Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

No Russian election since Soviet times has been manipulated to the extent we are seeing in the 2024 “presidential election”. The political context is dictatorial, the regime’s power grab comprehensive. The media are subject to wartime censorship, and there is not even a pretence of political competition. The death of Alexei Navalny has only heightened the atmosphere of fear. Yet although the vote is an authoritarian plebi­scite, a rubber stamp, signs of popular criticism of the regime and the war should not be overlooked. Germany and Europe should unequivocally state that this election is undemocratic and illegitimate. But even more importantly, contacts with critics of the war inside Russia must be maintained.

This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.

This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.

This policy brief discusses the Global Gateway investment programme launched by the EU to foster infrastructure projects connecting Europe with other parts of the world, particularly the Southern Neighbourhood. With an initial focus on generating €300 billion for investments by 2027, the programme aims to leverage the EU’s economic size and normative attractiveness to become a global power. However, it faces a dilemma when cooperating with authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, where autocrats have tightened control despite past hopes for democratic change. Although the Global Gateway isn’t designed as a democracy promotion tool, the EU hopes its investments will indirectly promote democratic standards. Partnering with authoritarian governments nevertheless poses long-term geostrategic risks. This brief highlights the challenges of balancing investment opportunities with the EU’s democratic values, especially in regions where autocracy prevails.

The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a  rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male  smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.

The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a  rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male  smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.

The development and adoption of innovations are important for economic growth, enhancing well-being and for a more sustainable management of land and natural resources. Globally, improvements in agricultural development have been achieved through the adoption of innovations targeting productivity, sustainability, resilience or product quality of farmers and other food system actors such as processors and consumers. The need to drive innovations among African smallholder farmers has never been more urgent. Africa has a  rapidly growing population, insufficient food production, high rural poverty and land degradation, which is exacerbated by climate and environmental changes and extreme weather events. Fostering new farming practices and innovation adoption among female and male  smallholder farmers, including marginalised groups requires addressing the economic, environmental and socio-cultural dimensions of development and contribute to social justice and gender equity. This is not a self-evident process as some innovations have contributed to adverse environmental or social effects, resulting in low adoption rates and unsuccessful scaling of innovations.

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

The present collection of short papers is an experimental, explorative and introspective German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) project on international and transnational cooperation for development and sustainability. It is the product of internal brainstorming discussions at IDOS in mid-2022 that aspired to conduct a preliminary, exemplary mapping of the use of “transnational lenses” and their understandings across various work strands at the institute. This might lead to new questions in our work, or it might simply be an attempt to look at our topics of interest with a different perspective. 

Bundeswirtschaftsminister Robert Habeck hat heute das europaweit erste Gebotsverfahren für sogenannte Klimaschutzverträge eröffnet. Die Verträge sollen Anreize setzen, in klimafreundliche Industrien zu investieren. Dazu eine Stellungnahme von Karsten Neuhoff, Leiter der Abteilung Klimapolitik im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Der Start der Klimaschutzverträge war längst überfällig. Energieintensive Unternehmen in der Stahl-, Zement-, Papier- oder Glasherstellung können den Umstieg auf klimaneutrale Produktionsprozesse nicht aus der Portokasse bezahlen. Ihre Margen sind gering und Unsicherheiten mit Blick auf CO2-neutrale Technologien groß. Die Schwerindustrie steht am Scheideweg: Klimaneutrale Optionen sind noch riskant, aber Investitionen in fossile Technologien auch nicht mehr wirtschaftlich. Klimaschutzverträge sichern jetzt CO2- und Energiepreisrisiken ab und ermöglichen so Investitionen in die grüne Transformation. Sie sind ein modernes Regulierungsinstrument auf dem Weg zur CO2-Neutralität – basierend auf langjähriger Forschung und umgesetzt vom Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz im intensiven Austausch mit Industrie und europäischen Partner*innen. Damit stellen Klimaschutzverträge einen fairen Deal zwischen Staat und Industrie und damit auch für die Gesellschaft dar.

Mitte Februar fanden in Indonesien die weltweit größten Wahlen statt – und das an einem einzigen Tag. Rund 205 Millionen Wahlberechtigte wurden an die Urnen ge­rufen, um einen neuen Präsidenten, einen neuen Vizepräsidenten sowie fast 20 000 Abgeordnete für das nationale Parlament, die Provinz- und die Bezirksparlamente zu bestimmen. Der Fokus lag vor allem auf der Wahl des Präsidenten, weil dieser im politischen System des Landes eine hervorgehobene Stellung hat. Sieger ist nach Hochrechnungen der ehemalige General Prabowo Subianto. Seine Wahl zum Staatschef wird von einigen Beobachtern als Bedrohung der indonesischen Demokratie oder gar als Rückkehr zur Diktatur gewertet. Viel wahrscheinlicher ist jedoch, dass Prabowo die Politik seines Vorgängers Jokowi fortsetzen wird, die vor allem der wirt­schaftlichen Entwicklung des Landes verpflichtet war. Demokratische Institutionen und Verfahren dürften indes weiter geschwächt werden. Deutschland und die EU sollten sich zugleich darauf einstellen, dass Indonesien unter Prabowo außenpolitisch aktiver und selbstbewusster auftreten wird. Leiten lassen wird sich Jakarta dabei wohl von einem dezidiert transaktional geprägten Verständnis internationaler Kooperation.

Als letzte große klimapolitische Initiative vor den Europawahlen hat die scheidende Europäische Kommission ihre Mitteilung für ein 2040-Ziel veröffentlicht. Mit ihrer Empfehlung eines 90%-Netto-Reduktionsziels im Vergleich zu 1990 schlägt sie erste strategische Pflöcke für die nächste Legislaturperiode ein. Dabei unter­streicht sie die zunehmende Bedeutung industriepolitischer Flankierung der Klima­politik, besonders von Carbon-Management-Technologien. Zwar beginnt die Ausgestaltung der klima­politischen Architektur für die Jahre 2031 bis 2040 erst nach den Europawahlen. Doch die Mitteilung zum 2040-Ziel gibt einen Vorgeschmack auf die politischen Heraus­forderungen, denen sich auch die Bundesregierung stellen muss.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.

Addressing the total energy cost burden of elderly people is essential for designing equitable and effective energy policies, especially in responding to energy crisis in an aging society. It is due to the double impact of energy price hikes on households—through direct impact on fuel bills and indirect impact on the prices of goods and services consumed. However, while examining the household energy cost burden of the elderly, their indirect energy consumption and associated cost burden remain poorly understood. This study quantifies and compares the direct and indirect energy footprints and associated total energy cost burdens for different age groups across 31 developed countries. It reveals that the elderly have larger per capita energy footprints, resulting from higher levels of both direct and indirect energy consumption compared with the younger age groups. More importantly, the elderly, especially the low-income elderly, have a higher total energy cost burden rate. As the share of elderly in the total population rapidly grows in these countries, the larger per capita energy footprint and associated cost burden rate of elderly people would make these aging countries more vulnerable in times of energy crises. It is therefore crucial to develop policies that aim to reduce energy consumption and costs, improve energy efficiency, and support low-income elderly populations. Such policies are necessary to reduce the vulnerability of these aging countries to the energy crisis.

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.

Inter- and transnational formats of cooperation are increasingly contested at a time when both are needed more than ever to address globally shared challenges. This paper focusses on the origins of contested legitimacy in inter- and transnational cooperation. Legitimacy is understood here not as a quality that an actor possesses or not, but one that results from social processes (see also Tallberg & Zürn, 2019). The paper introduces different formats for inter- and transnational cooperation. First, we show that despite an overall shift towards allowing more transnational actor participation in international decision-making, resistance against meaningful and comprehensive participation remains high among a substantial group of states. Also, among transnational actors themselves, questions concerning access and participation remain disputed. Second, the paper argues that different cooperation formats need to take into account the unequal capacities and capabilities of actors in a more extensive way. To enhance the legitimacy – and potentially also the effectiveness – of cooperation formats, these differences should be considered in institutional set-ups, facilitating not only participation but also real contribution. For this, more attention needs to be paid to the differences also among non-state actors, which are often classified according to their types but take different roles depending on the format of cooperation and the governance levels at which they operate.