Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Am 15. September feiert die Welt eines der großen menschlichen Erfolgsmodelle: die Demokratie. Als die Vereinten Nationen vor dreizehn Jahren dieses Datum zum Internationalen Tag der Demokratie erklärten, wurden sie von einer globalen Demokratisierungswelle getragen. Mittlerweile ist die Demokratie von Innen und Außen unter Druck geraten und zum ersten Mal seit fast 20 Jahren gibt es mehr Autokratien als Demokratien auf der Welt. Internationaler Demokratieschutz ist nun das Gebot der Stunde.

Für zwei Dekaden schien der Trend zu mehr und stärkeren Demokratien eindeutig und unumkehrbar. Inzwischen gerät diese Herrschaftsform zunehmend unter Druck und wir beobachten einen globalen Autokratisierungstrend. Die globale Finanzkrise von 2008 und „Migrationskrisen“ in Europa haben in vielen Ländern zur Entstehung populistischer und nationalistischer Bewegungen beigetragen, die sich auch gegen demokratische Grundwerte wie politische Gleichheit oder Minderheitenschutz richten. In Ländern wie den USA, Indien, Brasilien oder Polen werden etablierte demokratische Institutionen und Prozesse hart attackiert: so wird die Unabhängigkeit von Wahlkommissionen geschwächt oder Gesetze benutzt, um die Pressefreiheit einzuschränken, religiöse Gruppen zu diskriminieren oder politische Opposition zu verfolgen. Und auch die SARS-CoV2-Pandemie hat ihren Beitrag geleistet: Einige Staaten nutzen die Ausnahmesituation, um ihre Machtbefugnisse auszuweiten und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement einzuschränken.

Neu ist auch wie Autokratisierung verläuft, sprich existierende demokratische Institutionen und Mechanismen abgebaut werden. Im Gegensatz zum klassischen Umsturz durch einen Putsch sind aktuelle Prozesse weniger geprägt von plötzlichen Zusammenbrüchen demokratischer Institutionen, sondern von ihrer schrittweisen Erosion. Das führt in den betroffenen Ländern zu einem langsamen Abrutschen in hybride Herrschaftsformen.  Hier werden Wahlen zwar regelmäßig abgehalten, aber Bürger- und Freiheitsrechte sowie Rechtsstaatlichkeit nicht respektiert und geschützt.

Wie kann und sollte die internationale Gemeinschaft auf diese Entwicklung reagieren?

In den 1990ern bekam die internationale Förderung von Demokratie Auftrieb. Zuletzt hat sie jedoch auf vielen politischen Agenden an Bedeutung verloren – auch aufgrund einer Versicherheitlichung internationaler Politik, wie im Kontext der Terrorbekämpfung. Die derzeitige globale Lage der Demokratie zeigt allerdings, dass Demokratieförderung weiterhin wichtig bleibt und es darüber hinaus notwendig ist, demokratische Errungenschaften zu schützen.

Eine zentrale Erkenntnis in der Demokratieförderung ist, dass der alleinige Fokus auf Wahlen nicht ausreicht. Autokratisierung findet vor allem zwischen Wahlen statt, indem politische Teilhabe, aber insbesondere auch Bürger- und Freiheitsrechte sowie Rechtsstaatlichkeit sukzessive eingeschränkt werden. Ohne diese grundlegenden Freiheiten verliert jedoch auch der Urnengang an Bedeutung. Besonders Besorgnis erregend ist, dass die Erosion dieser Institutionen und Freiheiten die Wehrhaftigkeit der Demokratie einschränken. Wenn die Gewaltenteilung untergraben und die sogenannten Checks and Balances zwischen demokratischen Institutionen außer Kraft gesetzt werden, verliert die Demokratie ihre Wehrhaftigkeit. Zum einen kann sich die Demokratie nicht selbst verteidigen, da zum Beispiel die parlamentarische Kontrolle eingeschränkt und die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz ausgehöhlt wird. Zum anderen kann auch die Bevölkerung die Demokratie nicht verteidigen, da demokratische Mittel wie Klagen gegen verfassungsfeindliche Maßnahmen, Demonstrationen oder öffentliche Kritik dann nicht mehr möglich sind oder Repressalien nach sich ziehen. Auch hier haben die Lock-down Maßnahmen während der Pandemie autokratischen Bestrebungen in die Hände gespielt. Daher ist die internationale Gemeinschaft gefragt, sich möglichst frühzeitig im Demokratieschutz zu engagieren und die grundlegenden Pfeiler von Demokratie vor subtiler Zersetzung zu bewahren. Wie Demokratie effektiv geschützt werden kann ist jedoch keine einfache Frage. Wissenschaftler*innen und Entscheidungsträger*innen werden sie gemeinsam beantworten müssen.

Weltweit sehen wir, dass Bürger*innen nicht tatenlos zusehen, sondern aktiv und oft unter Einsatz ihrer Freiheit oder sogar ihres Lebens auf die Straße gehen oder sich anderweitig für Demokratie engagieren: Sie wird eingefordert. Von Ecuador bis Hong Kong, von Belarus bis zum Sudan oder Mali streiten Menschen für ihre Bürger-, Freiheits- und Menschenrechte, für Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie. Dies zeigt, dass Demokratie als Idee widerstandsfähig und universell ist. Um diesen Menschen die Hand zu reichen bedarf es in der internationalen Gemeinschaft eines Verständnisses, Demokratie nicht nur zu fördern, sondern sie auch aktiv zu schützen.

Am 15. September feiert die Welt eines der großen menschlichen Erfolgsmodelle: die Demokratie. Als die Vereinten Nationen vor dreizehn Jahren dieses Datum zum Internationalen Tag der Demokratie erklärten, wurden sie von einer globalen Demokratisierungswelle getragen. Mittlerweile ist die Demokratie von Innen und Außen unter Druck geraten und zum ersten Mal seit fast 20 Jahren gibt es mehr Autokratien als Demokratien auf der Welt. Internationaler Demokratieschutz ist nun das Gebot der Stunde.

Für zwei Dekaden schien der Trend zu mehr und stärkeren Demokratien eindeutig und unumkehrbar. Inzwischen gerät diese Herrschaftsform zunehmend unter Druck und wir beobachten einen globalen Autokratisierungstrend. Die globale Finanzkrise von 2008 und „Migrationskrisen“ in Europa haben in vielen Ländern zur Entstehung populistischer und nationalistischer Bewegungen beigetragen, die sich auch gegen demokratische Grundwerte wie politische Gleichheit oder Minderheitenschutz richten. In Ländern wie den USA, Indien, Brasilien oder Polen werden etablierte demokratische Institutionen und Prozesse hart attackiert: so wird die Unabhängigkeit von Wahlkommissionen geschwächt oder Gesetze benutzt, um die Pressefreiheit einzuschränken, religiöse Gruppen zu diskriminieren oder politische Opposition zu verfolgen. Und auch die SARS-CoV2-Pandemie hat ihren Beitrag geleistet: Einige Staaten nutzen die Ausnahmesituation, um ihre Machtbefugnisse auszuweiten und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement einzuschränken.

Neu ist auch wie Autokratisierung verläuft, sprich existierende demokratische Institutionen und Mechanismen abgebaut werden. Im Gegensatz zum klassischen Umsturz durch einen Putsch sind aktuelle Prozesse weniger geprägt von plötzlichen Zusammenbrüchen demokratischer Institutionen, sondern von ihrer schrittweisen Erosion. Das führt in den betroffenen Ländern zu einem langsamen Abrutschen in hybride Herrschaftsformen.  Hier werden Wahlen zwar regelmäßig abgehalten, aber Bürger- und Freiheitsrechte sowie Rechtsstaatlichkeit nicht respektiert und geschützt.

Wie kann und sollte die internationale Gemeinschaft auf diese Entwicklung reagieren?

In den 1990ern bekam die internationale Förderung von Demokratie Auftrieb. Zuletzt hat sie jedoch auf vielen politischen Agenden an Bedeutung verloren – auch aufgrund einer Versicherheitlichung internationaler Politik, wie im Kontext der Terrorbekämpfung. Die derzeitige globale Lage der Demokratie zeigt allerdings, dass Demokratieförderung weiterhin wichtig bleibt und es darüber hinaus notwendig ist, demokratische Errungenschaften zu schützen.

Eine zentrale Erkenntnis in der Demokratieförderung ist, dass der alleinige Fokus auf Wahlen nicht ausreicht. Autokratisierung findet vor allem zwischen Wahlen statt, indem politische Teilhabe, aber insbesondere auch Bürger- und Freiheitsrechte sowie Rechtsstaatlichkeit sukzessive eingeschränkt werden. Ohne diese grundlegenden Freiheiten verliert jedoch auch der Urnengang an Bedeutung. Besonders Besorgnis erregend ist, dass die Erosion dieser Institutionen und Freiheiten die Wehrhaftigkeit der Demokratie einschränken. Wenn die Gewaltenteilung untergraben und die sogenannten Checks and Balances zwischen demokratischen Institutionen außer Kraft gesetzt werden, verliert die Demokratie ihre Wehrhaftigkeit. Zum einen kann sich die Demokratie nicht selbst verteidigen, da zum Beispiel die parlamentarische Kontrolle eingeschränkt und die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz ausgehöhlt wird. Zum anderen kann auch die Bevölkerung die Demokratie nicht verteidigen, da demokratische Mittel wie Klagen gegen verfassungsfeindliche Maßnahmen, Demonstrationen oder öffentliche Kritik dann nicht mehr möglich sind oder Repressalien nach sich ziehen. Auch hier haben die Lock-down Maßnahmen während der Pandemie autokratischen Bestrebungen in die Hände gespielt. Daher ist die internationale Gemeinschaft gefragt, sich möglichst frühzeitig im Demokratieschutz zu engagieren und die grundlegenden Pfeiler von Demokratie vor subtiler Zersetzung zu bewahren. Wie Demokratie effektiv geschützt werden kann ist jedoch keine einfache Frage. Wissenschaftler*innen und Entscheidungsträger*innen werden sie gemeinsam beantworten müssen.

Weltweit sehen wir, dass Bürger*innen nicht tatenlos zusehen, sondern aktiv und oft unter Einsatz ihrer Freiheit oder sogar ihres Lebens auf die Straße gehen oder sich anderweitig für Demokratie engagieren: Sie wird eingefordert. Von Ecuador bis Hong Kong, von Belarus bis zum Sudan oder Mali streiten Menschen für ihre Bürger-, Freiheits- und Menschenrechte, für Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie. Dies zeigt, dass Demokratie als Idee widerstandsfähig und universell ist. Um diesen Menschen die Hand zu reichen bedarf es in der internationalen Gemeinschaft eines Verständnisses, Demokratie nicht nur zu fördern, sondern sie auch aktiv zu schützen.

À quelques jours du sommet virtuel UE-Chine des 13 et 14 septembre, retrouvez les recommandations politiques formulées par François Godement, conseiller pour l’Asie à l’Institut Montaigne, dans la note Chine : les répliques de l’Europe.

La résilience de l’Union européenne (UE) est presque autant mise à l…

Zusammenfassung:

Die Bereitstellung eines sicheren und wirksamen Impfstoffs gegen Covid-19 ist von zentraler Bedeutung für die Aufhebung der Eindämmungsmaßnahmen im öffentlichen Leben. Um den Zugang zu Impfstoffen zu sichern, schließen Regierungen mit Impfstoffunternehmen spezielle Verträge, "Advance Purchase Agreements" (APA), ab. Diese Studie vergleicht die Beschaffungsstrategien der USA und der EU. Es kann festgestellt werden, dass sowohl die USA als auch die EU Impfstoffdosen nur von Entwicklern beschaffen, deren vertraglich festgelegten Produktionsanlagen in den USA beziehungsweise in der EU liegen. Die Sicherung der lokalen Impfstoffproduktion ist während einer Krise von entscheidender Bedeutung, da Regierungen in der Lage sind, Exportbeschränkungen durchzusetzen. Impfstoffe, die auf ausländischem Boden hergestellt werden, könnten daran gehindert werden, die Region zu verlassen. Nur wer lokal produzieren kann, wird schnell einen Impfstoff bereitstellen können.

Polen und Litauen gehören zu jenen Ländern in EU und Nato, die sich im Kontext der Anfang August nicht ordnungsgemäß durchgeführten belarussischen Präsidentschaftswahlen an vorderster Front engagieren. Ihre Aktivitäten setzten dabei nicht erst mit der Krise in Belarus ein, sondern sind Teil langjähriger Bemühungen. Diese resultieren aus geopolitischen Interessen, gewachsenen wirtschaftlichen und zwischen­menschlichen Kontakten, historischen Anknüpfungspunkten und Solidarität mit einer Gesellschaft, die sich gegen autoritäre Herrschaft auflehnt.

Die beiden Länder haben bislang einen zweigleisigen Ansatz verfolgt: Sie wollten die Souveränität des östlichen Nachbarn abstützen und gleichzeitig dessen unabhängige Zivilgesellschaft fördern. Nun treten Polen und Litauen für gezielte Sanktionen ein, wollen aber vermeiden, dass Belarus dadurch weiter in die Arme Russlands getrieben wird. Unklar ist, wie ein solcher Kurs konzeptionell aussehen soll und was er für die Politik der EU und insbesondere der Östlichen Partnerschaft bedeuten würde. Würde Deutschland den Austausch zu Belarus mit beiden Ländern verstetigen, könnte dies der Reflexion solcher Fragen dienen und Vertrauen stärken.

Event Video: 
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As many as 1.6 billion students worldwide have faced school closures this year or continue to face uncertainty about their education in the coming months due to COVID-19. What will be the long-term impact on these children and youth? And how will it affect social, political, and economic development? Already concerns have been raised that interrupted learning exacerbates inequalities of all kinds, including economic, gender, and nutritional inequalities. What can we do to mitigate these risks?

This global crisis and how to address it in alignment with the principles of the “culture of peace” was the subject of a September 10th virtual policy forum cosponsored by IPI and the Office of the President of the United Nations General Assembly.

In opening remarks, Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, President of the 74th Session of the UN General Assembly, declared that the education sector “has been particularly destabilized by the pandemic. COVID-19 has robbed the world and disrupted learning opportunities of students around the world, particularly those in technologically disadvantaged regions.”

He noted that the world had already been lagging in fulfilling the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number four, which is inclusive quality education, with one in three African children not finishing primary school and only 20 million of the 158 million in sub-Saharan Africa meeting minimum proficiency levels in reading and mathematics. “Then came COVID-19, and the education of 1.6 billion children and youth, including those in refugee camps, took a hit. While learning continued in technologically advanced societies, students without access to digital connections either stayed at home while the pandemic lasted or relied on home-tutoring and parental guidance.”

Mr. Muhammad-Bande said that to promote and sustain the culture of peace, “governments must act proactively and creatively to address ongoing and future imbalances in access to quality education. It is important for education to be given primary consideration in all of our efforts to build back better and stronger, to ensure we truly leave no one behind.”

The concept of the culture of peace was introduced into the multilateral system in 1992 in a program of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In a series of resolutions and programs looking ahead to the twenty-first century, the UN called for a transition from the culture of war to a culture of peace. In 1999, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration and Program of Action on a Culture of Peace. That program identified eight pillars of the culture of peace that are interrelated and interdependent, and the first of them was education.

Abdul Aziz Saud Al-Babtain, Director and Founder of the Al-Babtain Foundation, said  “COVID-19 has revealed our mutual need to work together and share knowledge, sciences, and researches, …to benefit from the common intellectual knowledge we share between us to find a medical cure for humanity.” He added, the mission was now to “go beyond the previous globalization model and start a new multilateral model of interdependence centrally based on the education of a culture of just peace.”

Rabab Fatima, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN, said the pandemic and its effect on youth had driven home the cultural centrality of schools. “We realize that schools are simply and crucially places where we learn, but very much more than this, places where there is social protection, there is nutrition, there is health, and there is a social-first relationship with the rest of the world outside the family.”

The responsibility of the international community going forward, she said, was to avoid what the Secretary-General has called a “generational catastrophe.” She estimated that 24 million children from pre-primary school to university level, were at risk of dropping out of education altogether due to the pandemic’s economic impact alone. “A good majority may not be able to return to school for reasons ranging from poverty, child labor, and child marriage.” She cited figures showing that in the developing world, only 30% of people have access to online education. “It is imperative that the COVID response and recovery efforts include adequate measures and resources to ensure the right to education for all children. Both immediate and long-term response plans and programs must be planned and undertaken to address the disruptive situation in the education sector. The pandemic exposed the digital divide that hinders education for all.”

Ambassador Fatima proposed that “to make up for lost ground, we can leverage the focus of culture of peace on education, to review, innovate and restructure conventional education, including research and development.” She said the culture of peace could act as a “force multiplier in our pursuit, it could help bring back the much-needed inclusivity in pandemic response and SDG implementation.”

Stefania Giannini, Assistant Director-General for Education at the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), called the pandemic the “largest disruption in education since the creation of the UN system, and we can say, in history.” She said that a culture of peace is “intimately linked to a culture of inclusion. This is the starting point for educational recovery, pulling out all the stops to ensure that the most marginalized children return to school and learn in safe environments, with special attention to girls, with special attention to refugees in conflict situations.”

Mrs. Giannini said that “education should be a bulwark against inequality.” Accordingly, she said, the focus ought to be on investing in social and emotional skills like empathy, awareness, and a capacity to manage emotions and to develop positive relationships. “They must be mainstreamed throughout the education systems.”

To reorient education systems around the culture of peace, she asserted, students must be “wired to defend human rights, act for social justice and gender equality, and to take care of the environment. ”

Dr. Robert Jenkins, Chief, Education and Associate Director, Programme Division, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), pronounced this moment  “a once in a generation opportunity to reopen schools in a new way, to re-look at schools and the critical role they play and to support schools and education systems, to maximize the potential to transform learning that we have now in a new way.” He said the central question now with schools resuming was “how can we maximize the reopening process so that it has the most positive impact on peace that it could potentially have?”

Experience had taught him that speed was essential, Dr. Jenkins said. “ We have seen in previous school closures as a result of Ebola, the longer schools are closed, the more vulnerable children become, and the more risk there is of dropping out and never returning to their learning.”

He listed three key issues around reopening:

• focusing on reaching the most vulnerable.
• transforming the way learning is provided, recognizing that the world was experiencing a learning crisis before the pandemic.
• meeting the emotional, social, nutritional, health, and protection needs of children.

He suggested that teachers were showing the way. “Teachers are better skilled now at recognizing the traumatic situation many children have faced with this disruption and enabling them to bridge back to school. There have been a lot of interventions at a country level around working with parents providing the education skills or ways of coaching their children and supporting their children, both on learning and preparing to bridge back to school.”

The central role of education in sustaining peace was more appreciated now than before, he argued. “I think there’s been an increased recognition of the importance of schools in communities, by parents, by decision makers. I also think there’s a recognition that we have an opportunity to reimagine how the front door is open in a school, and what happens behind that door.” As for the urgency of getting increased funding to support schooling, he said, “We in the education sector are ‘all hands on deck’ reemphasizing that.”

He particularly stressed the importance of “engagement,” repeating the word three times in sequence for emphasis. “Countries that have been most successful in reopening schools are those that had very significant engagement processes, investing heavily in communication.”

In answer to a question about whether there was data on whether remote online education can be effective at spurring personal and emotional development, he said, “My simple answer—and sadly it’s unsatisfactory— is that the evidence is mixed.” He said that “there are some very exciting innovations that are IT-enabled that do indeed target social and emotional health. The most successful are those IT tools that enable interaction, questioning, and engagement.”

Mrs. Giannini commented that one of the key lessons learned from the Ebola crisis was the crucial role of community and families “which usually we don’t consider within the constituency of education. There is a traditional boundary between the school community and what we find outside, including family and parents, especially in the north of the world, they are viewed as the counterparts and not part of the same mission.”

She concluded: “To summarize, some key words: engagement, solidarity, partnership. What we need now is to strongly work together. We are making a big effort on the international organization side, unprecedented, in my opinion, in terms of integrating all out competency and expertise in one common mission, which is about the continuity of learning. It’s about assuring education as a basic human right.”

IPI Vice President Adam Lupel moderated the discussion.

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Jeudi 10 septembre 2020, Châlon Agglo et Planet A ont choisi pour la 15e édition de la conférence annuelle à la Foire, de mettre à l’honneur les agriculteurs français. Dominique Reynié, Sylvie Brunel et Christoph Büren ont démonté « l’agribashing » et rappelé le rôle nourricier comme géopolitique de l’agriculture française lors du d’une conférence […]

The post Table ronde « Agribashing ou héros de la seconde ligne : le rôle des agriculteurs sortira-t-il renforcé de la crise du Covis-19 ? » appeared first on Fondapol.

Tous les mois, l'Institut Elabe interroge les Français pour Les Echos, l'Institut Montaigne et Radio Classique, ce mois-ci les français et le plan de relance économique.

Un plan de relance perçu comme pouvant soutenir les entreprises en difficulté, mais qui suscite des doutes importants quant à son efficacité sur la croissance, l’emploi et la transition écologique…

L’ opinion européenne en 2019, sous la direction de Dominique Reynié | disponible en librairie. Cet ouvrage constitue le vingtième volume de notre publication annuelle L’opinion européenne, née en 2000. Nous avons voulu cette série afin de nourrir la réflexion sur l’Union européenne en éclairant plus particulièrement les transformations de la société civile européenne, l’évolution des modes […]

The post L’opinion européenne en 2019 appeared first on Fondapol.

Reputation Institute y Real Instituto Elcano. 10/9/2020

Edición 2020 del informe que analiza la reputación de España en el mundo mediante encuestas de opinión entre ciudadanos de 28 países utilizando la metodología Country RepTrak®. Dicha metodología es un análisis de la reputación de los países con un modelo inspirado en la medición de la reputación de las empresas.

L’Institut Montaigne a contribué à la consultation publique de la Commission européenne sur le Digital Services Act, le texte européen visant à responsabiliser les intermédiaires numériques. Que ce soit dans les secteurs des médias, du transport, du recrutement ou du e-commerce, on reproche aux plateformes le manque de transparence des technologies qu’ils utilisent pour faire fonctionner leurs services. Ces plateformes s'appuient sur des algorithmes…

Since 2016, Germany has been the second largest contributor to the United Nations development system (UNDS) for development-related and humanitarian activities, after the United States of America. The biggest increase in Germany’s funding has been in the form of earmarked contributions, that is, funding with specified geographic and thematic purposes. While humanitarian funding to agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) accounts for the bulk of Germany’s contributions to the United Nations (UN), development-related funding for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women also experienced a sharp rise. More recently, core contributions, which can be used by multilateral organisations with greater discretion, have also increased, most notably as part of the coronavirus (COVID-19) emergency response.
The significant increase signals that Germany places trust in the UN, including in times of crisis, and deems it to be of real importance. It is now time for Germany to more explicitly recognise its strategic interest in a strong and effective UNDS that can reinforce its foreign policies regarding stabilisation, reconstruction, refugees and the climate. Through multilateral organisations states can achieve more than they can alone. Although earmarked funding has helped the UNDS to expand its scope and scale, in the most prominent forms it has many negative repercussions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.
Earmarking also comes with direct costs to German actors, who face challenges stemming from the multitude of earmarked funding arrangements and their administrative burden. In addition, the German government presents itself in a fragmented manner with regard to the UNDS, with differences across and within ministries and implementing agencies.
For Germany, being in the prominent position of second largest contributor to the UNDS, at a time when the largest contributor is withdrawing funding, comes with responsibilities and opportunities. To be an effective supporter of multilateralism, the German government needs to get its own house in order.
• It should view its allocation decisions as a means towards strengthening multilateralism and supporting UN reforms, and to that end it should work towards a better balanced funding mix with greater shares of flexible funds.
• It should more clearly communicate and justify its increased engagement in the UNDS to the German public and increase the coherence of its multilateral efforts.
• It should assess the hidden costs that arise through the use of implementing agencies and improve guidance on earmarked funding in line with commitments made in the context of the Grand Bargain (2016) and UN Funding Compact (2019).
• It should stabilise the recently raised levels of core contributions to UN development agencies, recognise the strategic importance of core contributions and also make greater use of softly earmarked forms of funding.

Since 2016, Germany has been the second largest contributor to the United Nations development system (UNDS) for development-related and humanitarian activities, after the United States of America. The biggest increase in Germany’s funding has been in the form of earmarked contributions, that is, funding with specified geographic and thematic purposes. While humanitarian funding to agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) accounts for the bulk of Germany’s contributions to the United Nations (UN), development-related funding for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women also experienced a sharp rise. More recently, core contributions, which can be used by multilateral organisations with greater discretion, have also increased, most notably as part of the coronavirus (COVID-19) emergency response.
The significant increase signals that Germany places trust in the UN, including in times of crisis, and deems it to be of real importance. It is now time for Germany to more explicitly recognise its strategic interest in a strong and effective UNDS that can reinforce its foreign policies regarding stabilisation, reconstruction, refugees and the climate. Through multilateral organisations states can achieve more than they can alone. Although earmarked funding has helped the UNDS to expand its scope and scale, in the most prominent forms it has many negative repercussions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.
Earmarking also comes with direct costs to German actors, who face challenges stemming from the multitude of earmarked funding arrangements and their administrative burden. In addition, the German government presents itself in a fragmented manner with regard to the UNDS, with differences across and within ministries and implementing agencies.
For Germany, being in the prominent position of second largest contributor to the UNDS, at a time when the largest contributor is withdrawing funding, comes with responsibilities and opportunities. To be an effective supporter of multilateralism, the German government needs to get its own house in order.
• It should view its allocation decisions as a means towards strengthening multilateralism and supporting UN reforms, and to that end it should work towards a better balanced funding mix with greater shares of flexible funds.
• It should more clearly communicate and justify its increased engagement in the UNDS to the German public and increase the coherence of its multilateral efforts.
• It should assess the hidden costs that arise through the use of implementing agencies and improve guidance on earmarked funding in line with commitments made in the context of the Grand Bargain (2016) and UN Funding Compact (2019).
• It should stabilise the recently raised levels of core contributions to UN development agencies, recognise the strategic importance of core contributions and also make greater use of softly earmarked forms of funding.

Since 2016, Germany has been the second largest contributor to the United Nations development system (UNDS) for development-related and humanitarian activities, after the United States of America. The biggest increase in Germany’s funding has been in the form of earmarked contributions, that is, funding with specified geographic and thematic purposes. While humanitarian funding to agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) accounts for the bulk of Germany’s contributions to the United Nations (UN), development-related funding for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women also experienced a sharp rise. More recently, core contributions, which can be used by multilateral organisations with greater discretion, have also increased, most notably as part of the coronavirus (COVID-19) emergency response.
The significant increase signals that Germany places trust in the UN, including in times of crisis, and deems it to be of real importance. It is now time for Germany to more explicitly recognise its strategic interest in a strong and effective UNDS that can reinforce its foreign policies regarding stabilisation, reconstruction, refugees and the climate. Through multilateral organisations states can achieve more than they can alone. Although earmarked funding has helped the UNDS to expand its scope and scale, in the most prominent forms it has many negative repercussions in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy.
Earmarking also comes with direct costs to German actors, who face challenges stemming from the multitude of earmarked funding arrangements and their administrative burden. In addition, the German government presents itself in a fragmented manner with regard to the UNDS, with differences across and within ministries and implementing agencies.
For Germany, being in the prominent position of second largest contributor to the UNDS, at a time when the largest contributor is withdrawing funding, comes with responsibilities and opportunities. To be an effective supporter of multilateralism, the German government needs to get its own house in order.
• It should view its allocation decisions as a means towards strengthening multilateralism and supporting UN reforms, and to that end it should work towards a better balanced funding mix with greater shares of flexible funds.
• It should more clearly communicate and justify its increased engagement in the UNDS to the German public and increase the coherence of its multilateral efforts.
• It should assess the hidden costs that arise through the use of implementing agencies and improve guidance on earmarked funding in line with commitments made in the context of the Grand Bargain (2016) and UN Funding Compact (2019).
• It should stabilise the recently raised levels of core contributions to UN development agencies, recognise the strategic importance of core contributions and also make greater use of softly earmarked forms of funding.

1. Biodiversity conservation interventions have long confronted challenges of human poverty. The ethical foundations of international conservation, including conservation's relationship with poverty, are currently being interrogated in animated debates about the future of conservation. However, while some commentary exists, empirical analysis of conservation practitioner perspectives on poverty, and their ethical justification, has been lacking thus far.

2. We used Q methodology complemented by more detailed qualitative analysis to examine empirically perspectives on poverty and conservation within the conservation movement, and compare these empirical discourses to positions within the literature. We sampled conservation practitioners in western headquartered organizations, and in Bolivia, China, Nepal and Uganda, thereby giving indications of these perspectives in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

3. While there are some elements of consensus, for instance the principle that the poor should not shoulder the costs of conserving a global public good, the three elicited discourses diverge in a number of ways. Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism differentiate the perspectives, but beyond this, there are two distinct framings of poverty which conservation practitioners variously adhere to.

4. The first prioritizes welfare, needs and sufficientarianism, and is more strongly associated with the China, Nepal and Uganda case studies. The second framing of poverty focuses much more on the need for ‘do no harm’ principles and safeguards, and follows an internationalized human rights‐oriented discourse.

5. There are also important distinctions between discourses about whether poverty is characterized as a driver of degradation, or more emphasis is placed on overconsumption and affluence in perpetuating conservation threats. This dimension particularly illuminates shifts in thinking in the 30 or so years since the Brundtland report, and reflecting new global realities.

6. This analysis serves to update, parse and clarify differing perspectives on poverty within the conservation, and broader environmental movement, to illuminate consensual aspects between perspectives, and reveal where critical differences remain.

1. Biodiversity conservation interventions have long confronted challenges of human poverty. The ethical foundations of international conservation, including conservation's relationship with poverty, are currently being interrogated in animated debates about the future of conservation. However, while some commentary exists, empirical analysis of conservation practitioner perspectives on poverty, and their ethical justification, has been lacking thus far.

2. We used Q methodology complemented by more detailed qualitative analysis to examine empirically perspectives on poverty and conservation within the conservation movement, and compare these empirical discourses to positions within the literature. We sampled conservation practitioners in western headquartered organizations, and in Bolivia, China, Nepal and Uganda, thereby giving indications of these perspectives in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

3. While there are some elements of consensus, for instance the principle that the poor should not shoulder the costs of conserving a global public good, the three elicited discourses diverge in a number of ways. Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism differentiate the perspectives, but beyond this, there are two distinct framings of poverty which conservation practitioners variously adhere to.

4. The first prioritizes welfare, needs and sufficientarianism, and is more strongly associated with the China, Nepal and Uganda case studies. The second framing of poverty focuses much more on the need for ‘do no harm’ principles and safeguards, and follows an internationalized human rights‐oriented discourse.

5. There are also important distinctions between discourses about whether poverty is characterized as a driver of degradation, or more emphasis is placed on overconsumption and affluence in perpetuating conservation threats. This dimension particularly illuminates shifts in thinking in the 30 or so years since the Brundtland report, and reflecting new global realities.

6. This analysis serves to update, parse and clarify differing perspectives on poverty within the conservation, and broader environmental movement, to illuminate consensual aspects between perspectives, and reveal where critical differences remain.

1. Biodiversity conservation interventions have long confronted challenges of human poverty. The ethical foundations of international conservation, including conservation's relationship with poverty, are currently being interrogated in animated debates about the future of conservation. However, while some commentary exists, empirical analysis of conservation practitioner perspectives on poverty, and their ethical justification, has been lacking thus far.

2. We used Q methodology complemented by more detailed qualitative analysis to examine empirically perspectives on poverty and conservation within the conservation movement, and compare these empirical discourses to positions within the literature. We sampled conservation practitioners in western headquartered organizations, and in Bolivia, China, Nepal and Uganda, thereby giving indications of these perspectives in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

3. While there are some elements of consensus, for instance the principle that the poor should not shoulder the costs of conserving a global public good, the three elicited discourses diverge in a number of ways. Anthropocentrism and ecocentrism differentiate the perspectives, but beyond this, there are two distinct framings of poverty which conservation practitioners variously adhere to.

4. The first prioritizes welfare, needs and sufficientarianism, and is more strongly associated with the China, Nepal and Uganda case studies. The second framing of poverty focuses much more on the need for ‘do no harm’ principles and safeguards, and follows an internationalized human rights‐oriented discourse.

5. There are also important distinctions between discourses about whether poverty is characterized as a driver of degradation, or more emphasis is placed on overconsumption and affluence in perpetuating conservation threats. This dimension particularly illuminates shifts in thinking in the 30 or so years since the Brundtland report, and reflecting new global realities.

6. This analysis serves to update, parse and clarify differing perspectives on poverty within the conservation, and broader environmental movement, to illuminate consensual aspects between perspectives, and reveal where critical differences remain.