Europe must take more responsibility for its defence, if necessary without the United States, given Washington’s volatility. In March 2025, the European Union (EU) launched a series of initiatives to strengthen defence industry and defence policy cooperation. With these new instruments also come the outlines of a new partnership strategy. Previous Brussels formats for defence industrial cooperation were only open to members of the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). The Security Action For Europe (SAFE) Regulation – adopted by the EU in May 2025 – on the other hand, provides for a level of integration of Ukraine in this sector that comes close to that of an EU member. With the United Kingdom, the EU has created new opportunities for participation for the first time since Brexit via a security partnership agreement. The EU also wants to offer countries such as Canada, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Australia and even India points of contact via partnership agreements. In order for this strategy to be successful, the EU needs to make itself a more attractive partner.
In the discussions being held at EU level about the 2040 mitigation target, the role of international credits has recently taken centre stage. The new momentum in those discussions is due in part to the German government having announced its support for a mitigation target of a net 90 per cent greenhouse gas emissions reduction is conditional on up to 3 per cent of the target being achieved through international credits. How the target is to be drawn up and what it means for EU climate policy instruments will inevitably give rise to conflicts during the forthcoming legislative processes. Despite open questions about the quality, additionality and availability of the credits, it makes sense to hold a timely debate about their possible functions so that, if necessary, policy instruments can be further developed and corrections made later. It would be expedient to ensure that the use of international credits is focused on durable carbon dioxide removal technologies that are scalable only to a limited extent within the EU itself. Not only could international removal credits make a contribution to overcoming the challenges on the path to greenhouse gas neutrality by counterbalancing residual emissions; the creation of institutionalised demand for high-quality removal methods would also lay the foundation for achieving net-negative emissions.
Georgia is at a turning point due to democratic backsliding in domestic policy and a reconfiguration of external relations influenced by regional and global geopolitical turbulence. In addressing this challenge, the EU should: consider carefully whether using communication channels will promote Georgia’s democracy and future in Europe; assess the implications of cooperation for the broader population; and strengthen the resilience of Georgian civil society. Progress in the accession processes of other EU candidate countries could weaken EU-skeptical voices in Georgia and help solidify public support for the country’s European aspirations.
Dimitris Kollias, ELIAMEP Junior Research Fellow, gives a brief overview of Israel’s recently launched Operation Rising Lion.
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