Ideas on Europe Blog

The first efforts to cooperate in matters of asylum and migration at the European level can be mainly attributed to the mass inflow of asylum seekers during the late 1980s and early 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. As an initial response to the unprecedented influx, EU member states began to implement and coordinate policies to prevent irregular arrivals. During this period, two major problems were identified. The first involved the risk of ‘asylum shopping’, i.e., a situation in which migrants apply for asylum in more than one member state or seek to apply in a state other than the first state of arrival. The second challenge related to the possibility that asylum seekers would gravitate towards member states with more generous asylum and welfare systems.

As a result, the 12 EC states found themselves in need of a common solution to solve what was perceived as a transnational challenge. This led to the development of the Dublin Convention in 1990 and initial steps in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, where issues of asylum and migration became ‘matters of common interest’ but were still dealt with on an intergovernmental basis. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam, which amended Maastricht, included the objective to gradually establish an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) encompassing matters related to asylum and migration. Subsequently, at the Tampere European Council in 1999, member states agreed to harmonise their asylum systems based on binding legislation towards the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS).

Nevertheless, despite EU efforts to harmonise asylum legislation, spanning two decades, significant differences persist in the recognition rates, provision of reception conditions and procedural guarantees for asylum seekers across EU member states.

In practice, these divergences are the result of the ambiguous provisions in the asylum directives, yet more importantly, they reflect the diversity in national preferences in terms of how to deal with irregular migration. This highlights the difficulty in developing policies in this field, but even more so, in harmonising common standards across the EU.

The post An Introduction to the development of EU cooperation in the field of asylum and migration appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

As previously discussed (see Reform #2), the reformation of the united Europe’s political system is the precondition of introducing further reforms related to Republic of the United Europe’s (or RUE) finance, economy, social system, armed forces, and foreign policy. In this volume, I am going to focus on the most critical topics related to finance, such as the creation of a fiscal union, the reformation of the European Central Bank, the introduction of a common tax system, and the handling of government debts on the European level. My aim is to propose principles and guidelines rather than exact policies.

 

Fiscal union

In the Great Recession, Europe learned it in the hard way that the common currency was introduced without an establishment of a competent European institution, which could have supervised and co-ordinated the economy and fiscal policy of each member state. Many experts and politicians blamed the euro for the outbreak of the financial crisis – wrongly –, failing to recognise that the primary reason of the Euro Area crisis was the utter failure of neoliberal management policy designed in Berlin and Brussels. The euro has plenty of obvious benefits, such as the elimination of currency exchange costs, removal of bank charges related to transactions, price parity, economic stability, and low inflation – boosting trade and investments, and creating a political union eventually. In my view, the euro is advantageous and necessary, but the lack of proper regulations and capable institutions is harmful.

Recognising the same fact, the member states of the European Union agreed to ratify the Stability and Growth Pact (or SGP), which has since been reformed in the packages of Sixpack and Fiscal Compact – latter being the fiscal chapter (Title III) of the Fiscal Stability Treaty, which contains regulations regarding fiscal discipline (e.g. balanced budget, debt brake), co-ordination, and governance. Even though, the treaty is an improvement, it is only patching up the rifts of a structural dysfunction instead of replacing it with a new functional system. Some of the solutions proposed by economists are the conduction of bank and fiscal union (via deposit insurance, common regulations, resolution procedures, etc.), the authorisation of a European finance minister (tasked to set and execute fiscal rules), the raising of resources, common supervision of banks, and common European representation in international organisations, but these ideas have many dissensions amongst the member states.

The current monetary union is vulnerable, unstable, and incomplete without a fiscal union, whereas the creation of a fiscal union is senseless without establishing a political union first. The legal and political framework of the Republic of the United Europe could provide the perfect base for a fiscal union, using multiple elements of the already existing financial regulations to develop a stable European financial system.

In the Republic of the United Europe, the European Government (or EG) – in co-operation with the national governments, the European Parliament, and the President of the RUE – is going to be responsible to determine the common fiscal policy (e.g. synchronisation of tax systems and rates, collection and expenditure of taxes), setting the cornerstones of the member states’ budget by prescribing frames and directives to ensure financial stability and economic prosperity. By doing so, the EG must review at least the figures of inflation, government budget deficit, and government debt. It is imperative that the ratio of the annual general government deficit to GDP does not exceed 3% (except deficit related to investments), whilst the ratio of government debt to GDP does not exceed 60%. Those member states burdened by a government debt of more than 60% relative to their GDP must set the reduction of that as a primary target in their budget. In order to ensure relatively low government debt and unemployment rates, generating sustainable economic growth is also going to be absolutely critical, when preparing the budget.

The results of a centralised fiscal union – under democratic control – are economic stabilisation through debt management (Eurobonds to finance collective euro debts), common risk sharing, active control of national budgets, stricter fiscal policy, and the avoidance of financial crises. The fiscal union also necessitates an independent and powerful European central bank.

 

The Central Bank of Europe

The European Central Bank (as it is called currently) is the central institution of the European Economic and Monetary Union, which’s purpose is the co-ordination of economic and fiscal policies (including a common monetary policy and the euro). The ECB’s primary task is to maintain price stability by keeping inflation under control (below 2%), but the Frankfurt-based bank is also responsible for setting and implementing monetary policy (Euro Area), for supervising national banks, and for conducting foreign exchange operations – amongst others. The ECB has an 11 billion euro stock capital held by the National Central Banks of the member states (or NCBs) as shareholders (shares in the ECB are not transferable and cannot be used as collateral). It is the ECB’s exclusive right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes (member states may issue euro coins after consulted with and approved by Frankfurt). The European Central Bank and the national central banks of all EU member states form the European System of Central Banks, which’s main objective is to maintain price stability. The Eurosystem constitutes the European Central Bank and those national central banks, whose currency is the euro.

The decisions of the European Central Bank are made by the Governing Council, the Executive Board, and the General Council. The Governing Council is formed by the members of the Executive Board and the governors of the Euro Area NCBs. Since 2015, the governors of NCBs take turns holding voting rights in the Governing Council. The ECB’s Executive Board comprises the President, the Vice-President, and four other members, who hold permanent voting rights. They are appointed by the European Council by qualified majority on a recommendation from the Council after it has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council. Their terms of office are eight years, which is not renewable. The Executive Board is responsible for implementing monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and decisions laid down by the Governing Council. The General Council exists only until every member state adopted the euro as their currency.

The Central Bank of Europe (or CBE) should function as the national bank of the Republic of the United Europe, supervising the NCBs, whilst co-operating with them. In the RUE, the application of the euro as a common currency is going to be mandatory for every member state; therefore, operating a common fiscal policy is crucial. This will certainly reduce the national governments’ control over their national banks, but they will also gain financial stability and security in an era, when it can be confidentially stated that the global financial sector cannot be controlled merely in a national sphere.

The CBE is going to be accountable to the European Parliament and will be under the tight supervision of the European Government (Ministry of Finance). The Governing Council will include the governors of every NCB of the RUE – bringing the General Council to a natural dissolution –, whereas the Executive Board’s composition will remain the same, and its members (including the President of the CBE) are going to be appointed by the EPC. Also, the Eurogroup is going to cease to exist automatically, whilst the responsibilities of the Eurosystem is going to be transferred to the EG’s Minister of Finance and to the CBE.

The CBE’s role will not be reduced to the supervision of the national banks and of the euro, but it will focus on keeping inflation and unemployment as low as possible, influencing long-term interest rates, and providing loans to European enterprises, to member states, or even to foreign countries and enterprises. The member states’ government debts must be raised from national to European level, placing it into the responsibility of the Central Bank of Europe. Those member states above 60% of government debt to GDP will have to be given budgetary cornerstones and directives by the EG in order to reduce it. Common risk sharing will result in a de facto debt-restructuring, protection from foreign elements (e.g. foreign countries, private institutions, IMF, World Bank), and a monopoly of debt management (paying and taking) of the European institutions. Should it be still necessary to intervene financially, it is the CBE’s exclusive authority and duty to help out the member states.

This way, the member states’ debt burden would gradually decrease, whilst the appetite for investment would increase all over in Europe, which can be translated into sustainable economic growth, creation of jobs, and higher quality of life. The European Investment Bank and national development banks could enhance targeted investment in sectors and regions that are in need. Once Europe’s economy is significantly stronger and the European government debt decreased to a manageable level, the CBE could even provide loans to other countries, challenging the AIIB, the IMF, and the World Bank.

The CBE must find a way to challenge virtual currencies as well. There should not be any currency in circulation, which does not have a known and secure background. The simplification or abolishment of need for bank accounts, financial intermediaries, and clearing parties; and the introduction of electronic cash, directly deposited at the CBE, could be a viable response to successfully tackle the challenge of virtual currencies.

The Central Bank of Europe must be reformed in the context of the new enlightened political system of the Republic of the United Europe, meaning that it has to be the centre of a fiscal union, focusing on the general well-being of all member states and the ordinary people, not only on the interests of certain powerful ones and financiers – as the European Central Bank does.

 

Tax system

The introduction of a common tax system through the synchronisation of the member states’ tax systems and rates, and via the collection and expenditure of taxes on a European scale in the entirety of the Republic of the United Europe is imperative in order to achieve financial stability (via control and discipline), economic prosperity, and global competitiveness. The tax systems and rates vary in each member state. For instance, some apply progressive tax systems (e.g. France) and some operate with single-rate tax systems (e.g. Hungary). The national tax systems must be replaced by a common European scheme. As the reasons behind the different structures and measures are complex, thorough examination and careful analysis is crucial.

The EG’s Ministry of Finance could divide the RUE into specific tax districts, and set the frame of rates for each district. The borders of tax districts would not necessarily follow the national borders, as categorisation should be decided by factors, such as economic development, infrastructure, GDP per capita, etc. Europe could be divided into no more than five tax districts, ranging from most developed (e.g. Bavaria, Lombardy, Tyrol) to least developed (e.g. Croatia, Greece, Southern Italy). Enterprises operating in the more developed areas should pay more corporate tax than in the less developed areas. Both corporal and personal income tax rates would be the highest in the most developed and lowest in the least developed area, whereas the personal income tax system to be applied should be progressive (perhaps in three stages). Within the frames suggested, the member states would set the exact measures as it suits them the best. Applying the same principle to the citizens as well (personal income tax) is not only fair, but efficient to the economy. The implementation of such principles would result in a system, which gives the authority to the EG to set measures according to the interests of the greater good, whilst preserves the liberty of the member states to maximise the potentials of the framework.

The EG would propose different tax measures based on the aforesaid principles in the European budget. After the budget is approved by the EP and by the President, the tax rates would serve as frames, which would permit the member states to apply different rates as long as the frames are not exceeded, providing a wide range of liberty over taxation. The exact measures must be decided by experts, but looking at our main competitors’ (e.g. China, Russia, UK, US) average rate of corporate tax ours could be set somewhere around 19-25%.

Paying less tax would significantly reduce capital flight and labour migration from the less developed areas to the more developed ones – affecting Central and Southern Europe most negatively. Moreover, enterprises would be highly motivated and interested in investing and producing in the eastern and southern regions of Europe, which would definitely boost employment in those member states, in which the pressure of unemployment is the most urging already. Besides creating jobs and increasing net wages, a centralised tax system would help to close the gap between the less and more developed member states in a natural way, instead of using artificial funds (e.g. Cohesion Fund). The introduction of the new tax system would not only solve a series of issues (e.g. economic growth, employment, cohesion), but would also result in saving money.

 

Conclusion

By completing the political union, the desired and necessary fiscal union of the member states of the Republic of the United Europe is going to have the institutional tools to create a well-functioning mechanism via regulations, co-ordinating Europe’s finances in a disciplined, legitimate, and efficient manner. The European Government’s Ministry of Finance co-operating with the Central Bank of Europe is going to be responsible for synchronising the tax system (and rates) of the member states, which is one of the cornerstones of the European budget. The gained financial stability is the key to economic strength and general well-being in the Republic of the United Europe.

The post Reform #3: Finance and economy (vol. 1) – Finance appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In order to condemn the violence of the regime and to support the people opposing Lukashenko, the EU has put in place a two-level strategy which employs standard hard power instruments in regards to the leadership and a strategy inspired by the EUGS in regards to Belarussians. The approach toward Lukashenko is threefold, with different levels of political intensity: de-legitimation (non-recognition of electoral results), mediation (which has so far been entirely unsuccessful), and sanctions. Along with the US and other states and international organizations, the EU has also refused to recognise Lukashenko as the legitimate President, therefore de facto legitimizing the opposition, which is asking for renewed elections. The exiled Tsikhanouskaya is treated by the Western community as the legitimate representative of her country. Such recognition emerges through meetings she has had with institutional representatives (e.g. the President of the European Parliament), but also through invitations to ceremonies or the attribution of awards.

Both the US and the EU have also implemented sanctions on Lukashenko and other officials held responsible for voter fraud and post-election violent repression. For the EU, reaching a consensus on sanctions was somewhat problematic: Cyprus asked, in exchange for its approval, that EU members adopt a tougher approach to Turkey over its gas exploration in the waters off Cyprus. The sanctions dispute has therefore included apparently unrelated matters, proving once again the complexity of foreign policy decisions within the EU itself.

In regards to the people, meanwhile, Belarus opposition leader Tsikhanouskaya asserted that the Belarusian uprising is not a “geopolitical revolution (…) it is neither pro-Russian nor anti-Russian, not pro-EU nor anti-EU, (…) it is simply pro-Belarus and a democratic revolution” (European Parliament, 21 September 2020). Therefore, any EU action will have to carefully avoid suspicion of trying to bring Belarus into an enhanced partnership with the EU against Russia. Thus, in order to assist the people of Belarus, the EU can mainly rely on the concept of resilience, usually thought to be politically neutral, to replace the ambitious and increasingly contested goal of the promotion of democracy. The EU would likely act through selective and tailormade actions targeted at boosting the resilience of recipients (people, communities, groups, individuals). Resilience supports the need to rebrand the intervention of external actors, while at the same time legitimising their presence in their capacity of ‘tutoring’ communities. Endowing resilience therefore implies facilitating or developing the self-securing agency of those held to be most vulnerable, who need support in the development of a resilience capacity.

However, the circumstances in Belarus, where the autocratic regime can survive thanks to Russian economic support, partly hinder the enactment of resilience. The EUGS itself does not explicitly confront the question of how resilience can be supported in an autocratic regime that punishes any dissidents. Furthermore, it mentions that some of the factors that should endure resilience feature an inclusive definition of democracy (trust in institutions, sustainable development and growth, respect for human rights, and vibrant and inclusive societies), that can hardly be achieved in a long-lasting autocratic regime supported by a powerful external actor. Thus, the Belarusian situation points to two outcomes: an external intervention in favour of resilience could reinforce the autocratic regime in power, or, on the contrary, could undermine it, though likely causing tensions and possibly conflicts. Whereas the third progress report on the EUGS clarified that resilience “does not mean supporting stability by condoning authoritarianism”, it did not explain how to endorse resilience when those in power oppose any external action in its favour.

The EU has so far reacted rather pragmatically and has interpreted strengthening resilience as supporting resistance. Firstly, it has condemned the disproportionate violence against peaceful protesters and called for the release of those who have been prosecuted and detained. Journalists’ work in such a hostile environment has been praised, and attacks on and the detention of journalists, some of which are EU citizens, have been denounced. Also, in December 2020, the European Commission launched a programme called EU4Belarus: solidarity with the people of Belarus that focuses on four key areas of intervention: 1) civil society and independent media, in particular in regards to local communities and citizen groups’ initiatives; 2) support to youth, including scholarships for students and young professionals; 3) advisory support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in order to enhance resilience in the current economic slump; 4) reinforcement of health resilience by supporting Belarus’s response to the still ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Further support to SMEs, worth €6 million, is under preparation.

However, the most difficult task for the EU is to concretely deliver financial support for selected groups. The operation is politically very sensitive, because it could endanger local beneficiaries and the EU could be accused of meddling in a third country’ domestic affairs. Hence, the EU is obliged outsourcing resilience by relying on organizations based outside Belarus that are able to operate within the country. One of the key organizations involved is the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), which is financing activities on behalf of the EU, including small initiatives. The risk with supporting resilience in an autocratic regime is therefore the obfuscation of the question of accountability and responsibility, losing control of the whole process of enacting resilience.

On the side of the recipient groups, it is unclear to what an extent financing can enable them to impinge on the structure of power and reach their goals. In fact, it seems that while resilience recognises the agency of the people, it underestimates the obstacles posed by an hostile leadership. Then, even if resilience is not directly linked to regime change and democratization, the fact that it comes as part of a wider package of measures including sanctions directed to Lukashenko and his entourage scuppers the intention of de-politicising it. Furthermore, focusing on the resilience (resistance) of certain groups, especially within a single state, can bring to an underestimation of the complexity of politics. And moreover, as the issue of sanctions has shown, there are many ongoing crises in the EU’s neighbourhood and the solution to one has consequences in dealing with the others. Finally, the hazy nature of resilience and consequently its modest analytical value makes it difficult in this case to assess whether actions undertaken in its name achieve their objectives, which in truth remain unexpressed. It seems that resilience is a sort of floating concept that can at any time be interpreted according to current targets.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “The European Union Global Strategy and the EU’s Maieutic Role”

 

Author:

Serena Giusti is senior researcher and head of the Programme on Eastern Europe, Russia and Eurasia at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa. She is also Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Institute for International Studies (ISPI) in Milan. She holds a Ph.D. in Political and Social Sciences from the European University Institute in Florence and a Master’s degree from the College of Europe (Natolin).

https://www.ispionline.it/it/bio/serena-giusti

Serena.giusti@sssup.it

ISPI:

Twitter: @ispionline

 Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies:

Twitter: @santannapisa

The post The European Union Global Strategy and the limits of resilience in the case of Belarus appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Es ist immer noch relativ still rund um das neue Bundesamt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BfAA), seit den letzten Updates hat sich nach außen hin nicht viel getan. Aber so langsam scheinen sich die neuen Strukturen zu etablieren, und selbst die deutsche Konsulin auf Mallorca tauscht jetzt ihre mediterrane Arbeitsumgebung gegen das Havel Valley.

[Update (27. April): Es gibt jetzt ein offizielles Organigramm des BfAA.]

Was sich so langsam herausstellt ist, wo und wie das Bundesamt räumlich zu finden sein wird. Auf der Karriere-Seite des Amtes heißt es aktuell:

“Zunächst arbeiten wir in Büros im Brennabor Gebäude, Geschwister-Scholl-Str. 10, voraussichtlich ab Sommer 2021 beziehen wir zusätzlich die Kirchhofstr. 1-2, 14776 Brandenburg.”

Das Foto vom Amtsschild in der Kirchhofstraße habe ich ja schon im Januar gepostet. Da soll jetzt also Richtung Sommer eingezogen werden. Aktuell sitzt man in einem Gebäudeteil, der früher zu den Brennabor-Werken gehörte. Das sieht man auch am Hintergrund des Videos von Amtsleiter Birgelen auf der Karriereseite.

Ich hab mal ein Foto geschossen, wo man links die Fenster der Arbeitsagentur sieht, die auch bei Birgelen im Hintergrund zu sehen sind.

Was gibt es sonst noch für Neuigkeiten? In einer aktuellen Stellenausschreibung sucht das Amt für das “schnell wachsende[] Team am Standort Bonn” Mitarbeitende für “Verwaltung”, im Bereich der Personalbezahlung sowie für die Leitung des Bereichs Logistik und Transport.

Heißt, diese Aufgaben verbleiben nicht nur in Bonn sondern werden dort auch vergrößert. Im aktuellen FAQ des BfAA heißt es dazu (meine Hervorhebung):

“Rund 110 Beschäftigte der Zentralstelle für Auslandsschulwesen und 68 im Bereich Personalbezahlung und Logistik werden […] weiterhin am Standort Bonn arbeiten.

Etwa 30 Beschäftigte verbleiben in den Arbeitsbereichen Veranstaltungsmanagement sowie Fortbildung in Berlin, weil diese Aufgaben an die Räumlichkeiten des AA gebunden sind.”

Dass ein Bereich Veranstaltungsmanagement auch ins BfAA ausgelagert wird, ist interessant. Man hätte denken können, dass das doch eher im politischen Kernbereich der Arbeit des Auswärtigen Amtes ist, aber vielleicht betrifft das nur bestimmte Veranstaltungsformate oder solche einer bestimmten Größe.

Und dann gibt es aktuell auch die Ausschreibung für die Leiterin der Zentralabteilung, mit Details zur Organisation und dem Aufgabenbereich dieser Abteilung. Zum Einen wird klar, dass es dort die Referate Personalmanagement, Haushalt, Organisation, Innerer Dienst und IT geben wird. Die Zentralabteilung wird rund 40 Mitarbeiter*innen haben.

Zu den Aufgaben der Zentralabteilung gehören demnach:

• Verwaltungsmodernisierung und Digitalisierung im BfAA
• Zusammenarbeit mit der Auslands-IT des AA
• Aufbau- und Ablauforganisation im BfAA
• Aufstellung und Ausführung des BfAA-Haushalts
• Gleichstellung, Diskriminierungsschutz, Korruptionsprävention, Geheimschutz, Brandschutz, Arbeits- und Gesundheitsschutz und betriebliches Gesundheitsmanagement
• kundenorientierter Innerer Dienst
• BfAA-Liegenschaftsfragen.

Dazu gab es Ausschreibungen für den Zentralen Einkauf. Aufgaben für den Zentralen Einkauf sind unter anderem:

• Wirtschaftlichkeitsuntersuchungen
• Vergabeverfahren
• Inhouse-Vergaben
• Leistungen aus bestehenden Rahmenvereinbarungen abrufen
• Verwaltungsvereinbarungen mit anderen Einkaufsbehörden des Bundes abschließen
• Auslandsvertretungen bei der Durchführung von Auftragsänderungen und Vergabeverfahren begleiten

Ich habe meinen Organigramm-Entwurf vom Februar mit den Informationen aus diesem Blogpost und den jeweiligen Quellen aktualisiert bzw. ergänzt.

Bei einzelnen Aufgaben ist noch nicht ganz klar, in welcher Abteilung sie im Organigramm angesiedelt ist. Ich hab die jetzt mal im überarbeiteteten inoffiziellen Organigramm-Entwurf  in die misteriöse Abteilung D eingebaut, die ich “Dienstleistungen” nenne. Dort habe ich auch spekulativ das Veranstaltungsmanagement und die Logistik einsortiert.

Das ist weiterhin Spekulation, es gibt nach meiner Kenntnis kein offizielles öffentliches Organigramm.

Vielleicht gibt es ja demnächst mal ein offizielles Update zur geplanten Struktur des Amtes. Soweit ich das sehe, gibt es keine Presse- oder Kommunikationsabteilung, die man fragen könnte. Bis dahin sammele ich hier die Informationen zusammen, die öffentlich zu finden sind.

PS: Vor einigen Wochen hat mich eine Person, die sich für das BfAA bewirbt, kontaktiert (immer gerne über meine Email, die ihr hier findet), um zu fragen, wie es sich denn so in Brandenburg leben lässt. Ich empfehle da neben den Seiten der Stadt die Webseite Finde das Leben (Design: Bureau Steffi Holz), wo man auch viele der städtischen Partner finden kann. Über diese Seite bin ich auch nach Brandenburg gekommen.

Es gibt auch viele tolle Instagramm-Kanäle, z.B. Luftbilder Brandenburg oder Entdecke Stadt Brandenburg, in denen man den Alltag hier in der Stadt im Havel Valley ganz gut nachvollziehen kann. Schaut mal, wer den beiden Accounts folgt oder wem diese folgen, um die vielen duzend anderen Kanäle zu finden.

The post Das BfAA in Brandenburg: Von Mallorca ins Havel Valley appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In the immediate aftermath of the election of Joe Biden the European Commission proposed ‘A new transatlantic agenda’. This ambitious plan emphasizes that together the EU and the US ‘have the reach to set regulations and standards that are replicated across the world’. This very much sounds like a revival of the major priority of the unfortunate Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) talks. Their failure in 2016 is mostly explained by the ‘Trump effect’, that is the protectionist agenda of the former US president. The Commission’s hope for a new transatlantic relation with the new US administration reflects this appreciation. In an article in JCMS I show that such optimism misses the fact that even before Trump, the EU and the USA did not manage to agree on the transatlantic harmonization of standards and regulations. Indeed, such technical harmonization is likely to undermine the functioning of the market on either side of the Atlantic.

Traditional free trade agreements aimed at removing so-called at-the-border obstacles such as tariffs and quotas. The latter are rather readily quantifiable and therefore offer a solid ground for reaching a clear compromise. Under such circumstances, liberalization can be expressed in straightforward numbers, referring for instance to a specific level of mutual tariff reductions. Despite a recent rise of tariffs, there is a clear downward tendency since the foundation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.

Consequently, contemporary free trade agreements intend to remove so-called behind-the-border obstacles to trade. Technical standards and regulations and conformity assessment procedures famously fall into this category. However, the actual impact on trade of this technical infrastructure is difficult to assess. This makes bargaining more complex. As if that were not enough, unlike tariffs, the technical infrastructure does not only divert trade flows. It actually also organizes the functioning of an integrated market: Goods are not exchangeable by nature; they need to become knowable and identifiable by the market participants. Technical standards and regulations perform this essential function by fixing the requirements a product or process needs to fulfil. Conformity assessment procedures test whether goods correspond to these requirements.

The institutions that set standards, regulations and conformity assessment procedures are bound together by a relation of institutional complementarity – defined as ‘a constellation in which the combination of two (or more) elements increases the benefits attained from any of them’. The technical infrastructure thus forms a coherent set of institutions and it is organized around a coordination principle, which can differ from market to market. My research illustrates that the US market follows the principle of competition while its European counterpart is characterized by the principle of order. Each principle organizes the complementary links between the three different elements of the technical infrastructure in a distinct manner.

What makes the convergence of different technical infrastructures so tricky is that bargaining generally means making compromises. More specifically, insofar as each technical infrastructure forms a coherent set of institutions any trade-off is likely to disorganize complementarity. In order to know whether the transatlantic technical infrastructure divergence really mattered for TTIP it needed to be tested against evidence from the negotiations. However, the TTIP talks took place behind closed doors. Fortunately for this research, in 2016 Wikileaks released a significant amount of secret TTIP documents that provided substantial evidence on the bargaining process. I matched these leaked documents with official publications from the stakeholders.

What strikingly stands out from the empirical evidence is that each party did not only try to extend parts of its technical infrastructure to the other side of the Atlantic. Most likely, such a partial approach would give rise to an incoherent transatlantic technical infrastructure, which eventually would suffer from operational deficiencies. Rather, the proposals on standards, regulations and conformity assessment show that each party consistently promoted the coordination principle of its own technical infrastructure.

 

Table 1: EU and US proposals for technical convergence

The EU negotiators advocated the use of international ISO-IEC standards. By contrast, the latter promoted the use of US standards or standard-developing organizations (SDO), and they argued for opening European standardization to US stakeholders. In the field of regulations, the EU suggested to generalise the use of international regulatory bodies, whose rules should apply on the federal and sub-federal scale in the USA. The USA more modestly aimed at maintaining the specificities of their existing regulatory scales and direct incorporation of standards into regulation. They claimed improved access for US stakeholders to drafting European regulations. Regarding conformity assessment, the EU argued for manufacturer self-certification, based on prior harmonization of standards and regulations. The USA were at most willing to accept the mutual recognition (MR) between US and EU conformity assessment bodies. All these requests were perfectly coherent with the technical infrastructure of the party proposing the measures. Yet, the other party was unlikely to satisfy such requests that would profoundly transform the institutions that technically frame the functioning of its domestic market.

The outlined difficulties of transatlantic technical convergence illustrate that behind-the-border liberalization faces a contradiction. On the one hand, its very meaning is to address and transform national institutions in an upfront manner. On the other hand, these institutions are embedded in a set of complementarities that ensure the functioning of an integrated market. Finding an agreement implies compromises on both sides, but in the case of technical infrastructure striking a balance is simultaneously likely to harm its coherence. This fact tends to reduce the leeway of negotiators, especially if they represent similarly powerful economies whose technical infrastructures rely on different coordination principles. Highlighting this shows that the failure of TTIP is not merely the result of temporary protectionist pressure. Rather this research pointed out an additional institutional challenge for policy makers involved in the governance of global trade. The currently available cooperation tools – harmonization, mutual recognition and early information exchange – seem unable to overcome the dead end, where one party would need to abandon (parts of) its technical infrastructure in order to conclude an agreement.

With the growing relevance of behind-the-border liberalization the diversity of national or regional institutions increasingly becomes a matter of trade. Research on international trade therefore needs to address diverging institutional complementarities. This is all the more important as recent research on the construction of the Single market shows that the formation of the European technical infrastructure was also expected to institutionally boost the competitiveness of European multinational firms.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “The Limits of Traditional Bargaining under Deep Integration: TTIP Stumbling over Technical Barriers to Trade”

 

 

Short bio

Benjamin Bürbaumer holds a Ph.D. in economics from Université Sorbonne Paris Nord and a master’s degree in international relations from Sciences Po Paris. He is working on international trade, with a special interest in standards and regulations, and international political economy.

Personal Twitter: @BurbaumerB

Department twitter: @CEPNP13

Link to academic profile: https://cepn.univ-paris13.fr/benjamin-burbaumer/

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In 2004 Joseph Jupille published a book explaining why European Union (EU) institutions contest procedural rules governing how legislation is made. He identified jurisdictional ambiguity – the degree to which the contested bill falls under several procedural rules – and procedural incentives – what institutions stand to gain from conflict – as the main causes of what he termed procedural politics. In procedural politics, actors clash not over the substance of policy (at least not directly), but rather over which procedure should apply. The EU is known even outside academic circles to maintain a myriad of seemingly arcane legislative procedures.

In my article, I revisit the key theoretical claims made by Jupille in his seminal book. What I am chiefly interested in is to find out whether his ideas still hold water in the 21st century, or whether political scientists should discard them as out of date. To achieve this goal, I put together a new dataset of court cases in which EU institutions fight over what the legislative procedure should be in a given file. For example, the European Parliament has recently challenged the Council of the EU for choosing the seat of a new European agency without involving it in the decision. We expect such conflicts to arise when there is ambiguity about the applicable procedural rule and when the challenging EU institution has something to gain from changing the procedure. In this case, the main incentive is that of the Parliament to have a say on where EU agencies should reside, while the Council wants to continue making these decisions alone.

If we pored over each individual case, we would see that in some cases EU institutions do not clash over legislative procedures despite the theoretical conditions being fulfilled. This is not surprising. Few theories of social behaviour are only ever true or false. What I want to find out is whether the theorised conditions – the presence of ambiguity and incentives – help us explain the pattern of competence conflicts in aggregate. As a result, I look at the problem through statistical lens: what is the probability of legislation being challenged given its attributes? Does ambiguity and/or procedural incentives increase this probability and if so, by how much?

Statistical methods typically require quantified input. I measure procedural incentives by ranking all EU legislative procedures according to how much power they confer on the European Commission and the European Parliament, respectively. I then take the difference between the proposed and actually used procedure to quantify institutional incentives to challenge legislation. Measuring ambiguity is more complicated, but in a nutshell it involves comparing legislative texts against competence provisions (so called legal bases in EU jargon) to determine the extent to which there is overlap and therefore ambiguity regarding the applicable rule.

I feed my measures of ambiguity and incentives, along with other relevant information, into a statistical model designed to predict the probability of legislation being challenged before the European Court of Justice by one of the EU institutions or Member States. The main results are visualised in Figure 1. The less satisfied the Parliament and the Commission are with a procedural change – the higher the incentive – the more likely the legislation ends up before the Court of Justice. The higher the jurisdictional ambiguity of the legislation, the more likely it is procedurally disputed. We can see that when the Commission and the Parliament are very dissatisfied, and thus face strong incentives to enter into a dispute, the law is very likely to be challenged. On the contrary, the probability of a dispute is nearly zero at the opposite end of the scale. These results support the theory of procedural politics.

Figure 1: Effects of procedural incentives and jurisdictional ambiguity on the probability of a procedural dispute.

 

In addition to the main findings, I explored how the incidence of procedural disputes varies over time. Of particular interest is the question whether disputes are more likely to occur in the wake of changes to the EU’s constitutional framework. As competence and procedural rules change, it is more likely they will produce new sources of ambiguity. It turns out that the periods following Treaty amendments have been, with the exception of the Amsterdam Treaty, associated with more procedural disputes. With no new Treaty revision on the horizon, we should anticipate disputes to remain relatively sporadic in the years to come.

Frequently, theories in political science are formulated and tested once at their outset. As time passes, doubt about the ongoing validity of the model grows. For numerous reasons, theories are liable to become obsolete over time and there are no guarantees against loss of relevance or explanatory power. Subjecting existing theories to tests against new data is the only scientifically acceptable way of maintaining and renewing confidence in our stock of knowledge about the social world. Arguably, there are many theoretical candidates in the political science canon whose re-testing is overdue. It was with this goal in mind that I revisited Jupille’s theory of procedural politics with new data. After appraising the key tenets of the theory, I conclude that it continues to provide both a valid explanation for a part of EU politics and a falsifiable prediction about the prevalence – or, rather, absence – of procedural contestation at the current stage of European integration.

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “Procedural Politics Revisited: Institutional Incentives and Jurisdictional Ambiguity in EU Competence Disputes”

 

 

Michal Ovádek is a political advisor in the European Parliament and an affiliated researcher at the Centre for Empirical Jurisprudence at KU Leuven. His research focuses on the interplay between law and politics in the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe. Twitter handle: @michal_ovadek (https://twitter.com/michal_ovadek)

 

 

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By Michal Onderco & Reinout A van der Veer

Last week, the European Union agreed to impose new sanctions on Russia in response to the attempt to poison the opposition activist Alexei Navalny and his jailing upon return to Russia. Immediately afterwards, Russia threatened to respond in kind.

This development is not new. In recent years, the European Union, just like many other actors in global politics, increased the use of sanctions as a foreign policy tool.  This is even likely to increase in the future. The current European Commission, calling itself “the geopolitical commission”, announced plans to prepare “a  reinforced  sanctions  mechanism  […]  to ensure that Europe is more resilient to extraterritorial sanctions by third countries and that sanctions imposed by the EU are properly enforced.”

Increasingly, Europeans are becoming sensitive to the domestic costs of imposed sanctions. Nowhere was this argument clearer than in case of European sanctions against Russia, particularly after Russia instituted its own counter-sanctions designed to hurt European countries back. Now Russia threatens to do the same.

In our recent article in JCMS, we look at the costs that these sanctions bring to the firms in EU countries. We look at the Russian counter-sanctions for two reasons: they are widely understood to have been imposed in reaction to EU sanctions, and they are often conflated in popular discourse. Because they are Russia’s reaction to EU’s sanctions, their impact on European businesses tells us a lot about EU’s ability to weather the domestic costs of economic sanctions.

We utilize a unique data source: a database covering all Dutch exports, supplied by Statistics Netherlands. We use a quasi-experimental research design, which allows us to compare firms that were hit by the sanctions (our ‘treatment’) to firms that are comparable on all aspects except that they did not face the Russian sanctions. We look at the Netherlands, because it is a relatively large, open, and export-driven European economy which primarily exports food to Russia, and the Russian ban was aimed at these products especially.

We were mainly interested in two questions: whether the companies hit by the sanctions have a higher chance of (1) losing revenue and (2) ceasing exports altogether to Russia or elsewhere (which we refer to as firm failure), and (3) whether they were more likely to start exporting to countries near Russia, perhaps in an attempt to bypass the sanctions.

Our results indicate that firms that were hit by Russian sanctions were between 86% and 96% more likely to cease operations by 2015 and 2016 (respectively) compared to the firms that were not hit by the sanctions. However, we also find that the effect on revenue is negligible – in other words, if the firms survive, their exports do tend to recover fairly quickly and they do not suffer from the sanctions imposition afterwards.

We also see that the bigger the share of the firm’s revenue going to Russia, the more likely the firm was to stop exporting. At the same time, the big exporters that export only a small share of their products to Russia faced little impact. This is not entirely surprising – because these firms are much bigger, they also are much more likely to have the expertise and resources to implement sanctions. The higher risk of failing was especially visible for smaller firms in the chemicals and minerals industry, which exported between a quarter and half of their goods to Russia. Two-thirds of these firms failed in 2015 and 2016. Our research corroborates the earlier findings that highlighted that some sectors of Dutch economy were much more vulnerable than others. Agriculture is often listed as such sector, observation also recently confirmed by the Dutch agricultural diplomat in Moscow.

We also find that Dutch exporters that were hit with sanctions were more likely to divert their exports (i.e. whether they began exporting without precedent) to Belarus, Moldova, the Caucasus, Mongolia and China, but also Israel. We do not find evidence of such export diversion to other EU countries, where Dutch firms might already have an easy access. Neither did Dutch companies divert exports to Central Asia or Turkey, which offer less attractive options for diversion. Similarly, Ukraine’s conflict with Ukraine may explain why the Dutch businesses did not divert there.

Our results suggest that policy-makers who wish to help businesses to overcome the economic hardship caused by the sanctions (or retaliatory sanctions) should focus primarily on helping companies to survive in the short term, and focus on smaller companies that are more exposed to the sanctions. After this initial period, companies are able to bypass the sanctions by diverting their exports to other countries. Importantly, by now, the Russian counter-sanctions no longer hurt European businesses. Economic arguments based on their impact on firms should therefore not aminate the policy thinking about whether to keep sanctions on Russia or not.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “No More Gouda in Moscow? Distributive Effects of the Imposition of Sanctions”

 

 

Michal Onderco is Associate Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research focuses on politics of international security, with particular attention to the role of domestic actors in foreign and security policy.

 

 

Reinout van der Veer is an Assistant Professor at the Radboud University Nijmegen. His research interests include EU and EMU politics, the role of experts and expertise in liberal democracy, and the politicization and legitimacy of international organizations.

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Dear Correspondent,

On 18 April 2021 Europe should celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Treaty of Paris that brought the Continent lasting peace and prosperity. Europe’s Founding Fathers thus created the European Community and the Community method as well as achieving its major success to make war between Member States ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible’ — the European Coal and Steel Community.

Many politicians have forgotten the founding principles or never knew them. Have schools taught how this changed Europe for good, from a Continent where war occurred in the lifetime of every generation for more than 2000 years? Does the public know the facts?

What is more astounding is that the other major document signed on that day described how Europe’s democracy should be built up using both the Community system and the Human Rights system of the Council of Europe working in conjunction. They have never been published on the Commission’s website.

These democratic foundation stones of Europe, laid by the initial Six Member States, should be at the forefront of the Conference on the Future of Europe, announced for the 9 May 2021.

This is therefore a topic of major importance for every European citizen as well as UK citizens who should have been informed about how the ‘European Union’ should be reformed before the Brexit debate.

I am enclosing my open letter to EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen which includes these major documents and explains their significance. More information can be found on my websites: schuman.info and eurDemocracy.com (where the text can also be found)

Best regards,

David Heilbron Price

 

 

 

 

Schuman Project

Schuman.info

David H Price

Editor

9 April 2021

Dear President von der Leyen,

It is 70 years since the signature on 18 April 1951 of Europe’s founding document for peace, the Treaty of Paris. This created the European Community. It changed the destiny of Europeans who had gone to war every generation for more than two thousand years.

As the European Commission and the other institutions ponder the Future of post-‘Brexit’ Europe in the Conference to be opened on 9 May, I have one request to the leaders, the media and the public.

It is necessary to recall the founding principles of that peace and prosperity. This is not hidden. It is not something that can be changed by our generation. It was written in a document, signed by the plenipotentiary representatives of the Six founding States: France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.

What seems shocking to me is that the European Commission and the other institutions have not published this document. Schuman, a life-long student of democracy, called this the ‘Charter of the Community’ (Pour l’Europe, p146). It describes the Community method and the democratic principles that Europe must build on, in the same way as the United States applied the same eternal laws of human nature and worldly politics.

Schuman’s use of the term ‘Charter’ reflects that of the Magna Carta as a foundational document for British democracy. It distinguishes democratic Europe from the fraudulent ‘People’s Democracies’ of the Soviet eastern bloc. It is the litmus test of true democracy.

About a decade ago I spoke to the French Minister for Europe about publishing this ‘Charter’. He kindly supplied me with a copy from the French Archives. It was published on my website, schuman.info in 2012.

Although I pointed out this remarkable and important document to the Commission President at the time, the full text of the Schuman Declaration and the Charter of the Community has still not been published on the Commission’s own website. The lack of full information about the beginnings of European democracy is a disservice both to the general public, academics, the press and political leaders.

Secondly, while the European Commission has published the ‘full text’ of the Schuman Proposal, a governmental instrument, it has not published the text of his oral Declaration. The Commission website confuses the two: the governmental Proposal is aimed at other governments. The Schuman Declaration includes the explanation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Declaration includes far-reaching clarification of the original proposal agreed by the French Cabinet and signalled simultaneously to other European States via French diplomats or Schuman’s meetings with ambassadors and parliament in Paris on 9 May 1950.

It would be fitting that the foundational documents should be fully published on official websites and recorded in the Official Journal.

Madame President, I am therefore requesting that these historic texts about the Future of Europe be published before the opening of the Conference on Europe on 9 May this year.

Thanking you in advance for your attention to this matter, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

David Heilbron Price

 

Annexes.

 

 

1. Charter of the Community

Declaration of Inter-dependence                           Charter of the Community

Déclaration de l’Europe   Paris le 18 avril 1951

CHARTE DE LA COMMUNAUTE (Pour l’Europe, p146)

Statue Foundatrice de l’ Europe basant sa construction sur les Principes Supranationaux et le libre choix de ses citoyens

Déclaration commune des Ministres 

représentant les Gouvernements signataires du Traité

Le gouvernement de la République fédérale d’Allemagne, le gouvernement belge, le gouvernement français, le gouvernement italien, le gouvernement luxembourgeois et le gouvernement des Pays-Bas :

Considérant que la paix mondiale ne peut être sauvegardée que par des efforts créateurs à la mesure des dangers qui la menacent;

Convaincus que la contribution qu’une Europe organisée et vivante peut apporter à la civilisation est indispensable au maintien de relations pacifiques;

Conscients que l’Europe ne se construira que par des réalisations concrètes créant d’abord une solidarité de fait et par l’établissement de bases communes de développement économique;

Soucieux de concourir par l’expansion de leurs productions fondamentales au relèvement du niveau de vie et au progrès des oeuvres de paix;

Résolus à substituer aux rivalités séculaires une fusion de leurs intérêts essentiels, à fonder par l’instauration d’une communauté économique les premières assises d’une communauté plus large et plus profonde entre des peuples longtemps opposés par des divisions sanglantes, et à jeter les bases d’institutions capables d’orienter un destin désormais partagé,

Ont décidé de créer une Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier.

L’œuvre que nous venons de consacrer par notre signature est due à l’intelligence et à la ténacité de nos délégations et de nos experts; nous leur disons notre très grande gratitude.

Avant même d’être entrée en action, cette oeuvre a déjà, par la vertu de l’idée qui l’inspire, créé dans nos pays et au-delà de leurs frontières des espérances et une confiance tout-à-fait exceptionnelles.

En signant le traité qui institue la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier, communauté de cent soixante millions d’habitants européens, les parties contractantes ont marqué leur résolution de créer la première institution supranationale et de fonder ainsi les assises réelles d’une Europe organisée.

Cette Europe est ouverte à tous les pays européens libres de leur choix. Nous espérons fermement que d’autres pays s’associeront à notre effort.

Pleinement conscients de la nécessité de donner tout son sens à ce premier pas par une action continue et du même ordre dans d’autres domaines, nous avons l’espoir et la volonté de mener à bien, dans l’esprit qui a présidé à l’élaboration de ce traité, les projets qui sont actuellement en préparation. Les travaux se poursuivront en liaison avec les organismes européens existants.

Ces initiatives, dont chacune est limitée dans son objet, devront rapidement s’inscrire dans le cadre d’une communauté politique, dont l’idée s’élabore au Conseil de l’Europe. II devra en résulter une coordination et une simplification de l’ensemble des institutions européennes.

Tous ces efforts sont guidés par la conviction croissante que les pays de l’Europe libre sont solidaires les uns des autres, participent à une destinée commune. Nous consoliderons ce sentiment en associant nos énergies et nos volontés, en harmonisant notre action par des consultations fréquentes et des contacts toujours plus confiants.

Telle est la signification de cette journée. Elle sera comprise, nous n’en doutions pas, par nos opinions publiques et par les Parlements qui seront appelés à se prononcer sur le traité. Les gouvernements ici représentés seront auprès d’eux les interprètes de notre volonté commune de construire et de servir ensemble une Europe pacifique et prospère. »

 

 

2. Schuman Declaration – What Schuman declared

This is followed by the Schuman Proposal agreed by the French Government of Georges Bidault.

It starts “World peace cannot be safeguarded if constructive efforts are not made commensurate with the dangers that threaten it. …”

Full text at https://schuman.info/9May1950.htm

 

NOTE: What distinguishes Democracies — Free Choice (nations libres de leur choix)

The articulation of the ‘Free Choice’ of the Member States distinguishes them from fraudulent ‘People’s Democracies’ and dictatorships. Free societies decide their Community governance according to the most democratic procedures. A Community is created by the will of free people. It is not imposed like the constitutions of the Communist bloc by a party or parties. The Community, as manager of common resources and guardian against war between members, must be more democratic, fairer and more honest than its Member States. It should be a model of democracy for Europe and the world.

The Charter of the Community declares that all Member States

• must safeguard the rights of their citizens before the Council of Europe according to the Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
• No national State that does not adhere to these Fundamental Rights may be admitted to ‘Europe’ whose very definition depends on this Convention of Freedom of Speech, Assembly etc
• The voice of the nation must be respected. For example, Lisbon Treaty and its earlier redaction as the Constitutional Treaty were rejected in national referendums.
• The free will of the people has not been given to the designation of the Commission President or the Commissioners who by law should be independent of political parties, lobbies and outside interests. The original fair system has been replaced by a closed-door horse-trading meeting of politicians.
• Elections have not been held for the Consultative Committees (Economic and Social Committee and Committee of Regions) as assemblies of organised civil society,
• Europe-wide election to the European Parliament (not 27 national elections) under a single statute as repeatedly included in all treaties since 1951 must be held,
• The Court system should be fully independent of governments and outside interests.

 

 

 

 

 

Schuman speaks on Europe’s democratic principles for political union at the signing of the Treaty of Paris 18 April 195 

 

 

Signatories of Europe’s founding treaty, 18 April 1951

 

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Since its creation, the European Union has aimed to become a key international actor, promoting regional integration, democracy, the rule of law and human rights through its numerous international development programmes around the world. Yet, we should not forget a complementary dynamic that is as important as the EU attempts to diffuse its own institutional practices and values. This concerns how the EU learns from other actors, and adapts to practices proposed by other countries and international organizations. Therefore, we need to understand how and if the EU is an adaptive actor. Closely related to this, the European Union has been described as a complex system, due to its institutional structure, evolving nature and its inherent contradictions. The complexity of the EU system means that the European Union learns from its crises, successes and challenges, and adapts, evolves and improves its policy responses. Yet, this tends to happen in complex and unpredictable ways.

Thus, when analyzing the EU we deal with a complex adaptive actor which is also a learning entity. In my article, ‘The European Union: From a Complex Adaptive System to a Policy Interpreter’, I debate how the EU as an international actor opens to the outside environment and learns from it through feedback loops, while adapting as a result of changes that happen outside the EU system of actors. Taking international development as a case study, I show how the EU learns by sensing information and relevant changes in institutional practices and mechanisms of interaction between non-EU actors. Therefore, the EU actors interpret the nature of these changes and the urgency of institutional adaptation, and, subsequently, start to adapt their institutional practices. However, since the EU is a complex system, this adaptation process does not happen in a linear way, and involves reiteration, imperfect adaptation and imitation of institutional practices that contradict other existing EU policies.

I apply this approach in order to discuss the EU efforts for achieving international aid effectiveness. This has involved the EU participation in international forums such as the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda (2008) and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011). In this context, the EU has aimed to adapt its policy practices and carry out development at the most appropriate level, being inclusive in terms of actors and encouraging ownership by the beneficiary country. While the EU was trying to figure out the best policy approaches in order to make the most effective use of its aid budget, non-EU actors started implementing programmes going beyond top‐down approaches and using new policy practices such as horizontal cooperation between peers. This change was due to important changes in international development, former recipients of aid programmes becoming donors on their own (for example, many Latin American and Asian countries). This was mainly through South-South cooperation, allowing middle‐income and developing countries to share ‘knowledge, skills, expertise and resources to meet their development goals through concerted efforts’ (UNOSSC).

The EU aid effectiveness journey included new policy instruments such as the use budget support, a policy instrument aimed to help beneficiary countries to directly finance their national development agendas. Thus, the EU aimed to start building international partnerships with these developing countries. Yet, going beyond these initial approaches, the EU manifested more recently its interest in incorporating horizontal cooperation in its own policies and programmes. This has happened in two main ways. First, this ambition was stated in key EU documents. For example, in its last European Consensus on Development (2017), the EU highlights the desire to build ‘innovative engagement with more advanced developing countries’ and ‘partnerships [which] will promote the exchange of best practices, technical assistance and knowledge sharing [… by working] with these countries to promote South-South and triangular cooperation consistent with development effectiveness principles’. Triangular cooperation, as defined by UNOSSC, ‘involves two or more developing countries in collaboration with a third party, typically a developed-country government or multilateral organization, contributing to the exchanges with its own knowledge and resources’. It offers the opportunity for actors such as the EU to get involved in horizontal cooperation, by partially financing programmes in which countries in the Global South exchange experiences on development lessons, challenges and successes. The second and more recent way in which the EU has showed its interest in incorporating horizontal cooperation between its institutional practices is by starting to finance concrete triangular cooperation programmes such as a regional facility for development in transition for Latin America and the Caribbean, building on best practices taken mainly from Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Costa Rica and Argentina.

These EU attempts to adapt and start using institutional practices which have proved successful in programmes developed by new donors is a complex process in itself. It is complex because it still involves contradictions, and the EU is working in triangular settings based on the idea of horizontality between international actors, but at the same time many of the EU partners still complain about EU conditionality in their bilateral relation. Complexity and adaptability in the EU system are interconnected, and, while we can indeed talk about the EU as an adaptive actor, the complexity of its adaptation processes is a key feature of the EU learning journey. This enables and constrains changes within the EU institutional practices. However, the complexity of the EU as an adaptive actor should not prevent analysts and scholars from approaching this instance of EU actorness that is as relevant as the EU attempts to diffuse its own values and practices.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “The European Union: From a Complex Adaptive System to a Policy Interpreter”

 

 

Ileana Daniela Serban was a postdoctoral researcher in the School of Political Science at Waseda University, Tokyo, where she held a research grant from the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science. She is currently a Lecturer in Public Policy at King’s College, London. Her research interests include global governance, processes of policymaking, EU actorness and new forms of international development cooperation.

https://waseda.academia.edu/IleanaDanielaSerban

@danielaserban9

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University of Luxembourg, Photo taken by Alina Felder during her fieldwork in 2019

Alina Felder

European higher education institutions are receiving substantial attention in various areas of EU policy making. They are expected to foster excellence in research, mobility in education and cohesion through cross-border exchange. Yet, the interrelationship of these different governance sites for a Europe of Knowledge (Gornitzka 2010) appears under investigated. While higher education policy research scrutinizes the multi-level, multi-actor and multi-issue dimensions of governing the European Higher Education Area (Chou et al. 2017), research on European border regions is concerned with day-to-day cooperation practices in the so-called ‘laboratories’ of European integration (e.g. Lechevalier and Wielgohs 2013; Stokłosa 2015). Existing studies on such laboratories among higher education institutions remain at the respective cross-border cooperation level (e.g. Giband and Mary 2018).

 

Entering the laboratories of Europeanization in the area of higher education

In my work I depart from previous research by analyzing the relationship among higher education (policy) actors both at the level of cross-border cooperation and between the (sub)national and EU levels. Data was gathered through semi-structured interviews with cross-border cooperating higher education institution representatives at rector and administrative level, (sub)national political actors and higher education institution associations. The higher education (HE) institutions concerned by my research are those, which receive(d) funding through European Territorial Cooperation, better known as Interreg. Next to reasons of accessibility, the cases for comparative analysis were selected with different starting points in the support provided through EU funds. While the University of the Greater Region – involving six HE institutions from Belgium, Germany, France, and Luxemburg – was established due to Interreg funding in 2008, the International University of Lake Constance – a cooperation among 30 HE institutions from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland – was already established in 1999, prior to receiving EU funding in 2009.

While in the first case, Interreg has favoured a cooperation, which would not have emerged otherwise, my analysis reveals that Europeanization also matters for the already existing cooperation structures and issues. If conceived of as an opportunity and resource, Interreg is thus used to establish new or facilitate existing cross-border cooperation. Analysing how Interreg affects the cross-border cooperation among higher education institutions, delivers insights into concrete Europeanization processes, i.e. ‘processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of […] rules, procedures, policy paradigms, […] and shared beliefs and norms, which are […] consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic […] discourse, political structures and public policie’ (Radaelli 2004, p. 3).

Concerning the Europeanization of cross-border cooperating higher education institutions, such diffusion and institutionalisation manifests itself in the objectives guiding cross-border cooperation practices. Under Interreg IV (2007-2013), the University of the Greater Region was established as a project to ‘strengthen cooperation in the area of higher education’, whereas the International University of Lake Constance received Interreg funding to ‘foster knowledge transfer’ for regional competitiveness. Beyond these generic objectives, the gathered data suggests academic, economic, political, financial, and socio-cultural objectives for the cross-border cooperation among higher education institutions. Interreg serves to achieve these objectives and was thus used to establish and/ or facilitate cross-border cooperation. The required structural changes to implement the Interreg funding accordingly were moderate in both cases and the objectives stemming from the EU level could easily be accommodated.

 

Accounting for (Europeanized) objectives of cross-border cooperation

While higher education institution members more clearly distinguished between academic and economic objectives of cross-border cooperation, political actors referred to these as strongly intertwined by mentioning objectives such as the development of skilled labour force to prevent brain drain. At the same time, certain higher education institution representatives explained how the cross-border cooperation of their institutions is not only supposed to contribute to a specific economic area but also to a space to live, to study and to conduct research. Concerning the academic objectives of cross-border cooperation, proximity was mentioned as an asset for joint research projects, even though research is highly internationalised. Joint course offers were an initial goal in the beginning of both cases. Yet, organisational, legal and practical obstacles concerning different schedules, degree requirements and language barriers were unfavourable to increasing the regional mobility of students and staff. The comparatively smaller size of the University of the Greater Region and, thus, stronger administrative support has allowed maintaining the existing and establishing new joint study programs.

Regarding political objectives, higher education institution representatives point to the contribution of cross-border cooperation towards the internationalisation strategies of their institutions. This is especially valid for smaller higher education institutions. In this vein, political actors refer to how the cooperation across borders helps to increase the attention towards areas that are peripheral in the respective national contexts. Academic staff and political actors alike have outlined the cooperation framework as a role model, for example, for the effective implementation of innovation policies or for the successful cross-border cooperation (among higher education institutions).

In terms of financial drivers, higher education institution representatives relate to how cross-border cooperation is a means to increase access to national and/or EU funding, where pre-existing cooperation relationships are an asset to acquire funding. However, the administrative effort and high co-funding rates of EU funding weakens its role as a driver for cross-border cooperation. Finally, cultural and organisational differences appear as two sides of a coin in both cases, so that higher education institution representatives highlighted the benefits of learning from differences in the approaches to teaching, researching and providing students with advice on international and professional experiences.

 

A highly political endeavour to fulfil the increasing responsibilities of higher education

Common beliefs and interests have been essential not only in establishing, but also in maintaining cross-border cooperation. The identified objectives for cooperation suggest that these common interests are mainly of academic and political nature. Additionally, the idea to fulfil the perceived increasing responsibilities of HE institutions also played a significant role. This reflects the EU’s social investment narrative establishing a ‘linear relationship between knowledge […] and economic performance’ (Telling and Serapioni 2019, p. 401). Just as any cross-border cooperation endeavour (Scott 2014) the cross-border cooperation among higher education institutions is highly political, so that its stakeholders attempt to influence (supra)national policies for more favourable conditions and sustainable funding sources for cross-border cooperation.

 

This blog post is based on my paper published as part of the Eastern Journal of European Studies Special Issue ‘Cross border cooperation and peripheral areas in Europe’ edited by Tomás Lopes Cavalheiro Ponce Dentinho. Here you can access the article in full.

 

Alina Felder is a doctoral fellow at the Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences (BAGSS). In her PhD project she explores the under investigated cross-roads of EU regional policy with the area of higher education policy. The central question of her dissertation is how EU regional policy instruments influence the cross-border cooperation among higher education institutions and their attempts to shape EU knowledge policies. Her research interests thus include Europeanization processes that are induced through network modes of governance the EU is establishing and encouraging public and private actors to participate in. Next to her research, Alina regularly works in political education contexts.

 

References

Meng-Hsuan Chou, Jens Jungblut, Pauline Ravinet & Martina Vukasovic (2017) Higher education governance and policy: an introduction to multi-issue, multi-level and multi-actor dynamicy. In Policy and Society, 36:1, pp. 1-15, DOI: 10.1080/14494035.2017.1287999

Giband, David; Mary, Kevin (2018): Territorial cross-border cooperation in higher education. A case study of the eastern Pyrenean border. In Documents d’Anàlisi Geográfica 64 (3), pp. 587-601. DOI: 10.5565/rev/dag.516.

Gornitzka, Åse (2010): Bologna in Context. A horizontal perspective on the dynamics of governance sites for a Europe of Knowledge. In European Journal of Education 45 (4), pp. 535–548. DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-3435.2010.01452.x

Lechevalier, Arnaud; Wielgohs, Jan (Eds.) (2014): Borders and Border Regions in Europe. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Radaelli, Claudio M. (2004): Europeanisation: Solution or problem? In European Integration online Papers 8 (16), pp. 1-24.

Scott, James W. (2014): From Euphoria to Crisis. Cross-Border Cooperation, Euroregions and Cohesion. In: Luis Dominguez Castro und Iva Miranda Pires (Eds.): Cross-Border Cooperation Structures in Europe. Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future. Brussels: Peter Lang, pp. 81-94.

Stokłosa, Katarzyna (2015): Border Regions as Laboratories of European Integration. In: Elzbieta Opilowska and Jochen Roose (Ed.): Microcosm of European integration. The German-Polish border regions in transformation. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 16-31.

Telling, Kathryn; Serapioni, Martino (2019): The rise and change of the competence strategy: Reflections on twenty-five years of skills policies in the EU. In European Educational Research Journal 18 (4), pp. 387-406. DOI: 10.1177/1474904119840558.

 

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Introduction

Previously, I introduced my ideas of reforming the pillars of the European political system – in accordance with the principles discussed in other articles too (see Debut, Suffrage) – in four volumes: European electoral system, European Parliament, European Government, and the European Presidential Council and the President of the Republic of the United Europe. In this last volume, I intend to summarise the coexistence of the aforesaid European institutions, presenting a general overview of their roles and function in the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE).

 

The institutions of the European Union versus of the Republic of the United Europe

Originally, the institutional structure of the EU was designed to serve a small group of states in a very different era and international context. Overgrown and obsolete, this political system is unable to serve a Union of 27 member states in a world that is full of new global challenges. In order to triumph over the difficulties Europe faces, the member states of the European Union must step forward together by forming a proper political alliance, creating a new political system, which is both legitimate and efficient. Encouraged by historic examples (e.g. the Republic of Rome) and contemporary alternatives (e.g. the US), whilst using the EU’s current structure as a base, the Republic of the United Europe has every tool to succeed in this quest.

Arguably, the member states of the RUE need to transfer some of their sovereign powers to a more efficient decision-making mechanism on a European level to ensure efficiency, security, and prosperity. In return, the member states must receive guarantees that they and their interests are not to be bypassed in policy-making.

After introducing an enlightened electoral system, the composition of the European Parliament (or EP) will be different, as the role of national parties and national interests will be neutralised. Instead, pan-Europarties along European interests are going to enjoy a wider range of authority, of which one is the formation of the European Government (or EG). The EG and its ministries (led by the Prime Minister of the RUE) will replace both the European Commission (and its Directorates-Generals) and the Council of the European Union to be the executive branch of the RUE, outranking the national governments in the legal hierarchy. Its members are not going to be appointed by the national governments anymore, but by and from the directly elected MEPs, meaning more legitimacy and transparency.

This might seem as the European institutions’ rule over the member states, which authority comes from the necessary pro-European nature of the political system. However, upgrading the European Council to a European Presidential Council (or EPC), and introducing a single representative person, is an efficient way to counterbalance the EP and the EG with a pro-nation-state European institution. The elected heads of state and government of the EPC will directly and exclusively select the President of the Republic of the United Europe (or President) from their own members, and are going to be responsible for setting the general political direction of Europe by proposing, encouraging, or blocking certain policies of the EP and the EG through the President.

 

Authority, responsibility, and function

Certificated voters (who earned the right to vote) are going to determine the composition of their national and European parliaments. As the national elections are going to remain the subject of national regulations, it does not have to be discussed here. The seat allocation in the European Parliament is going to be determined by the pan-Europarties’ overall election results based on a transnational party-list proportional representative system. The national branches of the pan-Europarties are going to get seats allocated along a certain distribution mechanism (based on the figures of turnout and election result), forming the European Parliament, which is going to have an exclusive supranational legislative authority, meaning that its rule of law is effective in every member state of the Republic of the United Europe. The EP is accountable to the European citizens and will be responsible for approving the budget – and monitoring its implementation –, and for forming and supervising the European Government.

The lead candidate of the winning pan-Europarty is going to be promoted by the EP to be the Prime Minister of the Republic of the United Europe, and will be tasked to form the government (and its ministries). Being the executive branch of the RUE, the EG is going to be responsible for legislation proposal (and execution), budget preparation, and administration. As a supranational government, the EG will set the frames and directives of policy-making, which must be applied by the national governments, ensuring that the ship of Europe is steered in the same direction, but leaving plenty of room to the national governments to implement their own policies within the frames. The EG is accountable to the EP.

Both the European Government (led by the Prime Minister of the RUE) and the European Parliament will have a natural pro-European affiliation – latter being the bastion of Europe. In order to guarantee the sovereignty and interests of the member states, the European political system necessitates a strong counterbalance in the form of the European Presidential Council (formed by the heads of state or government, or their envoys). Apart from proposing the President of the EP and appointing the President of the Central Bank of Europe (as it will be called in the RUE), it is in the EPC’s exclusive authority to select the President of the Republic of the United Europe from its own members, and to form his or her political advisory body. As indicated by its membership and powers, the EPC can rightly be called the bastion of nation-states.

The President is the highest executive authority in the united Europe (outranking the PM of the RUE): commander-in-chief of the common European army, head of intelligence, and in charge of all matters related to foreign affairs. Besides, the President has legislative initiative and the right to veto any legislation (including the budget proposal) or the appointment of the PM once. The President serves an unlimited term, which is necessary to ensure political stability and efficiency. In order to avoid tyranny, the President can be removed from office on a political or legal basis. Former could be initiated by referendum, by the EP, and by the EPC; whereas the latter can be set in motion by the European Court of Justice. The President should be immune to political impeachment in the first three years in office to ensure stability, and could be initiated afterwards once in half a year or once in a year (by the same branch). At any stage of either political or legal impeachment, the European Accountability Committee’s involvement as preparing an independent expert report is important and necessary.

Whilst the European Parliament is going to be in the centre of the European political system – due to its ratification powers, appointment of PM, control over the EG, role in impeaching the President, etc. –, the European Government will have an essential role in proposing legislation to the EP and in executing them on the level of member states. The duty of the President of the RUE is to ensure that national interests are considered and national sovereignty is guaranteed in the European political system, thus, together with the European Presidential Council, having a pro-nation-state affiliation. By having a wide selection of political tools via strong powers, the President can either significantly block the initiatives of the EG or EP, or boost them enormously, providing a very efficient and powerful, but also safe and legitimate decision-making mechanism. It is going to be of key importance that the Prime Minister and the President have a good working relationship.

It is essential that in crucial matters none of the institutions can be bypassed. For instance, the budgetary process is initiated by the EG by drafting the proposal and putting it forward to the EP, which should approve or reject it, whilst the President has the right to veto the proposal at any stage. However, in foreign affairs, the President has the right to set certain policies and sanction crucial decisions (the PM of the RUE has no functions abroad), but these should be discussed and approved by the relevant ministries of the EG, and could be blocked by a certain majority of the EP. Regarding the amendment of the European constitution, the two-third of the MEPs and the three-quarter of the EPC members must agree, ensuring that any changes are supported by a general consensus between both representative bodies.

 

Conclusion

Efficiency, legitimacy, and balance are the three most important features of the reformed European political system. It is efficient, because it is expert and decisive compared to the current one. It is legitimate, because both the members of the European Parliament and of the European Presidential Council are directly elected either on a European or on a national election; therefore, the members of the European Government and the figure of the President of the RUE are promoted lawfully. It is balanced, because it maintains the equilibrium of the collective interests of Europe and the individual interests of the nation-states, whilst guaranteeing the sovereignty of the latter in a potentially fragile relationship.

The political system of the Republic of the United Europe is going to empower the leaders of Europe to succeed in reforming the economy, the social system, and the armed forces, whilst setting a bald new foreign policy, elevating Europe to be the leading global power.

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The most emblematic example of how sport is used as an icebreaker in international relations is no doubt the visit, between 10 and 17 April 1971, of nine American table tennis players to the People’s Republic of China, an event known worldwide as ‘ping pong diplomacy’.

(Screenshot from History Pod)

A lot has been said and written about this remarkable initiative that prudently paved the way for the opening on diplomatic relations between the USA and the PRC and allowed to envisage the presidential visit of Richard Nixon, who travelled to China less than a year later.

As Stuart Murray puts it in his 2018 theory of Sports Diplomacy, this landmark case study perfectly illustrates ‘the power of sport to transcend diplomatic estrangement’ (p. 74). He is right: sport can celebrate humanistic values in a highly accessible, immediately understandable message, while keeping ideological divisions below the carpet.

50 years later: diplomatic estrangement 2.0

Almost ironically, the fiftieth anniversary of this masterpiece of diplomatic craftsmanship happens to fall into a period of a new ‘diplomatic estrangement’ , unexpected in both its suddenness and intensity, and following a period of three decades of consistent deepening of economic and political ties between China and what must well be called ‘the West’.

The bipolar configuration that seems to emerge has prompted a lot of talk in the media about a new ‘Cold War’, but the metaphor is misleading. If my memory serves me well, there was not the slightest hint at economic interdependence between the two opposing sides at the time when I was stationed as a Bundeswehr Cold War soldier in Bavaria in the early eighties, guarding a forest full of Pershing missiles pointing east. And there was a solid conviction that the West simply was stronger than its ideological opponent, simply because it had universal values of democracy, human rights, or the rule of law on its side.

Today, both on the economic and ideological level, China is setting the agenda. As leading sinologists have shown, China has successfully entered the competition about semantics in an effort to re-define key concepts of politics and diplomacy. As a result, there is no such thing anymore as universal values, but only Western concepts of neo-colonial intent that the rest of world would do well to reject. And as leading economists never tire of reminding us, China will overtake the US as the world’s leading economy (in GDP, at least) by 2030 at the latest.

In 2021, the tensions, the rhetoric, and the susceptibilities on either side are such that the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, signed in a hurry at the end of the German Council presidency in December (and deemed insufficient in terms of reciprocity, sustainability, and human rights) has good chances of not being ratified. Which in turn would no doubt further deepen the rift.

Could a new sport diplomacy help?

While many in Europe feel it’s time to stand firm and push back the PRC’s current aggressive ‘wolf-warrior’ approach to international relations, there are also good reasons to argue in favour of a pacification of EU/US-China relations. Sooner or later, there will be a need of a face-saving area in which careful rapprochement is imaginable again. I would not be surprised if culture in general, and sport in particular, were floated as non-conflictual communication channels capable of highlighting commonalities rather than antagonisms.

Alas, this time around, sport diplomacy does not seem to be in a position to do its soothing work.

This is paradoxical, since, if anything, it has significantly grown in importance over recent decades. A number of nation-states (including the US, China and EU member states) are implementing full-fledged sport diplomacy strategies in support of their foreign policy objectives.

Even a non-state actor as the European Union has discovered sport’s potential for its external relations since article 165 of the Lisbon Treaty kindly granted it a competence in the field. The ERASMUS+ programme allows to reach neighbouring countries in numerous grassroots projects, involving a flurry of civil society organisations. And under the previous Commission, sport was explicitly added to the “high-level EU-China people-to-people dialogue”, with the aim of reinforcing (much needed) mutual understanding and trust.

At the same time, rather than an icebreaker, sport seems to work like a freezer in relations with the PRC. As episodes likes Mesut Özil’s removal from social media and video games in China or the temporary fallout between the NBA and Chinese television have illustrated, sport has itself become a political minefield.

In Germany, following a wish expressed by Angela Merkel and Xi Jinping, the football association arranged for the Chinese under-20 national team to be integrated into a regular regional championship (comparable to League Two in England), with the aim to help them progress in contact with European football. But the first fixture in November 2017 ended in a diplomatic scandal because of the presence of six peaceful pro-Tibet activists among the four hundred spectators in a Mainz neighbourhood. And since the German FA did not want to apologise for a harmless, spontaneous use of the freedom of expression, the project was stopped.

Instead of calls for a new ping pong diplomacy, what can be heard are calls for boycotting the Winter Olympics in Beijing next February. They are not likely to be followed by any of the national sports delegations, but their very existence and audibility are a good reminder of sport diplomacy’s flip side, where the refusal to engage in sporting encounters becomes a negative diplomatic tool in its own right (as Simon Rofe’s edited volume on Sport and Diplomacy illustrates in several case studies in it’s third part).

The ping pong diplomacy of 1971 deserves to be celebrated as a landmark of China’s long march back into the international diplomatic community. In the 21st century, sport diplomacy, despite being a helpful foreign policy tool in many configurations, will hardly be able to do the trick again in the West’s relations with the PRC.

 

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Introduction

In my previous articles, I covered the reformation of the European electoral system (see Reform #2 vol. 1) and the European Parliament (or EP, see Reform #2 vol. 2), and the introduction of the European Government (or EG, see Reform #2 vol. 3) as crucial elements of reforming the European political system, in which both the EP and the EG are predestined to enhance the principle of “more Europe less nation-state” in order to serve the general interests of all European. Despite the necessity of power transition from the member states to Europe, it is imperative to counterbalance the pro-European institutions with powerful pro-nation-state institutions, guaranteeing the proper representation and the sovereignty of the member states within the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE). In this volume, I intend to introduce the European Presidential Council led by the President of the Republic of the United Europe as the guarantors and protectors of the nation-states’ European interests – superseding the European Council.

 

The European Council

The European Council (or EUCO) is a fully recognised European institution (since the Lisbon Treaty), which’s main role is setting the general political direction of the EU by adopting so-called conclusions (the identification of issues and solutions). Although, the EUCO does not act as a legislating institution, it defines the principles of and decides on common foreign and security policy (e.g. international terrorism, relations with Russia, enlargement of the EU). The EUCO is formed by the heads of state or government of the member states and by the non-voting President of the European Commission. The President of the European Council (the office currently held by Charles Michel) has a mandate for two and a half years, which is renewable once.

It is in the EUCO’s authority to appoint its own President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the President of the European Central Bank; moreover, to propose a candidate for President of the European Commission, and to informally and indirectly influence police and justice planning, the composition of the EC, the suspension of membership rights, etc.

As far as I am aware, the only suggestions made so far related to the improvement of the European Council would degrade the role of the institution by turning it into a sort of upper house of the European Parliament (as discussed in volumes 2 and 3). That would be a huge mistake and could never be agreed on amongst the member states, as it would most certainly result in the nation-states’ total loss of political control on a European level. Therefore, I reject these theories, proposing a new one instead.

 

The European Presidential Council and the President of the Republic of the United Europe

In my proposal, the European Presidential Council (or EPC) is still going to be formed by the heads of state or government of the member states, but in the new formation, they can delegate envoys instead of themselves. The envoy has to be an elected representative in his or her member state as a precondition, and will enjoy the same rights and equality in the EPC (e.g. voting rights), except that he or she cannot be appointed to be President. Similarly to the EUCO, the EPC would remain rather informal, when it comes to legislation or decision-making (apart from proposing the President of the EP and appointing the Executive Board of the Central Bank of Europe), continuing to serve its duty of general political encouragement. As an important addition to that function, the most important and distinct role of the EPC is the selection of the President of the Republic of the United Europe (or President) from its own members, and forming the political advisory body to the President. In other words, the national leaders keep the President under a slight political pressure and control. By becoming the EPC, the EUCO might lose its current political weight as a collective body, but it also gains multiplied rights and powers by vesting its full potency into one person, whom it selects itself from its own ranks. It is essential to highlight that the role of the EPC can be fully understood only in unison with the function of the President of the RUE.

Referring to the values of democracy and legitimacy, many are eager to have a European president directly elected by the citizens of Europe. However, I find this theory rather unfair and even dangerous. Should the President of the RUE be elected directly, candidates of more populous, larger, and more advanced member states would almost certainly dominate the elections. Besides, all sorts of radicalism could find its way to the highest executive power of Europe with ease, unleashing mountains of disasters potentially. Therefore, I find it wiser to trust the EPC, whose members are elected officials with experience and expertise, to appoint one of their own.

Self-evidently, the President of the Republic of the United Europe must be a head of state or government in order to be an electable member of the European Presidential Council (as envoys do not count), meaning that the President elect is an elected official in his or her member state already – ensuring legitimacy. Should one of the candidates get the majority of the votes, the selection is over; if none of the candidates is trusted with a qualified majority, a second vote must be held, at which the members of the EPC must decide between those two aspirants, who received most of the votes in the first round. The selection of the President of the RUE is the exclusive right and main responsibility of the EPC, meaning that neither the EP nor the EG has a say in the process. Should the President-elect accept the office of Presidency, the resignation of his or her current office is absolutely mandatory.

The President of the Republic of the United Europe is the highest executive authority in the European superstate, whilst he or she is the commander-in-chief of the common European army and intelligence services, the most significant representative of the RUE abroad (outranking the Minister of Foreign Affairs), and the agenda-setter of European foreign policy. Every serious decision regarding foreign affairs must be approved and sanctioned by the President (e.g. declaration of war, entering or quitting a contract, diplomatic agreements). Additionally, the President has legislative initiative, approves the budget in every three years (proposed by the EG and accepted by the EP first), and can be granted with exclusive rights (power of attorney). In case of emergency (e.g. epidemic, state of war, natural disaster, economic crisis), the solutions of normalcy do not function. Extraordinary times demand a different type of leadership, but only as long as it is absolutely necessary (e.g. the institution of dictator in the Republic of Rome). For instance, in times of peace and prosperity, the member states and the EP enjoy extensive liberties, but in a state of emergency, these liberties shrink in favour of security. Should the three-quarter of the MEPs see it necessary, the EP has the rights to declare a state of emergency, granting the President absolute powers for a certain period of at least one, but of maximum twelve months.

The President of the Republic of the United Europe represents both the national and European interests, whilst co-ordinating them. The President and the Prime Minister have a tight working relationship, and are both authorised with executive powers. In legal hierarchy, the President outranks the Prime Minister, as the former can veto the decisions of the latter – once. The President of the RUE is a de facto branch of the nation-states within the executive branch of the European political system, whereas the PM of the RUE is the de facto branch of Europe. They shall work together as the Roman consuls did in the Republic of Rome; the President as Consul Maior and the Prime Minister as Consul Minor. The PM of the RUE is also the Vice President of the RUE at the same time, meaning that he or she is the acting President until the next President is selected, should the office be vacated unexpectedly.

It is crucial that the President of the RUE does not serve a limited term of office, meaning that he or she remains in office until his physical and mental medical conditions allow it or gets impeached (similarly to the Chief of Justice in the US). At first glance, it might seem to be the hotbed of tyranny, threatening the usurpation of ultimate executive power for unlimited time for one person. However, the President has no legislative power, as he can only start a debate, propose a law, and use its right to veto. It is my explicit opinion that the role and function of the office of Presidency – under sufficient parliamentary control – is the key to a successful, acting, and efficient European superstate. In terms of decisiveness, the undeniable success is to be seen in China and the US, with a significant difference that the President of the RUE is under a much stronger democratic control.

In the new European political system, the President is a legitimately elected figure, who passed several filters in order to be trusted with a wide-ranging executive power, whilst the office would not violate the principle of constitutionality or rule of law. This extraordinarily broad means of power will appear the most characteristically in issues related to foreign and defence affairs; in the means of domestic, economic, and financial areas will not be so remarkable. However, the most important tool to curb the President’s power is the right to call a motion of no-confidence (or political impeachment), which permits the EP and the EPC to force the President to resign.

Despite the broad executive power the President of the RUE enjoys, the European Parliament keeps the President in check as he or she can be impeached on a political basis, which is debated and decided by the EP. There are several ways to initiate it: via a referendum or petition (quarter of the citizens eligible to vote, from half of the member states), via the EP (third of the MEPs from three pan-Europarties), or via the EPC (half of the members). Should one of these methods be successful, the EP is obliged to hold a debate, and vote on removing the President from office (political impeachment). During the debate, the European Accountability Committee (or EAC, see in volume 2) has to prepare an official and professional legal report on the matter, which must be taken into account at the MEPs’ vote. Should the number of those, who support the removal of the President, not reach 50%, he or she can stay in office. Should the number of those, who support the removal of the President, reach more than 50%, but less than 67%, the EP can oblige the EPC to hold an open vote within their ranks, and decide on the President’s removal by absolute majority. Should the number of those, who support the removal of the President, reach 67% in the EP, he or she must resign, and the procedure of new selection must start. The President of the RUE enjoys political immunity in the first three years of the Presidency, ensuring political stability, but after that, the procedure of political impeachment can be initiated once a year from the same branch or in every half a year from different branches. In case of legal offence, the procedure of legal impeachment could be initiated, meaning the European Court of Justice – working together with the EAC – would investigate matters, present it to the EP, and then the MEPs would decide on the case.

 

Conclusion

The fact that political clashes do not happen only between different parties with different ideologies, but also between European and national institutions, make it necessary to establish a powerful executive authority, which is able and willing to guarantee that the nation-states cannot be bypassed in the European political system. It is important not to reduce the powers of European institutions (EP and EG), but to counterbalance them, meaning that both branches and levels can work to their best efficiency, whilst none of them gets uncontrollably powerful. The European Parliament and the European Government must be allowed to be powerful enough to work for the greater good of all European, being the bastions of Europe. On the other hand, the European Presidential Council and the President of the Republic of the United Europe must ensure that this work does not get derailed into the submission of nation-states, whilst also channelling and guiding the European superstate’s general direction of politics, being the bastions of nation-states. This is an enormous guarantee the nation-states can find in the EPC and the President.

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Why would one want to understand the conditions that have allowed for the establishment of the European Union’s (EU) external higher education policy? Because these insights help to get one’s head around the externalisation trends in other fields of EU supporting and shared competence, from energy to health and migration. They also have relevant, practical implications for policy-makers desirous of extending EU external action.

The EU’s external action portfolio has been continuously broadening over the past decades, including in unlikely, originally internal policy areas of limited legal competence. The question of how and – especially – why the EU engages externally in these areas has however only recently made it onto the agenda of EU scholars. A 2020 article by Schunz and Damro, for instance, examined the emergence of EU external action on culture, an area of supporting competence. As another key example of a (sub-)national prerogative, the case of higher education policy is particularly puzzling. In this blog post, we summarise the empirical insights and the explanatory framework – drawing on the concepts of ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘policy entrepreneurship’ – that we develop in our recent JCMS article.

The emergence and development of the external dimensions of EU higher education policy have been dynamic processes, as the below graph shows. Beyond the peculiar Bologna process, which started outside of, but was gradually integrated into the EU framework, the EU’s core activities in the realm of higher education have – since 2014 – been integrated in the Erasmus+ programme. While this new framework has systematised the ongoing internationalisation of higher education policies, the initial steps towards EU external engagement in this field were taken well before. They came, predominantly, in the form of tailored programmes targeting institutions and students outside the Union’s borders. Two key examples are the TEMPUS (1990) and the Erasmus Mundus (2003/04) programmes. Understanding which circumstances, intentions and actors enabled the establishment of these programmes provides the basis for reflecting on their implications in the final part of the blog post.

 

Graph: Key developments in the ‘externalisation’ of EU Higher Education Policy
Source: Authors’ compilation

 

The case of TEMPUS

The university support and cooperation scheme TEMPUS was established in 1989/1990 as a part of the European Community’s comprehensive response to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the ensuing democratization of the Central and Eastern European countries. Action in the realm of higher education was seen as essential to foster open societies in states like Poland or Czechoslovakia. This thinking was, most notably, informed by the successful start of the Erasmus exchange programme.

During that period, a relatively small group of policy entrepreneurs, spearheaded by the head of the Taskforce’s COMETT unit, David O’Sullivan, and driven by their idea(l)s, used the experience of the Erasmus exchange programme to react to the opportunity provided by the fall of the Wall by proposing TEMPUS. They were able to get their proposal adopted by building an inter-institutional coalition around their project and securing the broad political support – in the Commission, among the member states, and in the European Parliament – necessary for earmarking the additional financial resources.

 

The case of Erasmus Mundus

Ten years after TEMPUS, it was the 2000 Lisbon Strategy that encapsulated the EU’s new ambition in the field of higher education in response to the global discourses on ‘knowledge economies’, promoted among others by the OECD. Interestingly, it was the ‘TEMPUS unit’ of the newly established Directorate-General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) that was able to synthesise the zeitgeist in developing Erasmus Mundus. Inspired by the ‘Fulbright Program’ , Erasmus Mundus meant to improve the Union’s position in the worldwide ‘race for brains’ by – among others – attracting non-EU students with scholarships for joint study programmes.

Tracing the activities of Martin Westlake and Augusto Gonzalez, head and deputy head of the TEMPUS unit, between 2001 and 2003, when Erasmus Mundus was adopted, represents a prime example of successful policy entrepreneurship by Commission officials that capitalised on the expertise built up with Tempus and their convening power within the Commission and across EU institutions and member states. Their efforts benefitted from the eager support of external stakeholders (e.g. the European University Association) to foster an externalisation agenda on EU higher education policy.

 

The pattern

The comparison of the processes leading to the creation of these two landmark external higher education programmes suggests a clear-cut pattern regarding the emergence of EU external action in originally internal policy domains: for one, specific ‘policy windows’ open when external events and global discourses (‘opportunity’) coincide and resonate with EU internal structures and policy experiences (‘presence’); it then takes agency: policy entrepreneurs that address these policy windows by using their expertise and networks in order to build broad coalitions in favour of an ‘externalisation agenda’. These policy-makers are regularly driven by their normative convictions – in the case of higher education they believed in the value of responding to internationalisation trends and using higher education as a means of enhancing cooperation with third countries –, but also broader prospects for economic growth as well as their personal career ambitions.

 

The academic and practical implications

This pattern has both scholarly and policy implications that transcend the case of EU higher education policy. Academically, the co-existence of a ‘policy window’ and strong policy entrepreneurship seem to be able to explain how and why the EU engages externally even in the unlikely cases of EU policy fields of supporting/shared competence. This pattern can currently be observed in the way EU policy-makers are in the process of expanding EU external action in health policy, a supporting competence, in the context of the policy window provided by the Covid-19 pandemic.

From a policy perspective, our insights show that the trend towards an ever-broader EU external policy portfolio may well continue. What it takes are policy entrepreneurs capable of framing their externalisation proposals in ways that resonate with (interpretations of) external trends and are strongly informed by previous EU policy experiences. If they get this framing right, these entrepreneurs can capitalise on their knowledge of the EU’s internal policy process to gradually co-opt additional actors into a pro-external action coalition in a specific field. While not specifically analysed in this study, the relevance of personal networks converging around certain ideas around the need for such a policy expansion –inside and outside the institutions – strongly suggests itself in both case studies.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “Opportunity, presence and entrepreneurship: why the European Union acts externally on higher education”.

 

 

Carsten Gerards is Ph.D. candidate at Leiden University (Institute of Security and Global Affairs) and Senior Academic Assistant in the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department at the College of Europe (Bruges).

 

 

 

Simon Schunz is Professor in the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department at the College of Europe (Bruges).

 

 

 

 

Chad Damro is Senior Lecturer of Politics and International Relations, Dean International – Europe and Co-Director of the Europa Institute at the University of Edinburgh.

 

 

 

 

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On 25 November 2020, in a surprising move away from its previous positions, the European Parliament voted in favour of making European Union (EU) aid conditional to developing countries’ compliance with migration management measures. This is only the most recent episode in a decade-long process whereby European policy-makers link migration and development policies. As part of a special issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies on the politicization of European development, we analyzed the migration-development nexus through parliamentary discussions around the EU Migration Trust Fund.

Migration has become a highly contested policy issue across Europe. Populist and radical right parties have played a key role in the politicization of the so-called refugee crisis. In contrast, development policy remains a largely technocratic area. To be sure, European aid has clearly become more ‘political’ in the sense of being subordinated to foreign and security policy goals. However, it has barely been ‘politicized’ defined as being a matter of public discussion and polarized opinions.

Then, what happens when both policy domains become intertwined? Following the logic of ‘horizontal politicization’ that the special issue advances, we had expected that the hotly debated domain of migration would contaminate the hitherto shielded discussions on foreign aid. In other words, we thought that the migration-development nexus would spur the politicization of development policy.

However, our research shows that the opposite has happened, and that development policy has instead served as a useful de-politicization device for mainstream political parties in Europe. The study also points to some nuances regarding the extent to which and the way in which the migration-development nexus has been politicized.

Empirically, we focus on debates the Migration Trust Fund – officially the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) – in eight European parliaments. The EUTF constitutes the most ambitious and comprehensive EU initiative that links migration and development. It was established at the 2015 Valetta Summit to address the ‘root causes of destabilization, forced displacement and irregular migration’ and has since then pooled 4.5 billion Euro of pledged contributions from EU institutions and member states.

First, there is significant variation in the extent to which the EUTF was politicized in European parliaments. Employing a two-dimensional framework that includes issue salience (i.e. the relative number of actors intervening) and the polarization of opinions (i.e. the scope of conflict), we can discern different degrees of politicization. Whereas the EUTF has been debated considerably in the Swedish and Dutch parliaments, politicization was only medium in Germany and Denmark, and even low in Italy, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom.

These differences between member states might be explained by various factors including variation in their financial contribution to the Migration Trust fund, in their identities as aid donors, and in their parliamentary debating culture. While this remains to be researched further, it seems that politicization has overall been limited compared to other domains of EU (external) policies such as migration and trade. Even in Sweden and the Netherlands, it would be vastly exaggerated to say that the EUTF debates have dominated the parliamentary agenda. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that parliamentarians in these countries not only had more discussions on the EUTF (‘salience’) but also and more importantly that they displayed more diverse views (‘polarization’) on the nexus than in the other countries of our study.

Second, there are indeed various understandings in Europe on how migration and development policy should be related. In the article we elaborate a framework with five views – discursive constructions or ‘argumentation lines’ – on the nexus. First, the ‘preventive development-oriented’ view stresses that underdevelopment leads to migration and advocates more ‘traditional’ aid. Second, the ‘restrictive migration-oriented’ view emphasizes that (irregular) migration leads to underdevelopment, thereby justifying restrictive migration and migration-oriented development policies. Third, the ‘dominance of national interests’ view problematizes both immigration and development policy, arguing for restrictive national migration governance and abolishment of development aid respectively. Fourth, the ‘development against migration’ view also argues for restrictive national migration governance although development policy can be continued if it becomes migration-oriented. Fifth, and final, the ‘migration as a catalyst for development’ view rejects restrictive migration policies and the use of aid for this purpose.

Interestingly, only the first and second view construct the nexus. At first sight these seem to represent opposing perspectives. Existing studies have indeed depicted ‘preventive’ versus ‘restrictive’ views as two extremes on a continuum. However, our findings suggest that they could constitute a coin with two sides. While the former is ambiguous on how restrictive migration policy should be, the latter allows for continuation of aid as long as it becomes encapsulated in restrictive migration governance. The former’s point that migration is caused by underdevelopment is not incompatible with the latter’s argument that migration causes underdevelopment.

These discursive ambiguities basically allow for the compromise that respectively centre-left and centre-right European parties in government have forged through initiatives such as the Migration Trust Fund: development aid combined with restrictive migration. Meanwhile, our analysis also shows that challenging parties at the right (third view, e.g. Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands and Swedish Democrats in Sweden; and fourth view, e.g. Vlaams Belang in Belgium, AfD in Germany and Lega Nord in Italy) and left (fifth view, e.g. GroenLinks in the Netherlands and Vänsterpartiet in Sweden) put less effort in constructing a nexus. To the extent that their members of parliament do politicize these matters, they rather seek to politicize both development and migration policies as separate policy domains, without spending too many efforts in spinning stories on how these should be interlinked.

Going back to the original puzzle, the nexus potentially de-politicizes debates on restrictive migration policies, thereby preventing the ‘horizontal politicization’ logic to occur. It remains to be researched under which conditions the de-politicization impact of nexus building takes place and how successful challenger parties’ attempts to politicize development policy may be in the long run.

 

This blog draws on the JCMS article ‘The Politicization of the Migration–Development Nexus: Parliamentary Discourse on the European Union Trust Fund on Migration’.

 

 

Nathan Lauwers is a PhD Fellow at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University (Belgium). His research interests focus on EU external relations, in particular on the ‘nexuses’ between migration, security and development policies.Twitter handle: @Nathanlauwers

 

 

Jan Orbie is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University (Belgium). His research and teaching activities focus on EU external relations, in particular external trade, development, humanitarian aid, democracy, social and human rights promotion from critical and normative perspectives.

Twitter handle: @janorbie

 

Sarah Delputte is Assistant Professor at the Centre for EU Studies (CEUS) at the Department of Political Science at Ghent University. Her teaching and research interests concern the European Union’s policies and politics towards the so-called ‘Global South’, focusing in particular on  ‘development’ policy and the various ‘nexuses’ with other policy domains (e.g. migration, climate change, fisheries, …).

Twitter handle: @SarahDelputte
Twitter handle of institution: @UGent

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Introduction

In my previous articles, I introduced my ideas on reforming the European electoral system (see Reform #2 vol. 1) and the European Parliament (or EP, see Reform #2 vol. 2) as the first steps of the reformation of the European political system. As previously discussed, pan-Europarties are going to be elected to the EP, where seat allocation is going to be defined by the overall election results of the pan-Europarties and by voter turnout and election results of the national branches in the member states. Then, the pan-Europarties of the EP are going to form the European Government (or EG) by appointing the lead candidate of the triumphant pan-Europarty to be the Prime Minister (or PM) of the EG.

In this volume, I intend to introduce the European Government, which would be tasked to govern the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE), co-operating with both the national and the European institutions. In order to make this co-operation as smooth and as prosperous as possible, the EG has to have a broad European authority and a strong national counterbalance at the same time, whilst replacing the European Commission and the Council of the European Union as a natural result.

 

The European Commission of the European Union

The European Commission (or EC) is the executive body of the European Union (since 1965). Originally, the EC was predestined to act as the government of the EU, but it does not own such authority. However, the EC is the only institution that possesses legislative initiative and strong powers regarding competition and external trade policies. The EC is formed by a college of members (or Commissioners) delegated by the member states along the principle of one Commissioner per member state (since the Lisbon Treaty), whose terms of office is limited to five years, which is – since the Maastricht Treaty – renewable. Complete independence is required from every Commissioner in order to serve general European interests, meaning that they can neither seek nor take instructions from any external EU bodies or national governments. Also, they cannot be engaged in any other occupation.

The European Commission holds the powers of full initiative (legislative, budgetary, relations with non-member countries) and limited initiative (recommendation, opinion), of which the latter applies to the Commission’s role regarding the Economic and Monetary Union and to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The President of the European Commission (the office currently held by Ursula von der Leyen) decides on the internal organisation of the body, which consists of 33 Directorates-Generals. Generally, they are responsible for developing strategies, for drafting legislation, for mediating in the legislative process, for representing the EU in trade negotiations, for making regulations (e.g. competition policy), for preparing the budget of the EU, and for scrutinising the implementation of the treaties and legislation. The EC, as an institution, is collectively accountable to the EP.

The election of the President of the European Commission involves both the EP and the European Council. In accordance with the European election results and consulting with the EP, the majority of the European Council has the right to appoint a candidate for the position. Afterwards, the EP has to vote and decide with a majority of its component members over the candidate. At least, this was the case until 2019, when the Spitzenkandidaten system failed, as the European Council refused to appoint Manfred Weber (President of the winning EPP) to the position, nominating von der Leyen instead – whom the EP accepted.

The fact that the Commissioners are proposed by the Council of the European Union on the basis of suggestions made by the national governments, and then appointed by the European Council after the approval of the EP, affects the nature of the EU’s executive branch to be heavily national. Other complaints regarding the EC’s shortcomings are lack of transparency, unclear lobbyist relations, conflicts of interests, and excessive spending – all were highlighted in a number of reports made by internal and independent auditing organisations. Sadly, these issues were not yet addressed comprehensively in any proposals. Any recommendations regarding the improvement of the EC revolve around its authority, ignoring other aspects.

According to a popular idea, the European Commission could be further developed into a European government – meaning that the national governments would have a great influence on forming a European government, using the EC’s current structure as a first base – and somebody could run for presidency on a direct election, where the voters would decide on the figure of the President of Europe. However, this theory would only broaden the EC’s authority, failing to address its structural failures, thus leaving it unreformed. It is obvious that the EC could not be inserted into the political system of the Republic of the United Europe, as it is not compatible with the new European Parliament, which’s directly elected MEPs are going to determine the consistence of the European executive branch. Therefore, both the European Commission and the Council of the European Union must be replaced by a European government, which would take over most of their responsibilities, whilst taking more tasks and authority to govern the united Europe.

 

The European Government of the Republic of the United Europe

Most importantly, the European Government must be formed by the elected pan-Europarties of the European Parliament. The lead candidate of the winning pan-Europarty could be automatically appointed as Prime Minister of the Republic of the United Europe by the EP – and approved by the President of the RUE. It is in the duties and authorities of the PM of the RUE to appoint ministers, thus forming the European Government, which is going to propose and execute legislation. The EG should have a mandate for five years.

The responsibilities of the ministries of the European Government must be designed along European issues and context. Based on this, the following ministries could operate on a European scale: Climate Protection (including environment and nature protection), Consumer Protection, Culture, Defence (including security policy), Economic Co-operation and Development (including cohesion), Economy and Energy (including competition and trade), Education and Research, Finance, Food and Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Health, Home Affairs, Immigration, Justice, Labour and Social Affairs (including demography), Regions, and Transportation and Digital Infrastructure. The EC’s current responsibilities could be transferred to the EG. The EG will also be located in Brussels, whilst its procedural languages will be English, French, and German, to which Latin could be added.

In the legal hierarchy, the European Government is superior to the national governments and ministries, meaning that the executive branch of the RUE sets frames and directives regarding policy-making, but the national governments enjoy considerable liberties to accomplish the goals within these frames. The EG is also an administrative institution, which manages the state apparatus of the Republic of the United Europe, ensuring the implementation of law. The PM of the RUE will co-ordinate the functioning of the ministries, and will have a close working relationship with the President of the RUE. At the same time, the PM of the RUE will be the deputy of the President of the RUE, occupying the office of the Vice President of the RUE. The European Government is accountable to the European Parliament.

Amongst the ministries listed above, three of them might need some more explanation or clarification: the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Immigration, and the Ministry of Regions. Many states have ministries that are responsible for taking care of the culture of their communities. The European Ministry of Culture is going to be responsible for preserving the cultural heritage of Europe, focusing on general European elements, but also on the cultural expression of nation-states and subnational regions. The authority of the Ministry of Culture covers a wide range of areas, such as arts (e.g. architectural, cinematographic, literary, musical, theatrical, visual), historic sites (e.g. archaeological sites), national archives of cultural work (e.g. galleries, libraries, public museums), etc. The ultimate goal is to rediscover, maintain, and actively promote our unique European identity and rich European cultural heritage in the entirety of the Republic of the United Europe.

The Ministry of Immigration is going to be responsible for the issues related to immigration and integration in the whole of the RUE. Due to the lack of proper family support in the past, some member states lack labour force today. The real and lasting solution to this problem is the strong political support of families (e.g. in Hungary), but it is not going to bear fruits in the next two decades or so. Therefore, Europe needs a short- and mid-term answer to this urgent demographic challenge. The primary remedy is the potential redistribution of European unemployed from member states that struggle with high unemployment to those that grapple with labour shortage. Only as a secondary solution and only temporarily might Europe need professional labour force from outside of Europe as well. The Ministry of Immigration is going to be responsible to find a legal way to attract youth, who already speak the language of the welcoming member state, educated, and have a clean record. Should these criteria be fulfilled, and the welcoming member state is taking them voluntarily, the immigration is approved and the immigrant is permitted to have a temporary visa. Any sort of illegality (e.g. illegal immigration, committing crimes) results in an immediate expulsion. In order to promote legal immigration, the Republic of the United Europe could set up agencies (Bureau) in those countries, where it is willing to take immigrants from. The potential immigrants can proceed with their application in these agencies, which are going to make the decisions. These agencies would belong to the Ministry of Immigration, which could provide only a temporary working visa, and only then, if the applicant fulfils a job vacancy, what a European citizen cannot. Permanent residence permit and citizenship can be granted only by the welcoming member state (former needs to be approved by the relevant European institution as well). The member states could set up agencies under the leadership of the RUE (Ministry of Immigration) in those safe countries, where the demand is high (e.g. Bureau of Germany in Thailand of the Republic of the United Europe). These agencies could run various programs, such as language courses, culture educational courses, job adverts, relevant training, etc. in order to prepare the immigrant for the European way of life. The current form of illegal immigration – especially in masses and uncontrolled – is madness, which benefits neither the Europeans nor the arrivals.

The Ministry of Regions is going to be the official and direct link between the European and national ministries, co-ordinating the functioning of the various ministries between the EG of the RUE and the nation-states – similarly to the Council of the European Union. This method helps to discover and clarify every legal issue and complaint. Should it be required by a member state, the RUE’s relevant ministry could settle issues in the related area via an expert delegate of the Ministry of Regions working together with the relevant minister of the given member state (e.g. the RUE’s Minister of Finance sends a delegate to Austria to work with Austria’s Minister of Finance). The Ministry of Regions could legitimise the decisions of the EG by working together with the national institutions, whilst it could also prepare a forum for professional debates between the relevant ministries of the EG and the member states at the same time. Therefore, the Ministry of Regions could enhance quick and effective communication between the European Government and national governments, whilst increasing and ensuring professionalism and legitimacy.

 

Conclusion

The responsibilities and authorities of the European Government are going to be similar to the ones of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union, but going to be put into a broader context, gaining control over the national governments to some extent by setting frames and directives based on common and general European interests. The provision of official channels and forums will ensure that complaints are heard and dealt with, highlighting legitimacy and fairness (e.g. Ministry of Regions). The most significant improvement of creating the EG is the fact that its members are not going to be nominated by the national governments of the member states, but formed by the MEPs directly (via a new enlightened electoral system). The creation of the European Government (and its ministries) is going to supersede the European Commission (and its portfolio system) and the Council of the European Union automatically – or shady institutions, such as the Eurogroup. The result is a legitimate, efficient, transparent, and truly Europist executive branch, which’s power is far from infinite, as it is accountable to the European Parliament, whilst its decisions could be vetoed thus blocked by the highest institution of the European executive branch: the President of the Republic of the United Europe.

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I know my IR colleagues like nothing better than a strategic review document, since it gives them hours of enjoyment coding for stuff and generally feeling like there’s some interest in their field. And the arrival of the UK’s much-delayed Integrated Review this week has given me some sense of that, even as it almost instantaneously reminded me of why I so heartily dislike such documents. For the benefit of those with more sense than to be into such things, this was the culmination of a rather protracted process of trying to conceptualise the new foreign policy and security environment for the UK. A central part of the delay was the getting-out of the EU, so it’d be not unreasonable to think that EU relations might be an important part of the general picture. Plus, as I’ve endlessly argued, it might also give us some clues about what the broader context for those EU relations might be, given that a central problem has been that the UK doesn’t seem very clear about what it wants to be in the world. You’ll be possibly unsurprised to find that this document does not really provide the answers to such questions. I’ve covered references to the EU in this thread, so I’ll spare you the finer detail:

So how does #IntegratedReview see the EU?

Mainly as a problem that's been solved, and then as base from which to build wider international action by UK

Neither part of this looks that robust

1/https://t.co/S8pg4wKOHJ

— Simon Usherwood (@Usherwood) March 16, 2021 However, the core is worth restating here: the Review treats the EU as a firm ally and one with whom there is much scope to build further collaborations on points of mutual interest. What’s missing is any sense of a problematic relationship that will take – even in the most ludicrously positive scenario – many years to find a mutually-trusting stability. This matters both for itself and more generally. There’s much talk about the value of multilateralism, of regulatory power and of free trade, with no sign of how a closer relationship with the EU might advance those agendas. While it is perfectly understandable to consider that withdrawal is a done deal, and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement with it, that should not mean there has to be a rose-tinted view of how things stand. Instead, a strategic document like this needs to take a much more hard-nosed approach, to allow for the planning of responses to threats and opportunities. If nothing else, some plan to work towards rebuilding trust with EU partners might have been in order. All of which brings us back to the paradox of the EU in British politics. This might not be another example of the deliberate antagonism that seems to colour so much of Johnson’s actions, but it will be an important contributory factor to an unnecessarily fractious environment. As I’ve noted in another thread, the UK’s going to continue to struggle with its European policy as long as it fails to be seen as having credible alternatives:

Thinking again about the UK's European policy and why it doesn't work

tl;dr EU doesn't think UK has a credible alternative to making things work in long-run

1/

— Simon Usherwood (@Usherwood) March 15, 2021 That doesn’t have to mean a closer relationship to the EU, or any programme of working to rejoin the organisation, just a sense of some things being beyond the UK’s power to control or influence, which in turn require finding ways to get along. As the Integrated Review notes, there’s a lot going on out there, so we have to engage with, and work with, others if the international system is to persist. Working out some ideas on how to do that with our neighbours might be a good place to start.

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The Next Generation EU superfoods are on their way. Can they save a starving Italian patient?

Photo: Mauro Scrobogna/LaPresse via AP/NTB

Italy entered the Covid-19 crisis enfeebled by years of anaemic growth, stagnant public and private investment, high unemployment, a heavy debt load and tendentially feverish interest rates. Hopes for its recovery were pinned on the Eurozone’s standard recipe of spending cuts, labour market flexibilization, product market liberalization, and trade surpluses all aimed at reducing the debt to GDP ratio.

Unfortunately, the diet made the patient even weaker and further aggravated its recovery potential. The diagnosis of the liberal doctors was that only a lean and trim patient could hope to absorb shocks and return to health, even as the cure made her economy demand-depressed and starved of investment.

Socioeconomic disparities were boosted by many of the reforms, such as various rounds of labour market flexibilization. Moreover, repeated spending reviews induced cuts to public health – a condition that aggravated the lethality of the Covid-19 pandemic, making it into a veritable syndemic.

Change with the pandemic

The pandemic, however, has prompted a change in the recommended treatment. As stated by the General Secretariat of the Council:

[H]ow quickly Member States’ economies will recover from the crisis … depends on the fiscal space Member States have available to take measures to mitigate the social and economic impact of the crisis, and on the resilience of their economies. Reforms and investments to address structural weaknesses of the economies and strengthen their resilience will therefore be essential to set the economies back on a sustainable recovery path and avoid further widening of the divergences in the Union.

Large doses of analeptics and tonics in the guise of deficit spending to sustain ailing companies and furloughed workers were administered by Italian authorities. The precious stimulants were allowed by the European Commission which temporarily suspended the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) provisions.

The Italian public debt thus spiralled to roughly €2,700 billion. Its debt to GDP ratio soared, further debilitating an already sickly economy, whose GDP has dipped by some 6,7% in 2020 after having declined by 5% between 2009 and 2019. At the end of 2020, the debt to GDP ratio reached the figure of 158% (Banca d’Italia 2021).

Next Generation EU superfoods

The current narrative has it that the Next Generation EU (NGEU) superfoods are on their way. In the guise of investment funds in digital and green technology, education, innovation and research, the nutritious Covid-19 recovery fund vitamins aim for economic, social and territorial cohesion and greater gender equality.

It is impossible to be against such a program, to be achieved through an increase in public and private investment and a few structural reforms.

The Council made interesting references to “diversifying key supply chains [and] thereby strengthening its [the EU’s] strategic autonomy.” In other words, recognizing the need to sustain an internal demand that does not depend on foreign imports for fundamental health and technological supplies.

Perhaps this signals a turn towards a more demand-driven economic model rather than a purely export-driven one. Apparently, for the first time since the Maastricht Treaty, direct financial support to Member States does not simply aim at rebalancing territorial inequalities, but at making the regional economy of the EU more independent from foreign demand.

The extra boost to public and private investment is coming from a dedicated tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RFF). The Facility is partially financed out of the European budget and partially through the issuance of Euro-bonds drawn by Members States, hence adding to their public debt, but guaranteed by the European Central Bank and therefore priming lower interest rates.

Moreover, part of the support from the RRF is “non-repayable”, which means that it takes the form of one-off transfers of resources from the EU budget to the Member States. Some states will receive more and some less than what they contribute to the EU budget, which should manifest solidarity among Member States and particularly towards the weaker ones.

Building resilience

This policy change has been hailed as a veritable transformation in the EU economic discourse. Some of the old approach, however, can still be gleaned beneath the surface.

Let’s start from the notion of resilience. In engineering, resilience is the capacity of materials to withstand shocks and resume their original form once the pressure is released. In economic thinking, as can be surmised from the Council’s documents, it means being able to resume the original growth path once the crisis is withstood.

Unfortunately, the Eurozone has been suffering from secular stagnation in the last decade (2009-2019) so that “resuming the original growth path” does not look like a very promising prospect.

After the storm

A more scathing criticism comes from those who note that the single market structurally favours stronger economies. Accordingly, any form of compensation to weaker economies for their structural disadvantage is really destined to perpetuate disparities and breed continuing suspicion and resentment between the two.

The question then is whether this resolve to show solidarity and build resilience will continue after the Covid-19 syndemic, given that the Commission wants to maintain “the consistency of the proposed recovery and resilience plan with the relevant country-specific challenges and priorities identified in the context of the European Semester, including fiscal aspects thereof, and, where relevant, those identified in the context of the macroeconomic imbalances procedure” [emphasis added].

In other words, the measures financed under the RRF will eventually have to be compatible with the usual reinforced Stability and Growth Pact constraints and do not imply any relenting of the usual budgetary constraints.

More internal, less external

While unlikely, it seems that the only real hope lies in a veritable change of the economic growth model that has been pursued so far. Stronger emphasis should be placed on a model that puts a premium on the support of an internal EU demand – both in investment and in consumption – rather than the exclusive focus on an export-driven, external competitiveness-seeking growth model that has prevailed so far.

 

For further studies, please see Simona Piattoni and Ton Notermans’ special issue of German Politics: Italy and Germany: Incompatible Varieties of Europe?

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On 23rd September 2020, the EU published the ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’ that aims to be ‘[a] fresh start on migration in Europe’.  The Pact contains various commitments and timelines for action ranging from proposed reforms on existing asylum procedures rules to a proposed new Screening Regulation and a proposed Asylum and Migration Management Regulation. Since the Pact was published, its contents have received significant criticism from academics, practitioners, and NGOs alike. That criticism has focused on a range of matters, including human rights concerns, and scepticisms about the Pact’s potential to alleviate the burden of member states at the EU’s external borders who receive the most refugees and asylum seekers.

The focus of this blog, however, is on what might be described as a missed opportunity to meaningfully address the issue of human trafficking within the Pact. I highlight the near absence of an explicit focus on addressing trafficking within the catalogue of proposed instruments which make up the Pact and stress the possible negative impacts of proposed measures. Before turning to the Pact itself, I briefly recall how human trafficking is defined, and what obligations EU member states have in this regard.

International law defines human trafficking in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially women and children. The definition, which is replicated almost word for word in the EU Trafficking Directive and the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, comprises three elements: an act ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt’; a means, ‘threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person; and a purpose, ‘exploitation’. The relevant international and European instruments oblige EU member states to not only criminalise conduct falling within the scope of the above definition, but also to prevent trafficking, and to provide protection to trafficked persons.

Given the obligations outlined above, the connections between human trafficking and migration, and the fact that addressing human trafficking falls within the EU’s competence, one might expect to see a focus on preventing and tackling trafficking within the various proposed instruments which make up the Pact. This is not the case. Take, for example, the proposed Screening Regulation. The entire draft regulation mentions trafficking only in relation to the involvement of national anti-trafficking Rapporteurs in cases where screening may indicate trafficking.  In the proposed Asylum and Migration Management Regulation, human trafficking is referred to only twice, both in relation to children’s needs. While these connections, along with references to the EU’s Trafficking Directive in the recitals, are certainly welcome, such limited explicit focus is arguably insufficient, given the realities of risk and vulnerability within the asylum context. Questions certainly remain. How, precisely, will action to prevent trafficking be implemented within migration and asylum processes?

Whatever the reason, notwithstanding the limited references mentioned above, the issue of trafficking has apparently not played any meaningful role in the development of the Pact’s normative standards on migration and asylum. Perhaps it might be asserted that a focus on human trafficking is not necessary, given that other international and EU instruments address this issue. Arguably, though, such an approach fails to capture the complex reality which exists in practice: one where action taken to address migration and asylum can have an impact on both the risk and prevalence of human trafficking.

For example, some of the proposed measures, if enacted, may actually work in practice to aggravate trafficking or even re-trafficking risk. Consider the proposed screening regulation which requires accelerated border procedures in cases where asylum seekers are deemed to have originated from ‘safe’ countries. The human rights concerns about these provisions have been documented elsewhere. Specifically related to trafficking concerns, the idea of accelerated border procedures for those deemed to have arrived from so-called ‘safe’ countries is problematic, since signs indictors of trafficking may be missed in the course of such a procedure. Moreover, if such individuals are refused asylum and assistance measures owed to trafficked persons when, in reality, they need protection, they will remain at risk of harm and exploitation. Surely obligations to prevent trafficking require a different approach.

The example outlined above presents just one area in which the opportunity to meaningfully consider anti-trafficking obligations appears to have been missed. At present, the proposed instruments within the Pact have not entered into force. However, given their stage in the legislative process, and the complexities of achieving consensus among Member States, it remains unlikely that any significant substantial change will occur meanwhile. Since the EU member states have obligations not only to prosecute but also to prevent trafficking and protect trafficked individuals, surely this requires at the very least, that legal rules on managing migration and asylum should not have the potential to increase trafficking risk or result in situations where trafficked persons remain unidentified.

Simply put, asylum law, policy, and practice cannot be ignored if efforts to tackle trafficking are to succeed. The challenge, going forward, is to ensure that anti-trafficking obligations are addressed in a more significant way within EU asylum law.

 

[1] This commentary is based upon content provided by the author for a webinar on the EU Pact for Network for Migration Matters.

 

Author

Gillian is a PhD candidate in the School of Law at Queen’s University, Belfast. She holds an LLB in International and European Law, and an LLM in Human Rights Law. Her PhD research investigates the role of international law in preventing and tackling human trafficking among refugees and asylum seekers.

 

Twitter Handle: @gilliankane87

The post The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum: A Missed Opportunity to Strengthen Protection against Human Trafficking? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

As discussed in my previous article (see Reform #2 vol. 1), the European electoral system would go through a radical reformation, which affects the composition and working dynamics of the European Parliament (or EP) profoundly. Based on the figures of turnout and election results, the pan-Europarties and their national branches are going to reshape the face and the purpose of the EP of the Republic of the United Europe, enhancing legitimacy and competence on a European scale.

In this article, I am going to focus on the transformation of the European Parliament as the second volume of the reformation of the European political system. However, before introducing the new EP, I would like to begin with the provision of a brief and general overview of the EP in its current state – highlighting its strengths and weaknesses, whilst proposing solutions.

 

The European Parliament of the European Union

Officially, the European Parliament represents the European citizens, and forms the democratic basis of the European Union. During the last decades, the EP became gradually more powerful, and is considered to be the main agenda-setter of the EU. The first significant step to increase the EP’s authority was granted by the Maastricht Treaty, which provided the institution the power of final approval of the membership of the European Commission (including its President), meaning political control over the institution responsible for being the guardian of European laws. As a second important step on this path, the Amsterdam Treaty extended the co-decision procedure to most areas of legislation, granting the EP the same importance as the European Council has. Most recently, the Nice Treaty and Lisbon Treaty further extended the scope of co-decision – now known as the ordinary legislative procedure –, and became the most widely used decision-making procedure.

The European Parliament has ratification powers, and participates in the legislative process (e.g. ordinary legislative procedure, consultation, assent, initiation). Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EP is involved in the budgetary process from the preparation stage (e.g. general guidelines, type of spending), it adopts the budget, and monitors its implementation. Also, the EP keeps the European Commission in check, and has the right to appeal to the Court of Justice. Besides its official powers, the EP has an enormous indirect influence through non-binding resolutions, committee hearings, and the media based in Brussels.

Since 1979, the MEPs are directly elected on European elections. The European Parliament has 705 representatives, distributed amongst the 27 member states as follows: Germany 96; France 79; Italy 76; Spain 59; Poland 52; Romania 33; the Netherlands 29; Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, and Sweden 21-21; Austria 19; Bulgaria 17; Denmark, Finland, and Slovakia 14-14; Ireland 13; Croatia 12; Lithuania 11; Latvia and Slovenia 8-8; Estonia 7; Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta 6-6.  The total number of seats is allocated in accordance with the size of population; however, more populous member states agree to be under-represented in order to favour greater representation of less populous member states (degressive proportional apportionment).

The European Parliament’s political bodies comprise the Bureau (the President and fourteen Vice Presidents), the Conference of Presidents (the President and the political group chairs), the five Quaestors (responsible for the members’ administrative and financial business), the Conference of Committee Chairs, and the Conference of Delegation Chairs. The President of the European Parliament – elected for two and a half years – oversees the functioning and work of the EP. The EP has 22 committees and 44 delegations, and also sends a delegation to the Joint Assembly set up under the agreement between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states and the EU. The EP organises its work independently, in accordance with its Rules of Procedure, acting by a majority of its members.

Theoretically, the political groups are defined by political affinities and not by nationalities, which secures the transnationality of the European Parliament. A political group must comprise members elected from at least a quarter of the member states, and must consist of at least 25 members. The European parties in existence (as of 2021) are the European People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Renew Europe, the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), the Identity and Democracy (ID), the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the Confederal Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL), and the independent Non-attached Members (NI). Supranational parties work in close co-operation with the corresponding political groups in the EP.

In my view, the European Parliament of the European Union has numerous shortcomings, of which the strong national tone, the deficiency in legitimacy (e.g. degressive proportionality, low turnout), and the costliness and inconvenience of multiple locations of sessions (Brussels, Luxembourg, Strasbourg) and of multilingualism are the most distressful. The EP of the EU is neither legitimate nor transnational to that extent as it would be desirable and expected; moreover, it is distant from its citizens and unnecessarily expensive. In addition, due to the seat allocation being based on national features (e.g. size of population), and the European parties are pursuing national interests, the competence of the EP as the parliament of Europe is also questionable – not to mention certain representatives, who are executing orders taken from unelected individuals. It would be rather harmful and dangerous, if this EP with its obvious defects would receive further authorities and responsibilities. As the context of the Lisbon Treaty would not allow to reform or further increase the power of the EP anyway, being stuck in a dead end, the solution is to accomplish the reformation of the European Parliament in the frames of the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE).

 

The European Parliament of the Republic of the United Europe

Before I would introduce my own idea, let me bring to attention the most popular theory of reforming the European Parliament. According to this envisage, the federal Europe should consist of two chambers: Lower House and Upper House. The Lower House would include directly elected MEPs, who are the members of their own national parliaments at the same time, aiming to eliminate discrepancies between the EP and the national parliaments, and to reduce potential conflicts between Europe and nation-states. The idea of the Upper House’s structure would be somewhere between the model of the Senate in the US and the Bundesrat in Germany. In the US, every state directly elects two-two senators, whilst in the Bundesrat, the number of the votes varies depending on the size of population. In my opinion, the two-chamber system would make the already stammering European decision-making even more sluggish and indecisive. Also, the European Council would de degraded to the role of forming an Upper House, which could be bypassed and overruled by the directly elected President of the European Commission, who would be the de facto president of the EU at the same time. Besides, this theory would not encourage the formation of true European parties along European issues; on the contrary, pressing issues would stick on the level of nation-states, which are incapable to solve them. Instead of overcoming the challenges of indecision and illegitimacy, the dysfunctional mechanism of the EP – thus the entire Union – would be rather cemented in the two-chamber system. Therefore, I fully reject this idea.

Another theory, which emerged after the failure of the Spitzenkandidaten process after the EP elections in 2019, would allow voters to vote for a preferred candidate for the position of President of the European Commission, enhancing European parties to put forward a joint programme and a single coalition lead candidate. The establishment of a European Electoral Authority is on the table with ideas, such as remote voting, lowering the voting age to 16, common admission, and campaigning and funding rules. This theory argues that transnational lists would increase the transparency of European political parties and movements, whilst supporting the establishment of collective responsibility for the European Commission and the transformation of the European Council into a second EU legislative chamber (also attempting to degrade its current role). This idea has positive elements, but altogether proposes nothing extraordinary or altogether constructive.

In my view, the EP has some features, which are worth to keep, and some require only small adjustments. The European Parliament of the Republic of the United Europe has to be formed along the principles of reformed suffrage and European electoral system, which results in a fundamental transformation. Despite the enormous structural changes, the EP could keep all of its powers it enjoys now, which could be expanded even further by widening its authority and responsibilities.

The new European Parliament would consist of 800 seats, which are allocated based on the new European electoral system (see Reform #2 vol. 1). The MEPs would continue to serve five years terms. For the sake of simplicity and cost effectiveness, the EP’s official languages should be English, French, and German – perhaps Latin in the future (especially in administration) –, whereas the sessions should be held at one location only (e.g. Brussels). The European Parliament – as a fully authorised parliament – has to be in the centre of European decision-making. It shall remain in the EP’s full authority to decide about and accept the budget of the RUE, but for the coming three years – instead of seven. The EP is accountable to the citizens of Europe, and its rule of law should apply to the entirety of the Republic of the United Europe, meaning that it outranks the national parliaments in the legal hierarchy. Should there be a legislation made in the European Parliament, it must not be ignored or contradicted in the member states. It is in the duties and authorities of the EP to propose penalties on any of those member states that breach the constitution of the RUE. The measures of penalty would be decided by the ECJ and executed by the European Government.

As I intend to introduce the European Government of the Republic of the United Europe in the next volume of the reformation of the political system (volume 3), I mention only loosely that it is going to be formed by the pan-Europarties that got elected to the European Parliament. These pan-Europarties would form coalitions and factions as they please in order to increase their influence on legislation, which is going to lead to the formation of a European government ultimately. In this process, the EP appoints the Prime Minister, who is ideally the leading candidate of the winning pan-Europarty. After appointing the PM, the President of the RUE (will be introduced in volume 4) has to approve it as well, as he or she possesses the right to veto the person of the PM once.

The European Parliament would control and supervise the European Government, and would form committees along areas of expertise, helping legislation. Regarding the EP’s current structure and daily working routine, I do not see a reason for fundamental changes (e.g. political bodies). The most important committee I find vital to introduce is the European Accountability Committee (or EAC), which would be a committee independent from the EP, but would work together with it and with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) tightly. The EAC’s duty is to investigate every MEP and minister after their terms of office are over, but also during their terms, if the third of the Parliament agree (at least from four different parties). It is an essential body, which should tackle issues, such as misuse of power, corruption, incompetence, series of wrong decisions, ineffectiveness, inactivity, etc. The members of the EAC would vote and decide unanimously, preparing and sending their report to the ECJ, which would start a legal investigation regarding the case, making its judgement eventually. Should a minister or MEP proved to be guilty, they must get a stricter sentence than an ordinary citizen. It is imperative that only politically inactive and proven experts (e.g. former ministers or representatives) are to be approved to be the members of the EAC.

 

Conclusion

The reformed European Parliament would be significantly more legitimate, focusing on European issues and solutions, and representing the citizens of Europe. The cornerstones of its power should be the oversight of other European and certain national institutions, the supervision of use of the European budget, and the implementation of law. In the complex European political system, the European Parliament is going to be the bastion of Europe, influencing European legislation and its execution – latter through the formation of the European Government.

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