Ideas on Europe Blog

Today is International Women’s Day, and I want to take the opportunity to remember the wise words of Hannah Arendt, a woman who is regarded as one of the most influential political philosophers of the twentieth century.

Born to a German-Jewish family in 1906, she had to flee from the Nazis when Hitler came to power in 1933. She became an expert in dictatorships, and the disturbing tell-tale signs that lead to totalitarianism.

But it’s what she said in an interview, one year before her death in 1975, that I particularly want to draw attention to, because the parallels with what’s happening in Britain today are chilling.

That’s not because I believe the UK is a totalitarian state. No.

It’s because we are on a path that could, if we are not alert, lead us to the wrong place.

Said Hannah in an interview with the French writer Roger Errera in 1974.

“What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed?”

She went on:

“If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer. 

“This is because lies, by their very nature, have to be changed, and a lying government has constantly to rewrite its own history.

“On the receiving end you get not only one lie – a lie which you could go on for the rest of your days – but you get a great number of lies, depending on how the political wind blows. 

“And a people that no longer can believe anything cannot make up its mind.

“It is deprived not only of its capacity to act but also of its capacity to think and to judge. 

“And with such a people you can then do what you please.”

NORMALISED LYING Today, we live under a government, and a Prime Minister, who have normalised lying to ‘the people’.

The country is so misinformed, with so many competing and incompatible versions of events, that nobody is sure what to believe anymore.

And so, passively, so many of us just accept what’s happening, apathetically shrugging our shoulders as the government radically changes the country, with hardly a murmur of miscontent, let alone any signs of rebellion.

Last week a court order confirmed that the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, misled Parliament when he reassured MPs in the House of Commons in February that all Covid-related contracts were “on the record”.

That wasn’t true.

Let me be less polite. It was a lie.

The Judge’s Order stated that:

“the Defendant acted unlawfully by failing to publish the contracts”.

The Prime Minister acted unlawfully and misled Parliament.

Why isn’t that front page news? Why is it hardly in the news at all? Why no uproar, not even murmurings, from the masses?

Heck. Why hasn’t the Prime Minister resigned?

It’s because lying to us, misinforming us, cheating on us, have become normal and accepted.

AN UNLAWFUL PRIME MINISTER Remember the autumn of 2019? Boris Johnson decided to close-down Parliament for five weeks, saying that was his right.

But the Supreme Court ruled that his actions were unlawful. The Judges said it was wrong of the Prime Minister to stop MPs carrying out their duties.

The Prime Minister faced calls to resign, but they were muted, and mild. 

In ‘normal times’, wouldn’t an honourable Prime Minister have immediately stepped down, after the country’s highest court judged that he had acted unlawfully?

Not in current times.

A ‘source’ at 10 Downing Street simply told the press that the Supreme Court had “made a serious mistake…” 

Not that the Prime Minister made a mistake. The court had made a mistake.

Less than three months later, in the General Election, Mr Johnson won a landslide victory, having told the country another whopper of a lie – that he had a “fantastic” Brexit deal that was “oven-ready”.

The country voted back into office a man who we all know is a compulsive liar (and I am safe in publishing that without fear of being sued for defamation) and who the country’s highest court confirmed had acted unlawfully.

And once again, a court this month confirmed that the Prime Minister acted unlawfully.

‘So what?’ the country replies in its silence.

IT’S OK TO LIE There’s an old saying. We teach people how to treat us.

And so, it has come to pass. The placid populace has taught the government that it’s ok to lie.

It’s ok to break the law. 

It’s ok to do what they want to the country, because we, the people, are so fed-up, befuddled, and depressed, that we are beyond caring, or fighting back.

And in this ‘perfect storm’ that has seen any misgivings by ‘the people muzzled by lockdowns, to the rescue of the government, that cheats and lies, is an inept and weak Opposition.

An Opposition that facilitates the government, rather than bellows every day with fire and anger, that the Prime Minister has no clothes – he is naked, a nobody, a conman, a cheat, who should not be anywhere near the levers of power.

And so, it goes on.

STATISTICS AND DAMNED LIES Last month The Guardian reported a survey of The Road Haulage Association (RHA) that in January export volumes from the UK to the EU had dropped by a staggering 68%, all because of new Brexit barriers.

But the government hit back, robustly asserting that the RHA survey was wrong.

The Cabinet Office, run by Michael Gove, confidently cited statistics that inbound and outbound volumes were “close to normal”.

The UK Statistics Authority, however, has officially reprimanded the government for using unpublished and unverifiable data, in their attempt to deny that Brexit had caused a massive fall in trade through UK ports.

Does that seem familiar? It does to me.

THE LIE ON THE BUS During the EU referendum campaign, Boris Johnson drove around the country in his battle bus that claimed that the UK sent £350m a week to the EU, that could instead be used to fund the NHS.

It wasn’t true.

The UK Statistics Authority wrote to Mr Johnson to complain that the claim made on his bus was ‘potentially misleading’ as it made no account of what Britain got back from the EU, including the deduction of a hefty rebate.

Sir Andrew Dilnot, then the Chair of the UK Statistics Authority, warned Mr Johnson and his campaign:

‘Given the high level of public interest in this debate it is important that official statistics are used accurately, with important limitations or caveats clearly explained.’

It made no difference. Mr Johnson continued to use the wrong figure on his bus; he continued to lie.

After the referendum, Dominic Cummings, Vote Leave’s Campaign Director, wrote:

‘Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests No.’

• So, a misinformed country voted for Brexit.
• A misinformed country voted for Boris Johnson.
• A misinformed country watches on, with barely a blink, as our nation is dismantled and rearranged, by those who have, indeed, fulfilled their sinister promise to ‘Take back control’.

REMEMBER THESE WORDS Today, remember the wise and prophetic words of Hannah Arendt. Let them shoot shivers up your spine. Let them sear your spleen and spur you into action. “What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed?”

It is imperative that we become informed. That we seek and engage the truth.

That we understand that knowledge is our best defence, and attack, against the creeping totalitarianism that now threatens our country.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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The post On International Women’s Day, remember the words of Hannah Arendt appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

Once the reformation of suffrage (see Reform #1) is accomplished – laying down the foundation of enlightened democracy –, the transformation of the united Europe’s (henceforward Republic of the United Europe or RUE) political system is the next priority. As any political system is complex and their institutions are interconnected, I am going to introduce the political system of the Republic of the United Europe in separate volumes, focusing on the European electoral system, the European Parliament, the European Government (and its ministries), and the European Presidential Council (including the President of the RUE).

In my previous article, I argued that the eligibility to vote and to stand for election must be radically redefined along certain principles. This volume is going to focus on the mechanism of how the votes of the enlightened public is going to translate into seats and power in the European institutions, introducing the reformation of the European electoral system – as the first step of the reformation of the European political system.

Principles

The European Parliament election procedures are based on European and national legislation. The common European rules explain the principle of proportional representation and certain incompatibilities with the MEP (Member of the European Parliament) mandate. The exact voting system used and the number of constituencies are governed by national laws, meaning that the electoral system of the European Union is far from unified, as it is in the nation-states’ authority to decide on the regulations – following only two loose European guidelines. The direct result of national control is major dissimilarities in voting age, compulsion in voting, threshold, and apportionment of seats – amongst others. However, the most concerning fact is the dearth of true European parties. Therefore, the European electoral system is in need of numerous fundamental amendments before it could serve as the RUE’s voting system.

The basic requirements to vote on European elections should be citizenship in any of the member states, age of sixteen, and certificate of eligibility (see Reform #1). Regarding the electoral system, most experts prefer the voting systems of mixed-member proportional and single transferable, which normally could be considered the best indeed. However, the Republic of the United Europe is going to be a very unique political entity, which has national and European institutions co-operating in symbiosis; therefore, could not adapt either of those voting systems. In my view, the best and most common electoral procedure is the application of party-list proportional representation in a transnational form (or transnational list), enabling only true European parties (henceforward pan-Europarties) to stand for election.

Regrettably, the current European parties are mere coalitions of national parties without European agendas and programmes, meaning that the national delegates of national parties stand for election, campaigning along national issues and interests. Therefore, only pan-Europarties should be permitted to stand for election, obligating them to nominate candidates (in accordance with Reform #1) in every single member state and to campaign only under the name (and symbols) of the pan-Europarty. The transnational representative system would require national parties to form broader European coalitions, thus creating pan-Europarties, which concentrate on existing universal European issues, seeking to find solutions to problems (e.g. wages, unemployment, illegal immigration, health care) by proposing programmes across Europe.

Another important principle is the abolishment of seat allocation based on population size in the European Parliament (or EP), making 800 seats available for distribution in the EP based on the pan-Europarties’ election results instead. Once these principles are translated into legal regulations, the voters are going to have the new opportunity of voting for a national branch of a pan-Europarty in either of their member state of origin or of residence (voting should take place on the same day in all member states).

Mechanism

In the transnational party-list proportional representative system, the actual number of votes in each member state is going to be irrelevant, as only the rate of election result and turnout are going to decide the final result. The pan-Europarties’ rate of support is determined by the total result in percentage divided by the number of member states, ignoring the actual number of votes. More specifically, at the elections of the Republic of the United Europe (consisting of 27 member states), the European Green Party gets 15% of the votes in nine, 10% in ten, and 5% in seven member states, whereas it does not get a single vote in one of the member states. In this case, the calculation is [(15×9)+(10×10)+(5×7)+(0x1)]/27=10, which means that the Greens gain 10% (80 seats) of the total seats available in the EP. As I find it necessary to introduce a mandatory 5% admission threshold, there would be occasional surplus votes, which must be divided proportionately between the qualified parties in accordance with the votes gained. As even the most powerful national parties would be unable to nominate candidates and launch campaigns in every single member state of the RUE – let alone reach an average of 5% election result –, they will have to unite, forming pan-Europarties on a supranational level.

The first phase of the electoral system determines the number of seats gained by the pan-Europarties in total, but it does not resolve the issue of internal seat allocation to the numerous national branches. In my view, internal seat allocation has to be decided by the rate of supporting voting age population (henceforward SVAP), which indicates the rate of those, who voted for the national branches of the pan-Europarties of all eligible to vote (and registered) in each member state. In order to get the rate of SVAP, the rate of turnout (rate of registered VAP that voted) must be multiplied by the rate of election results in each member state, and then divided by 100. Each pan-Europarty’s average of total rate of SVAP and average of total seats gained must be used to calculate a key figure, which can be applied to calculate the exact seat allocation of each national branch within each pan-Europarty.

In order to present the precise calculation, I am going to use the EPP’s election results from 2019 in the followings (see full table at the bottom). Applying my principles of transnational list, the EPP secured the 26.04% of total votes (national branches’ rate of election results in total, divided by the number of member states), which translates into 208 seats (800×0,2604) in the new European Parliament. The exact seat allocation of these 208 seats is going to be set by two directives: the rate of SVAP and the mandatory minimum MEP.

The higher the turnout, the more representative the election result is, when it is compared to the entire population. Therefore, a strong election result is not going to be enough in itself, unless it is backed by strong turnout figures. For instance, Germany’s CDU-CSU gained 28.90% of the votes, backed by a 61.38% turnout; whereas Luxembourg’s CSV gained only 21.10% of the votes in the 2019 EP election, but the turnout was at an outstanding 84.24%. The current electoral system ignores the figures of turnout completely, rewarding parties purely based on their election results, which deforms the image of real support behind the elected political party. Therefore, I find it vital to integrate turnout into the process of seat allocation, treating it equally important to election results in order to recognise the real support of a political party amongst the population (or the rate of SVAP).

The rate of SVAP is determined by the turnout multiplied by the election results, and divided by 100 – in each member state. In the case of Germany’s CDU-CSU, the calculation is (61.38×28.90)/100=17.74, which means that 17.74% of the population eligible to vote support the coalition. In the case of Luxembourg’s CSV, the calculation is (84.24×21.10)/100=17.77, which is a very similar figure to CDU-CSU’s, meaning that despite of the lower election results, significantly higher turnout in Luxembourg could turn around the overall results. The rate of SVAP is going to be the key figure, which determines the exact seat allocation amongst the national branches of the pan-Europarty. In order to simply, but accurately calculate the exact seat allocation, the figures of average of total rate of SVAP and of theoretical average seats per national branch need to be known – based on the pan-Europarty’s election results.

After the rate of SVAP is calculated in each member state, the total figure has to be divided by 27 (number of member states), which equals to 12.41. As previously mentioned, the EPP’s election results in 2019 would gain them 208 seats (or 208.32 to be precise) in the new EP of 800 seats. The figure of theoretical average seats per national branches can be simply extracted from the 208.32 (total seats gained), dividing it by 27, which equals to 7.71. The average rate of SVAP (12.41) divided by the theoretical average of total seats gained per member state (7.71) equals to the amount of rate of SVAP (1.61) worth one seat in the EP. The master key of 1.61 has to be applied in order to calculate the exact seats gained by each national branch within the pan-Europarty (in this case the EPP). The rate of SVAP divided by 1.61 equals to the exact seats gained by the national branches. In the case of Germany’s CDU-CSU, it is 17.74/1.61=11.02 (11 seats), whereas in the case of Luxembourg’s CSV, it is 17.77/1.61=11.04 (11 seats).

As explained, the second phase resolves the issue of internal seat allocation per national branch within the pan-Europarties, highlighting the importance of turnout coupled with election results; whilst eliminating the large power deficit between more and less populous member states. In the current system, which is based on population size and national interests, CDU-CSU has 29 seats, whereas CSV has only two seats in the EP. Regardless of the number people that turn up voting, parties can still claim chunks of seats based solely on election results, which is unacceptable in my opinion.

I find it important to add one more small legal condition to the mechanism of internal seat allocation: mandatory minimum MEP. The mandatory minimum MEP ensures that every national branch of the pan-Europarty can delegate at least one MEP, meaning that in case of an awful election result the national branch of the member state would not be excluded, thus unrepresented, in the EP (e.g. Estonia). In order to add an additional MEP without gained seat, one of the national branches of the pan-Europarty has to relinquish one seat, which could be decided by the pan-Europarty’s leadership (e.g. the national branch that gained the most seats could transfer one seat).

Conclusion

The reformed European electoral system is not only going to be truly European, introducing regulations related to pan-Europarties, transnational list, and nomination, but also more legitimate due to the inclusion of true representation based on the number of people that attend to vote, not only on the number of votes. In order to enhance legitimacy in the European Parliament, candidates are going to have to mobilise their voters, and make them interested in voting (e.g. comprehensive programmes). The neutralisation of national tone in the agendas, programmes, and campaigns is also essential, which I am going to mention more detailed in the following volume of the reformation of the political system: the European Parliament.

The electoral system of the Republic of the United Europe

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Let’s thank my need to get the car MOT’ed for my chancing upon a very interesting discussion about the OODA loop on the radio. For those not into military tactics, the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop was devised by a US fighter pilot in the Cold War to conceptualise ways of (literally and metaphorically) out-manoeuvring your opponent: essentially by trying to get inside their approach you gain an advantage to disrupt and destroy them. All good stuff. If you’re into destroying things. Which was the gist of the radio programme: fundamentally, OODA is about handling situations as you find them, rather than about dealing with root causes. In their reading, one of Dominic Cummings’ basic problems during his time in No.10 was that he treated everything in OODA terms, rather than considering whether other, more cooperative strategies might be more effective. This is all interesting on its own terms, but also because the start of David Frost’s time as point man on the UK’s Brexit work has seen a demonstration of a very similar logic at work. Yesterday, in among all the budget news, the UK announced it would unilaterally extend the grace periods currently in operation in Northern Ireland relating to food. Certainly, there are issues on this that need attention, but to make a unilateral decision is one that smacks of disruption, mainly because any change to the TCA (which this would be) requires mutual approval with the EU. Instead, the UK has merely committed to discussing it with them in the coming weeks. The challenge to the EU is quite what to do. If they accept, then they open the door to similar future UK action, which might cause much bigger problems. If they refuse, then they will be blamed for obstructing efforts to solve the matter. Anything else requires UK buy-in that might not happen. As such, it’s essentially a bouncing operation, and much in line with previous actions by Frost. How it plays out is very unclear right now, but the opening observation of this post still stands: OODA is about fighting, not relation-building. If the UK-EU relationship is ever to find its feet, then it needs some foundation on which to stand. Trying to up-end the legal instruments – be that the Internal Market Bill and the Withdrawal Agreement or this current affair and the TCA – does not speak to that agenda at all. Maybe No.10 has an appetite for permanent conflict with the EU, but that’s a rather different question from one of whether the UK will be able to come out on top as a result.

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In mid-December the European Commission announced two draft laws on the regulation of the IT market. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act are intended to limit the influence of global Internet companies in the EU.

European officials define these initiatives as a tool that can ensure fair competition in the European IT market. The main “do’s” and “don’ts” for digital giants have been developed within these laws. There are some quite interesting positions in the documents:

• companies are prohibited from “mixing” personal data from various platforms and using them for their own purposes without the consent of citizens;
• platforms that refuse to obey and “threaten the lives and safety of people” may be temporarily banned;
• users will be allowed to delete pre-installed software on their devices;
• users can download software not only from official app stores (for example, iPhone owners will be no longer tied to the AppStore);
• IT giant products should be available for users separately without any synchronization (for example, Gmail is not more required to create an Android account);
• companies will have to inform the EU about planned mergers or takeovers.

For violation of the law the European Commission proposes fines up to 10% of the annual turnover of the company. For repeated violations regulators may force the IT giant to sell one of its enterprises or part of it.

The Acts also introduce a new term for large companies that provide access to digital products and services. In the legal language of the EU Google, Apple, Amazon and Facebook will be called «gatekeepers». The list of such companies will be regularly updated: the main criteria is 45 million active users in the EU countries.

The document aims not only to protect business and fair competition. The Acts also regulate the storage of personal data, and other important issues which allows us to consider it as the first timid step of Brussels to disassociate itself from global Internet platforms in favor of digital sovereignty.

What is digital sovereignty?

With no doubts, independence from global IT companies has become one of the most pressing issues on the political agenda of most modern states. Countries define digital sovereignty in different ways and, according to the interpretation, form a set of measures to ensure it. The classic definition looks like this:

Digital (information) sovereignty is the right of the state to formulate information policy independently, manage information flows, and ensure information security regardless of external influence.

In modern conditions the independence of the state in this sphere is determined by the ability to ensure the safety of citizens’ personal data, force transnational IT companies to act within the national legislation and limit the distribution of banned content.

Anyway various governments began to think of strengthening digital sovereignty after the events of the Arab Spring. In 2011 the series of protests and coups in the Middle East was actively coordinated through social networks with offices in the United States while the Arab national governments had absolutely no control over the dissemination of often unsound information.

The discussion escalated in the beginning of the year, due to the storming of the U.S. Capitol when Twitter blocked the account of President Donald Trump. The de-facto private company closed the important communication channel of the current head of the state with the millions of his voters. This event divided American society into supporters and opponents. However, other governments, without any doubts, have concluded that it is necessary to control IT giants on their territory.

The experience of other countries

On October 1, Turkey adopted a law regulating the activities of social networks in the country. According to the new rules, platforms with a number of users of 1 million and more are to open representative offices in Ankara. By the decision of the Turkish court, resources also have to “clean up” illegal content within 48 hours. For violations social networks will be fined up to €4.3 million, advertising may also be blocked or access speed may be limited.

Turkey is also actively promoting its own payment system. The national TROY card was launched in 2016. Through TROY, Turkish citizens can pay for purchases or cash in ATMs. The number of transactions in 2018 amounted to 100 million for a total of $3.3 billion. Turkish leaders also plan to ensure the possibility of using its own system outside the country.

Russia is also taking active actions to implement the concept of digital sovereignty. Moscow is promoting its own payment system «Mir», stimulating the development of domestic IT products (for example, Yandex and Sber), localizing the storage of personal data within the country. Russia has its popular social platforms VKontakte and Odnoklassniki which are able to compete with foreign social networks.

As for foreign IT giants, the Kremlin has not yet found a universal tool for establishing control over them on its own territory. The Russian authorities have repeatedly fined American platforms for distributing objectionable content which social networks refused to remove. According to Russian law, the amount of fines for such violations is from $11 000 to $54 000. However, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are in no hurry to pay the fines.

Poland intensified work on national legislation in the field of digital sovereignty right after ban of Donald Trump’s accounts. The authorities have developed a package of laws. The part of the initiatives is the creation of the Council for the Protection of Freedom of Speech. The Council will monitor the observance of the constitutional rights of users of social networks. It will consider pre-trial cases of blocking content on the Internet and the reasons for deleting a particular publication. The Polish bill provides the possibility of filing a complaint in e-format for the removal of content which should be considered within seven days. The court’s decision must be implemented immediately. Otherwise the platform may be fined from $13 thousand to $13.5 million.

Is there anything like this in Ukraine?

As for now the Ukrainian authorities have not developed either a universal method of control over foreign platforms or a national payment system. In Ukraine there are no analogues of popular American social networks or other IT products of a national scale that could compete with world-famous brands. Ukraine uses regulation in the Internet only to ban Russian platforms. For example, Russian services Yandex, Mail.ru, VKontakte and Odnoklassniki have been banned in 2017. Moreover, relations with other well-known foreign platforms are not regulated at all.

At the same time, there are enough examples of how foreign social networks influenced the social and political processes in Ukraine, in particular, they provoked the growing popularity of neo-Nazi organizations. In January, the «Time» published an article examining the activity of Azov battalion in Facebook.

The authors noted that new members of the organization were recruited via social network. For a long time, the administration of the world’s largest platform turned a blind eye to the spread of radical ideology by Ukrainian users. Only in 2016, Facebook began to take measures against Ukrainian radicals and block accounts for “hate speech”. Despite this, many of them are still active and continue to split the Ukrainian society into “friends” and “foes”.

In mid-February, in the first reading the Verkhovna Rada approved a bill proposing to tax non-resident companies providing electronic services. Experts note the positive impact of the initiative in terms of unification of taxation and increased competition in the digital services market, but for users it can lead to higher subscription cost. Talking about the digital sovereignty, the law cannot be called a step forward. It does not regulate the distribution of content and does not make foreign platforms dependent on the Ukrainian state.

The realization of digital sovereignty is one of the most important question for governments with political will. Otherwise, the “keys” to the largest channels of communication, financial sphere and personal data will remain in foreign hands. And this, as Americans say, is a “threat to national security”. If Ukraine decides to regulate this undoubtedly vital sphere, the leaders of the country have much work to do.

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University of Edinburgh. Photo credits: University of Edinburgh

Justyna Bandola-Gill

The quest for usable science is one of the defining challenges for contemporary universities. One of the key drivers of this change is the rise of the so-called impact agenda, in which research funding is directly linked to the socio-economic value of produced knowledge. This change in research funding – and the financial stakes involved in it – has had important consequences for the incentive systems of universities in the UK. One feature of this change is the upsurge in a new practice – termed in the British context ‘knowledge exchange’. In less than a decade, knowledge exchange has become a commonplace in UK universities – from a newly emerged category of professional services supporting these activities, through dedicated institutional formations, such as Knowledge Exchange and Impact Offices and strategies, and finally to the inclusion of impact in career progression criteria.

 

Yet, despite this expansion of the idea of knowledge exchange across university structures, the concept itself is often undefined and used vaguely. In the paper drawing on my doctoral work which was awarded the 2019 Excellent Paper Award, I addressed this topic by exploring knowledge exchange as a problem of practice: knowledge exchange seen from this perspective is not a set of universal strategies but rather a malleable phenomenon that changes its meaning in different contexts. Building on this insight I empirically explored the practice of knowledge exchange in two large initiatives funded by UK Research Councils – initiatives which, although located at universities, were charged predominantly with mobilising knowledge and working towards research impact. Through qualitative interviews and document analysis I aimed to answer the question: what meanings of knowledge exchange emerge in this context?

 

The key finding here was the fact that knowledge exchange is a multicultural practice which requires navigation, integration and translation between different paradigms of science. Academics who identified more strongly with traditional academic values (such as autonomy, impartiality and intellectually-driven inquiry) saw knowledge exchange as a knowledge-focused practice, the outcome of which could be a new policy framework (the ‘Challenge’ framing of knowledge exchange) or social learning of different actors in deliberative forums (the ‘Facilitation’ framing). Academics who saw themselves as ‘new’ scientists – sometimes referring directly to Mode-2 science – saw knowledge exchange as an engagement-based practice. They perceived knowledge exchange more instrumentally as an action-oriented and utilitarian practice, the effects of which were envisioned as concrete changes in policy. Here, for example, the academics referred to collaborative research (the ‘Co-production’ framing) or promotion of specific solutions (the ‘Advocacy’ framing). Knowledge exchange was therefore an area of intensive boundary work, where the spheres of science and policy were re-drawn across different value-laden lines.

 

Despite drawing on different academic traditions, these framings were malleable and the academics mixed-and-matched different strategies. The choices of strategy depended on multiple factors.

 

Politicisation of the problem

The choice of strategy was shaped by the level of politicisation of an issue. When dealing with contested issues (e.g. DNA testing, genetic databases, health inequalities), academics prioritised knowledge-based strategies (over the engagement-based ones). In particular, when faced with contentious issues, the academics opted for repertoires of knowledge exchange which were aligned more closely with the notions of impartial and autonomous science, as this was perceived to be more effective at broadening the debate.

 

Process characteristics

The interviewees pointed out that some stages of policy development were more conducive to specific repertoires of knowledge exchange. In particular, the early stages of policy formulation were conducive to strategies aimed at expanding the scope of policy options. Nevertheless, the interviewees saw the biggest opportunity for contributing to evidence-informed policymaking at the level of implementation of policies, particularly at the local level. One of the reasons for this focus was a perception that it was easier to develop close relationships and trust between actors at the local level, thus enabling models of co-production based on engagement, such as learning facilitation and co-production models.

 

Changes in the research funding system

With the introduction of Research Excellence Framework (REF) in the UK, academics became incentivised to produce more traceable (and consequently auditable) forms of impact. The interviewed academics reported that, since the introduction of REF, they had seen the system of incentives evolve to support practices resulting in such impact; for example, Co-production or Advocacy (rather than the more conceptual and open-ended practices of Challenging and Facilitating).

 

Overall, my research points to the fact that ‘knowledge exchange’ is in fact an umbrella term, containing a broad – both epistemically and practically – variety and multiple types of interactions between various types of knowledge and their uses. Even though the importance of close relationships for knowledge exchange are central to the effectiveness of the initiatives, this research highlights that some forms of interactions – such as critical or advocacy action – in fact benefit from looser connections to policymakers, instead gaining legitimacy, credibility and usefulness from academic evidence. The four repertoires of knowledge exchange reinforce existing arguments on the variety of roles academics can employ in the policymaking process, ranging from a greater focus on the autonomy of researchers, to closer engagement with the policy process. The forms of engagement were shaped by the variety of contextual factors, supporting claims for the central role of context as both the determinant of knowledge exchange and the key element of the process of evidence uptake in policy.

 

Dr. Justyna Bandola-Gill is a Research Fellow in Social Policy at the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. Justyna works at the intersection of Science and Technology Studies and Public Policy. Her research explores the interactions between research and policy, especially the ways in which knowledge is organised, governed and mobilised across different settings in order to achieve political goals. Currently, Justyna is working on an ERC-funded project, METRO, exploring the global rise of metrological fields, where her research focuses on the rise of Sustainable Development Goals.

 

This blog post is based on the paper that won the 2019 Award for Excellent Paper from an Emerging Scholar from the ECPR Standing Group ‘Knowledge Politics and Policies’. The award was celebrated during the ECPR 2020 General Conference. This was the fourth time this prize was awarded. Previous winners are Emma Sabzalieva, Olivier Provini and Que Anh Dang.

 

The post Evidence to do what? Emergence of Knowledge Exchange as an Academic Practice in UK Higher Education appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

European Union (EU) citizens have become increasingly mobile within the Union. For a long time, free movement as well as cross-border social rights of EU migrants have been extended, especially by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In principle, economically inactive EU migrants, i.e. EU migrants who do not work, have also acquired significant transnational welfare rights. But what are these rights in practice? How do EU Member State administrations apply relevant EU law and handle EU citizens’ access to social assistance? Which impact does the ECJ finally have? Is there “social tourism” (possible) – as often claimed by certain political parties? This blogpost deals with all these questions by presenting the key findings of my article, which analyses local authorities’ practices and the consequences for EU citizens.

I argue that Member States’ local authorities tend to restrict the access to social assistance benefits for economically inactive EU migrants given that they have an incentive to keep both administrative and financial costs low. Still, there may be variation on the ground. As shown in my article, varying application between local authorities cannot, surprisingly, be explained by the party-political environment. Rather, it depends on whether local authorities face a high amount of (similar) requests and resulting professionalization.

Under EU law, economically inactive EU migrants generally enjoy the right to equal treatment after a residence of three months in another Member State. However, in order to be allowed to reside for more than three months, EU citizens need to have “sufficient resources” and a health insurance so that they do not become a “burden” on the social assistance system of the Member State of destination (Article 7 Directive 2004/38). As mentioned above, this field of EU law is highly shaped by the European Court of Justice. The latter ruled in an expansive direction for quite some time and urged Member States to undertake individual assessments of the benefit requests of economically inactive EU citizens. Yet, a characteristic of ECJ judgments is that they are case specific and characterized by underspecified core concepts. Consequently, the implications for the specific case at issue are clear but not its broader implications. Lawful residence seems to be decisive in every case in order to enjoy equal treatment, but apart from that, different factors can be required. For instance, in Bidar (C-209/03), it is decisive that the person has a certain degree of integration into society; in Grzelczyk (C-184/99), the crucial factor is that the financial problems of the applicant are only temporary. Yet, Member States are not provided with a clear, general definition of for instance “burden” or “certain degree of integration”. They do hence not know about the exact limits of equal treatment.

In practice, Member States authorities could make an individual assessment and interpret the numerous and vague factors mentioned in the diverse ECJ rulings – such as “certain degree of integration” – in an expansive direction. This can probably be described as the preferred response by the ECJ. Such a response is, however, unlikely. Namely, in general, authorities need to economize both their administrative and financial costs. An individual assessment implies high administrative costs and the expansive direction of ECJ rulings would lead to increased welfare expenditure. Local authorities therefore rather opt for diverging responses which entail less administrative or/and financial costs: they abandon the individual assessment and generally deny social assistance to economically inactive EU migrants, or they clearly specify the criteria of the individual assessment, such as “burden”. They are, hence, becoming more restrictive and limit the impact of the ECJ.

Local authorities think it is all the more necessary to economize costs if they face many requests of (EU) citizens – as empirical evidence from Austrian welfare authorities’ practices with regard to social assistance claims demonstrates. Local authorities have become routinized and increasingly see the need to tighten the rules and keep financial costs low. As a consequence, they have made the access to benefits more difficult.

Welfare authorities in rural areas are not confronted with many social assistance requests of (EU) citizens. Such less exposed welfare authorities typically apply simplifying strategies: when assessing whether an EU migrant is eligible for social assistance, they only rely upon the (non-)presence of a certain document, the registration certificate. The registration certificate is a purely declaratory certificate documenting legal residence that EU citizens have to apply for with migration authorities when staying longer than four months in Austria. Migration authorities, for their part, have made the access to the registration certificate more difficult over time, interpreting ECJ case law in a more restrictive way. Hence, since economically inactive EU migrants often no longer obtain the registration certificate in the first place, they do not have access to social assistance benefits in the second place.

Still, the division of competences between migration authorities and welfare authorities partly leads to unintended generosity, meaning that economically inactive EU citizens can be granted benefits in some instances: EU citizens can fulfil the conditions for the registration certificate while being economically active and be issued the document. With this certificate, which is rarely revoked, they can draw minimum benefits afterwards when no longer working.

Therefore, welfare authorities in larger cities facing many similar benefit requests finally no longer rely upon the registration certificate. They rather opt for a categorical exclusion of economically inactive EU citizens from social assistance. Hence, they interpret ECJ case law in a more restrictive way. The empirical evidence from Austria thus confirms that exposedness and resulting professionalization matters. At the same time, it finds that, surprisingly, the respective party-political environment cannot account for the application of ECJ case law on “social citizenship”: I identify numerous restrictive practices that occur independently from the party-political context.

The underlying research demonstrates that it is difficult for local authorities to undertake individual assessments without fixed criteria or definitions. It illustrates case workers’ demand for clear rules and confirms that vague ECJ case law is a burden for authorities. Recent case law since Dano (C-333/13) has lightened the burden for administrations: it confirms the restrictive practices and general benefit denials to economically inactive EU migrants. For poor EU migrants, the restrictive practices and recent case law mean that they find themselves in a precarious situation, excluded from the last safety net of social assistance. The findings of the article hence also stand in stark contrast to alleged “social tourism”.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article ‘‘Social Citizenship’ at the Street Level? EU Member State Administrations Setting a Firewall’.

 

 

Author:

Anita Heindlmaier is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Salzburg. She is part of the D-A-CH project “Rebalancing the Enlarged Single Market”, which is funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and the German Research Foundation (DFG) and which deals with atypical labour migration in the European Union. Her research interests include EU free movement of persons, social rights and working conditions – and in particular the implementation of related EU law and policies.

Twitter handles: @heindlmaier @SCEUS_Salzburg

The post Social Europe? Why EU Migrants Are Denied Social Assistance Benefits at the Street Level appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Irregular migration in the European Union (EU) dominates the current EU political agenda. It is also the top concern of European citizens, according to the latest Standard Eurobarometer (Spring 2019). EU member states, however, are not affected to the same degree, resulting in political friction with regard to how to deal with the challenges of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the EU’s failure to provide an adequate and unitary response to the unprecedented influx of irregular migrants in 2015 exposed the strength of state sovereignty within member states and led to divisions within the EU so far as to threaten the overall functioning of the Schengen Area. As a result, the EU approach to irregular migration shows clear signs of following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation, where the supranational institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in the driving seat. Nonetheless, there is an apparent paradox: EU institutions and member states are more divided than ever over a common approach to irregular migration, yet at the same time they are increasingly converging towards more restrictive migration policies.

EU Integration and Policy (In)coherence towards Irregular Migration (2020). In: Harwood, M., Moncada, S. and Pace, R., (eds.) The Future of the European Union – Demisting the Debate,  The Institute for European Studies, University of  Malta, pp. 230-241. Available at: https://www.um.edu.mt/library/oar/handle/123456789/52312

Introduction: Contextualisation of the problem

The issue of irregular migration currently dominates the European political agenda. It has been at the heart of recent election campaigns across the continent and has spilled into broader debates concerning the future of Europe. According to the Standard Eurobarometer of Spring 2019 (European Commission, 2019a), the phenomenon is perceived as the most crucial issue facing the EU. It is the top concern in twenty- one EU member states, reaching its highest scores in Malta (63 per cent), the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia (all 53 per cent). Irregular migration, however, has played out differently in the regions of Northwestern, Southern, and Central-Eastern Europe, resulting in different approaches across the EU member states.

Following the unprecedented influx of migrants in 2015, when over 1.8 million irregular migrants arrived in Europe (Frontex 2018, p. 8), the prevention of irregular migration has become one of the top EU policy priorities. Consequently, Europe experienced a ‘race to the bottom’, with most member states introducing a series of restrictive migration policy measures to deter irregular migration. At the same time, the question of how to deal with the phenomenon has become the most divisive issue within the EU, at both national and EU level.

The diverse policy approaches to the unparalleled influx of irregular migrants indeed created a divide among EU member states and institutions, drastically altering the landscape of European politics. In essence, the migration debate brought to the forefront questions concerning the resilience of the European integration project. Given the current situation, therefore, it is uncertain whether the EU will manage to rise to the challenge of irregular migration or risk fragmentation of the European project.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the difficulty in developing coherent migration policies, to deal with the challenge of irregular migration, due to the heterogeneous policy preferences of the EU member states and institutions. Then it examines the impact of the absence of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility among member states on the EU approach to irregular migration. The final section summarises the chapter, and questions whether the EU will succeed in achieving policy coherence in this domain in the future.

Incoherence in the EU approach to irregular migration

Since 1999, the EU has been working to develop a common EU migration policy (Peers et al., 2015). European cooperation in the area of irregular migration, however, has been neither unproblematic nor has it automatically translated into EU integration. This stems primarily from the fact that member states have jealously guarded their sole right to admit or exclude third country nationals from their respective territories.

EU member states’ reluctance to delegate decision-making in this sovereignty- sensitive policy domain beyond the national level has resulted in an ongoing tension over what should be handled at the supranational level, and what should remain in the domain of national governments (Givens, 2010). In consequence, member states have not yet succeeded in agreeing on clear political objectives for a common migration policy. Migration policy in the EU, therefore, remains a largely national endeavour, where member states continue to develop their own migration policies (Calleja Ragonesi, 2014).

In addition to member states’ unwillingness to transfer competences in the field of migration to the supranational level, the EU’s failure to articulate a coherent approach to irregular migration can be attributed to heterogeneous national policy preferences over how to deal with the phenomenon. In practice, varying political cultures and migration traditions, together with the asymmetrical distribution of irregular migrants across EU member states, have shaped differing national preferences in the context of irregular migration (Ruhs, 2017). Hence, they explain the challenge in achieving policy coherence in this domain.

Initially a six-member bloc, by the mid-1990s the Union comprised fifteen member states, which, with the exception of the southern states, were prosperous and of a Northwestern European cultural trope. The accessions from 2004 onwards brought the number of member states to twenty-eight with most of the new members from Central and Eastern Europe with a post-communist past. This has made the Union much more heterogeneous, bringing new preferences and challenges, raising the question of whether it is possible to have a ‘one size fits all’ EU law (Chalmers et al., 2014). The date of EU accession is an important factor shaping member states’ approaches to irregular migration. In essence, while most of the ‘older’ members have had years of experience with irregular migration, those member states that joined from 2004 onwards were faced with a relatively recent phenomenon to which they have had to adapt very rapidly.

Some of these states also became entry points for irregular migration and consequently more dependent on EU support for border control, while concurrently facing the social and political complications that arise from the phenomenon, such as informal employment (Carmel, 2013). EU member states’ approaches to irregular migration also vary in the context of their geographical proximity to zones of instability and conflict. Indeed, one of the principal determinants influencing a member state’s approach to irregular migration concerns geographic location.

Since the different regions of the EU experience different migratory pressures, this has a significant impact on the approaches of individual member states. For instance, the focus of destination states, such as Germany and Sweden, has been on secondary movements of irregular migrants. In contrast, frontline states, such as Italy and Greece, have long called for the abolishment of Dublin’s ‘first country of entry’ rule, which places a burden on such states. This has resulted in a situation where some member states, particularly those staggering under the weight of irregular migration, strive for a common policy governed by solidarity, while others far removed from the issue have little incentive to standardise policy and thus are less interested in pursuing long-term durable solutions.

Another major challenge in achieving policy coherence in this domain concerns the issue of variable geometry, which formally limits the ability of the EU to establish a common policy. More specifically, this relates to those member states that joined in the first enlargement of 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the UK. With the aim of safeguarding national sovereignty, these states have obtained ‘opt-outs’ from the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) to avoid cooperation in the adoption of measures relating to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Adler-Nissen, 2008). The unequal application of the processes of supranationalisation in the field of JHA, therefore, reveals the difficulty in developing a coherent policy to deal with irregular migration.

An additional obstacle, in the above context, concerns the costs attached to the granting of asylum. The possibility that irregular migrants may claim asylum appears to constitute the main barrier to cooperation in this field. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017) estimates, the average cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers within the EU is around 10,000 euro per asylum seeker for the first year. Accordingly, the major challenge stems from the fact that most member states perceive no benefits in cooperating in matters of irregular migration, hence the tendency to ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the frontline states.

In the absence of a coherent policy to deal with irregular migration, member states are increasingly pursuing unilateral measures, such as concluding bilateral agreements with third states, and building walls and fences along their borders to prevent irregular migration. There has also been a visible shift towards the tightening up of national asylum and migration policies in most member states, in an attempt to decrease the attractiveness of the respective member state for irregular migrants (Zanker, 2019). Such measures, however, do not reflect the Union’s fundamental values, namely the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.

Apart from the diverse policy approaches of the EU member states, the objectives of the three main institutions involved in EU legislation also differ, which explains the differences in their respective approaches to irregular migration. Nonetheless, following the unprecedented influx of irregular migrants in 2015, the Commission’s stance changed significantly, from promoting the rights of asylum seekers to satisfying political interest in the Council. Likewise, the European Parliament (EP) appears to be ‘going backwards’ in terms of migrants’ rights (Lopatin, 2013). As co- legislator, Parliament has often emphasised the need for a solidary approach to irregular migration; however, the rise of right-wing populist parties in the EP is influencing EU policy choices as support for mainstream political parties is on the wane (Lutz, 2019).

In recent years, the issue of irregular migration emerged at the centre of the debate in national elections across the EU, particularly since 2015, with right-wing populist parties gaining support in several member states. More importantly, the rise of right- wing populism is transforming member states’ approaches to irregular migration. The case of Germany illustrates such a transformation. Known for its ‘open-door’ policy, enacted in August 2015, which allowed in over a million irregular migrants, it shifted course only the following month with Chancellor Merkel’s U-turn leading to the reinstatement of border controls at the German-Austrian border. Merkel’s change in tone can be seen as a response to increasing public pressure against her ‘open-door’ policy (Dimitriadi et al., 2018).

Right-wing populist parties have made significant electoral gains across Europe, such as in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Italy. Some have taken office, while others have become the main opposition voice. In France, National Front40 leader Marine Le Pen outpaced traditional centre-left and centre-right parties in the presidential elections of 2017, reaching the second and final election round, in which she received about a third of the votes cast. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom (PVV) came in second place in the national election of the same year. Meanwhile, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) shifted from being primarily neoliberal in focus to becoming an outspoken anti-immigrant populist party, receiving 12.6 per cent of the votes in the September 2017 federal elections, and becoming the first right-wing populist party to be represented in the German Bundestag since World War II. At the end of 2017, the coalition government formed by the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) resulted in the first western European state with a governing right- wing populist party (Ehmsen and Scharenberg, 2018). This continental shift towards right-wing populism also includes Italy, where the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle) and the League (Lega) scored a major success in the March 2018 general elections, becoming coalition partners in the new government and the first populist government in Western Europe.

The rise of the right-wing populist party, Sweden Democrats, in the 2018 elections in Sweden illustrates that this is Europe’s new normal. Since 2015, Sweden rapidly changed, from promoting one of the EU’s most open immigration policies to embracing one of its most restrictive, although it was thought to be immune from the trend to nationalistic politics (Ekman, 2018). Populist resentment towards irregular migration also played a crucial role in the victory of the pro-Brexit forces in the UK EU membership referendum, which took place on 23 June 2016 (Dinan et al., 2017).

In the aftermath of the mass influx of irregular migrants in 2015, most EU decisions taken to deal with the issue were approved at the meetings of the European Council, and taken in the Council, suggesting a shift towards intergovernmental policymaking as well as the bypassing of supranational institutions, exemplified by the 2016 EU- Turkey Statement. The controversial deal, which in practice closed all borders along the Western Balkan route, was agreed upon by EU leaders without the involvement of Parliament. The EU approach to irregular migration thus shows clear signs of following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation, where the supranational institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the (JHA) Council in the driving seat.

The manifold approaches within the EU to irregular migration reveal an inherent tension in the development of a common policy. Above all, they reveal the inability of EU member states to act cohesively, particularly in the face of migration pressures. Nevertheless, EU actors all seem to support the same pragmatic strategy; that is, offering benefits, notably money, to third countries, in exchange for a reduction of irregular migration. Indeed, EU member states and institutions, are increasingly converging in the ‘fight against illegal migration’, resulting in a paradigm shift characterised by more restrictive policy prescriptions across Europe, involving strengthening the bloc’s external borders, and the externalisation of migration controls. The words of European Council President Donald Tusk, following the informal meeting in Salzburg in 2018, encapsulate the prevailing focus of the EU vis- à-vis irregular migration:

The migration debate showed that we may not agree on everything, but we agree on the main goal, which is stemming illegal migration to Europe.

An apparent paradox thus emerges. Although the EU is more divided than ever over a common approach to irregular migration, it is united in preventing irregular arrivals. Indeed, Europe is more divided than ever over how to tackle the phenomenon, resulting in deadlocked inter-institutional negotiations on the reform of the Dublin Regulation (since 2016) and prolonged internal border controls (since 2015). However, when it is a question of the goal of preventing irregular migration, the EU tends to be surprisingly ‘united in diversity’. Still, despite convergence in the tightening up of migration policies, EU member states and institutions have not managed to overcome their differences on fundamental aspects of EU integration, in particular concerning the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.

Lack of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in the EU approach to irregular migration

An inherent flaw in the EU approach to irregular migration is that it lacks a long- term comprehensive strategy involving sustainable, durable solutions, governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. In practice, the EU approach is characterised by short-term ad hoc initiatives and the absence of intra- EU solidarity. A good example here is the Commission’s 2015 emergency relocation mechanism to assist Italy and Greece (Carrera and Guild, 2015), which even so resulted in most member states failing to fulfil their obligations and relocate the figures they had committed to, revealing a lack of solidarity even in times of crisis

Lack of solidarity in this policy domain has resulted in a political deadlock since 2016 over reform of the Dublin Regulation, largely due to political controversy as regards the inclusion of a corrective allocation mechanism to fairly distribute migrants across EU member states and thus alleviate the pressure on frontline states (Di Filippo, 2016). So far, the only form of solidarity that has been institutionalised concerns the financial aspect, specifically through the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) which consists of a fixed amount per member state, in addition to a variable amount, for those member states requiring emergency assistance in the event of a mass influx of irregular migrants (EP, 2018).

The failure of European solidarity calls into question the resilience of the European integration project. Schengen, one of the major achievements of European integration, has been under huge stress since 2015, following the decision of some member states to ‘temporarily’ reinstate border controls – with the aim to prevent secondary movements of irregular migrants from neighbouring member states. Previously, this measure was primarily used in connection with large sporting events or high-level political meetings and usually carried out for only a few days or weeks. Member states justified the reintroduction of border control at their internal borders on account of the unprecedented and uncontrolled influx of irregular migrants and the risk related to organised crime and terrorist threats (Guild et al., 2015).

Germany was the first member state to implement such border controls, in September 2015, which led to the reintroduction of internal border controls in other member states, such as Austria, Sweden, France and Denmark. Although these measures were authorised by the EU, they were prolonged several times, and thus amount to a major and long-term restriction of the earlier state of integration. Internal border checks are set to expire on 12 November 2019, even though since 2017 the number of irregular arrivals dropped significantly owing to the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 (European Commission, 2019b).

The reintroduction of border control, therefore, remains a prerogative of the member states. In addition, Schengen rules are strongly dominated by intergovernmental interests, reflected in the sustained unwillingness to lift internal border controls. This state of affairs raises questions concerning the absence of intra-EU solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in the context of irregular migration, where precedence is given to national over common interests, and lack of mutual trust among member states is hindering progress towards a coherent policy. It also highlights that even those member states that were initially more liberal, namely Germany and Sweden, suspended Schengen rules in order to deter irregular migrants from entering their territory and encourage them to search for protection in other states. In addition to the reintroduction of ‘temporary’ border control at the internal borders within the Schengen area, other EU member states, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia, erected walls and fences along their internal borders to prevent the arrival of irregular migrants from other member states, resulting in further disunity within the EU.

If there is one conclusion to be drawn with a relatively high level of certainty, it is that the long-term challenge of irregular migration requires more than the present ad hoc solutions based on compensatory economic solidarity. Moreover, as long as the principle of solidarity is voluntary, it will not work and hence will continue to pose a serious challenge in developing a coherent, long-term and comprehensive strategy to tackle the challenge of irregular migration. In the latter’s absence, the risk is that the philosophy of each individual member state will prevail, resulting in the renationalisation of migration policies, permanent controls at the internal borders, and ultimately, the end of Schengen.

Conclusion: towards a coherent approach to irregular migration?

This chapter examined the challenges related to developing a coherent policy towards irregular migration; a goal that has not yet been achieved. The issue of irregular migration dominates the current political agenda in Europe. It has been at the heart of recent election campaigns across the continent, resulting in the rise of right-wing populist parties and a decline in traditional mainstream political parties. It has also become Europe’s most divisive issue due to discordant policy objectives with regard to how to deal with the phenomenon. Although at the time of writing irregular arrivals have dropped to pre-crisis levels, the issue remains highly controversial at both EU and national level. Given the circumstances, it is uncertain whether the EU will succeed in achieving policy coherence in this domain in the future.

The chapter illustrated that although the EU focus is increasingly on the prevention of irregular migration, the policy process in this sovereignty-sensitive field remains fragmented. In addition, it is marked by unilateral measures taken by individual member states to protect their domestic political interests against the perceived threats posed by irregular migration.

One of the major obstacles in formulating a coherent policy to deal with irregular migration concerns the variation in policy preferences across the EU. At the national level, policy approaches are deeply rooted in historical legacies as well as political, economic and social factors, including issues of religion and cultural identity. Moreover, the asymmetrical impact of irregular migration across EU member states, primarily the result of geographic location, has significantly influenced their respective approaches. At the EU level, discordance between the EU institutions’ approaches reflects their respective objectives, even though following the influx of irregular migrants in 2015, the Commission and EP’s stance changed significantly, from promoting the rights of asylum seekers to satisfying political interest in the Council. These powerful cleavages thus make it harder to reach consensus in this policy domain.

Interestingly, since 2015, there has been some form of convergence in the EU approach to irregular migration, as EU member states and institutions are increasingly shifting their focus towards the ‘fight against illegal migration’ and the externalisation of migration controls. In other words, security-oriented measures have dominated, resulting in convergence towards more restrictive migration policies in order to prevent irregular migrants from reaching Europe. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that EU cooperation in this policy domain has not automatically translated into EU integration.

Indeed, despite visible convergence in restrictive migration policies, EU member states and institutions have not yet managed to overcome their differences on fundamental aspects of migration governance, in particular, the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. The key challenge lies in the fact that those member states not located on the EU’s external borders perceive no benefits in cooperating in matters of irregular migration. Hence, the tendency to ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the frontline states rather than cooperate in establishing a permanent burden-sharing mechanism to fairly distribute migrants across EU member states and alleviate the burden from such states. The absence of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility within the EU has become a major barrier to policy coherence. So long as this principle will remain voluntary, it is most unlikely that EU member states will pull together and agree on a long-term solution.

Furthermore, the long-term challenge of irregular migration requires more than the present ad hoc solutions based on compensatory economic solidarity. Policy development has so far proven to be reactive rather than forward-looking. Particularly, since 2015, EU member states and institutions are increasingly opting for ad hoc policy solutions which operate outside legislative frameworks including intergovernmental agreements and soft policy approaches, exemplified by the EU-Turkey Statement, agreed upon by the heads of state or government of the EU member states and their Turkish counterparts. EU policymaking in this field thus shows clear signs of following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation where the supranational institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the JHA Council in the driving seat.

The direction in which EU policy towards irregular migration will develop hence remains uncertain. Will the EU split further and pursue a policy strategy aimed exclusively at preventing irregular arrivals, or will it manage to find a way out of the current impasse and reform the Dublin Regulation in accordance with the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility? Taking into consideration the current political climate, the likelihood is that common positions will not be found in the near future. The development of a long-term comprehensive strategy will require political will, mutual trust, and genuine solidarity. If undertaken successfully, however, these common efforts could re-energise European integration and have positive spillover effects in other policy areas.

 

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Porro, N. (2018) ‘Arriva il governo dei porti aperti’, il Giornale, 9 September. Available at: http://www.ilgiornale.it/autore/nicola-porro.html

Ruhs, M. (2017) ‘Free Movement in the European Union: National Institutions vs Common Policies?’, International Migration, 55 (S1), pp. 22–38.

Zanker, F. (2019) ‘Managing or restricting movement? Diverging approaches of African and European migration governance’, Comparative Migration Studies, vol. 7, Article 17. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878–019-0115–9

The post EU Integration and Policy (In)coherence towards Irregular Migration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Seit Anfang Januar arbeitet das neue Bundesamt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BfAA) jetzt bereits in Brandenburg. Nach außen hin ist noch nicht viel zu sehen, aber es gibt seit meinen letzten Blogbeiträgen zumindest ein paar Updates zur Struktur der Behörde, zum Gebäudesituation und zur den Stellenprofilen des Amts.

1. Die Struktur der Behörde

Aktuell gibt es auf der BfAA-Webseite und auch auf der gut gewachsenen Wikipedia-Seite zum BfAA noch keinen Link zu einem offiziellen Organigramm, zumindest keinen, den ich finden konnte. Im aktuellen Podcast des Behörden-Spiegel spricht der Leiter des Bundesamts Georg Birgelen aber von fünf Abteilungen, mit einer sechsten (der Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen, ZfA) in Planung, die demnächst noch eingegliedert werden soll.

Auf einem Facebook-Video von Birgelen aus dem Januar kann man noch ein paar weitere Details eines Entwurfs, oder eines damaligen Brainstormings zur Struktur erkennen. Daraus habe ich mal einen Organigramm-“Entwurf” gebastelt, als Platzhalter, bis das offizielle Organigramm da ist. Dort schien es noch, als würde es sieben Abteilungen geben. Daher bite mit Vorsicht genießen, da nur aus zwei Quellen zusammengebaut, aber immerhin ein Start!

Nichtoffizieller Entwurf eines Organigramms des BfAA, zusammengestellt aus unterschiedlichen Quellen. Eigene Darstellung. (NB: Von “Abteilung D” sprach Birgelen im Behörden-Spiegel Podcast nicht eindeutig, sie war aber auf der Tafel im Facebook-Video enthalten.)

2. Die Liegenschaften in Brandenburg an der Havel

Laut Birgelen (Behörden-Spiegel Podcast) hat das BfAA in Brandenburg “zwei Bürogebäude im Auge”, davon sei eines schon im November 2020 bezogen, mit insgesamt 72 Arbeitsplätzen. Davon seien wegen Corona maximal 50% nutzbar. Ein zweites, größeres Bürogebäude mit nochmal 90 Arbeitsplätzen würde gerade renoviert werden. Allerdings sei auch hier nicht klar, wie viele Plätze in Pandemie-Zeiten besetzt werden können, was den Start herausfordernder gestalte.

In einem Podcast des Brandenburger Regionalmediums “Meetingpoint Brandenburg” (auch auf Youtube) gab der Brandenburger Bürgermeister Michael Müller—Erster Beigeordneter für Stadtplanung, Bauen und Umwelt—bekannt, dass das BfAA in der Kirchhofstraße einen Mietvertrag für 10 Jahre habe (ca. Minute 13 im Podcast).

Es gebe außerdem, so Müller, auch die Zusage für einen Standort für einen möglichen Neubau (in Bahnhofsnähe?), wobei aber noch keine genaueren Planungen vorlägen, auch, weil der Bund noch nicht mitgeteilt habe, wie die zukünftige Ausgestaltung des Amts aussehen soll. (ca. Minute 13 im Podcast).

3. Stellenbesetzungen

Über die bislang ausgeschriebenen Stellenprofile hab ich bereits in vorherigen Posts berichtet. Trotzdem gab es auch zuletzt weiter neue Ausschreibungen, für eine Reihe von Profilen, an denen man sehen kann, wie und woran das Amt in Zukunft arbeiten wird:

• eine/n Projektmanager (m/w/div) für das Immobilienmanagement Ausland, die*der unter anderem die “fachliche Beratung der Auslandsvertretungen, der Goethe-Institute, anderer Kultureinrichtungen und Deutscher Auslandsschulen” übernehmen soll. Damit ist klar, dass die Immobilienverwaltung auch über das Auswärtige Amt im engeren Sinne hinaus gehen wird.
• eine/n weiteren Projektmanager wie oben, aber mit der Spezialisierung “Technische Gebäudeausrüstung“, unter anderem mit der Aufgabe der “Weiterentwicklung des technischen Facility Managements“
• Dazu wird gesucht nach einer/einem Volljurist/in (m/w/div) für Arbeits- Tarif- und Beamtenrecht, unter anderem auch zur “Führung von Güteverhandlungen und Gerichtsverfahren bzw. Vorbereitung und Koordination von Anwaltsprozessen in den vorgenannten Rechtsgebieten“, gleichzeitig werden “Kenntnisse bzw. praktische Erfahrungen im Bereich des Gleichstellungs-, Personalvertretungs-, und Schwerbehindertenrechts” verlangt, was möglicherweise auf dein wichtiges Themenspektrum hinweist (wenn auch nicht zentral in der Ausschreibung platziert)
• Dazu eine/n Sachbearbeitenden (m/w/d) für Buchführung und Vermögensrechnung mit SAP-Kenntnissen und als Erstaufgabe die “Steuerung der Buchführung und Rechnungslegung über das im Auswärtigen Amt, seinen Auslandsvertretungen und dem BfAA verwaltete Bundesvermögen“.
• Schon im Januar wurden darüber hinaus mehrere mehrere Sachbearbeitende (m/w/d) im Rechts- und Konsularwesen, von der Ausschreibung her eher im Berufseinsteiger oder Umsteiger-Bereich angesiedelt.

Man sieht an diesen Ausschreibungen, die über das Internet und Plattformen wie LinkedIn laufen, dass das Amt so langsam die oben beschriebenen einzelnen Abteilungen mit Leben füllen will. Gerade auch regional wird ausgeschrieben, und man sieht auch, dass neu eingestellte Menschen z.T. hier aus der Stadt Brandenburg oder der Region kommen.

Alles in allem merkt man, dass es eine Behörde im Aufbau ist: viel ist noch nicht zusehen, aber viel scheint hinter den Kulissen zu passieren. Mal sehen, wann es erste Hinweise auf die inhaltliche Arbeit aber auch über die wachsende Belegschaft geben wird.

Im Podcast des Behörden-Spiegels macht Leiter Birgelen auch deutlich, dass die Rekrutierung wegen der Corona-Pandemie deutlich weniger effizient war als gehofft, aber doch ganz gut über Video-Interviews durch das Auswärtige Amt etc. gelaufen sei.

Wenn nach den Lockdown-Zeiten die ersten 180 Menschen hier in Brandenburg in den beiden ersten Liegenschaften arbeiten können, wird sich vermutlich zeigen, welches Gewicht die Behörde in der Stadt haben wird. Und wenn erstmal die Abteilungen stehen, wird man sehen, welches Gewicht die Behörde insgesamt bekommen soll.

(Änderungen: Nach Veröffentlichung nur kleine sprachliche Korrekturen.)

The post Das Bundesamt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BfAA): Aufbau in Corona-Zeiten und mögliches Organigramm appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Indecision Peak, apparently

Let’s call this the age of Gloomy Dawning Realisation.

Since the start of the year, every day has been filled with examples of How It’s All Going To Be, as various individuals and sectors click that what we have is what we’ve got.

This seems an odd way to put it, especially since those of us working in the field all talk about an era of permanent negotiation: surely this can’t be it?

But that negotiation will be within a framework, that of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement. That framework is here to stay, for the foreseeable future, and it imposes some hefty limits on what is even discussed.

Crucially, the two treaties will persist because they secure – as much as international treaties ever can [cough] – the key interests of the larger party, the EU.

The WA is very clearly about this, providing a schedule for resolving the financials, protecting citizens’ rights and creating a durable (and discrete) mechanism for Northern Ireland.

But the TCA also does something simply, giving legal footing to post-membership arrangements on trade and fish, as well as a single mechanism for future negotiations.

In short, if you want to talk to the EU, then this is how you’ll talk to it.

From a perspective of those days when we might well not have had a deal at all, this is all well and good, but we should remember that this deal still stands a long way closer to Not Much than to the Very Close Friendship that was seen as a viable/desirable outcome in 2016. In many ways it’s the bare minimum given the particularities of the UK’s situation.

But a deal is a deal and how it’s hard to see either side wanting to bin it in a hurry, given the pain of getting to even this.

Which creates something of a problem.

As Jon Worth rightly notes, most of our attention seems to be on the UK these days: lots of thought-pieces and blogs about the challenges that the country faces in making the relationship work (I’ve done just the same BTH). But the same is true, he argues, for the EU.

Having gotten through the crisis phase of Brexit, there’s now a need for a serious discussion about how best to manage relations with the UK, something that Jon discusses better than I will. And it speaks to a bigger point, namely that whatever the institutional arrangements, the EU also needs to consider its policy.

And here the successes (possibly ‘successes’) of the WA/TCA come into play.

The EU might well feel that it has secured its key defensive interests: it’s got legal commitments from the UK, plus enforcement mechanisms, so its back is covered.

But just as the UK has been driven by what it doesn’t want, so too is the EU at risk of simply avoiding the bear-traps. In neither case is there a constructive plan of engagement, or even of management.

And this can’t simply be put down to the UK’s vacillation about what it’s aiming for: the EU seems to be at risk of getting stuck in arch “well, this is the consequence of what you asked for: Brexit means Brexit, no?” rhetoric, rather than anything more.

For all the other priorities that EU leaders have, the absence of open conflict with the UK cannot be the sum total of their policy, not least when the UK can be a useful and significant partner in achieving other objectives. Climate change and security are just the two most obvious examples.

But there is no strategic vision on the EU side, just as there isn’t on the UK’s. No policy papers are circulated, no discussions are held, nothing more than a vague sense of “thank goodness that’s settled”.

If there is one thing that both sides might have learnt from the longer-term experience of EU-UK relations, then it would surely be that benign neglect doesn’t really work.

The UK seems intent on continuing to use the EU as a scapegoat, even as it (the UK) fails to appreciate that it’s now a third country and so much more liable to unfriendly retaliation.

The EU might well have succeeded in getting much of what they wanted in the WA/TCA, but they risk playing into the UK’s narrative of high-handedness and falling into future spirals of tit-for-tat.

In short, with neither side knowing where this is going, the field is clear for others to start plotting a course that neither wants to take, so it’s essential that one, the other, or both start to pick up the reins and lead.

To take back control, if you will.

The post What next? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Immigration Issue

The European Refugee crisis, which began in 2015, has provided significant challenges for political parties across Europe and for the governance of the European Union (EU). In 2015, over one million migrants and refugees arrived into Europe. This wave continued into 2016, with a substantial reduction in 2017 and 2018 taking place. The peak number of refugees entering the EU in 2015 is often referred to as the European Refugee crisis.

As a result of the Refugee crisis, the importance of immigration as a political issue has remained high on the list of issues the public say is important to them. This has created electoral opportunities for far-right parties across Europe to lay claim to the immigration issue and capture disaffected voters.

This crucial electoral period has provided challenges for traditional centre left (Social Democratic) and centre right parties (Conservative) to update their party strategies across Europe. Though far-right parties are often seen as ‘owning’ the immigration issue from other political parties, our recent paper published in JCMS shows that this is not the case.

We tested our theory of strategic positioning using data on party competition in national parliamentary elections across 28 EU member states during the Refugee crisis (2015–2018). We found that centre right parties that adopted more anti-immigrant positions can increase their electoral success at the ballot box.

Most significantly, we found that this such a strategy benefits centre right parties more than it does for far-right parties during the European Refugee crisis period. We refer to this political phenomenon as ‘strategic positioning.’ We also find that centre left parties do not benefit at the ballot box from adopting more anti-immigrant positions.

 

The Refugee Crisis: Strategic Positioning

To illustrate the electoral success of centre right parties on the immigration issue during the Refugee crisis, we examined the cases of Austria and the Netherlands in Western Europe.

 

Western Europe

In Austria’s General Election in 2017, the centre right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)

adopted more anti-immigrant positions. This helped the ÖVP to increase their electoral success and to form a coalition government with the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) after the elections.

In the Dutch General Election in 2017, we found a more complex pattern. Though the governing centre right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) adopted more anti-immigration positions, the party’s vote share decreased and the far-right right party for Freedom (PVV) under Geert Wilders made electoral gains.

Although the VVD performed electorally worse, they still managed to form a coalition government after the election. Adopting ‘tougher’ positions on immigration is likely to have reduced further electoral losses to the far-right PVV. By adopting more restrictive positions on immigration, the centre right in both countries has been able to alleviate the electoral threat that the far-right poses.

 

Central-Eastern Europe

We also identified an additional pattern in our analysis (‘a mainstreaming effect’) that has important implications for the future of liberal democracy across Europe. The ‘former’ traditional centre right Conservative Fidesz Party has now become a fully-fledged far-right party, with their focus on anti-immigrant positions.

This same ideological transformation can also be seen recently in Poland, with the Law and Justice (PiS) Party. This pattern paints a more negative picture for the future of European politics, particularly in the context of Central–Eastern Europe and the rightwards shift of a number of political parties.

 

Why do Centre Right Parties perform better?

Why have centre right parties often adopted hard-line positions on immigration? Scholars have noted that centre right parties are often ideologically ‘pragmatic’, governing parties that generally pursue electoral strategies to maintain and consolidate their political power.

The answer may be simple. The rationale for centre right parties is one of political survival. Such ‘strategic positioning’ may ensure that the centre right can remain in power as a governing party despite the opportunity during the Refugee crisis for challenger parties from the far-right to increase their electoral success.

For the duration of the Refugee crisis, a number of centre right parties across Europe have arguably been electorally resilient by adopting anti-immigrant positions to outmanoeuvre the far-right on this issue.

However, by shifting further right on immigration, centre right parties may have opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’ and brought the ideology of the far-right into the political mainstream. We argue that this strategy is a double-edged sword for centre right parties. This strategy may benefit the centre right in the short-term but may aid the far-right more in the long-term. This has worrying implications for the future of liberal democracy across Europe.

 

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article, “The Looming Refugee Crisis in the EU: Right-Wing Party Competition and Strategic Positioning.”

 

This blog is also adapted from a previous blog post that was published by LSE EUROPP, “Opening up Pandora’s box? How centre-right parties can outperform the radical right on immigration.”

 

 

James F. Downes is a Lecturer in Comparative Politics at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is also a Senior Fellow and Head of The Populism Research Unit at The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. James is an Associate Research Fellow in the Global Europe Centre at the University of Kent/Brussels School of International Studies and at the Center for Research and Social Progress (Italy). Previously he was a Visiting Scholar (Visiting Scholar) at The European Union Academic Programme Hong Kong (EUAP). He tweets at @DRJamesFDownes

 

Matthew Loveless is an Associate Professor at the University of Bologna (Italy). He is also a Co-Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Research and Social Progress (Italy). He tweets at @cersporg

 

 

 

 

Andrew Lam is a District Council Member in Hong Kong and also an Associate Lecturer at The Open University of Hong Kong.

 

The post Centre Right Party Electoral Success on Immigration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In 2015, the Turkish government and the European Commission officially started a process for the modernization and expansion of the Customs Union between the European Union (EU) and Turkey (hereafter called “CU-EUT”). The CU-EUT entered into force 25 years ago on December 31st, 1995. While it provides a far-reaching trade integration for industrial goods, lately both the EU and Turkey have stressed deficiencies in the implementation of the agreement and have discussed extending trade liberalization to new areas like services, agriculture and public procurement. In December 2016, the European Commission asked the European Council for a mandate to launch negotiations with Turkey. However, so far, the European Council has refused to approve the mandate and has suspended any preparatory work for the reform of the CU-EUT over concerns about the democratic development and human rights situation in Turkey. Consultations about the opening of negotiation talks are still ongoing.

Amidst the recent political tensions between the EU and Turkey, we look back and analyze how successful the CU-EUT has been in spurring trade flows between Turkey and the EU.

 

Reassessing the CU-EUT trade effects

Previous studies have mostly drawn an underwhelming picture of trade creation within the CU-EUT. Many academic papers do not find evidence for a significant and relevant trade-enhancing effect. For the preparation of the opening of negotiation talks the European Commission also requested two external studies which reach sobering conclusions regarding the effect of the CU-EUT on bilateral trade flows: while the World Bank finds no statistically significant effect, BKP, Panteia, and AESA identify an overall negative impact of the CU-EUT on two-way goods trade. In order to provide a thorough reassessment of the CU-EUT effects on trade between the EU and Turkey, we apply the latest developments in the quantification of regional trade agreements and rely on a database of international and internal trade flows in the manufacturing sector between 1988 and 2006. In contrast to previous research, we find a statistically significant and strongly positive impact of the CU-EUT. Compared to trade flows under the Ankara Agreement which had been in place before, the CU-EUT has increased manufacturing trade between the EU and Turkey by 60%. We also show that deviations from the best practices in evaluating trade policies can explain why previous studies were often unable to find a significant and economically large effect.

 

The effects on trade between Turkey and non-EU countries

The implementation of the CU-EUT committed Turkey to align to the EU’s customs tariffs and rules, to its commercial policy vis-à-vis third countries, as well as to the EU’s acquis in the areas covered by the CU-EUT. This alignment resulted in a decrease of Turkey´s import tariffs and provided an impetus for reforming Turkey´s customs procedures and internal technical legislation. Besides the immediate effects on Turkish trade flows with the EU, these improvements may also foster Turkey´s trade with other partner countries. Based on recent contributions in the empirical trade literature, we are able to estimate these third-country trade effects. Our results indicate that the reductions in bilateral trade frictions between Turkey and non-EU countries after the entry into force of the CU-EUT have increased trade flows by 28%. Thus, the CU-EUT has significantly fostered Turkish trade not only with EU member countries but also with all other trading partners.

One heavily debated feature of the CU-EUT is its asymmetric structure as to the external commercial policy. The CU-EUT requires Turkey to recognize all trade policies taken by the EU vis-à-vis third countries, such as the signing of a free trade agreement or a change in the EU´s common external tariff. At the same time, as Turkey is not a member of the EU, it neither receives automatic reciprocal access to these outside markets nor is it permitted to participate in the negotiations of trade liberalizations with them. Under this set up the CU-EUT may have asymmetric third-country effects on Turkish im- and exports. Indeed, we find that Turkish imports from non-EU countries increase more strongly than its exports as a consequence of the CU-EUT. Nevertheless, the results also indicate that Turkish exporters benefit from the CU-EUT by gaining market access to non-EU countries.

 

Do some member countries and sectors benefit more from the CU-EUT?

Policymakers are often interested in the specific trade effects for a single member country or sector. Although economic theory suggests that generally countries gain from trade liberalization, recently many political debates about free trade agreements have raised concerns about “one-way trade deals” and challenged that they bring prosperity to the individual nations. Therefore, we also examine heterogeneous impacts of the CU-EUT for each pair of member countries within the customs union as well as for various manufacturing sectors. Estimating country- and sector-specific effects reveals substantial heterogeneity in both dimensions. The largest effects are found for trade between Turkey and Ireland, Portugal, Belgium as well as Finland, while the positive impact of the CU-EUT is lowest for Italy, Austria, and Germany as Turkey´s trading partners. As regards sectoral differences, trade has increased the most in Machinery and Wood, whereas the smallest coefficients are estimated for Minerals, Chemicals and Food.

At the same time, the heterogeneity analysis also demonstrates that the positive CU-EUT trade effects are far-reaching. We find that for almost all country pairs and sectors the CU-EUT has significantly promoted trade flows. Exceptions are Turkish imports from Italy, Denmark, and Austria as well as trade in the Metals sector. We also combine the two dimensions of heterogeneity, allowing for different ex- and import effects in each sector and country, and estimate in total almost 1001 different coefficients for the CU-EUT. Two thirds of these coefficients are significantly positive which demonstrates the widespread benefits from the customs union at a highly disaggregated level. Overall, our results highlight that both the EU and Turkey gained considerably from the CU-EUT in terms of trade creation.

 

Renegotiating the CU-EUT

The small trade effects in some sectors indicate a potential for additional liberalization of manufacturing trade in an upcoming renegotiation of the CU-EUT. Furthermore, the CU-EUT cannot be considered an exceedingly deep agreement in terms of covered provisions since it misses, inter alia, liberalization in primary agriculture, services, public procurement, and investment. There is still room for more far-reaching commitments which may stimulate trade flows between the EU and Turkey even more. Our analysis reveals that deep trade liberalization beyond a mere free trade agreement is a worthwhile endeavour. In that sense, an upcoming modernization of bilateral trade relations should not easily jeopardize the benefits arising from a customs union.

 

This blog is based on our article ”A Tale of (almost) 1001 Coefficients: The Deep and Heterogeneous Effects of the EU‐Turkey Customs Union”.

 

 

Mario Larch is professor of empirical economics at the University of Bayreuth. He is also a scientific advisor at CEPII, research professor of the ifo institute, external fellow of GEP, and CESifo research network fellow. His research focusses on theoretical and empirical international trade and econometrics.

 

 

 

 

Aiko Schmeißer is a PhD student at the Berlin School of Economics. He has worked on research projects in labor economics, international trade, and political economy.

Twitter: @AikoSchmeisser

 

 

 

Joschka Wanner is an assistant professor of quantitative economics at the University of Potsdam and external researcher at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. He works on econometric challenges in the estimation of trade flow determinants, as well as on international environmental agreements and environmental policy in a global context.

Twitter: @JoschkaWanner

The post Revisiting the Trade Effects of the EU-Turkey Customs Union appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The UK’s push for the frictionless market of the Norway option, while accepting only the obligations of the Canada option, was not viable. It was a delusion, either due to ignorance or self-deception.

Photo: James Veysey/Shutterstock/NTB

The UK never had the same vision of the EU as the other Member States. A main reason for the UK’s accession to the EEC in 1973 came down to economic difficulties. It did not wait long to show its distinctness, by demanding a budgetary rebate. Then, it got derogations from the common currency, the cooperation in justice and home affairs and social policy.

Jealous of its sovereignty, it slowed, with others, the coordination of the Member States’ economic and fiscal policies, foreign policies, cooperation on defence, as well as on police and justice and internal security.

During its 47-year membership, the UK helped to develop the single market (SM), to open external trade, to welcome new EU members and to preserve its idea of Europe.

PM May’s key decisions

When the British chose to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum, the UK’s concerns had all been met:

• by increasing the number of States and thus of possible vetoes from 9 to 28, without adjusting the EU’s decision-making
• by getting better control of the EU powers (subsidiarity) and eliminating federalist symbols
• by keeping the single market benefits, despite derogations from the euro, Schengen, and normal budget rules
• by preserving vetoes on foreign and defence decisions, police and judicial cooperation, internal security, and many areas

Brexit leaders promised that the UK would keep the single market’s benefits after leaving, as the EEA/EFTA countries do in the EEA framework (the Norway option). However, as soon as the first quarter of 2017, PM Theresa May took two key decisions:

• She triggered the two-year negotiation (duration fixed by article 50 of the Treaty on European Union) too early, at a time when there was no UK position, no study of options and deep divisions among people in the UK, and within Parliament and Government.

This put the UK negotiators under time pressure, while time was necessary to find a solution to avoid a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

• She announced UK red lines: no freedom of movement, no Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), no customs union.

This excluded the Norway option for the future. It meant that the result could only be a hard Brexit, similar to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the EU (the Canada option).

Between Canada and Norway, there are only the cold waters of the Atlantic Ocean.

As I said at the time, between Canada and Norway, there are only the cold waters of the Atlantic Ocean. Trying to get a frictionless market, similar to the Norway option, while accepting only the obligations of the Canada option, was not viable. It was a delusion, either due to ignorance or self-deception.

Red lines

When PM Boris Johnson arrived at N°10, he managed to get a positive vote in the House of Commons on the draft Withdrawal Agreement (WA) negotiated by his predecessor, through slightly modifying provisions on the Irish issue. On this basis, he organised and won the general election.

Finally, the Withdrawal Agreement entered into force in February 2020, three and a half years after the referendum. PM Johnson then promised a hard Brexit and negotiated with the EU a Free Trade Agreement on the Canada option’s model. His negotiating team had only nine months to avoid a cliff edge and the application of WTO rules on 1st January 2021.

What were the red lines of the two negotiating parties?

For PM Johnson, the agreement on future relations with the EU had to fully respect the UK’s national sovereignty: the UK should decide alone its laws and policies, be the only master of its borders (no free movement of persons), its waters (EU fishermen), and its external relations (trade). The future agreement should exclude reference to EU law and to the CJEU, as well as cooperation on foreign policy and defence.

For the EU, the essential red line was to preserve the single market’s credibility.  As EU’s trust had decreased sharply after PM Johnson had tabled a bill violating the Withdrawal Agreement, the EU insisted on associating the Level Playing Field (LPF) conditions on open and fair competition (state aid, social and environmental standards) with a binding arbitration and possible unilateral cross-sector retaliations, should an arbitration ruling not be respected.

Both parties got their red lines respected. A solution for a decreasing access of EU fishermen to British waters during a transition period was also finally found, largely in favour of the EU.

The agreement (Trade and Cooperation Agreement: TCA) was initialled one week before the possible cliff edge. It is based on the respect of the rule of law and on the protection of fundamental rights. It provides for cooperation in many areas, while mentioning others for which unilateral decisions of equivalence or agreed cooperation could be developed.

New year, new realities

Despite the provisional implementation of the TCA, huge changes happened on 1st January 2021:

• Provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement permitting the UK to be treated as an EU member ceased to apply. British citizens lost the right to move freely to the EU 27 to reside, study, work, open a business, retire or have health care. Their (visa free) stay in the EU is limited to three months during any six-month period.
• The UK stopped benefiting from the EU’s single market, customs union (except for Northern Ireland), EU policies and most EU programs.
• As the TCA covers all goods, it should be beneficial to the EU, given its surplus of nearly £ 100 billion with the UK. Trade in goods continues to be tariff-free, but with non-tariff barriers: although not paying customs duties, goods must be checked at the border for their conformity with EU/UK sanitary and phytosanitary rules, norms and standards and rules of origin.
• Trade in services became difficult for British economic actors, not only for financial services’ providers, who lost the EU passport and did not get significant EU decisions of equivalence. While services represent nearly 80% of the UK’s economy, the provisions of the TCA for services are weak, comparable to the Canada-EU agreement. UK firms and individuals lost the right of establishment and to deliver some services in the EU.
• As for the fight against crime, including terrorism, the result is lose-lose, the UK being cut from EU institutions, organs, data bases and mechanisms (Europol, Eurojust, the Arrest Warrant, Schengen data bases, etc…), while keeping the Passenger Name Record and the Prüm cooperation. The EU did not adopt an equivalence decision for general transfer of data.

How to improve UK-EU relations?

The strategic, political and economic Brexit effects, especially for the UK, but also for the EU, will be negative, both in the short and the long term.

It was known before the referendum that Brexit could not lead to positive economic results. It was politically and ideologically driven, not aiming at economic results, but at increasing the UK’s national sovereignty.

The TCA’s aim was to reduce obstacles to trade created by Brexit. A soft Brexit was an illusion, excluded in 2017 by PM May’s red lines, confirmed and hardened by PM Johnson’s policies.

Given this context, what could be done to improve UK-EU relations? Should they, together, try to be less dependent on the external world? Should the EU be more open for closer cooperation with the UK in some areas? Which ones? Will both parties show good will?

 

This text is based on Jean-Claude Piris’ chapter in Handbook on the European Union and Brexit (Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2021), co-edited by EU3D researchers John Erik Fossum and Christopher Lord.

The post Brexit: The cold waters between Canada and Norway appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Something’s bothering me about Brexit.

The main thrust of Johnson’s time in Number 10 has been ‘getting Brexit done’, which I have always taken to mean ‘getting Brexit off the front pages so we can get back to some more interesting/important thing’.

This has manifested itself in Johnson’s lack of engagement with the detail (or even much of the broad sweep) of negotiations for both the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement, in the lack of desire to get into impact assessments or comprehensive contingency planning/implementation activity, and in the general appeals to looking past whatever problems there are now to the bright, sunlit uplands, etc.

Emblematic in this was the decision after the 2019 general election to banish the very use of the word ‘Brexit’ in government communications, a decision that lasted until late 2020 and the need to ramp up work for the post-transition period required using the vocabulary that everyone else has stuck with.

In short, this government has appeared to have placed a lot of emphasis on moving on and getting away from the dramas of the May years. And the Cameron years, for that matter.

So why then has 2021 been so marked by an antagonistic approach to EU relations by the government?

Whether it’s not recognising the EU’s ambassador, or being holier-than-you on the Art.16 issue, or failing to demonstrably comply with the implementation requirements in Northern Ireland, the government appears to be taking a path of most resistance.

That, in turn, generates more the headlines and comment that it seemed previously to have shunned. Especially as it is the UK that regularly has to make a subsequent u-turn.

So what gives?

Firstly, let’s just think about what some logics of how a UK-EU relationship might work, in theory.

If the UK were to be very positive and friendly, then you’d expect a close relationship, with much effort to make the most of the opportunities presented to work closely and to find common ground.

But if the UK were fundamentally distrusting, then what? Well, the formal relationship would be as thin as possible, with none of the warm words, but you’d still expect that there was a rigorous and scrupulous implementation.

The reason would be that if you don’t trust the other lot, then you want to make sure that you cover your back. That means not leaving any gaps in what you do that could then be used against you, down the line, by them. If you have an agreement, you stick to it, and you make sure they stick to it too. Which means you hold them as close as if you were friends, just to make it harder for them to start pulling fast ones on you.

Again, this is about substantive action, rather than rhetoric: just as the US and USSR waged a war of words from 1945, that did not preclude arms-control treaties (with comprehensive inspection protocols).

Clearly, the EU and UK are not nearly in the same situation as that: armed conflict is no more on the table than are fundamentally different ideologies on the nature of the state and economic organisation. But the point remains that we might expect the practice of relations to be running more smoothly than it has.

Two main thoughts come to mind on why.

The first is the more prosaic explanation. The UK government might feel that having secured the treaties, they have both a pretty robust legal relationship with the EU and a much less interested British public. In that sense, job done. These current issues are minor compared to the high drama of 2017-9 and it’s good to keep the European issue alive to try and show the core constituency the value of having left.

In this view, this is just the rough and tumble of politics, trying to make a bit of local capital where possible. If you score a point, then good for pumping up your voters; if you don’t, then it’s not that serious and it wasn’t as if the EU’s going to just walk away from it all.

The second takes this to a deeper critique of British European policy, one that I’ve made before. In the absence of a strategic intention, the government lacks any clear direction for its dealings with the EU, and so deals with points on a case-by-case basis. Often that generates unintended consequences.

Now this shouldn’t, by itself, generate antagonistic behaviour, but we also know that part of the Johnsonian view of Brexit has been as an opportunity to new things with the country. All that’s lacking is clarity on what those things should be.

In this context, antagonism might make more sense, by preventing the emergence of steady-as-she-goes, pragmatic engagement. If EU relations are sinking back into mundanity, then there’s a risk of creating new path-dependencies that might preclude the bold action that Number 10 wants to take down the line. So keeping as much in the air as possible could be useful, at the strategic level.

What ties together these two ideas is their lack of grounding in the world and a failure to recognise the consequences of actions. Crisis management as a mode of policy-making is not simply a way of dealing with the situation in hand, but is also a product of dealing with it in that way: there is a vicious cycle of production and re-production.

Part of the reason the UK got to leaving was a failure to appreciate the potential consequences of holding a referendum in the first place, and an underestimation of the impact of prior rhetoric.

All of which leads us to wonder whether any lessons from the past have been learnt. On that, we might expect that things will continue to be problematic for as long as it takes for the strategic impasse lasts.

Don’t hold your breath.

The post Why be such a pain? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

There has been much speculation, and a lot of inaccurate gossip, about the EU’s vaccination programme. So, to get to the facts, please refer to this new and clear question and answer website setup by the European Commission to answer your questions. Just click the graphic:

Just click on one of the themes on the European Commission website to find relevant questions and answers on COVID-19 vaccination in the EU, vaccine negotiations and its authorisation process.

I would like to add this: Everything to do with the management of this pandemic, by everyone, every country, the UK, the EU, the USA, is a gamble.

That is not the issue.

The question is which gambles will pay off? And the answer to that we will not know until the end of this.

 SECOND DOSE DELAYS IN THE UK The reason that the UK has had to delay the second dose of the vaccine is because of shortage of vaccines.

If presented with that problem, based on the information I know (which is of course limited) I would probably take the same route: vaccinate as many of the most vulnerable people as possible with the first vaccine, to give them at least some protection.

But I would not pretend that isn’t a gamble, as full protection is only conferred after the second dose, and even then, we still don’t know for how long protection lasts.

• If vaccine protection lasts just 3-6 months, we are in serious trouble.
• If those that are only half vaccinated, or not vaccinated, help the virus to mutate (which scientists warn can happen) then we are in serious trouble.

The last thing we want is for the virus to outpace the vaccines. That’s why we need as many people across the world to be vaccinated as soon as possible.

 DIFFICULT DECISIONS Most of the government’s ‘gambles’ regarding the management of the virus have most certainly not paid off.

We have among the worst numbers of deaths from Covid-19 in the world.

However, I do hope that the government’s gamble in offering a first vaccine to as many vulnerable people as possible, and delaying the second vaccine, will pay off, and in retrospect, turn out to be the right course.

I have great empathy with the scientists and doctors helping to make these difficult decisions, because they don’t know all the answers, but I am sure they are trying to make the best decisions they can with the limited knowledge we have.

 GLOBAL THREATS If the handling of the pandemic is a practice run for how the world is going to tackle global warming, then I think the world is in serious trouble.

Countries should be working together to tackle the pandemic, just as they should to tackle climate change. Currently, it is not happening on the scale and speed necessary.

 GUY VERHOFSTADT MEP Guy Verhofstadt, former Prime Minister of Belgium, has posted strong criticism of the EU Commission’s deliberations in securing vaccines and calling it a ‘fiasco’.

You can read his objections on Facebook.

Good. It shows that the EU is open to democratic criticism, which is always how it should be.

However, on this, I don’t agree with ALL he has said.

CONTRACTUAL ISSUES Guy blames contractual issues for the delay in supplies of vaccines. His solution is for the EU to renegotiate the contracts.

That, in my view, is not necessary and entirely impractical. The EU is already in talks with the drug companies to facilitate and speed up manufacture so that they can fulfil their contractual promises.

Guy also says it was a mistake for the EU to insist that drug companies must accept civil liability for their vaccines.

I would say that was essential, to give Europeans confidence in the vaccines, especially since there is considerable vaccine scepticism across Europe.

The reason for the shortage of vaccines in the EU is because of problems in manufacture, openly admitted by the drug companies. Those problems are being resolved.

If the drug companies had supplied all the vaccines as contractually promised, this would not now be a problem.

There is a worldwide shortage of vaccines, and many countries (poorer ones) don’t have any. This issue is being addressed, but it will take time.

 MANUFACTURING PROBLEMS I am at pains to repeatedly point out that the date that the EU signed contracts with drug companies has absolutely nothing to do with the delay in supplies, according to currently available information.

If the EU had signed their contracts three months earlier, how would that have prevented today’s vaccine manufacturing problems, that could not have been foreseen last summer?

The EU’s contracts were, reportedly, more comprehensive than the UKs, and required drug companies to accept civil liability for their vaccines.

Furthermore, the EU required their European Medicines Agency to give full approval for the vaccines. The EU also secured vaccines at a much lower cost per unit than the UK.

That, of course, all took time, but from all I have researched on this, none of that is the cause of holdups in supply which are entirely down the problems of manufacture, which are not the fault of the EU.

 VACCINE PRICES I would also say that the EU’s insistence that the vaccines must be sourced at reasonable prices was the right move.

The Oxford/AstraZeneca vaccine costs the UK government around £3 per jab, according to the BBC, whereas the EU is paying only around £1.80 per jab. South Africa is paying even more for AstraZeneca, at £3.84 a jab.*

Of course, everything I write today, could change tomorrow. It all depends on currently available information. If the information changes, so will my response.

We will only know which strategies turn out to be the right ones much later on.

But, frankly, we have to hope that all strategies being employed help all humans wherever they are in the world.

Until we can defeat Covid-19 across the entire planet, none of us are safe.

Ditto, global warming.

• 2-minute video:

• *Sources: BMJ The Week

• Join the discussion about this article on Facebook:

The post Don’t rely on inaccurate gossip about the EU vaccine strategy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The British approach to the Brexit talks

Another day, another round of Brexit negotiations. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, UK prime minister Boris Johnson has committed to driving a hard bargain of the EU, setting out unrealistic expectations, signalling the UK is prepared for ‘no deal’, launching parallel negotiations with the United States, and adopting a bullish rhetoric towards Brussels. This follows the hard bargaining strategy adopted by his predecessor Theresa May, which involved many of the same strategic: Threats to walk away from the table, Eurosceptic rhetoric, the claim that “no deal is better than a bad deal”, coupled with demands that would never have been met by Brussels.

The failure of hard bargaining might be one of the few valuable lessons from Theresa May’s (mis-)handling of the negotiations on the terms of British withdrawal: Claims to support a ‘no deal’ Brexit were not viewed as credible, unrealistic expectations established red lines which could not be rowed back from, hard-line Eurosceptic rhetoric undermined trust so heavily that the EU sought additional safeguards in the resulting agreement, the failure of which to live up to the promised outcome of the hard-line approach ensured its rejection (three times) in Parliament.

One reason is that hard bargaining only works well when conducted from a position of strength. From a position of weakness, threats do not appear credible, and high demands appear unjustifiable. Without the requisite clout, hard bargaining is either futile, or damaging, depending on the risk to one’s reputation of having one’s approach fail to succeed.

And the UK, to put it bluntly, is the less powerful actor in these negotiations: The EU27 has a far larger combined economy than the UK, greater expertise and bureaucratic capacity when it comes to international negotiations, control of the withdrawal process – through the ability to extend Article 50 or consent to an extension of the transition period – and, perhaps ironically, is more unified in its goals than the UK itself.

The EU is able to withstand a no deal Brexit in a way the UK is not. And the UK has few alternatives to this outcome, since most of the rest of the world opposed Brexit and has promised to prioritise their relations with the EU. The much-vaunted free trade agreement with the US, meanwhile, will come at a hefty cost, and might not pass the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives.

Why, then, does the UK continued to drive a hard bargain in the Brexit negotiations, even as its relative weakness becomes more evident, and the failures associated with hard bargaining begin to stack up?

We argue that a number of sources of British hard bargaining are cultural – that is, they are rooted in the norms of the UK’s political environment and its relations with its European partners which are long-lasting and which continue to impact on how the UK perceives the negotiations, irrespective of its objective bargaining power.

Drawing on interviews conducted in Brussels and London during 2017 and early 2018, we suggest a number of sources of British hard bargaining which are rooted in cultural factors rather than simply in the domestic political environment of the UK.

 

The cultural sources of hard bargaining

To begin with, perceptions are important. British politicians view their country as more powerful than it actually is, a misconception with a lengthy pedigree – consider the Suez Crisis in this respect – and are prone to overestimate the UK’s bargaining capabilities. Discourses of a ‘great global Britain’ and ‘concentric circles’ of British influence reinforce these misperceptions. The predictable result is the adoption of a harder bargaining strategy than is warranted for an actor far weaker than the EU27 combined.

Moreover, British politicians are not used to compromising with Europe. Successive rounds of treaty negotiations – which the UK has stormed in with demands for rebates and opt-outs – have generally resulted in concessions for the British. This is perhaps unsurprising, since the demands of such a powerful member state as the UK have needed to be taken into account during successive moments in the integration process. But it has reinforced the idea that hard bargaining tends to be rewarded.

And then there is the lack of meaningful socialisation. British membership of the EU – as has been noted by many – has been justified on largely instrumental terms. Unlike ‘the six’, or newly democratic nations, membership for the UK meant greater prosperity and greater international influence. The kind of normative bonds necessary for developing a shared worldview, which would have underpinned the search for compromise, were thus never created between the UK and its EU partners.

Then there are aspects of British politics which lend themselves to hard bargaining. For one thing, the Westminster system is more adversarial. Politicians cut their teeth in debating societies and this tradition of uncompromising engagement is carried on in the legislature, with the benches of the British Parliament arranged in opposing fashion. Moreover, single-party majority government is the norm in the UK, and British politicians do not take easily to the kind of compromises required of coalition government.

Ideology is also a factor, notably that held by a number within the governing Conservative party. The ideology of conservatism undergirds hard bargaining in two respects: First, most conservatives tend to be realists when it comes to external relations, and to venerate the demonstration of strength as a precondition for negotiating success in response. Second, conservatives tend to be more individualist, and this competitive worldview lends itself to driving a harder bargain.

 

More of the same?

Hard bargaining is not a rational strategy mandated by the UK’s relative power positions, nor a mere performance for domestic audiences, but is rather rooted in a number of cultural factors specific to the UK and its relationship with Europe, each of which push in the direction of a harder bargaining strategy.

In fact, the cultural sources of hard bargaining in the UK context are somewhat overdetermined, given Britain’s weak socialisation into European norms, its historical experiences of hard bargaining, perceptions of British power and prestige, its conflictual political institutions, and the (present) dominance of right-wing ideologies based on individualism and realist visions of statecraft.

But this does not mean Johnson will be any more successful than was Theresa May in deploying strategies linked to hard bargaining, since he will face the same constraints as May: The UK threat to withstand a no deal Brexit is not credible, Britain stands to lose far more than the EU, and unmeetable demands will ultimately harm the UK more than they will Brussels.

In fact, the upshot of highlighting the cultural sources of hard bargaining is that it exposes the biases ultimately responsible for the choice of a sub-optimal bargaining strategy. But these are deeply rooted. Irrespective of the utility of hard bargaining, expect more of the same in the coming months.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article Negotiating Brexit: The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining.

 

 

Benjamin Martill, University of Edinburgh

 

 

 

 

Uta Staiger, UCL European Institute

The post The Cultural Sources of British Hard Bargaining appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Map of the Belt and Road Initiative, Eurasian Economic Union and their overlap in Central Asia, prepared by Natalia Leskina

Natalia Leskina

China, Russia and their regional projects intersecting in Central Asia – Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – have been in the limelight recently. Despite the fact that educational component pays an important role in both the EAEU and BRI, the information about their educational initiatives remains scarce. That is why with my colleague Emma Sabzalieva we started our research by asking: how are Russian and Chinese led visions for Eurasian higher education regionalism developing in Central Asia, and to what extent do these visions overlap? how do the Central Asian states approach this presumed role in Eurasian higher education regionalism?

Despite common expectations that the interests of Russia and China in Central Asia are in competition and could lead to confrontation, researchers have found out that instead, they operate harmoniously in the region. This has been explained by “the division of labor”: in other words, Russia’s military power does not confront China’s economic power.

But this explanation does not match the higher education policy area, where similar ideas on a Eurasian higher education area are fostered by Russia and China: both EAEU and BRI include higher education as a complementary to other competences, and the regions are planned to be built in similar ways through the mutual recognition of qualifications, joint degrees, and academic mobility. Both competition and collaboration can be found in the overlap of the EAEU and BRI educational components in Central Asia.

 

Why to use “points of correspondence” instead of collaboration/ competition?

We found out that relations between China and Russia are more nuanced than the collaboration/competition dichotomy. This finding led us to search for concepts that would adequately grasp the regional dynamics at play. In doing so, we turned to the original concepts developed by China, Russia and Central Asian states.

Thus, we introduced the “points of correspondence” concept to describe the current configuration in Eurasia. This concept is derived from the Russian term “sopryazhenie” (сопряжение) and Chinese zui jia qi he dian (最佳契合点) and means “the ongoing pursuit to find ideas and policy tools that best fit one another” without flowing into each other.

At the third Ghent – Russia Colloquium in 2019, Prof. Yang Cheng compared Sino-Russia relations with a family: even if you do not like each other, you are linked and therefore you need to compromise and find a way to live together because of the common duties. This way of thinking is incorporated in the “points of correspondence” that allow both competition and collaboration.

It also shows how the position of Central Asian states allows this co-existence and also is a tool to exert their agency that shapes Eurasian regionalism. At the same time, each of the parties has its own understanding of what “points of correspondence” actually means.

 

“Points of correspondence” as coordination between Russia and China

For Russia “points of correspondence” means “coordinated and parallel development” of the China-led BRI together with the EAEU. In practical terms it implies that Beijing should respect Moscow’s interests in the post-Soviet space, i.e. any integration issues have to be discussed at the regional level instead of bilateral agreements that may seem to be behind Russia’s back.

BRI also seeks connectivity with the regions already in place. But China has a slightly different view on the coordination: it understands the need to show respect for Russia’s interests and to this end is ready to engage in official dialogue, but at the same time Beijing still prefers to handle issues at the bilateral level.

Effectively, in 2019 China and Russia signed a cooperation agreement between the EAEU and BRI following a joint statement four years before. But Beijing still puts great emphasis on bilateral agreements in higher education: in 2017 China had signed bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of qualifications with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The same comes to the allocation of mobility scholarships and participation in the BRI university alliances.

 

“Points of correspondence” as a way of exerting agency by Central Asian states

In general, the Central Asian states welcome both BRI and EAEU, but to a different extent. Kazakhstan has its own vision of a Eurasian higher education area and actively promoted it so far, making wide-ranging propositions from the development of mobility to the recognition of qualifications and a Eurasian university ranking. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan welcome both BRI and EAEU, emphasizing the need for new technologies and innovations to revitalize the economies of the region. Turkmenistan and, until recently, Uzbekistan remain on the most neutral end of this spectrum of responses to the new initiatives.

Instrumentally, Central Asian states engage China and Russia in points of correspondence as a way to balance their ambitions in the region. Simultaneous participation in overlapping regionalisms allows them to choose bilateral or multilateral format, to engage with China’s or Russia’s vision, depending on the issue at stake, and ultimately, to shape the actual regionalism on the ground.

The “points of correspondence” emerging between the EAEU and BRI in Central Asia characterize the development of Eurasian higher education regionalism and add new nuances to the research of education areas beyond Europe. At the same time, our findings raise questions about the extent to which “points of correspondence” could travel beyond this area and factors that contribute to their emergence.

 

 

Our paper is part of Special Issue of Eurasian Geography and Economics on Sino-Russian relations edited by Fabienne Bossuyt and Marcin Kaczmarski. Here you can read our article in full. If you are interested to know how our article came into being, you can read Emma’s blog. This article was presented at the Knowledge Politics and Policies section of the virtual ECPR General Conference in 2020.

 

Natalia Leskina is a doctoral researcher at the Department of International Relations at Ural Federal University, Russia. Her research interest is higher education regionalism with a regional focus on the post-Soviet space.

 

The post Constructing a Eurasian higher education region: “Points of correspondence” between Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Central Asia appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

Today’s modern European democracy grants every adult citizen – regardless of race, gender, social status, wealth, or education – the right to vote in the form of universal suffrage. The right to vote (or active suffrage) is not to be taken for granted, as until the second half of the twentieth century not all adults were permitted to vote in Europe. Despite the relative electoral passivity (based on low turnout figures in most European states), the right to vote is the most important tool in the people’s hands to shape the policies of their countries by deciding whom they trust to govern. Suffrage is a powerful mean, which ultimately affects every single person in- and even outside of the given community or state. Therefore, I find it vital to review the principles of both active and passive suffrage, and propose regulations to redefine the characteristics of and the dynamics between voters and candidates.

 

Active suffrage

Today, every adult citizen has equally one vote, which is granted on the single condition of being a citizen of the state and reaching a certain age (usually 18). The adult citizen’s vote defines the fate of the community or state by empowering certain political groups with certain ideologies and policies. The fact that decides whether the individual’s vote leads to prosperity or failure is that how well people can judge the complex and broad range of matters related to governance, which include the subjects of economics, politics, social issues, laws of nature, armed forces, foreign policy, and even history – amongst others. Arguably, the overwhelming majority of the adult citizens do not comprehend even the basics of these subjects, because they are either uneducated or uninterested – often both. Due to the lack of understanding, election campaigns focus on targeting people’s emotions instead of their intellect, as it is easier to manipulate than convincing them. In turn, people vote without knowing the exact programmes and previous results of the contesting political forces, concentrating on catchy campaign promises, sympathy, appearance, race, or religion instead. The result is a blind-leading-blind-society, in which one expert vote stands against ten inexpert votes, and in which the clueless majority rules over expertise and knowledge.

Let me translate my argument to three simple examples, which highlight the enormous shortcomings of universal suffrage. Should one have the intention of driving a car, reaching the legal age limit and possessing a driving licence are mandatory. In order to obtain the right to drive, one must pass a theory exam (including first aid), take driving lessons, and complete the driving exam eventually. The margin of error is very thin, as one has to score almost 100% on each of these exams to succeed. For the purpose of driving safely, one must know and apply numerous rules regarding traffic regulation, operation of vehicle, and first aid perfectly. Should the driving licence be our birth-right as the suffrage is now, everybody, who can afford a car, could sit in and drive as pleases. Let us imagine the disaster it would bring to the roads! The point of going through all the necessary procedures of learning and applying is to avoid disastrous accidents and deaths by providing the right to drive only to those, who can provably drive safely.

Also, should one desire to work in a senior role at any enterprise, the necessary qualifications and experiences are required by the ownership to ensure that the applicant is going to enhance prosperity. Supposing that the director and the managers are not experts, the enterprise is going to stagnate or decline, harming the well-being of all employees. Therefore, only those should be allowed to fill these positions of responsibility, who provably and completely understand the job that has to be done. However, being an expert is only one side of the story. Should the employees be allowed to decide who to nominate as director on a democratic election, less qualified candidates could enter the competition, in which popularity would become a dominant factor instead of expertise. In order to convince the employees, and get elected into the powerful position, the director elects would promise almost anything (e.g. higher wages, more paid holidays, reduced working hours). Employees themselves could stand for election, regardless of education, experience, or general knowledge. It seems to be an equal opportunity for everyone, which sounds incredibly fair, but it is actually not. The immediate results would be loss of revenue and bankruptcy, which is quickly followed by unemployment and poverty. Therefore, it is essential to leave positions of responsibility to proven experts, who are chosen by people with at least a basic knowledge of matters.

The most ordinary example of universal suffrage is the example of family. Let us say that a family of five (mother, father, and their three children) wants to decide on a new form of decision-making by introducing democratic principles. Assuming that only the father and the eldest daughter would like to run for the position, they prepare their programmes, which they intend to present to the other members of the family in order to get elected. Father, knowing the exact figures of revenue and expenses, tries to put together a programme, which is sustainable and reasonable. Whereas, the eldest daughter, knowing nothing of the exact figures, tries to present an appealing deal with lots of promises in order to gain popularity. Father would argue that separating funds for rent, bills, food, and other necessities are more important than spending on sweets, toys, and games. At the end of the debate, mother, being convinced by reason, votes for father, but the children, anticipating more pleasure and treats, vote for the eldest daughter. When the vote is done, the children’s will is going to prevail over their parents’, as the rule of democracy is that everybody has one vote and the majority decides. The result of the vote is three inexpert votes against two expert votes, which means that the election is won by someone, who does not understand anything about how the household should be managed. Should the rent and bills not be paid, the family is out on the street in a short period of time. The eldest daughter could also pass a legislation to refuse attending classes in school, even tough it is in the children’s essential interest, what they do not necessarily understand yet, but their parents do.

As the examples intend to present, most people should not be permitted to get involved into decision-making due to their lack of knowledge; moreover, they themselves are in the need of appropriate leadership. Therefore, the abolishment of universal suffrage and the redistribution of votes are essential to accomplish. The solution is to launch an educational course on state affairs organised and financed by the state. The course could be designed to be as simple as possible, minimising the physical attendance in a few hours each month. The core of the course would be a book – written by experts, not politicians –, covering the basic overview of state affairs. This book must be explained and discussed on the course, whilst read and memorised at home. At the end of the course, the citizen can decide to take an exam and thus earn the right to vote. In order to succeed in passing the exam, the citizen should score at least 91%, which would make them eligible to a certificate, fulfilling the precondition of suffrage. Should one fail, the exam can always be repeated. Should one not pass the exam until the next elections, the citizen is not permitted to vote (the participation on referendums is an exception, as it is not binding legally). The certificate must be renewed before every general election. The preparation course, the learning material, and the exam would cost nothing to the citizens, as it would be covered by the state entirely. Nobody would be deprived from suffrage, because the chance is given to match the basic conditions of knowledge required; therefore, it is up to the citizen’s commitment and determination to learn and earn the right to vote.

 

Passive suffrage

It is important to enlighten the voters, but it is not enough alone to create an enlightened democracy; the preconditions to stand for election (or passive suffrage) must also be redefined, focusing on the topics of expertise, accountability, and campaign regulations.

Our hearts have many desires, which cannot be all expressed for the sake of our well-being; therefore, it is our brains’ duty to control our emotions, filtering them by letting through only the constructive ones. It is almost the same with all different demands and wishes of the different people within a community or state. Their voices must be heard, but should not everything be accomplished, as it is likely to be rather destructive for the well-being of the entire community. Therefore, an enlightened government should endorse only those demands, which are going to benefit the state and the people within. It is imperative and in the interest of every citizen to entrust governance to a provably expert leadership.

However, most politicians are far from being experts. It might be sad, but the harsh truth is that they do not have to be, as there is not a single legislation in any country, which would require candidates to prove their expertise. Candidates have to fulfil only one condition to be elected into office: popularity. Many actors, comedians, and businessmen got elected into high positions due to their popularity (e.g. US) – expertise was irrelevant. The fact that popularity is far more important than expertise and competence reduces trust in democracy on long-term, and causes one of the root causes of the multiple crises we witness today globally (e.g. climate crisis). In my view, an independent committee of experts should approve the candidacy based on expertise and competence (e.g. qualification, experience, language skills) before each election campaign. This way, the wheat can be separated from the chaff before elections, avoiding potential disasters of bad policy-making.

The next step is the regulation of campaigning, which means that the politicians must summarise their campaign promises and publish them. This contract of election would ensure the presentation of a clear programme, which must be accomplished as much as possible. It would be the duty of an accountability committee to supervise that the agreement is fulfilled. Should the elected political force purposefully neglect the fulfilment of their campaign promises, legal consequences are to be implemented. I find this element crucial, as politicians are allowed to promise whatever they want, fooling their voters deliberately, but they are not held accountable for their promises and wrongdoings at the end of their terms. The worst that can happen is that they are not reelected, which is not of any consolation to the deceived.

The regulation of campaigning would also include the restriction of political adverts and the introduction of real debates on exact policies. This would end smear campaigns and dissolve the odd mixture of politics and showmanship, in which cheap manipulation dominates over expertise by using dirty language and fake statements in every political advert or appearance. Also, the blurry and meaningless programmes, and populist lies would disappear once and for all. All elected candidates shall be legally obliged to account for their results in office after their terms – without exception.

 

Conclusion

As a result of politicians purposefully and constantly lying to the voters, people put up with the fact that politicians are not trustworthy or outright liars. Many voters would not even bother to vote, let alone take the time to research each party’s agenda. Many of those that decide to vote, doing it based on half-truths or beliefs instead of facts. The communist-turned-extreme liberal parties of Eastern Europe are one of the best examples of how a dictatorial political party can change its cloak from one day to the other to pose and sell itself as the most liberal one in the new era – and most people bought it. Infamous examples of recent years, such as the deceitful 2015 Greek Bailout Referendum and U-turn in policy of Greece’s Syriza, the deception of Brexit’s Leave campaign, and the breakthrough of Trump’s incompetence, all share one common feature: deliberate and shameless lying to the voters in order to gain popularity, thus power.

Regrettably, deceit is embedded in the fundament of democracy; therefore, the abolishment of this dysfunctional system is vital, and begins with the reformation of suffrage, which has two directions: one from below (active suffrage) and one from above (passive suffrage). The result is a new, revolutionary, enlightened political system, in which the candidates are proven experts and the voters are expected to be aware of the basic consequences of their decisions. In enlightened democracy, political parties and their candidates would have to prepare and present their programmes to a very different type of voter that is not a mere political consumer anymore, but a conscious citizen. As a result, sustainable prosperity, political stability, and general well-being would prevail over corruption and inertia.

In enlightened democracy, active suffrage would not be an unconditional birth-right anymore, but earned by learning. Also, the preconditions of passive suffrage would require one to be a proven expert on the given field, to convince the voters in a civilised manner, and to be accountable for their results at the end of their terms. The success of every other reform that aims to improve our life in a united and enlightened Europe depends on this foundation.

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This week, the government published some commissioned research on the financial impact of Brexit on UK universities. The work looked at the likely impact of changing demand from EU students in response to various changes in fees and finances. The broad picture of the impact was that while numbers would fall markedly, that would be partly offset by the rising tuition fees. In the case of ‘cluster 1’ (Oxford and Cambridge) that would mean an increase in income, but for the rest of the sector, a drop (especially for cluster 3 (roughly, pre-1992s)). This is much as you’d expect, given the relevant international prestige of institutions and their exposure to international markets. But what the analysis is not, is a full estimation of costs of Brexit to HE. Even within the narrow coverage of the report – students – it does not take account of those factors that are not immediately financial in nature, such as social attitudes in sending countries towards the UK, or the soft power gains of exposing students to life here. Likewise, the scoping of foregone benefits from students remaining to work after their study is limited by some significant gaps in what data is to hand. But students are only one vector of Brexit impacts. Even with continuing participation in Horizon Europe, the UK will lose out on research funding opportunities, mostly because of staff deciding to move out of the country. The attractiveness of British HE as a global convenor of research and higher education more generally is compromised by the restriction of access to the EU. All of which suggests that the costs to the sector will be much more considerable than this report outlines. In some senses, this is a similar situation to the City: a reputation as a global centre seems to work against public policy solutions. Instead, the sector can shrug it all off and thrive mightily [sic], just like before. But this is not a case of carrying on regardless. All clusters are contingent and chipping/hacking away has an effect. In extremis, that might mean a failure of the cluster altogether; maybe not immediately, but further down the line, when it is all but impossible to stem the flow. I’d suggest we run a workshop about this, but that’s not really going to cut it.

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In the last decade, a number of European donors, including the EU, has framed their development policy within a human rights-based approach. Donors have also increasingly been willing to sanction their partners for non-compliance with human rights. Recently, the promotion of LGBTI human rights have been subsumed in several donors’ development policies. The EU, for instance, adopted in 2013 Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by LGBTI persons.

The EU’s expansive LGBTI rights frame has, however, been politicized, both within Europe and in beneficiary states. EU heads of delegations have been expelled from the Gambia and Tanzania because they criticized the treatment of LGBTI persons in these countries, and aid has been cut back as a result. In a recent article we shed light on why and how politicization of LGBTI human rights promotion occurs within donor states and in partner countries.

Our findings add nuance to the debate on human rights promotion by showing that it is primarily not the validity of a universal LGBTI human rights norm that is politicized, but rather the way in which this norm is applied in a conditional strategy that causes politicization.

 

Politicization in beneficiary states

In beneficiary states, contestation of LGBTI human rights promotion is based primarily on grounds that it challenges the principle of state sovereignty. The more human rights issues are stringently applied in a conditional strategy, the more such rights norms are exposed to politicization. Postcolonial studies have argued that universal justice and principles developed in the Global North constitute a form of neo-colonial intervention in the Global South. Such efforts may in turn result in an outright rejection of LGBTI human rights among some actors in the Global south, where LGBTI human rights promotion is perceived as the imposition of ‘homocolonialism’.

Adding to this literature, we find a more nuanced applicatory contestation in partner states. Human rights activists from the Global South contest the practice of aid conditionality but also insert themselves as change agents aiming to reshape the policies of international norm promoters. For instance, a coalition of civil society organisations in Uganda managed to influence several donors on how to shape their response to a harshly anti-LGBTI bill that was passed in 2014. While Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark adopted aid-cuts immediately, civil society’s influence on Swedish and UK authorities contributed to shaping their responses in a way that would cause less harm to the LGBTI population on the ground in Uganda.

At the same time, when local human rights activists increasingly cooperate with Northern states, they play into the homophobe pretext of the Ugandan government and their supporters, which politicize the LGBTI human rights norm based on the norm itself.

 

Politicization in donor states

In donor countries, politicization occurs through the application of the LGBTI human rights norm. Domestic civil society groups and parliaments tend to call for an accountability-driven approach towards development partners in order to show to their constituents and voters that they are actively ‘doing something’. EU diplomats, on the other hand, often argue for behind-the-scenes political dialogue with partner authorities. And some member states have historically conditioned interests that may lead them to be more stringent in specific cases at the same time as the EU aims at generalized LGBTI rights policy prescriptions

Our research also shows that there is a marked difference between the positions of domestic audiences in member states despite their similar degree of influence, and also that such pressure is much less visible at the EU level. This has resulted in the Council of the EU taking deliberate steps to depoliticize aspects of LGBTI human rights promotion in response to its contestation, aiming to respond with more context-sensitive solutions. This conciliatory approach has been contested by the European Parliament but the EP’s contestation was not as effective as in member states. Hence, policies are significantly more affected by political pressure from constituents ‘at home’ in the member states, which corresponds to domestic development and LGBTI rights policy priorities.

In sum, our case study of EU-Uganda relations finds that while the application of aid conditionality based upon LGBTI rights depoliticizes development aid within the EU as it makes it seem more accountable to domestic audiences, it politicizes aid externally because of the pressure exerted. In this case, our results indicate that that the promotion of human rights norms is contextual and not necessarily universal – unlike the claims themselves.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article ‘The politicization of LGBTI human rights norms in the EU-Uganda development partnership’

 

 

Johanne Døhlie Saltnes is post-doctoral researcher at ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. Her research focuses on EU development policy, rights-based approaches to development and EU-Africa relations.

Twitter: @johannesaltnes

 

 

Markus Thiel is associate professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University, Miami and director of FIU’s Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. Dr. Thiel’s research interests are the political sociology of the EU and European (Union) Politics more generally, as well as Nationalism & Identity Politics.

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Since 2018, Italy and Malta have restricted access to their ports for NGO migrant rescue vessels. While both countries have faced criticism for this policy, it should be noted that since the 1990s, most EU member states have erected barriers along their borders to prevent irregular migration. There is, therefore, a degree of hypocrisy in other EU states portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ over their approach to the issue.

Tensions within the EU over responsibility for migrants rescued at sea escalated in June 2018 when Italy and Malta effectively closed their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels. Although the duty to rescue persons in distress at sea is a fundamental rule of international law, it is not clear which state is legally responsible for their disembarkation. In practice, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that the master of a ship is obliged to rescue persons in distress at sea, yet it does not specify the procedures for disembarkation of such persons.

Migratory pressures are not distributed equally across the EU’s member states. Moreover, recent influxes of irregular migrants to the member states located on the EU’s southern borders have resulted in tensions between these states and other member states which are more protected against direct irregular entries. The former have long complained of the Dublin Regulation’s ‘first country of entry’ rule which puts an unfair ‘burden’ on them, as well as of the lack of solidarity from other member states to deal with a situation that is entirely due to their geographical position.

With regard to the Dublin rules, by establishing state responsibility for the processing of an asylum request, the assigned member state is required to grant reception conditions to applicants of international protection including housing, food, clothing, healthcare and education for minors. According to the OECD, the cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers is estimated to be around ten thousand euros per application for the first year but can be significantly higher if integration support is provided during the asylum phase. Since the practice of providing international protection is costly, states have an incentive to discourage asylum seekers from seeking international protection in their territories and instead encourage them to do so in other EU member states with better conditions.

By accident of geography, member states located on the EU’s external southern borders stand at the forefront of irregular migration flows from Africa and Asia, thus carrying a disproportionate ‘burden’. Italy has become one of the primary host countries of the EU and the EU’s smallest member state, Malta, has had to deal with high per capita irregular arrivals in recent years. It could be argued, therefore, that the less affected member states ‘free-ride’ at the expense of the southern member states when it comes to the distribution of asylum seekers.

Despite widespread criticism of the Italian and Maltese governments’ decision to close their ports to NGO migrant rescue vessels, there is not one European government that currently stands out for its open immigration stance. In practice, all member states are protecting both their internal and external borders from irregular migration.

Hence the hypocrisy of portraying Italy and Malta as Europe’s ‘black sheep’ for having closed their ports when member states of the EU and the Schengen area have constructed almost 1,000 km of walls since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to prevent irregular migration. Ten member states (Spain, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovenia, the UK, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) have built such border walls, with a sharp increase during the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ involving the creation of seven new barriers. As a result, the EU has gone from just two walls in the 1990s to fifteen by 2017.

Furthermore, following the outbreak of the crisis, several Schengen members resorted to reinstating internal border controls to prevent secondary movements of asylum seekers from other member states.

Table 1: ‘Temporary’ reintroduction of border control at internal borders

Note: Compiled by the author using data from the website of the European Commission

Although the Schengen Borders Code allows for the temporary reintroduction of border controls in the case of serious threat to national security, this was the first time they were reinstated for an extended period. Internal border checks have effectively been prolonged several times since 2015 and are set to expire on 12 November 2019. Rather than being reintroduced in exceptional circumstances, internal controls have become the political norm, justified on the grounds of migration control. This illustrates a lack of solidarity as well as lack of trust among EU member states, where precedence is given to national over shared interests.

Solidarity is one of the critical challenges facing EU asylum and migration policymaking and is becoming increasingly relevant as divisions and distrust persist among member states. As long as the principle of solidarity remains voluntary, it is unlikely that EU member states will pull together and agree on a long-term strategy, particularly one involving reform of the Dublin system to include a permanent relocation mechanism that would help member states facing disproportionate migratory pressure.

So what does the future hold for this policy domain? Will it continue to be dominated by the construction of walls and fences as well as permanent controls at internal borders? And could this lead to the end of Schengen, the most tangible success of European integration? There is a strong likelihood that EU asylum and migration policymaking will continue to be characterised by short-term ad hoc and unilateral measures since most member states perceive no benefits in developing long-term solutions.

This article was first published on the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) blog on European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) on 28 August 2019.

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