European Union

In theory, building a tall structure has no upper limit.  Given a sufficiently large base resting on bedrock, the right materials and deep pockets, a skyscraper could literally reach the upper atmosphere and even beyond.  This architectural fact was discovered millennia ago, but only came into its own in the period of Europe’s great Gothic cathedrals.  Once the problem of supporting the outer walls was solved with ‘flying buttresses’ and other techniques, medieval builders were soon engaged a fierce and expensive competition to outdo one another.  At Chartres, Reims, Cologne, Paris and countless other cities, civic leaders vied with one another in an expensive and lengthy contest with their neighbours to build taller and more elaborate cathedrals to demonstrate their faith, wealth, ingenuity and pride.

This enterprise, sometimes called the ‘Gothic imperative’ by historians, came to a sudden and dramatic halt in the French city of Beauvais.  Visit today, and one learns that this rather strange structure was begun in 1225 by Bishop Milo of Nanteuil and financed by his family.  Even as it is, the Cathedral of Saint Peter of Beauvais is regarded as a typical example of French Gothic – minus one important feature: its tower.  Intended to be the tallest structure in the world at the time, the architects and craftsmen pushed this defining feature of the medieval Gothic church to an extraordinary 153 meters, the height of a modern fifty story skyscraper.  Then, in 1573, having tested the technology of the time to its limits, the tower collapsed, and with it Beauvais’ hope of becoming the proud centre of dominance in stone and mortar of human endeavour.  Cathedral construction in Europe continued, but with far less hubris and arrogance.  Architects and their patrons across the continent were duly chastised, and literally “went back to the drawing boards.”  The Cathédrale Saint-Pierre de Beauvais remains unfinished to this day, a testament to the folly of over ambitious goals.

Now, many of Europe’s leaders seem obsessed with another ‘imperative’ – the construction of a federal state, what many refer to as the ‘United States of Europe’.  Their rationale is persuasive.  More than two dozen modern nations, joined in creating a ‘supernation’ with a central government, finance system, foreign policy and trade relations with the rest of the world, perhaps even an army, and a population of more than 500 million. A truly united Europe is an attractive and appealing prospect, the logical outcome of the dream of the European Union’s idealistic founders who wanted a continent united in peace and prosperity.

Since it appears to be the model, perhaps the ‘United States of America’ itself is worthy of closer examination in terms of its own path to unity and federation.  How did it come about? What is the ‘glue’ that holds it together? And crucially, is it the model Europe should follow?

§

“Politics follows nationality wherever politics is free.” The view of American political scientist Michael Walzer.  He points out that from Plato through Marx to the near present, all political thinkers have assumed “One people equals one nation.”  He adds: “The only exception to this is the United States.”

Take a typical American street in an archetypal American Midwestern town, say, Lafayette, Indiana. Roberts Street in this very ordinary community is short, less than a half mile long.   Perhaps forty homes line the leafy avenue, stretching from a small local factory at one end to a school at the other.  When the first grade teacher at Linwood School, Mrs Goris, (Dutch) calls the roll of her six-year-olds, the names sound strange to the English ear: “Sietsma, Hockema, Van de Graaf, Dwyer, Korschatt, Buit, Wieringa, Kellogg, Niemansverdriet, Klaiber, Grey” and on.

This is the exception Walzer means.  Each of the families these children represent can trace their American identity back no more than one or two – or, at a stretch – three generations.  They are of Dutch, Irish, German, Italian, Czech, Scot and English descent.  Indeed, many of their grandparents would struggle with the English the children readily use each day.  Somehow, these disparate peoples – mostly European migrants – left behind their European identity, much of their culture, their ancient rivalries, and ultimately their language to become something new and different: Americans.

They are the product of the largest single voluntary peacetime migration in world history, and it took place largely in the 19th century.  Within decades of their arrival – mostly through Ellis Island in New York Harbour – Chicago had more Poles than Warsaw, New Jersey more Italians than Milan, New York more Jews than Tele Viv, and Cincinnati more Germans than Cologne.  Later they would be followed by wave after wave of Hispanics whose arrival would eventually make America the third largest Spanish-speaking country on Earth after only Mexico and Spain itself.   The ‘melting pot’ was truly blending mankind’s many ‘flavours.’  It continues to this day – America is genuinely a ‘work in progress’, unfinished but with a clear trajectory, a ‘nation of nationalities.’  It justifies E pluribus unum, the Latin slogan that appears on everything from the Presidential seal to dollar bills, “Out of many, one.”

These immigrants were to make their new homes in a democratic republic, the first to be freely established since the ill-fated Roman endeavour two millennia before.  Moreover, it was a federal republic, what the Merriam-Webster dictionary says is a nation -

formed by a compact between political units that surrender their individual sovereignty to a central authority but retain limited residuary powers of government

The founders of this new and revolutionary project, were very nervous, fearful even, of central government.  Their carefully worded constitution for the thirteen original states made it clear that only those powers that the states specifically delegated were to be exercised by a central governing authority located in the new capital of Washington.  This historically unique limitation on power was the defining characteristic of the new Republic of the United States of America.  For the next two centuries, indeed, to this day, it was to become the main focus for political turmoil and eventually, a bitter and costly civil war.

After all, the thirteen had only come together in the Philadelphia meeting in 1787, eleven years after the American Revolution that had separated all of them from the British Crown of George III.  Their first years were not happy ones.  As former colonies their rivalries and differing views about the future soon surfaced, and the nascent national government spent much of its time arbitrating their many disputes.  Something had to be done.  Their shared experience against the British, their isolation from Europe, their fear of another war with their former colonial master, their problematic relationship with the native American Indian tribes among them, and now the recognition that they needed to act in greater harmony – all provided the reasons behind the gathering in Independence Hall where the Declaration of Independence itself had been signed.  It was May of 1787.

These were all ‘transplanted’ Europeans.  The infant Congress had asked each of the thirteen states to send representatives to the Pennsylvania.   Fifty-five, representing the four million citizens of the newly independent colonies, were to craft a new agreement or alter the existing one.  That became the central question: “Do we fix the present government we have, set up in haste in the days and weeks after the Revolution, or do we create a new one?” Were they thirteen individual nations in need of a supra-national agency to do their bidding, or where they a country requiring a central government?

When the latter was agreed, their attention turned to a myriad of details focusing on how much power this new national institution was to have, and what was to be retained by the former colonies.  Some argued that ‘States Rights’ should be enshrined in the document.  Others wanted a stronger central government.  The result was the Tenth Amendment, an attempt to disperse and weaken any attempt by future Presidents and Congresses to accumulate more and more power to themselves.  As James Madison, an advocate of a new central government, wrote:

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace negotiation, and foreign commerce; the powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.

Incorporated into the famous Bill of Rights – itself a historic departure from any system of government in the past – the Amendment comprised a mere 28 words:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The fundamental premise of a new federal government had now been agreed.

§

In the first half of the nineteenth century, arguments over states’ rights arose in the context of slavery. From the 1870s to the 1930s, economic issues shaped the debate. In the 1950s racial segregation and the civil rights movement renewed the issue of state power.  Were the fears of the signers of that new constitution justified?  Almost certainly, few would today recognise the structure of the government they fashioned or had in mind, one in which in Lincoln’s memorable words was to be “for the people, by the people and of the people.”

When an American President can threaten lawsuits and withdrawal of federal aid to local schools that refuse to let transgender pupils use toilets matching their gender identity; when the FBI can steadily expand its jurisdiction over a wider and wider range of crimes, all at the expense of local law enforcement agencies; when the U.S. Supreme Court rules that Congress exceeded its power to regulate interstate commerce when it extended federal minimum wage and overtime standards to state and local governments; when Presidents and Republican and Democrat lawmakers in Washington  push for even more federal regulations, laws that would pre-empt state statutes, especially state laws that attempt to regulate financial corporations and other types of business – then it is clear that the 250 year old battle by state governors, state legislatures, local mayors, city and county councils to cling to their ‘reserved powers’, has lost ground, a continues to do so.   Even the effort to reverse the trend by one of America’s most popular presidents, former California governor, Ronald Reagan, failed, prompting him to remark: “The most alarming words in our language are: ‘I’m from your federal government and I am here to help.’”

Americans wrestled then, and continue to this very day, with the ‘dual sovereignty’ concept behind the thinking of the framers of the country’s constitution.  Remarkably, much of the heated language in the recent debate in Britain about the future course of the European Union would be recognised by those early American statesmen.   Substitute ‘Brussels’ for Washington and ‘State’s Rights’ for national sovereignty, ‘federal government’ for the European Commission, and you have an uncanny yet almost identical echo of the phrases any historian of the American experience would immediately recognise. Moreover, the vote to leave by more than half of the participating British electorate gives real meaning to Professor Walzer’s observation that “Politics follows nationality wherever politics is free.” Walzer’s prescient views are contemporary and clearly have relevance today.  But he comes as the latest in a long line of scholars and political philosophers who have tried to unravel the complex knot we know as ‘nationality.’  Many of them were European, for whom understanding nationality essentially meant fathoming the reasons behind the most puzzling conundrum in Europe’s long history – why so many wars?

Indeed, it largely goes unremarked that Europe has been a uniquely dangerous place in modern times.  The conflicts that have involved European nations over the last two centuries alone total nearly 150, from the hideous World Wars which began in Europe and then engulfed the entire planet, to countless smaller and forgotten civil confrontations and uprisings. The unmistakeable conclusion? Europeans have often resorted to violence to resolve many of their differences, behaviour that contrasts sharply with their self-image as the seat of modern civilisation and culture.  Sadly, they continue into our own day.

§

“We were not allowed to go into this room.” Marie-Helene Von Mach is showing the BBC’s Allan Little the Belgian country house where she had a modest role in the founding of the European Union. “I was only twenty, and a typist for all of these important people.”  The building is Chateau de Val Duchesse, which in the summer of 1956 was where Marie-Helene reported at eight o’clock each morning.  She was sworn to secrecy about the goings-on inside this former priory, built in 1780.

The “important people” can be compared to those American patriots who gathered in Philadelphia in the 18th century.  And the Chateau was the equivalent of Independence Hall, except for one fact: only a handful of selected government officials and senior civil servants knew what was happening within the walls of Val Duchesse.  Allan Little takes up the story:

This is where they wrote the Treaty of Rome.  Its driving force was Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister who would go on to become secretary general of Nato. Like most Europeans of his generation, Spaak had lived his entire life in the shadow of war: twice in 30 years, conflict between France and Germany had led to a global conflagration that had now left Europe in ruins. The six nations (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) that gathered at Val Duchesse that summer had something in common: they had seen democracy and individual liberty swept away by dictatorship; national sovereignty swept away by invasion, military defeat and foreign occupation. The leaders of all six had lost faith in national sovereignty; they wanted to build a new kind of political Europe.

Intent on creating a United States of Europe, Spaak and his dedicated colleagues worked almost entirely behind the walls of the Chateau.  Only a handful of high-ranking politicians in the participating countries had any idea what was going on.  Allan Little again:

Marie-Helene and the others had to sign contracts which banned them from talking about their work, even to their families.  There was little reference to public opinion; the political elites laboured on in splendid isolation.

What Marie-Helene was typing, and re-typing, were drafts of the Treaty of Rome, Europe’s equivalent of the American Constitution.  But there was no public debate, and certainly no media coverage, meaning that the European Community we know today, and that Britain has just voted to leave, could be seen as an elitist, ‘top-down’ endeavour that, once agreed by the six nations, would be presented to their people as a fait accompli, suggesting a kind of intellectual arrogance that Americans find baffling.  Why?  As Little notes: “From the beginning they struck a tone that dogs the European project to this day: they worked largely in secret…”

In contrast, the fifty-five delegates from the thirteen colonies who began their work in Philadelphia in the spring of 1787, were very well informed about the voters’ views on their assignment.  When the early and soon-to-be replaced Congress resolved to set up the constitutional convention in the February of that year, the act became a major news story.

In his Selling of the Constitutional Convention, American historian John K. Alexander closely follows the news coverage the Congressional resolution provoked.  More than half of the young nation’s nearly sixty newspapers quoted the entire resolution, and soon their readers and columnists took up what was to become a heated debate.  Rivalries and fears were played out, and the shortcomings where one state accused another became front page news.  Rhode Island, for example, was seen as a hotbed of anti-federalist intrigue. But overwhelmingly, the press supported a stronger central government, with one writer arguing that without robust federal institutions, tyranny, anarchy or worse – the complete failure of the American experiment – would result. The delegates at Philadelphia were listening.

§

Political legitimacy derives from openness, surely a truism in the affairs of a nation, or, in this case, a group of nations, whether American or European.  In creating any supra national institution, from the United Nations to the World Bank to the International Court of Justice, there is much to overcome.  Above all is nationalism, the almost unexplainable feeling of loyalty we have to the place where we were born, simply because we were born there.  But it is far from that simple.  Long before Paul-Henri Spaak and his colleagues began their mission, determined to unify Europe for all time, a distinguished 19th century French philosopher made it clear that neither race, religion, geography, nor even a community of interests were sufficient to create a nation.

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one and the same constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present consent, the desire to live together, the desire to continue to invest in the heritage that we have jointly received. Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate: our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past with great men and glory (I mean true glory) is the social capital upon which the national idea rests. These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories in the past and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together and wishing to make them again. One loves in proportion to the sacrifices that one has committed and the troubles that one has suffered.

Ernest Renan, writing in 1882.  From Brittany, Renan was one of France’s leading scholars and historians.  In the same treatise, he prophetically added: “Nations are not eternal. They have a beginning and they will have an end. A European confederation will probably replace them.”

Indeed, now a ‘confederation’ is building, much of its foundation in place, the edifice climbs higher and higher.  The architects of a united Europe seem confident of success, as confident as those medieval artisans of Beauvais.  The stunted Cathédrale Saint-Pierre de Beauvais remains today a reminder of what can go wrong with the best of plans.  Indeed, it might be visible from the top floor of the Berlaymont building, headquarters of the European Commission in Brussels, even from the offices of Jean-Claude Junker, the President. He’s on the 13th floor.

 

The post Europe’s Halting Struggle Towards Federation appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

A historic work experience - a study visit at the European Parliament Information Office in London

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Look! A distraction!

Another day, another upheaval in British politics. In the 21 days since the EU referendum, we’ve had more changes of more consequence than in any time since the second world war.

All very grand to say that, but where are we going with all this?

Until yesterday, it was very hard to say, precisely because so much was up in the air. However, with Theresa May’s installation as Prime Minister and his first round of senior appointments to her Cabinet we now have a bit more of a clue.

The starting point is that there is no Tory split, and there is little chance of one any time soon. With the speedy and painless removal of Cameron and Osborne, May has led the pragmatists that make up the bulk of the parliamentary party over to a Brexiting position and brought in the more genuinely sceptic into some positions of consequence. We can take the comparison with Labour as the most instructive one here.

May is also trying to not be overly-defined by Brexit – to listen to her speech outside Number 10 last night, it was only a part of her bigger project to tackle social injustices – and so she has taken several steps to try and achieve this.

The first is to ensure Leavers got the Brexit briefs. David Davis will head up the new department running the negotiations with the EU27, while Liam Fox takes on the establishment of new trading links with the rest of the world. This makes it much harder for critics to say May is backsliding in her approach, but it also ring-fences Brexit so that other ministers have half a chance to get on with their own projects. That’s a sensible move, if an optimistic one: as Brexit proceeds, it’s clear that it will touch (or, more accurately, go to the heart of) many areas of public policy, so May will find herself arbitrating more and more between competing dynamics.

Secondly, she’s played the distraction card, early and hard.

It would be fair to say that in the round ofi nterviews I’ve done since last night, the main topic has been Boris Johnson. I’ve been asked why he got appointed, was he any good, and was it true he ruffles his hair to make it look even more dishevelled than it seems. Let’s tackle the first two elements of this.

Johnson has been brought in close to May by his selection as Foreign Secretary. He was clearly as shocked as everyone else by the decision, because he’d worked out the consequences.

Cast out by his failure to contend the Tory leadership, he looked like toast, destined for a career on TV chat shows. But May has taken the emblematic Brexiteer and stuck him in a position that plays to his strengths, while also limiting his capacity to cause trouble, either for the UK or for May.

It’s fair to say that the past couple of decades have seen a considerable down-grading of the status of foreign ministers, especially in Europe. Prime Ministers and Presidents have become much more engaged in international diplomacy (think of the EU, but also the G7 or G20): at the same time, the intrusion of international cooperation into the full spectrum of public policy has meant other ministers also are taking more of a role. Consequently, foreign ministers’ traditional gate-keeping role has shrunk considerably. They now do some coordination, manage a centre of diplomatic expertise and sell their country around the world.

Seen in that light, Johnson is ideal as Foreign Secretary: charismatic, charming, intelligent, multilingual. Yes, he’s got some apologies to make, but as the UK’s salesman, he’ll do a stand-up job.

Moreover, recall that he’ll be a Foreign Secretary deprived of the two key tasks he might have done: re-forming the UK’s relationship with the EU, and setting up new trading arrangements with everyone else. A man who’ll be spending much of his time on a plane to press the flesh is also a man with less energy and less opportunity for plotting. And ultimately, if he’s no good at his job, he’ll not be able to blame anyone else: it’s not a push to imagine May say, more in sorrow than anger, that Johnson is simply not up to the job and she’ll have to move him on (and out).

So far, then, so clever. Unite the party, sell potential opponents a dummy [sic], contain Brexit and generally make a good fist of things. What could go wrong?

Plenty.

Firstly, we still lack a clear timetable on Article 50 notification. Logically, this will still be in the autumn, when the new government is a bit clearer about things. The EU27 will wait until then too, because they have process and substance debates to settle themselves. But if we get to October without a firm date for notification, then things get much harder for May. The EU27 will be very unhappy (but will have to wait), markets will start making waves, and Brexiteers will start wondering what’s going on.

This said, it’s hard to see this being an issue, as May looks to be very firmly pursuing Brexit, albeit on her timetable and terms. It’d be surprising if we don’t have some indication in the next week on this.

Secondly, there’s the containment issue mentioned above. Brexit is almost inevitably going to eat up much government time and effort, both on the big questions and the fine print. Even if Article 50 is essentially a process of the UK deciding whether to accept the EU27′s offer – rather than a negotiation of equals – there’s still lots of scope for disagreement and surprise.

And this leads to the third element. As decisions and choices are made, some people are going to be unhappy. The Brexit coalition was always far too broad to be satisfied by any given deal, so May has to decide who she’s going to annoy. Right now, that looks like being the harder end of the spectrum, who reject the EEA/Norwegian style model that May seems to favour.

That’s not only an issue with the public, but also within the party. Recall that there is a very small majority, so it only takes a small number of rebels to make May’s life very hard, especially because she doesn’t look like someone going for a snap election.

This is the final paradox. An autumn election would be a distraction, but it would strengthen May’s personal mandate and muzzle Tory critics much more (both through the manifesto commitments and the likely increase in Tory majority). Unfortunately, this is a card she can best play now: if she waits until things look more tricky, then the benefit is likely to be much smaller.

If the past three weeks have been unsettled, then you shouldn’t hold out for a quiet summer.

The post May’s foreign policy gambit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Freedom of establishment
EU law precludes concessions for the exercise of tourist and leisure-orientated business activities on State-owned maritime and lakeside property from being extended automatically without any selection procedure for potential candidates

Germany v Commission
State aid
The General Court sets aside the Commission decision ordering Germany to recover from Deutsche Post part of the subsidies paid in respect of former civil servant postal workers’ pensions

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Theresa May has picked the team to take Britain out of the EU.

Staunch Brexiter David Davis will oversee negotiations as Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, which provides the apt acronym “SSEE U!”

Mr Davis is an optimist, to put it lightly. The former Europe minister (two decades ago) revealed a rather punchy Brexit plan in the aftermath of the vote: first, sign trade deals with anyone and everyone outside the EU, including the US and China, creating the world’s largest trade bloc. The bulk of this can be done in two years, he says.

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Although the EU has become a leading multilateral actor in the field of security sector reform (SSR), it continues to face significant challenges that hinder its potential for delivery. In the run-up to the prospective adoption of an EU-wide strategic framework for supporting SSR, this study aims to shed light on the realities faced by SSR policy makers and practitioners. By looking at the EU’s SSR track record, as well its involvement in the complementary process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), this study provides an assessment of the lessons learnt and highlights the ways forward for the EU as a security provider, particularly ahead of the launch of its maiden Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS).
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EU countries will have to introduce stronger controls on “blank-firing” guns, to prevent them being converted to fire live ammunition, under Internal Market Committee amendments, voted on Wednesday, to a draft update of the EU firearms directive. The changes approved by MEPs ensure that any firearm which has been converted to firing blanks continues to be covered by EU gun control rules. This closes a legal loophole which became evident in the aftermath of last year’s terrorist attacks in Paris.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

EU countries will have to introduce stronger controls on “blank-firing” guns, to prevent them being converted to fire live ammunition, under Internal Market Committee amendments, voted on Wednesday, to a draft update of the EU firearms directive. The changes approved by MEPs ensure that any firearm which has been converted to firing blanks continues to be covered by EU gun control rules. This closes a legal loophole which became evident in the aftermath of last year’s terrorist attacks in Paris.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

One year after the conclusion of the landmark deal on Iran's nuclear programme agreed in Vienna, the European Union is pleased to note that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is being implemented. This demonstrates that with political will, perseverance and multilateral diplomacy, workable solutions can be found to the most difficult problems.

The European Union will continue to actively support the full and effective implementation of the JCPOA throughout the lifetime of the agreement, as well as the UNSC Resolution 2231. The EU and its Member States underline the need for Iran to strictly adhere to all its commitments under the JCPOA and to continue to cooperate fully and in a timely manner with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They also call upon Iran to refrain from activities that are inconsistent with UNSC Resolution 2231. The European Union confirms the support to the High Representative's coordinating role of the Joint Commission foreseen under the agreement and calls for assistance to the IAEA in its responsibility to monitor and verify Iran's nuclear-related commitments. The upholding of commitments by all sides is a necessary condition to rebuild trust and allow for steady and gradual improvement in relations between the European Union, its Member States and Iran as stated by the July 2015 Foreign Affairs Council.

The European Union notes that its sanctions-related commitments under the JCPOA have been fulfilled in accordance with the agreed implementation plan. On Implementation Day (16 January 2016), when the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran had implemented its nuclear-related commitments, economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. On the same day, a comprehensive Information Note on the lifting of sanctions was issued in order to provide clarity to EU business operators on the new regulatory environment.[1] It is in the interest of the European Union that the lifting of economic and financial nuclear-related sanctions delivers benefits to the Iranian people.

The European Union acknowledges that clarity regarding the lifting of sanctions is key to allow a full reengagement of European banks and businesses in Iran. In this context it notes the extensive guidance that was provided on the scope of sanctions lifted and those that remain in place.  The EU is committed to continue actively engaging with the private sector and encourages all parties to the JCPOA to continue their outreach efforts in this regard. For Iran to fully benefit from the lifting of sanctions, it is also important that it overcomes obstacles related to economic and fiscal policy, business environment and rule of law. The European Union and its Member States stand ready to cooperate with Iran in these areas and to provide technical assistance, including on compliance with FATF requirements, and to consider the use of export credits to facilitate trade, project financing, and investment.

The European Union reaffirms its commitment to further developing relations with Iran, in particular in areas such as trade, energy, human rights, civil nuclear cooperation, migration, environment, fight against transnational threats such as drugs, humanitarian cooperation, transport, research, education, culture and regional issues.  In this regard it takes note of the final joint statement from the visit to Tehran of the High Representative with a group of Commissioners. The European Union supports a strategy of gradual engagement that is comprehensive in scope, cooperative where there is mutual interest, critical when there are differences and constructive in practice. As part of that, the European Union intends to open an EU Delegation in Iran.

The JCPOA is for the benefit of the entire region and creates the opportunity for improved regional cooperation that should be seized by all parties. The European Union calls on all parties to work towards a cooperative regional environment and to help reduce tensions. The EU reaffirms its commitment to help make an improved regional situation a reality.

[1] Information note on EU sanctions to be lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and restrictive measures

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The 18th bilateral summit between the EU and China takes place on 12-13 July in Beijing. Discussions focus on political and economic relations as well as global and regional issues, in the framework of the jointly agreed EU-China 2020 strategic agenda for cooperation.

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The shockwaves of the UK’s Brexit referendum resemble those of an ocean-depths earthquake, creating tsunamis that grow and accelerate as they spread outwards. Nobody can yet tell the damage they will do to the 60-year project of European integration or to the global economy, but their effects will be felt for years to come.

It will no doubt be to David Cameron’s eternal regret that as Britain’s prime minister he paid no heed to the warning that earlier referendums on EU-related issues had come to grief in France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Denmark.

The UK’s outlook is for internecine political strife and longer-term economic decline, but it’s the wider European picture that is the more important. The UK’s bitter membership debate and the vote to leave by a substantial majority of over a million people has greatly exacerbated popular discontent around the EU, and notably in France and Germany.

Both have elections next year, and the triumph of eurosceptics in the UK may well trigger similar protest votes.  Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel and French president François Hollande need to react with a credible plan of action that can allay voters’ doubts and discontent.

“Unless ideas for reforming the EU are bold and eye-catching, voters across Europe will dismiss them”

What, then, might a credible plan look like? It would not only have to be acceptable to EU governments that in many cases have resisted genuine EU reform for 20 years, but also convincing to public opinion in Europe that is increasingly impatient with the EU’s shortcomings. Unless ideas for reforming the EU are bold and eye-catching, voters across Europe will dismiss them, boosting the popularity of eurosceptic political parties.

Sitting tight and hoping for the best is no longer an option for Europe’s mainstream parties. In Germany, the eurosceptic AfD has been gnawing away at the traditional support base of Merkel’s centre-right CDU party. In France, the fear is that even if the Front National’s Marine Le Pen doesn’t make it into the presidency next Spring her party will nevertheless be a dominant force.

There’s no shortage of ideas for tackling the EU’s creaking and overly-secretive decision-making arrangements. Political scientists have been putting them forward for many years. A credible reform agenda for EU leaders could begin with a pledge to lift the veil of secrecy around Council of Ministers meetings that are in effect the EU’s legislature. Incredible though it must seem, there is no public record of their deliberations, and of who said what or how they voted.

A next step would be to bring national parliamentarians into the process of EU-level decision-taking. Until 1979, double mandates enabled some national MPs to sit in the delegated European Parliament, and that’s worth re-considering.

Other possible reforms include the creation of an EU Senate to make the European Parliament bi-cameral. Its members could include nationally-elected EU Commissioners, headed by a Commission president universally elected in EU-wide polling.

There are endless possibilities for shaking up the EU, but the key question is the future nature of the EU itself. Britain’s decision to leave opens the way to a very different and far more flexible European Union.

“Countries where freedom of expression is endangered and political pluralism threatened could be ‘re-classified’ as a signal to their electorates”

It is conceivable that today’s EU of 28, or rather tomorrow’s of 27, will consist of concentric circles and an abandonment of the founding fathers’ vision of perfect equality between member states regardless of their size or clout.

The inner core would of course be the eurozone’s strongest members; many of these have been urging new governance rules introducing checks to prevent countries from irresponsibly taking on debt.

This would add up to some form of ‘political union’ as these rules, and their enforcement, would override sovereignty. It is something Berlin has long urged and Paris has resisted because it would spell the end of the sweeping presidential powers with which Charles de Gaulle endowed the Fifth Republic.

Beyond this core, there would be an outer ring of eurozone countries with weaker economies – Greece, Portugal and perhaps Spain. This ring might also include in some manner economically-stronger non-eurozone Scandinavian countries.

The next concentric ring might consist of EU countries whose governments pose political rather than economic challenges. Poland, Hungary and increasingly the Czech Republic have been flouting the norms of liberal democracies that are the cornerstones of European integration. Countries where freedom of expression is endangered and political pluralism threatened could be ‘re-classified’ as a signal to their electorates.

That leaves the outer ring. This would be made up of a single country no longer in the EU – the United Kingdom. Limiting the impact of Brexit is in the common interest, and some sort of special association status – membership-plus of the European Economic Area – might be a halfway house. It would keep the UK within the single market, maintain the EU’s four freedoms, including movement of people, and require budget contributions. And like any fair compromise, it would be unpalatable for all concerned.

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On a visit to the US last month, Ukraine’s prime minister Volodymyr Hroysman said the country’s three main ‘enemies’ are populism, corruption and Russia. As Hroysman is a member of Petro Poroshenko’s team, it is worth analysing how his mentor is coping as President and Commander-in-Chief with these ‘enemies’.

The first, populism, is an abused term used everywhere to negatively denigrate one’s opponents, and most people, including Ukrainian politicians, use it without understanding what it means. It was always ridiculous for Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions to accuse the opposition of being ‘populists’ when they themselves (oligarchs) were the biggest populists (towards working-class voters) in Ukraine. It was also a sign of the term being politicised when it was primarily used against Yulia Tymoshenko – if she is a populist then so is every other Ukrainian politician.

Poroshenko, who has routinely derided Tymoshenko for populism, has never undertaken any steps to deal with the issue. He has never invested in Ukraine’s political party system, and the absence of parties is a major problem; after all, parliamentary democracy cannot function without political parties. Poroshenko has always had close relations with oligarchs, who are the main funders of populist political projects. His failure to reduce their influence is something commonly accepted by experts all over, and it is almost universally thought that the next three years will see no change. Oligarchs are as bad for the development of European-style political parties as they are good for populism, as they often create election projects that use populist rhetoric. Their monopolisation of the economy prevents the growth of small and medium-sized businesses, which produce less than 20% of Ukraine’s GDP and are often forced to operate in the shadow economy – where half of Ukraine’s GDP has come from for the last two decades, double the size of Italy’s underground economy.

“Poroshenko is building a hybrid Ukraine that inherently generates political instability”

The ‘enemy’ of corruption has never been tackled by Poroshenko; and when the New York Times criticised him for this, he described it as part of the ‘hybrid war’ being conducted against Ukraine. Not a single member of Yanukovych’s mafia cabal has been brought to justice. As journalist and MP Serhiy Leshchenko wrote, ‘nowhere is the rottenness of Ukrainian politics more evident than in the prosecutor’s office’. It seemed, after the deaths under Viktor Yanukovych of people wanting a fair and democratic Ukraine, that punishments of corrupt officials should have been a matter of honour for the new government. But instead, Berkut snipers who murdered protesters have been allowed to flee Ukraine, others (such as Party of Regions MP Yuriy Ivanyushchenko) have been removed from Interpol lists of wanted Ukrainians and a third group (such as gas lobby leaders Yuriy Boyko, Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin) have been given immunity from prosecution. President Poroshenko’s four prosecutor-generals have shown no commitment to fighting high-level corruption.

Leshchenko and other journalists and politicians from Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchina (Fatherland) party have repeatedly raised the president’s failure to combat corruption, but to no avail. Ukraine is in the midst of a battle between genuine pro-European political forces including Batkivshchina and civil society who are psychologically in Europe confronting Poroshenko’s faction that wants Ukraine to remain in the twilight zone between the Soviet past and European future. In other words, Poroshenko is building a hybrid Ukraine that inherently generates political instability as it fails to fulfil people’s expectations for justice.

“Poroshenko’s four prosecutor-generals have shown no commitment to fighting high-level corruption”

The third ‘enemy’ is Russia. This is an area in which Poroshenko has failed in four ways. First, he has been unwilling to reform Ukraine’s intelligence services and clean out Russia’s spies. The intelligence services are not only important for the ongoing war against Russia but also for the fight against high-level corruption. Ukraine has a Security Service (SBU), but is it Ukrainian? When one intelligence officer is caught spying in the West, it is a major scandal; but in Ukraine, there have been thousands found since 2014. The SBU recently published a list of 1,397 of its own officers who betrayed Ukraine in the Crimea. Even the Deputy Commander of the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) – Ukraine’s official name for military operations in the Donbass – was a Russian spy.

The second was the signing of the Minsk accords, which benefitted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s transformation of the separatists into a large and well-equipped army and placement of the economy and finances of the DNR and LNR under the control of a Russian shadow government. Instead of dismantling the separatist institutions, as the Minsk accords outlined, they were consolidated. European leaders on the other hand were able to wash their hands of Ukraine by claiming Minsk had brought peace to Europe.

The third area is Western military support for Ukraine.  A lack of reforms in the SBU and its continued infiltration by Russia makes it problematical for it to run the ATO, as NATO and the West more generally are concerned that weapons sent to Ukraine would be stolen (through high-level corruption) or even sold to Russia. If Ukraine declared the Donbass conflict to be a war, not a terrorist threat, its commanders would be the military rather than the clearly unreliable SBU.

“Even the Deputy Commander of Ukraine’s military operations in the Donbass was a Russian spy”

Additionally, in providing immunity from prosecution for the gas lobby, Poroshenko is failing to assist the US in the pursuit of criminal charges against Firtash, who is waiting in Vienna for a response to American demands for his deportation to stand trial in the US. It is in Ukraine’s interests to do everything it can to please American politicians (who are influential in NATO) in order to receive political support, military equipment and training. By instead supporting the old boys’ network and putting personal gain first, the president is damaging Ukraine’s national security.

The last factor is the vast unpopularity of the commander-in-chief among Ukrainian soldiers. During my two visits to the front line in March and May of this year, I heard not a single soldier voice support for Poroshenko. Most soldiers said their enemies are Russia, politicians and incompetent and corrupt generals in Kiev. I mentioned this to the US government’s representatives at a seminar I gave last month in Washington DC, and they were genuinely shocked, indeed no one could imagine hearing such negative and at times threatening views of their commander-in-chief on an American or British military base, particularly during wartime.

Prime minister Hroysman pointed to Ukraine’s three ‘enemies’ of populism, corruption and Russia. What a pity that his mentor President Poroshenko is failing or unwilling to deal adequately with any of them.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Petro Poroshenko

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