see this AAN analysis);
• Barna Karimi, a former deputy chief of staff during President Hamed Karzai’s administration, former deputy minister for policy with the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and Afghan Ambassador to Canada in 2012 and 2013; in 2015, he was Ghani’s first nominee for the post of Minister of Telecommunications but his nomination was rejected by parliament;
• Abdul Qayum Sajadi, a Ghazni MP in the Wolesi Jirga, founder of a Kabul-based think-tank, the Afghan Centre for Strategic Studies as well as editor-in-chief of Fajr-e Omid monthly and Guftaman-e Now, an academic quarterly journal;
• Assadullah Sadati, an MP from Daikundi province and chief editor of Musharekat weekly of Hezb-e Wahdat Islami-ye Mardom led by Khalili; he is also a member of the Enlightening Movement’s leadership council;
• Ustad Muhammad Akbari, a former mujahedin leader from Bamyan and the founder of Hezb-e-Wahdat-e Melli-ye Islami, MP for Bamyan; (3)
• Engineer Muhammad Nasir Ahmadi, CEO and founder of the company Omran Holding Group since 2004, a Hazara originally from Uruzgan.

The other members appointed were former jihadi commander and MP from Parwan, Haji Almas Zahed, a Jamiati; the second deputy speaker of the Meshrano Jirga, Hasibullah Kalimzai, a Pashtun from Maidan Wardak province; two current ministers (Sayed Sadat Mansur Naderi, for urban development, son of the Baghlan Ismaili community leader; and Minister of Economy Abdul Sattar Murad, another Jamiati); Deputy Head of the National Security Council, Faizullah Zaki, an Uzbek close to Jombesh leader General Dostum; and finally former finance minister Hazrat Omar Zakhilwal, now Afghan ambassador to Pakistan. It was Zakhilwal who had signed the grant agreement with ADB for the power line project via the Salang route in December 2013 on behalf of the Afghan government (more on this later).

However, from among Ghani’s Hazara appointees, only Karimi accepted. Behzad, Sajadi, Sadati, Akbari and Ahmadi refused to attend the commission’s meetings. Behzad said their movement would continue to protest. Thus, the commission was reshuffled again on 18 May 2016, as published on the official Facebook page of Vice President Danesh’s office. In their places, three other Hazaras or Shia were appointed, bringing the number of commissioners down to 11. The three new ones were:

• Humayun Rasa, Minister of Trade and Industries, a Bayat, a subgroup of the Hazara;
• Mahmud Balegh, Minister of Public Works, a Hazara from Daikundi, associated with Khalili and Danesh; and
• Sayyed Muhammad Hassan Sharifi, a Hazara MP from Sarepul, affiliated with Mohaqqeq.

The commission came to the following decision, in a 12-page report (the full text is available here, in Dari):

In order to protect the important interests of the country, in order to ensure national unity and the stability of Afghanistan, for the sake of preventing ethnic and regional tensions and confrontation due to a fait accompli and the fact that all technical and procurement phases of the 500 KV power transmission project from the north to the south through Salang route have been completed over the last two and half years and considering the findings of the National Commission after reviewing the relevant documents, the procurement phase of the project [via Salang Pass] should be resumed.

The plan to provide electricity to Bamyan province through a 220 KV power transmission line from Poshta-ye-Sorkh [a power sub-station in Jabal-us-Saraj district of Parwan province, built with Indian government support and inaugurated in January 2016] cannot meet the strategic needs to develop a national power network in the country and the Commission recommends that the 220 KV power transmission line project (double circuit) with the capacity to carry 300 megawatts from Doshi [district of Baghlan] to the central region, which has the capability of providing electricity to all central provinces, be implemented…

According to the commission, a power distribution grid in Bamyan province should provide electricity to at least 20,000 families by November 2019. The commission also suggested that when “the thermal power station in Eshpushta of Bamyan is constructed, a 500 KV power transmission line from Eshpushta to Arghandi [should] be constructed. The budget for this project should be prepared by the Ministry of Finance and submitted to parliament during the national budget’s 1395 (2016/2017) mid-year review.”

The power line to Bamyan was a compromise to cater to the Bamyanis’ demand for electricity, as well as the related development which they hoped would come with it.

Following the commission’s decision, Ghani issued a decree (available in Dari here and a summary in English here), which reiterates the commission’s wording, although in a different order, putting Bamyan’s future plans first, while the Salang route resumption comes second.

A glimpse into the past: the consultants’ report and the ADB loan

The German consulting company Fichtner, which has a monopoly on energy sector consultancies in Afghanistan (the company is used by the German Development Bank KfW, the Asia Development Bank and USAID), developed the country’s Power Sector Master Plan in May 2013. The 450-page document was in fact a desk study conducted from Fichtner’s home office in Stuttgart (see the letter from Fichtner to DABS dated 1 February 2016, published here by Pajhwok), in which the company discusses the optimum solution for the north-south power connection, which is a part of TUTAP.

In its executive summary, the 2013 desk study’s Master Plan favoured the Bamyan route over the Salang Pass:

For the additional Hindu Kush crossing it is recommended to use the so- called Bamyan route for a new transmission line on 500 kV level. The Bamyan route will avoid the narrow space and difficulties along the Salang Pass, will allow connecting further generation by coal fired power plants along the route and will secure power supply of Kabul and south Afghanistan by using a separate route. (4)

It was not until after May 2013 that Fichtner carried out a field survey in Afghanistan regarding the north-south power line (see this letter from Fichtner to DABS dated 1 February 2016). The results of this walk-through survey combined with satellite imagery showed that the Salang Pass route was feasible, contrary to Fichtner’s findings in the desk review study. Following Fichtner’s field research in 2013, the parties involved, namely DABS, ADB and the Ministry of Energy and Water decided that the Salang Pass corridor would be used to construct the 500kV line between Dasht-e Alwan (near Pul-e Khumri) to Kabul province (Arghandeh, to the west of the capital).

In December 2013, the ADB approved a 99 million US dollars grant to the Afghan government for the construction of the north-south power transmission line from Pul-e Khumri to Kabul. The money came from the US and Japan. The project documentation was finalised and the grant agreement signed on 14 December 2013 by then-Minister of Finance Zakhilwal and the representative of ADB. The publicly available project documentation clearly indicates that the Salang Pass was chosen in 2013. It did not fail to mention the challenges posed by the Salang route, which became part of the Hazara leaders’ arguments in favour of the Bamyan route. (5) However, when the debate about the route re-surfaced in January 2016, none of the political leaders, who outspokenly pointed to discrimination, mentioned the project documentation that had been available online in three languages: Dari, Pashto and English.

This, along with ex-minister Zakhilwal’s involvement, the man who signed the controversial agreement and who was appointed a member of the commission tasked to review the project, became another cause for suspicion among the Hazara leaders. Zakhilwal, however, maintained neutrality by not signing the final report of the TUTAP commission.

During the 2014 election year, the project lay dormant. The following year, however, the procurement process for the company (or companies) that will construct the line began. (The government had already taken a decision, but had not yet issued a contract or made it public, as future developments blocked this process.)

This went smoothly until January 2016 when Second Vice President Muhammad Sarwar Danesh wrote a letter, first to President Ghani and then to the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and DABS, to raise his concerns about the routing of the TUTAP via the Salang. The letter came at the moment the procurement documents were sent to the national procurement commission, established by Ghani, for its approval. At this point, the ADB had also signed off on the documents, confirming that procurement was in line with the agreed standards of the grant agreement.

It is unclear why Danesh – who, as acting higher education minister was in the cabinet from 2010 to 2014 – and other Hazara leaders had not come up with these complaints in 2013. More intriguingly, Karim Khalili, then-Vice President of Afghanistan, did not complain in 2013, but he helped mobilise opposition to the TUTAP decision in 2016. The saga culminated in the Great Monday protest that was held on 16 May 2016 and was reported on in detail by AAN.

Fichtner writes a letter

Earlier this year, the German consultants from Fichtner felt compelled – after some Afghan lobbying in Stuttgart, as AAN heard from within the development community – to interfere in the matter, now favouring the Salang route in its 1 February 2016 letter to DABS. Among the reasons given was that the line via Bamyan would cost an additional 35 million US dollars and that the project might be delayed by approximately two years, the time required for designing and tendering the new route, if it was indeed routed through Bamyan. Fichtner also pointed out that the new route might delay the implementation of power purchases and sales related to the electricity agreement with Turkmenistan signed in May 2015. According to this agreement, Turkmenistan would increase the volume of exported electricity to Afghanistan four-fold between 2018 and 2027.

Additionally, Fichtner argued that the provision of power to the southern provinces of Kandahar, Khost and Ghazni (in a parallel project financed by USAID which would link power lines from Kabul to the South) might also be deferred by two to three years.

It also seems that the company did not understand – or ignored –the fragile ethnic balance in the country and had rushed into unnecessarily hasty conclusions on the routing of the power lines, first in its 2013 master plan and then again with the 2016 letter.

Why would one want a high voltage power line?

While the early 2009 Bamyan protests reflected genuine popular demands for electricity in a province where there was no power supply at all at the time, the latest protests, although bigger, have become more politicised and convoluted. It is thus becoming more difficult to differentiate between honest calls for community development and political manipulation.

AAN recently visited Bamyan’s provincial centre to discuss the TUTAP power line with a number of interlocutors: civil society representatives, political party and provincial council representatives, the provincial governor and Bamyan University representatives. This range offered different interpretations of the issue, but more significantly it pointed out the growing polarisation in public opinion regarding the TUTAP power line.

One end of the spectrum, opinions were firm that the TUTAP line through Bamyan was a must, explaining that “originally we wanted electricity, now we want equality.” Many at this end of the spectrum, at least for those communities far from Kabul, saw the “non-transparent” changing of the routes from Bamyan to the Salang as “discrimination” against the Hazara or entire central highlands community. Those who used the former version often referred to “hundreds” of years of discrimination of their particular ethno-religious groups by the (Pashtun-dominated) centre; a trend that, they said, continued under both post-Taleban presidents. Some even used the word “fascist.”

Those who spoke about the highlands community in general included both Hazaras and Tajiks, who dominated Bamyan city up until the mid-1990s. In Bamyan city, inter-ethnic relations are complicated by land conflicts. In the Tajik-majority districts of Kahmard and Saighan, memories of warlord atrocities and the desecration of Sunni mosques from the mid-1990s factional wars are still fresh.

Those at the other end of the spectrum were more moderate and supported the TUTAP commission’s decision. They included members of Mohaqqeq’s wing of Hezb-e Wahdat, who had initially participated in the protests in both Kabul and Bamyan, and of smaller (predominantly) non-Hazara parties in Bamyan, including Jamiat-e Islami, Harakat-e Islami (Anwari) and Ensejam-e Melli led by Karzai ally Sadeq Modaber.

Amin Joya, the Dean of Bamyan University, summarised the issue for AAN with a rhetorical question: “The issues here are mixed up. Is what people need the cables, or do they need the electricity?” He also pointed out the environmental issues related to the TUTAP power line, that had figured in the original 2009 protests, and the industrialisation many hope would come with it. He said: “If Bamyan is to be industrialised, that would be a disaster for the country; five rivers have their sources in these mountains”, pointing out that large mining projects would drain local water resources and possibly pollute the rivers, with effects far beyond Hazarajat.

Zaki, from the local civil society, said that local political parties had joined the electricity protests organised by his network and other groups, not the other way around. He also said that although they were optimistic about the commission’s decision, “we don’t believe in it.”

Muhammad Mahdi, a member of Akbari’s Hezb-e-Wahdat wing from Bamyan said “We want a guarantee that we will get electricity. If they do not start work in one month, we will start demonstrations again.” This sentiment was echoed by local representative of Jamiat-e-Islami. Both Jamiat-e-Islami and Mahdi’s Hezb faction are members of a new Justice Council of Political Parties in Bamyan that stands against what it calls “the almost complete political domination of Khalili’s Hezb-e-Wahdat in the province.”

According to Ghani’s decree, the planning of the power line to Bamyan should start in June 2016. Tahir Zohair, the provincial governor of Bamyan, told AAN that they had not yet received any official paperwork from Kabul, but he was hopeful it would come soon. Others, like Mahdi, have less trust in the government.

Kabul arguments

In the capital, there seems to be a disagreement between the civil society part of Jombesh-e Roshnayi (the Enlightening Movement) and its political party affiliates. The statement of the movement from 27 May 2016 suggests that the movement is losing width. “Those who separated from the ranks of the people in this advocacy and justice-seeking struggle and stood by the government will also be unveiled when necessary”, the statement said, in a not entirely veiled nod at party leader Mohaqqeq and Vice President Danesh, who accepted the TUTAP commission’s ‘anti-Bamyan’ decision. Gul Amir Naimi, representative of Mohaqqeq’s Hezb-e-Wahdat in Bamyan, told AAN that there are now two protest movements on TUTAP in Afghanistan.

The Enlightening Movement’s statement was issued on the day a smaller protest was held in Kabul, on 27 May 2016. Hasht-e-Sobh daily put the number of participants in the gathering in the “hundreds,” while Assadullah Sadati, one of the prospective TUTAP commission members who boycotted it and who participated in the protest gathering, reported “thousands” of participants in a post on his Facebook page. BBC Persian also reported on the gathering but gave no numbers of protesters and added  that despite the new protests by the Enlightening Movement, a number of leaders, including Deputy CEO Mohaqqeq and Vice President Danesh had accepted the government’s decision and called on the protestors to cease and wait for the project to be implemented.

Two days later, on 29 May 2016, the People’s High Council issued another statement. Firstly, it thanked the people of Kabul for participating in the second gathering and called on “the supporters of the Enlightening Movement and all justice-seekers of the country in Kabul and provinces to resort to indefinite civil resistances.” As one possible means of such resistance it mentioned the “refusal to pay the electricity bills to the traitorous Breshna Sherkat.”

This call, in particular, was met with criticism even by some of those otherwise sympathetic with the movement. Social media activists said that over the years, powerful and corrupt government officials had not paid for their electricity, and this call was an (indirect) endorsement of their misdeeds. One said that while certain officials had power (both kinds) and would not be harmed, poor people in Dasht-e Barchi or Khairkhana or Shah Shahid who refused to pay their bills would have their electricity cut off.

Zaki Daryabi, a social media activist who also runs Ettilaat-e Roz (News of the Day) newspaper wrote: “The Enlightening Movement may call on the people to refuse to pay their electricity bill. [But then] the government will ask Breshna to cut off their electricity.”

A lack of transparency and ethnic politics

Deputy Minister for Energy and Water Amanullah Ghaleb warned on 24 May 2016 to 1TV that ethnic aspects should not influence national projects. But the north-south transmission route became an issue of ethnic politics anyway. In the letter Vice President Danesh sent to Ghani in January 2016, he stated in rather moderate words that the central region had frequently demanded justice from the government, as well as more consideration for its general development needs. Mohaqqeq, in a Facebook post on 12 January, upped the ante by saying that what Danesh had mentioned in his letter was the result of “discriminatory tendencies of former [government] officials,” indirectly pointing to people in the Karzai administration. The “discrimination” (tab’iz) word was then picked up by a broad segment of the May 2016 protesters in Kabul and political activists in Bamyan.

This directly relates to memories of the century-long, pre-war history of discrimination against the Hazaras in a Pashtun-dominated state. These memories still make many Hazaras suspicious of any central government, particularly if led by Pashtuns. These feelings were exacerbated by the lack of transparency in parts of the TUTAP decision-making process (putting project documents on the internet does not suffice in the Afghan context), the shifting position of the German consulting firm, the fact that the New Zealand-sponsored solar grid in Bamyan only started functioning in 2014. Add to this, more generally, the lack of performance by the National Unity Government (see latest AAN analysis), particularly in the socio-economic sphere, as well as the continuing government efforts to reconcile with armed insurgents groups that many Hazaras see as an attempt to strengthen the Pashtun part of the Kabul centre, as recently reflected in the initialling of the agreement with Hezb-e Islami (AAN analysis here). Several interlocutors in Bamyan told AAN that, in the past, the province received development aid only because people raised their voices and protested. Ustad Ebtehaj, the professor of Persian literature at the University of Bamyan and a member of Khalili’s faction of Hezb, told AAN: “All the projects that Bamyan has received have been approved because we, the people, created the pressure.”

This atmosphere has turned the TUTAP issue into a fertile playground for manipulation and ethnicisation. Various Hazara political leaders have used it to re-position themselves vis-à-vis the government and the emerging opposition circles. Some protests leaders resorted to the ‘discrimination argument’ and many protesters followed them. This, in turn, created a backlash from within other ethnic groups – there have now also been demonstrations in favour of the Salang route in several Pashtun-majority provinces (see for example here, in Khost) – and has the potential to escalate if not contained.

Speeding up the implementation of the TUTAP-related power-line between Doshi and Bamyan, and other development projects in the Hazarajat and equally deprived areas elsewhere in the country, would be the best way to address these tensions. Not least as the government has repeatedly emphasised, starting from president Ghani’s inaugural speech in 2014, that it favours a “balanced” development of the county.

 

(1) The Socio-Demographic and Economic Survey of Bamyan, that was conducted by the Afghan Central Statistics Organisation in 2011, found that “animal dung was the most common source of energy for cooking in Bamyan, with 45.5 percent of households in this province using it as their fuel for cooking. (…) Straw, shrubs or grass and wood were also commonly used. The former was used by 26.3 percent of households in Bamyan, while wood, by 13.4 percent. Liquefied petroleum gas was used by only 6.4 percent of households, and coal/lignite, by 2.1 percent. The remaining 6.0 percent used other types of fuel such as electricity, kerosene, charcoal, and agricultural crop residue.”

Regarding energy used for heating and lighting the survey found that domestically produced solar power (through individual, small solar panels usually attached to the roof of a household) was most commonly used. “Solar power was the leading source of energy for lighting among households in Bamyan Province. Three in every five households in this province were using solar power for lighting. Electricity was used by 21.0 percent of households, and kerosene lamp by 15.1 percent. The other 2.6 percent used other sources for lighting such as gas lamp and candle. Households that did not use any fuel for lighting made up 0.1 percent,” the survey established.

During recent field research in Bamyan province, AAN observed in the villages and districts close to the provincial centre that the use of domestic solar panels and dried dung ‘cakes’ (so-called chalma) continues to prevail.

(2) The project, called the “Afghanistan: North-South Power Transmission Enhancement Project,” formerly “Power Distribution Project” (for project documentation see here), was approved in 2013. The Salang line is only one of ten projects that will contribute to TUTAP, which is a business cooperation framework and political initiative between Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, rather than simply a power transmission project.

TUTAP, that was agreed by participating countries to the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC), will connect the Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Afghan and Pakistani electricity grids through unification of the Afghan grid. TUTAP is part of the Central Asian South Asian Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM), which includes other power sharing initiatives such as CASA-1000 and the TAPI gas pipeline.

The focus of the CASA-1000 project is on Pakistan. This World Bank supported project consists of an electricity transmission line that will go from a hydroelectric power station in Kyrgyzstan, through Tajikistan and Afghanistan, with the aim of providing Pakistan with electricity. The hydroelectric power station in Kyrgyzstan produces superfluous energy for five months of the year, mainly during the summer, which is when Pakistan suffers from a substantive lack of energy. Initially, CASA 1000 was supposed to provide electricity to Afghanistan as well, but as there is currently a lack of funding to build the necessary substations in Afghanistan, the country will only benefit from charging for the electricity transmission through its territory (in the range of tens of millions of US dollars). Afghanistan will also benefit from selling land for the towers for the CASA-1000 power line, and eventually some benefit may come from employment on the construction sites.

(3) The formerly united, Hazara-dominated Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan) has split into various factions, including those of former Vice President Muhammad Karim Khalili, current deputy CEO Muhammad Mohaqqeq and Muhammad Akbari. Khalili’s wing continues to use the original name, while the other groups added mardom (people) or melli (national).

(4) The coal-fired power stations, mentioned in the 2013 Power Sector Master Plan, are linked to other large Afghan projects that have stalled, including the development of the copper mine in Mes-e Ainak in Logar province and of the iron-ore deposits at the Hajigak Pass in Bamyan (see further AAN analyses here, here and here.

(5) For details, see the environmental study available here that includes the flora and fauna, and particularly the avian population along the Salang route, which is a major route of bird migration (here), and its vulnerability to the impact of the planned power lines.

 

The lower house of the Afghan parliament has always struggled with attendance. However, during the current legislative year, which began in March, it has been rare for it to get a quorum (ie a majority of MPs attending). With two thirds of all plenary sessions inquorate, many laws on the agenda could not be voted on and the parliament has fallen behind in its legislative calendar. AAN’s Salima Ahmadi and Lenny Linke have been looking at how the house is trying to cope with the dwindling number of MPs turning up to work. It has suspended six MPs who had been absent from parliament for more than 21 consecutive days, and threatened to suspend three more. It has also quietly been declaring sessions quorate when only a minority of MPs was actually present.

It seemed to start so well…

The opening of the parliament’s sixth year, on 6 March 2016, saw one of the highest numbers of MPs ever turning. They flocked to the lower house, the Wolesi Jirga, along with high-ranking figures such as former president Hamid Karzai and the ambassadors of neighbouring countries. While AAN has not been able to find out the exact number of MPs who attended (as parliamentary monitors were not allowed to witness the session), a member of the Parliamentary Affairs Office, an office within the parliament acting as a liaison between the government and the parliament, told one of the authors that more than 230 MPs out of a total of 240 had been present. (According to the constitution, the Wolesi Jirga should have 249 members, but nine MPs who died, were killed or given government jobs cannot be replaced because replacing MPs is banned in the final year of a parliament. (1) That ‘final year’ will be extra-long this time, given that the official tenure of the Wolesi Jirga expired on 22 June 2015, but elections have yet to happen. (For further detail on the legal status and legitimacy of the parliament, see here, and a detailed discussion on the Wolesi Jirga quorum, see here.))

Voting for the new Administrative Board (7 to 14 March 2016), also brought in large numbers of MPs, with a high of 220 (around 92 per cent). Elected anew each legislative year, the Board presides over plenary sessions, prepares the lists of who can speak in the free discussion hour, records MPs’ attendance and is in overall charge of running the sessions of the Wolesi Jirga. Positions on the Board are considered very influential. Hence, competition among the MPs looking to secure a seat is fierce. (2) As in previous years, the election was not easy or quick. Indeed, MPs took almost two weeks (a total of six plenary sessions) and four rounds of elections to complete the election and in the end, the new Board looked very much like the old one – all but one member had been re-elected to their previous position. The one exception was Ahmad Nazir Ahmadzai, a Kuchi representative, who had held the position of Second Deputy Speaker and was replaced by Sheikh Nematullah Ghafari from Helmand. The two most contested positions – the First Deputy Speaker and the Second Deputy Speaker – were in the end taken by Haji Zahir Qadir from Nangarhar and Sheikh Nematullah Ghafari from Helmand, respectively. (3)

During the two weeks of elections for the Board, attendance was astonishingly high – for the six sessions, the attendance figures were: 220, 216, 211, 207, 206 and 131, out of a total of 240. MPs appeared unwilling to finish the voting in one or two days; they kept casting large numbers of blank or invalid votes making a new round of voting necessary. Observers speculated that MPs were using delaying tactics to solicit more bribes from the candidates. “MPs do business with blank votes,” one member of the Parliamentary Affairs Office told AAN. The same source added that there were “rumours that the candidates spent millions of dollars to be elected as first and second deputy speakers.” (See Dari report here).

…and quickly went bad

The high attendance must indeed have been related to the elections, because immediately afterwards, in the first session after the vote, the number of MPs attending had plummeted sharply. Only 58 MPs turned up to that first session with a regular agenda (provincial reports from MPs) on 16 March 2016. Indeed, in the second half of March 2016, the Wolesi Jirga failed to reach a quorum for any session.

Then, on 9 April 2016, there was again a spike in attendance. It was the day of voting for or against the president’s nominees for Minister of Interior (Taj Muhammad Jahed) and Attorney General (Farid Hamidi). The MPs turned up in droves – 226 MPs, about 94 per cent, were present, constituting the highest attendance rate for any plenary session since the beginning of the 2016 legislative year. (Both candidates got the necessary votes. For further information, read AAN’s previous report).

In contrast, the lowest number of MPs turning up to work so far this year has been for the sitting on 19 March 2016. On that day, reports from the provinces were supposed to be presented, with one MP from each province speaking about the problems and developments in their province, while other MPs listened. Only 24 MPs, or about ten per cent, came to parliament that day. So actually, fewer MPs turned up than there are provinces of Afghanistan. Yet, this should have been a particularly important session, with MPs having a chance to speak directly on behalf of the interests of their constituents.

Another day with an especially low attendance was 16 May 2016, the day of the protests about the routing of the TUTAP power line (for detail, see AAN reporting). Many MPs joined the protest and only 28 MPs (not even 12 per cent of the members) attended the parliamentary session. It was supposed to discuss and vote on the Real Estate Draft Law. Due to a lack of quorum, however, this agenda item had to be pushed to the next session, like so many others since March 2016.

Low Attendance – the biggest obstacle for Wolesi Jirga

With only one session that had a quorum so far in the month of May (and two inquorate ones where voting took place nonetheless), the low attendance has been the biggest challenge for the Wolesi Jirga, particularly problematic given its ambitious legislative calendar. In 2015, there had already been criticism about low attendance paralysing its normal procedures on several occasions (see AAN’s previous reporting). In 2016, however, MPs seem even less interested in attending the plenary sessions or meetings of the commissions, which prepare legislation ahead of discussion and voting in plenary sessions.

Out of the 35 sessions held before 31 May 2016, only eleven sessions had a quorum. Excluding the six sessions used for the Administrative Board elections, there were only five regular plenary sessions that had a quorum – not even 15 per cent of the total. The repeated failure to reach a quorum has prevented progress on several important issues where voting and discussions have had to be constantly postponed. For example, proposed amendments to Article 11 and 12 of the Civil Aviation Law, which seek to change the registration procedures for civilian aircrafts in Afghanistan, and the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Strasbourg 1983, which is intended to facilitate and regularise procedures for the social rehabilitation of prisoners by giving foreigners convicted of a criminal offence the possibility of serving their sentences in their own countries, were both on the agenda for three and four consecutive sessions in April, respectively. The vote for these pieces of legislation finally took place only on 4 May 2016, after seven consecutive sessions without quorum.

Five other pieces of legislation were on the agenda twice before they could be discussed and voted on: the bilateral trade agreement between Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates; Presidential Decree 76 (Annex One to the Criminal Procedure Code which legalises detention without trial (see AAN reporting for more detail); the draft law of the Afghanistan Red Crescent Society’s Affairs; the Passport Law, which will change procedures for issuing passports; and the Draft Law on the Military Higher Education Institutes aimed at expanding and developing higher education in the military field.

On 30 May 2016, the house had two pieces of legislation on the agenda: the Convention on Protecting the Cultural Property and Artistic Works, and on the G7+ Charter, whose purpose is to stop conflict, promote state building, and eradicate poverty through innovative development strategies. Surprisingly, three other pieces of legislation were added to the agenda after the initial two had been voted on. These three had already been on the agenda at least twice before 30 May 2016: the Protection of Consumers Law, Legislation Regulating the Usage of the National Flag, Anthem and State Insignia, and the Draft Law on the Military Higher Education Institutes. All five pieces of legislation were approved during this session.

However, the Wolesi Jirga actually lacked a quorum, but voting was allowed to go ahead anyway. (More detail on this tactic, below).

Failing to turn up to commissions too

Low attendance rates have also affected the work of the commissions and joint commissions, which are crucial for discussing prospective legislation ahead of discussion and voting in the plenary. Many MPs have complained about flaws and problems in draft legislation presented at plenary sessions. It appears that usually it was those MPs, who criticised the legislation, raised objections and proposed amendments during the plenary sessions, who had failed to attend the commission’s sessions. This back and forth of legislation between commissions and plenary frequently resulted in even further delays to parliament’s work.

The absence of MPs also paralysed the sessions of the Committee of Presidents, which meets every Tuesday when parliament is sitting and is attended by the heads of the Wolesi Jirga’s standing commissions and the Administrative Board. It has the hugely important task of setting the agenda for the coming week (beginning each Saturday). On Monday, 2 May 2016, no plenary session could take place because no agenda had been set. Several MPs who had apparently come to parliament that day only to find that no session was taking place complained about it – Negah TV reported on it during evening news. However, the Secretary of the House, when questioned about the reason for the cancellation of this session, said “Today, MPs were tasked to work on commissions.” Most MPs did not find this to be an acceptable answer as commissions’ work usually only takes place on Sundays and Tuesdays, while Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays are reserved for the plenaries.

Taking action: suspending MPs

Despite threats and warnings, no serious measures were ever taken against MPs who were constantly absent from plenary and commissions sessions. MPs have been suspended or expelled for other reasons, but never for absences. However, Articles 121, 122 and 123 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga do prescribe a range of measures that can be taken, depending on the number of days (or months) of unexcused absence, ranging from a salary cut to withholding a person’s entire salary, to suspending his or her privileges, including revoking immunity. (4) These rules had never been enforced since the inauguration of the Afghan parliament in 2005 – but pressure has been mounting on the Wolesi Jirga to start doing its job properly.

After several inquorate plenary sessions this legislative year, criticism from a host of those MPs who do turn to work was picked up by the media, and appears to have led to the Administrative Board taking action against the absentees. For example, shortly before the Nowruz holidays, the plenary on 19 March 2016 saw only 21 MPs present and, afterwards, Sharif Balkhabi from Sar-e Pul province gave highly critical interviews to journalists.

Then, on 30 April 2016, the Secretary of the House, who is also a member of the Administrative Board, made an unexpected announcement, “The standing commissions of the house have been asked [by the Administrative Board] to report members with 21 days of consecutive absence [which equates to seven weeks]. The house promised to share the list of absent MPs with the media in order to implement Rules of Procedures and so that MPs felt compelled to attend to their responsibilities and be present in the house and approve the laws.” According to the Rules of Procedures, Article 70 A (3) “Publication of the name of the offending member in the official journal of the Jirga,” is required and, presumably, that was what the Secretary of the House was referring to when he mentioned the media. (For full citation, see footnote (5)).

Ironically, on the same day, the house again lacked a quorum, so that day’s agenda had to be postponed to the next session.

The strict warning from the Administrative Board, however, did little to improve the attendance pattern of MPs. For example, from 4 May to 30 May, the Wolesi Jirga held fourteen plenary sessions. In only three of the sessions was a quorum reached. In another two, the Administrative Board announced a quorum, but in fact a minority of MPs had been present.

On 14 May 2016, the Speaker then followed through on his earlier threat of suspension, announcing the names of six MPs whose active membership in the parliament was to be put on hold for two months. The lawmakers suspended are the following: Amanullah Guzar from Kabul, Farishta Anwari from Nimroz, Muhammad Ishaaq Rahguzar from Balkh, Ezatullah Atif from Kabul, Faridoon Momand from Nangarhar, and Alam Khan Azadi from Balkh. Speaking to AAN in mid-April 2016, ie before his suspension, MP Amanullah Guzar said, “Those coming to the sessions are from the provinces. They cannot travel to their provinces due to security reasons, so they have no other choice but to come to the plenary sessions. As for me, I have many things to do and many people to meet here in Kabul.”

The Administrative Board decided after suspending the six MPs to recalculate the quorum. From 18 May, the total number of MPs went from 240 to 234 and the quorum from 121 to 118.

However, despite the suspensions and the lower target for reaching a quorum, on 23 May 2016, the house again lacked a majority. Voting on the Military Higher Education Institutes Law was postponed until the next session. This again caused an outcry among MPs who were present, who, this time, asked the Speaker to take even stricter actions against the absentees. Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, in response, said, “The house has already suspended six MPs who were absent for a long period of time and suspended all their privileges (withholding their entire salary, banning them from the house and revoking their immunity).” The Administrative Board, he said, was now considering suspending other MPs who also had 21 consecutive absences.

It should be noted that, although the Administrative Board is in charge of running the Wolesi Jirga, it is actually not much better than most MPs in terms of turning up to work. Those MPs who are frequently in parliament have complained that not all Administrative Board members are coming to the sessions either.

Fewer MPs in total – another problem with getting a quorum

Apart from suspensions, the Wolesi Jirga has also ‘lost’ MPs through walkouts, boycotts and government appointments. These lost MPs have not been subtracted from the official total number of MPs in parliament. This has added to the difficulty of reaching a quorum.

Several MPs have recently been given high-profile jobs:

– Naqibullah Faiq appointed head of the Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA), an anti-corruption body, 8 February 2016

– Shukrai Barakzai appointed ambassador to Norway, 11 February 2016

– Shinkai Karokhel appointed ambassador to Canada, 13 May 2016

For the moment, Karokhel is still coming to the plenary sessions, but when she departs to Canada, the Wolesi Jirga will have lost three MPs. These appointments mean an actual permanent reduction in the number of MPs until the next election, but, unlike the suspended MPs, the official number and the quorum have not been adjusted downwards.

Another loss to the number of MPs, at least temporarily, was Sakhi Meshwani, MP for Kunar who was suspended due to misconduct. On 13 April 2016, during a summoning (istejwab) session for the Ministers of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Finance, and Public Works regarding the status of national development projects, Meshwani assaulted the Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Nasir Ahmad Durrani. He had become furious when his microphone was cut off after his three-minute time for putting a question had expired. He went up to the ministers and hit Durrani in the face with his name placard. Security guards took Meshwani out of the session and his fellow MPs insisted his action was against the Internal Rules of Procedures of the House and action should be taken against him.

Based on Article 70 of the Internal Rules of Procedures, the house then decided to bar Meshwani for a period of ten consecutive calendar days. MPs had initially demanded a year-long suspension. (6) The MPs also demanded he should apologise to Erfanullah Erfan – the Assistant Secretary of the house who had also been assaulted by him.  While Sakhi Meshwani is now back in parliament after his suspension, it occurred during a period of time when the Wolesi Jirga did not have a quorum even once. (The majority was not adjusted while he was suspended.)

Sakhi Meshwani’s suspension for misconduct was the first disciplinary action taken by the house since 21 May 2007 when it voted to suspend Malalai Joya for the rest of the parliamentary term. An outspoken ‘anti-warlord’ MP from Farah, who had received the most votes in her province, she was deemed to have insulted parliament after comparing it to a “stable of animals” during a television interview. (She said her remarks had been edited out of context and she had said she had divided MPs into two groups – one which was working to uphold democratic principles while the other was undermining them, thereby serving the Afghan population even less than animals in a stable.)

MPs walking out

More MPs have also been lost in the controversy over where one crucial part of the north-south electricity line known under the acronym TUTAP should be routed. On 14 May 2016, most Hazara MPs and a number of others – 31 in total – walked out of the session, announcing they would not return until the fate of TUTAP had been determined. The non-Hazara MPs were Latif Pedram from Badakhshan, who declared there was a need for an opposition to the announcement of the government decision on the TUTAP route and he would lead it (he returned to parliament on 21 May), (7) Mohiuddin Mehdi, a Tajik Jamiat-e Islami intellectual and the Uzbek Muhammad Hashem Ortaq (although he is a member of Jombesh, the TUTAP ‘route it through Bamyan’ movement is not supported by party leader, Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum).

The walkout was a further blow to the already meagrely attended Wolesi Jirga and to the efforts to increase attendance through a strict implementation of the rules. Since the walkout, the house has failed to reach an (undisputed) quorum. Recognising the consequences of the walkout, the Speaker met the disgruntled MPs on 22 May and requested they return. He was partially effective; first, five and then another four MPs returned to parliament on 23 and 25 May. On 30 May, two more of walkout MPs rejoined the sessions. It is not clear whether and when the remaining 19 MPs plan to come back to the Wolesi Jirga.

How to cope with a chronic lack of quorum…

One solution to the scarcity of MPs has been to falsely declare inquorate sessions quorate. This has occurred twice so far, on 18 May 2016, and then again, on 30 May 2016. The plenary session held on 18 May under the chairmanship of Haji Zahir Qadir, the First Deputy Speaker and MP for Nangarhar, ordered a discussion and voting on the following: the Real Estate Law, Legislative Decree Number 78 (detention without trial), proposed amendments on the Passports Law, and the Draft Law on Industrial Concepts. Only 98 MPs were present in the session, but the Assistant Secretary of the house announced 122 MPs were present. The Women and Peace Studies Organization’s Parliament Watch reported on this discrepancy on their Facebook page; one of the authors also witnessed it. The house then proceeded to vote on and approve the Passports and Industrial Concepts Laws and referred the Real Estate Law to a commission for further discussion. As a way of explaining the events on 18 May 2016, a member of the Parliamentary Affairs Office told AAN, “The house is upset with the Hazara MPs who walked out, and the rest of the MPs are trying to show that, even without them, the house can have a quorum and approve legislation.” The tactic – to continue work even without a quorum – had previously been discussed during the commission sessions by MPs upset about ‘the Hazara walkout’. On 30 May 2016, the situation was repeated – the Assistant Secretary of the House announced 121 MP as present and proceeded with the agenda, although parliamentary observers (including one of the authors) only counted 111 MP in the plenary. The Women and Peace Studies Organization’s Parliament Watch again reported this discrepancy.

One thing to note: as far as one of the authors could find out, other organisations, that also monitor the parliament, only report the attendance numbers as officially announced by the Administrative Board.

Those who want to return

While around 40 MPs (12 per cent of original gone) have not been at the parliament in the last month and/or will not attend any more, Kabul MP Baktash Seyawash, who has been absent since June 2015 as a sign of protest against President Ghani’s extension of the current parliament’s term wants to come back. Two other MPs have been boycotting plenary sessions for the same reason – Farkhunda Zahra Naderi and Ramazan Bashardost. While there has been no word from Naderi since June of last year, Bashardost, who said on 10 June 2015 that, “people say MPs traded with the government leaders on extending the Parliament term in exchange for collecting votes in their favour in the second round of presidential elections,” came back to the house a month ago. Seyawash has also expressed an interest in re-joining the Wolesi Jirga (possibly because of the lack of a realistic date for the end of this parliament and new elections). He has now said he will continue his boycott until the Administrative Board officially asks him to return. A member of the Parliamentary Affairs Office told AAN, the Board would not request his return, despite him several times asking them to invite him back. Considering the difficulties that the Wolesi Jirga has with reaching a quorum, each additional MP willing to return is important. The Board has not adjusted the quorum for the boycotting MPs. (8)

What does this mean for the rest of the legislative period?

When, on 25 May 2016, the Wolesi Jirga again lacked a quorum and the house could not vote on two pieces of legislation, the Secretary of the House announced the Administrative Board would go ahead with suspending three more MPs and would soon be announcing their names. He also said suspensions would continue, until MPs recognised they had an obligation to attend parliament. It seems, therefore, that the total number of recognised MPs and the quorum is likely to shrink further.

The pattern of non-attendance is paralysing the Wolesi Jirga. It is now far behind its legislative calendar. Suspending six MPs did not work to bring other delinquents to heel. Since then, the House has had no session with a quorum and has resorted twice to falsely announcing higher attendance numbers to order to vote on legislation in bulk. With three more suspensions due and the threat of more to come, one wonders how low the numbers would have to go before there were enough working MPs to form a majority in the house. Low enough to get regular quorums might also be so low as to raise questions of whether the house was still representative of the country’s population. Yet, even without that dire scenario, a house with so many non-attending MPs is scarcely representing the country in practice, anyway. (9) Unfortunately, whatever action the Administrative Board takes will deepen the democratic deficit of the Wolesi Jirga, unless or until more MPs turn up for work.

 

(1) According to the constitution, the Wolesi Jirga has 249 members and 68 of those seats are allocated to women through a quota system. Currently, however, there are 69 women in parliament as one woman was able to secure enough votes to enter parliament even without this quota. The Constitution stipulates there must be “at least, on average” two women from each of the 34 provinces (Art 83). Of these 68 seats, three are allocated to Kuchis.

The overall membership of the current Wolesi Jirga has been reduced from 249 to 240. Three of the nine members that the Wolesi Jirga lost were killed as a result of terrorist attacks. Two MPs died of natural causes; other MPs resigned ahead of 2014 presidential elections – some of them were not replaced, as there is a legal provision stipulating that their seats be left open. Between 2005-10, when there was an even higher number of such incidents, victims were simply replaced. The candidate who had secured the next largest number of votes would assume the vacant position. However, given that he/she may have been a political opponent, this practice, which was widely known as the “assassination clause,” was seen as possibly encouraging of such acts. Therefore, this practice was altered and now only those MPs who die of natural causes are replaced, and only “if more than one year remains until the end of the term of office of Wolesi Jirga.” So far the only MP replaced has been Shahnaz Hemati from Herat province, who died in a car accident. The next female runner up for Herat province, Semin Barakzai, took her seat.

Other replacements of MPs occurred because at least seven MPs from the current parliament resigned ahead of the 2014 presidential elections in order to campaign for presidency or other key positions in the government. The parliament replaced the resigning MPs, including Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq, Sayyed Ishaq Gailani, Sayyed Hussain Anwari, Abdul Rab Rassul Sayyaf, Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali, Sayyed Hussain Alami Balkhi, and Ibrahim Qasemi. Later on in 2014, other MPs resigned as well ahead of the second round of the presidential elections because they were hoping for key positions in the new government (such as ministers, for example.) They were not replaced, as this parliament had entered its last year of tenure.

(2) The Administrative Board includes the president, the vice-presidents, the secretary and assistant secretary, as outlined in chapter 3 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga.

(3) The new Administrative Board members were: Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi – the Speaker, who is elected for another five years term, Haji Zahir Qadir – First Deputy Speaker, Sheikh Nematullah Ghafari – Second Deputy Speaker, Abdul Rauf Inaami – Secretary, and Erfanuallh Erfan – Assistant Secretary.

(4) Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga, Chapter 22 “Presence and Absence”:

Article 121:  

In case of a Member’s unjustified absence in the plenary or in the Commission session, the net salary of the Member is reduced on a pro-rated basis.

 Article 122:

If a Member cannot attend the session because of some engagement in relation to his or her duty or a legal holiday, his or her salary may not be deducted.

These engagements include national and international travel in relation to his or her duty or those duties to be performed at the time that sessions are being conducted in the Capital.

 Article 123

1. If a Member does not attend the plenary or the relevant Commission session for one month, his or her net salary may not be paid.

2. If a member does not attend the plenary or the relevant Commission session for two successive months, according to the report of the Administrative Board, the issue of his or her absence shall

3. be assessed by the Rights, Privileges and Security Commission. The Commission shall present its proposal to the plenary and the Jirga may pursue a proper decision about the Member in accordance with article 108 of the Constitution.

 Article One Hundred Eight of the Constitution states:

In cases of death, resignation, and dismissal of a member of the National Assembly or disability or handicap, which impedes permanent performance of duty, the placement of the new representative for the remaining period of the legislative term shall be in accordance with 30 provisions of the law.

Matters related to the presence and absence of members of the National Assembly shall be regulated by the Internal Duties Statute. 

(5) Chapter 12 of Rules of Procedures, Article 70 states:

Members of the Jirga are subject to the disciplinary measures if they committed any of the following offences:

1. Disregard for the internal rules and procedures of the Jirga

2. Absence or lack punctuality, tearing up documents in a sign of objection, provocative and irrelevant slogans

3. Leaving the session without reasonable excuse, quarrels and physical fighting or causing chaos and riot in the session

4. Intimidation and threatening of a member, defamation and accusation of others, insult and disrespect for the Administrative Board, government officials and staff of general secretariat

5. Engagement in other employment contrary to the provisions of the article 152 of the Constitution

A. In case of violations of the tenets of the above-mentioned article, the following disciplinary measures shall be taken:

1. Advice

2. Warning

3. Publication of the name of the offending member in the official journal of the Jirga

4. Exclusion of the offending member from the session of that day

Implementation of the disciplinary measures stipulated in the preceding paragraph is under the authority of the Speaker of the Jirga

B. The suspension of an offending member for more than one day for any violation is implemented upon the recommendation of the Administrative Board and approval of the Jirga.

(6) Chapter 12 of the Rules of Procedures covers disciplinary measures of the house, see here.

(7) Pedram has tried at earlier occasions to put himself at the head of a parliamentary opposition but without success (see for example here).

(8) Although absent for most or all sessions since 2015, the three MPs boycotting parliament because they were unhappy with its extended term have not been categorised as suspended – reportedly, according to a source in the Parliamentary Affairs Office because they had officially declared their boycott and because most of them did not seem to have used any of the privileges accorded to MPs such as the use of cars and guards.

(9) Concerns about representativeness have been raised all along with regard to the system of SNTV (single non-transferrable vote) in elections. Among other problems, it allows MPs to be elected with extremely low numbers of votes). (For more detail, see previous AAN analysis ).

 

The National Unity Government (NUG), which was created to solve the impasse caused by the bitterly disputed 2014 presidential elections, has come under intense criticism for a wide range of real and perceived failures. Its position has been called into question by uncertainty over whether, based on the text of the political agreement, its mandate expires in September 2016 or not. Comments by US Secretary of State John Kerry, in the margins of a visit to Kabul in April 2016, claimed there was no ‘expiry date’ for the government, but this has not put an end to the debate. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert and Ali Yawar Adili take a closer look at the political agreement and at differing opinions on what should happen next.

The National Unity Government’s mandate and timeline

The establishment of Afghanistan‘s National Unity Government in September 2014 was an improvised solution after a very contentious presidential election. A political agreement was negotiated between the two main candidates who had competed in the election’s second round, and who were locked into an ongoing argument as to how the electoral bodies should deal with allegations of mass fraud. US Secretary of State John Kerry flew into Kabul twice to get the two camps to agree to a full-scale audit with the understanding that the outcome would lead to a form of shared government (for more details, see here  and here). The deal allowed both contenders to form a government of national unity, while the audit was supposed to determine who would be president and who would be appointed as Chief Executive Officer (CEO), a newly created post. A political crisis was averted – however, the government has since struggled with the contradictions inherent in its structure and the high expectations that followed its promises of reform.

The political agreement that underlies the current government structure (full text here) is based on five main points. These are: (a) the calling of a Loya Jirga to amend the Constitution and consider the position of an Executive Prime Minister; (b) the establishment of the quasi-prime-ministerial position of Chief Executive Officer; (c) an agreement that all senior appointments be based on “parity” between the two sides, as well as merit; (d) recognition of an opposition leader, or “leader of the runner-up team,” by presidential decree (this point was never very clear and seems to have been quietly dropped); and (e) a shared commitment to electoral reform, with the objective that they take place before the – now postponed – 2015 parliamentary elections.

The text of the agreement also contains a timeline: the Loya Jirga is to be convened within two years – this timeframe would expire in late September 2016.

To be able to call a Loya Jirga that has the authority to amend the Constitution, the government first needs to hold parliamentary and district council elections. (1) Eighty-five per cent of all constitutionally prescribed voting Loya Jirga delegates are, directly or indirectly, elected through the District Council and Wolesi Jirga elections. Strictly speaking, the government may be able to get away with inviting current MPs whose mandates have been extended, but it will be very difficult to defend a Loya Jirga without district council representatives, who are supposed to make up almost half of all voting delegates.

However, twenty months after the inauguration of the National Unity Government, it is clear that these timelines will not be met. The electoral reform process has been excruciatingly slow and is set to culminate in a very watered-down version of its original mandate (with changes that focus mainly on who will control the selection of the electoral commissioners – further analysis on this is forthcoming). It is very unlikely that Wolesi Jirga elections will be held this year, with the Independent Election Commission (IEC) in stasis: donors froze most of their funding, the chairperson resigned and the commission is awaiting a renewed selection process. No preparations have yet been made for District Council elections that are supposed to take place for the first time.

As time has gone on, the different, loosely organised opposition groups have stirred. Some of them have openly questioned the government’s legitimacy, while others have indicated they will make up their minds once the government’s mandate had truly ‘expired’ in September 2016. There were rumours that people in the Palace have been looking at ways to get rid of the position of the CEO.

When, on 9 April 2016, news broke that US Secretary of State John Kerry had travelled to Afghanistan (for security reasons the trip had not been widely announced), it looked to many Afghans as if the real purpose of his visit was to either repair the current political arrangement, or to negotiate the creation of a new one.

Kerry’s visit to Afghanistan

The purported aim of Kerry’s visit was to attend the third meeting of the US-Afghan Bilateral Commission, but his visit was clearly a show of American support for the current government. During a joint press conference, he commended the government for its progress and praised the two leaders for “standing together”:(2)

I want to begin by thanking President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah for the constructive spirit of the discussions we had today, but more importantly, for the leadership that they are offering to Afghanistan in the context of a unity government. A unity government is not easy; it is difficult. It is an enormous contribution that both leaders have made as statesmen to stand together, despite the fact that they opposed each other in an election, but in the interests of nation to bring people together. And I want to salute the efforts they are making to overcome many years of challenges that have built up, none of which can be solved overnight, all of which require a special kind of dedication and unity to change. And President Ghani is leading the effort to create a new Afghanistan.

There was a brief Q&A session, with time for two questions only, in which both questioners touched on the issue of the ‘expiry’ of the National Unity Government. The first question, by Wali Arian from Tolo News, asked what would happen after the political agreement ended:

Mr. Kerry, you played a role in solving the electoral deadlock and towards developing the National Unity Government. In the next six months, this political agreement is going to reach an end. So do you think for the – what do you think [is] the solution of this? What other option exists?

The US Secretary of State did not speculate on what needed to happen, but instead stressed that the agreement itself had no end date and that the government still had a mandate for five years:

Let me answer it quickly. Let me make this very, very clear, because I brokered the agreement. President Ghani signed it and Chief Executive Abdullah signed it, and I was there to witness the signing, and I had the privilege of joining them in announcing it. There is no end to this agreement at the end of two years or in six months from now. This agreement ends – this is an agreement for a unity government, the duration of which is five years. … [I]n no way does the agreement itself have some particular termination. The constitution has elected a president. The president has agreed to a unity government, and a political agreement was made between Dr. Abdullah and President Ghani for how they would go forward in a unity government. But it is our understanding that that is a mandate for five years and there’s no termination whatsoever in six months.

A second question, by Ershad Muhammad from Reuters, already signalled that Kerry’s previous comments would probably not be enough to settle the matter, when he asked:

Many people among the Afghan opposition believe that [the NUG agreement] does end in two years. Are you afraid by taking that position that the National Unity Government could go on, you might end up with a backlash from the opposition?

Kerry, in response, welcomed the notion of a loyal opposition and stressed:

It’s the people of Afghanistan and the president and his government who will make any decisions regarding where they go with respect to the government. But it’s not specifically terminated within the context of the agreement, and that’s the only point that I’m trying to make.

Reactions to Kerry’s remarks

The opposition groups and personalities, some of whom had already been mobilising around (veiled) calls for the government to step down, objected to Kerry’s comments. These included the former officials and confidantes of former President Karzai; the Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) or Shora-ye Harasat wa Sobat-e Afghanistan, (whose most prominent spokesperson is MP and former mujahedin factional leader Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf; other prominent members include former Energy and Water Minister Ismail Khan, former Wolesi Jirga speaker Yunus Qanuni, former Interior Minister Bismillah Khan, current Wolesi Jirga Speaker Ibrahimi and former Interior Minister and Ambassador to Pakistan, Umar Daudzai); as well as the New National Front of Afghanistan, led by former Finance and Commerce Minister and former Leader of the Afghan Milat Party, Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi.

Former President Karzai called  Kerry’s remarks a blatant violation of national sovereignty and sensitivities. Speaking at a conference on “The Nature and Prospect of Afghanistan’s Crisis”, he said that no foreigner could represent the will of the Afghan people: “America must know it should not play with our national sovereignty. We became very unhappy and pained in this regard. We do not get unhappy with war, but we get upset over this issue. … They should not force us to confront them.” Former foreign minister and head of the National Security Council, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, who continues to be one of Karzai’s close confidantes and still accompanies him on most of his foreign trips and public events, wrote an article entitled “Abraham Lincoln Democracy and John Kerry Democracy,” where he placed Kerry’s remarks in the context of ‘a superpower’s support for Third World dictators to further its own interests’.

The Council for the Protection and Stability of Afghanistan (CPSA) called on Afghanistan’s partners and friends to act in accordance with international rules and norms, and to base their remarks on the full observance of the country’s sovereignty. CPSA Spokesperson Massud Tarshtwal told AAN that Kerry’s role of mediator and witness “following the scandalous presidential elections” was the only acceptable role he could play and that he should not be allowed to “impose” his views.

Supporters of Umar Daudzai, who is a member of the CPSA but has also tried to assert himself as a leader in his own right, published a statement in his name on a Facebook page called “The Public Relations Office of Muhammad Umar Daudzai.” The statement (which, according to a close aide of Daudzai, “partially reflected” his position) criticised the National Unity Government for “facing such a managerial crisis that it waits for others to decide on the continuation of its term, in such a way that it has led to increased hopelessness and intra-governmental tensions.” It further argued that the government had faced illegitimacy from the outset and that “the people of Afghanistan” wanted a change in the current administration; it stopped short, however, of actually calling for that change.

Ahadi, who was in the United States during Kerry’s visit to Kabul, criticised the US position by saying that “any successful government has to have the support of both the people and the donors, one [alone] is not sufficient.” A previous call for early presidential elections (at the same time as both parliamentary and district council elections), was repeated in a statement posted on 10 April 2016 on the Front’s Facebook page:

It is common in the world that the governments that are formed based on popular vote and transparent elections and that take the helm of state of affairs, if they fail … they morally stand down. It is obvious that the government of so-called national unity has failed in all areas … The government needs to abandon demagogy and put aside time-killing and pave the way for holding early and transparent elections as soon as possible.

Atiqullah Baryalai, a former deputy defence minister, Jamiat-e Islami commander and now frequent commentator on strategic issues, also gave his analysis of the situation:

The US was concerned that the decision and management of the Loya Jirga could take the situation out of its control during the remaining ten months of Obama’s presidency and [for that reason] they wished to keep the status quo.

Baryalai believed that Kerry’s reading of the political agreement (that is no expiry date) had provided President Ghani with an opportunity to undermine his political ally, CEO Abdullah, within the government and among his supporters and to “manage the situation according to his liking.”

Baryalai further alleged that Ghani was hoping that the possible joining of Taleban factions and Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami to the government might help him manage the Loya Jirga. (3) On the other hand, Baryalai said CEO Abdullah sees the American decision “as an opportunity to retain the title of chief executive and to present himself as a flexible partner.”

The Taleban took the opportunity to publish a series of statements on their website in reaction to John Kerry’s remarks, which include the following titles: “Grand Wizard plays the role of Grand Assembly;” “Kabul regime testifies to its own Americanism;” “John Kerry extends term of his corrupt decaying regime;” and “John Kerry further humiliates the surrogate Kabul administration.”

During the weekly meeting of the Council of Ministers on 11 April 2016, CEO Abdullah hit back at critics by making a point of showing surprise over the outcry. He was quoted as having said: “These political forces have not yet taken the position of opposition forces; their views are appreciated. But they have missed a relevant point in the most important agreement that was signed in the political life of Afghanistan and that established National Unity Government,” urging critics to reread the agreement. Although he did not say it outright, he implied that the agreement did not contain an expiry date and that the Loya Jirga timeline was unrelated to the duration of both his position and to the National Unity Government as a whole.

Post-September scenarios

While Secretary Kerry’s remarks were widely seen as a de facto extension of the National Unity Government’s term, the de jure arrangement after the two-year timeframe mentioned in the agreement remains a matter of contention. There are roughly three positions that can be distinguished:

The first position argues that the National Unity Government’s term ends after two years and that its failure to keep to its own timelines should result in the government’s dissolution. This could happen through a traditional Loya Jirga (called for mainly by former President Hamid Karzai and those in his circles) or snap elections (propagated mainly by Ahadi’s front). The Council for Protection and Stability of Afghanistan has not revealed its position yet, in terms of what it might call for once it believes the government’s legitimacy has indeed run out, however it does keep stressing – against what is by now humanly feasible – that the Loya Jirga be held on time. (4)

The second position can be found in circles close to the Palace and was largely formulated by Abdul Ali Muhammadi, the former legal adviser to President Ghani, who lost his job over the Smart City (Shahrak Hoshmand) scandal. This position argues that the elections were held to establish a government for five years, but that, two years on, there does need to be a decision about the fate of the CEO position. In a talk show called Amaj on 26 April 2016, Muhammadi explained that to take this decision “some customary legal mechanism must be found, such as a Consultative Loya Jirga, a referendum, or a political consensus. The government should take the initiative to break this stalemate within these next five months.”

Rumours recently surfaced that advisers to the president thought the two-year deadline could be used to reorganise the government and force out Abdullah as a CEO (for details, see a New York Times report here and an interview with Ahadi here, where he describes how the office of chief executive would be dissolved, with one of the vice-presidents resigning so Abdullah could replace him; his deputies would be appointed as ministers). According to the NYT article, Palace advisers argued that, while the position of chief executive would expire, the president would still have a mandate based on ‘an election that they say was cleansed by a United Nations audit’.

Talking to AAN, however, Ahmad Omid Maisam, the CEO’s deputy spokesperson, called the idea “impossible and impractical,” because, he said, the CEO had received “50 per cent of the popular vote.” It is interesting to note, in this respect, that the IEC on 24 February 2016, suddenly and without any clear explanation, released previously withheld results of the 2014 presidential elections. The results had been widely leaked, but were not yet official. The now officially released results showed that, after the audit, Ghani had received 55.27 per cent of the vote and Abdullah 44.73 per cent.

The third position, as put forward by Muhammad Nateqi, head of the High Commission to Oversee the Implementation of the Political Agreement, is that the National Unity Government – in full – should remain for the full five-year term. This is based on the fact that the election cycle is five years and that the two campaign teams created the joint government based on the people’s votes. Nateqi said he thought it “unlikely that the president would decide to dissolve the office of chief executive, as it would lead to a serious crisis.”(6) Instead, he envisioned a scenario in which the position would be extended until the Loya Jirga was convened, which, according to him, could be done under the current political agreement ­– similar to the extension of the mandate of the Wolesi Jirga until the next parliamentary elections are held.

This view, which is held by the CEO’s camp, seems to be shared by the largely pro-Ghani High Council of Jihadi and National Parties (Shora-ye A’ali Ahzab Jihadi wa melli). (7) On 8 May 2016, Abbas Basir, head of the Secretariat, told AAN that from the Council’s point of view “it was the people’s vote, not the political agreement” that formed the legal basis for the National Unity Government, and that the political agreement was only a framework for cooperation between the two camps. A failure to deliver on the commitments of the political agreement would not harm the legitimacy of the government, and the CEO, as far as the Council was concerned, could continue to serve beyond the two years. The CEO’s Deputy Spokesperson, Maisam, went even further when he told AAN that “even if the Loya Jirga, when held, did not approve the post of Executive Prime Minister, the CEO would still serve for five years.” (8)

The President’s Office, when asked for its views, gave the regular assurances that the president was committed to implementing the political agreement and that the parliamentary and district council elections would be held and the Loya Jirga convened (although probably with some delays). Shah Hussain Murtazavi, deputy spokesman for President Ghani, said to AAN that the president has the power to assign some of his authorities to others, as he did with CEO Abdullah and Ahmad Zia Massud, now Special Representative for Reform and Good Governance. (It is, however, unclear as to whether this view that the establishment of the CEO position was within the president’s personal authorities, and whether this also means that the Palace thinks he can dissolve the position whenever he wants to). Murtazavi added that when the two-year deadline for the convening of the Loya Jirga had expired, “the president would provide an explanation to the people, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, as to the mechanism under which the CEO would continue.” He did not elaborate on what the mechanism or explanation might be.

Changing not just the government, but the political system

Beyond the wrangling over the legitimacy of the government and the positioning of the opposition that is hoping to step in, lies a deeper discussion: the long-standing wish on the part of the political establishment to institute a parliamentary system.(9) CEO Spokesman Mujib Rahimi told the BBC on 10 April 2016:

Our fundamental and underlying demands have been the changing of the system. We have changed the system in practice from a presidential to a prime ministerial structure. But now, it should be enshrined in the Constitution – electoral reforms must be brought, the Loya Jirga should be convened and the position of the Chief Executive should be promoted to that of an executive prime minister.

Comments on 27 April 2016 by Sayed Aqa Fazel Sancharaki, the CEO’s cultural advisor, however, show that the current system still suffers from the monopolisation of power that those advocating for a parliamentary system hope to address. Sancharaki criticised the president for concentrating all large projects and relevant executive committees under his own authority: “People in ministries complain that they are jobless, as all their work has been transferred to the presidential palace; [they say] ten to fourteen councils have been created and we sit here without work.”

However, to formalise the position of an executive prime minister and to enshrine it into the Constitution, the president needs to form a commission, which, according to the agreement, was supposed to have happened after the inauguration ceremony (“After the inauguration ceremony, the President will appoint in consultation with the CEO by executive order a commission to draft an amendment to the Constitution.”) This has not yet happened. Nateqi, the head of the Commission to Oversee the Implementation of the Political Agreement, suspects that political motives are the reason for the delay, arguing “a change to the political system may go against the grain of the president and his circle.”

 

(1) According to the text of the political agreement, the National Unity Government agreed to the following, regarding the convening of the Loya Jirga:

A. Convening of a Loya Jirga to amend the Constitution and consider the proposal to create the post of executive prime minister

– On the basis of Article 2 of the Joint Statement of 17 Asad 1393 (August 8, 2014) and its attachment (“…convening of a Loya Jirga in two years to consider the post of an executive prime minister”), the President is committed to convoking a Loya Jirga for the purpose of debate on amending the Constitution and creating a post of executive prime minister.

– After the inauguration ceremony, the president will appoint, in consultation with the CEO by executive order, a commission to draft an amendment to the Constitution.

– On the basis of Article 140 of the Constitution, the National Unity Government is committed to holding district council elections as early as possible on the basis of a law in order to create a quorum for the Loya Jirga in accordance with Section 2 of Article 110 of the Constitution.

– The National Unity Government is committed to ratifying and enforcing a law on the organization of the basic organs of the state and determination of the boundaries and limits of local administration by legal means.

– The National Unity Government commits to completing the distribution of electronic / computerized identity cards to all citizens of the country as quickly as possible.

– The above issues and other matters that are agreed to will be implemented on a schedule that is appended to this agreement.

(2) Although he took great care to praise both men, Kerry did single out President Ghani as “leading the effort,” which may have been carefully negotiated wording. This was also reflected in the protocol. After his arrival, he first met Ghani for about an hour, before Abdullah joined them. After the meeting, Kerry stopped by the Sapidar Palace to see the CEO in his own office, in an attempt to maintain a “balanced” protocol. That such issues of protocol are very touchy is illustrated by Abdullah’s refusal to attend President Ghani’s speech to the special joint session of Parliament on 25 April 2016, after he found out he would have been treated like any other regular senior official.

(3) Baryalai also noted that Ghani had already promised during his presidential campaign that he would convene a Loya Jirga (although he had envisaged it for the fourth year of his presidency), suggesting that the president may be reverting to an original plan. Ashraf Ghani’s campaign manifesto does indeed state:

The tool of change and amendment is integrated in the constitution. … Hence, one of our most essential pledges with regards to the rule of law is that simultaneous with the national assembly elections, we will also run district council elections so that the legal mechanism for change and amendment in the constitution is prepared. For this reason, our specific proposal is to create an authorized committee composed of the relevant and authorized institutions to examine the necessity for amending the constitution. This committee must be given three years so that with profound and comprehensive effort, it collects the articles that lawfully have potential for reform, distinguish them and at the same time, create the conditions for realizing the articles that can pass through executive injunctions. Following a comprehensive examination and national participation in this debate, within four years we can invite the Loya Jirga tasked with amending the constitution to, by making use of its legal right, make decisions about specific matters that need change or amendment and in this manner, once again make the constitution harmonize with the needs and wants of the people.

(4) Speaking at the launch of the CPSA on 18 December 2015 Sayyaf said that, although many views had already been aired, the system should be changed – through the convening of a Loya Jirga, the holding of early elections or the formation of an interim government – the CPSA had sought to pursue the route of legal demands. CPSA member, Yunus Qanuni, stressed that if the amendment of the Constitution and the decision regarding the fate of the CEO was not carried out by a Loya Jirga within a year, “the legitimacy of the government would be seriously questioned,” but he did not spell out what the CPSA would do if the government failed to meet the deadline. Instead, he explained what he said were the Council’s plans for the coming four years: to actively participate in the upcoming parliamentary and district council elections and to introduce a candidate for the next presidential election.

Daudzai’s political office said something similar in a written English statement to AAN on 5 May 2016:

If the NUG succeeds in implementing the commitments made in the political agreement ahead of September 2016, the need for early elections or any other addressing mechanism will evaporate. [But] in the event that the NUG fails to deliver on its commitment, the legal and political logjam and the problem of a dual-headed government will require a solution endorsed by the Afghan people. The Council will announce its recommendation for such an eventuality in due time.

During an interview in October 2015 with Tolo News, Daudzai said, “My advice to President Ghani is to take a bold decision and hold early presidential elections as soon as possible, so there would be a president with clear powers and legitimacy.” He said that if he were President Ghani, he would not wait for another four years to complete the term, but stopped short of demanding that the government be dissolved, stressing instead that he hoped the government would complete its term and not fall apart before then – but, of course, if for any reason, the leadership of the NUG could not complete its term, both the nation and those who felt responsible had to be prepared so they would not be surprised. It was also during this interview that Daudzai characterised his own political position as an “alternative in waiting” (after which, some of his supporters created a Facebook page under the same name.

(6) Sayyaf’s CPSA also said it would not agree with attempts by the president to continue governing without the CEO. According to CPSA Spokesperson Tarshtwal, both the president and the CEO draw their legitimacy from the political agreement, rather than the Constitution. “If the president thinks he derives his legitimacy from the Constitution,” he said, “the Constitution stipulates transparent elections, which did not take place. In the view of the CPSA, the dissolution of one of the positions will automatically mean the end of the other: the president cannot continue alone.”

(7) The High Council of Jihadi and National Parties was established on 29 August 2015 and consists of Jihadi figures such as former chairman of the Senate and leader of the Jebh-eye Nejat-e Melli Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, former vice-president and leader of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Mohammad Karim Khalili, former vice president and special representative of the president for reform and good governance Ahmad Zia Massud, leader of Mahaz-e Melli Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani, head of Hezb-e Harakat-e Islami Sayed Hussein Anwari, and senior member of Hezb-e Islami Qutbuddin Hilal. In fact, it is comprised of members that had put their weight behind President Ghani in the presidential elections.

(8) The term “Executive Prime Minister” is used in the political agreement. In the context of Afghanistan, the word “executive” often precedes prime minister in political statements to connote the subordination of the post to the presidency; a pre-emptive move to see off claims that the existence of such a post would cause division within the political system.

(9) The debate over the possible introduction of a parliamentary system dominated the Constitutional Loya Jirga in late 2003. Some Uzbek and Hazara delegates even demanded parliamentary federalism, a system that many Pashtuns saw as “a recipe for disintegration.” As reported by Katharine Adeney in her paper Constitutional Design and Political Salience of “Community” Identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Taliban Era: “The clincher for this deal was that the Tajiks were also not in favour of a federal state. Although the Tajiks are a minority, as the second largest community in Afghanistan, they are less territorially concentrated than either the Uzbeks or the Hazaras, and thus “focused on power sharing in the central state” rather than on territorial autonomy.” But when it came to the debate on whether to adopt a presidential or a parliamentary system,

Pashtuns and the Americans argued for a presidential system because of the perceived need for a “strong man” to lead Afghanistan. Indeed, Karzai—the Americans’ favored presidential candidate—threatened “that he would only stand in future presidential elections if the Loya Jirga approves the strong presidential system.” The [Constitutional Loya Jirga] split along ethnic lines on this issue, with Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras opposed to the adoption of a strong presidency, fearing it would exclude them from power.

 

The killing of Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansur in an American drone strike has deprived the Taleban of their official, and before that, de facto leader of six years. Mansur had shaped the movement profoundly – leaving it stronger militarily, but with more internal dissension. His successor, Mullah Haibatullah, is an austere, pious man with higher religious credentials than either of his two predecessors, but also a legalist theologian who has no military or leadership experience. AAN’s Borhan Osman assesses Mansur’s legacy and what we might expect from the new man in charge.

How Mansur was killed

According to Taleban sources in Pakistan, Mansur had been very much restricting his visibility and movement since mid-December 2015. Before going off the radar, he had met some of the Rahbari Shura members closest to him and delegated authority for day-to-day operations to his deputy and to the shura. He had already empowered the Rahbari Shura to play a larger role in decision-making and ordered it to convene more regularly than it used to. He told friends he would no longer be available, as he had used to be in Pakistan and spoke of the need for finding alternative bases for senior members of the movement. The sources are not consistent as to where, from Quetta, he shifted his base to, but all agree on his decreased visibility after December. Concerns about his security may have been triggered by the reported attempt on his life on 4 December 2015, but that is not certain.

According to the same sources, on 21 May 2016, Mansur wanted to meet some of his closest friends and senior members of the Taleban in a border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan to discuss some urgent and important issues in person. He had been communicating with the Rahbari Shura through other channels during the previous five months. On 21 May 2016, however, he drove back into Balochistan again to see comrades in person. He was targeted by a US drone within hours of his entry into Pakistan. Suspicions are running high among a number of Taleban cadres about Pakistan’s hand in the provision of intelligence to the Americans. Why Pakistan would have wanted to get rid of Mansur and why now is not obvious, but the mere fact that (parts of) the Taleban suspect Pakistan underlines the degree of mutual mistrust that has been brewing. The Taleban statement announcing Mansur’s death and the appointment of his successor hinted at the possible pressures Islamabad had put him under to enter peace talks. “He did not accept anyone’s offers of imposed and fraudulent processes; neither was he scared by threats; his determination remained unshaken by internal and external conspiracies and pressures.” [AAN translation]

Mansur’s legacy

Mansur has left behind a Taleban movement that he has shaped profoundly, an organisation, which is largely a product of his six years of de facto and official leadership. (Mullah Omar stepped back from the effective running of the insurgency in 2008, did not even see close comrades after 2010, died in 2013 and had his death revealed in 2015; Mansur went from the position of Kandahar ‘governor’ during the early years of the insurgency to deputy leader in 2007, de facto leader in 2010 and announced leader in 2015.)

Under Mansur, the Taleban went through a ‘modernisation’, which saw the transformation of the insurgents from a loose, rag-tag army to a relatively well-organised movement. The transformation had started with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in 2008 who had stepped into the day-to-day running of the organisation because of Omar’s need to stay hidden; Baradar’s vision culminated in the Taleban’s code of conduct or Layha of 2010 (also see the AAN paper on this topic here), the year he was arrested by Pakistan. Mansur followed, implemented and expanded that vision. At the core of this process was the establishment of an elaborate, hierarchical command and control system that involved shifting a patronage-based military structure to a rationalised army-like structure. This might have not been effectively implemented everywhere, but has anyway radically changed the way Taleban fighters operate. Like Baradar, Mansur was a strategist and further streamlined the movement’s overall structure into a quasi-state with 13 commissions and administrative bodies modelled on Afghanistan’s ministries and agencies. This relatively sophisticated administration brought about a level of centralisation that the movement had always lacked since it emerged in 1994 (apart from its years as the state 1996-2001). Mansur’s organisational skills were remarkable even before he moved into the leadership circle. His comrades from 2006-2007 when he was in charge of fighting in Kandahar say his units were highly organised, in contrast with other groups.

A divisive leader

Before looking in more detail at Mansur’s effective leadership, it is worth bearing in mind that he was not without doubters, even from among Taleban ranks. He was accused (including by fellow Taleban) of deep involvement in the drugs trade and of having non-drug-related businesses ‘on the side’. The allegation that Mansur was involved in narcotics, not only for funding the movement, but also for ‘personal financing’ has haunted his reputation ever since he was Taleban minister of aviation in the 1990s. Mansur was also accused of being worldly, of leading a rich life and travelling extensively and mysteriously. This set him in sharp contrast to Mullah Omar and many other Taleban leaders as well as the rank and file.

Mansur was also accused by critics within the movement of manipulating his authority to promote his fellow Ishaqzais, as well as non-Ishaqzai loyalists, while marginalising personal rivals within the movement. Mansur has probably stepped on the toes of many Taleban in his jockeying for power since he started serving in the leading positions eight years ago. The most prominent of those deeply discontent about what they believed was his nepotism were the two senior-most commanders of the movement, Abdul Rauf Khadem and Abdul Qayum Zaker, respectively the deputy and head of the military commission in 2010 (Zaker had recently reconciled with Mansur and Khadem was also killed in an air strike in February 2015).

Additionally, Mansur had a history of close relations with Pakistan, albeit one that seemed to have soured in recent months. His closeness with Pakistan seems to have been acknowledged even from the outset of the insurgency by the Taleban leaders, something they then used as an asset. When the Taleban’s first post-collapse leadership council was formed in summer 2003, Mansur was appointed as the man ‘in charge of liaison with Pakistan’, a covert role occupied ever since by Taleban members loyal to Pakistan.

Funding and fighting

Mansur, during his years of de-facto and official leadership, turned out to be not only discipline-savvy, but also business-minded (bearing in mind the caveats about personal finances just made). He centralised the collection of Taleban revenues, expanded ‘taxation’ and established a virtual monopoly over external fund-raising. He did so by appointing one of the most trusted of his people, Haji Gul Agha, a fellow Ishaqzai from Helmand to the position of head of the financial commission, after purging it of people he did not trust and sending official letters to the external ‘donors’ to pay only the people officially introduced by the financial commission.

He fired commanders who did not send revenues to the central command and appointed close confidantes to take charge of finances. In order to keep a semi-monopoly on insurgency activities on the battlefield, he also took measures to curb dissidents and stop the emergence of rival groups. He used co-optation and reconciliation and, if neither worked, resorted to brutally fighting the dissidents. For example, he tried hard to not enter into an open confrontation with the most staunch of his rivals, Abdul Qayum Zaker, by paying his expenses and constantly using go-betweens to try to reduce the tension. Similarly, when foreign militants moved into Afghanistan from North Waziristan in the summer/autumn of 2014, they were followed and closely kept in check by Taleban fighters along the way and at their final destination. In one case, when the foreign fighters, together with dissident commander Mansur Dadullah, openly went into opposition last autumn, Mansur sent the most brutal of his commanders to fight the dissidents in Zabul. When the biggest threat to his monopoly on the insurgency emerged in the form of an Islamic State (IS) franchise in early 2015, he first tried hard to stop it by talking to ‘IS Central’ in Syria through personal channels and then sent an open letter trying to dissuade the group from opening a new front in Afghanistan. When he failed to change the Islamic State’s stance, he actively fought its local franchise, sending the best of his forces.

Mansur also reshuffled the Rahbari Shura last year, bringing in a Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek, who, together with the two existing Tajik members brought the number of non-Pashtuns in the movement’s highest decision-making body to one fifth (an all time high). Unlike the Taleban era in the 1990s, the Taleban now has a northern front, which is run and made up of local commanders and this has made it more sustainable. The active expansion of the insurgency in the north had started in 2008, and within three years, the Taleban were present in substantial parts of five northern provinces. However, under Mansur’s leadership the insurgency has expanded far more widely in the north, including to non-Pashtun or Pashtun-minority provinces. The capture of Kunduz city for two weeks last September and the escalation of fighting in Badakhshan underlined how consolidated the northern front has become, partly due to the leadership of commanders from local ethnic groups, an initiative which Taleban cadres credit Mansur with.

Mansur also tried to upgrade Taleban military training and infrastructure. In spring 2015, he established an elite force that was tasked to intervene in critical military situations and crush dissidents, called the qita-e montazira (literally: reserve force). It has been the most effective and well-equipped unit as shown (and reported on by AAN) in its fights last year. Additionally, the overall training exercises for Taleban became more diverse and were professionalised over the past three years.

Mansur presided over a period (when de facto leader, but even more so during his official leadership), which saw a record-level escalation in insurgent violence, with the Taleban responsible for the bulk of the civilian casualties. He took the war into urban centres, which caused massive suffering and casualties for the population. The Shah Shaheed bombing in Kabul, the overrunning of Kunduz and the Pul-e Mahmood Khan bombing in Kabul all happened during his 10-months reign as the official leader of the Taleban. Long before these bombings, the escalation of fighting had continued steadily in the wake of the drawdown of international troops in 2014. Many had wondered if Mansur (then the de facto leader of the Taleban) might use the drawdown as an opportunity to switch to a political settlement with the Afghan government and save the country from violence, which is now almost entirely Afghan on Afghan. However, he displayed no strong desire for doing so, and might well have wasted a reasonable opportunity for ending the war in Afghanistan. Of course, his failure to make peace a serious option was equally matched by the Afghan government (and US) mishandling of a desired peace process.

Diplomatic outreach

On a par with his ‘upgrading’ of military and administrative structures, Mansur also revolutionised the movement’s external relations. He was instrumental in opening the Qatar office in 2013, after he had persuaded Mullah Omar to agree to it in late 2011. Although the Doha-based political office never entered into formal talks with the Afghan government, it did engage in a series of track-II talks with various political actors, which helped the Taleban boost their image within some of the most influential political groups in Afghanistan, such as the mainly Tajik Jamiat-e Islami and the two Hazara Hezb-e Wahdats. In addition to Qatar, the Taleban under Mansur initiated or strengthened its relations with Russia, China and Iran, among others. Utilising the fears of these countries of a spillover of militancy from Afghanistan and a US long-term presence in the country, Mansur’s representatives regularly met with senior officials in recent years. The meetings aimed at gaining support of these countries in return for the Taleban’s assurance that the foreign jihadists operating in Afghanistan-Pakistan with an intention of attacking the above mentioned countries would be stopped from doing so. The visits, at times, involved Taleban envoys travelling outside their Afghanistan-Pakistan axis. These developing relations were a source of increasing Pakistani discomfort with Mansur, even though he had enjoyed a friendly relationship before taking over the leadership. Mansur seems to have successfully shifted the perceptions of the Taleban in China, Russia and some Central Asian republics from being a threat to a potential bulwark against the threat of ‘extremists’.

During his reign as the official leader of the Taleban after the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar in late July 2015, Mansur shrewdly navigated the power crisis. He used extensive negotiations to bring many of the senior Taleban members who opposed his leadership or the way he was appointed back into the fold. Where negotiations did not work and critics went into public opposition, he used extreme force to eliminate them, despite the risk of a blowback. In the 10 months of his official leadership, he managed to neutralise practically all of his critics and dislodge those who went into open dissent. His death came at a time when he had pretty well consolidated the movement around himself. (Part of that consolidation involved the integration of the so-called Haqqani network into the mainstream by elevating its de facto leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, to the position of his deputy and by reshuffling the Rahbari Shura.)

Haibatullah, pious and austere

Four days after Mansur’s death, the Taleban announced, on 25 May 2016, that Mansur’s deputy, Haibatullah (1) had been appointed as the new amir ul-mumenin and that Mullah Omar’s son, Mullah Yaqub, and Sirajuddin Haqqani would be his deputies, the latter retaining his old position.

Haibatullah is a very different man from Mansur with different life experiences. As briefly profiled in an earlier AAN piece, his main credentials are that he is a respected religious cleric (alem) who is also known as a sheikh ul-hadith, ie a specialist in interpreting the sayings of the Prophet. For many years, he has taught Hadith and Quran to thousands of Taleban fighters during the winter lull in Quetta, including the sons and grandsons of the leaders of the movement and thus became the spiritual leader of a younger fighter generation (see also here). He is one of the few religious scholars whom the Taleban have embraced as their spiritual guide and was among the few ulama, who gained Mullah Omar’s esteem and trust.

The 47 year old was born in Sperwan area of Panjwayi district in Kandahar to a family locally known as mullahs since his father and uncle were both renowned preachers in the area. Haibatullah himself has spent all of his adult life outside Panjwayi. His family fled around 1979 to Balochistan and settled in a refugee camp near Quetta, where he was taught religious studies by Afghan ulama. He reportedly fought with the anti-Soviet mujahedin under a commander who initially belonged to Harakat-e Inqilab-e Islami, led by Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi, and then switched to Hezb-e Islami of Yunus Khales. This seems to be in the years between 1988 and 1992. During the early years of Taleban rule, he ran a small madrasa in the Rabat area of Spin Boldak (1995-1997). Then, he briefly assumed his first official job with the Taleban at the Kandahar provincial court, where he was reportedly introduced to Mullah Omar as a knowledgeable young mullah. Later, he headed the military court in Nangarhar for two years (possibly from 1998 to early 2000), and then served as head of the military court in Kabul until the fall of the regime. After 2001, he taught Hadith and Quran to religious students and Taleban in the Kuchlak area of Quetta. It is here that he gained the title of Sheikh ul-Hadith and Sheikh ut-Tafsir. He was appointed (year not known, but probably 2008) by Mullah Omar as the chief justice of the Taleban’s shadow bureaucracy. Around 2012, he became a member of the Rahbari Shura, and in 2015, was appointed as deputy to Mansur.

Hailing from the same district as Mullah Omar and coming from a family well known in Panjwayi, during the Taleban’s years in power, Haibatullah made it easily into the circle that Mullah Omar was personally in touch with. According to an audio recording from Haibatullah, he was entrusted by Mullah Omar (as head of the Kabul military court) with keeping a strict eye on violators of Sharia within the ranks of the Taleban and to have no care about the position of those accused of violations. During the insurgency too, the Taleban’s first leader would turn to him for advice on potentially sensitive edicts and disciplining unruly commanders.

Haibatullah is widely seen as a pious alem, who, like Mullah Omar prefers austerity in his personal life, and is extremely strict in following Sharia. Some independent interlocutors describe him as a calm person and a good listener. His speeches also suggest his calmness. He is more articulate and obviously much more knowledgeable in Islamic studies than his two predecessors, placing him above them in religious credibility.

The succession

Based on his status as a highly respected Taleban scholar and given the trust both Mullah Omar and Mansur put on him, Haibatullah has been appointed for being one of the least controversial candidates. His active engagement in internal reconciliation efforts during the initial six months of his job as deputy to Mansur has further enhanced his status as a unifier.

Consultations about the succession started immediately after the killing of Mansur, which the Taleban did not confirm until the appointment of the successor was finalised. According to Taleban sources, the consultations were led by the Rahbari Shura plus the heads of the commissions and quasi-ministerial bodies. The Taleban in its announcement of the successor called this assembly (about 35 people) as the ahl al-hal wa’l-aqd shura, literally, those who solve problems and make contracts. Ahl al-hal wa’l-aqd are religious scholars and influential and pious members of the community who, according to some Islamic political theories in medieval times, were qualified to choose the best person as leader. The Taleban had previously used the same term for Mansur’s selection in July 2015. The shura reached out to other key personalities in the movement (military and political) to take their views into consideration. It has possibly consulted a much broader pool of opinions than was the case with Mansur’s selection, so as to avoid a power struggle that would undermine the new leadership.

Taleban sources in Quetta and Peshawar say the first obvious name, which came up was Haibatullah, who had already been chosen by Mansur as one of his two deputies. There were other candidates as well, most prominently Mullah Omar’s son, Yaqub. However, the shura, initially as the view of the majority, and later as a consensus candidate, went for Haibatullah, with Yaqub as a new deputy and Sirajuddin Haqqani retaining his position as another deputy (both enjoy equal status, according to a Taleban spokesman). Most of the consultations with commanders and those not in the shura were carried out after the shura had agreed on the three names. Taleban sources say that, unlike the selection of Mansur, which was done by a shura of less than half of the current membership, this shura was attended by all Rahbari Shura members and heads of the commissions. Given that Mansur had already purged the Rahbari Shura and commissions of those whom he did not trust, there did not seem to have been huge differences of opinions complicating the election process. In the wake of Mansur’s appointment, one third of the then 18-member Rahbari Shura opposed his succession, some of them publicly talking against Mansur in the media the same day he was picked. However, Haibatullah’s succession has not been followed by such opposition so far, although the true width of the consultations beyond the so-called ahl al-hal wa’l-aqd shura is not clear yet, and the emergence of objections may take time.

The succession process was swifter than many expected, without having any blowback so far. At this very early stage, there do not seem to be any prospects of a huge anti-Haibatullah faction on the horizon. That Haibatullah can prove to be a more unifying person than Mansur is grounded mainly in the hugely different characters of the two and in the different historic baggage the two carry.

Haibatullah compared to Mansur

Generally, Haibatullah seems a weaker leader than Mansur, but he also may be a much less controversial figure. Mansur was a strong and decisive leader, willing to destroy dissent if he felt it necessary, but also with hands-on skills of administrative and military management. None of these qualities are obviously present in Haibatullah. However, he equally lacks the major liabilities attached with Mansur, which made him divisive.

Unlike Mansur who was accused of running drugs trade and personal businesses, Haibatullah is seen as clean of that. Whereas Mansur was accused of being worldly and leading a wealthy life, Haibatullah is characterised as leading a relatively austere life and has little personal property or businesses. Similarly, in contrast with Mansur who was criticised for manipulating his authority to build up a clique of loyalists, Haibatullah has no such record of (alleged or actual) nepotism; neither is he seen as having tried to build his own personal power. In terms of tribal affiliation, Haibatullah is a Nurzai, some members of which have complained about underrepresentation. The largest dissident faction, who fought against Mansur under Mullah Rassul was made up mainly of Nurzais and accused Mansur of tribal nepotism. Like Mullah Omar, Haibatullah appears to be ‘tribe-neutral’. In his village in Sperwan, residents do not see him or his family as particularly identifying with the tribe, but rather see them as tribe-neutral clerics. Finally, Haibatullah’s record of relations with Pakistan or any other government is also not strained, as was the case with Mansur. So far, he is not known to have built any relationships with his host country’s government, perhaps not surprising given the non-political and non-leadership positions he has held for most of his life. It is the very distance of Haibatullah from prominent public roles and his apolitical past that arguably makes him more a unifying figure than many other presumed candidates who were part of Mansur’s clique.

The absence in Haibatullah of the liabilities that plagued Mansur’s leadership, plus his reputation as a scholarly person who taught many Taleban members in the ranks and files greatly reduces the chances of the aggressive opposition which Mansur faced upon assuming the leadership.

Mansur had consolidated the movement by the time of his death and set it on a consistent and somehow predictable course. Haibatullah is going to be closely watched to see whether he can manage the large-sized movement, given his lack of relevant experience and whether he keeps with the previously defined path in war and peace.

Haibatullah, inexperienced and a disciplinarian

It will take time to understand the new Taleban head’s leadership skills and style. He obviously has a deficit in political and military know-how. However, the institutionalisation of the bureaucracy may mean it is not so crucial to have a former commander at the head of the insurgency. Its operations may continue to run as before and stay uninterrupted by leadership changes. The chain of command, on paper at least, is clear for the fighters on ground. So are the rules and policies for members. Continuation of the same operational model tends to remain the norm, with interruption an aberrance. This is manifested by the hitherto lack of interruption to military operation or intensity of fighting on the battlefields since the announcement of Mansur’s death. Unless Haibatullah wanted to change the modus operandi and break with his predecessor’s habit of delegating authority, he may be able to avoid facing major difficulties in running the movement in the short term. However, circumstances will arise at some point that will require major decision-making on military matters.

Haibatullah may have a different personal vision for his movement, as he brings a different set of experiences from the Taleban judiciary and his teaching. How much room Haibatullah is likely have to brand any personal vision he might have on the movement will be discussed at greater length in an upcoming piece. At the moment, however, it is possible to look at what marks his personal views and preferences out in contrast to his predecessor’s.

1. A man favouring military discipline

Haibatullah appears to be passionate about Islamic justice, viewing it as the core of an Islamic political order (Islamic government). He clearly says this in speeches heard by AAN. This can play out in two ways. First, he might come down hard on his own fighters and commanders who breach the Taleban’s codes and Layha, as he did during the Emirate era. By doing so, he risks stepping on many of the powerful commanders’ toes. In the meantime, harder disciplining can serve as a tool to exert authority over his subordinates.

Secondly, better discipline could boost the Taleban’s image if he was successful in reining in the misbehaviour of fighters towards the population. Haibatullah has long been vocal on the issue of civilian casualties (although note the narrow definition of civilian here, which sees many non-combatants as ‘legitimate’ targets.) He was instrumental in getting Omar to sign a decree in the 1990s for qisas (execution as punishment for murder) of those who beat prisoners to death. According to Taleban sources interviewed in 2014, Haibatullah was also instrumental in recent years in establishing an internal code for reducing civilian casualties, which targets fighters who do not take enough precaution to protect civilians, especially while setting up IEDs. The decline in the use of inherently indiscriminate pressure plate bombs in 2013 (see AAN reporting) also reportedly happened because of Haibatullah pressing for it. Taleban sources said death sentences had been handed out in a few cases to commanders ‘breaking the rules’.

2. A strict advocate of a strict version of Sharia

People in the Taleban who know Haibatullah personally say he favours enforcing Islamic injunctions as robustly as possible. They describe him as a mutasharri’a (absolutely conforming to Sharia in his own life). In his speech to a gathering in the wake of the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death last year, he frequently commended Omar’s lack of compromise on Sharia and the fact that he had paid particular attention to the amr bil-maruf wa nahya an al-munkar (commanding what is right, and forbidding what is wrong, a moral norm originating from the Quran central to the Taleban’s interpretation of Islam – and used as the name for its ‘religious police’ between 1996 and 2001). This may favour his chances of consolidating his status as a ‘jihadi leader’, but bodes ill for the relative moderation the Taleban have displayed on certain issues, such as giving up puritanical stances on music, beards, imagery and education. However, (as will be discussed in an upcoming piece), his role in reversing the Taleban’s progress in ‘moderation’ – if that is what he decides to do – will depend on how far can he get along with the other highest religious authorities in the movement, who might have different opinions.

One trait of his character described by different sources who know him is that he listens to other opinions, especially in group discussions and does not impose his personal views. There is also an anecdote suggesting this. He reportedly endorsed the Taleban’s code for education in 2012 which, for the first time explicitly allowed girls education, although under some conditions. Since he had been one of the religious authorities whose endorsement was needed for all possibly sensitive edicts, the Rahbari Shura sought his stamp on the code, which reportedly he gave after hearing the views of the Shura members. Additionally, his assuming of the leadership position itself may force him to give up some of his strictures and adopt some pragmatism, given the varied situations he will be facing. Leading an insurgent movement is not the same as being a judge or teacher.

Possible implications for peace

The killing of Mansur was celebrated by the US, NATO and the Afghan government leaders as a boost to the prospects of peace, and as an opener of a new opportunity for peace. US President Barack Obama said Mansur’s death marked an “important milestone” in the longstanding effort to bring peace to Afghanistan and that “Mansur rejected efforts by the Afghan government to seriously engage in peace talks and end the violence that has taken lives.” The NATO Secretary General’s statement justified Mansur’s killing on the grounds that he “stood in the way of talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, blocking the prospects for progress towards peace and reconciliation for Afghanistan.” The statement also said: “We support an Afghan-led and owned process for peace and reconciliation, and welcome all efforts in this regard. This is the time for Afghans to talk to Afghans, so that Afghanistan can develop in peace and security.” Afghan President Ghani tweeted in the wake of initial reports about Mansur’s death that: “The Government of Afghanistan once again asks all Taliban to welcome the call for peace of the people & government of Afghanistan…They can return to the country from the foreigners’ land and join the Afghan-owned and Afghan-led peace process. …In the event of Mullah Mansour’s killing, a new opportunity presents itself to those Taliban who are willing to end war & bloodshed.” It may be, of course, that talking about improved prospects for peace sounds better than celebrating Mansur’s death as useful for the war.

However, with the US killing Akhtar Mansur, it is unlikely the Taleban will be set on anything but revenge for now, as can be understood from the movement’s political psychology. This is also understood from the initial reactions of individual Taleban on its own media and social media. There is no reason to believe the fighting will de-escalate with the new leadership. If there is any conclusion to be drawn from the comparison of the backgrounds of Haibatullah and Mansur, there is nothing in Haibatullah’s record to deem him as more pro-peace than Mansur. On the contrary, there are clues in Haibatullah’s background and views, that he would push for a military victory, if he were to lead by his personal views. He is seen as a more dedicated ‘mujahid’ than many other Taleban leaders, including Mansur. According to a well-grounded Taleban source, Haibatullah has a son registered as a suicide bomber and living away from the family in ‘suicide bombing training camp’. Two days into his leadership, AAN was told by people in touch with Taleban military cadres in Pakistan that the desire for intensifying the ‘jihad’ has notably elevated among many fighters with Haibatullah’s ascension. Haibatullah can thus be expected to show a determination to fight and not be intimidated by Mansur’s killing. His first priority will be internal unity, as Mansur’s was when he officially took over in 2015, and fighting is better than peace-making at maintaining the coherence of the movement. A softening of positions on peace with the Afghan government cannot be expected.

Meanwhile, the US government has confirmed that Haibatullah is not on their terrorist list.

The US role becomes more prominent

The decision to kill Mansur has brought the US forcefully back into the debate on war and peace in Afghanistan. The deeper the US engages in war, the more the party against which it fights will expect it to play a central role in peace talks. The Taleban have consistently considered the US as their main opponent in the conflict and refused to take Afghan government offers of talks seriously because of this. However, the US has tried to play more of a background role in peace efforts, as an observer, and has insisted on direct talks between the Taleban and Kabul. The Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US – the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) – platform is a prominent example. The US rather wants to portray itself as a partner of the government in Kabul and is not willing to assume responsibility for political negotiations. It has pushed for an ‘Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process’. However, with the US engaged in such a high-level attack, it is difficult for the Taleban not to believe Washington is not really in the driving seat

Even in the case of a division of the Taleban into factions over the succession of Mansur, prospects for the emerging factions to opt for peace are still mostly dim. At least in the short run, the different factions are likely to compete in fighting hard against the government (or each other), rather than moving towards a political settlement. The largest blowback from the last succession struggle emerged in the form of the dissident Rasul faction, which left an extremely unsavoury record, as far as future possible dissenters might be concerned. According to widely-held beliefs in Taleban ranks, it has now been virtually co-opted by the Afghan intelligence service (also as reported here and here). Not surprisingly, the Rasul faction has been the only voice speaking out against Haibatullah’s appointment. However, it is now considered beyond the pale (for serving as a cover for NDS plots) by the rest of the Taleban, and therefore was not consulted in the leadership transition, at all.

A follow-up to this piece will look at who, apart from the leader, may call the shots in Taleban decision-making, and who might have the greatest impact on Haibatullah in determining the future course of the movement. 

 

(1) Haibatullah is the colloquial pronunciation of the name, and also the spelling used in English-language statements of the Taleban. However, the new Taleban leader’s name might actually be Hibatullah – derived from the Arabic for Hibat (gift), as opposed to being derived from the Arabic word Haibat (fear, awe).

On 18 May 2016, two delegations representing respectively the insurgent faction of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan and the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) initialled a draft peace agreement that should end Hezb’s armed struggle. The status of the document – and whether it may still be subject to changes – is not fully clear, but there is optimism in official circles, particularly within the HPC, that the actual agreement may be signed soon. The government and some of its allies see the draft agreement as a possible blueprint for a peace accord with the Taleban—who so far have shown little interest. As AAN co-directors Thomas Ruttig and Martine van Bijlert write, there are however still some stumbling blocks and open questions.

On 18 May 2016, after several earlier meetings that were widely reported on in the national and international press, the High Peace Council and a delegation of the armed wing of Hezb-e Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar finalised a draft peace agreement. The document was initialled (not signed) in the house of HPC chairman Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani who was appointed in February 2016 (his house currently serves as a temporary HPC office). A photo of the two groups after the meeting was immediately circulated on social media and the draft agreement was presented as an important achievement for the now-reformed HPC that is still struggling to prove its usefulness. (1)

The HIG and HPC delegations after initialling the agreement. Photo c/o Mutmaeen/ Twitter.

Background

Hezb-e Islami has been led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ever since it was founded in the second half of the 1970s (2). During the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, it received the lion’s share of funding handed out to the Afghan mujahedin by western and Arab governments, through Pakistan’s ISI, who believed Hezb to be the most effective anti-Soviet force. The group lost western support when Hekmatyar spoke out in favour of Saddam Hussain during the first Gulf War, and most of Pakistan’s support when Islamabad started favouring the Taleban movement in the mid-1990s. After the collapse of the Taleban regime, Hezb split, or divided itself, into the insurgent faction that is now often called Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and a wing that was registered as a legal political party inside Afghanistan. This relegated HIG to a far distant second place in the Afghan insurgency. HIG currently controls fighters in many provinces across the country, with strongholds in Wardak, Baghlan, Kapisa, Farah and Kunar, but it has not consolidated any significant territorial control or parallel administration-like structures, like the Taleban. Its military impact is also significantly smaller.

Politically, Hezb’s legal wing was more successful. In order to get registered, it distanced itself from the insurgency and Hekmatyar, as demanded by the US government but it did not burn all bridges. Its continuing relationship with the HIG wing became more and more open over the years. As we wrote in 2013, representatives of both the insurgent HIG and of the registered Hezb faction in Kabul

… have implied in interviews with AAN that there is only one Hezb-e Islami and [that there are] no splinter groups. This, of course, conflicts with the pre-condition of the registration of Hezb’s Kabul wing and also contradicts earlier statements of the Kabul-based faction that Hekmatyar could not return to work under the party’s name.

With positions in the government, both on the central and the subnational levels, the largest number of seats in parliament and several provincial governor positions, both under the Karzai and the Ghani/Abdullah government, Hezb may well politically be the best represented mujahedin party inside Afghanistan (more detail in this AAN analysis) – approximately on par with its old foe Jamiat-e Islami, from which it split in the 1970s. In 2014, a Hekmatyar deputy, Qutbuddin Helal, ran for president as an ‘independent,’ gathering 2.75 per cent of the vote in the first round. It never became fully clear whether he did this on his own or with Hekmatyar’s backing, nor was he required to distance himself from the insurgency before being accepted as a candidate. What added to the confusion was the fact that HIG’s official position on the elections kept changing, from participating to ‘boycotting’ while tacitly accepting Helal’s candidacy (more in previous AAN analyses, here and here).

The current draft agreement between HIG and the government follows years of negotiations through different channels. Talks started under president Karzai, around 2008 (or even earlier), but had no tangible results. They were then restarted under Ghani. HIG negotiator Karim told AP that Ghani in July 2014, while he was still campaigning to become president, had already approached Hekmatyar with a letter, suggesting to re-initiate talks.

What is in the agreement?

According to a soft copy of the agreement, dated 26 Saur 1395 (15 May 2016), that has widely circulated in Kabul and that AAN has obtained, Hezb will agree to cease all military anti-government activity and recognise the current Afghan constitution, in exchange for an exemption from prosecution for “the leader and the members of Hezb-e Islami with regard to past political and military measures [eqdamat]”, integration into the political system and a strong, if still undefined, role in political decision-making.

Many stipulations are left rather vague and remain subject to clarification by a “joint executive commission” (kamisyun-e mushtarak-e ejrayawi) that is to be established with a parity of representatives from both sides. This commission will also be responsible for the oversight of the agreement’s implementation and to settle disputes stemming from it.

The agreement starts with a preamble and general commitments (ta’ahudat) from both sides. These include the commitment to the current Afghan constitution and the values enshrined in it, including a specific reference to articles 2 and 3 stipulating that no Afghan law can be against “the tenets and provisions of Islam” and extending this further by stating that “the religious principles and guidance will be the original foundation of all laws and government action [italics by the author].” Furthermore there are joint commitments to elections, equality of women and men before the law, and Afghanistan as a unitary state that belongs to “all tribes [ethnic groups] and people” on its territory. Both sides also support the withdrawal of the foreign military forces “based on agreements that are in the national interest of the country.”

Chapter Two is divided into two parts and spells out the commitments made by each side: 14 for the government and four for HIG.

Based on the draft HIG commits that, after the agreement is signed, it will, “in order to permanently stop the war and violence (…) become active in the country as an important political party,” announce a “permanent ceasefire”, stop all military activity and dissolve its military structures. It will also release all prisoners and hand them over to the government, while the government arranges for the security of HIG members. HIG undertakes to maintaining no relationship with terrorist groups and illegal armed organisations and to giving no support to them. It will move its party offices to the provincial capitals and support the government’s peace efforts.

The list of government commitments starts with legal commitments. The government promises to work with the UN Security Council and all concerned states and international organisations to lift all sanctions against Hezb, its leader and members “in the shortest possible time” (Art. 5). It says it will provide legal immunity for the party’s leader and members and free all HIG-related prisoners who have not been sentenced for certain crimes and both sides agree on. To accomplish this, a “special judicial commission” will be established within three months. HIG will guarantee that released prisoners do not return to the battlefield (Art. 11).

On the political side, the government commits to provide freedom of travel and accommodation for “the honorable leader of Hezb-e Islami and other eminent personalities of that party” (Art. 6) and to give Hekmatyar the choice “of two or three appropriate residences,” including security arrangements, for which it will take on the costs (Art. 10). It will, according to the text of the agreement, further honour Hekmatyar in a special presidential decree “for his efforts for the liberation of the country,” (Art. 9) and will officially announce the right of Hezb to be active both in the political and the social realm and to participate in all elections, (Art. 7). It will also arrange for the presence of Hezb in the “consultation process for important government policies” (Art. 12).

The articles that most explicitly seek to provide Hezb with a guaranteed role in the government are 13 to 15.  Art. 13 provides for participation of Hezb in “government institutions,” the modalities of which will be agreed on in the joint commission and proposed to the presidential office. The same goes for the integration of “interested HIG individuals [fighters] and commanders” into the government forces (Art. 14). Art. 15 provides for the re-instating of officials and officers linked to HIG, who had been in government positions earlier, “based on the law.” This article leaves open to which positions and which period of time it refers.

It is in particular these articles, that contradict the claims of Hezb representatives, like deputy to the CEO Khan Muhammad and HIG chief negotiator Karim, that the agreement does not represent a ‘power sharing’ arrangement and that Hezb has neither demanded, nor been promised concrete government posts.

The agreement also provides for the voluntary return of refugees from HIG-related camps in Pakistan and other HIG members in exile, and the equal treatment of HIG-related disabled persons and family members of martyrs. Returnees will receive land “in Kabul and other provinces,” and about 20,000 families will be given help from “the international community.”

Art. 8 insists that the government is to “provide the circumstances for more reform of the electoral process” and to ensure HIG’s presence in the “reform process of the electoral system.” Hezb concedes that there might be not sufficient time to carry out electoral reform before the coming elections, but seems to have received assurance that there will be an “adjustment of the electoral system towards a party-based, proportional system” (nezam-e entekhabati-ye mutanaseb-e hezbi). The insistence on electoral reform and a role for Hezb in the reform process, shows political savvy and pragmatism, as it seeks influence in the electoral (reform) process and the electoral bodies, with an eye to future elections. Here, it partly overlaps with its old rival, Jamiat-e Islami, that favours strengthening parliamentary elements and the role of parties in the political system and, by that, decreasing the power of the president. Given that it is already extensively present in most spheres of the Afghan political system, Hezb probably assumes it would do well in party-based system.

HIG chief negotiator Eng. Muhammad Amin Karim,. Photo: Pajhwok.

Likely impact of the agreement

Although any cessation or decrease of violence will be welcomed by the population and it is clear that the government is keen to show success after the difficulties in its talks with the Taleban, the text of the agreement does suggest that the ‘peace’ may be bought rather expensively. Hezb’s comparatively low military impact on the current battlefield means that the agreement is unlikely to result in a major shift in the strategic balance between the insurgency and the government forces.

The agreement, if indeed signed and implemented as drafted, will result in a display of prestige for Hezb leader Hekmatyar, providing him a red-carpet return to the country, as well as honours, support and special treatment for him and his followers. The renewed access to resources is likely to translate into political power, as seen when Hekmatyar’s co-mujahedin leader returned to Afghanistan after having been pushed out by the Taleban in the mid-1990s.

It is debatable whether an agreement that so explicitly seeks to give positions and privileges as part of the peace negotiations, is the way to go. Or whether it will indeed be a good blueprint for a possible future peace accord with the Taleban. The experience of the NUG should serve as a warning that the division of government between different camps that need to negotiate every major decision and appointment along formulas reflecting power arithmetics, greatly complicates the business of governing. It hampers the prospects for reform and development, and threatens to bring the government to the point of paralysis.

How and when will the agreement become valid?

Technically, the ‘signing ceremony’ that was announced on social media and in the press, merely signalled the fact that the draft agreement was finalised and initialled by both sides (this was confirmed by a member of the HPC). But there seems to be some disagreement on how ‘final’ the current draft might be. A source close to the HPC told AAN on 19 May 2016 that the document “cannot be subject to any further changes [as it] has the agreement of all sides,” including that of “the internationals,” and because the HPC acted on behalf of the Afghan government.

On the other hand, Hezb chief negotiator Eng. Muhammad Amin Karim told Pajhwok on 14 May 2016 that the draft agreement – which according to him had already been finalised on 11 May – would continue to be shared with key members and officials of Hezb across the country and that this process could take “a few weeks or two months. (…) If they have no concern, the agreement will become ready for signature,” he said.

The draft that has circulated mentions three signatories to the agreement: the head of the High Peace Council, the leader (“Amir”) of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan and the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (see this picture). However, the sequence of the signing does not seem to be clear yet, or even between whom the agreement will be: whether it is a tripartite agreement signed by HIG, HPC and the president, or whether it is between HIG and the HPC, with a presidential endorsement. This would seem to make a difference in its enforceability.

HPC sources have told Afghan media that they envisage Hekmatyar coming to the country for a joint signing ceremony with the Afghan government. This was confirmed to AAN, with the addition that the time and venue are not clear yet. (3) Hezb chief negotiator Eng. Muhammad Amin Karim, on the other hand, told Pajhwok on 14 May 2016 that the return of Hekmatyar to Kabul was not a condition for signing the deal, but that it would facilitate the signing of the agreement immediately after it was signed by the president and the high peace council chairman.

Possible stumbling blocks

Although the High Peace Council and some officials appear optimistic about the scope of the current draft agreement, there are a few potential stumbling blocks and complexities. There is first of all a sequencing problem in the draft’s provision on taking HIG, Hekmatyar and other party leaders from the sanctions lists.

Hekmatyar was designated a “global terrorist” by the United States in 2003 and, on the request of the US, blacklisted by the United Nations in the same year. In both cases, HIG as an organisation is not listed. (Since 2005, it is on the British government’s list of “proscribed terrorist organisations”, though.) The Afghan government commits in the draft agreement to start the process to lift all sanctions against Hezb-e Islami, but such proceedings tend to take months, if not years, and apparently the Afghan government has not yet started. There are indications that Hekmatyar does not intend to sign the agreement until after the de-listing. Hezb chief negotiator Karim told Pajhwok (English version, not accurately translated, here) – partly cited in indirect quotes – that it was impossible for the HIA leadership to come to Kabul to sign the agreement when the HIA youth were imprisoned – a reference to Hezb fighters still in Afghan government custody – and that removing sanctions on HIG and removing names of the party leaders from blacklists were a prerequisite to sign the peace deal. In a direct quote from the interview, he said: “You cannot make peace with a party which [simultaneously] has its leadership on a list that makes it your target and on which a bounty is placed; such action is against the peace process.”

The de-listing, in turn, is complicated by the fact that the US apparently wants a clear commitment from Hezb that it will and has severed all links with terrorist groups and particularly, and explicitly, with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Daesh). The draft, though, only speaks of “terrorist groups and illegal armed groups” in general. According to a source in the international community, the relevant Article 19 might, for that reason, still not be the final version.

In general, however, the US government expressed its “support” for “an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned process for a negotiated … resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan.” The State Department’s spokesman on 17 May 2016 went on to say:

All relevant groups, including Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, should be a part of such a political dialogue so that Afghans can talk directly to other Afghans about the future of their country. So in this regard, we would welcome political negotiations that have been taking place. (…) we’re going to continue to seek reconciliation conditions, including that any reconciled group must end the violence – these are end conditions, not preconditions – that any reconciled group must end violence, break associations with international terrorism, and accept Afghanistan’s constitution, as we’ve said many times, which includes the protections for women and for minorities.

Another stumbling block could be the long-standing and often violent rivalry between Hezb and the former ‘Northern Alliance,’ and particularly its core party, Jamiat-e Islami. This rivalry dates back to the early years of both parties; it continued throughout the Soviet occupation (1979-89), and did not end when the Soviets departed. (4)

The animosity resounds in statements like that of former intelligence chief (and erstwhile assistant to Ahmad Shah Massud) Amrullah Saleh, who lambasted Hekmatyar in a Facebook post for his Pakistani connections and his “40 years in a place of anti-Afghanistan conspiracies” and tweeted that “[t]hree pages of vague & rosy redemption doesn’t make a terrorist a good person overnight“ – although in both cases without mentioning his name.

CEO Abdullah, in contrast, who belonged to Jamiat’s inner leadership during the most vicious conflicts with Hezb, stated some days ago that the situation had changed. He said he had already enjoyed the support of Hezb’s registered wing during the 2014 elections and was now ready to sit down with Hekmatyar for a meal in a sign of reconciliation.

Other consequences of the agreement

One of the major consequences of a possible return of Hekmatyar to Afghanistan will be the possible merging of the different, currently quarrelling factions of Hezb that are politically active in the country and of HIG under a united leadership. There are three groups: the registered mainstream party, led by Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, who was economy minister under Karzai, that supported Abdullah in the 2014 election; the so-called Alliance of Hezb-e Islami Councils, a loose group of party heavyweights that did not follow Arghandiwal in the elections and supported Ghani instead; and a smaller sub-faction led by Muhammad Khaled Faruqi, who belongs to the same tribe as Hekmatyar. Faruqi was the first leader of Hezb’s wing inside Afghanistan before it was registered in 2004 and – not fully voluntarily – replaced after a party congress in 2007 by Arghandiwal. Several attempts, including by Hekmatyar deputy Helal, have been made in the past to bring these groups together again, but so far they have failed.

Renewed unification attempts – that of course also serve to improve one’s position in case Hekmatyar’s does indeed return to the country and the top of the party – have already gained a new dynamic. Juma Khan Hamdard, a former governor of Balkh and Paktia and member of the Hezb Councils, recently brought together Hezb members of different strands to prepare for the return of Hekmatyar (see this picture). According to Afghan media, former presidential candidate and Hekmatyar deputy Helal meanwhile has been made the “joint head of Hezb-e Islami’s branches.”

If the agreement, in its current form, is indeed endorsed and implemented, it could also result in the return of thousands of refugees from camps in Pakistan, particularly from Shamshatu, a refugee settlement near Peshawar, that has traditionally been controlled and used as both a recruitment reservoir and the seat of the party’s leadership council by Hezb. A mass return of such a politically allied population, particularly if they are housed in specific areas, would provide Hezb with a continued recruitment and mobilisation base. Moreover, a preferential treatment for returnees from Shamshatu may well alienate other returnees who already have to struggle with a myriad of problems, particularly access to land (AAN analysis on this here). And it might draw ‘new’ Afghan refugees to Shamshatu, who have been living elsewhere in Pakistan so far.

The draft agreement mentions international support for the voluntary return of 20,000 families (although AAN was told by UNHCR that it had not yet been contacted by the government on the issue). According to a joint document of UNHCR and the administration of the Pakistani Khyber Agency, where Shamshatu is situated, the HIG section of Shamshatu had 37,995 inhabitants in October 2015. But given the long existence of Shamshatu (it is some times called a “refugee village” rather than a “camp”), a significant number of families might want to stay put.

Does the peace agreement signal impunity?

The draft peace agreement raises questions as what to do with the accusations and evidence of gross human rights violations during the decades of war (for detail see for example the report “Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001“ by The Afghanistan Justice Project. Patricia Gossman, senior Afghanistan researcher for Human Rights Watch, has summarised this recently in the Los Angeles Times:

Many Afghans revile Hekmatyar because his forces relentlessly and indiscriminately rocketed and shelled Kabul in the early 1990s. His forces weren’t the only ones to do it, but they carried out some of the worst attacks, killing and wounding thousands.”

But it seems Hezb will be protected twice against being held to account, first by the particular clause in the peace agreement and second by the so-called amnesty bill (AAN analysis here) that came into force in 2010 and provides a blanket amnesty to all sides for the pre-2001 Afghan wars. This, of course, does not preclude accountability based on international law.

Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has mentioned HIG in its preliminary reports, there are no indications that intends to investigate allegations against the party, given the ICC’s worldwide workload and HIG’s relative insignificance, particularly after 2003 when Afghanistan became party to the ICC. It would be in the capacity of the ICC, however, to look into the last large terrorist attack claimed by Hezb, a suicide bombing in Kabul in May 2013, as a result of which 16 people, including three US citizens, were killed.

In contrast to when he chose General Dostum as his running mate in 2014 (see AAN analysis here), President Ghani does not seem to have insisted on a public apology from HIG for its involvement in past violence. The specific honours promised to Hekmatyar will be difficult to swallow for the relatives of victims of Hezb, both among the civilian population and the former rival mujahedin.

A blueprint for peace with the Taleban?

The government and some of its international allies also seem to hope that the agreement could serve as a possible blueprint for a desired peace accord with the Taleban (see for example here). But this seems overly optimistic. First, the Taleban have repeatedly rebuffed overtures of the Kabul government for direct talks. Attempts to arm-twist them into accepting such talks by the Quadrilateral Coordination Group have so far gone nowhere (the QCG just held its fifth meeting amid a low of optimism, after Afghanistan hardened its position vis-à-vis both Pakistan and the Taleban; see AAN analysis here). In contrast to the Taleban’s rejectionist position, Hezb had not just initiated, but had keenly pursued talks with the government in Kabul under Karzai. This can be largely explained by the fact that a peace deal was always likely to increase, possibly even inflate, Hezb’s political and military relevance – both in the run-up to and after any eventual agreement.

A Taleban spokesman explicitly poured cold water over the idea that they may be inspired to follow suit, when he stated that the deal with Hezb-e Islami would have “no impact” on the movement’s position and that “a majority of Hezb-i-Islami members are already part of the government.”

It is also questionable that the Taleban would be inspired by an organisation with which they had enjoyed increasingly strained relations, particularly in the last years, although they were theoretically fighting the same enemies. The two groups started as rivals when the Taleban emerged in the mid-1990s. The Taleban then defeated Hezb on its way from Kandahar to Kabul and absorbed a number of its fighters; Hekmatyar had to give up his headquarters in Chahrasyab, south of Kabul, under their first their onslaught in early 1995 and fled to Iran a year later, when they took Kabul. After the US-led military intervention, Hekmatyar entered into a tacit alliance with the Taleban. At least, that is what he said in a 2006 interview with the Arabic newspaper al-Hayat (quoted here):

We issued clear instructions to the Mojaheddin in Hezb-e Eslami to help anyone acting against the occupation in their areas. We respect and appreciate the efforts everyone is exerting in this direction. I admit to you, as head of the Hezb-e Eslami organization here, that there is not, very unfortunately, comprehensive and full coordination in all the fields and fronts with “Al-Qa’idah” and Taleban at the leaders’ level, though this is present at the individuals’ level in the various areas and we back it and wish it to spread and broaden. […] We negotiated with the Taleban on the various issues. But, very unfortunately, we have not reached an official agreement so far. The brothers in Taleban are acting alone and independently and we are acting alone and independently too.’

In March 2007, Hekmatyar announced an end to this cooperation because “certain elements among the Taliban rejected the idea of a joint struggle against the aggressor” and proclaimed his readiness for talks with the Karzai government. Since then, repeated fighting has been reported between the two groups, including in the Hezb strongholds in Baghlan and Wardak.

What will happen now?

There are rumours that Hekmatyar may be in bad health. Afghanistan’s first lady, Rula Ghani, told the audience at an event held by the US Institute of Peace (quoted here) that Hekmatyar and other former mujahedin leaders were “old people” who should be allowed to come back. “If they want to come to Afghanistan and finish their lives where they were born, I think it is only the human way to say, ‘OK, you come, but we put some conditions.’” Others are more sceptical: “I think he is very ambitious. He would not come to Kabul and accept an isolated life,” said Haroun Mir, a Kabul-based political analyst. “He would certainly engage in politics, and we know what kind of politics he favors…”

Hekmatyar’s senior co-mujahedin leader, the late Maulawi Yunos Khales, was quoted in a 2006 portrait of the Hezb leader published by the Jamestown Foundation:

I pray to god to let Hekmatyar live among us in Pakistan, but I don’t want him with us in Afghanistan because he would not let anyone, other than himself, become the country’s leader.

 

(1) The Washington Post reported that the HPC was kept “technically operational” after the “US rushed in $5 million to pay [HPC] administrators” while the money for the Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme managed by the Joint Secretariat under the HPC was “drying up… amid broader scrutiny here [in Afghanistan] and in Washington of de-radicalization efforts.”

(2) The exact founding year is contested. Hezbis often mention 1968, but the actual split of the originally unified, but loosely organised urban Islamist movement into Jamiat and Hezb happen in the mid-1970s, most likely as a result of the failed uprising in July 1975.

(3) It is not fully clear where Hekmatyar is now. First deputy to the CEO, Khan Muhammad, who is from Hezb’s legal wing in Afghanistan recently said he did not know Hekmatyar’s whereabouts. HIG usually claims he is based inside Afghanistan, but he is mainly believed to shuttle between Afghanistan (particularly Kunar) and Chitral, Bajaur and Mohmand agencies on the Pakistani side of the border. Many of his followers and part of the party’s leadership live in Shamshatu camp in Pakistan and his sons live in Peshawar. Hekmatyar has stopped holding speeches in the camp since the emergence of the Taleban in mid-1990s. His last Eid message was read in his name.

(4) The rivalry between Hezb and Jamiat started in 1975 when Hekmatyar and Massud, then members of the Muslim Youth (Jawanan-e Musalman), accused each other of betrayal after their armed Islamist uprising against then President Muhammad Daud failed. After the emergence of their separate organisations, fighters of both sides clashed in Parachinar (Pakistan) as early as in December 1978, according to Edward Girardet (Edward Girardet, Killing the Cranes: A Reporter’s Journey Through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan, 2001, p 174-5 and Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War, 1985, p 170). A climax was reached, when on 9 July 1989 a group of commanders associated with Massud’s Shura-ye Nazar – Jamiat’s main military wing – ran into a Hezb ambush on their way back from a planning meeting with Massud in Farkhar district, Takhar province. 30 men were killed, including seven commanders. The ambushers were hunted down, captured by Massud’s men, sentenced to death and executed in December 1989 in a public park in Taloqan (read here and here).

In late April 1992, when the Najib government collapsed, both sides clashed heavily over control of Kabul, with Massud’s forces gaining the upper hand and pushing Hekmatyar’s forces out of Kabul (Hekmatyar was officially the Prime Minister, but had not yet been instated as he was kept out of the city by the fighting). On the morning of New Year’s Day 1994, an alliance of Hezb with Khalili’s Wahdat and Dostum’s Jombesh tried to topple the Jamiat government, triggering years of fighting that ultimately resulted in the emergence of Taleban, who pushed both Jamiat and Hezb out of Kabul. In a last ditch effort to fend off the Taleban in June 1996, Jamiat made peace with Hezb and Hekmatyar was allowed to return to Kabul for the first time since his student days, where he was sworn into the position of Prime Minister he had been denied so far. The Bonn conference after the fall of the Taleban brought Jamiat to power, while Hezb was not invited.

AAN has done a series of twelve in-depth interviews with families of Afghans who recently travelled to Europe. The conversations provided a fascinating insight into the practicalities of both the decision making processes and the journey, the complex interplay between economic and security considerations and the mixed feelings families often have once their loved ones have finally, safely, reached Europe. In this third and last installment, AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look at what happened since the migrants arrived and lays out the hopes and concerns their families have, now that brothers and sons are in Europe.

This series of three dispatches is based on twelve interviews done for a joint project with (and funded by) the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and resulted in a joint study titled “’We Knew They Had No Future in Kabul’: Why and How Afghan Families Decide to Leave” published on 27 April 2016.  The data collection was conducted in the spring of 2016 with selected Afghan households to explore the decision-making processes at the family level of a small number of migrants. (1) The three dispatches present the main findings and place them in a wider context. The first dispatch in the series focused on the main motives and decision making processes and can be found here. The second dispatch focused on the details of the journey, the routes and practical preparations and can be found here.

Situation after arrival in Europe

During the interviews, migrants’ families were asked where their loved ones were now and how they were doing. The fact that the interviews were done with the relatives of the migrants, rather than with the migrants themselves, obviously means that the information is partial and that everything is seen through the lens of those who stayed behind. But it is also instructive, as it provides insight into the continued linkages with the home front – a factor that tends to be underplayed in asylum interviews. (Many migrants, in particular minors, are coached to claim they no longer have living relatives or that they have lost all contact).

In all interviews except one, the migrants who had left Afghanistan in 2015 had arrived in Europe, although their journey had often been long and stressful (see this earlier dispatch in the series for details). The one exception was an interview with a young man from Kandahar, a migrant himself, who had tried to reach Europe but had failed; he was in Kabul at the time and preparing to attempt the journey again.

All migrants who had arrived in Europe were now awaiting a decision as to whether they could stay or not. Information about their situation tended to be fairly patchy. All relatives knew in which country their family members were staying, but none of them seemed to know the name of city (or they did not mention the city during the interview). Details tended to be about whether they had received money or language lessons, whether they were allowed to work and how they had been housed.

My son is now in Germany, but I don’t know the name of the city where he is living right now. He arrived there almost a month ago. I don’t have a lot of information about his status, but he is living in a camp and is waiting for the bureaucracy to decide whether he can stay. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

They are in Germany. They are learning German over there and now know a little already. I do not know what is going to happen to them. They arrived 40 days ago. They have been registered in Germany now, but not interviewed yet. They were given a card so that they can go to the city and buy necessary things, but they are not permitted to work. My eldest son gets 180 Euros and my younger son gets 150 Euros every two weeks. That is all they have received until now. They were given a room in a block where other Afghan migrants live. I don’t remember the name of the city. (Mother of a 15-year and an 18-year old, from Kabul)

My son is in Belgium. He arrived there almost six months ago. He did not choose a country. He just wanted to leave Afghanistan because he was tired of everything here. … He wants to stay in Belgium and is taking language classes. He is paid by the Belgian government and is happy there. He was supposed to have his interview after two weeks. I don’t know how it went. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul)

The relatives tended to have rudimentary knowledge of the bureaucratic procedures, but often had little detail, other than whether interviews had already been held or whether a decision had yet been taken.

Now, he is in Germany. He has got through two courts in Germany. He gave them his documents that explain the main factors and reasons for him going. His last appearance – in the high court – is going to be next month. He told us on the telephone that they would send him to the next court. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

He has an apartment with two bedrooms. I’m not sure [when they arrived there]. They are waiting for their second or third interview. (Brother of a migrant from Herat, who left with his whole family)

Linkages to home

In the past, once a migrant left his or her home country, communication became cumbersome, erratic and expensive. However, increased access to the internet and the growing use of smart phones, well beyond urban areas and the upper middle class, have made it much easier for families to stay in touch. The access this provides to information all over the world and the ability to stay connected after departure has obviously impacted the migration process. Afghans contemplating the journey can now gather information beforehand, those en route can ask for help and those who have arrived can get their families to send copies of crucial documents needed for their asylum procedure.

We thought he was joking when he said he wanted to leave, but once he got his Iranian visa, we started believing him. He used Facebook on a daily basis to read about the situation along the route. He read that the border between Turkey and Greece was open, he might have been motivated by this. He is currently in Belgium. (Brother of 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

They went illegally, so they did not take any documents with them. They took money and when they got to Europe, we sent pictures of their national ID cards (Tazkira) via mobile phone. The day they left, my eldest son took one hundred dollars from me and left without our blessings. When my younger son left, we gave him money. His father gave him 150 USD for the journey. When they were in Iran, we again sent them money. (Mother of a 15-year and an 18-year old, from Kabul)

However, not everybody has easy access to communication. One father said he only had limited contact with his son as neither of them had a smart phone (which would make them dependent on an expensive landline-to-cell phone service rather than speaking via internet services such as Skype). (But his son had also left for Europe without telling his father and had only called him later, so he may also intentionally be keeping his father in the dark.)

He said it was a very difficult journey, but he did not tell us about the details because he did not want to make us upset. Also, neither my son nor I have the device [smart phone] to enable us to talk for a long time. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Maidan Wardak)

Hints of regret

Most families said their relatives planned to stay where they had ended up, even though in some cases this was a different country to where they had initially intended to get to, and that they were happy there. A few, however, said their family members in Europe were unhappy.

My 17-year old brother left for Europe. He basically intended to go to Belgium but couldn’t make it, as he was trying to reach Belgium when the Paris attacks happened. So he returned to Germany and then left for Italy. Belgium was his first choice because we believed that people were accepted as migrants easily there. He is currently living in Italy. He arrived there in 2015. He is very, very unhappy there with no legal status. He intends to leave for a city in France where it is believed he would be accepted as an asylum seeker more quickly. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

The case of the younger brother from Nangarhar was further complicated by the fact that the boy had left against the wishes of his family and that the journey had been expensive:

He decided to leave even though all the other members of our family were opposed to it. I am still encouraging him to return because, even after spending around 8,000 US dollars, he now also regrets going. He decided to go because my niece who was already in Europe kept calling him to come to Europe. Also, my brother was not happy here because when he failed the entry test to university. He wanted to join the Afghan National Army (ANA), [but] we did not want him to join the ANA, because he would have been killed if he had joined. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

When asked what his vision for his younger brother was now that he was in Europe, the older brother was not very optimistic:

There were serious concerns about him and now we don’t have any hopes for his future. He ruined his life and all we can do is hope for something better for him. We don’t specifically know what will happen to him next; he knows this better. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

In another case, the migrant simply seemed to be tired of moving around and affected by being away from home.

He is exhausted from traveling and he says if his case is accepted in Finland, he will stay in Finland. He is really tired of moving, so he also said if his case doesn’t get accepted, he will return to Afghanistan. (Brother of 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

In several of the interviews it became clear that those staying behind had disagreed with their loved ones’ wish to go. In some cases they were ultimately persuaded, while in other cases they continued to disagree even after their relative had left.

Actually everyone, including his wife, opposed his going. At the same time, family members were not sure how to stop him as neither the economic nor security situations got better. He said he wanted to leave and take the risk just like other people who were leaving. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand, who left behind a family)

My brother had been interested in going to Iran or Turkey. His classmates and friends had discussed it for a long time. They heard life was better there and they would have better job opportunities, but my family did not agree with him. We wanted him to finish his studies and to get a job with the government. It is not easy for parents to send their kids away. Parents want their children to live with them. It was hard for us, but we wanted him to live in a peaceful place. My brother began talking about this topic, but we did not agree with him. But when security began to deteriorate, the family agreed to send him abroad. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

We all disagreed with his going, all the brothers. We believe more in our own tradition rather than going to another place. We are a traditional family with our own character. I’ve been to many conferences overseas and I know about the difficulties of being a foreigner, especially those with Asian traditions and culture, and languages and religion, even the skin is different. And even if your skin isn’t different, there is racism there sometimes. There are many advantages in Europe, but people can’t count on them. (Brother of migrant from Herat, who left together with his family)

Relatives who had had misgivings before the migrants left, other than just the risks of the journey, tended to still feel conflicted even after their family members had arrived in Europe. Some of them felt they had left behind a good life and would face greater difficulties in Europe. See for instance, again, the comments of the brother of the journalist from Herat:

I would have preferred him to stay because there is an advantage here for a traditional family and a journalist in having a normal life. He goes there and for many years he will try to learn a new language and a new culture and it will take some years for his case to be accepted – and then the golden time of his life will be over. That’s why I was telling him, and persuading myself, that if there is one chance to stay, it is better to stay. If there had not been a threat, he would have stayed. For an Afghan man, this might be the maximum adventure he can have: a salary, a car, a wife, kids. What more do you want? (Brother of migrant from Herat, who left with his family)

Visions for the future

Apart from feeling relief that their relatives had safely reached Europe, family members obviously hoped that their loved ones would be allowed to stay and build a life; that they would be able to focus on their education or finding a good job, maybe start a family or bring some of their remaining family over as well and, of course, help out those who stayed behind:

He is in Germany now and has been there for around eight months. He is waiting for some sort of court to decide his case. He intends to stay in Germany. We hope he can help us take our land back [ie pay back the mortgage that was needed to pay for the journey] and that he will help us build a house for ourselves, because we are currently living in a rental house. We also want to get him engaged. We definitely had worries about the journey, but now that he is there, we have some hopes. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

At least now we are relaxed that he has a peaceful life, and will not be seeing robbers or bomb blasts. My hope for him was and still is that he will have a better life and that he may get married or have children, so they would have a better future. If he has a good salary, he can maybe help us too. We don’t know what will happen to my son. It totally depends on the will of God. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

The mother, who had initially opposed her young sons going, now feels relief that at least two members of her family are safe. And she hopes one day she may be able to join them:

I hope that, after enduring the risks and hardships of this journey, the boys study there and have a better future – because we knew that they had no future in Kabul. I would like to go and join them in Germany. Their younger siblings would also like to join them. Afghanistan is not safe anymore and everyone wants to live in a safer place. We are happy with this decision now. If, God forbid, something happens to us in Kabul, then at least two of our family are safe and alive in Germany. (Mother of two migrants, 15 and 18-year olds, from Kabul)

But there were also relatives who had concerns about the life the migrant may lead. For instance, in the case of the man from Helmand, who had left behind his family and had initially only planned to travel as far as Iran or Turkey:

Well, we are definitely hopeful he will get a good job and can at least help support his own family and children. But we cannot forecast the future. It’s up to the Belgian government now. … The only concern we have is that he left Afghanistan and will be working in another country instead of Afghanistan, while he could have spent his energy improving his own country. Also, my parents are worried about his religious practices. Even if he continues his religious practices, they are concerned about the next generation who they think might not stick to our religious beliefs. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

And then there is of course the uncertainty over whether the migrants will be allowed to stay or whether they will be sent back. Many interviewees did not dwell on this very long, most of them merely referred to the fate of the migrant now being in the hands of God and the host country. Others were more outspoken.

The goals and vision we have for him are that he will have a safe and good life. We do not have to worry about his safety anymore. We do not have to worry that Kuchis, or Daesh, or the Taleban will kill him one day. [But] we are not sure about his future. It depends on the host country and whether they give him refugee status or send him to another country or deport him. In this regard, I cannot say anything. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Maidan Wardak)

Based on the information I have received from friends and relatives, if he gets accepted in Finland and stays there, I think he will have a better future. He will, at least, not live in war. He will get a better education and will have a better chance of getting a good job. But if his case doesn’t get accepted, he might have a very dark future. He spent more than a year trying to get there. He has been away from his culture during this time. He has also been away from higher education so if he doesn’t get accepted, he will be devastated and will have a dark future. He will suffer psychologically as well. If he returns home, maybe my father and all of us will tell him that we spent all our money on you and you returned home with nothing and no future. So there will be a lot of pressure on him. My father will probably tell him that we don’t have any more money to invest in you and nobody else will risk giving him any money either. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

The pressure to be a “good investment”

In many cases the wish for their relatives to do well was intertwined with the hope that the risk, the stress and the expenses of the journey would ultimately turn out to have been a good investment, not just for the individual but also for the larger family. In some cases this was an important reason driving the decision to “send” a relative to Europe. In the case of the migrant from Takhar for instance, after one of the brothers was killed and their house was set on fire, the family pooled their resources to send one of them to Europe:

All the family decided together that we would send our brother to Europe so he could help out the whole family financially once he makes it. We specifically chose Germany. We expected that our brother would be accepted as an asylum seeker in Germany and that he would be able to bring the whole family to Germany, because there is nothing left for us in Afghanistan. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

Similarly, in the other cases, where the decision to embark on the journey seemed primarily driven by other factors, the opportunities that Europe represented still played a role in the families’ considerations.

His employment as a driver with an organisation brought him threats, so my father persuaded my brother to leave the country for a safer place. … At first my brother decided to go to Iran. Then his friends encouraged him to go to Turkey and consequently, he was motivated to try to reach Germany after consultation with family members. We thought, if our brother stays in Turkey, all he would do was work as a labourer. So we thought he should go to Germany, continue his education there and then help us to get there too. … We always wanted to go to a safer place but we didn’t have enough money to leave as a whole family – we still owe some of our relatives for the expenses we spent on our brother leaving. (Sister of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz)

However, the possibility that their gamble may not pay off still looms, particularly for those whose families had struggled to gather the money and those who left despite opposition from their relatives. This is neatly summarised by the older brother of the 20-year old migrant from Baghlan:

Like my brother, my cousins who left, their families also struggle financially. They sold their land and other possessions and gathered money to send their kids to a safe place with better opportunities. It hasn’t been easy on either side. The families are still waiting to hear good news from their boys and the kids live with uncertainties in Europe. The family of one of my cousins who went to Europe still hasn’t paid the smuggler in full, so the smuggler comes knocking on their door every day asking for the outstanding money. 

I have to tell you that all the families that I know of, who sent their sons abroad, are hoping that their sons will get settled in Europe and will help them in return, because they have spent all their money to get their sons there. So far, no family has received anything from their boys in Europe during the last year. The families in Afghanistan are not very hopeful because we know that the influx of refugees in Europe has made it more difficult for Afghans. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

The pressure to be a “good investment” in this case was particularly strong, given that the young man came from a family that struggled financially.

In a way, travel to Europe has always been a ‘high-end’ addition to the regular diversification and coping strategies that many Afghan families employ. For several families this was not the first child or sibling to travel abroad, nor was it the first instance of displacement. Several families had moved—to the provincial capital, another province, or to Kabul—when the situation in their own area had become too insecure, and many of them had spent long years either in Pakistan or Iran. The family from Herat had spent many years in Iran, with several other distant relatives still living there and two siblings already living abroad.

Many youngsters from the family are still in Iran. Some have left for Europe or are planning to go because of economic difficulties and new restrictions there, but there are dangerous challenges. Many hesitate to go. … I have a small brother in Iran, another in India. But they are similar cultures. There is an advantage with education and facilities and incomes that encourage people to travel to Europe. Many from our own family, however, prefer to stay. (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

One of the sons of the family in Helmand had also already gone to Europe in 2000.

Two earlier arrivals

The migrants who arrived in Europe some months ago are still very much at the beginning of their new lives, provided they are allowed to stay. Two interviews done earlier this year for AAN by Anne Wilkens provide some insight into the difficulties the recent arrivals might still face.  Both interviews are with Afghans who were still minors when they arrived in 2010. They were accepted and are, to a certain extent, well integrated. They were quite forthcoming about their difficulties, probably much more than they will have been to their relatives. The evaluation of their stay in Europe is also informed by hindsight:

In Sweden, Jawad has done exceptionally well: he has learned the language and graduated from high school with good marks. But he still thinks his life is tough, albeit in a manner different from before. He misses his country, its nature and his home. … He is not used to living alone and feels psychologically vulnerable: “In Afghanistan we had no money but we were together and we were happy inside. Here it is the other way around: we have money, but inside we are alone.” … He wants to return to Afghanistan as soon as possible, saying again: “In Afghanistan, we were free inside.”

Unlike Jawad, Massud has been reunited with his family. After a couple of years, his mother and five siblings arrived in Sweden, but it was not a happy day for him. Massud felt overwhelmed by his feeling of responsibility for them all: “I cried and cried so much, I had to leave the house. My mother seemed so much older, and was no longer the competent person I thought she was.”… Massud says he has lost himself: “I miss myself and will never be able to find myself again.” He has seen a couple of therapists, but it has not helped him. As he sees it, he has sacrificed himself for his family: “It was not the intention but this is how it turned out.”

 

(1) The study consisted of twelve in-depth, semi-structured interviews that took place across Afghanistan’s regions as follows: four interviews in Kabul and Wardak province; four interviews in Takhar, Sar-e Pul, Kunduz and Baghlan; one interview in Nangarhar; two interviews in Helmand and Kandahar; and one interview in Herat. The ethnic composition and urban/rural population ratio in the provinces was taken into account in the selection of interviewees. Respondents were selected and located through a referral system where AAN researchers reached out to their networks looking for families where at least one member had left for Europe in 2015. The respondents were interviewed about the departure of their family member(s), how decisions were made prior to their departure, details of the trip to Europe and thoughts on the future of the migrant in Europe. In addition, basic household information was collected for each of the families. For a shorter summary of the study, published jointly with FES, see here.

All migrants included in the study were male, with one exception where a whole family – husband, wife and young children – travelled together. In one case, two young brothers from one household travelled together, and in one case a migrant who had been forcibly returned, was interviewed directly. All migrants included in this study were between the ages of 15 and 30 years. Most of the interviewees giving information about the migrants in question were brothers and fathers (there was one mother and one sister).

AAN has done a series of twelve in-depth interviews with families of Afghans who recently travelled to Europe. The conversations provided a fascinating insight into the practicalities of both the decision making processes and the journey, the complex interplay between economic and security considerations and the mixed feelings families often have once their loved ones have finally, safely, reached Europe. In this second instalment, AAN’s Jelena Bjelica focuses on what migrants’ families relayed about the details of the journeys, the routes taken as well as practical preparations.

This series of three dispatches is based on twelve interviews done for a joint project with (and funded by) the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and resulted in a joint study titled “’We Knew They Had No Future in Kabul’: Why and How Afghan Families Decide to Leave” published on 27 April 2016.  The data collection was conducted in the spring of 2016 with selected Afghan households to explore the decision-making processes at the family level of a small number of migrants. (1) The three dispatches present the main findings and place them in a wider context. The first dispatch in the series focused on the main motives and decision making processes and can be found here. The third dispatch will take a closer look at what happened has since the migrants arrived in Europe and lays out the hopes and concerns their families have now that they are there. 

From Afghanistan to Turkey

All the family members of the migrants interviewed for the study said that their relatives who had travelled to Europe had gone through Iran and Turkey. Most went directly, entering Iran via the western Afghan provinces of Nimroz and Herat.

The shortest distance between Afghanistan and Turkey, as the crow flies, is 2,947 kilometres via Iran. Additionally, the land route from Afghanistan via Iran and Turkey is traditionally also used for smuggling opiates to Europe (this route is sometimes referred to as the “Balkan route.” (see UNODC’s map on the opiate flow from Afghanistan). As the brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand explained, many perceived the route via Iran as the usual route from Afghanistan to Turkey.

[…] He first went to Iran and then Turkey. Iran was chosen because it’s the route that everyone else takes. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

Some migrants had an Afghan passport and a valid Iranian visa, for instance, as described by the brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat, who fled Afghanistan with his family:

He went legally to Iran with his passport and then with smugglers. I don’t know about the smuggler contact. He had some savings and sold his car; maybe his wife sold her jewellery too. Maybe he borrowed money, I don’t know – he wouldn’t have said, he’s proud. He didn’t borrow money from the family.

Others made a detour via Pakistan because of tougher security along the border between Afghanistan and Iran:

They told us they went to Iran from Pakistan as it was difficult to go directly to Iran due to tight security [as they did not have a visa for Iran]. From Iran, there was another illegal route, but in the end they decided to return to Pakistan, then back to Iran and on to Turkey. It took them 15 days to reach Iran. They had to stop a lot and on the way there was hardly any food. It was a long journey. (Mother of an 18-year old and a 15-year old migrant from Kabul)

All but one migrant in the sample had not been issued with a Turkish visa. In some cases, the smugglers who organised their travel advised them and their families not to bother getting a passport, while in other instances, families said they did not have enough money to obtain visas (although applying for a Turkish visa through legal channels would be relatively inexpensive) and therefore had to rely on the (illegal) overland route.

Crossing the Aegean Sea

All but two migrants travelled to Greece from Turkey by boat. Of the two who avoided the sea route, one migrant (from Baghlan) travelled overland from Turkey to Bulgaria, then Hungary and finally to Germany. His brother explained that the smuggler chose this route. A 27-year old migrant from Kandahar who returned to Afghanistan and who was interviewed directly, said he decided to try the land route, as he did not feel the smugglers had made sufficient arrangements for a safe boat trip. He was, however, arrested on the Turkish-Bulgarian border.

We moved through Iran quickly, but in Turkey we had to move more slowly. We arrived in Istanbul after several weeks. From there, the smugglers took us to Izmir, but we did not want to get into the boat as the sea was rough and the weather was bad […] We heard from others about an alternative route so we decided to try the ‘land route’, moving first to Erdine, from where it would only be a very short trip by boat along the coast to Greece, avoiding Bulgaria. (27-year old migrant from Kandahar)

Many of the migrants who did travel by boat spent a long time (anywhere between several days to several weeks) on the Aegean Sea coast, as they often had to make several attempts to cross the sea to Greece. After each failed attempt (for instance because the engine broke down or the boat took on water), the migrants would return to Turkey and wait for a new opportunity to sail. Two interviewees, the mother of the two migrants from Kabul and the brother of a migrant from Sar-e Pul, explained what happened on the Aegean coast to their loved ones:

During the trip from Turkey to Greece, their boat hit a rock and sank but they were rescued. They spent a month in a camp in Turkey and were taken care of by UNHCR. They again tried to reach Greece by boat, but the boat’s engine stopped working. Fishermen rescued them again. The third attempt was also a failure. Only on their fourth attempt did they make it to Greece. (Mother of an 18-year old and a 15-year old migrant from Kabul)

He faced tough problems and only just reached Europe. He saw companions drown in the sea, when a storm hit. Some were rescued. He said, “We walked for about 20-22 hours to Turkey. Then, a storm caused the boat we were on to sink and a Greek vessel rescued us.” I don’t remember, but two Iraqi or Syrian people, who were in the same boat with my brother, died. (Brother of a 23-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

An interviewee from Takhar described how his brother called home and asked his mother to pray for him to cross the sea safely:

When he was about to cross the sea, he called my mother and asked her to pray for him. He told her: either I will make it or I will drown. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

The Western Balkan route

According to a European Parliament report, throughout 2015 the Western Balkans route was the busiest. It starts in Turkey, heads west into Greece and then into the Western Balkans, at present primarily via the former Yugoslav Republics of Macedonia and Serbia. Some of the region’s aspiring EU candidates, particularly Kosovo and Albania, have been a source of irregular migration themselves, with outward border crossings peaking in 2014 and early 2015. Increased migrant flows from outside Europe, however, have shifted this trend, now turning the region into one of transit. It appears from the interviews that all of the migrants took this Western Balkan route.

Most of the information, however, that family members of the migrants recalled was focused on the journey through Iran and Turkey, with few being able to give much detail on the journey within Europe, either in terms of conditions along the way or the time it took for their family member to reach the country where they are now. For the interviewees, the accounts by their relatives of the routes taken after having left Greece were rather blurred and many had only a vague knowledge of European geography, in particular when it came to Southeastern and Eastern European countries. The brother of a 25-year old migrant from Maidan Wardak described his brother’s journey through the Balkans in temporal terms:

From Turkey he went to Austria through different countries, but I don’t remember the names of the other countries through which he travelled. I think he spent one and a half months travelling through all of these countries, 20 days of which he spent in Iran. The main reason for choosing this route was that it was cheaper than the other options and the decision was made to use this way because it was the only one we could afford. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Maidan Wardak)

The Balkan route is notorious for human trafficking and migrant smuggling (see the 2008 UNODC report on trafficking and smuggling in the Balkans). The porous borders between the former Yugoslav Republics were the result of ongoing hostilities between the newly established states. The relatively new police and customs departments there did not cooperate with one another, while traffickers and smugglers worked closely along ethnic lines. Since the end of war in the Western Balkans in the early 2000s, new regional forums have been established (such as the Migration Asylum Refugees Regional Initiative – MARRI, see also this LSE paper on regional initiatives) to improve cooperation between the former republics.

In 2015, the states along the Western Balkans route created a humanitarian corridor. The open borders policy, as well as the relatively moderate political discourse and public attitudes, made them ‘refugee-friendly’ countries, despite reported cases of mistreatment, according to a European Parliament report. The state authorities of Serbia, Macedonia and later Croatia (after Hungary closed its border with Serbia in the summer of 2015) even organised border-to-border transport for refugees in their respective countries. The news of the humanitarian corridor reached Afghanistan and may have encouraged their families to send their relatives on the perilous journey:

[…] the media were broadcasting reports of people leaving for Europe. We said, “Let’s trust God. You will arrive somewhere.” (Brother of a 23-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul) 

He used Facebook on a daily basis to read about the situation along the route and he read that the border between Turkey and Greece was open. He might have been motivated by this. He is currently in Belgium. (Brother of 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

Difficulties along the way

Based on the information their families provided, all the migrants had set out between the (early) summer and late autumn of 2015. The families had often only sketchy details of how long the trip had taken, but it was clear that many of the travellers had been forced to interrupt their journey along the way. In Iran and again in Turkey, several had to wait for smugglers to arrange for their onward passage. In one case, a migrant worked in Turkey for seven months to earn money for his onward journey.

He had to leave for Iran, then Turkey [where he stayed some seven months because he didn’t have enough money to travel to Germany]. He found work in Turkey and eventually spent that money, together with money sent by the family, to travel on to Germany. (Sister of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz)

Even for those passing through, the stay in Turkey was often long as most migrants entered the country on foot through the mountains. In many cases, they did not tell their families the extent of the difficulties they faced along the way, in order not to worry them. Some family members said they had asked not to be told any details because they would be too upsetting.

However, the mother of the two migrants from Kabul described how smugglers left her sons without food or water during the 15-day walk through the mountains between Pakistan and Iran:

They were told they would walk in the mountains for two to three hours. But in the area between the Pakistani and Iranian border, the boys had to walk for 10 hours per day, without any water for 15 days. The boys told the smuggler they could not go on without food or water. In the mornings, they were given some bread and a bottle of water for the whole day. One day, a boy who was part of their group collapsed and later died from exhaustion. My boys then asked for more water but were usually only given a little bit of muddy water once they ran out of bottled water. (Mother of an 18-year old and a 15-year old migrant from Kabul)

The brother of a 20-year old migrant for Baghlan shared a similar story:

He told me that he had been stuck on the border between Iran and Turkey for 20 days. I think the smuggler could not get him through the border on one particular day. The smuggler hid him in a desert area with 30-35 other people. In this area, there was a lot of trash and different kinds of animals. My brother said that the food they had lasted for only a day and that for the next three days they had nothing. He said if the smuggler had not shown up on the fourth day, they might all have died.

Other migrants told their families about difficulties that included instances of arrest, mistreatment and perilous journeys by boat. They described the hardships of being at somebody else’s mercy when it came to getting food, water and shelter. Some migrants told their families that the trek over the mountains around the Iranian-Turkish border had been horrible. Others said they had been mistreated either by the smugglers or the local authorities, as described by these two interviewees:

He said he was arrested with two smugglers along the Turkish border with Iran and mistreated. We didn’t have any news from him for almost two weeks. He then had to spend almost one month in a migrant camp in Turkey where the conditions were very bad. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

My brother said a local smuggler in Iran beat him, along with a group of 50 Afghans; he gave them electric shocks and took their money and luggage. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

A good smuggler is hard to find

The interviewees, most of whom had been involved in the preparations of their family member’s journey, described how in most cases the family contacted a smuggler to discuss their options, get assurances that their loved ones would be taken care of, and agree on a price. (2)

Finding the money and the smuggler was necessary. From the time of the initial discussion until he left, I made sure we found a good smuggler who would succeed in getting him to Europe. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

I discussed the issue with the smuggler […] There was no need to get a passport for my son, I was told. When my son got to Turkey, I paid the money to the smuggler. We were in touch with the smuggler while my son was in transit, and if something happened to him, the smuggler would report it to me, I was told. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

In Kabul, we found a smuggler and told him that only after the boys reached their destination would we pay him. The smuggler’s mother-in-law lives in our neighbourhood, and her son-in-law knows a lot of people and has connections to many other smugglers along the route to Europe. (Mother of an 18-year old and a 15-year old migrant from Kabul)

With a few exceptions, most families discussed at length the difficulties they faced in getting the funds together. For many, it required borrowing money from relatives and friends and/or mortgaging their homes. Payment arrangements, as well as the cost of the journey to Europe, seemed to vary widely: from 1,500 US dollars to more than 8,000 US dollars per person. (In some cases the price mentioned only concerned the journey to Turkey, with the families not specifying how much their sons or brothers had paid for the boat trip from Turkey to Greece. For the humanitarian corridor in the Western Balkans, where the governments organised the onward journey, no smugglers’ services would have been required).

I discussed the issue with the smuggler, who said payment from Kabul to Turkey was 1,500 USD. (Father of a 19-year migrant from Kabul)

He spent almost 8,000 USD getting from Mazar to Germany. (Brother of a 23-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

Some families said that their brothers or sons would contact them when they needed money while on their journey, and that they would provide them with instructions on how to pay:

He had already talked to the smuggler and paid him 1,500 USD. He paid this money to the smuggler to take him to Turkey. When he got to Turkey, he told his friends he needed more money. These friends then informed us and we sent him the money he needed, which we borrowed from our relatives. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Maidan Wardak)

Some migrants’ families were able to negotiate that payment would only be made once their family member had reached Europe, while others paid after each leg of the trip was completed (generally Iran, Turkey and Europe). The mother of the 18-year old and 15-year old from Kabul said that the smuggler told the family:

Whenever your boys call and say they are in Iran or in Turkey, then you can pay the money for this part of the journey.

The brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar said that several different smugglers had been involved in his brother’s journey to Germany:

He spent a total of 4,000 USD in order to reach Germany […] We first sent him to Nimroz then smugglers took him to Iran for 600 USD, another smuggler took him to Turkey for 700 USD, then to Greece and from Greece to Germany. It took two months for him to reach Germany.

The brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar described how he made a deal with the smuggler for his brother:

I took him to the smuggler and we made a deal and agreed that payment would only be made once he had reached his final destination. The money would not be paid if there were three failed attempts by the smuggler to get him there.

The 27-year old migrant from Kandahar (who was able to give the most detailed account of his journey), was repatriated and decided not to return to Kandahar and based himself in Kabul. He said he paid increments of 2,000 to 3,000 US dollars for each leg of the trip. He also said that smugglers set up a chain of hiding places along the way and they provided the migrants with food and water along the way.

On the way, we had to stay with the smugglers in apartments provided by them. We moved through Iran quickly but in Turkey we had to move more slowly. We arrived in Istanbul after several weeks. From there, the smugglers took us to Izmir. (27-year old migrant from Kandahar)

Although the interviewees knew only a fraction of what their family members had endured during their journeys and were thus unable to provide detailed accounts of their relatives’ travels through some parts of Europe (especially through the Western Balkans), it is clear that all the migrants used this relatively new and shorter migration route (when compared to the route via Libya to Italy). The Balkan route, although not devoid of peril, is considered safer than travel through Libya to Italy, as it is mainly a land route. For those migrants coming from the Middle East and Afghanistan, Turkey is within easier reach than Libya. However, there are now new challenges along the road, in particular in the Western Balkans, which include new fences along borders and unanticipated reactions and changes in policies by the primary destination countries, which burdens the transit countries (such as Greece). This is what has most likely led to the emergence of new, secondary routes in the region.

 

(1) The study consisted of twelve in-depth, semi-structured interviews that took place across Afghanistan’s regions as follows: four interviews in Kabul and Wardak province; four interviews in Takhar, Sar-e Pul, Kunduz and Baghlan; one interview in Nangarhar; two interviews in Helmand and Kandahar; and one interview in Herat. The ethnic composition and urban/rural population ratio in the provinces was taken into account in the selection of interviewees. The respondents were selected and located through a referral system where AAN researchers reached out to their networks looking for families where at least one member had left for Europe in 2015. Respondents were interviewed about the departure of their family member(s), how decisions were made prior to their departure, details of the trip to Europe and thoughts on the future of the migrant in Europe. In addition, basic household information was collected for each of the families. For a shorter summary of the study, published jointly with FES, see here.

All migrants included in the study were male, with one exception where a whole family – husband, wife and young children – travelled together. In one case, two young brothers from one household travelled together, and in one case a migrant who had been forcibly returned, was interviewed directly. All migrants included in this study were between the ages of 15 and 30. Most of the interviewees giving information about the migrants in question were brothers and fathers (there was one mother and one sister).

(2) The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its protocols on human trafficking and smuggling, and manufacturing and smuggling in arms from 15 November 2000 are signed by all states on the route that the migrants described (only Iran has yet to ratify it).

When protesters interrupted President Ashraf Ghani’s speech in London three times on 13 May 2016, the heated controversy surrounding the route of TUTAP, a main electricity grid initiative, received even international attention. In Afghanistan, the tensions have been simmering since January 2016 when Hazara members of the government started trying to prevent a potential rerouting of the electricity transmission line away from their ethnic group’s settlement areas. The leak of their efforts into the media triggered the first public protests. In early May, following a cabinet decision to stick to the rerouting plan, the subject reached the wider public, translating into a broad protest movement. For today, 16 May 2016, large protests in Kabul have been announced and are expected by some to reach or even surpass the scope of the ‘Zabul Seven’ demonstrations in November 2015. AAN’s co-director Thomas Ruttig, with contributions from Ali Yawar Adili, Salima Ahmadi and Jelena Bjelica, looks into what is at stake.

Thousands of demonstrators are expected to gather this morning (16 May 2016) in Kabul to protest the government’s decision where a new key electricity transmission line would cross the Hindu Kush massive. Two alternative routes have been hotly discussed: one over the Salang Pass and one through Bamyan province. The government finally opted for the first one in April 2016.

Protests and counter-protests

The protests are planned to mirror the ‘Zabul Seven’ demonstration of 11 November 2015, one if not the biggest in the Afghan capital since the fall of the Taleban regime. The organisers, who call themselves the People’s High Council (Shura-ye Ali-ye Mardomi), plan to rally protesters converging along ten routes from different parts of the city onto Kabul’s central Jada-ye Pashtunistan in front of the entry to the Arg, the presidential palace. This square was also the venue for the ‘Zabul Seven’ protests, locally known as inqilab-e tabasum (Tabasum revolution), named after an under-age girl beheaded during the abductions by militants in Zabul province in October 2015.

In what amounts to a call for a general strike, or a “city closure” (ta’til-e shahr), as it is called by the organisers, the people’s council issued a follow-up statement on 13 May 2016 calling on “all educational centres, schools, madrasas, universities, shop keepers and business people” to “leave their routine work and pour into the streets” on “Great Monday” (Dushanbe-ye Bozorg) and to support the call for freedom and justice. In this statement the intent was apparently to project broader political aims: “Our dream [sic] is disgust of darkness and getting to the light. By ‘light’ we do not only mean it in its literal meaning.” Some social activists told AAN they would be ready to remain in the streets for many days.

The Kabul protests were preceded by demonstrations in Mazar-e Sharif and Ghazni on 15 May. In Mazar, hundreds of protesters, mainly university students, chanted slogans such as “stop discrimination” and “we want justice.” In Ghazni, according to a local leader of Khalili’s Hezb-e Wahdat “thousands“ of protesters demanded “justice and balanced development.” Simultaneous protests were announced for Daikundi, Baghlan and, again, Bamyan on 16 May as well as for a number of western capitals both on 15 and 16 May, including Washington, Stockholm, Berlin and Tokyo, mainly organised by the Hazara diaspora. The Ghani protests in London on 12 May 2016, when the president attended an anti-corruption summit, as well as the interruption of Ghani’s speech at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) a day later were also organised by locally based Hazara and other activists.

A late-night meeting held in the palace on 14 May 2016, in order to find a last-minute compromise on the route of the power line, so that the protests could be called off, came to nothing. It was attended by the president and politicians in the government who have publicly supported the planned Kabul protests, including second Vice-President Muhammad Sarwar Danesh and Second Deputy Chief Executive, Muhammad Mohaqqeq (here and here). The government is afraid that, as with the ‘Zabul Seven’ protests, security problems might arise. Indeed, some participants tried to scale the Arg’s walls during the ‘Zabul Seven’ protests, and there were rumours that certain individuals participating in the demonstration were planning to storm the palace and topple the government. (The situation de-escalated after the protesters were allowed onto the palace’s premises to hold an overnight vigil.)

The High Council of Jihadi parties backed the government on this. On the eve of the protests, it gathered in Kabul and warned against possible violence caused by the planned demonstration, urging the organisers to call it off. They also urged the government not to take any steps towards the implementation of the initiative until the issue has been resolved and offered to mediate. Participants included Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, Mawlawi Abdul Hakim Munib, Wahidullah Sabawun, Qutbuddin Helal, Haji Din Muhammad as well as Sarwar Danish from those supporting the Jombesh-e Roshnayi (Enlightening Movement) and other Shia and Ismaili leaders such as Sayed Mansur Naderi and Sayed Hussain Anwari. Muhammad Karim Khalili’s Hezb-e Wahdat published a statement on 15 May 2016 saying that, in contrast to media reports, Khalili “has not participated in the decision[-making]” of the council and only supports one stance and that is the “revocation of the cabinet decision and transiting the electricity through the Bamyan-Maidan route as a national project.”

The protest organisers, however, did not give in. In a statement published on the afternoon of 15 May, the People’s High Council called on Kabulis to “be prepared for a great civil march without paying any attention to the rumours [about a possible compromise] or to the psychological warfare by the government.”

There have also been an increasingly number of counter-rallies. These have been the result of a statement made on 3 May 2016 by the Minister of Water and Energy Ali Ahmad Osmani announcing that the decision about the TUTAP route could not be changed because such a change would “affect” the plans for electricity supplies to 12 mainly southern provinces including Maidan-Wardak, Ghazni, Logar, Paktia, Paktika, Khost but also to Parwan, Panjshir and Kapisa. The following day, acting head of Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), Mir Wais Alemi stated that: “God forbid there is insistence that the project is routed through Bamyan, there is the risk that this project … might be cancelled.” Rallies and meetings were held in favour of the Salang route in the provinces of Paktia, Khost and Helmand on 10 May; further gatherings followed on 15 May in Paktika, Khost, Logar and Parwan, supporting the Salang route for the transmission line and denouncing the anti-Ghani protesters in London.

What is TUTAP?

TUTAP – an acronym for the participating countries Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan – is an initiative designed to close the large gap in Afghanistan’s current need for electrical power by connecting existing “insular” grids inside the country and linking this unified grid system to neighbouring countries. This would allow the export of surplus electricity from Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics to Pakistan and be used to cover seasonal power shortages in participating countries by the use of ‘two-way’ lines. The TUTAP regional power-sharing initiative and the better known CASA-1000 project (another 1000kV transmission line planned to connect Tajikistan with Afghanistan and Pakistan) (for initial information regarding the initiative, see this 2015 AAN dispatch) constitute the first phase of the East-Central-South Asia Regional Electricity Market (E-CASAREM) development program, which envisions the creation of a shared power market among the countries of East, Central and South Asia. For Afghanistan, TUTAP should provide all the power it needs by 2030.

The controversial Hindu Kush passage, whether via the Salang or Bamyan, covers only a short distance but topographically, it is the most complicated part of one of the lines of the envisioned TUTAP grid through the project’s main hub in Pul-e Khumri. From there, it crosses the Hindu Kush mountains to southern and southeastern Afghanistan.

Afghanistan ranks among the five per cent of countries with the lowest per capita energy consumption in the world, and is still a net energy importer. In 2014, for example, more than 80 per cent (1,000 megawatts [MW]) of its total power supply (1,247 MW) came from Iran (16%), Tajikistan (25%), Turkmenistan (12%), and Uzbekistan (27%), with the rest generated through indigenous hydropower and thermal sources (see a 2015 ADB report). According to the same report, the “lack of domestic generation remains the key challenge for energy security in Afghanistan,” which often “create disparities in economic development; and fuel ethnic and regional tensions, insecurity, and discontent.”

In 2008, Afghanistan began a comprehensive programme to expand its power grid and to develop new capacity in the generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical power. The Strategy for Regional Cooperation in the Energy Sector of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC) endorsed by the Seventh Ministerial Conference on Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation held between 19 and 21 November 2008 in Baku, Azerbaijan decided on an investment proposal for Afghanistan. This included “transmission and distribution rehabilitation in Afghanistan to enable the country to absorb the imported power from Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and distribute it to load centers.” CASA-1000 and TUTAP are initiatives that were derived from this decision.

The executing agency for TUTAP in Afghanistan is the Asian Development Bank (ADB), through which the funding from multiple donors is also being channelled.

In October 2012, the Afghan government developed a national priority programme, called the National Energy Supply Programme (NESP), which detailed Afghanistan’s energy supply challenges and demands. The NESP highlighted that:

The current transmission system for import of power from the neighboring countries is operating at its limit. Imports from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to the north of Kabul are severely constrained by the transmission line over the Salang Pass. All three countries plan to continue supplying Afghanistan in the same amount and even increase their power transfer, which would require increasing the current transmission line capacity. The option of the Salang Pass transmission line is being studied and analyzed in the Power Sector Master Plan and results will be available in 2013.

In 2013 the Asian Development Bank commissioned the German consulting company Fichtner to develop the country’s Power Sector Master Plan. In May 2013, Fichtner came up with a 450-pages document that states in its executive summary:

For the additional [TUTAP] Hindu Kush crossing it is recommended to use the so called Bamyan route … The Bamyan route will avoid the narrow space and difficulties along the Salang Pass… 

Choosing the Salang Pass route for construction of the new line to Kabul may have the advantage of slightly shorter time for construction and will have slightly less investment costs, as a separate investigation on technical feasibility of this route has shown.

From the other point of view, significant disadvantages need to be considered. First, the network integration of the coal fired power plants along the Bamyan route [another government mega project that has fallen into serious delay, however; more in this AAN analysis] and the power supply of Bamyan region will require an additional transmission line and the additional investment will be significant high, adding to the total investment. The Salang Pass will also be the route for the HVDC line for CASA-1000 project, as the actual planning of CASA-1000 project indicates and the construction of a third line along the Salang Pass will be very difficult, if not impossible. 

Routing all lines to Kabul on one corridor will increase the risk of losing the whole supply for Kabul region due to one single event, with its major consequences.

What appears to be a recommendation (and indeed became one of the main lines of argument by the protesters), comes with the disclaimer that “this consultant’s report does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB or the Government concerned, and ADB and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents” and that “all the views expressed herein may not be incorporated into the proposed project’s design.” This practically refers the decision-making back to the government in Kabul – which it did, and which triggered the current protests.

How did the conflict emerge?

In early January 2016, second Vice President Muhammad Sarwar Danesh wrote a letter, first to President Ghani and then to the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and the state-owned electricity company, DABS (the only electricity grid operator in the country and party to the TUTAP initiative) to raise his concerns about the planned rerouting of the TUTAP line from Bamyan to the Salang. He also listed the arguments against the Salang and those for the Bamyan route. The letter was somehow made public and was published by the media on 9 January 2016 (see for example here).

The leaking of Danesh’s letter – it is unclear by whom – led to the first street protests. Still on the same day, 9 January 2016, people in Bamyan demonstrated. A member of the local provincial council and of Khalili’s Wahdat party, Muhammad Hassan Assadi, who participated in the protest, was the first one who reportedly demanded Bamyan’s MPs to boycott parliament in protest. On 12 January 2016, Mohaqqeq echoed Danesh’s concerns in a social media post and joined the protest.

Tawassoli Gharjistani, a member of the technical committee set up by the president following the leaking of Danesh’s letter, told AAN that the president’s office responded to the letter by ordering the MoEW and DABS to work with Danesh’s office. According to Gharjistani, after a first meeting on 10 January 2016, the following main decisions were taken: firstly, that the procurement process for TUTAP be stopped, and secondly, a technical committee comprising of representatives of the MoEW, DABS, the offices of the Second Vice-President and of the Second Deputy Chief Executive as well as other relevant ministries be established to review the pros and cons of the two routes. After some delay and further meetings, on 10 March 2016 the technical committee agreed on an assessment report that was to be submitted to the cabinet.

A copy of this report, received from Taqi Amini, a former member of the technical committee and now one of the protest leaders, includes two major (and somewhat contradictory and unrealistic) recommendations. First, it was recommended that TUTAP be built through Bamyan and that this should take place within the framework of the existing financial plan or obtain additional funding. Secondly, it was recommended that, should the Salang route be chosen, a further 220 KV power line be added to connect Bamyan to TUTAP in order to alleviate local concerns that the rerouting would not cut the province off from the main power system (which would further increase the costs).

On 30 April 2016, the NUG cabinet approved the Salang as the route for the TUTAP power line. This was confirmed in a video message by President Ghani dated 9 May 2016:

The cabinet’s decision regarding this project, which was announced last week, was in fact in line with steps already taken in previous years by the leaders of the then-government and in accordance with an agreement they had signed with the Asian Development Bank. This project, which was supposed to have started a long time ago and already be operational by 2016, was delayed for several years. At this juncture, we had to consider the development opportunity cost. As our financial resources are sadly insufficient, our current dependence on funding has meant that our options regarding national projects are also limited and dependent on conditions, which are presented mostly with a particular perspective of economic rationality. For this reason, we had to use this last chance and deadline and take the final steps towards the implementation of this national project in order not to lose this important development opportunity.

The president further announced that in order to ensure that “big development steps are taken with national consensus,” he had tasked a national commission, whose members are to be appointed “in consultation with representatives of the people, political and civil activists and specialists.” This commission will review all related documents and finally submit “a comprehensive and coherent opinion, taking into consideration both its economic aspect and social impacts” for Ghani’s final decision. He also appealed to all parties to “keep the doors for negations open, instead of emotions resort to professional arguments, and take the collective interest as criterion for our decision-making.”

The conflict pours onto the streets

Following the cabinet’s decision in April, the Jombesh-e Roshnayi political and social movement developed. It gave the government an ultimatum of 72 hours to respond to the “demands of the people” and have the TUTAP line run through Bamyan province. On 6 May, it brought out “thousands of people” in Bamyan city criticising the government’s decision. Demonstrations in Daykundi and Herat followed.

The logo of the Enlightening Movement.

When the government did not respond as demanded, the People’s High Council held a large open-air gathering on 9 May in the Shahid Mazari Mosala, an open space in the west of Kabul, to decide on further steps, that included the preparation of a larger demonstration. Former Vice President Muhammad Karim Khalili, Danesh, Mohaqqeq and Sadeq Modaber, another Hazara party leader close to former president Karzai and the former head of the Office of Administrative Affairs, as well as a number of Hazara MPs joined the gathering. In a symbolic move, they left the platform erected for the leaders and sat with the rest of the crowd on the ground. The council then issued a statement setting 16 May 2016 as the date for the large-scale protest in Kabul.

Mere hours after the gathering, Ghani released a video message calling for negotiations and ordering yet another review committee. The following day, the People’s High Council responded to the president’s message by making the revocation of the pro-Salang cabinet decision the precondition for negotiation with the government.

Who are the organisers?

At least some the ‘Zabul Seven’ organisers are part of Jombesh-e Roshnayi which is mainly a Hazara movement. The People’s High Council is its leading body. It includes representatives from political parties, independent politicians, MPs, civil society and social activists from different spheres like independent journalism, education and social work. It is the non-party activists, though, who run the preparation of the protests and shape the face of the movement. With this composition, the protest movement is much broader than the ‘Zabul Seven’ protests in November 2015 although it finds it difficult to mobilise beyond the Hazara community.

Furthermore, the movement’s methods of communicating are distinct. All gatherings, held in the Baqir ul-Ulum mosque close to the Darulaman Palace, are open to the public. Decisions and the call for today’s protests are communicated through social media. One of the major channels of communication is the Facebook group Jumhuri-ye Sukut (The Republic of Silence). It has been reporting and discussing Hazara issues and promoting ‘humanist’ education and human rights beyond the ethnic group for a number of years already. Decisions of the council and the announcements for the protests have also used these channels but have also been publicly disseminated through public loudspeakers in some parts of Kabul.

On 14 May 2016, most Hazara and a number of other MPs – altogether 31 people – walked out of the Wolesi Jirga session, announcing that they would not return until the fate of the TUTAP initiative had been determined. The non-Hazara MPs are Latif Pedram from Badakhshan who, after the announcement of the NUG, declared there was a need for an opposition and that he would lead it; the Uzbek MP Muhammad Hashem Ortaq (the movement is not supported by Uzbek leader Dostum) and Mohiuddin Mehdi, a Tajik Jamiati intellectual. This walkout now threatens to delay major parliamentary decisions in the coming days, such as the vote over the new defence minister and NDS chief.

Last-minute measures

As emotions run high, the controversy has increasingly taken on an ethnic colouring. With Bamyan mainly populated by Hazaras, and given that the protests were started and are mainly carried out by Hazaras, this has created a counter-reaction among Pashtun MPs and Pashtun communities living in the provinces south of where TUTAP is supposed to cross the Hindu Kush. Mirroring the feelings of people in Bamyan, they also fear they might not profit from the new TUTAP system if it is not routed through the Salang. (In fact, neither would make much of a difference for them, as in both instances the transmission line will end in the power-hungry capital Kabul and go south from there. Many of the protesters and politicians involved have possibly not read or understood the – indeed complicated – project documents.) Among Hazaras, deep-seated feelings of what they see as government neglect of the central provinces over the past 15 years became apparent, finding its most extreme expression by the London RUSI protestor calling Ghani a “racist” (which was in fact rejected also by many of those supporting the protest movement).

In parliament, there were mutual accusations of “discrimination” and turning the TUTAP initiative into a “victim of ethnic politics” between different groups of MPs. The bad word of a baghi – “rebel” in a religious connotation, recently used by President Ghani for the Taleban – was hurled at the protestors. The dispute on 14 May almost turned into a physical brawl but some cooler-headed MPs stepped in just in time.

There are also a number of politicians – both Tajik and Pashtun (but few Uzbeks) – that have tried to capitalise on the protests by supporting the protesters’ demands and turning them into a vehicle for further undermining the NUG, which is already under pressure, or to encourage the administration to bring them back into (or keep them in) government positions. The former category includes ex-Minister of Interior Muhammad Omar Daudzai who is close to former president Karzai; among the latter are the acting governor of Balkh province Atta Muhammad Nur as well as two former chiefs of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Amrullah Saleh (who wrote on his Facebook page that the “central regions are part of the country’s soil, not a colony of the central government”) and Rahmatullah Nabil. This papers over the fact that at least some of these politicians had been a part of the Karzai government when the initial decisions regarding TUTAP were taken. Several leading Hazara politicians have climbed on the bandwagon to win back popularity they lost during the ‘Zabul Seven’ protests when they tried to speak on behalf of the protesters without being asked to do so. Hence, the need for their humble and symbolic gesture of sitting on the ground besides the protests’ foot soldiers.

In the meantime, during the afternoon of 15 May 2016, the protests spawned their first success. Following a morning meeting with MPs – minus the boycotting group – and senators  in the presidential palace (the day’s Senate session was cancelled), President Ghani reportedly promised to send all documents related to TUTAP to parliament for deliberation. The president also issued a decree with the names of the 12 members of the new review commission he had announced earlier.  Dr. Mohammad Humayoun Qayoumi, one of the President’s Chief Adviser, was named as the head of the review commission, which, among others, includes also the Afghan ambassador to Pakistan and former finance minister Omar Zakhilwal as well as the Minister of Economy Abdul Sattar Murad and the Minister of Urban Development Sayed Sadat Mansur Naderi. Ghani also suspended the 30 April cabinet decision on the trans-Hindu Kush route. The commission now has ten days to come up with a solution.

It is high time that someone starts to distinguish the technical arguments from the political ones. These last-minute steps might also take the edge off today’s protests that, as it turns out, will go ahead anyway. Given the lack of trust in the government, however, whatever decision the new commission will finally take will almost surely lead to new protests.

The security forces, meanwhile, were also active. A number of the planned demonstration routes have been blocked with containers, as witnessed by AAN colleagues. The garrison commander of Kabul held a press conference and said that the demonstrators would only be allowed to march to the Chaman-e Huzur, the fairground near the National Stadium in the southeast of the city.

The National Unity Government (NUG) has finally moved to fill the last two vacant key posts in the national cabinet, those of defence minister and head of the intelligence agency. In the climate of mistrust between its two camps, it was not easy to identify mutually acceptable candidates – and, so, the names are neither a surprise nor new. AAN senior analyst and co-director Thomas Ruttig (with input from Kate Clark, Fazal Muzhary, Ehsan Qaane, Jelena Bjelica and Christine-Felice Roehrs) looks at their biographies and the politicking around the nominations – with both candidates still needing parliament’s approval.

Five months after the resignation of the head of the country’s intelligence agency and ten months after their last pick for defence minister was rejected by parliament, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his quasi-prime minister, Dr Abdullah, have come up with (not so) new picks for both posts. The names – Muhammad Massum Stanakzai for the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and General Abdullah Khan Habibi for Defence – were made public in two different presidential decrees during the night of 5 to 6 May 2016. The decrees also included the candidates’ immediate appointments as acting heads of the institutions they are supposed to lead, once approved by parliament.

With this, Abdullah Khan replaces Stanakzai, who has been acting as defence minister ever since the Afghan parliament denied him its vote of confidence in early July 2015. The NUG, now in its 19th month, never had a regular defence minister; its four previous candidates were either voted down or withdrew before the vote. As for the NDS, it has been led by an acting director general (its head has cabinet rank but is not called a minister), Massud Andarabi, since December 2015. His predecessor, Rahmatullah Nabil, left (or lost) his job, after he publicly criticised President Ghani’s efforts to re-engage Pakistan and re-launch peace talks with the Taleban during a trip to Islamabad.

Forward to the past

Both names come as no surprise. Stanakzai, who was the first ever civilian in a defence position (although never confirmed by parliament), had, according to Kabul’s rumour mill, long been considered the favourite candidate for the NDS job. Abdullah Khan, who is already the fifth NUG candidate for the top defence job, had already been picked once before (he was third in this line at the time) but was never officially introduced to parliament. (It is not clear why, although it might have had to do with his lacklustre mujahedin background). The fact that he has yet to be rejected might make him acceptable to the parliamentarians who, over the past years, have blocked many attempts, mainly by Ghani’s predecessor Hamed Karzai, to re-introduce candidates already voted down.

The filling of these two positions has been a recurring demand of both houses of parliament (see this AAN analysis) (both led by politicians who are close to the new quasi-opposition), but also of donor countries. Ghani is expected to attend the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw in early July 2016, and it would cost him a degree of credibility in those circles (who, off the record, are all but uncritical about the NUG’s poor performance so far) if he, in spite of repeated promises, were to show up with those two positions still vacant. The other key positions, which were vacant for a long time, that of interior minister and attorney general, were filled in April 2016.

Abdullah Khan is not unknown. He is a career army officer who has served in every regime since that of President Najibullah (ie also under the mujahedin and Taleban regimes), posts that have culminated in his current position as director of the Afghan army’s general staff. Stanakzai, however, is the more prominent of the two. As the long-standing head of the Joint Secretariat of the High Peace Council and CEO of the Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme from 2009 to 2015, he was a key figure for the international community in its (so far futile) attempt to get peace talks with the Taleban underway. He managed to gain Ghani’s trust, even though according to a number of Afghan and international insiders he was initially suspicious of Stanakzai as a ‘Karzai man.’ But the president has obviously been convinced of Stanakzai’s qualities, to the extent that he kept him on as acting defence minister for almost a year after he was rejected by parliament. This, despite the fact that when he took office, Ghani had insisted that he wanted to run a ‘legal cabinet’ without unapproved acting ministers.

Ghani seems to have held on to Stanakzai for a number of reasons. For one, both seem to work well together – a rarity given the president’s temperament and his frequent impatience with even the highest-ranking government officials’ performances. Stanakzai also gets on well with Hanif Atmar, now in charge of what has become the overarching security agency, the National Security Council. He also, maybe equally importantly, got on well with the US commanders of both NATO’s Resolute Support mission and the US counter-terrorism mission, Freedom’s Sentinel. The US seems to have lobbied throughout 2015 to keep Stanakzai at the defence ministry. Given its large financial footprint, most certainly it will have had a say. (According to the October 2015 report of the US government’s Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (pp 75,78, 79), US funding for the Afghan security sector was over 3.2 billion dollars in 2015, totalling 68.4 billion since 2002. For 2017, 3.5 billion dollars more have been requested from US Congress.)

While he was kept on in his position, US diplomats say Stanakzai delivered on some key issues that had been long lagging in the MoD, including sending home high-ranking officers past retirement age and clarifying competencies in the ministry and in the provincial defence departments – something that had apparently not been undertaken for many years, despite massive international funding for the ANA.

Stanakzai has, incidentally, not only been appointed acting NDS chief but also adviser-minister (see presidential website in Dari here), which looks like a precautionary measure in case the Wolesi Jirga says “no” to him again. The lively twitter account of the Kabul Council of the Jamiat-e Islami party, in a hint of dissatisfaction, has already reminded its readers of Stanakzai’s last rejection by parliament. With no safety net in place, this could otherwise easily end his political career; however the adviser position would enable him to continue to serve the NUG from the second row, although with less public prestige.

Lieutenant General Abdullah Khan, whose penultimate position was chief of personnel in the ANA’s general staff, comes across as a good choice to succeed Stanakzai at the MoD. According to officials both in the National Security Council and the Resolute Support Mission, he enjoys a reputation of professionalism, attaining high marks in his military training (including in the Soviet Union), and clean hands. This was confirmed to AAN by Atiqullah Amarkhel, a former high-ranking MoD official who has worked with Abdullah Khan. Amarkhel, who is now a military analyst, had stated before:“If the government wants better war management, the institutions should be non-political and the heads of the institutions must be professional people.” With his unbroken career throughout the most diverse regimes, Abdullah Khan seems to be ‘un-political’ enough to be considered for this position – but, at the same time, might lack full-hearted political backing.

Ethnicity and politics

The nominations also continue to go against the 50:50 job distribution formula between the two NUG camps, often considered along ethnic lines: both are Pashtuns – Abdullah Khan is a Kunari and Stanakzai is a Logari. (The Ghani side mainly nominates Pashtuns, the Abdullah side mainly Tajiks – the latter has already led to protests on social media by other allies, including Hazaras and Uzbeks, who demanded to know why none of their own were being considered.)

When reviewing Stanakzai’s chances of becoming defence minister in 2015, people involved in the appointment negotiations on both sides of the NUG told AAN that the president wanted what he considered ‘loyal Pashtuns’ in all four key security positions. With Atmar in the NSC, then-NDS and Interior Minister chiefs Rahmatullah Nabil and Nur ul-Haq Ulumi (both out of their offices now) and Stanakzai acting, this had clearly been achieved. However, it came at the cost of increasing criticism that the NUG had been disregarding the role of former mujahedin leaders.

In the controversy surrounding Ulumi, the former interior minister who had been an Abdullah candidate, his political affiliations seemed to have been even more important than his ethnicity: for the former mujahedin who opposed his nomination, it appeared to be of significance that he had not only not been a mujahed (instead a former communist general), but that he was a Pashtun – despite the fact that Ulumi had been a political ally of Dr Abdullah since the 2009 election. In particular, memories of former ‘communist’ affiliations do not fade away. (The reason Abdullah introduced him was probably that he wanted a professional officer as his candidate and to show that he also nominated non-‘northerners’.) With General Jahed (a Panjshiri Tajik, mujahed and relative of the former ‘Northern Alliance’ (NA) leader, Qassim Fahim) having succeeded Ulumi in April 2016, this might have partly been rectified in their eyes. Abdullah Khan, who, according to his former colleague Amarkhel, joined Jamiat-e Islami after the collapse of Najib’s regime (a step many former communist generals took; there are also rumours that he has an ID card from Panjsher province), might still run into the same problems due to his affiliation with the former PDPA regime. Some senators during the session on 8 May 2016 already voiced their criticisms of both candidates for not having a ‘transparent background.’

Recycling the elite

That two old names came up again shows that the NUG continues to have trouble finding candidates for key positions that are acceptable to both camps. There do not seem to be many obvious, well-trained or mutually acceptable newcomers for the top positions in the security ministries, beyond the relatively limited circle who already held positions during the post-2001 period. The names of the former incumbents were brought into the discussion following the inauguration of the NUG in late 2014 and again now, including former interior and defence minister General Bismillah Muhammadi and former NDS chiefs Amrullah Saleh and Eng. Aref Sarwari – and now Stanakzai and Abdullah Khan again.

The situation has become even more difficult since many influential former mujahedin leaders, as well as those in circles close to former President Karzai, have made it one of their goals to give Ghani a hard time for appointing too many young people to influential positions. But it is also a sign of a much wider problem that the post-2001 elites – largely consisting of the 1978-96 mujahedin elite, plus a number of ‘technocrat’ newcomers, some ex-communists and a sprinkling of ex-Taleban officials – have clung to their posts, powers and privileges. This is particularly the case for the former mujahedin, who seem to believe that only those who have fought the Soviets and the Taleban are fit to govern.

It is not clear yet when the Wolesi Jirga will vote on Stanakzai and Abdullah Khan.

 

Annex: Biographic details for both candidates

Abdullah Khan Habibi 

(an official biography in Dari of Abdullah Khan Habibi can be found on the MoD website)

Abdullah Khan, as he is usually known, had already been flagged for the MoD position in 2015 but he withdrew before being introduced to the Wolesi Jirga for a vote, possibly in response to misgivings among some former mujahedin to his ‘communist’ background (despite his shift to Jamiat). A Pashtun from Sauki district of Kunar province (year of birth 1952, equivalent to the Afghan year 1331), he is a professional army career officer who was trained as an artillery officer both at the Military Academy in Kabul (graduated 1972/1351 with a bachelor’s degree) and in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s (lisans [master’s equivalent] of Military Science in 1980), all reportedly with distinction. He held different posts at the Ministry of Defence during the Najibullah, Rabbani, Taleban and Karzai governments. This included a stint as the head of the Afghan border troops under Najibullah. (The border troops were under the defence ministry then. Also, shifts between army and police are normal in Afghanistan; see also current interior minister Jahed who came from the army.)

In 1995, during Rabbani’s government, he became the head of the training and education department; he was deputy head of the same department during the Taleban regime. In the early Karzai years he initially continued to work in the same department, until in 2003 he became head of inspection at the office of the Chief of Army Staff, and then the head of information (pezhandwal) department in the same office. From 2008 to 2010, he served as a military aide for the minister of defence and in 2010 he became Commander of the 201st ANA corps, responsible for the eastern region (Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan, Laghman). This is also his place of origin, close to the Pakistani border, and surely one of the areas he had an eye on when heading the border police. In 2012, he returned to his former positions as the head of pezhandwal department at the office of the Chief of Army Staff. From there, in 2015, he rose to the position of Chief of Staff (rais-e arkan) where he served in this capacity until his ministerial nomination.

 

Muhammad Masum Stanakzai 

(shortened version from an earlier AAN dispatch)

Stanakzai (born in 1958) is a Pashtun from Logar province. He graduated from the communications (mukhabara) section of Kabul Military University. Later, he got a Masters degree in Philosophy of Engineering for Sustainable Development from Cambridge University. As a young man, Stanakzai served in the Afghan army for a decade, where he worked his way up, eventually attaining the rank of Colonel in Communications. No official dates are given, but this would have been during the PDPA era. At some point, he moved into NGO work in Peshawar, serving as Director of one of the largest Afghan NGOs, the Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation (AREA) (2001-2002). Stanakzai also served on the steering committee of ACBAR, the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief.

He moved into government in 2002, first as Minister of Telecommunications (2002-2004), then as an advisor on security to President Karzai. In 2009, he was appointed Head of the Joint Secretariat of the newly created High Peace Council (HPC) and its Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme (APRP) – one of the few senior officials to stay in office during the transition from Karzai to Ghani. Stanakzai was centrally involved in Karzai’s peace-making efforts, serving as his loyal ally and having contact with the Taleban. His final action in this capacity – under Ghani – appears to have been organising and “holding talks,” as it was reported in The Wall Street Journal, with three senior Taleban officials on 19 and 20 May 2015 in Urumqi, the capital of China’s western Xinjiang region.

In September 2011, Stanakzai was seriously injured in the suicide bombing that killed Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of the HPC. He eventually recovered from his injuries, although he still walks with a cane. He returned to his job, although he was targeted in another suicide attack on 21 June 2014.

 

On the president’s order, six convicts sentenced to death were executed by hanging in Pol-e Charkhi prison on the morning of 8 May 2016. The executions came after the president’s speech at the joint session of both houses of Parliament on 25 April 2016, in which he announced that the time for unjustified amnesty was over. Although the death penalty is legal in Afghanistan, according to both the criminal code and Islamic law, actual executions have been implemented on an ad-hoc basis. The recent executions, however, may signal an end to the informal moratorium on capital punishment that has been in place for the past fifteen years, partially at the urging of the international community. The public’s increasing impatience with insurgent violence and the desire of the Afghan government to present itself as acting decisively seem to point in that direction. AAN’s Ehsan Qaane and Jelena Bjelica take a closer look at the issue.

On the morning of 8 May 2016, six convicts who had been sentenced to death were executed by hanging in Pol-e Charkhi prison in Kabul. According to information released by the National Directorate of Security (NDS) following the executions, the six were:

1. Muhammad Usman, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for planting an improvised explosive devise (IED) in Khairkot district of Paktika, which killed seven police officers. (No further details are available)

2. Khan Agha, also known as Abdul Rahman and a member of al-Qaeda, who was convicted for his involvement in the attack on Abdullah Laghmani, the deputy head of the NDS in 2009. Laghmani, local officials and 14 civilians were killed and 56 injured in the attack that took place outside a mosque in Mehtarlam.

3. Hamidullah, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for being involved in the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul on 20 September 2011. Burhanuddin Rabbani was one of the founders of Jamiat-e-Islami, a former president of Afghanistan during the mujahedin era and head of the High Peace Council since 2010. (1)

4. Muhammad Ismail, a member of the Haqqani network who was convicted for his involvement in the planning of the suicide attack on Finest Supermarket in 2011. In this attack, Ms. Hamida Barmaki, a commissioner of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was killed together with her husband and four children; in total nine Afghans and five foreigners died in the attack.

5. Hujatullah, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for planting an IED on a vehicle in Paghman province. The explosion killed nine civilians and injured others. (No further details are available)

6. Akmal, a member of the Taleban who was convicted for planning the attack on the Muhammad Daud Khan Military Hospital in 2011. The attack killed at least six people, including four members of the Afghan National Security Forces and injuring more than 20.

Presidential order

The execution of the six convicts comes in the wake of President Ghani’s hard-hitting speech at the joint session of both houses of Parliament on 25 April 2016 and a deadly attack in Kabul on 19 April 2016, which killed 68 and injured 347 people, and for which the Taleban claimed responsibility. In his address, which signalled the government’s hardening position on the war, on peace talks and on the Taleban (see AAN’s previous analysis here), the president avowed his resolve to implement tough justice, including through capital punishment:

The time for those who enjoyed unjustified amnesty is over. The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is committed to resolutely implementing decisions of the courts and judicial entities, including the rulings of execution.

At the same time, Ghani assured MPs (and a wider audience, including the international community) that his committment to punishing those who commit terrorists acts would be accompanied by respect for human rights, the rule of law and the Afghan constitution:

The enemies of Afghanistan should know that if they are caught on the combat field while committing terrorist acts against the people of Afghanistan, they will be brought to justice and the rule of law will be fully implemented. I assure you, respected representatives, elders, and the noble people of my country that as president and protector of the rights and security of the people of Afghanistan, I will resolutely deal with those who shed the blood of our soldiers and our innocent people and I will not hesitate to punish them. […] Our resolute acts have one clear message: our hand of justice is long and powerful and can reach all criminals and terrorists. Obviously, our firmness in establishing justice goes with our respect for our constitution, our human rights commitments and justice seeking policy.

He even thanked judges who had tried and ruled death penalties, and promised to protect them from revenge attacks: “I thank those who have tried the baghis (2) and ruled to execute them, and I assure them that we shall protect them.”

Ghani’s deputy spokesperson said on 29 April 2016 that “a week ago” the president ordered a review of the death sentences in accordance with the country’s legal system, which is based on Islamic law, Afghanistan’s constitution and human rights values. Indeed, a couple of days before his speech in parliament, the president established a committee to review all death sentences handed out so far, prior to their carrying out. While the exact composition of the review committee is unclear, AAN was told that it is chaired by the Attorney General and includes the deputy Attorney General, a member of the Supreme Court and unidentified “independent experts.” The president’s office reportedly also asked the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) to join the committee, but they were said to have refused. With at least two or three members of the committee affiliated to the country’s judiciary organs, which prosecuted and tried those sentenced to death, they are essentially put in charge of reviewing their own institutions’ work. This raises possible questions about the impartiality of death sentence reviews.

During the first week of the review committee’s work, ten cases were considered. The committee ruled that in six of the ten cases all legal standards had been met. A press release, issued by the presidential palace (Arg) on 8 May 2016, stated that the president had signed the execution orders “after careful consideration, completion of due process and [ascertaining the] fairness of the trials conducted.” According to Afghanistan’s legal system, once a death sentence has gone through all judiciary instances (Primary Court, Appeals Court and Supreme Court), execution orders for each death sentence still require the president’s signature.

The Arg press release also noted that the decision to carry out the death sentences had taken into account “the repeated requests of the families of the victims of terrorist attacks” and highlighted that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the president are “committed to justice and punishing criminals who committed the criminal and terrorist acts, killed innocent people, or put security and public safety at risk.”

The six executions could be the first of many. According to palace officials in October 2014, shortly after Ghani came to power (quoted by Khaama news here), there were, at the time, 400 cases still waiting to be reviewed or signed off for execution by the president. Around 100 of these cases had been approved by the Supreme Court at the time and were awaiting the president’s signature. The remaining 300 had yet to be approved by the Supreme Court. This figure does not appear to have changed since then.

The 400 cases represent approximately 600 individuals sentenced to death.
 AAN was told that the majority of these individuals have been sentenced for ‘ordinary’ crimes, such as murder, while a notable number—estimated to be around 100 individuals—were sentenced for mass murder through acts of terrorism. It appears that the review process is focused on this latter category of convicts.

Taleban reaction

The Taleban issued an initial statement on 29 April 2016 in reaction to Ghani’s speech to the Parliament and the press statement made by the president’s spokesperson on the same day. In their statement, the Taleban said that the call for execution “holds no legal basis because these political prisoners are handed the death penalty by the most corrupt and incompetent judicial body in the world.” It also said that the “known individuals or unions and their workers advocating implementation of such crimes [ie execution]”, will “be classified as legitimate military targets.” The Taleban statement called on “international human rights organizations, independent media outlets, the ICRC and other free impartial committees not to remain indifferent in using their influence concerning [the] matter of prisoner execution.”

Following the 8 May 2016 executions, the Taleban issued two more statements. The first one, issued on the morning of the same day, was rather generic, lamenting the poor conditions in the overcrowded Afghan prisons and the lack of fair trials and accusing the Afghan government of torturing prisoners. The statement, which seems to have been prepared ahead of time and was probably not in response to the executions, was addressed to the United Nations and called on the UN’s shared responsibility to ensure that the Afghan government adhered to its international commitments.

The second statement issued in the evening of 8 May (available in English here) directly referred to the executions that were carried out, describing them as a “vindictive barbarity” that “spinelessly martyred six defenseless Mujahideen inmates.” The statement reiterated the warning to those involved in the executions, saying they would become “the top priority during military planning” and that “they will not be allowed to breathe peacefully, nor will they ever be able to feel secure.”

After 14 executions were carried out in 2012, the Taleban also demanded that the United Nations, Islamic countries, international human rights organisations and the Red Cross prevent prisoners’ executions (see AAN previous reporting here). Two days after the executions took place on 23 November 2012, a massive truck bomb by the Taleban targeting a joint Afghan/ISAF command facility in Wardak province was labeled as a “revenge attack.”

Public opinion and political complexities

The death penalty is legal in Afghanistan, according to both the criminal code and Islamic law. Public opinion also seems to be strongly in support of the capital punishment. Nader Nadery, a former commissioner of the AIHRC and currently a senior adviser in the presidential palace, told AAN in 2012 “there is more public demand for the death penalty because the rate of crime is increasing.” After the execution of five men found guilty of gang rape in Paghman province, carried out on 8 October 2014, local human rights groups as well as officials in Afghanistan welcomed the executions and the Afghan media found “public opinion appears solidly behind capital punishment,“ despite concerns over rushed proceedings and a possible lack of due process. In 2016, the rhetoric and position on capital punishment remains unchanged. When a young Afghan girl was raped and killed in Iran earlier this year, Afghan civil society activists went public with their demand for capital punishment for the perpetrator.

Arman-e Melli, a daily that is close to the National Union of Journalists of Afghanistan, wrote on 8 May 2016 under the headline “Well done, Ashraf Ghani!”: “The president has taken a good and constructive measure and we believe that such measures can have a positive impact on stability and security in the country… We support the measure taken by the president of our beloved country in this particular issue….” The privately owned Mandegar daily wrote that “the people of Afghanistan welcome the executions of terrorists and perpetrators of crimes against humanity and they expect these executions to be carried out and reported in full transparency… The media outlets should be present where the executions take place so that they can document the executions and report on them.” Daily Afghanistan, linked to Muhammad Mohaqqeq, now deputy to the CEO Dr Abdullah Abdullah, also welcomed the executions, adding that “The previous governments in Afghanistan did not take the war against the Taleban seriously… By taking this action, it seems that the government is no longer showing leniency towards the Taleban… This reaction puts the Taleban in a difficult situation and sends them a message that if they do not make peace, they are practically at war with the government and the government will treat them this way.”

Victims’ families, MPs and intellectuals have often been strong advocates for capital punishment. On 4 May 2016, for instance, Balkh MP Mawlavi Rahman Rahmani said at a Wolesi Jirga session that he had received a list of the 631 criminals who had been sentenced to death. “President Ghani has said he will seek the views from the international community and human rights organisations on sentencing these criminals to death,” Rahmani added that in his opinion “the criminals should be punished, otherwise we will continue to face the consequence we have been facing until now.”

There were some other misgivings, but not with regard to the death penalty per se. Atta Muhammad Nur, the acting governor of Balkh, for instance, was quoted on the Nunn.asia website on 10 May 2016, as saying that the convict’s family had not been consulted on the execution of Rabbani’s assassin – which he said should have been done and had been agreed upon. Atta added that “this person had many secrets about Rabbani and with his execution all those secrets were also buried.”

At the same time, Afghanistan faces pressure from donor countries, mostly by those who have abolished capital punishment themselves. The European Union has traditionally been the most outspoken in trying to convince Afghanistan not to implement death sentences. As EU Special Representative to Afghanistan, Franz-Michael Skjold Mellbin wrote in an earlier editorial published by Pajhwok news agency on 5 October 2015:

The European Union and its member states hold a strong and principled position against death penalty. Its abolition represents one of the main objectives of our Human Rights Policy – not only in Afghanistan, but worldwide. To honour the European & World Day against the Death Penalty, we therefore urge the Government to establish a moratorium with immediate effect that suspends the execution of death sentences in Afghanistan. Afghanistan needs less – not more violence.

Executions from 2001 until 2015

From the beginning, the EU and human rights organisations encouraged president Karzai, if not to abolish capital punishment entirely, to at least declare a formal moratorium on executions until the criminal justice system was sufficiently reformed to ensure that all convicts received a fair trial.

In April 2004, Abdullah Shah, a military commander from Paghman convicted for multiple murders committed during the country’s civil war, was executed in Kabul – the first execution since the establishment of the interim government in late 2001. He had been convicted in October 2002 in special court proceedings, which, according to Amnesty International, fell far short of international fair trial standards: Abdullah Shah had had no defense lawyer at his trial, the hearing was held in a closed court and the chief judge in the initial trial was dismissed for accepting bribes. The case was also criticised by those who saw it as an attempt to eliminate a key witness who could have implicated powerful figures in past human rights abuses.

President Karzai’s then chief spokesperson, Jawed Ludin, called the execution of Abdullah Shah an exception rather than a new rule, and stressed that this did not mean that the execution process had started.

Indeed no executions took place in 2005 or 2006, but in 2007 Afghanistan carried out fifteen executions and in 2008, eighteen death sentences were carried out. After another two years without executions, there were again two in 2011, fourteen in 2012, two in 2013, six in 2014 and one in 2015 (see here for the list of crimes that are punishable by death in Afghanistan).

Since taking office on 29 September 2014, Ghani signed one other execution order before the 8 May 2016 cases: on 28 February 2015, Rais Khudaidad (also known as Rais Saidullah) was hanged after being convicted of murder, kidnapping and armed robbery one month earlier. At least 12 new death sentences have been imposed for murder and rape under the new government, but have yet to be implemented.

Five more individuals were executed on 8 October 2014, shortly after Ghani became president. Their execution order for armed robbery and rape had been signed by Karzai only days before he handed over power and was carried out by Ghani, despite UN calls for a stay of executions, see here and here).

Walking a tightrope

President Ghani is walking a tightrope as he tries to show both the Afghan people and the international community that he can deliver on his promises to be tough and decisive on the insurgency. The government’s new position on executions, while playing to public demands, still sits uncomfortably with the international community, particularly the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations issued a press release following the executions, in which the organisation reiterated its “continued call for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty.” The United Nations noted that there is no conclusive evidence of the death penalty having any deterrent value and that its use does not contribute to public safety, encouraging the Government of Afghanistan to expedite legal reforms, which would allow death sentences to be commuted to life imprisonment. Human Rights Watch (HRW) on 10 May 2016 called on President Ghani to “impose an immediate death penalty moratorium” and called on Afghanistan’s donors, who have bankrolled the reform of the country’s judicial system, to make ending the death penalty “a top priority.” Part of the context is that, apart from doubts regarding due process in all cases, torture is still an existing practice among Afghan security organs and that it cannot be ruled out that, in certain instances, confessions are obtained by such means.

However, with the review of the many pending cases having just begun and in a climate where executions seem to be welcome and wished for by the public, as well as with the government seeking to project a tougher position on its armed opponents – who show no signs of dropping terrorism from their agenda – the six executions carried out on 8 May 2016 may be just the beginning.

 

(1) For more background on Hamidullah’s role in Rabbani’s assassination, see earlier AAN reporting here, here  and here (the last dispatch also has the transcript of a video recording of Hamidullah’s confession, that was released by the NDS on 4 October 2011).

(2) Baghi is a legal term in Islamic jurisprudence used for a specific group that transgresses and conducts violent acts against a legitimate Islamic authority. In the context of Sharia law, baghis are outlaws and criminals that need to be eliminated.

 

AAN has done a series of twelve in-depth interviews with families of Afghans who recently travelled to Europe. The conversations provided a fascinating insight into the practicalities of both the decision making processes and the journey, the complex interplay between economic and security considerations and the mixed feelings families often have once their loved ones have finally, safely, reached Europe. In this first instalment, AAN’s Lenny Linke takes a closer look at the reasons families gave for either sending or allowing their sons or brothers to leave for Europe.

This series of three dispatches is based on twelve interviews done for a joint project with (and funded by) the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES) and resulted in a joint study titled “’We Knew They Had No Future in Kabul’: Why and How Afghan Families Decide to Leave” published on 27 April 2016.  The data collection was conducted in the spring of 2016 with selected Afghan households to explore the decision-making processes at the family level of a small number of migrants. (1) The three dispatches present the main findings and place them in a wider context. The second dispatch will focus on the details of the journey, the routes taken and practical preparations. The third dispatch will take a closer look at what has happened since the migrants arrived in Europe and lays out the hopes and concerns their families have now that they are there.

The decision-making process

The demographic of the migrants in the sample was relatively young (all under 30) and predominantly male. (1) Many family members reported that it was their sons or brothers themselves who had initiated the discussion about going to Europe.

When my son told me he was thinking of going to Europe, I approved; we decided that if my son continued living in Afghanistan, there would not be an improvement in his or our current situation, so it was better for him to go to Europe… We all agreed and there was no reason to disagree. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

To be honest, we thought he was joking when he said he wanted to leave, but once he got his Iranian visa, we started believing him. He himself brought up the issue of going to Europe. He used Facebook on a daily basis to read about the situation along the route and he read that the border between Turkey and Greece was open. He might have been motivated by this… (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

In several cases, family members, including wives and fiancées, were initially opposed to the migrants leaving, but several of the migrants subsequently persuaded their relatives to give their blessing and to support them, even if some were still reluctant.

…finally their father agreed to send them, because many times the boys had planned to leave without letting us know. Their father was compelled to send them with his blessings, rather than sending them off to deal with unreliable people. (Mother of a 15-year and an 18-year old migrant from Kabul)

One migrant from Maidan Wardak, whose father was interviewed, had left without telling his family or talking about possibly leaving beforehand: “I was not at home when my son left for Europe… When he reached Turkey, he called and said he was in Turkey and would leave for Europe.”

In some cases, however, families remained antagonistic towards the idea of their relative going to Europe, even after son or brother had left. The brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar said, “Well, we all opposed his leaving,” while the brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand said “To leave was his personal decision after the economic crisis hit Afghanistan. His wife and children begged him not to leave.”

In other families, the decision to leave for Europe had been a joint decision, where family members had decided to send the migrants away or had urged them to go to Europe. In these cases, worsening security had often been the main, or at least an important, driver for leaving Afghanistan.

It was a family decision to send my brother abroad. We all agreed because we wanted him to live longer and to not die in the war… When security began to deteriorate, we started discussing whether he should go to Europe. We discussed this for a month, and after a month we decided he should go to Europe. We also talked about what he might do in Afghanistan if he didn’t go to Europe.  (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

Due to the fact that his employment as a driver with an organisation brought him threats, my father persuaded my brother to leave the country for a safer place. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz).

In fact, we had never thought about such words as ‘going to Europe’ nor did my brother evoke them. In the end, though, we said, “Where should he go?” We thought, “Should he go to Pakistan or Iran?” The media were broadcasting reports of people leaving for Europe. We said, “Let’s trust God. You will arrive somewhere.” (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

After the insurgents killed our brother and set our house on fire, the decision was made to send our brother away…. All the family decided together that we would send our brother to Europe so he could help out the whole family financially once he made it … We expected that our brother would be accepted as an asylum seeker in Germany and that he would be able to bring the whole family to Germany, because there is nothing left for us in Afghanistan. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

It was decided by my family that I should leave after I received threatening letters from the Taleban because of my work with NGOs and also because I had worked for the US forces as a translator and project facilitator in rural Kandahar… My mother, my sisters and my wife were the driving force for me and also my brother leaving for Germany, as there was an imminent threat against the entire family as long as we stayed in Kandahar. (27-year old migrant from Kandahar, who was interviewed in Kabul after he was forcibly returned)

In several cases, where deteriorating security had been a main concern, there was a longer period of contemplating going ‘somewhere.’ For example, the brother of the migrant from Herat said:

He [the migrant] was feeling unsafe. I said “You can come to Kabul.” He said “Even there, they will reach me.”… He’d had threats from some Taleban. He’d also had threats from some unknown people. The threats had increased. He had been thinking for a while and talking about what he should do. For a long time, I tried to persuade him to stay, but in the end, as the threats against him increased, he said, “I have to go.”

While most migrants travel alone, some leaving wives and children behind, there was one case where a whole family left together.

It’s very difficult [for a father] to keep a family in Herat, both financially and morally, when you are not there. He decided that if they would face any difficulties, they would face them together. (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

Motivations for leaving

People’s motivations for going to Europe, as reflected in the twelve interviews, were often a combination of frustration felt over the lack of jobs and/or educational opportunities as well as concerns over the deteriorating security situation. Even in cases where the lack of opportunities for employment and education were mentioned as the primary reason for migration, these were usually followed by explicit and implicit references to the security situation. None of the respondents cited the lack of opportunity as the exclusive reason for leaving.

What also emerged from the interviews was that in at least four cases, migrants had either come under threat because of their past employment and/or could no longer find or take on work due to direct insurgent threats or the fear of being exposed to insecurity because of their work.

A lack of economic and educational opportunities

Many of the migrants’ relatives mentioned the lack of economic and educational opportunities as an important factor in the decision to leave. Several of the migrants had just finished high school or university and were unable to find employment or to continue their education.

His main motivation [for leaving] was his failure to get into university. If he had succeeded in the exam, other factors wouldn’t have played an important role. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

…we thought he should go to Germany, continue his education there and then help us to get there too. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant fom Kunduz)

[Advice I gave to my brother:]…you are a medical student in the 6th semester and you can’t finish your education here, [but] you can keep your education up there. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

When my son finished high school, we thought since there are no jobs and the situation is getting worse day by day, it would be good if he went to Europe, where he could find a good job and have a good future. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

When the boys were studying in school, I could not afford to send them to a private school for better quality education. … My husband is disabled and I am the only breadwinner in the family. Due to financial and family problems, my eldest son could not continue his education. He studied until the 8th grade and then started to work and earn money for the family. … He was working during the day and therefore could not go to regular school. I managed to find a job and my eldest son returned to school. He went to evening school so that he could continue working during the day as well. He was looking for a better paid job but could not find one… (Mother of two migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

He said he had studied for almost 18 years, but could not find a job and nobody would hire him. He thought it would be better for him to go to Europe and maybe try to find a job there. It seemed a relatively new decision to leave, which he made after he had sent his CV off to several organisations and not received any positive responses. He only seemed to have decided to leave once his frustration in Afghanistan became too much. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Maidan Wardak)

He was jobless and it was difficult to feed 15 people with the money he earned as a bus conductor. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Wardak)

The main motive was economic. Because his work situation [ability to find a well-paying job] had not been good in recent years, he thought it would be better to leave Afghanistan. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

Everyone agreed that because of our family’s bad economic situation there was nothing to do about it except send him away. (Brother of migrant from Takhar)

In one case, the mother of an 18-year old migrant explained that while the general lack of income opportunities had been one factor, the need to earn money in order to get married had also featured in her son’s decision to leave:

Her father asked for 240,000 Afghanis [just over €3,000] as the bride price but my eldest son could not earn that money in Afghanistan and get married quickly. (Mother of two migrants from Kabul) 

Others who did not cite the lack of economic or education opportunities as a primary factor for leaving often brought it up as a secondary factor behind the more dominant security considerations.

The second most important reason was his future, his education and the financial support [he could give] to the family. We wanted him to live in a peaceful place, pursue his education and help his family in Afghanistan. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant form Baghlan)

But there were also migrants for whom life in terms of economic opportunities and professional satisfaction had been good and who, according to their families, would have been better off staying in Afghanistan—had that been possible.

There are many advantages in Europe, but people can’t count on them. For traditional people, people who have jobs, journalists with credibility in this country, who have a salary, [for them] life is good. But then, when it comes to safety, there is no choice… If there had not been any threats, he would have stayed…For an Afghan man, this might be the biggest adventure he can have: having a salary, a car, a wife, kids. What more do you want? (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

Security threats

About half of all interviewees stated that their family members had gone to Europe because of reasons related, at least in part, to security. While some seemed mainly threatened by the overall deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and did not have any direct exposure to threats or violence, others left because of direct threats or exposure to violence, as experienced by themselves or their immediate family members.

He’d had threats from some Taleban. He’d also had threats from some unknown people. The threats had increased. … With no clear idea of the future and of what might happen in Herat – he thought there was no better future in Herat because of the increasing threats and the insurgency in the western region. (Brother of a 29-year old migrant from Herat)

My brother began talking about [leaving], but we did not agree with him. When security began to deteriorate, the family agreed to send him abroad. …The deteriorating security situation was the main reason for my family finally agreeing to send my brother to Europe. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

As he’d worked as an interpreter for two weeks, the insurgents told him that because he had been an interpreter for the Americans, he had become an infidel. He could neither come to Sar-e Pul, nor go anywhere else. He was just stuck in Mazar, trapped. As security got worse each day, the obstacles he faced amplified. If he had stayed here, he might have been killed. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

After the insurgents killed our brother and set our house on fire, the decision was made to send our brother away. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Takhar)

Interestingly, while some respondents initially only mentioned the lack of economic opportunities as a primary motive for leaving, during the course of the interview it often became apparent that the migrant of the family had in the past been directly exposed to traumatic events. Even though these events were not given as a reason to leave, they did seem to have contributed to the overall decision.

One day (in late 2014) we had gone for a feast in Logar with relatives there. A boy’s car was attacked; he was taken out of his car and dragged along behind a motorbike. Someone had told the insurgents that the boy was working in a government office. At the time, we were close to where the incident took place. After that incident, we were more frightened. Also, when the explosion happened in the Police Academy [in August 2015], the boys were on their way to Qargha Lake [just west of Kabul]. At the time of the explosion, the boys were in the car in the area and witnessed the incident. They saw the dead bodies of police lying on the ground. After the incident, for three nights, my boys could not sleep. (Mother of two migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

Another reason behind his decision was security. We are from Maidan Wardak, the situation there has not been good and so we chose to move to Kabul. My brother could not go back to Maidan Wardak either, as security there is still bad. People told him that as he was an engineer, it was not good for him to go to Maidan Wardak because the insurgents would try to kill him…. He didn’t feel safe even in Kabul, because once when my father went to the mosque in Kabul, someone threw a hand grenade at him. It only injured him and did not kill him, but this had a bad effect on my brother. He had never previously had any thoughts about going to Europe, but the situation got very bad in Karzai’s final years and it is even worse under the new government. (Brother of a 25-year old migrant from Maidan Wardak)

Beyond direct threats, the deteriorating security situation has clearly been concerning enough, or has affected people’s lives enough to warrant sending a family member abroad. Sometimes even rumours were all it took to make the decision.

…there were rumours that, if there are two young men in a family, the Taleban would take one as a fighter – that’s how we came to the decision. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz)

The insecurity and lack of income/educational opportunities nexus

The lack of security and economic and educational opportunities were the two main reasons given by the respondents for why family members left. But some interviewees clearly struggled to just name one, or to determine which one had been the most important.

 He left because of insecurity and joblessness… at the same time, we see the security situation getting worse and worse. (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Wardak)

Several interviewees highlighted the connection between declining security and rising economic pressures on migrants’ families.

Well, in a way the worsening economic situation is an outcome of the bad security situation. He would say that [even] if we were rich in Afghanistan, we would be threatened and if we were poor, again we would be in a bad condition. He was also threatened by insurgents because he used to work with international organisations. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

From the interviews, it is apparent that because of their jobs, migrants faced increasing insecurity and threats. In some scenarios, these threats forced migrants to give up their employment or prevented them from seeking new jobs.

My brother was an intelligent guy, he was top of his class throughout high school. He completed a two-year English course and learnt English fluently. Later, he applied for a job as an interpreter in Sar-e Pul. The US forces sent him to Mazar and then they [the US forces] wanted him to work in Helmand province, but because of the risk my father told him not to take the job and never go to Helmand or to other places. Hence, after two weeks working as an interpreter in Mazar, he didn’t go back to work. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Sar-e Pul)

 Being associated with certain activities deemed as inappropriate by the insurgency, for example, put people at risk:

…he was working as a driver and taking female colleagues home from the office … we thought it was becoming more dangerous for him. (Brother of a 22-year old migrant from Kunduz)

His wife is a teacher and a social activist; he would take his wife to participate in programs organised by these international organisations. People thought badly of him because of this. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

A specific scenario cited by several interviewees concerned the possible recruitment of their sons or brothers into the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Without prospects for other jobs or further education, some migrants said they had intended to join the ANSF as a last resort, which caused their families to fear for their security to the extent that they considered it safer to send them to Europe.

My older son had initially said he would join the national army. If he could not find any other job, then he would join the army. His father was frightened about the prospects of him joining the police or the army as the war was going on and he would be sent somewhere to the battleground. (Mother of two migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

My brother was not happy here because he failed the entry test to university. He wanted to join the Afghan National Army (ANA). We did not want him to join the ANA because he would be killed if he joined. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

Possible recruitment by the Taleban of unemployed youth was also a concern.

The Taliban were recruiting young men in the area to fight the Afghan government forces. We were afraid they might hire my brother. My brother was young and unemployed, so we feared he might make the wrong decisions. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

Sometimes even just the danger of travelling to and from the workplace was cited as an issue of concern. This was either due to not being able to safely access employment or the constant risk that a person is exposed to when leaving the house.

He did not have a good job here and could not go to Dai Mirdad [a district in the south of Wardak province] freely. On the way to Maidan Wardak, anything could happen to him. … He used to say “you [the entire family] are all at home and safe there. I have to deal with the risks and dangers because I have to earn money.” (Father of a 23-year old migrant from Kabul/Wardak)

The primary motivation was to escape revenge killings and Taleban threats, the secondary motivation was to be able to find a good job, one which we could take on without feeling threatened. My brother and I could not have gone outside the house to find work anywhere in Kandahar because we were afraid of the Taleban and of revenge attacks – we stayed at home, borrowing money from others, relying on our extended family to provide for us as we dared not leave or have any routine, or take a public job, for fear of being discovered and killed. … Even in Kabul or Pakistan, I would not have been safe. I wanted to break the cycle of violence so as to not endanger my own family – the only way to do this was to leave the country. (27-year old migrant from Kandahar)

‘Pull’ factors

 In addition to the ‘push’ factors related to insecurity and the lack of income and education, about a third of the respondents mentioned that the final decision to leave had been influenced by the actions of others who had already gone to Europe. These interactions seem to have either contributed to the final decision, or appeared to have helped families justify their consent to the migrant leaving once the decision had been taken.

It was not long after we saw other people from the neighbourhood leaving that we decided that our son should also go. (Father of a 19-year old migrant from Kabul)

My younger son’s friends from our neighbourhood – there were three of them, one is 20 years old and the other two are also minors – left for Germany. He was in contact with them via Facebook. (Mother of two young migrants, aged 15 and 18, from Kabul)

He decided to go because my niece, who was already in Europe, kept asking him to come to Europe. (Brother of a 17-year old migrant from Nangarhar)

From my own family, my younger brother left for Europe. After he left, one of my paternal cousins and three of my maternal cousins left as well. (Brother of a 20-year old migrant from Baghlan)

He said he wanted to leave and take the risk, just like other people who were leaving. (Brother of a 30-year old migrant from Helmand)

From the twelve interviews conducted with families of migrants, a picture has emerged of families either struggling to decide whether to send a family member, or scrambling to come to terms with the decisions already made by their relatives, usually sons or brothers. With regards to the motivation for the journey to Europe, although the majority of the respondents mentioned economic and/or educational opportunities as a main contributing factor, it was clear that in almost all cases declining security had also been a significant (primary or contributing) factor. In some cases where insecurity and threats had been a primary concern, the subsequent negative impact on the families’ income opportunities appeared to have become the final push in the decision to leave.

 

(1) The study consisted of twelve in-depth, semi-structured interviews that took place across Afghanistan’s regions as follows: four interviews in Kabul and Wardak province; four interviews in Takhar, Sar-e Pul, Kunduz and Baghlan; one interview in Nangarhar; two interviews in Helmand and Kandahar; and one interview in Herat. The ethnic composition and urban/rural population ratio in the provinces was taken into account in the selection of interviewees. The respondents were selected and located through a referral system, where AAN researchers reached out to their networks looking for families where at least one member had left for Europe in 2015. Respondents were interviewed about the departure of their family member(s), how decisions were made prior to their departure, details of the trip to Europe and thoughts on the future of the migrant in Europe. In addition, basic household information was collected for each of the families. For a shorter summary of the study, published jointly with FES, see here.

All migrants included in the study were male, with one exception where a whole family – husband, wife and young children – travelled together. In one case, two young brothers from one household travelled together and in one case a migrant who had been forcibly returned was interviewed directly. All migrants included in this study were between the ages of 15 and 30 years. Most of the interviewees giving information about the migrants in question were brothers and fathers (there was one mother and one sister).