Europäische Union

Am Dienstag wird der ukrainische Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj während einer Sondersitzung des Europäischen Parlaments zu den Abgeordneten sprechen, vier Jahre nach Russlands Vollinvasion.
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Am Dienstag wird der ukrainische Präsident Wolodymyr Selenskyj während einer Sondersitzung des Europäischen Parlaments zu den Abgeordneten sprechen, vier Jahre nach Russlands Vollinvasion.
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

While China is expanding its nuclear arsenal at a dramatic pace, Russia and the U.S. are also testing new delivery platforms.

Murat Adam tried to defend the rights of his client, an editor under fire, and found himself in the state’s crosshairs. 

Party offices in some districts have been reopened, and national and party flags are being raised.

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS zu dem Bericht 2025 der Kommission über die Türkei
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Nacho Sánchez Amor

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über die Bekämpfung transnationaler Repression und die Entwicklung einer EU-Strategie für den Schutz der Souveränität und der demokratischen Werte Europas
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Hannah Neumann

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Construction activity, effluents and sewage are destroying the Deepor Beel in Assam.

ENTWURF EINER STELLUNGNAHME zu dem Vorschlag für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates zur Einrichtung des Europäischen Fonds für Wettbewerbsfähigkeit (ECF), einschließlich des spezifischen Programms für Forschungs- und Innovationstätigkeiten im Verteidigungsbereich, zur Aufhebung der Verordnungen (EU) 2021/522, (EU) 2021/694, (EU) 2021/697 und (EU) 2021/783 sowie zur Änderung der Verordnungen (EU) 2021/696, (EU) 2023/588 und (EU) [EDIP]
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung
Riho Terras

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

The outcome has decidedly mixed implications for the LDP’s junior partner.

It is commendable that Dili is showing solidarity with the people of Myanmar – but a failed prosecution could end up undermining the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Phnom Penh denounced the capture of the vessel and its crew as “an unauthorized incursion” into Cambodian territorial waters.

Earlier, government permission was required to sack 100 employees or more. Now, no permission is required for sacking up to 300 employees.

Tommy Schaefer, who was convicted for the 2014 murder of socialite Sheila von Wiese-Mack, is likely to face further charges once back on U.S. soil.

In December 2025, the European Commission published a communication entitled Strengthening EU economic security as a follow-up to its 2023 economic security strategy. Economic developments – whether related to trade, investment or industry – are increasingly viewed through the lens of security. From a foresight perspective, this development can be analysed as the result of three overlapping and partly reinforcing trends. The first is the weakening of a value-based approach to the economy, as exemplified by fair trade agreements and the EU Green Deal. The second is the rise of geo-economics, which places the interests of countries and regional blocks at the forefront, increasing the need for mitigating policies such as economic security. The third is the growing interaction between defence policy and economic policy, with military security influencing economic decisions and the defence sector growing in importance in the EU economy. This briefing argues that these combined trends are transforming the EU's economic policy and economy, and that the growing prominence of security as a guiding principle of economic and trade policies is bringing the question of EU strategic autonomy back to the centre of EU policy. Although the increasing importance of economic and defence security appears to be mutually reinforcing, with both trends potentially enhancing EU strategic autonomy, synergy between them is not a given. The raw materials and finances needed to reinforce the EU defence industrial base require a strong and open economy. However, concerns about foreign influence require economic decoupling from certain countries (e.g. Russia) and de-risking from others (e.g. China). Moreover, the EU faces unexpectedly difficult choices in its relations with the United States (US), where its dependence on US support in defence and security reduces its capacity to act independently as an economic player and rule-maker.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Academic freedom is widely recognised as a fundamental value of contemporary higher education and research, and as a prerequisite for well-functioning democratic societies. However, in recent years, major concerns have been expressed by various stakeholders about the state of academic freedom in the European Union. The European Parliament annual Academic Freedom Monitor aims to improve the promotion and protection of academic freedom in the EU. The 2025 edition is organised in two parts. The first part consists of an update of existing measures of academic freedom in all EU Member States, an updated overview of public debate and studies of the state of academic freedom in four selected EU Member States, and an examination of the EU's state of academic freedom in a global context. The second part contains a thematic analysis of the potential impact of selected trends in academic freedom within the EU, namely political polarisation, recent developments in the US higher education and research system, the commercialisation of academia, and foreign interference. Furthermore, EU-level policy options are proposed for possible legislative and non-legislative initiatives to enhance the support for academic freedom in the EU Member States.
Study : ENAnnex 1 : EN
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In December 2025, the European Commission published a communication entitled Strengthening EU economic security as a follow-up to its 2023 economic security strategy. Economic developments – whether related to trade, investment or industry – are increasingly viewed through the lens of security. From a foresight perspective, this development can be analysed as the result of three overlapping and partly reinforcing trends. The first is the weakening of a value-based approach to the economy, as exemplified by fair trade agreements and the EU Green Deal. The second is the rise of geo-economics, which places the interests of countries and regional blocks at the forefront, increasing the need for mitigating policies such as economic security. The third is the growing interaction between defence policy and economic policy, with military security influencing economic decisions and the defence sector growing in importance in the EU economy. This briefing argues that these combined trends are transforming the EU's economic policy and economy, and that the growing prominence of security as a guiding principle of economic and trade policies is bringing the question of EU strategic autonomy back to the centre of EU policy. Although the increasing importance of economic and defence security appears to be mutually reinforcing, with both trends potentially enhancing EU strategic autonomy, synergy between them is not a given. The raw materials and finances needed to reinforce the EU defence industrial base require a strong and open economy. However, concerns about foreign influence require economic decoupling from certain countries (e.g. Russia) and de-risking from others (e.g. China). Moreover, the EU faces unexpectedly difficult choices in its relations with the United States (US), where its dependence on US support in defence and security reduces its capacity to act independently as an economic player and rule-maker.
Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

We replied to citizens who took the time to write to the President (in French and English):

English EU-Mercosur agreements

In December 2025, the European Union (EU) and the Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) finished negotiating a partnership agreement. The agreement covers trade and also political dialogue and cooperation in matters such as the environment and human rights.

On 9 January 2026, the Council of the European Union (the governments of EU countries) authorised the European Commission to sign the agreement. The agreement was signed on 17 January.

For the agreement to enter into force, the European Parliament must vote on it. Parliament must either approve or reject the deal, but it cannot change it. All EU countries will also have to approve it.

The EU and Mercosur also signed an interim agreement. This will allow the trade aspects of the deal to be implemented before the partnership agreement as a whole enters into force, which could take several years. Since trade policy is exclusively an EU competence, the interim agreement does not need approval from individual EU countries. It only needs approval from the European Parliament.

Parliament’s position on the EU-Mercosur agreement

On 21 January 2026, Parliament decided to ask the EU Court of Justice to review the agreements’ compatibility with EU Treaties. Parliament will have to wait for the Court of Justice’s decision before taking a final vote on the agreements. The Court of Justice could take over a year to deliver an opinion.

In an October 2025 resolution, the European Parliament highlighted that the agreement would strengthen EU-Mercosur cooperation on common challenges, while counteracting the growing influence of authoritarian actors in the region. Parliament also considered that the agreement would help the EU diversify its supply of critical raw materials.

In a previous resolution in April 2025, the European Parliament expressed concern over the agreement’s potentially negative impact on EU sustainability and safety standards, as well as on the EU agricultural and food sector’s competitiveness.

Provisional application of the partnership and interim agreements

Under the EU Treaties, the Council can decide on the provisional application of international treaties before Parliament approves them.

Before now, Parliament has regretted the Council’s decision to allow the provisional application of international agreements in areas which are subject to Parliament’s consent, such as trade.

Safeguard clause

The European Parliament and the Council have agreed on rules for applying the safeguard clause included in the partnership agreement. This clause allows the EU to suspend trade preferences on imports of agricultural products from Mercosur countries if such imports harm EU producers.

French Accords UE-Mercosur

En décembre 2025, l’UE et les pays du Mercosur (Argentine, Brésil, Paraguay et Uruguay) ont achevé la négociation d’un accord de partenariat. L’accord couvre non seulement le commerce, mais aussi le dialogue politique et la coopération dans des domaines tels que l’environnement et les droits de l’homme.

Le 9 janvier 2026, le Conseil de l’UE (les gouvernements des pays de l’UE) a autorisé la Commission européenne à signer l’accord. La signature a eu lieu le 17 janvier.

Cependant, pour que l’accord entre en vigueur, le Parlement européen doit se prononcer par un vote. Il doit soit approuver soit rejeter l’accord, mais il ne peut pas le modifier. Tous les pays de l’UE devront également l’approuver.

L’UE et le Mercosur ont signé également un accord intérimaire. Celui-ci permettra de mettre en œuvre les aspects commerciaux de l’accord avant l’entrée en vigueur de l’accord de partenariat dans son ensemble, ce qui pourrait prendre plusieurs années. Étant donné que la politique commerciale relève exclusivement de la compétence de l’UE, l’accord intérimaire n’a pas besoin de l’approbation de chaque pays membre. Il requiert seulement l’approbation du Parlement européen.

Position du Parlement sur les accords UE-Mercosur

Le 21 janvier 2026, le Parlement a décidé de demander à la Cour de justice de l’UE d’examiner la compatibilité des accords UE-Mercosur avec les traités de l’Union. Le Parlement doit maintenant attendre la décision de la Cour de justice avant de procéder au vote final sur les accords. La procédure devant la Cour de Justice pourrait durer plus d’un an.

Dans une résolution d’octobre 2025, le Parlement européen a souligné qu’un accord renforcerait la coopération UE-Mercosur face aux défis communs, tout en contrant l’influence croissante des acteurs autoritaires dans la région. Le Parlement a également estimé qu’un accord aiderait l’Union à diversifier ses sources d’approvisionnement en matières premières critiques.

Dans une résolution précédente d’avril 2025, le Parlement européen s’est dit préoccupé par les conséquences potentiellement négatives de cet accord sur les normes de durabilité et de sécurité de l’UE et sur la compétitivité du secteur agricole et alimentaire de l’UE.

Application provisoire des accords de partenariat et intérimaire

En vertu des traités de l’UE, le Conseil peut décider d’appliquer provisoirement des traités internationaux avant que le Parlement ne les approuve.

Par le passé, le Parlement a regretté la décision du Conseil d’autoriser l’application provisoire d’accords internationaux dans des domaines qui sont soumis à l’approbation du Parlement, tels que le commerce.

Clause de sauvegarde

Le Parlement européen et le Conseil se sont mis d’accord sur les règles d’application de la clause de sauvegarde figurant dans l’accord de partenariat. Cette clause permet à l’UE de suspendre les préférences commerciales sur les importations de produits agricoles en provenance des pays du Mercosur si ces importations nuisent aux producteurs de l’UE.

Background

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament expressing their views and/or requesting action. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) replies to these messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

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