Ideas on Europe Blog

by Lukas Spielberger This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

 

The European Central Bank (ECB) is a strange creature. Since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, it has been a supranational EU institution that is jointly owned by all member states. But when it comes to its policy tasks, it acts mostly as the central bank of the Euro Area. As I show in a , these two roles can conflict with one another and the ECB’s choice of which one to take more seriously is mostly the result of its internal politics.

I compared the ECB’s credit lines to central banks from member states outside the Euro Area (like Denmark or Hungary) during the Global Financial crisis in 2008 and the COVID-19 crisis in 2020. In both instances, several central banks reached out to the ECB and requested support to be able to stabilise their financial markets. Intriguingly, the ECB did not treat all requests the same way and allowed some central banks to borrow at better conditions than others.

A clear economic rationale exists for applying different credit conditions.   lines, the most common instrument, are secured against nothing but trust in the borrower’s ability to repay; repos, by contrast, protect the lender against losses, but are less useful for the borrowers. If the ECB acted as the Euro Area’s central bank, we might expect that it sets lending terms based on the technical merits of both instruments. This would mean that it demands tougher borrowing conditions from member states with weaker sovereign credit ratings to reduce the financial risks to its own balance sheet.

In 2008, sovereign credit risk indeed seemed to have been the ECB’s main consideration. Sweden and Denmark – two member states with perfect credit ratings – received swaps, while Hungary, Latvia, and Poland (all of which had lower ratings) could only borrow under more stringent terms. Additional interview evidence confirms that the ECB rejected the Hungarian request for a swap line primarily due to opposition from its Economics department because of concerns regarding credit risk. As Eastern European members states faced financial meltdowns, the ECB was primarily concerned with limiting its own liability.

But in 2020, the ECB seemed less worried about credit ratings alone. Croatia and Bulgaria received swap lines, even though they had the same weak credit ratings as Hungary and Romania, to which the ECB only provided repos. Why did the ECB seemingly put aside its worries about financial risks for only two countries during the COVID-19 crisis?

To understand this shift I argue that we have to look more closely at the ECB in its role as supranational EU institution. As such it has a special relationship with that want to enter the Euro Area. Before a member state can adopt the euro as its official currency, it has to spend at least two years in an exchange rate arrangement called the ERM II, where it promises to keep its exchange rate relatively fixed to the euro. All member states except Denmark are legally obliged to adopt the euro eventually. But several Eastern European member states have delayed this process by not joining the ERM II.

What set Croatia and Bulgaria apart in 2020 was that they were on the cusp of joining the ERM II and had solid macroeconomic records to back up their decisions. Nevertheless during the overall financial market panic, their currencies were suddenly attacked by speculators and failure to defend their exchange rates would have delayed their ERM II entry. By backing up both central banks through swap lines, the ECB, however, sent an unequivocal sign that speculation was futile. Consequently, the market pressures dissipated immediately after the credit lines were announced. In the summer of 2020, the entry of Croatia and Bulgaria into the ERM II was fast-tracked and now both countries are one step closer to Euro Area membership. By contrast, Romania’s ERM II entry is not anticipated before 2024 and it remains doubtful that Hungary will ever want to follow.

The ECB’s proactive and informal support for Euro Area aspirants contrasts with its disciplinarian stance during the 2008 financial crisis in Latvia. Back then, Latvia participated in the ERM II and wanted to adopt the euro rapidly but found itself so close to devaluing its currency that it had to request a sovereign bailout from the EU and the IMF. Although the ECB was also opposed to devaluation, it explicitly prohibited the Latvian central bank from using its credit line to prop up the exchange rate. As an ERM II participant, Latvia supposedly had to show that it could withstand such shocks on its own. An internal document (which the ECB disclosed after a public access request) spells out its rationale back in November 2008: “the ECB’s policy line has always been that […] unilateral pegs by third countries are not backed in any way by policy commitments from the ECB”.

The ECB’s policy towards Euro Area outsiders, clearly, has come a long way over the past twelve years. In 2008, its overarching goal was to protect its own balance sheet, while choosing a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the ERM II. Last year, the ECB acted more flexibly by supporting aspiring EMU members against currency speculators, apparently irrespective of their credit ratings or institutional obligations. It seems that  the ECB has widened its focus from monetary policy considerations of the Euro Area to a more political logic related to its role as a supranational institution.

To understand the ECB’s reinterpretation of its role as an EU institution and international currency issuer, I rely on literature about international organisations that stresses  changes in leadership are drivers of policy change. Back in 2008, the ECB paid little attention to developments in EU member states outside the Euro Area . Its Executive Board back then was stuffed with career central bankers who held orthodox views on how politically central banks should operate. One Board Member summed up this thinking at the height of the crisis in January 2009 by asserting that “[t]he ECB cannot be a small god for everyone or everything”.

Since then, the ECB has developed its awareness of the political significance of its actions. The current Governor, Christine Lagarde is not just the first female ECB Governor, but also the first one to never have worked in a central bank before. But as a former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, she brings a wealth of experience in dealing with the politics of international organizations during financial crises. For instance, when the crisis called for it, Lagarde knew that a widely with the Bulgarian prime minister would send a strong sign of confidence.

The question whether the ECB is acting too independently from its original mission is currently of concern to many scholars of European integration. A recent piece argues that by taking decisions based on political, rather than technical considerations, the ECB is overstepping its mandate and becoming politicised. But in the realm of international cooperation, it is difficult to point to an easy way out because the ECB may have to balance conflicting imperatives as EU institution and Euro Area central bank. Though its policy in 2008 has been severely criticised, its more politically considerate course of action in 2020 likewise highlights potential legitimacy problems. The ECB seems to be stuck in a ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’ situation.

I conclude that future scholarship should pay closer attention to the ECB’s internal politics in order to understand its policy decisions in such ambiguous situations. After all, the ECB was originally made independent to shield it from political pressures. If its role as an EU institution requires it to also take into account political considerations, a new rationale might be needed.

 

Lukas Spielberger is a third-year PhD candidate at Leiden University and a UACES Scholar 2021. In his doctoral research, he studies the cooperation between central banks across Europe during the financial crisis in 2008/09. His wider interests concern EU macroeconomic governance, international central bank cooperation, and the role of the financial sector in national growth models.

 

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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by Carles Ferreira Torres This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference 2021 (17-18 June, online)

In 2017, the parliament of Catalonia (Spain) unsuccessfully declared the region’s independence after several years of intense secessionist politics. Three years before the Catalan bid for independence, the Scottish people had voted to remain in the UK in a referendum on the constitution. After Brexit, however, this issue is far from settled. Movements of sovereignty are also found in Flanders (Belgium) or the Basque Country (Spain). Although some authors had held that nationalism was a phenomenon of the past that would disappear with globalisation, Europe is living instead an “age of secession” or, at least, an age of secessionist politics.

In democracies, due to the importance of persuading voters for movements to achieve their goals, discourse emerges as a crucial variable with enough potential to trigger radical constitutional change. This post contributes to our understanding of secessionist discourse by outlining how minority nationalist parties frame secession, namely, how they describe and justify independence. In my research, I have identified four main frames that are always present in pro-independence parties’ propaganda: the sense of acting on behalf of a distinct community or nation (communitarian component), the mobilisation around perceived grievances against the host state (remedial component), the desirability of being ruled by themselves (self-government component) and the achievement of sovereignty as means of accomplishing several policy goals such as improving people’s lives (instrumental component).

Regarding the former, secessionist parties always claim to act on behalf of a distinct human group that lives in a perceived Homeland, namely, a nation. This group is allegedly different from the rest of the population of the host state. An example of this situation would be the case of the Scots in the UK or the Catalans in Spain. Therefore, the minority nation they claim to represent is the “imagined community” around which the case for independence is built, that is to say, Scotland or Catalonia – following the same example. Hence, the first strand of discourse stresses nationhood or the existence of a group with an “encompassing culture” as the source that legitimates secession: “we are a nation; therefore, we deserve independence”. Following this rationale, independence is the “normal” state for nations in the world.

However, this distinct human group would have few reasons to undertake the risks of creating its own polity if its current situation were satisfactory. To put it in other words: if the union were positive for the minority group, there would be no need for them to secede. Therefore, a discourse around constructed or perceived grievances is also always present: nationalist entrepreneurs try to mobilise the population through a “distancing rhetoric” from the host state. Achieving statehood would remedy the mistreatment exerted by the central authorities against the minority group. In European democracies, secessionist parties tend to advance “soft” remedial arguments for independence based on an unequal distribution of power, resources, and/or status. it is typical for nationalist parties to complain about the “fiscal plundering” against their region, the inadequate protection of the local language and culture or the central government’s encroachment on regional powers.

Thirdly, the desirability of achieving sovereignty or self-government as opposed to foreign or alien rule also underlies all the movements seeking self-determination. This discourse is the pure “independentist” argument for secession: it will always be preferable to be ruled by ourselves than to be ruled by others. Pro-independence parties state that their group is a permanent minority within the established polity, leading to a feeling of statelessness. In this regard, the minority will never control the state’s apparatus, and thus the majority-alien group owns the tools for ruling the secessionist community. As opposed to this, pro-independence activists argue that the policy decisions over the targeted group – including the decisions around its constitutional future – must be taken by this group, and not by the alien larger community.

Finally, all secessionist movements give their targeted population instrumental reasons to convince them to support independence. Therefore, attaining statehood is a means of obtaining particular goals in one or more policy areas: preserving the group’s culture, boosting the economy, improving the welfare system, etc. From this point of view, sovereignty would simply be the means of building a better country and improve people’s lives – thus, not simply a way to address grievances. As the Scottish government stated before the 2014 referendum campaign, “Scotland is not oppressed, and we have no need to be liberated. Independence matters because we do not have to powers to reach our potential”.

To summarise, we have seen that secessionist parties advance four main arguments to persuade people of the benefits of independence – based on identity and nationhood, grievances, self-government, and policy goals. The next question surrounds the combination of these arguments in independence parties’ propaganda platforms. Preliminary research shows that, maybe counter-intuitively, secessionist parties increasingly focus on the “material” benefits of independence by providing arguments based on improving people’s lives. Conversely, identity and nationhood, although present, are less prevalent in their discourse. Further research should explore why “ethnic entrepreneurs” such as minority nationalist parties do not stress identity-based arguments when making the case for constitutional change. The next developments in places such as Catalonia or Scotland will provide more clues to understand how these actors behave. What we know for sure is that, in Europe, secessionist politics is here to stay.

 

Carles Ferreira Torres is a Political Scientist, Assistant Lecturer and PhD Candidate in Comparative Politics at the University of Kent. He studies Territorial Politics, Nationalism and Political Parties.

Twitter: @carlesferreira

 

 

The European Commission’s support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflect the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

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For me, it was the morning after that I remember most vividly.

An early train to London left me wandering into Parliament Square at too-early-o’clock to hunt down the Radio5Live tent on College Green, to sit with Adrian Chiles for a few hours while he interviewed some of the many passing politicians about the result of the referendum.

I remember it a bit because Adrian was very generous in sharing his biscuits, but much more because of what I saw unfolding around me.

Almost to a person, everyone looked as if there had been an explosion and they were now staggering through the dust, trying to work out what had happened. Leavers as much as Remainers carried a look of those who weren’t entirely sure what whether this was real or not, a figment of their fevered imaginations.

And more than this.

There was a vague sense in the air that if this was so, then what else might be possible? For a while, everything seemed uncertain, nothing was fixed. As a good Gen Xer, I was put in mind of Ice Magic: the hard shell of our political institutions being lifted off to reveal a rapidly-melting polity.

No, I hadn’t slept much.

Throughout the 24th, I kept coming back to this strange place, simultaneously fearing that no-one else knew what came next and hoping that no-one did, that they might come up with something calamitous.

But no one did. Just a trail of resignations, of sheepish press conferences, of hours, then days, of drift. Very soon it became clear that no one had really, truly, properly prepared for this.

And this has been the leitmotif of the past five years: an aftermath, a picking up of the pieces, with no sense of whether to whip out the superglue or to stick the mess in the bin.

Ultimately, the referendum was a decision without a rationale or a reason. That’s not wrong – unlike some, I’m not here to call out the quality of the debate beforehand – but it is problematic.

Whatever relationship the UK wants with the EU, it will not be secured in the way that it has been pursued since 2016. The British approach has been driven by what is not wanted, rather than by any coherent sense of what should be, and why it should be so.

My hope in 2013 had been that Cameron’s offer of an in-out referendum might trigger a careful national discussion about such things, although I’ll profess to being dubious it would happen until that offer came good.

My hope in 2015, after the general election, was that now would be the time.

My hope in 2016, after the referendum, was that this was now essential, ahead of any negotiations.

And my hope now, after all my previous hopes have been dashed, is that one positive consequence of the tortured process we’ve undergone is that the case of trying to build an inclusive project for the UK is now easier to make.

Maybe I’m too optimistic on that front, but I do know that I’ll keep on trying to help people make sense of the issues and the options, so that we can work towards a new, stable and resilient relationship with the EU.

PDF: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic84

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Analyses of EU transparency traditionally focus on its legal development with little attention to informality. In such accounts, the Council of the EU is routinely understood as an obstructionist force blocking the expansion of transparency, only to be strong-armed into concessions by external pressure. However, in the Environment Council, a formation of the Council of the EU, transparency policy developed quite differently. Here, the Council actively promoted the expansion of rule-based transparency, while NGOs hardly made use of these legal transparency rights. A close analysis suggests that informality –often dismissed as anomalous or overlooked outright–  takes a central place in explaining this peculiar development.

EU transparency, when conceived as a formal policy, consists of a framework of rules and their implementation. Among the rules, Regulation 1049/2001 on access to the institutions’ documents counts as the central piece of legislation. In the area of environmental policy, the Environment Council went further, with the EU signing up to the UN-sponsored Aarhus Convention, which eventually led to Regulation 1367/2006. This lex specialis, which created a more expansive EU environmental information regime, was adopted without noticeable member state resistance. Most observers, both inside the Council and outside of it, agree that the Environment Council implements these rules faithfully and without undue restrictions, especially when compared to other Council formations. Yet while environmental NGOs (ENGOs) lobbied hard to expand formal transparency rights, they themselves made limited use of them.

 

Too good to be true?

Based on what we know of the Council’s transparency-sceptical attitude in other policy contexts, as well as ENGOs’ emphasis on transparency, the ‘dormancy’ of a highly developed Environment Council transparency policy is counterintuitive. My recent article argues that the explanation lies in informal norms which the Environment Council and its members mobilise to ‘repair’ elements in the formal transparency framework that they consider either too restrictive or too lenient from the perspective of transparency. As Helmke and Levitsky argue in a seminal publication, to properly understand formal policy frameworks, they must be regarded in light of their interplay with informal solutions. By filling remaining gaps, compensating shortcomings, buffering impacts, or purely contradicting, informal norms can take a structural character that fundamentally alters –or even brackets– the functioning of formal rules. Studying transparency policies without considering the informal norms’ bearing on them will render such policy incomprehensible or provide a grossly distorted picture.

Informality thus serves as a response to certain aspects of transparency rules. In the context of the Environment Council, chiefly three scenarios are imaginable in this respect. First, the Environment Council could perceive a need to balance formal transparency requirements against efficiency needs. This would primarily undermine transparency rules, to the benefit of confidentiality. Second, the Council could subordinate formal transparency duties to functional requirements, tailoring information sharing to its needs at every stage of the decision-making process. This would not result in outright information suppression, but in the strategic timing of disclosure. Third, informal norms could be volatile, as different member states seek to institutionalise informal norms to varying, changing ends. This would translate into informal norm conflict and, for ENGOs, information venue shopping.

 

Playing beyond the rules

A close analysis shows that informal norms indeed have a major impact on the way in which the Environment Council approaches its formal transparency obligations. Informality does not always limit access to information. For instance, several environmental affairs ministries maintain close contacts with their nationally based ENGOs about ongoing Council legislation, while at the European level, a representative has traditionally been invited to participate on behalf of the ENGO community in the half-yearly informal Environment Council meeting. Some member states even go as far as to engage in the unauthorised sharing of documents with stakeholders, or leaking them to the press. All these activities serve to expand access to information beyond, or even against, what the rules allow, although mostly for privileged groups of outsiders, and often for politically strategic, rather than transparency-promoting ends.

At the same time, various informal norms also limit access to Environment Council information. One of these is the so-called ‘limite’ label, an informal document classification which prevents (legislative) documents from being directly disclosed or shared with outsiders, as well as the internal agreement to withholding the identity of member states suggesting amendments when disclosing documents concerning ongoing legislative negotiations. After this latter practice was struck down by the Court of Justice, the Council decided to leave references to member states out of the document altogether. A different situation occurred with respect to so-called trilogue negotiations, which were originally conceived to create an informal legislative negotiating space between the Council and the Parliament beyond the reach of the transparency rules. Ever since the Court of Justice struck also this legal interpretation down, both institutions have de facto been breaking the rules by continuing this secretive practice.

 

Governing informally: a volatile affair

Searching for patterns in the above-described informal norms for regulating access to information in the Environment Council, it soon becomes clear that they do not fully match with the first two of the above-described scenarios. Some balancing informality occurs, but remains relatively rare due to member states’ wide divergence on the question how much informal transparency suppression is acceptable. Informal transparency norms also follow to some extent functional patterns, with different norms applying to different stages of the decision-making process. In this regard however, it is unclear why ENGOs should be involved in Environment Council meetings. Both scenarios moreover fail to explain the very preponderant practice of document leaking. It would seem that document leaks serve as a ‘release valve’ from the information control created by the formal transparency rules and informal norms.

The empirical picture shows most congruence with the volatility scenario. This scenario places the emphasis on change and incoherence in the Environment Council’s informal handling of the transparency question. Developments such as the 2004 EU enlargement, and two transparency court cases that rendered previously ambiguous norms explicitly illegal, did indeed alter interactions within the Environment Council and between member states and ENGOs, leading to revisions in informal responses. Conflicting but simultaneously operating norms such as transparency suppression through the ‘limite’ label and document sharing through member states moreover highlight that such revised norms were underpinned by clashing motives between different actors in the Environment Council.

In sum, the informal aspect of Environment Council transparency policy clearly paints the formal legal access regime in a different light. Various informal norms allow the Environment Council to ‘repair’ transparency rules where the member states consider them difficult to cope with. This helps to explain why the Environment Council has not proved very reluctant to expand formal transparency rights over time. Informal limits on formal transparency rights also explain ENGOs’ limited reliance on these rights: for the purpose of advocacy, they offer too little, too late. Instead, ENGOs walk informal roads in search of useful policy information related to Environment Council decision making. The fact that they often find insiders willing to informally provide them with such information illustrates that contesting notions of ‘repairing the rules’ are prevalent in the Environment Council.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “Access to Environmental Information in the EU: A Great Policy No-One Needs?”

Maarten Hillebrandt is postdoctoral researcher at the Eric Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki (@intlaw_eci). His research interests include government transparency policy and governance of the Council of the EU. Maarten is a member of the Standing Committee of Experts on International, Refugee and Criminal Law (@ComMeijers).

Twitter: @mzhill

 

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In current international climate governance many eyes are on the EU and China as two of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. Since the Trump administration announced the US’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement their relationship in the climate realm has changed considerably. But how do they view their own roles as ‘partners for the planet’? Julia Gurol and Anna Starkmann analyze this question from a role theoretical perspective. They argue that EU-China relations bear a lot of potential for closer collaboration on climate issues.

With the global pandemic ravaging economies worldwide, questions of climate change and how to address it, have slightly got out of focus. Yet, with the upcoming Conference of the Parties (COP) in the UK, the adverse effects of the deteriorating climate are brought back to the table of international negotiations and discussions. In that context, all eyes are on China. As one of the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases, a rising power yet also a still developing economy, the People’s Republic plays a crucial role that might determine the failure or success of many international climate measures. Ever since the Trump administration announced the withdrawal of the US from the 2015 Paris Agreement (PA), China’s role in international climate governance has been brought to the fore. Together with the EU, China had been eager to fill the resulting leadership vacuum left by the US in 2017. The two major emitters reaffirmed their commitment to the PA and intensified their cooperation on climate change. Despite prevailing tensions in other policy fields, EU-China climate cooperation has evolved over time from rather technical to high-level political cooperation. In our article, we discuss the complex relationship between the EU and China in international climate governance and seek to answer the question of how they view their own roles and responsibilities to combat climate change. In a nutshell, we argue that none of the two can tackle this issue unilaterally and that therefore, they have become new ‘partners for the planet’ – albeit with a complicated relationship.

 

Role-theory as a useful approach to climate cooperation between the EU and China

Applying role-theory to the analysis of this relationship helps us to identify three things. First, we can shed light on how the EU and China regard themselves as actors in international climate governance. This is called ‘self-conception’. Second, we can identify the external expectations of other actors concerning how the EU and China should navigate in international climate governance. And last but not least, role-theory helps to uncover the changes of these self-conceptions and expectations over time and therefore also to explain the changing relationship between the EU and China. In short: by using this approach, we seek to take into account both external factors as well as the actors’ positions and thoughts.

 

The roles of the EU and China from Copenhagen to the US withdrawal from the PA

EU-China climate relations are heavily influenced by critical events in global climate politics.  Specifically, we identify three events that contributed to the recent increase in climate cooperation and a development from technical towards political cooperation, despite the overall political constraints in EU-China relations: the 2009 climate conference in Copenhagen, the PA in 2015, and the US’ announced withdrawal from the PA in 2017.

How did these events shape the roles of the EU and China in climate governance? The EU has considered itself a leader since the beginning of international climate cooperation. It has asserted its normative power status by a strategy of “leading by example” and advocating for strong international rules and binding agreements. However, the 2009 COP in Copenhagen revealed a discrepancy between the EU’s self-conception as unilateral leader and external role expectations and recognitions. At this conference parties failed to agree on a follow-up agreement for the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU was sidelined in the negotiations. Consequently, the EU had to adapt its role performance. It became a “leadiator”, a combination of a leader and a mediator, actively building bridges between other actors.

China, on the other hand, has long understood its own role as that of a developing country, with the right to economic growth and development, and hence claimed a “right to emit”. Consequently, it placed the responsibility to mitigate climate change and curb emissions exclusively on the historical culprits for climate change, i.e. the US, Europe, and other highly industrialized nations. While China still makes strategic use of this weak power face, China has since the run-up to the PA undergone a tremendous role change, towards a more proactive policy creator, willing to accept responsibility and peak its emissions. This role change was affected by ambiguous internal role conceptions between developing country role and great power aspirations as well as clashing external expectations to play an active role as the world’s largest emitter of CO2 emissions since 2006.

Consequently, the first critical juncture was the 2009 COP, which led to a to a role adaption of the EU role towards a bridge-builder supplementing its leadership claims in international climate governance. The second critical event was the PA, which became possible due to the of role change of China from a policy-taker or even policy-negator towards a policy-maker in climate change. The third critical juncture was the US’s withdrawal from the PA, which created a leadership vacuum, opening a window of opportunity for the EU and China to readjust their positions in the international climate governance system and fostered EU-China cooperation.

 

Conclusion and Outlook

In short, we argue that internal role conceptions influence the behaviour of the EU and China in international negotiations and bilateral cooperation. Also, conflicts between different self-perceptions of actors (the conflict between China’s developing country and major power role) or between internal conceptions and external expectations (the EU’s international leader role conception, which turned out not to be widely shared in Copenhagen and external expectations on China as major emitter that stood in contrast to China’s self-conception as developing country) led to a change in role performance.

Thereby, the roles of the EU and China have become more compatible which led to increased cooperation efforts in the realm of climate change. However, this does not mean there are no disagreements between the two actors. While the 2019 EU Strategic Outlook on China underlines the need for cooperation between the EU and China because the “partnership is essential for the success of global climate action”, there is also criticism of China’s investments in coal energy and a clear call to swiftly peak its emissions. This implies that the EU is unsure whether China lives up to its role as a leader.

What can we expect from EU-China relations in the realm of climate policy looking forward? With the European Green Deal, the EU firmly reaffirmed its role conception as a global leader. The communication also expressed the EU’s ambition to reinforce bilateral cooperation and explicitly pointed to opportunities for strengthening the partnership with China. Thus, much hints at deepening ties in the future despite existing disagreements. Accordingly, the EU and China could indeed be new partners for the planet when it comes to mitigating the adverse effects of climate change. The future will show whether the US under the new Biden administration, who has already announced to re-enter the agreement, will join this partnership or alter the EU-China relationship on climate issues.

 

This blog post draws on JCMS article, “New Partners for the Planet? The European Union and China in International Climate Governance from a Role-Theoretical Perspective.”

Dr Julia Gurol is a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at the Chair for International Relations at Freiburg University. Her research focuses on global governance in the Global South, EU-China (security relations), Chinese foreign policy and transregional authoritarian practices.

Twitter: @JuliaGurol

 

Anna Starkmann’s research focuses on international climate and environmental governance, EU external climate policy, regional organizations and comparative regionalism.

Twitter: @anna_starkm

 

 

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Will Berlin finally acknowledge that economics is a social science and not theology?

Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the Bundestag. Photos: Baris Seckin/Abaca/NTB & Gregor Fischer/DPA/NTB 

How to escape the pandemic?

For some – the Italians Mario Draghi and Paolo Gentiloni or the French Emmanuel Macron and Thierry Breton – the pandemic has called into question the previous economic policy equilibria and so they are asking for the promotion of a new fiscal governance model.

For others – the Germans Wolfgang Schäuble and Olaf Scholz or the Latvian Valdis Dombrovskis – the pandemic has produced a headlong (and necessary) rise in public debt which, nonetheless, must be brought back within the confines of the previous fiscal policy model as soon as possible.

The outcome of this stand-off will define the future of the European Union.

Future of the SGP

The pandemic has highlighted the inadequacy of the “Maastricht compromise”. This is based on the centralisation of monetary policy and the decentralisation of fiscal policies which are then subject to the restrictions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The limitations of this compromise were already clear in the euro crisis in the last decade, a crisis which led to an unprecedented division among the member states of the Eurozone.

The pandemic has necessitated the suspension of the SGP. To respond to its devastating impact, all the European states had to enact a sharp rise in public spending, with monetary cover guaranteed by the European Central Bank. Above all, the pandemic required the promotion of the Next Generation EU (NG-EU) program financed by European fiscal resources, with which to support recovery in those same states.

These changes inevitably provoked a debate on the future of the SGP. Speaking at question time in the Chamber of Deputies on 11 May, Mario Draghi stated:

I want to be very clear. There is no question that the SGP rules will have to change (…) my position is that the current rules are inadequate, they were already inadequate, and they are even more so as we come out of the pandemic. We will have to focus on strong growth to ensure the sustainability of the public accounts.

A theory of moral hazard

On the other hand, Wolfgang Schäuble, the current President of the Bundestag and former minister for economy and finance, continues to be concerned only about stability. In an article published on 16 April in Project Syndicate (later published by Gavi and others), the German politician firmly stated that “maintaining competitiveness and a sustainable fiscal policy are the responsibility of member states”, adding “I have often spoken about that kind of moral hazard with Mario Draghi…and we always agree” on this point, “given the structure of the Economic and Monetary Union”.

So, the SGP can be temporarily suspended, but must then return to normal operation. Maybe with some addition, according to the Social Democratic Minister Olaf Scholz, such as the current program which helps states combat domestic unemployment.

The compass directing Wolfgang Schäuble’s approach (and that of much of the German traditional establishment) is the theory of “moral hazard”. According to this theory, monetary union among states which differ from each other (in terms of their economic and institutional capacity) will inevitably create negative incentives (if not properly regulated), since some states may spend more than they have available, thus transferring their debts to the other states.

Hamiltonian moment

For Wolfgang Schäuble, this theory even underpins American fiscal federalism. In his article, Schäuble returns to 1792, when the then US Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton set up a federal fund to take over the debt taken on by states (to support the war of independence against Great Britain) on specific conditions:

All 13 US states were required to deposit good collateral, practice budgetary discipline, and reduce their debts. Persistent deficit sinners were put into structured insolvency to prevent moral hazard at the expense of the more frugal states. That external constraint on fiscal policy – and not the mutualization of individual states’ debts, which is occasionally recommended for the EU – was the crux of the oft-cited “Hamiltonian moment”.

Note the use of terms such as “state sinners”, “moral hazard”, “frugal states” to describe the American debate in 1792.

In short, the SGP introduced in Europe at the end of the 20th century is nothing more than a copy of what was done in America at the end of the 18th century.

… or is it?

Unfortunately, that’s not quite right. The “Hamiltonian moment” did not result in the formation of a system of federal rules to bind the budget policies of federated states, but rather it saw the creation of fiscal power that was independent from the federal centre (as argued by Jonathan A. Rodden).

It could not have been otherwise, given that the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, which was introduced in 1791, prevents any federal interference in matters which are the responsibility of the states and are not delegated to the federal centre. This is seen also by the fact that the states continued to spend beyond their budgets, with the result that several of them went bankrupt in the 1830s and1840s.

This time, however, the American federal centre did not intervene to take responsibility for their debts but left it to the financial markets to regulate their budget policies. Consequently, many states introduced laws to keep their accounts in balance and therefore to reassure lenders. At the same time, however, the federal centre was driven to intervene indirectly in struggling states, through the federal budget. Starting from the 1930s, this model has been fully institutionalised.

The pandemic has shown that, in a union of states, fiscal policy cannot be an exclusive national responsibility.

Therefore, the American fiscal model is based on a division of responsibility between Washington D.C. and state capitals. The latter are responsible for the use of their fiscal resources (to the extent that they are free to fail), the federal centre has available autonomous fiscal resources to be used anti-cyclically or for support (in struggling states).

The “Hamiltonian moment” started the construction of the federal centre’s fiscal capacity, not some kind of SGP ahead of its time. America has never experienced the fiscal regulation system adopted by Europe. Looking for legitimatisation in Hamilton in order to offer up the SGP once again for post-pandemic Europe highlights German culture’s fixation for stability regardless of time, space and costs.

No saints or sinners

In short, the pandemic has shown that, in a union of states, fiscal policy cannot be an exclusive national responsibility, as claimed by Wolfgang Schäuble, Olaf Scholz and the German traditional establishment. The supranational centre must also have its own fiscal sovereignty to produce European public goods, as argued instead by Mario Draghi, Emmanuel Macron, and important European commissioners such as Paolo Gentiloni and Thierry Breton.

Indeed, NG-EU has the potential to create a limited fiscal capacity for Brussels, independent from financial transfers (with their related conditions) from member states. Through the NG-EU investments it is possible to create the conditions for growth of national economies – especially those economies hardest hit by the pandemic – a necessary condition to make national public debts sustainable in the medium term.

The post-pandemic EU would require a new fiscal governance for accommodating differences between member states, none of which is saint or sinner. Is there anyone in Berlin who is finally willing to acknowledge that economics is a social science and not theology?

The post After the pandemic: Still Draghi vs Schäuble? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Eastern Partnership are key strategic policy frameworks for European Union external action. However, after little effective transformation and many unanticipated consequences, the EU admitted in 2015 that its once prized policy was overly ambitious. In response, it was scaled back to an incentivized reward mechanism for good government behavior, yet unfulfilled promises remain. Now, the Eastern Partnership countries are rethinking the original EU-led partnership framework in favor of a balanced, mutual cooperation that amplifies their voices in their diverse and evolving region.

Ex-Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker with president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. Photo: Etienne Ansotte

Grandiose and unattainable ambitions are (hopefully) left in the past

After unexpected challenges, the European Union (EU) downgraded the Eastern Partnership in 2015. Originally intended as a path towards EU Membership, the policy framework did not perform as anticipated, leading the EU to scale down expectations, and instead refocus it as a reward system for good government behavior. My doctoral research examined the build-up to and fall-out from this decision as it pertains to the critical relationships between the EU and the formerly Soviet Eastern Partnership countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership falls under the EU’s broader European Neighbourhood Policy framework, which is a core responsibility of the European External Action Service (EEAS). However, its complex and comprehensive design involves various agencies, policies, interests, and objectives.

The key objective of the Eastern Partnership is to manage the acclimatization of the post-Soviet region to EU integration standards. By the EU’s own account, however, this framework and its objectives proved to be far too ambitious. Involved policymakers and policy experts have criticized the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership for their “one size fits all” regionalism perspective, dependence on conditionality compliance, lack of reciprocity, ineffective democracy promotion, and under-estimation of security threats, among other concerns. These issues were met with promises from the EU to implement a tailor-made approach that differentiates between partner countries. However, such promises remain unrealized, and as a result, the future of the EU’s relations with its Eastern Partners is unspecified and lacking a long-term perspective.

The EU claimed that relegating the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Eastern Partnership, to a reward system for good governance in 2015 would assume a less ambitious and more pragmatic, flexible approach moving forward. Yet, merely increasing funding packages as ad-hoc rewards takes on a diminished “payer not a player” role compared to a mutually engaged and beneficial strategic partnership. Consequently, applying this incentivized reward perspective across the board has not worked out as the EEAS intended. The EU’s influence in its Southern Neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa, has continued to decline since 2015. Similarly, despite the EU’s aim to bring its Eastern Partners up to its own standards, the EEAS has not managed to effectively promote democratization or stabilization in its Eastern Neighbourhood that is left vulnerable to longstanding regional tensions.

Unidirectional governance obstructs cooperative partnership

The lack of mutual exchange between the EU and its Eastern Partners substantiates criticism that the Eastern Partnership was not intended as a balanced and equal cooperation. While democratic peace, economic progress, and civilian safety may generally inform EU policy standards regarding societal needs, the inability to provide those needs abroad as promised challenges views of EU external action as merely humanitarian and civilian-oriented. Contrary to claims that the EU is simply a promoter of universal norms, its EEAS objectives and behavior towards its targeted Neighbourhoods do not corroborate merely apolitical intentions. They instead reveal that considerable power would be required to accomplish foreign compliance with the EU’s conditions and standards. As such, the claim to be “one of the most important, if not the most important, normative powers in the world” does not communicate a non-hierarchical and mutual cooperative exchange.

The EU’s emphasis on prescribing its own standards and values to its Eastern Neighbourhood confirms that the Eastern Partnership was not designed as a horizontal and equal relationship, especially since the partner countries were meant to acclimate ‘up’ to EU standards. Moreover, this prescriptive, asymmetrical association has communicated to the stronger countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood region, such as Turkey, Russia, and Azerbaijan, that integration with the EU is not pragmatic and offers little comparative value. Other Eastern Partners’ recent statements of disappointment in the EU suggest similar reservations.

The value of recognition

The 10-year Anniversary Summit of the Eastern Partnership in May 2019 marked an important milestone for the policy framework, as well as for the EU’s relations with the Eastern Partners. From the EU’s side, there was an expectation for all involved parties to sign a Joint Declaration regarding progress made and future goals. However, the Anniversary Summit came and went without the anticipated signing of the Joint Declaration. Azerbaijan’s refusal to acknowledge a statement that did not mention its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh was the most adamant position against the Joint Declaration. Nevertheless, the other Eastern Partners also expressed disappointment with uncertainties and delays, including the lack of EU accession prospects.

Soon after, in December 2019 the Euronest parliamentary assemblies of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Armenia proposed a new partnership agenda called the “Trio Plus Strategy 2030.” This strategy better acknowledges these specific Eastern Partners’ many years of reforms measures in compliance with the EU’s partnership conditions. It also emphasizes these partner countries’ preferences for potential deeper integration with the EU. Rather than including all original six Eastern Partners, the Trio Plus Strategy proposes finally abolishing the EU’s regionalism perspective. It holds the EU to its differentiation promises, and demands greater recognition and reward for their greater compliance.

Conclusion: mutual exchange can support fair and realistic cooperation

The EU should clarify that its objective for future partnerships within its Eastern Neighbourhood is to in fact still have them. In order to save itself – and its Eastern Partners – the trouble of further over-ambitious governance goals or unrealized promises, the EU must show that it does not take its relations in the region for granted. Additionally, it is important to express that it recognizes and appreciates the steps towards positive reforms that have occurred. Most importantly, while EU support may encourage such steps, any meaningful change is expressly the result of the Trio Plus countries’ own diligence and resolve.

Rather than unidirectional, prescriptive governance from a foreign institution, the future iteration of the Eastern Partnership should entail a cooperative and strategic framework that outlines shared interests and goals. The framework should also design mutually beneficial and reciprocal action steps that the EU and its Eastern Partners can take together in order to achieve their common objectives.

The post Trading ambition for cooperation: What’s next for the Eastern Partnership? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

After the referendum, and before Covid, I sat down at one of my favourite eating places to enjoy a vegetarian curry. Hot stuff!

But more heated was the discussion that took place afterwards.

Brexiters to the left of me; Brexiters to the right of me. I was outnumbered, but I put up a good fight. Here’s how it went.

‘The EU isn’t democratic!’

‘Yes it is; laws are democratically passed.’

‘No. You are deluded. The Parliament is full of puppets. They do as they’re told.’

‘Actually, the EU is run by democratically elected politicians.’

‘You’re talking out of your behind! Look, tell me this, if the EU passed a law saying everyone had to wear women’s knickers on their heads, what could you do about it? Well, what could anyone do?’

‘The EU would never pass such a law. What could you do if our Parliament passed such a law?’

‘We could vote at the next general election.’

‘So, we can vote in the next European elections. Did you vote in the European elections?’

‘No. Waste of time. So you see, if the EU told us to wear women’s knickers on our heads, there’s nothing you could do.’

‘So, tell me one law of the EU that you don’t like.’

‘There are thousands, so many.’

‘Well, just tell me one.’

No answer. Conversation moves on…

‘And the EU accounts have never been signed off!’

‘Yes, they have been signed off every year by the independent auditors.’

‘No they haven’t.’

‘Yes they have.’

‘No they haven’t’

Get out mobile phone.

‘Look, here’s the signature of the President of the European Court of Auditors, signing off the EU accounts.’

‘Oh that’s not independent, it’s got European in the name’.

‘Of course it’s independent.’

‘No, I mean when PwC [PriceWaterhouseCoopers] refused to sign off the EU accounts.’

‘PwC has never audited the EU accounts.’

‘So, it must have been one of the other big accountancy firms.’

‘Why would any of them audit the EU accounts when the EU accounts are already signed off by the European Court of Auditors?’

‘Look another thing, it’s a gravy chain for EU bureaucrats. There’s a guy at the EU who gets paid 90,000 a year just to look into the shape of lettuces.’

‘Who are you talking about?’

‘I met him at a party. He told me. Why would he lie to me?’

‘Well, people sometimes embellish things at parties. What’s his name, I’ll contact him to check this out?’

‘I don’t know his name. I just met him at a party, and that’s what he told me. Of course he wouldn’t lie!’

‘Look, this is getting ridiculous. The referendum has split the country in half. There’s a real danger that it could split up the four countries of the UK.’

‘What’s wrong with that? We don’t need Scotland. Let them go.’

‘I think it would be very sad for the UK to split.’

Look, get over it. We’re leaving That’s democracy. We’re leaving.’

‘Yes, but in a democracy, voters can change their minds.’

The exchange went on for another hour. You can guess the rest.

These are all the same comments left on my Facebook pages every day, but this time, in real time, real space, face to face.

I said in passing,

‘The best debates are ones where you can agree the facts, and then discuss what you think about those facts. But the problem with the debate about Brexit is that nobody can agree on the facts.’

We all parted on good company, shook hands, and agreed it was a lively and interesting discussion.

But it’s taken over 40 years for such misinformation about all things EU (and Europe) to become rigidly entrenched in the minds of millions and millions of Britons. 

Where’s the big campaign to enlighten and change minds? There isn’t one.

If there was another referendum next week, all the same immovable myths and misunderstandings would swirl around the country. Just like last time.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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• And LinkedIn

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The post “What if the EU ruled that we must all wear knickers on our heads?” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

As I noted in an earlier post, if the first priority in establishing the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade & Cooperation Agreement was the legal text, then the second has been their implementation.

Part – a very visible part – of that has been the politics of getting that done, from domestic arrangements and infrastructure to supporting affecting individuals and organisations. Indeed, even before the signing and ratification of either Agreement, there has been plenty to consider on both sides.

But there is also a more prosaic element of operationalising an institutionalised relationship. Both Agreements set up a framework of bodies for the EU and UK to meet and discuss.

PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic71

If the graphic looks a bit daunting, then be encouraged by the realisation that all either system (and they are separate) is simply a main body, plus sub-committees dealing with each section of the relevant treaty. The TCA’s Trade Partnership Committee breaks down that work into sub-sections, again mapping onto the legal text.

The ambition of the TCA framework is clearly bigger than that of the WA’s: the latter is a closed arrangement for the limited purposes of the winding-up of liabilities from membership, while the former seeks to create a space in which future discussions and negotiations can occur, up to and including treaty revisions. It’s a similar approach to the one that the EU has been trying to get the Swiss to agree to for some years (not very successfully).

The logic is a simple one: a standing institutional framework can be re-used, rather than having to reinvent the wheel each time, plus it helps embed that framework more firmly if it has a general purpose. Which is part of why the UK was rather resistant to it at the start.

The TCA framework also provides for inputs from parliamentarians and civil society, again underlining the ambition.

But ambition isn’t facts on the ground.

While it’s possible to map the meetings of the WA bodies since March 2020 (below), we still have yet to have any meetings of any TCA bodies. The delay in EU ratification to the end of April this year offers some explanation, but given the pressing nature of many of the implementation issues that have arisen since New Year, there has been a distinct lack of urgency on either side.

PDF version with clickable links: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic78

This week’s European Council did engage in a short discussion and review of relations with the UK, but its conclusions offered little beyond the usual reminders about the costs of non-membership and the need for effective implementation.

While much of this seems – and is – highly technical stuff, it remains important. In the context of a low-trust environment, it will be through constructive and effective interactions at this level that the two parties will start to be able to find a more stable modus vivendi.

I’ll be running regular updates to this meeting tracker for both Agreements on my Twitter feed, so do check on this as we progress.

The post Making the WA/TCA work, institutionally appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

The reforms previously introduced aimed to construct a solid political and fiscal union upon enlightened ideological foundations (see Enlightened Europism), creating strong frames for the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE) to introduce a fair and just social system by redefining the role and authority of the state. The capitalist state – mainly in the global West – is led by democratically elected representatives, governments, or presidents, who serve terms; however, they are not the state. The state is a legal entity that functions to serve the collective interests of its members (i.e. the citizens), shielding the poor and vulnerable from the wealthy and powerful by providing vital public services and equality before the law. Regrettably, the capitalist state and its leaders deliberately ignore their duties to serve general well-being, protecting the interests of wealthy individuals and enterprises instead. Therefore, the ideology of capitalist selfishness must be abolished when designing the social system of the united Europe, replacing it with enlightened ideas that help to reconfigure the means of state.

 

Theory

Today, almost all nation-states construct their economies along the principles of capitalism, in which mass production, steady consumption, ever-increasing economic growth, and the cruel pursuit of self-interest are the key features of success. Capitalism’s negative impact on the society and environment prove that it is not only wasteful and unsustainable, but socially destructive as well. Despite the obvious shortcomings, there are many, who promote the idea of less market-related government regulation, seeking to unleash a laissez-faire stateless capitalism. Opposed to them, there are many – growing in numbers by the day –, who would like to have more regulations and government control over economic planning and policy – often and wrongly labelled as communists.

The argument comes down to the core question of the state’s role as the collective acting entity of the public. When the state was still small and managed by the monarch, the common people had absolutely no protection against the wealthy elite of landlords and clergy. Since the tyranny of the aristocracy and clergy has been overthrown in the French Revolution, the democratic state has gradually expanded and was entrusted with more tasks and responsibilities. By today, the state has become an apparatus, which operates the society by legislation within a certain territory, providing security (e.g. military, police), health care (e.g. hospitals, doctors, nurses), pension, benefits, transportation, and other public services to its people. The state is vital and beneficial for the overwhelming majority of the society, as it is the common people that need the state to provide protection, not the wealthy that can buy enough power to ensure their own well-being.

Sadly, the state’s capacities and potential were abused and distorted numerous times before (e.g. extreme nationalism, Bolshevism), as it is misused today (capitalism). The capitalist state’s sole purpose is to serve the interests of enterprises and the wealthy in a form of representatives of companies and business circles approaching politicians, promising funds for their election campaigns and for personal gains regarding their private businesses; and in exchange, the politicians are expected to promote pro-enterprise legislation. The unelected wealthy do not operate only behind closed doors, setting government policies hand-in-hand with elected government officials, but also openly as honoured guests at the Davos Economic Forum and at the Munich Security Conference, as CEOs that dictate wages and working conditions, as property owners that set renting fees unilaterally, as shop owners that influence prices, etc., throwing only crumbles to the ordinary people. The wealthy and propertied are protected by the capitalist state that does nothing or very little to reduce the soft tyranny of the owners over the propertyless.

Due to the rapidly growing social inequality between some privileged and great many underprivileged, the reformation of the capitalist state is inevitable and necessary. The mindset behind the great achievements of 19th century classical liberals and social democrats, such as enhanced working conditions, regulated working hours, women’s rights, old-age pension, and unemployment benefit could be used as a base for further improvement. The legal protection against the wealthy and the extension of public services are the most important social duties of the enlightened Europe.

The noble task is no smaller than achieving real equality through the orderly redistribution of wealth, ensuring the reasonable flow of money from the wealthy to the poor. The alternative is private capital dismantling the institution of state, exposing the ordinary people to unregulated tyranny and true slavery, thus creating a world that is harsher than feudalism was. The enlightened state’s single aim is to achieve and maintain social equality through legislation. My theory materialises and translates into acts that focus on the topics of public ownership, housing crisis, profit-based salary, and Guaranteed Citizen’s Basic Income as solutions to the most pressing social issues in today’s Europe.

 

Action

It is crucial that the European state – in co-operation with the member states – purchases major industries, utilities, and transportation systems from private enterprises, securing public ownership over strategic services. The expansion of extensive publicly financed state services is also pivotal, whilst launching projects on grand scale could benefit both the public and the economy. Such a project is the construction of homes to ease the ever-growing housing crisis, which exists as the result of property shortages, pumping up the prices to purchase or rent compared to stagnating salaries – especially in the big cities. Renting a property alone is simply unaffordable to the overwhelming majority of people, meaning that many are forced to rent a room in a bigger house, living with strangers and in small places. In addition, harsh conditions, such as high deposit, restriction of children and pets, additional costs, etc. make it impossible for one to find a place that can be called home. The situation is somewhat easier for couples, but not significantly. The alternative to renting is buying an own property, which requires long-term commitment from both parties both emotionally and financially, as they certainly have to take massive loans, paying it for the rest of their lives.

The only long-term solution to the housing crisis is the mass construction of state-owned homes, meaning an increase in supply, which results in a more affordable price and provides a better bargaining position for the tenant, improving the overall conditions for tenants. State ownership is crucial, because the governments can have a direct impact on the real estate sector by reducing renting fees. The system works excellently in Vienna, which is officially the most livable city in the world. In the capital of Austria, most flats belong to the state or to the city, whilst the city’s leadership is promoting a lifelong renting programme called Genossenschaft.

As long as the housing crisis is not addressed properly, the owner-tenant relationship is going to remain imbalanced, allowing the former to dictate the latter. As the process of fund allocation, launching projects, and construction takes many years, an intermediary solution is needed. Applying the proposed Berlin-model of rent freeze and rent cap as a base, my proposal goes further to imposing a temporary profit-maximum on renting fees for properties that are permanently occupied for living, declaring the profit-ceiling based on the real costs of the owner, leaving a marginal profit for the landlords. This would result in cheaper renting fees for the tenant, whilst it still generates a limited profit for the landlord. This might end in hysteria of the propertied, labelling the law as communist; however, let us not forget that the great majority of the people are propertyless, and their interests must be represented. Besides, the owners can still keep their properties and can still generate profit, but only moderately for the time being. In this case, the solidarity of the propertied is required in solving the housing crisis.

Yet another social challenge is to harmonise the complex relationship between employee and employer, protecting the former from the latter. The element I would like to focus on here is the salary. Collective salary categories related to professions and qualifications should be introduced, including a range of salary paid for certain jobs. In addition, all employees would be eligible for profit-shares paid out quarterly – based on the profit made by the enterprise in the last quarter. At least the fifth of the entire profit could be distributed amongst all employees equally (in accordance with the actual working time), regardless of position and salary. This new scheme would erase other bonuses, such as 13-14th month’s salaries, loyalty bonuses, performance bonuses, etc.; but could include an obligatory 20 hours overtime allowance per month (or all-in contracts for managers). The intention is to involve the employees in the success (or failure) of the enterprise they work for, motivating them to work harder and, occasionally, longer, should it be required.

The obligation of sharing the fifth of the profit could be seen as offensive and outrageous to the owners of enterprises, but they have to bear in mind that the tables are turning: the endless exploitation on every front line of life – waging war at home (owner-tenant), at work (owner-employee), and in the shops (owner-customer) – is not going to last forever. The urgency of the redistribution of wealth is more imminent than it might seem.

By recognising the people as de facto shareholders of the European state, the citizens of Europe should be eligible to receive a dividend from state-owned profits in the form of a regularly paid income – in money rather than service. Today’s very poplar idea of introducing a Universal Basic Income (or UBI) acknowledges that fact, but it does not go as far as it should be. In my view, eligibility must be tied to European citizenship, residency in one of the RUE member state and clean criminal record, whilst paid out equally regardless of nationality, country of residence, gender, salary, or occupation. Therefore, my theory intends to express the combination of basic income and the German expression of Bürgergeld (citizen money) completed by the guarantee from the European state; for this reason, henceforward, I am going to use the term of Guaranteed Citizen’s Basic Income (or GCBI).

The allowance is to be paid out individually in accordance with the category of age: 18-21 (I), 22-29 (II), 30-59 (III), 60+ (IV). Category I represents those, who want to continue their studies after finishing school, and those, who would like to start their lives as entering employment. The youth is the least supported age group, meaning that it is important to provide them a financial support that meets their relatively lower needs. Category II represents those, who have finished their studies, and about to enter employment, settle down, and start a family. I propose the transformation of the already existing traditional family support (e.g. tax reduction, discounts) into GCBI payments, guaranteeing at least the same amount as before. The support of families is absolutely imperative for many reasons (e.g. social, demographic, economic), meaning that the state must encourage couples to opt for starting a family. Category III represents the spine of the society and economy, as they are working, paying their contributions to the state, building a career, running the engine of economy, consuming, and raising children. They are also the majority of the society in numbers.

Category IV represents the pensioners, who studied, worked, paid their dues, raised children, and look forward to their well-deserved rest. In the current pension scheme, there is a discrimination in age and in the amount paid, as men are permitted only to retire later than women – in most countries –, and those, who previously earned high salaries can enjoy wealth, whereas those, who were underpaid suffer destitution. Yet another shortcoming of the current system is that in the event of death, the state keeps all contribution paid throughout an entire lifetime, leaving nothing to younger family members. Therefore, I propose the merge of the current pension system into the system of GCBI, meaning the abolishment of pension contribution deducted from the salaries and the introduction of an equal payment of a lower allowance from the age of 60 regardless of gender and salary, meaning that every individual is going to be able to save more during their active working age or to work part-time after reaching the age of 60.

It is extremely difficult to allocate exact amounts for each age category, because it depends on many factors (e.g. types of social expenses merged, living quality across member states, prices, synchronisation of wages, rate of inflation), but setting the ratio of expenses and share of population is a good start. The rate of adult population of the RUE is divided amongst the four categories roughly as 3-10-46-26%, whilst the rate of expense to each category of age could be distributed as 5-25-20-50% of the total available fund for social expenses.

The merge of major social expenses (e.g. unemployed benefit, traditional family support, old-age pension) of the member states into the common European GCBI system is going to simplify and make the social system more transparent, thus reducing the costs of bureaucracy significantly. Restructuring and merging completed by the introduction of capital tax on the wealthy can cover the expenses, even with the loss of pension contribution, which will not have to be paid anymore.

This income should be enough to cover the basic necessities of life, such as a modern shelter and healthy nutrition. In order to avoid laziness, more must not be granted, only achieved through diligent work. The intention is to offer a strong incentive and provide the liberty of choice to the people. For instance, women will not have to be forced to choose between a professional career and motherhood, the youth will not have to be forced to choose between earning money and studying, etc., as working part-time could provide a sufficient income to do both, thus helping to achieve full employment, economic growth, and social justice.

 

Conclusion

Generally speaking, the mindset of prioritising amoral economic interests has to change, placing environmental and human needs in the centre of focus. The state, driven by capitalist dogmas, is corrupt, exploitative, obsolete, and dysfunctional. The ultimate aim of the wealthy is to hijack the legislation through sponsoring political parties, and to dismantle the institution of state eventually, introducing an economic and social structure instead, in which the only simple law is the dynamics of supply and demand. The European Government must overcome the pressure, and protect the propertyless and underprivileged.

The enlightened state, which is neither capitalist nor communist, must act justly and decisively to reverse the ongoing social destruction, abolishing not only poverty, but making the burden of keeping up subsistence disappear. The result is a pioneer concept that enables all to pursue occupations that they do willingly and with pleasure, encouraging creativity and productivity, which would otherwise be lost in an everlasting drudgery, truly liberating one from under the captivity of monotone work.

The post Reform #4: State appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Multinationals have taken advantage of tax benefits for a long time. Leading the fight against multinationals, Margrethe Vestager, Vice-President of the European Commission and DG-Competition Commissioner, has been referred to as “Silicon Valley’s dragon slayer”. The idea that large companies can finally be held accountable by Vestager has gained her a worldwide reputation as a “watchdog” for tech giants. However, both Vestager and the European Commission have suffered serious backlash as their tax related decisions were at times negatively received by member states and multinationals alike. Now, with US president Joe Biden’s arrival into politics, Vestager might have gained an ally in her fight against multinationals in Europe.

With Joe Biden’s arrival into politics, Vestager might have gained an ally in her fight against tax evasion in Europe. Photo: EC-Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, Jennifer Jacquemart, 2017

Large multinationals have used numerous schemes to avoid paying taxes in various EU countries. This was made possible by EU Member states having differing legislation and national policies for dealing with taxation. Countries like The Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Cyprus are among the world’s 15 worst corporate tax havens. Ireland, for instance has a tax arrangement coined the “Double Irish”. This arrangement allows companies to shift taxable income from within Ireland to another Irish-registered firm in an offshore tax haven. In turn, these practices harm fair competition in the European Union.

The Commission’s quest against tax ruling malpractices

The Commission, or more specifically, The Directorate General for Competition (DG-Comp) is in charge of establishing and implementing competition policy for the European Union. Since 2013, DG-Comp has made tax-ruling practices of member states involving the investment of large multinationals an important part of their investigations. The Commission set up tax measures aimed to assess public allegations on member states giving favourable tax treatments to certain companies. Since 2014, the Commission’s new tax force has made decisions on several cases: UK Tax scheme for multinationals (Controlled Foreign Company rules), alleged aid by Luxembourg to McDonald’s, ENGIE, Amazon and Fiat, state aid implemented by Ireland to Apple, Excess Profit exemption in Belgium, and aid in favour of Starbucks in the Netherlands. There are also other ongoing investigations against Ikea and Nike in the Netherlands and Huhtamäki in Luxembourg.

Margrethe Vestager’s fight against tax malpractices as Vice-President of the Commission and as DG-Competition Commissioner has gained her the reputation of “dragon slayer” or “giant killer”. While many might see her as a champion against large multinationals, the pursuit against these multinationals has also caused awkward tensions between the Commission and certain member states.

Indeed, as my doctoral research has shown, appeals brought by member states against tax rulings tend to be accompanied by claims seeking to delegitimise the Commission’s decision and authority. For example, the appeal by the Irish government against the Commission’s decision with respect to Apple was accompanied by claims disregarding the tax rulings as “politically motivated.” Irish governmental officials, Apple representatives, and some competition experts blamed the Commission for making Ireland an example on its new quest against tax practices.

 It is clear the approach [towards Apple] is politically motivated and the huge headline-grabbing number and endless rounds of interviews are designed to maximise PR impact for the commission at a time when some member states are losing faith in EU institutions – Liza Lovdahl-Gormsen, Competition Law Researcher,  Irish Times February 2017

 Members of the Irish government justified their appeal by suggesting the Commission’s decision was purely politically motivated as well as going against their country’s sovereignty. However, this perception that the Commission is politically motivated could become harder to sell in the future for both Ireland and multinationals involved in state aid cases. This comes as newly elected US president Joe Biden might be a promising ally in the battle against large multinationals.

Biden’s arrival and push for a global minimum tax rate

In June 2020, Vestager had already pushed for a global consensus on digital tax. However, former President Trump threatened to put tariffs on champagne, Roquefort cheese and other products if the digital tax proposal went ahead. This caused France’s President Macron to postpone talks for a year. Now, under the current Biden administration, a push for taxing the biggest 100 companies that have benefited from globalisation has begun.

The Biden administration has recently made mentions of leading a major change to global tax rules. US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen stated that the US wants to pursue a 21% minimum tax rate to US multinationals abroad. This is part of a global minimum corporate tax rate that according to Yellen “can stop the race to the bottom”.

However, this might eliminate the tax advantage that certain EU member states such as Ireland have. Currently, Ireland attracts multinationals and US investments by having a 12.5% corporate tax rate, compared to rates over 30% for other countries such as France or Germany. In 2020, this allowed the country to earn 11.8 billion euros from corporate taxes (most of which are coming from US firms), representing one-fifth of total revenues for the country. A global taxation rate that potentially makes Ireland less attractive to foreign investors would thus have a substantial impact on the Irish economy. Indeed, Irish officials are already aware of the potential impact that a globally enforced tax rate could have on their nation.

Team Vestager-Biden is highly likely to stand united against international tax avoidance.  As the US government has changed its position on international tax policy, it seems that a consensus for a global minimum corporate tax rate is finally underway. This would make it more difficult for multinationals to take advantage of existing loopholes in the international system, making their hunger for obtaining tax benefits harder to prevail in the future. This would be a necessary and welcomed shift towards stopping tax evasion practices across Europe and the world.

 

 

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As I mentioned last week, the focus so far on the Trade & Cooperation Agreement (and, to a lesser extent, the Withdrawal Agreement) has been on the legal aspects.

Part of that has been driven by the growing realisation among non-legal scholars (like me) that there’s not merely a need to read the fine print of the treaties, but also to have a sense of wider legal frameworks and principles.

With that in mind, I’m found myself coming back to such questions at regular intervals in the past 18 months.

In this post, I’m going to pull them together for you (and for me), so you have quicker access and so we can start thinking about their interaction.

Pacta sunt servanda and force majeure

Tellingly, much of what I’ll cover relates to the extent of obligation that a party enters into by signing a treaty. In part, that’s a function of the apparent lack of understanding on the side of various ministers in their pronouncements on the TCA/WA, but also connects back to the fundamental failure of the UK to determine what it actually wants from Brexit.

I’ve explored the latter point at length in various other places (like here), but a consequence of not really knowing what you want to achieve is that once you have an agreement you may well discover down the line that it’s not what you wanted.

The central legal concept that applies here is that of pacta sunt servanda: if you sign up to it, you’re stuck with it (roughly speaking).

I cover the main points in this thread and these slides:

PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic40

The concept contains a lot (as you can see) across all the stages of international agreements, so it pays some time to unpack it all.

Indeed, it provides the basic framework for the current discussion about force majeure that we’ve been seeing around the Northern Ireland Protocol. While I did make a graphic about that too, in essence you have much of the idea from the stuff above:

PDF version: https://bit.ly/UshGraphic80
Thread: here

And as a final thing, I now have a mirror of this blog running at the OU.

The post Some useful legal concepts for understanding the TCA/WA appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Today’s political reality of populist movements, geopolitical competition and disinformation has inspired an emerging scholarship on politicisation in EU external policy. Yet most of these recent contributions on EU external policy focus on politicisation processes within the EU. Comparatively, little research has been done on how actors based in and/or representing third countries contribute to politicising EU policy processes from the outside-in.

An exclusive focus on EU actors in studies on politicisation of EU external policies may unintentionally misrepresent third country actors as passive recipients of the EU’s policy whims rather than active shapers of these processes. Outside-in politicisation is understood as the process whereby the politicization of EU external policies in third countries influences (de-)politicisation dynamics in the EU. The pertinence of researching outside-in politicisation is underlined in recent scholarship questioning Eurocentric perspectives in European Studies and in post-development critiques of EU development policy.

Our recent article explores the empirical relevance of researching outside-in politicisation processes in European studies. We set out to increase our understanding of when and how third countries actors engage in these processes. We specifically explore the assumption that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), i.e. stakeholders beyond the group of official actors, can play a key role in promoting outside-in politicisation, and contribute to better understanding the conditions under which they can do so. Our article focuses on the EU’s relationship with Western Africa for being its earliest external relationship and for its prominence on the EU’s political agenda in recent years. The EU’s engagement today mainly stems from its migration policy, as well as in relation to perceived trans-regional challenges such as terrorism in the Sahel region. Moreover, Western African states such as Nigeria constitute important emerging markets for EU exports.

In the field of development policy, CSOs face the challenge of reconciling their roles in influencing and monitoring policy with effective project implementation. As regards the first role, recent research assesses European CSOs’ various approaches to engaging in Brussels-based development policy discussions. The engagement of CSOs based in Europe and Africa in relation to EU-Western Africa relations more specifically remains underexplored, as are the ways in which they influence EU policy processes.

Against this backdrop, we looked into the following research question: to what extent and how have CSOs contributed to the politicisation of EU policies towards Western Africa? We analysed the involvement of CSOs in two specific cases: the negotiations of a European Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Western African states and the EU, and the EU´s Sahel engagement. Through our analysis of these two cases, we seek to inform future research on the outside-in politicisation of EU development policy and its nexuses.

Because the initial deadline of an expiring WTO waiver by the end of December 2007, the EPA negotiations between the EU and West-Africa can be separated into two distinct phases. CSOs played key intermediary roles during the first phase of negotiations (2003-2007) and contributed to the increasing politicised nature of the trade negotiations. Both European and Western African CSOs made important contributions to reframing the negotiations as part and parcel of the broader and historically motivated relations between the EU and Western Africa, in contrast to the EU negotiators who considered the EPAs as self-standing trade agreements.

In the case of the Sahel as major region of the EU´s external focus in the last years, CSOs had a much more limited role in shaping patterns of politicisation. Sahelian CSOs played a minor role and were not successful in persuading policy makers to be associated to the initiative. European CSOs in turn focused their engagement on human rights violations and migration standards, while only to a limited degree opposing the overall initiative.

Both case studies confirm the importance of authority transfer as a factor influencing CSOs’ possibilities for engaging in outside-in politicisation: while the transfer of policy competencies within the European Commission promoted polarisation and in turn facilitated CSO engagement in the EPA case, the opposite was shown in the Sahel case were imposing a European top-down structure effectively closed the space for CSOs to engage. In a similar manner, both cases also suggest the relevance of the domestic country context in the Western African states concerned as a factor influencing CSO involvement. In the Sahel case, Western African CSOs were constrained by control and repression exerted by the G5 Sahel public authorities. In contrast, the Western African CSO campaign against the EPA benefitted from an inclusive approach towards CSO engagement among decision-makers and little control and repression exerted by (key) countries.

These findings suggest that CSO engagement in outside-in politicisation can particularly be effective in case of prior polarisation among the official actors. In more crude terms, if official actors disagree about directions and outcomes in a given policy process, they may officially or unofficially invite CSOs to disagree with them. The critical stance towards the trade liberalisation in both Europe and Western Africa enabled CSO engagement in the EPA case, since the CSO campaigns and publications contributed to legitimising the dissenting official voices. In contrast, when there is consensus among official actors concerning a course of action, such as external intervention in the Sahel, CSOs may have limited room to engage. CSOs themselves may also refrain from engaging in politicisation in cases where they are ‘part of the solution’, in terms of being involved in implementing projects providing services in line with the overall policy aims concerned.

Further research could study CSO engagement in other cases and contexts, and that way help us to better understand when and how they contribute to politicising EU policies. This would enable us to learn about the conditions under which CSO involvement results in a change of EU preferences and/or approach. This could allow us to better understand when CSOs and other actors contribute to politicisation with, or against the grain of the official actors leading on policy processes.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “Outside-in Politicisation of EU-Western Africa relations: What Role for Civil Society Organisations?”

 

 

Friedrich Plank is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany. His research focuses on EU external relations, Peace and Conflict Studies with a particular focus in Africa-EU relations and conflict resolution attempts.

Twitter: @FriedrichPlank

 

Niels Keijzer is a senior researcher in the research programme ‘Inter- and Transnational Cooperation’ at the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). His research and advisory work focuses on European development cooperation, EU-Africa relations and development effectiveness.

Twitter: @keijzer_niels

 

 

Arne Niemann is Professor of International Politics and Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Studies at the Department of Political Science of the Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany. His research focuses on the European integration process and European Union politics and policies (particularly EU external policy).

The post Invited politicisation? Exploring the roles of Civil Society Organisations in politicising EU-Western Africa relations from the outside-in appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

In the past four years the European Union has become an increasingly important actor in the field of defence. One key development, the establishment of a European Defence Fund (EDF) with a budget of 7.953 billion EUR for defence research and development for the period 2021–2027, has generated much interest in academic and policy circles. For some researchers like Tardy, this new actorness marks a welcome break with the past, as it shows that the EU is taking defence seriously and responding to a more threatening external environment. Others see the EDF as the outcome of supranational entrepreneurship by the European Commission over decades. Haroche for example considers it an example of neofunctionalism, while critics of the EDF like Goxho see the EDF mostly as the outcome of gradual lobby capture by the defence industry.

The core argument of our JCMS article Sociotechnical Imaginaries of EU Defence: The Past and the Future in the European Defence Fund is that the EDF is better understood as an outcome of a long process through which certain beliefs about defence technologies and industrial innovation became institutionalised in some EU networks, particularly within the European Commission. We trace the development of a particular narrative on security, innovation, research, and economic growth based on fears of technology gaps with, and dependence on, the US. We show how this narrative became deeply embedded in successive policy initiatives and research programmes, arguing that this sociotechnical vision or imaginary of the future, in existence since the late 1960s, is now materializing in the EDF.

Theoretically, we draw on Science and Technology Studies to deploy the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries to analyse how political outcomes are shaped by collectively held visions of desired futures that are attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology. We build on the six elements of Jasanoff’s definition of the imaginary: 1) a vision of a desired future; 2) collectively held; 3) institutionally stabilized; 4) publicly performed; 5) animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order; 6) attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology.

We show how the ideas about a desired, future EU defence emerged in the 1960s and how several initiatives tried to enact them, how these ideas were promoted for decades and stabilized in the early 2000s, and how the EDF constitutes the materialization of these ideas, through public performance and institutional anchoring in both industrial and defence bureaucracies. Using an historiographical methodology, we draw on these insights to argue that current EU innovation, industrial and defence policies are entwined in wider political and social understandings about the past, present and future.

Bringing the history back in allows us not just to provide a richer account of the emergence of the EDF than currently exists, but also to critically analyse the contemporary materialisation of the sociotechnical imaginary. By putting technology and innovation at the centre of our analysis, our theoretical and methodological options enable alternative understandings of key contemporary defence policies in the EU and expand our views on the growing role of the European Commission in defence matters. Centring the sociotechnical imaginary enables us to understand the EDF neither just as an industrial policy, as its legal basis suggests, nor just as an instrument at the service of Europe’s strategic autonomy in geopolitical issues, as some commentators highlight, but rather as a complex combination of both.

Our contention is that from the 1970s onwards a particular view emerged of how the EU should support defence technology. The view is deeply rooted in the beliefs of that time that investment in defence technology drove civilian technological innovation and thus economic growth, and that the EU needed to bridge the transatlantic technological gap. Yet, these dynamics are, in many ways, a story of the past. Understanding how ideas about the future have created a stable sociotechnical imaginary of EU defence is relevant to comprehend the past and the present of key EU defence initiatives. We would take this argument further and claim that the EU’s vision of its future sees technology and innovation as performing central roles, and that research into the EU’s tech-based political orders of the future would gain from critical engagements with the literature that puts the socio-politics of technology at the centre of the analysis.

In the context of current discussions on the need for the EU to increase its strategic autonomy, it is important to understand that this need has triggered a wide array of initiatives since the 1960s both in the domains of industry and innovation, on the one hand, and defence, on the other. The logic, has argued by Marcum already in 1986, has been to prevent ‘a deep political and technological dependence on the United States’ (Marcum, 1986: 35). In other words, the possibility of strategic autonomy being viewed as a desirable policy outcome in these policy areas is not a new idea, and our article sheds light on the roots of the geo-political and geo-economic visions of the current Commission.

 

This blog post draws on the JCMS article “Sociotechnical Imaginaries of EU Defence: The Past and the Future in the European Defence Fund”

 

 

Jocelyn Mawdsley is a senior lecturer in the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology at Newcastle University UK.  Her research focuses on the political economy of defence and the interplay between defence, innovation and industrial policies. Twitter handle @JocelynMawdsley @nclpolitics

 

 

 

Bruno Oliveira Martins is senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), where he coordinates its Security Research Group. He researches developments happening at the intersection of technological developments, security practices, and societal change. Twitter handle: @BrunoOMartins7 @PRIOUpdates

The post How the Past and the Future shaped the European Defence Fund appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Manipal Higher Education Meet in 2018

Priya Vijaykumar Poojary

The current political shifts in the form of increasing populism, the resurgence of nationalism, structural racism, and the pandemic are altering global political environments. These shifts are occurring in tangent with the internationalization of higher education as we witness new regional higher educational models (both intra- and inter) and increasing cross-border academic mobility. Thus, higher education institutions (HEIs) while situated in their national ecosystems are increasingly impacted by the political shifts (Smith & Freeman, 2014), creating (at times) newer borders or redefining the existing borders in what we term as cross-border education.

 

Just as universities constitute sites of producing and reproducing political, social, and economic (in)equalities, they also provide platforms for resistance. These and other such issues will be discussed at the India-EU Higher Education Meet titled Reimagining Borders in Cross-Border Education, October 7-8, 2021. India-EU relations in the past few decades have been increasingly strengthened through education – academic exchanges, mobility of students and staff, research collaborations especially through some of the recent initiatives such as Horizon 2020 and Erasmus programmes. Funding programmes such as Jean Monnet Chairs and projects, Centres of Excellence, Networks and Capacity Building in Higher Education (CBHE) projects have played crucial roles in strengthening academic association between India and Europe (Inamdar and Hegde, 2021). Since 2014, India has been the recipient of the highest number of grants under the Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree (EMJMD) programme. Under the Marie Sklowdowska-Curie programme, 1397 Indian researchers were funded while under the Research and Innovation staff Exchange (RISE) mobility, 28 researchers from the EU came to India. These numbers are clearly indicative of the visible imbalances in the flow of knowledge seekers between the regions where on the one hand a large number of Indian scholars go the EU, very few come to India. There is a definite necessity to introspect on the challenges that promulgate such imbalances.

 

These realities call for a reassessment of not only what constitutes knowledge, but also what encompasses the idea of borders. In this conference, we wish to address borders of different kinds – economic, political, racial, systemic, epistemic and institutional – and at different levels, while seeking sans-border education. These borders (varied in nature and form), have constrained higher education, necessitating us to introspect them and maybe in the future even overcome them, thus championing universality at the heart of university systems. We are interested in understanding whether the existing shifts can contribute to greater inclusivity in cross-border education. Our attempt is to foster a dialogue among scholars across borders on the inclusive role that education can play and how universities in particular can become significant political actors in the process. This will not only lead to a more robust understanding of the universities as critical actors but also enable us to debate and deliberate on the conceptual contours of what constitutes borders in cross-border education.

 

How can we generate knowledge that is of local relevance and inclusive of perspectives of people from diverse cultural and socio-economic backgrounds? How do debates on indigenization of curriculum and knowledge production correspond to the role of universities in driving sustainable development? Fundamental questions concerning the nature of knowledge formation, its flows, and its consequences on social equality as it interacts with global issues of migration, modernization, and geopolitical changes will also be discussed at the Meet.

 

The emergence of newer regions of knowledge including the creation of an ‘Academic Silk Road’ (reference here to the development of an Asian higher education region led by China mainly through its Belt and Road Initiative) vis-à-vis an existing ‘Europe of Knowledge’ tempts us to re-examine the notions of cooperation and competition in cross-border education. This politics of knowledge brings to question the issues of power (intrinsic and ascribed) and legitimation of particular kinds of knowledge over others. These dynamics are increasingly challenging the knowledge production and dissemination in diverse contexts. India-EU Higher Education Meet intends to bring to discussion this politics of knowledge with a specific focus on cross-border education drawing experiences from India and Europe. We invite interested scholars to present papers addressing some of the themes presented above. Select papers will also be included in an edited volume published by Manipal Universal Press (MUP). Participants can also register and participate online. More information about the conference can be accessed here: http://coemces.manipal.edu/PublicPages/India-EU_Higher_Education_Meet2020.aspx

 

Priya Vijaykumar Poojary is a Lecturer and research scholar at Manipal Centre for European Studies – Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), India. Her doctoral thesis includes a comparative study of Higher Education Regionalism (HER) in Europe and Asia.

 

References:

Inamdar, N., & Hegde, M. (2021). Knowledge Diplomacy in Action: Delineating Educational Connect in India-EU Engagements. In N. Inamdar, P. V. Poojary, & P. Shetty, Contours of India-EU Engagements: Multiplicity of Experiences (pp. 165-198). Manipal: Manipal Universal Press.

 

Smith, K., & Freeman, R. (2014). A New Politics of Knowledge? Exploring the contested boundaries between science, knowledge and policy. Retrieved from LSE Impact Blog: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2014/05/27/politics-of-knowledge-book-series/

 

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Working in, researching, studying or interested to know more about EU health governance? We’re delighted to introduce a new network to connect, support and inform this vibrant, interdisciplinary field – welcome to EUHealthGov!

EUHealthGov aims to provide a hub for the exchange of ideas and information on all things EU health governance. It is open to anyone with an interest in the health law and policy of the EU, regardless of geographical location, career stage, academic discipline, methodological tradition or professional occupation.

Sounds good…but why now?!

Well, two main reasons:

1. Even before COVID-19 raised the stakes and prompted the biggest expansion in EU health funding to date, there was a whole range of exciting developments taking place in health law and policy in Brussels. The launch of a(nother) new programme to tackle cancer, the impact of competition law on how health services are provided, the shaping of health policies within wider frameworks of fiscal policy and trade…there’s a lot going on. Despite this, there aren’t too many opportunities to engage in regular discussion with colleagues across disciplines, professions, countries and career stages.

2. From an academic perspective, EUHealthGov is particularly keen to elevate health within the field of EU studies. Though it’s origins reach back to the founding years of the European Community and its scope is as wide as many other policy areas, health seems to remain a lesser-known sub-field of EU studies. It features rarely and briefly in EU textbooks and syllabi, and is often part of social policy or welfare panels at workshops and conferences. EUHealthGov seeks to establish an identity for the sub-field.

Got it. So what is EUHealthGov doing to help, exactly?

There are several plans! Firstly, let us introduce the network website, Twitter account and mailing list. These will help us disseminate news, publications and ideas, and facilitate the sharing of information between network members.

The network will host events – these might include roundtables, ‘practitioner perspectives’, work-in-progress sessions, ‘in conversation’ events, and other formats. We’ll be seeking to cover a wide range of topics and perspectives, and to organise these events quarterly.

We’ll also be organising panels at the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) annual conference and other relevant events. For UACES (which generously funds the network), we hope to establish a health ‘section’, with a consistent collection of linked panels covering health-related topics. These panels will be open to academic and non-academic presentations, from any discipline, across career stages and countries. Early career colleagues are also able to apply for subsidies to support their participation. Additional funds will be made available to support network members in attending other, non-UACES conferences, to bring EU health studies to other audiences.

I’m convinced. How do I get involved?

– You can follow the network on Twitter

– You can visit the website

– You can join the mailing list

Most importantly, we’d love to hear from those working, researching and studying in the field of EU health governance. If you’ve an idea for an event or collaboration, if you’d like to present work or discuss an idea, if you’ve a blog post to share or news to disseminate, or if you’d like to feed in more generally – get in touch! The EUHealthGov Twitter DMs are open or you can email euhealthgov@gmail.com.

We look forward to connecting with you soon!

The EUHealthGov coordinators

Dr Eleanor Brooks (School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, UK), Dr Charlotte Godziewski (Department of Sociology and Policy, Aston University, UK) and Dr Mary Guy (Law School, Lancaster University, UK).

The post Welcome to the EU Health Governance network appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Elinor Ostrom provides the ideal framework to understand the European Union. Jan P. Vogler explains why.

When the EU faced massive refugee inflows from Syria in 2015 and 2016, polycentric governance was maintained in the crisis response: On the one hand, individual states managed and coordinated the entry of a large number of refugees. On the other hand, only the combination of these individual efforts with a major agreement between the EU and Turkey ultimately resolved the crisis. Photo: NTB/AFP/Bulent Kilic

The EU is often subject to biting criticism by its opponents: political speechwriter Aram Bakshian contends that the EU has “a single giant bureaucracy and an imposed-from-above social model” and journalist Leo McKinstry suggests that it is “a federalist monster that will not stop until nations are abolished.”

Such negative portrayals of the EU as a highly centralised system of governance that relentlessly imposes its will on participating nations in a top-down fashion are widespread. They likely have amplified Euroscepticism and contributed to Brexit – the most dramatic setback of the European project thus far.

But are these criticisms justified? In a recent book chapter, I argue that they are not.

Instead, using Vincent and Elinor Ostrom’s theory of polycentrism, I suggest that the EU is the opposite of what many of its critics claim. Indeed, it is actually best understood as a “polycentric” system of governance characterised by:

• a high degree of vertical and horizontal dispersion of decision-making authority
• an efficient division of governance responsibilities among central, national and local political units
• the preservation (and sometimes expansion) of substantial influence by regional and local actors

What is polycentric governance?

The theory of polycentrism was originally developed by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and her husband Vincent to analyse governance in metropolitan areas.

Their central argument was that these conglomerates of towns and cities are best governed in a “polycentric” fashion. By using this term, they referred to an organizational structure with substantial dispersion of political authority and with local governments providing the public goods and services that are most efficiently supplied and managed by them.

In line with this first argument, they suggested that a system that centralises all political power in a single institution would suffer from severe inefficiencies and low levels of responsiveness to citizens.

While units in a polycentric system do profit from working under a centralised set of rules, their interactions are mostly deliberative in style and system-wide governance decisions are mostly not just imposed from above.

Importantly, however, they also acknowledged that certain aspects of governance could and should be organized centrally – if central management represents the most efficient solution. For example, this is the case if centralised provision profits from high economies of scale, if there are cross-unit spillover effects in the underlying phenomena or if standardization significantly improves the functioning of markets.

How we can analyse the EU as a polycentric system of governance

Although the theory of polycentrism was originally developed for the analysis of metropolitan areas, it also is a perfect framework to investigate and understand the institutions and governance of the EU. This is so for several reasons:

First, the three areas in which the EU centralises most decision-making authority are economic exchange, environmental regulation and the agricultural sector.

Given (1) the substantial benefits from both market integration through standardisation and the removal of internal and external trade barriers as well as (2) high levels of cross-border environmental interdependence (which both indicate significant potential spillover effects), organizing these policy dimensions in a more centralised fashion likely represents the most efficient solution.

Second, the EU’s institutional framework is evidently designed in a way that avoids an omnipotent central authority.

EU’s institutional framework is evidently designed in a way that avoids an omnipotent central authority.

It does so through several mechanisms, including by distributing political power horizontally between the Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament and by fully integrating the political “subunits” (nation-states) into central decision-making processes.

Furthermore, the European Council in particular has a deliberative style of governance and it can therefore be seen as a carrier of polycentric principles.

Finally, the theory of polycentric governance places much emphasis on the importance of local governments.

Only if local and regional actors retain substantial authority over public goods and services most efficiently organised at their respective administrative levels, can the EU truly be classified as a polycentric system.

In this area, too, the EU meets the framework’s criteria: Local and regional governments retain substantial authority, often managing all sorts of public goods, from transportation and infrastructure to schooling and policing. They might also be able to expand their administrative capacities through EU funding. Indeed, prominent EU scholars argue that European integration has given local and regional governments more power than they would have in a Europe of nation-states.

Prominent EU scholars argue that European integration has given local and regional governments more power than they would have in a Europe of nation-states.

Will polycentric governance survive crises?

While all of these circumstances clearly show that the EU – in terms of its formal institutional arrangements – can be classified as a polycentric system, a key question remains:

Are polycentric governance processes maintained in system-wide crises?

Often, such crises lead to either full centralisation or systemic breakdown, making them crucial objects of analysis. In my book chapter, I analyse two crises that posed serious threats to the EU, namely (1) the sovereign debt crisis of 2010–12 and (2) the refugee crisis of 2015–16.

The debt crisis started because restrictions on the liquidity of financial markets in the aftermath of the Great Recession (2008–10) casted doubt on the ability of several European governments to refinance their debt. In the EU’s response to this crisis, polycentric governance was maintained:

While central institutions, especially the European Central Bank, played a key role in providing liquidity and stabilizing financial markets, it was only the combination with more decentralised policy initiatives by major subunits of the polycentric system  as well as with deliberations in the European Council that provided comprehensive institutional steps toward a permanent solution.

The two subunits that had the greatest influence on the process were Germany and France, who were also crucial to establishing the financial stabilisation facilities that represented more institutionalized solutions.

In the EU’s response to the 2015–16 refugee crisis, too, there was a complex mixture of initiatives by different actors, including national governments, the European Council and the European Commission. Individual states, both in southern and northern Europe, managed and coordinated the entry and allocation of refugees. Additionally, the Commission created a joint-action plan with Turkey to more comprehensively address repeated refugee waves.

Thus, similar to the sovereign debt crisis, only the combination of decentralised and centralised actions helped deal with the refugee crisis in a broader form, highlighting the system’s persistent polycentric character.

Only the combination of decentralised and centralised actions helped deal with the refugee crisis in a broader form, highlighting the system’s persistent polycentric character.

Why polycentric governance theory is relevant

As the analyses of the EU’s institutional structures and of two major crises show, the EU can be classified and analysed as a polycentric system of governance:

• It is characterised by significant horizontal and vertical dispersion of political power
• pools and diffuses decision-making authority over public goods based on the criteria of efficiency and responsiveness
• leaves substantial power in the hands of local and regional governments

These broader institutional principles were maintained throughout two major crises, highlighting the persistently polycentric character of European governance.

I hope that, in the future, more political economists specialised in the EU will consider applying this theoretical framework. Not only does it have a pertinent dual focus on the EU’s effectiveness of governance and the efficiency of public goods provision, but it is also inherently flexible in terms of accounting for a wide variety of different actors and contexts.

Given this openness and flexibility, a second key strength of polycentric governance theory is its wide applicability to contexts beyond the EU (and metropolitan areas). In this sense, I believe that its application will massively benefit not only scholars of the EU, but also scholars of governance more broadly.

This post is based on Jan P. Vogler’s book chapter, which can be accessed here.

The post Why the EU is a polycentric system of governance appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Introduction

As previously discussed, the reformation of the united Europe’s finance and economy must start with establishing a fiscal union within the political union of the member states (see Reform #3 vol. 1). After the financial and political preconditions are fulfilled, the leaders of the Republic of the United Europe (or RUE) are going to have to stimulate the economy, achieving growth, prosperity, and sustainability. In this volume, I am going to focus on the most essential components of economic success: full employment, trade, and resource utilisation.

 

Full employment

Employment is one of the most crucial elements of every economy, as the employed contribute to the public budget in more than one way. Their taxes paid, their work completed, and their wages spent, the employed generate state revenues in the forms of direct tax payment, GDP growth, and consumption. The employed are the economic engine of the society; therefore, reaching full employment is absolutely critical in order to operate a powerful and stable economy. Since the Great Recession, however, horrifyingly high unemployment rates have become the new normal in the European Union (especially in the Southern member states), whereas the economic crisis unfolding due to the restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic seem to demolish the small, but hard-earned progress that has been achieved in the years before. Lagging behind the UK (5%), China (5.5%), Russia (5.7%), and the US (6%), the EU’s average unemployment rate is at 7.3%. The worst figures are to be found in Spain (16.1%) and Greece (15.8%), where the unemployment rate has decreased from the critical heights of 27-28% since 2013, but remained high nevertheless – even more troubling is the rate of youth unemployment (40% in Spain and 34% in Greece). The fact that Spain has the fourth largest population and economy in the EU makes its crisis more serious to the entire European economy – especially to the Euro Area. Still, high and permanent unemployment – especially amongst the youth – is a very common and worrying phenomenon in many EU member states.

Many individuals try to escape unemployment in their home countries by migrating to another member state with better prospects (the primary destinations are the Western and Northern member states). Due to the support of the flow of workforce in the European Union, the unemployed has the opportunity to work and live in another EU member state. It is not ideal to leave as being forced to leave, but it is still a good opportunity and a viable temporary solution for those, who speak a foreign language – especially English, French, or German. In addition to speaking the language, it is important to have a profession (or degree) and work experience. For instance, a German-speaking electrician is highly sought after in Austria or Germany in comparison to a philologist, who only speaks Greek. The former will definitely find a well-paid job, whilst the latter has no chance. Therefore, programmes that focus on attaining a profession and on learning European languages should be launched across Europe – fully sponsored by the European state.

Instead of supporting our own fellow European unemployed, however, Europe’s extreme liberal elite and their allies are desperate to import millions of illegal immigrants from Africa and the Middle East, and spend fortunes on so-called integration (mainly the Western and Northern member states), ignoring the European unemployed, who should be supported by launching programmes and proper trainings financed by the public. The extreme liberal elite preach about solidarity as the interpretation of helping the ones in need, but they intentionally ignore the real needs of their very own citizens at the same time. Real solidarity is to help our own citizens, neighbours, countrymen, unemployed, homeless, etc., not strangers. Once we eradicated unemployment, poverty, homelessness, injustice, and deviance within Europe; then, and only then, we can start thinking of helping others in the world, bringing aid to where the trouble is, rather than importing the trouble to Europe. The shameful betrayal of Europe committed by the extreme liberal leadership is neither right nor in the interest of the Europeans.

From economic perspective, unemployment puts a massive strain on government budgets. Decreasing tax contributions, shrinking GDP, and lesser consumption make state revenues plunge, which combined with increasing state expenditures (e.g. unemployed benefits) lead to massive government budget deficits that can only be financed by government debts, causing a potential economic crisis and dependency on foreign powers. Besides the obvious economic reasons and the fact that unemployment is a huge waste of resources for the economy, the social aspect of unemployment is as important as the economic aspect. It is one of the fundamental rights and basic duties of a person to get engaged in a productive occupation: to work. Labour is a useful and constructive occupation both for the person itself and for the society too. Labour provides an income, which covers the expenses related to existence (e.g. housing, nourishment, clothing) and pleasure. The individual with a decent job has self-esteem and dignity, whereas the unemployed feels worthless and without dignity, as they are unable to provide for themselves and their families, relying on the rest of the society to provide for them.

This awful financial and mental state leads to depression, rage, or revolt, meaning that unemployment is a threat to national security as well, because the long-termed unemployed react impulsively to radical ideas (especially the youth), as they look at themselves as losers, who might have nothing left to lose. As proved by history (e.g. French Revolution, Bolshevist coup), high and long-term unemployment is a ticking bomb, which can be heard ticking in today’s Europe too (e.g. France, Greece, Italy, Spain). In order to avoid social upheaval and possess a powerful economy, the Republic of the United Europe must achieve full employment, to which previous reforms provide useful and powerful tools (e.g. benefiting from the fiscal union and common tax system, through tax reduction for businesses for new hires, via spending on public works).

 

Trade

The European Single Market guarantees the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people, enhancing internal trade between the member states of the European Union (and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) by benefiting from the removal of tariffs and border control (and from the common currency in the Euro Area). Besides enjoying thriving internal trade, the EU is the largest exporter in the world. The bloc’s most important trading partners are China, the US, and the UK, but Switzerland, Russia, Turkey, Japan, Norway, and South Korea are also amongst the largest contributors in terms of trade volume – in this order of significance. The EU has concluded many trade agreements on various levels across the globe, of which the two most important are the Canada-EU Trade Agreement (2017), and the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (2019).

The Republic of the United Europe is going to inherit these relations and agreements, but the new principles of external trade are going to be set by the European Government (or EG), excluding the member states from negotiating agreements with an external partner. The RUE should focus on four major directions: the US, the UK, China, and Russia – in this order of importance.

Europe’s most important trading partner is the US (555 billion euros of total trade in 2020), as the North American global power is the largest market for European exports (353 billion euros in 2020). There is a strong ambition on both sides of the Atlantic to intensify and deepen economic co-operation under the aegis of the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (or TTIP). The partnership intends to merge the European market into the American – including the member states and citizens –, meaning an absolute domination of American capital on the European market, thus the de facto conquest of European economic and financial sovereignty. The TTIP is an attempt of the American capital to seize the prestigious European market in the race for maintaining global supremacy over China. As such, the TTIP goes against European interests, thus harmful and wrong.

The relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom is yet to be defined, but whatever the outcome may be, London is going to remain an important trading partner of the united Europe. Therefore, a smooth and clear trade agreement is more than desirable. However, it is important not to let London picking cherries, making it explicit that any access to the European Single Market is not possible, as the precedent it would set to other member states could politically destabilise Europe.

The EU’s top trading partner is China (586 billion euros of total trade in 2020), which has already the largest market in the world, growing continuously. The facts that China is the future and Europe has an enormous trade deficit with Beijing (181 billion euros in 2020), make it all the more important for Europe to increase their volume of export. Serving this interest, the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (or CAI) deal aims to open up China’s internal market to European companies and to protect EU direct foreign investment in China (e.g. in manufacturing sector). It is imperative that neither the CAI nor China’s Belt and Road Initiative project is hindered by ideological differences, ensuring the return to pragmatism in the relations with Beijing.

Looking at the trade volume and at the difference between the sheer size of economies, Russia’s importance is far less than the above mentioned countries’; however, the symbiosis between Europe and the Eurasian giant is relatively tight, hiding enormous potentials for both parties. Besides the fact that both regions represent a huge market with hundreds of millions of people living in vast areas (from Lisbon to Vladivostok), Europe needs energy from Russia (especially the eastern member states are exposed to the desperate need of Russian natural gas). Significant projects similar to the Nord Stream would be beneficial both for Europe and Russia, but as long as the relationship between Moscow and Brussels is strained by political disagreements, hostility is going to dominate over co-operation, leaving the great potentials not only unexploited, but also further eroded.

The Republic of the United Europe is going to possess enormous capacities to increase their export, forging trade agreements on European terms and meeting European interests. It is crucial that every trade agreement includes a closure to enforce environment protection, which must present not only principles, but exact figures and deterrence in case of violation.

 

Resource utilisation

Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, hydrocarbon resources are needed to fuel our economy. As hydrocarbon resources are effective only when they burn – destroying our environment in a fast pace –, reforming the use of them is impossible. Since the 1970s, nuclear power generation proved to be very effective and emission-free, but the rare examples of Chernobyl and Fukushima presented that it can be very unstable and dangerous, should something go wrong. In the last decades, renewable energy resources have become popular due to their abundance, cleanliness, and safety. Therefore, it is without doubt that we have to transform our fossil-fuel based economy into a clean one, in which the renewable energy resources become dominant, and ultimately monopolistic. However, on mid-term, it is inescapable to use nuclear energy to recover the potential loss in energy efficiency, due to the replacement of fossil fuels with renewable resources (Sun, wind, water, geothermal, etc.). Even though it is expensive to start with, thorium-based nuclear power and small modular nuclear reactors are clean and safe enough to provide a bridge in the transition from fossil fuels to renewables until the technology of solar panels, water and wind turbines, and harnessing geothermal energy is advanced enough to fully supply the economy.

Scientifically, the immediate replacement of fossil fuels with renewable resources would be the most desirable scenario. However, such a radical change in a short period of time would most likely lead to an imminent economic crisis, which would most certainly result in a social collapse. Therefore, the transition must be paved out cautiously, but without hesitation. Most countries have already begun to switch to renewable energy, but in a much slower pace than it would be required to solve the climate crisis. The leading examples are Costa Rica, Iceland, Finland, Nicaragua, Norway, and Sweden.

The Republic of the United Europe must act as a leader of a movement that aims to involve all countries to sign a pact of environment protection. The Paris Agreement on battling climate crisis and von der Leyen’s European Green Deal are good steps forward, but both are too little and too late to seriously address the raging climate crisis. In order to boost transition, immediate actions, such as provision of funds (related projects and IT), global agreement on environment protection, the reduction of taxes on renewable energy, and the introduction of carbon tax and plastic tax must be taken. The introduction of plastic and carbon tax in every member state of the RUE could be a significant and viable step. Plastic tax must be as high as possible to force industry to find another solution for packing and other purposes, abandoning the use of plastic overall on very short-term (glass, linen, wood, and other materials could be used instead). Carbon tax should be set relatively low at the beginning – giving time to industry to shift –, but increased gradually as fast as possible, considering its impact on the economy and everyday life. Simultaneously, tax reduction on renewable energy is imperative, whilst involving more solutions based on renewables at the same time (e.g. solar photovoltaic and wind-powered plants, advanced energy storage, green hydrogen, using electric vehicles in transportation, massive tax discounts and governmental support for clean solutions) is going to force fossil fuels out of market on mid-term. Although, the introduction of carbon tax and plastic tax could result in costliness on short-term, economic production is going to be cheaper, more sustainable, and safer on mid- and long-term. Both taxes should be introduced globally, for which the RUE must fight.

The transition does not only protect the environment, and brings us closer to a higher form of civilisation, but also completely ceases our dependency on resources from other countries. In the future, the RUE will not have to import natural gas from Russia or oil from the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries, which are interested in manipulating the prices, thus causing instability in our economies – purposefully. The permanent and ever-growing scarcity of fossil fuels leads to increasing prices, economic and humanitarian crises, and war. In order to prevent such catastrophes, countries that are not oil exporter – thus not interested in oil production – could form a global organisation, which refuses to import hydrocarbon resources, pledging to fully promote the use of renewable energy resources. Starting as a European initiative, the Union to Support Renewable Energy (USRE) could aim to develop an efficient energy strategy based exclusively on renewable resources, accessing a great abundance of energy, and achieving massive and sustainable economic growth and permanently low prices for all.

 

Conclusion

The political and fiscal union of the Republic of the United Europe is certainly going to provide the tools and expertise to the leaders of Europe to steer the European economy out of its current agony towards prosperity. The suicidal dogmas of neoliberal economic policies (e.g austerity) and the harmful effects of cyclical consumerism are going to be abolished by focusing on creating and protecting jobs, and on strategic production, setting longevity, accessibility, and compatibility as key priorities.

As the enlightened reformation of the political system is an essential precondition to a stable and thriving economy, a strong and sustainable economy is required to achieve general well-being and prosperity. In order to ensure that prosperity is distributed appropriately amongst the members of the society (i.e. the citizens of Europe), the reformation of the social system is inevitable and necessary.

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By Alina Felder

Education and research are at the fore of strategies to enhance competitiveness in the European Union. Higher education institutions thus appear as the nexus of the different knowledge related EU policies that aim at excellence in research, mobility in education or at cohesion through cross-border cooperation. In my research, I focus on the higher education institutions at this very nexus – the higher education institutions located in border regions. My objective is to determine the extent to which the ‘interplay between education and training and other policies of the EU’ is not only more visible than ever, but also has a tangible impact on higher education institutions and policies.

Europeanisation research has always argued that the EU influences domestic policy, while domestic actors shape the very structures the policies emanate from. Whereas previous research has consciously focused on the top-down direction of Europeanisation, Europeanisation researchers nowadays dedicate themselves to circular Europeanisation approaches. Since circular Europeanisation research is conceptually and methodologically difficult to conduct, I used the three tools of sequencing, comparison, and in-depth knowledge for researching the Europeanisation of cross-border cooperating universities.

Sequencing allows to not only consider actors as mediators of Europeanisation, but also to acknowledge them as active users of Europe. In this vein, EU policy is not only a constraint but also an instrument of empowerment for (sub)national actors. Applying sequential approach in my analysis, I first account for the effect of EU funding on (sub)national structures and subsequently the feedback of their implementation experiences towards the EU-level.

The (sub)national level of interest for my analysis, i.e. border regions, display a ‘privileged space to analyse how fluxes and exchanges of goods, peoples and capital have evolved in time and to what extent the process of integration is responsible for the increment of those transactions.’ Within these spaces, some variables or mechanisms of Europeanisation may be important, while they are not important in others so that a comparison is necessary.

While comparisons are at the core of Europeanisation research, the cases for comparison require careful selection. Since the objective of my research is to single out the effect of Europeanisation on the cross-border cooperation among higher education institutions, my ‘laboratories of European integration’ are thus cases of cross-border cooperation that made use of EU funding: the University of the Greater Region (UniGR) and the International University Lake Constance (IBH).

Higher education institutions that cooperate across the border and make use of EU funding instruments, i.e. Interreg, are not only expected to adapt towards the EU opportunity structure, but also attempt to alter it. In a first analysis I confirm these expectations and identify the two major factors guiding Europeanisation processes – rational decisions and socialisation. Higher education institutions cooperate with each other across borders not only due to strategic and rational decisions, but also due to an emerging cross-border identity that results from the joint experience.

When accounting for the concrete paths that the rationalist, as well as the ideational variant of Europeanisation takes in cross-border cooperation contexts, exchanging with the actors who are designing and implementing the EU’s knowledge policies is essential. To gain in-depth knowledge of ‘my laboratories’, I gathered primary data through semi-structured interviews with higher education institution representatives from the selected cases both at rector and administrative level, (sub)national political actors located in the respective region and in Brussels, and representatives from university interest organisations.

Overall, Europeanisation research does not only provide theoretical, but also methodological guidance for studying cross-border cooperation practices in Europe. The presented tools of sequencing, comparison and in-depth knowledge demonstrate that Europeanisation research when guided at establishing causality, requires detailed data and analysis, and thus time. While focusing on a small number of cases, my study provides insights into concrete Europeanisation processes. When clarifying the phenomenon in focus, the models of change and the theoretical challenges, Europeanization research does not necessarily run the risk of concept stretching. Instead, Europeanisation theory and methodology has helped me to reflect critically about ‘knowledge policies as transversal problem solvers’ and thus to unravel the overstretched responsibilities attached to higher education institutions.

 

 

Alina Felder is a doctoral fellow at the Bamberg Graduate School of Social Sciences (BAGSS). The central question of her dissertation is how EU regional policy instruments influence the cross-border cooperation among higher education institutions and their attempts to shape EU policies they (could) benefit from. Her research interests thus include Europeanization processes that are induced through network modes of governance the EU is establishing and encouraging public and private actors to participate in.

 

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Nach meinen vorherigen Versuchen, das Organigramm des Bundesamts für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (BfAA) aus öffentlichen Quellen zu rekonstruieren, ist jetzt eine offizielle Version online verfügbar.

Offizielles Organigramm des BfAA, Stand 12. April 2021 (laut Änderungsdatum des PDFs)

Zum Vergleich hier meine letzte Version, die ich aus offizielle Quellen zusammengestellt hatte. Ich denke, ich war nicht so weit weg:

Viele der Referats- und Abteilungsleiter-Namen sind im offiziellen Organigramm aktuell noch mit N.N. eingezeichnet, was sehr deutlich zeigt, dass das Amt noch mitten im Aufbau ist. Aber mit dem Organigramm wird jetzt deutlich, wie genau sich die zentralen Aufgaben der neuen Behörde verteilen.

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