Defence`s Feeds

I’m going to be participating in the following panel tomorrow. Great lineup, encourage those interested to sign up.

Yesterday, together with Pavel Baev I participated in a Marshall Center panel on the regional fallout of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. My colleague Graeme Herd put together the following summary of the discussion…

This is a summary of the discussion at the latest workshop of the current series of online Russia Seminar Series (RSS) webinars held on March 8, 2022 by the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC) in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The summary reflects the overall tenor of the discussion, and no specific element necessarily should be presumed to be the view of either of the participants.

Context

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had a devastating impact on humanitarian conditions within Ukraine itself. Critical national infrastructure in Ukraine is under attack. Ukraine’s transport system, hospitals and communication networks are being degraded. The UNHCR reports that over 2 million Ukrainians, mainly women and children, have become refugees in neighboring countries, particularly Poland. At the same time, Russian military advances in Ukraine appear to have stalled in most operational theatres. Explanations for this unexpected outcome include logistical difficulties, poor planning, long and vulnerable supply lines, and an inability to execute combined arms warfare effectively. In places where Russia has taken territory, a hostile civil population protests in the rear, even in Russian-speaking regions such as Kherson. Can captured territory be held?

However, the picture is fluid and Russia is not yet fully committed. While Russia will seek to bombard the pivots and hubs used to supply military materiel through Poland and Romania, its usable precision guided weapon stockpile for this “special military operation” is fast depleting, though reserves are available for operations against NATO. Ukraine is able to create reserve battalions around Lviv and receive air defense and anti-tank capabilities. Poland has offered to hand over its entire inventory of 23 MiG-29 fighter aircraft to the US at Ramstein Air Base in Germany for potential transfer to Ukraine pending a NATO decision. These combat aircraft can be flown by Ukrainian pilots. Romania, Slovakia and Hungary also have MiG-29s in their inventories and some or all of these could also be provided to Ukraine. Russia does not have the troop to task ratio to occupy an unwilling Ukraine. And Ukrainian resistance is growing, with the calculation in Kyiv that any deal made today will not be as good as the one made a week from now.

This deadlock is dangerous as Putin needs a “special military operation” victory to support his “everything going according to plan” narrative. Thus, if “victory is not possible and defeat is not an option” – if the choice is between bloody debilitating occupation or withdrawal – then Putin may seek to escalate by opening new fronts to present the Russian public with distracting mini-breakthroughs and victories in the wider region. Short-term risks in the Black Sea region appears highest. Longer-term risks include disruptions to energy and food exports from Russia and Ukraine, and conflicts around Exclusive Economic Zones in the Black Sea, for example, as borders are redrawn but not recognized. This summary identifies short and longer term spillover risks in both regions.

Black Sea Region

Had the “special military operation” actually gone to plan, Kyiv would have fallen within 2-4 days, and in a “best case” scenario from a Russian perspective, resistance would implode and Ukraine suffer sullen occupation. At this point the risks of spillover to Moldova and Georgia would have been much higher. The ideological narrative constructed by Putin around “Slavic unity” and regathering “ancient Russian lands” may have included Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. If not, then this would have suggested EU membership was off the cards for both states and imposed neutrality (“demilitarization”) would have been attempted by Russia.

However, without first capturing Odesa (still possible through a combined air assault and amphibious landing operation) and finding troops to occupy Ukraine in the context of a hostile and debilitating insurgency, military operations into Moldova do not appear viable. Transnistrian forces themselves have no offensive capability and rail links to Odesa region from Tiraspol are cut. Thus, while in Moldova pro-Russian parties and opposition groups in the breakaway Dniester region and the pro-Russian Gagauzia oppose EU accession, Russia aggression in Ukraine propels the majority of the society to support this westward economic and normative reorientation, as is the case in Georgia.

However, the seizure of Georgian territory is possible. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has been remarkably passive and inactive and still has the reserves and capacity to act. The seizure of Poti region in Georgia is a possibility, supported by Chechen forces formally subordinated to Russia’s Rosgvardia (National Guard) but actually under the control of Ramzan Kadyrov. If Putin’s power weakens, Kadyrov may also plan to act more autonomously into the Pankisi Gorge, even if in the name of Putinism and justified with reference to Russian national goals. In such circumstances, Azerbaijan might look to complete “unfinished business” towards Nagorno-Karabakh.

In Georgia itself, the Russian invasion of Ukraine further polarizes society. There is pressure on Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili and ‘Georgia Dream’ party who have adopted a “neutral” policy towards Russia. Neutrality translates into a policy of not supporting international sanctions and keeping Georgia’s air space open to Russian aircraft. Since 24 February opposition rallies in Tbilisi have protested daily against the Russian invasion outside the Georgian Parliament, demanding: 1. A visa regime with Russia; 2. Banning Russian media/propaganda outlets in Georgia; and 3. Closing Georgia’s airspace to Russia.

The role of Turkey is pivotal. Turkey attempts to avoid alienating Russia by keeping its air space open to Russian commercial flights and not applying sanctions. As a result, Turkey, like Georgia, is not included on the Russian list of hostile states. However, Turkey does send effective military aid (drones) to Ukraine. Turkey, citing Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, has closed the entrance to the Black Sea to the navies of the parties to the conflict. With its “sea bridge” unable to function, Russia is forced to resupply Syria using a more expensive and more limited air bridge. This in turn weakens Russia’s presence in Syria relative to Turkey’s. At the same time, the US and NATO face a difficult choice regarding the sending of combat ships into the Black Sea in support of Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey attempts to dissuade allies from requesting access, but the need to protect two exposed allies is growing.

Baltic Sea Region

The risk of spillovers into the Baltic-Nordic region are less than the Black Sea region, at least in the short-term and while the “active phase” of Russian aggression in Ukraine is ongoing. Risks associated with Kaliningrad proves to be the exception to this general rule. If the closure of air space is joined by cutting rail links to Kaliningrad, then this could generate a Russian kinetic response. In addition, reports of resignations and refusal of Belarusian officers and soldiers to follow orders and deploy to Ukraine suggest that Lukashenka’s regime may be less stable than supposed. Does Russia have the spare capacity to bolster Belarus, when Rosgvardia is needed at home as a praetorian safeguard to quell protest potential in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities in Russia?

The Estonian Center Party has severed ties to the United Russia Party. On 5 March, 103 members of its extended board, with no abstentions, voted to rescind the cooperation protocol signed in 2004. In Latvia, though, the polarization of society is a danger, with pro-Russian supporters using provocative rhetoric to radicalise their potential voters ahead of parliamentary elections. Two potential conflict dates loom – the commemoration of Latvian Legionnaires on 16 March and the Soviet Victory Day on 9 May. Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gabrielius Landsbergis has stated that Vilnius has no red lines regarding possible sanctions against Russia – including oil and gas.

Non-aligned Finland and Sweden seek even closer defense cooperation with each other and with NATO. Indeed, the potential for NATO membership has increased and this will lead to heightened tension in medium to long-term. Defense spending is set to increase in all Baltic States. Lithuania adds an extra $0.5bn and its parliament agrees to increase defense spending to 2.5% of GDP. Spending will likely be on deterrent gaps in capabilities necessary to counter Russia’s way of war, such as air defense and drones.

Points of escalation might be driven by the possible use of thermobaric bombs in Kyiv, and/or the slaughter of Ukrainian refugee convoys struggling to reach the Polish border from Lviv. Such horrific violence would stress-test to destruction the ability of NATO member states to achieve all three of its objectives: 1) apply sanctions to Russia and provide humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine; 2) uphold
national interests, democratic values and principles; and 3) avoid miscalculation, spillover and escalation. As RHSS#3 summary noted: “In the context of mass civilian casualties, how does the West calibrate and balance moral principles that reflect its values with pragmatic approaches in line with interests? At what point does “responsibility to protect” trump other considerations?” Almost certainly risk calculus in NATO would change, with a much greater emphasis on alleviating immediate suffering and the “responsibility to protect”.

Conclusions

• The invasion has also shaken the Putin regime in Russia. The Putinist system, born in the violence of the Second Chechen campaign, has grown organically over the last 23 years. It weathered the ‘Moscow Maidan’ protests of 2011-12 and was boosted by the Crimea annexation of 2014. Putin and the players in the system understood the rules of the game, how these rules could be enforced and the necessity of a balance between the normative state, parastatal entities and oligarchs. In 2022, the pressure of sanctions disrupts and destabilizes oligarchs, the business models of parastatal entities and the normative state moves to a war footing, its lead representatives complicit in the war and war crimes.

• In this context, escalation does not have just to be horizontal – a spillover into the wider region – but it can be vertical. The possibility of an accidental radioactive discharge due to Russian attack on nuclear power plant is high. If nuclear signaling is needed, Russia could withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and then promptly stage a nuclear test to intimidate and deter. A low likelihood event involves a Russian “false flag” operation around CBRNE might be considered. A “dirty bomb” fits Russian media narratives that a US-controlled “neo-Nazi” regime would practice genocidal “nuclear terrorism”. The function of this narrative could be to provide a retroactive justification for invasion – prevention of nuclear terrorism – and to place the blame for any nuclear radiation leakage on Kyiv. Such leakages would massively impact on refugee flows westwards. For Putin such flows would be understood in terms of an asymmetric responses by Russia to western pressure.

• Might Putin be tempted to declare martial law or a state of emergency in Russia? Putin may calculate that full mobilization is a necessary means to offset 1) battlefield losses through conscription; 2) economic isolation and rent redistributions to shore up elite support; and 3) evidence the idea that this is an existential fight for Russia, that Ukraine is merely the territory upon which Russia battles the real enemy – NATO. Such reasoning concludes that once battle is joined all measures are justified by Russia if this leads to the defeat of NATO.

• If such reasoning prevails, martial law and mobilization in Russia could prove to be the second and last strategic blunder by Putin. Russian military reforms introduced by Defense Minister Serdyukov 2009-2012 means mass mobilization is not possible – the Russian military does not have the capacity or infrastructure to train such large numbers. Moreover, such a move might precipitate a societal revolt, one in which the Russian security services would struggle to maintain order. Alternatively, it could encourage a military coup, with a charismatic and politically acceptable Defense Minister Shoigu at its head. Given “everything is forever until it is no more”, the entourage and inner-circle around Putin may well calculate that the president himself is the problem and his removal the solution.

• Fear of failure in Ukraine and fear of revolt and removal in Russia likely increases Putin’s isolation and paranoia. He may then adopt a differentiated understanding of risk. At home he is risk averse. Martial law or declaring a state of emergency is avoided. Putin likely compensates by accepting greater risk abroad. This suggests a Black Sea Fleet “special military operation” against Poti could come into focus, or Russia looks to conducts a dirty bomb “false flag” operation in Ukraine. In Putin’s mind, both options would create disruptive situations to generate options and new opportunities for leverage and exploitation.

I was on the Defense One Radio Podcast on Friday, together with some other guests, talking about the larger context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. You can listen or read the transcript here. Here’s a sample:

Watson: I’m wondering, what is your read on this next generation of power brokers in Russia, and their interest in Putin’s kind of, you know, revanchist tendencies here?

Gorenburg: It’s, you know, it’s really hard to tell what, how things, you know, what any of these next generation people really think. And, you know, one movie that I think is well worth watching, not just for the history, but also for just when you start thinking about how a bunch of psychopaths interact with the Supreme Leader’s, is the “Death of Stalin.” And you see that kind of cow-towing, right? But also, what the actual history of that time tells us is that the survivors, the people who stuck around in positions of power became very good at hiding their true beliefs while Stalin was around. And so, we don’t really know what a lot of these people think, because the ones that had clear positions that were contrary to what Putin wants have been sidelined.

…

Watson: What are the long-game considerations that maybe the U.S. officials in the policy community may not have been thinking about as much as perhaps they ought to? 

Gorenburg: Well, I think we’re heading into clearly a time of NATO-Russia confrontation. A lot will depend on how this goes. If this goes well and easily for Putin, then I think the appetite may increase. If it becomes complicated and painful, then there’ll be a time of reckoning, recalculation, or even just a time of trying to assimilate what’s been gained. But if it does go well, then I worry a bit about Moldova, honestly.

Here are the abstracts from the latest issue of our Russian Media Analysis newsletter. You can also download the full text PDF version.

This newsletter covers developments up to February 21, 2022. Russian media discussions of Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics on February 21, 2022, as well as the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, will be covered in the following issue.

1. HIGHLIGHTS OF PUTIN SPEECH

The key points of Vladimir Putin’s speech on February 21 include the following: Ukraine is preparing for a conflict with Western military support. Ukraine will seek to create nuclear weapons, or potentially get Western assistance to do so. Ukraine joining NATO is just a matter of time. Ukraine in NATO is a “direct threat to Russian security.” The US and NATO have sought not only to arm and train but also to integrate Ukraine’s military. These actions present a threat to Russia. NATO military bases are already present in Ukraine. Previous rounds of NATO expansion have not led to an improvement in relations with Russia, as the West has promised. Russia has unsuccessfully sought to cooperate with the West in various formats. Instead, the West has “cheated” and NATO infrastructure is now on Russia’s doorstep. US missile defense and strike capabilities are expanding and will pose a threat to Russia from Ukrainian territory. The West has “ignored” Russian proposals to resolve the current situation and this will have consequences.

2. PERCEPTION OF US GOALS IN THE CRISIS

Several articles discuss Russian perceptions of what the United States is looking to achieve in the current confrontation between the West and Russia. They focus on US domestic problems and fears of a loss of world domination as reasons that Washington is provoking a confrontation with Russia. They also suggest that the current confrontation is just the culmination of a long-term US plan to weaken Russia. They also argue that the US feels that Russia has little to offer in the way of potential concessions to end the crisis.

3. RUSSIAN GOALS IN THE CONFRONTATION

Several articles discuss Russian goals in the confrontation with the West and what Russia has achieved. Unlike Western analysts, who tend to focus on efforts to stop NATO enlargement or reorient Ukraine, Russian analysts address possibilities such as averting a new European missile crisis or forcing Ukraine to carry out the Minsk agreements. Russian achievements during the confrontation including bringing the US and its European allies to the negotiating table on major security issues, while negative consequences include reinforcing Western unity and creating a more negative perception of Russia in the West.

4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAR AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Two authors discuss the potentially dangerous consequences for Russia of a war in Ukraine, while several offer possible solutions to the crisis. Writing from opposing perspectives, a conservative commentator and a liberal former FSB general agree that Russia is not prepared for war in Ukraine and for confrontation with the West. Possible solutions to the crisis focus primarily on the possibility of a neutral Ukraine, though some propose a broader array of confidence-building measures to reduce the extent of confrontation in Europe as a whole.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF US AND EUROPEAN SANCTIONS

Numerous articles in the Russian press discuss and even dismiss the potential implications of US efforts to impose sanctions on Russia. In Gazeta.ru, Anatoliy Akulov analyzes the challenges of US consensus-building among European actors to sanction Nordstream 2. In Topwar.ru, Aleksandr Staver critiques US targeted sanctions against Russia, arguing that they in essence view the children of Russian investors in the UK as hostages. In Izvestiya, Mariya Vasil’eva focuses on the sanctions’ potential impact on the Russian embassies abroad, arms exports, and electronics, among others. In Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er (VPK), Vladimir Eranosyan writes about the challenges that the US faces in making good on its threat to disconnect Russia from SWIFT as well as about the INSTEX system created in the wake of Iran’s disconnect from SWIFT. Finally, in another article in VPK, Vitaliy Orlov writes about how Russia could transition away from the use of the US dollar for exports of Russian armaments abroad.

6. WESTERN FORCE DEPLOYMENTS GARNER RUSSIAN ATTENTION

As the crisis between Ukraine and Russia heats up, Russian authors have been quick to point out new military deployments by Western powers in the region. American deployments to Poland and Slovakia have been of interest, as well as UK support elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Overall, the articles view these deployments as ominous, but also par for the course given the bellicose trajectory of interstate relations in recent months.

7. UKRAINE ARMS FOR WAR

Many articles in the Russian press are reviewing current political and military tensions surrounding Ukraine. Taking a variety of tacks, articles largely focus on the state of the Ukrainian military and its support by Western powers. They encompass details about military equipment and technology transfers, discuss the broader abilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, and launch critical broadsides against Ukraine’s perceived bellicose position relative to Russia and the separatist republics.

8. BELARUS AIDS IN RUSSIA’S MILITARY BUILDUP

Cooperation between Russia and Belarus are a point of interest for several observers, especially as tensions continue to ratchet up with neighboring Ukraine. Belarus and Russia are jointly undertaking combined-arms military exercises in the form of “Union Resolve – 2022,” which some view as a further step away from any putative neutrality by Belarus. Others noted that Belarus has taken a hard line vis-à-vis Ukraine in terms of public declarations of support for Russia’s side, which is a shift from previous years. Finally, a military doctrine for the Russo-Belarusian Union State has been recently approved, which has further underlined the considerable alignment between the two countries.

9. TURKEY AS A MEDIATOR FOR THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT

An Izvestiya article interviews Russia’s ambassador to Turkey, who discusses Ankara’s offer to mediate the Russia-Ukraine crisis. While Turkey claims that it is “the only country” that can meet both Russia and Ukraine halfway to find resolution, the ambassador has doubts of Turkey’s impartiality, noting its “well-known military-technical ties with Ukraine.” Moreover, the ambassador suggests that Ankara may not adequately understand the extent of Russia’s grievances. He states, “If our Turkish partners can influence the Ukrainians and encourage them to fulfill the previously-made [Minsk] agreements and obligations, this can be welcomed.”

10. SIVKOV CAUTIONS US ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR

In VPK, Russian commentator Konstantin Sivkov extrapolates from what he alleges to have been a statement made by Gen. David Goldfein about “three steps to destroy Russia.” He concludes that a nuclear conflict between the US and Russia would be fatal for both Russia and the United States—and lead to the dominance of other states in the international system. This, he notes, should force “global and US elites to think—should they free up a “place in the sun” for others?”

11. PERSPECTIVES ON INFORMATION WARFARE

In a February 11 article in Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (NVO), Yuriy Yur’ev writes about the concept of information warfare as a “component part of hybrid warfare” and traces the evolution of US information warfare concepts, arguing that Russia has lost the initiative to its opponents in this area. In Krasnaya Zvezda, Oleg Martynov discusses the creation in Poland of a cyber defense force. This article traces the evolution of US and NATO concepts in the cyber domain and posits that NATO has long “viewed the cyber sphere as a domain for military action.”

12. NEXUS OF CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS IN HYBRID WARS AND COLOR REVOLUTIONS

In VPK, Konstantin Strigunov focuses on the nexus of criminal and terrorist groups as a potential globalization trend that weakens state governments. He argues that criminal, terrorist, and other groups are also utilized in “non-classical wars” such as hybrid wars and color revolutions.

13. US EXERCISES AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS

VPK and Kommersant discuss US and allied exercises and weapons systems. In Kommersant, Marianna Belen’kaya discusses Western reactions to the Russo-Belarusian Allied Resolve 2022 exercises and Russian commentators’ perspectives on military activities in the region. In VPK, authors discuss US presence in the Mediterranean for the Neptune Strike-2022 exercises, the testing of the joint air-to-ground missile, and US ballistic and cruise missile programs.

14. CHINESE-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Several articles reported on the meetings between presidents Putin and Xi on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics: the leaders declared that there were no limits to their strategic partnership; they vowed to counter instances of foreign interference in internal affairs; and Beijing announced that it joins Putin in opposing further NATO expansion. While some articles gloat at these new developments, others are more cautious—noting drawbacks and inequities in the alliance in the context of the Ukraine conflict. Another article argues that the US is trying to use Ukraine to drive a wedge between China and Russia.

15. KURIL ISLANDS DEVELOPMENTS; RUSSIAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Several articles report on an alleged US Virginia-class submarine incident that occurred near the Kuril Islands on February 12, which the Russian Ministry of Defense characterized as “a gross violation of international law.” According to reports, the submarine entered Russian territorial waters during a planned Russian military exercise, ignored warning messages instructing the vessel to surface, and was chased away by a Russian frigate. Other articles discuss the Japanese-Russian territorial dispute surrounding the South Kuril Islands, and how potential anti-Russian sanctions from Tokyo might affect the bilateral relationship.

16. IRAN NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS

Two articles discuss the US decision to reintroduce sanction waivers to Iran in hopes of reviving the nuclear negotiations. In an interview, the Russian Permanent Representative to International Organizations in Vienna notes that this step “should have been taken long ago” but welcomes the decision. A different article questions whether this is enough to save the Iran deal, noting Tehran’s lack of enthusiasm in response to the waivers, and the lack of trust that a diplomatic resolution would be upheld by future US administrations.

Here are the abstracts from the latest issue of our Russian Media Analysis newsletter. You can also download the full text PDF version.

1. The Ukraine Crisis: Views of US-Russia Negotiations

Negotiations between the United States and Russia over the Ukraine-Russia crisis are widely discussed across Russian media, from a variety of angles. Most commentators are in agreement that the United States and its allies are engaging in bad-faith negotiations, given their continued military-technical support for Ukraine, although some note concern with Russian posture. The negotiations themselves are seen as a first step, and meetings with Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Lavrov, as well as the formal diplomatic response from the United States to Russia over their treaty proposals, are treated in a variety of ways.

2. The Ukraine Crisis: Perceptions of US Strategy

In discussing the current confrontation between the United States and Russia, a number of publications consider causal factors affecting US strategy. The focus is on the impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and its effect on US assessments of geopolitical risks and US aggressiveness. The articles also discuss the US predilection for narcissism and double standards. Some analysts do note the clear rejection of a military response by US leadership as leaving open the possibility of a compromise solution.

3. The Ukraine Crisis: Discussion of Russia’s Strategy

Russian media published a number of articles discussing Russian goals and strategy in the Ukraine crisis. Several articles focus on Russia’s need for security guarantees as a key driver of the current crisis. Other articles suggest that Russia’s real concern is not NATO enlargement per se but specifically the placement of NATO military hardware near Russia’s borders. Others suggest that in provoking a crisis now, Russia is reacting to a perception of weakness on the part of the United States in order to push the US into making concessions on Russian security demands.

4. The Ukraine Crisis: Signals of Potential Elite Unease

Two articles highlight the possibility of concerns within the Russian military about how an invasion of Ukraine would play out. The two authors, both well connected with segments of the Russian military and defense industry, suggest that a Russian military intervention in Ukraine could go badly and does not correspond to Russian national interests.

5. The Ukraine Crisis: Reaction to Potential US Sanctions

In Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er (VPK), Vladimir Vasil’yev of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies (ISKRAN) argues that the Russia sanctions bill proposed by Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Bob Menendez is “Cold War 2.0 legislation.” Vasil’yev notes that one way to interpret the bill is that it intends sanctions to “speed up and ease the Ukraine’s accession” to NATO. In a Topwar.ru article focused on how sanctions on exports of high technologies to Russia can be incredibly damaging to the Russian economy, Andrey Mitrofanov posits that US sanctions seek to turn Russia into North Korea 2.0.

6. The Ukraine Crisis: Reactions to Western Military Activities and “Information Warfare”

Numerous articles in the Russian press focus on the US deployments to Europe and the shifts in force postures and military activities in the region. Kommersant describes the state of “information warfare” and “hysteria” around Ukraine. Nezavisimaya Gazeta describes the military exercises and troop movements in the region, noting that NATO “assumes Russian aggression against Ukraine, [while] the Russian-Belarusian side [is concerned about] the possibility of NATO provocations that could push Kiev to resolve the problem of Donbass and Luhansk by force. Anton Lavrov, Roman Kretsul, and Andrey Fedorov discuss changes in the US force posture in Europe and quote a former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official as saying that some can be regarded as a “menacing maneuver.”

7. The Ukraine Crisis: Military Aid to Ukraine

More than 10 articles report on training and military aid to Ukraine, including new shipments from the US and UK, as well as transfers of US weapons from the Baltics, UAVs from Turkey, and artillery shells from the Czech Republic. While one article suggests that the acquisition of these new capabilities proves Ukraine’s intent to invade the Donbas, most are skeptical that these weapons provide Ukraine with any new meaningful capability.

8. The Ukraine Crisis: Ukrainian Military Developments

Several articles report on Ukrainian military developments “which confirm the fact that it is preparing for aggression against the [Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics].” Two articles report on movements of the 58th Separate Motorized Infantry and 53rd and 54th Separate Motorized Brigades, transport of portable demining units, military exercises near Crimea, and Zelensky’s decree to increase the size of armed forces by 100,000. A Topwar.ru article argues that Ukraine has been preparing to take back the Donbas by force since 2014. A fourth article reports on the low morale of Ukrainian troops.

9. Reactions to NATO Development Plans

Several articles address how NATO is planning to develop in the near to medium term and the threat that the organization’s plans pose to Russia. The topics include the expansion of NATO’s zone of operations to new territories, such as the Middle East, and new domains, such as space. NATO enlargement and its aggressive militarism, in the context of an overwhelming conventional force superiority over Russia, are highlighted as the main threats to Russia. The possibility of an unwanted NATO-Russia war being caused by Ukraine is also mentioned.

10. Scandinavia and NATO Enlargement

Yevgeny Fedorov, writing in Topwar.ru, discusses the possibility of Sweden and Finland joining NATO. He argues that even though the two countries recently reiterated that they are not currently interested in joining the alliance, they retain the right to join at any point in the future while remaining so closely integrated with the alliance that membership would be merely a formal change in status.

11. Concerns About Turkish Expansionism

An article in VPK discusses how Turkey is increasingly being used by the US and UK as a proxy to contain Russia on its southern flank and to pursue expansionist ambitions in Central Asia. The article argues that despite some tensions with its NATO allies, Turkey remains firmly committed to the alliance’s strategy to weaken Russia by forcing it to defend all of its borders and to impact its economy by creating alternative energy sources for Europe.

12. Potential Russian Military Development in the Caribbean

Two articles discuss potential Russian military developments in Caribbean states-namely, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. A Topwar.ru article argues that because NATO is “increasingly, unceremoniously settling in close to Russia’s borders from the Barents to the Black Sea,” including US missile deployment, Russia is forced to respond in kind. A Novye Izvestiya article argues that while US influence on Venezuela and Cuba may prevent them from being viable hosts of Russian military bases, Nicaragua may be a more suitable option. Both articles acknowledge the challenges associated with challenging US hegemony in the region.

13. US Support for Japan’s Military Goals

Russian commentators continue to be concerned about a further deepening of the US-Japanese security relationship, arguing that Japan’s military-strategic plans to reemerge as an important player in East Asia have led it to follow the US lead on geopolitical issues elsewhere. Writing in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Valery Kistanov explores the question of why Japan wishes to become a military power, and what it is willing to sacrifice in order to achieve this. Although suspicious of Japan’s claims to be concerned about national security, he nevertheless writes that it is necessary to take this as-is and focus on the fact that a considerable military buildup is in its early stages.

14. Chinese-Russian Relations as a ‘Biathlon’

The Olympic Games in Beijing may bring about renewed and strengthened diplomatic ties, according to Yuri Tavrovsky, the head of the Expert Council of the Russian-Chinese Committee for Friendship, Peace, and Development. Writing in Moskovskii Komsomolets, Tavrovsky argues that upcoming meetings between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in the context of the games are a perfect venue for continuing down a line of close cooperation between the two at a personal level.

15. The CSTO in Central Asia Versus NATO

The deployment of CSTO forces into Kazakhstan during political troubles earlier in January has led to some Russian analysts to reappraise the organization. One article in Gazeta.ru by Viktor Sokirko and Dmitry Mayorov attempted to assess the CSTO’s military capabilities at the alliance level. They argue that in fact the CSTO, while inferior to NATO in general, is more than capable of maintaining order in Central Asia and ensuring a form of moderate collective defense. This is more than sufficient, given that the CSTO has very different goals from NATO in the first place, according to the authors.

16. Russian-Iranian Cooperation and Reactions to JCPOA Negotiations

Topwar.ru provides an update on the JCPOA negotiations and expressed criticism of the US position in the talks, highlighting Russian opposition to artificial deadlines. An article in Ekspert about the recent visit by Iran’s president Ebrahim Raisi to Moscow highlights areas of Russo-Iranian cooperation, and says that the visit was aimed at securing Russian support in the face of US pressure for additional concessions from Iran as part of JCPOA negotiations.

Here are the abstracts from the latest issue of our Russian Media Analysis newsletter. You can also download the full text PDF version.

1. Russian perceptions of the NATO threat

Several articles describe Russian perceptions of NATO and the threat that it poses to Russian security. They focus on the role of the alliance as a weapon of US domination in Europe, the threat posed to Russia by NATO’s previous expansion to the east, and the possibility that it could expand further to include Sweden, Finland, or Georgia. These Western actions can be countered either by NATO and the United States providing binding security guarantees to Russia or by Russia extending its security border to the Soviet Union’s previous western border in Belarus and Ukraine.

2. Karaganov argues that NATO is a metastasizing “cancer” that needs to be “limited territorially”

On January 19, the Russian newspaper Argumenty i Fakty interviewed Sergey Karaganov, dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, on the state of Russia’s relations with the US and NATO. In the interview, Karaganov also discusses Russia’s intentions in Ukraine, contrasts Russia with the Soviet Union, and discusses potential steps that Russia could take in response to the ongoing crisis.

3. US-Russia diplomatic engagements

During this reporting period, recent diplomatic efforts are frequently mentioned. These include US-Russia talks in Geneva, NATO-Russia talks in Brussels, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) talks in Vienna, and a phone conversation between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Blinken. Several articles discuss Russia’s motivation behind the talks, which followed unrealistic demands for security guarantees and largely ended in stalemate. They also discuss what lies ahead.

4. Plans for US sanctions against Russia

Several articles highlight potential US plans to further strengthen sanctions against Russia. Draft US plans to impose personal sanctions against top Russian officials are dismissed as unlikely. However, the possibility of serious measures to limit interactions with Russian financial institutions and to prohibit the transfer of a wide range of technology to Russia (and the use of that technology by Russia) is taken more seriously. Russia could respond with highly disruptive countermeasures and may see the most severe measures as, in effect, a declaration of war.

5. The West prepares for conflict

Russian media published extensive discussions of statements being made by Western officials in response to Russia’s deployment of forces near Ukraine. These articles focus on the deployment of additional NATO forces to Eastern Europe, reports about the evacuation of Western and Russian embassy personnel from Kyiv, and US efforts to find alternative sources of natural gas for EU member states that would be engaged in a conflict with Russia.

6. NATO, Russia-Belarus military exercises

One article discusses NATO’s upcoming Cold Response exercise, which will take place in late March and early April and will include 35,000 military personnel from 28 states. The article notes that “such large-scale exercises as Cold Response-2022 have not been held in Norway since the 1980s.” Earlier in the year, on February 10–20, Russia and Belarus will hold joint military exercises, titled “Allied Resolve.” Two articles discuss the size, scope, and motivation of the maneuvers. A fourth article reports that the head of Poland’s National Security Bureau requested that NATO hold military exercises in the region in response to the joint Russian-Belarusian exercises.

7. Nuclear risk reduction and potential Western reactions to Belarusian nukes

Several articles cover nuclear issues. Krasnaya Zvezda focuses on Russia’s views on the importance of the P5 Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and the importance to Russia of the “inadmissibility of any war between nuclear states, whether nuclear or with the use of conventional weapons.” Aleksey Poplavskiy in Gazeta.ru offers Russian expert commentary on potential Western reactions to the unlikely placement of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. (The December 6–16, 2021, issue of Russian Media Analysisaddressed this latter issue.)

8. Options for new Russian missile bases as competition grows

As geopolitical competition increases, Russian authors are suggesting possibilities for new staging points that can counter perceived NATO encroachment. Two articles in Topwar.ru point out the potential for sites in Cuba and Serbia, respectively, as states that may be particularly open to hosting new forward-deployed arms. While Cuba is seen with a glow of Soviet-era nostalgia, the Balkan case represents a more novel vision in any future arms race.

9. Western information warfare against Russia

In Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er (VPK), Sergey Korotkov argues that the US (and the West) are leaders in disinformation and have used this in the past to create a justification for wars in Iraq and Yugoslavia. The article posits that “the US views the internet as the main instrument of conducting hybrid warfare to achieve global domination in the global information space” and “aggressive propaganda in the form of disinformation campaigns is conducted at the state level and is a component of the ‘systematic deterrence of Russia.’” Separately, an article in Topwar.ru offers perspectives on a January 6 Atlantic Council event that featured retired general Wesley Clark, who argued that Putin is a war criminal and that Russia could use chemical weapons in Ukraine.

10. Military aid to Ukraine

Many articles have focused on the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, looking specifically at new plans for military aid being developed by NATO countries to assist Ukraine in light of a potential Russian military action. Several articles focus on aid from the UK, which is stated to be moving faster and with greater qualitative effectiveness than other aid plans at present. Other authors review US military aid being debated in Congress as well. In general, the articles frame UK and US military aid as a means of ratcheting up the local threat against Russia, further destabilizing the regional security environment, and further cementing Ukraine’s de facto position as a quasi-member of NATO and the broader Western security architecture.

11. Tumult and fragmentation in Ukrainian domestic politics

The domestic travails of Ukraine were recently noted by two Russian authors, each arguing that the internal politics of the country were riven by scandal, faction, and dissent. Both articles are provocative: one, in Topwar.ru, asks why Ukrainian statehood had ever even been considered; the other, in VPK, drives home the point that Western efforts to aid Ukraine are not always clearly appreciated by Kyiv.

12. How future wars will be fought

Two articles by noted military specialists address the question of how wars will be fought in the future. Aleksandr Khramchikhin suggests that UAVs are likely to become the most important weapon in future wars, because they would be virtually impossible to eliminate and could be used to eliminate enemy air defense infrastructure. Viktor Murakhovsky is, on the whole, more skeptical about the dominance of technology in future warfare. The ineffectiveness of high-tech warfare in Afghanistan and Yemen suggests that future warfare may not be as technology dependent as visionaries on both sides believe.

13. Concerns about Turkish geopolitical designs

Multiple articles in Topwar.ru look at the geopolitical place of Turkey as well as ethnic ties across the Turkic peoples of Eurasia. Focusing on the potential for military cooperation along a pan-Turkic basis, as well as the prospects for major military expansion by Turkey in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, the articles add to a growing sense of paranoia about the prospect of alternative regional power blocs based on ethnic relations.

14. US accused of stirring up extremist groups in the North Caucasus

According to an article by Evgeny Fedorov in Topwar.ru, the United States is seeking to undermine internal Russian stability by way of encouraging extremist movements in the North Caucasus. Fedorov argues that American support in organizing and propagating Islamic extremist movements over the internet has grown in recent years, with the goal of provoking protest and confrontation between the authorities and local radicals. Fedorov highlights a new memorial set up by a local extremist organization, 1ADAT, as a new means of American meddling in internal affairs.

15. Alarm about new Kazakhstan biosafety-level-4 lab

Several articles in the Russian media and on online sites discuss the planned construction of a BSL-4 laboratory in Kazakhstan. Articles in Topwar.ru and Izvestiya argue that reference labs and biosafety facilities in Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan are an enormous cause for concern for Russia because they are nontransparent and potentially unaccountable facilities conducting dangerous work close to the Russian border. While both of these articles include disinformation, they also exemplify the perspectives of Russian military analysts about CTR-supported installations in Eurasia.

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel,

koya979 / Shutterstock.com

At three recent European Councils (December 2012, December 2013 and June 2015), the Heads of State or government have called for a deepening of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) namely by strengthening its crisis management dimension and further developing civilian and military capabilities. The June 2016 European Council reverted to security and defence policy with particular attention to the strengthening of the relationship with NATO, including on the development of complementary and interoperable defence capabilities.

But what are the achievements? Is there a way of measuring progress made over the past years? Is there a gap between intentions/declarations and deeds? What are the challenges and how to address them?

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) will address these questions at a roundtable discussion on ‘The European Council and CSDP: success or failure?’ on 27 September 2016, 13h30-15h00, in the European Parliament’s Library main reading room in Brussels. Participants at this roundtable debate are: Elmar Brok MEP, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Jean-Paul Perruche, Former Director-General of the European Union Military Staff, Professor Alexander Mattelaer, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and Elena Lazarou, Policy Analyst, EPRS.

Registration
If you do not have an access badge to the European Parliament and are interested in attending the event, it is essential to register by Friday 23 September, using this link.

At the event the EPRS study on ‘The European Council and CSDP: Orientation and Implementation in the field of Crisis Management’ will be presented and discussed. This study assesses the planning, command and control of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, progress made in developing civilian and military capabilities, particularly rapid response capabilities in the form of the EU Battlegroups, as well as challenges encountered during the force generation process, areas in which the European Council repeatedly called for further progress to be made.

 

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© mrallen / Fotolia

Challenges to security in Europe will take centre stage at the NATO summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July when its heads of state and government will discuss issues ranging from Russia’s conflict with Ukraine and its growing military assertiveness to turmoil across the Middle East and North Africa, and the future of the military alliance.

This note highlights a selection of commentaries, studies and reports by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes on European security and defence published in the run-up to the NATO summit. More reports on the subject can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ from in November 2015.

NATO summit

NATO Summit 2016: From reassurance to deterrence. What’s really at stake?
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2016

The Warsaw summit and the return of Western nationalism
Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2016

Warsaw summit
Atlantic Council, June 2016

NATO Summit 2016: NATO must reaffirm its “open door” policy
Heritage Foundation, June 2016

National priorities for the NATO Warsaw summit
German Marshall Fund, May 2016

NATO defence planning between Wales and Warsaw: Politico-military challenges of a credible assurance against Russia
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016

What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and beyond
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

Preparing for NATO’s Warsaw summit: The challenges of adapting to strategic change
Danish Institute of International Studies, December 2015

Other studies

Restoring the power and purpose of the NATO alliance
Atlantic Council, June 2016

Time to restore conventional deterrence-by-denial
Egmont, June 2016

A new strategy: Implications for CSDP
Clingendael, June 2016

All not quiet on NATO’s eastern front
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

A threat-based strategy for NATO’s southern flank
Carnegie Europe, June 2016

Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Activation of risk potential
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2016

The future of Transatlantic security
Rand, June 2016

Evaluating future U.S. Army force posture in Europe
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, June 2016

NATO must stop crowding Russia
Cato Institute, June 2016

European defence: From strategy to delivery
Clingendael, May 2016

Embedding NATO into the European Union Global Strategy: The missing link?
European, May 2016

Closing NATO’s Baltic gap
International Centre for Defence Studies, May 2016

Russia: A test for Transatlantic unity
Transatlantic Academy, German Marshall Fund, May 2016

A historic reminder, an ever-present dilemma? Assessing Brexit’s potential consequences for European security
European Policy Centre, May 2016

Russian “countermeasures” to NATO are coming
Brookings Institution, May 2016

EUISS yearbook of European security 2016
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Envisioning European defence: Five futures
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

For a “new realism” in European defense: The five key challenges an EU defense strategy should address
German Marshall Fund, April 2016

A new Helsinki needed? What security model for Europe?
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2016

The parliamentary dimension of defence cooperation
Clingendael, April 2016

European defence spending 2015: The force awakens
European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2016

Do we need an EU army? Which way for the European security and defence cooperation
Mendel European Centre, March 2016

NATO’s guns point the wrong way
Friends of Europe, March 2016

NATO, the US and Baltic Sea security
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, February 2016

The annexation of Crimea: Lessons for European security
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2016

Ensuring deterrence against Russia: The view from NATO’s front-line States
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, February 2016

Forces terrestres et réassurance: Quelles options pour l’Alliance?
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2016

The defence of Europe before European Defence: Returning to the Schuman method
Fondation Robert Schuman, January 2016

A stronger CSDP: Deepening defence cooperation
Clingendael, January 2016

Defence budgets and cooperation in Europe: Developments, trends and drivers
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Consortium of Think Tanks, January 2016

Reinforcing deterrence on NATO’s Eastern flank: Wargaming the defense of the Baltics
Rand, January 2016

NATO and European security: back to the roots?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015

The EU, Russia and the quest for a new European security bargain
Clingendael, December 2015

European strategy, European defence and the CSDP
Egmont, November 2015

L’Europe à la croisée des chemins: La politique de défense et de sécurité a besoin d’initiatives franco-allemandes
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2015

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel, Stanislas de Finance, Ralf Drachenberg

This 25-26 June 2015 summit witnessed an intense debate. While the agenda originally covered Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the digital single market and the European Semester, in addition to a presentation from David Cameron, United Kingdom Prime Minister to outline his vision on renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU, the summit became a crisis Council. Many discussions again focused on the situation in the Mediterranean, with several lively exchanges. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel described the issue as the ‘biggest challenge’ Europe had faced during her time in office.

The Council’s conclusions nevertheless managed to address all issues on the agenda. The Heads of State or Government concentrated on three key dimensions of the European Commission’s agenda on migration: the relocation/resettlement of migrants; their return/readmission/reintegration; and cooperation with countries of both origin and transit. Clear differences in opinion persisted on the voluntary or mandatory nature of the relocation scheme, but agreement was reached on ‘the temporary and exceptional relocation, over two years, from the frontline Member States: Italy and Greece, to other Member States of 40 000 persons in clear need of international protection’.

Although the debate on CSDP fell short of its original ambition, the Council conclusions included a statement that the European Council ‘will keep security and defence policy on its regular agenda’, thereby clearly underlining the future importance of CSDP.

United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron’s presentation of his vision on renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU, did not outline any specific details, however, it provided an impetus for European level discussions on this issue, with Council President Donald Tusk seeing it as ‘the first step in a longer process that will also end at the European Council’. This issue is certain to reappear on the agenda for the Council meeting in December 2015.

The significantly shortened debate on the Commission communication on a Digital Single Market strategy for Europe, nevertheless led to Council conclusions calling for the rapid adoption of the Telecommunications Single Market Regulation, the Directive on Network and Information Security, and the Data Protection package. Heads of State or Government also stressed that action must be taken on key components of the Commission communication, such as eliminating mobile roaming charges. On this issue, on 30 June 2015, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, reached agreement to end roaming surcharges by 15 June 2017.

The EPRS publishes briefings on the European Council before summits, and European Council outcome briefings (next to be issued just after the European Council of 15-16 October 2015).

Read this Briefing on Outcome of the 25-26 June European Council in PDF

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel Gavrilescu and Ralf Drachenberg

The June European Council has a comprehensive list of topics to discuss, including the situation in the Mediterranean, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), fighting terrorism, economic governance aspects, and the digital agenda. In addition, a presentation by the British Prime Minister on the future role of the United Kingdom is on the agenda.

Migration is the main topic of this June European Council. Heads of State or Government will discuss the recently published European Agenda for Migration and take stock of the progress made since the extraordinary European Council meeting on migration in April 2015. The European Council will discuss the European Commission’s proposal for a temporary relocation mechanism, which envisages relocating 40 000 persons from Italy and Greece to other Member States.

The European Council should also agree on a new CSDP roadmap and set the objectives for capabilities development, fostering the defence industry and the defence market, and strengthening relations with international organisations (i.e. the UN, NATO, the African Union). The Heads of State or Government will decide on a timeline for the completion of the strategic review process, most probably by June 2016. Within the broader context of discussing security aspects, the European Council will also examine the implementation of the informal February 2015 European Council‘s decisions on the fight against terrorism. 

During discussions on the 2015 European Semester the European Council endorse the Country Specific Recommendations that Member States should implement to ensure sound public finances and to make their economies more competitive. Whilst on the topic of better economic governance in the euro area, the ‘Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ report is expected to be presented to the Heads of State or Government.

The European Commission’s recent Digital Single Market strategy for Europe will be tabled for examination, and the European Council will most likely call for a rapid adoption of pending legislation in this field, such as the European Single Market for Electronic Communications, the Directive on Network and Information Security and the proposal for a Regulation on Data Protection.

This European Council meeting will also hear United Kingdom Prime Minister, David Cameron outline his vision for renegotiating his country’s relationship with the EU.

Read the complete ‘Outlook for the European Council of 25 – 26 June 2015‘ in PDF.

Written by Marcin Grajewski

The recent interview by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, in which he advocated ‘a joint EU army’ as a means to strengthen European foreign policy and ‘allow Europe to take on responsibility in the world’ has revived an on-going debate in think-tank and academic circles about how to maximise the effectiveness of existing national and Europe-wide efforts in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The European Council adopted an extensive set of conclusions on the subject in December 2013.

This note highlights a selection of recent studies, reports and commentaries by some of the major international think tanks and research institutes that analyse issues surrounding the development of CSDP.

Commentaries © TebNad / Shutterstock

Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why of Juncker’s call for a common European army  European Policy Centre (EPC), March 12, 2015

Does the EU need its own army?  Carnegie Europe, March 11, 2015

The illusion of an independent EU army  Carnegie Europe, March 10, 2015

If not now, when? The Nordic EU battle-group

European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS), February 17, 2015

The EU and the UN: together for peace

European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 18, 2014

Europe’s global power potential: locked in the EU28’s defence silos  Friends of Europe, December 4, 2014

2014: a centenary and a discovery  Egmont, December 2014

Analyses

The EU neighbourhood in shambles  Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 3, 2015

More Union in European defence  Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), February 26, 2015

European Defence Trends  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 6, 2015

Report: EU as a security provider  Clingendael, December 18, 2014

Why Europe must stop outsourcing its security

European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), December 15, 2014

Peacemaking: Can the EU meet expectations?  Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December, 2014

Europe’s changing security landscape: What role will the EU play in security and defence?

Finnish Institute of International Affairs, December 12, 2014

Actors in the European defence policy area: roles and developments

Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 24, 2014

Constructing the defence dimension of the EU

International Security Information Service Europe, June, 2014

Security and defence: an issue for the European citizen?

Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), March, 2014

Livre blanc français de la défense 2013 : lignes de forces autour de la sécurité-défense européenne

L’Institut royal supérieur de défense, December, 2013

Why do Europeans need armed forces?  Fride, November, 2013

 Related publications

Why peacekeeping matters to Europe  Friends of Europe, March 11, 2015

The Wales pledge revisited: A preliminary analysis of 2015 budget decisions in NATO member states

European Leadership Network, February, 2015

In the belly of the beast: A European view on sending arms to Ukraine

Brookings Institution, February 4, 2015

Challenges for European Foreign Policy in 2015: How others deal with disorder  Fride, January 12, 2015

A new European security order: The Ukraine crisis and the missing post-Cold War bargain

Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, December 8, 2014

Integrating EU defence and migration policies in the Mediterranean  Fride, November, 2014

EP publication

The Cost of Non-Europe in Common Security and Defence Policy

European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), European Added Value Unit, June 2013

Read this At a glance on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in PDF

The European Union (EU) must not only promote the observance of human rights by other international actors, but also respect them itself in the course of all its actions abroad. However, the applicability of international human rights instruments to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations is problematic since the EU itself, as opposed to its Member States, is not party to these instruments. International human rights apply to EU-led missions as part of customary international law.

© EUFOR Tchad/RCA

These human rights obligations are enforced through specific accountability mechanisms. The EU is also responsible for human rights violations committed by private military and security services when fulfilling duties assigned by the EU.

The envisaged accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights raises questions as to the attribution of acts during CSDP operations to theMemberStates and EU. The European Court of Human Rights’ case law on the extra-territorial application of the Convention gives guidance as to its future relevance for EU missions abroad.

Click here for the whole briefing

© apfelweile / Fotolia.com6 language versions available in PDF format

Die maritimen Aspekte der GSVP der EU

La dimensión marítima de la PCSD de la UE

La dimension maritime de la PSDC

La dimensione marittima della PSDC dell’UE

Wymiar morski unijnej WPBiO

The maritime dimension of the EU’s CSDP

As piracy off Africa has become a global security issue, the need for the European Union (EU) to protect its interests at sea through a maritime dimension to its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has also been recognised.

Importance of the sea for the EU

With a coastline of 70 000 kilometres and with 90% of its external trade transported by sea, the EU has vital maritime interests: security of global maritime flows, safety of maritime transport, fish, energy resources etc. Protecting the world’s maritime routes and lines of communication is an essential dimension of the EU’s security. The EU requires to develop an active approach to the varied challenges and threats to maritime security (terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, environmental degradation, depletion of marine resources etc.) in its neighbourhood and other zones.

EU’s role in maritime security

Although no EU maritime strategy as such exists, a maritime dimension has developed across EU policy areas and through EU agencies, e.g. fisheries, marine pollution, maritime transport, maritime surveillance, and energy security, as well as maritime power projection through CSDP. The Integrated Mari­time Policy for the EU (2007) aimed at uniting the various approaches, but its underlying economic rationale left little room for security issues. Equally, neither the European Security Strategy (2003) nor its Implementation Report (2008) directly addresses maritime security.

Despite some initiatives taken under the CSDP, there are still calls for a maritime dimension to CSDP strategy. In particular, the EU should actively seek to safeguard key trade routes (“Suez to Shanghai”, the Arctic) and prevent state or non-state actors from disrupting them.

The surge in African piracy prompted the launch in 2008 of the EU’s first CSDP naval operation, EUNAVFOR-Atalanta, with the objective of combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and protecting UN food aid deliveries to the country. Two further CSDP missions (EUCAP Nestor – improving regional maritime capacities – and the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia – to train Somali security forces) – are part of a broader EU approach, based on the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (2011). Although Operation Atalanta enhanced the credibility of EU CSDP, the Somali case proves that a combination of threats (weak governance, piracy, illegal fishing, under-development) requires complex policies and tools.

Towards a Maritime Security Strategy

In this context, academics have called for an EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). This should take a holistic approach, integrating civil and military aspects, and state the EU’s maritime strategic objectives and the means to implement them, while avoiding duplication of capabilities at EU level. Cooperation with other maritime forces (NATO, the United States, China, Russia etc.) also needs to be tackled.

In 2010, EU Foreign Ministers launched the process of preparing “options for the possible elaboration of a security strategy for the global maritime domain.” The Commission and the European External Action Service are expected to present a formal proposal for the December 2013 European Council meeting, dedicated to CSDP matters.

European Parliament

The EP has adopted several resolutions addressing maritime security. The latest report on the Maritime dimension of the Common Security and Defence Policy (rapporteur Ana Gomes, S&D, Portugal) states the importance of global maritime flows and calls for an EUMSS combining approaches to maritime safety and maritime security, and considering the “nexus between human security, state governance and human development”. It also stresses the need for improved exchange of information and intelligence on maritime risks and threats between EU Member States, and proposes the creation of EU coastguards.