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Zunehmend drängt sich der Eindruck auf, dass europäische Entscheidungsträger den Glauben an das multilaterale Handelssystem verlieren – ein Eindruck, der sich auch im deutschen Diskurs in der Abwertung der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) als „funktionsunfähig“ niederschlägt. Als Alternative zur WTO werden zunehmend Freihandelsabkommen gesehen, von denen Deutschland als Teil der Europäischen Union (EU) mehr als 40 Abkommen mit mehr als 70 Ländern abgeschlossen hat. Hierbei wird es jedoch nicht bleiben. So will die EU das schwelende Abkommen mit dem lateinamerikanischen Wirtschaftsverbund Mercosur endlich ratifizieren. Erst letzte Woche wurden die Verhandlungen mit Indonesien abgeschlossen und auch mit Indien will die EU bis Ende des Jahres handelseinig werden. Zuletzt in der Diskussion: eine engere Kooperation der EU mit den zwölf Mitgliedern der Transpazifischen Partnerschaft, ein besonders umfassendes und innovatives Abkommen.

Gibt es außerhalb der krisengeschüttelten WTO also tatsächlich einfachere, pragmatischere Wege regelbasierten Handel zu ermöglichen?

Leider wird oft übersehen, dass in dem Maße wie Freihandelsabkommen überschätzt werden, die Rolle der WTO vielfach unterschätzt wird. Das zentrale Argument gegen Freihandelsabkommen kommt aus der italienischen Küche: der Handelsökonom Jagdish Bhagwati verglich Freihandelsabkommen einst mit einer Spagettischüssel. Er kritisierte damit die mangelnde Kohärenz und Übersichtlichkeit zahlreicher bilateraler Abkommen. Freihandelsabkommen schaffen tatsächlich ein unübersichtliches Geflecht aus Zöllen und Bestimmungen, das Kosten und Bürokratie verursacht, durch die die Vertragsparteien versuchen, andere Länder von den Handelsvorteilen auszuschließen. Dies schmälert die Effizienzgewinne, die mit niedrigen Zöllen einhergehen. Gerade kleine und mittlere Unternehmen ohne gutausgestattete Abteilungen für Zollwesen greifen daher oft lieber auf die zwar teils höheren aber einfacher umzusetzenden multilateralen Zölle zurück, die im Rahmen der WTO vereinbart wurden. Zudem dauert es oft Jahre, bis die zunehmend komplexen Freihandelsabkommen verhandelt und ratifiziert sind. Auch ist mit den beiden anderen Handelsgroßmächten, China und den USA, kein Abkommen in Sicht. Freihandelsabkommen sollten daher als Ergänzung, nicht aber als Ersatz für die WTO angesehen werden.

Die WTO befindet sich in einer Krise, sicher; dysfunktional ist sie deswegen aber nicht. Während der Streitbeilegungsmechanismus – früher als Kronjuwel der WTO bezeichnet – aufgrund einer Blockade des Berufungsorgans durch die USA geschwächt ist, werden stetig neue Streitfälle eingebracht. Der Austausch in den technischen Komitees der WTO führt dazu, dass viele Missverständnisse gelöst werden können, bevor aus ihnen Streitfälle werden. Die WTO hat zudem nach wie vor eine wichtige Rolle im Monitoring der Handelspolitiken ihrer Mitglieder und sorgt damit für systemweite Transparenz. All diese Funktionen der WTO können und müssen weiterentwickelt werden. Sie können aber nicht durch ein Netz von Freihandelsabkommen ersetzt werden, die diese Systemleistungen nicht bereitstellen.

Im Schatten der Diskussion über den vermeintlichen Stillstand in der WTO, bleiben erzielte Fortschritte oft unbemerkt. Eine wichtige Funktion der WTO ist die Aushandlung neuer Handelsregeln. Der Verhandlungsmotor der WTO läuft untertourig und zu langsam, abgewürgt ist er aber nicht. Erst vor wenigen Tagen ist das Abkommen gegen Fischereisubventionen in Kraft getreten. Dieses Abkommen kommt spät – mehr als 20 Jahre nach Verhandlungsstart – es hat dennoch das Potential einen Beitrag zur Verhinderung weltweiter Überfischung zu leisten. Auch wurde vor Kurzem ein Abkommen zur Erleichterung des Dienstleistungshandels beschlossen und ein Abkommen über Investitionserleichterungen liegt verhandlungsfertig auf dem Tisch. Gerade diese beiden „plurilateralen“ Abkommen verdeutlichen, wie auch angesichts der Blockadehaltung einiger weniger Mitglieder in Zukunft das WTO-Regelwerk weiterentwickelt werden kann: durch themenspezifische Kooperation in Allianzen mit gleichgesinnten Mitgliedern.

Das WTO-Abkommen für Investitionserleichterungen kann hierbei den Weg weisen: es ist ein Abkommen, das vor allem von Volkswirtschaften (mittlerweile: 127 der 166 WTO-Mitglieder) niedrigen und mittleren Einkommens initiiert und verhandelt wurde. Es enthält ein flexibles Regelwerk und eine umfassende Entwicklungsdimension. Es hat das Potential den weltweiten Wohlstand zu steigern, auch von Nicht-Mitgliedern. Nach wie vor blockieren Länder wie Indien und Südafrika die Aufnahme des Abkommens in das WTO-Regelwerk. Dessen ungeachtet haben die Mitglieder bereits angefangen, das Abkommen umzusetzen, indem sie die Implementierung der darin enthaltenen Regeln vorbereiten, weil sie davon überzeugt sind, dass sie hierdurch einen verlässlichen Rahmen für ausländische Direktinvestitionen bieten können. Deutschland und die Europäische Union sollten diesen Umsetzungsprozess noch stärker unterstützen, im Interesse der Partnerländer, aber auch der eigenen im Ausland investierenden Unternehmen.

Die WTO sollte nicht ohne Not zum Problemfall gemacht werden. Gerade angesichts der Notwendigkeit, die wirtschaftlichen Risiken in den Handelsbeziehungen zu China und den USA zu reduzieren, sind Deutschland und die EU auf die WTO angewiesen. Sie bleibt die zentrale Plattform, um mit der Mehrheit der Volkswirtschaften themenspezifische Partnerschaften aufzubauen, um ein kooperatives und regelbasiertes Welthandelssystem zu fördern.

Zunehmend drängt sich der Eindruck auf, dass europäische Entscheidungsträger den Glauben an das multilaterale Handelssystem verlieren – ein Eindruck, der sich auch im deutschen Diskurs in der Abwertung der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) als „funktionsunfähig“ niederschlägt. Als Alternative zur WTO werden zunehmend Freihandelsabkommen gesehen, von denen Deutschland als Teil der Europäischen Union (EU) mehr als 40 Abkommen mit mehr als 70 Ländern abgeschlossen hat. Hierbei wird es jedoch nicht bleiben. So will die EU das schwelende Abkommen mit dem lateinamerikanischen Wirtschaftsverbund Mercosur endlich ratifizieren. Erst letzte Woche wurden die Verhandlungen mit Indonesien abgeschlossen und auch mit Indien will die EU bis Ende des Jahres handelseinig werden. Zuletzt in der Diskussion: eine engere Kooperation der EU mit den zwölf Mitgliedern der Transpazifischen Partnerschaft, ein besonders umfassendes und innovatives Abkommen.

Gibt es außerhalb der krisengeschüttelten WTO also tatsächlich einfachere, pragmatischere Wege regelbasierten Handel zu ermöglichen?

Leider wird oft übersehen, dass in dem Maße wie Freihandelsabkommen überschätzt werden, die Rolle der WTO vielfach unterschätzt wird. Das zentrale Argument gegen Freihandelsabkommen kommt aus der italienischen Küche: der Handelsökonom Jagdish Bhagwati verglich Freihandelsabkommen einst mit einer Spagettischüssel. Er kritisierte damit die mangelnde Kohärenz und Übersichtlichkeit zahlreicher bilateraler Abkommen. Freihandelsabkommen schaffen tatsächlich ein unübersichtliches Geflecht aus Zöllen und Bestimmungen, das Kosten und Bürokratie verursacht, durch die die Vertragsparteien versuchen, andere Länder von den Handelsvorteilen auszuschließen. Dies schmälert die Effizienzgewinne, die mit niedrigen Zöllen einhergehen. Gerade kleine und mittlere Unternehmen ohne gutausgestattete Abteilungen für Zollwesen greifen daher oft lieber auf die zwar teils höheren aber einfacher umzusetzenden multilateralen Zölle zurück, die im Rahmen der WTO vereinbart wurden. Zudem dauert es oft Jahre, bis die zunehmend komplexen Freihandelsabkommen verhandelt und ratifiziert sind. Auch ist mit den beiden anderen Handelsgroßmächten, China und den USA, kein Abkommen in Sicht. Freihandelsabkommen sollten daher als Ergänzung, nicht aber als Ersatz für die WTO angesehen werden.

Die WTO befindet sich in einer Krise, sicher; dysfunktional ist sie deswegen aber nicht. Während der Streitbeilegungsmechanismus – früher als Kronjuwel der WTO bezeichnet – aufgrund einer Blockade des Berufungsorgans durch die USA geschwächt ist, werden stetig neue Streitfälle eingebracht. Der Austausch in den technischen Komitees der WTO führt dazu, dass viele Missverständnisse gelöst werden können, bevor aus ihnen Streitfälle werden. Die WTO hat zudem nach wie vor eine wichtige Rolle im Monitoring der Handelspolitiken ihrer Mitglieder und sorgt damit für systemweite Transparenz. All diese Funktionen der WTO können und müssen weiterentwickelt werden. Sie können aber nicht durch ein Netz von Freihandelsabkommen ersetzt werden, die diese Systemleistungen nicht bereitstellen.

Im Schatten der Diskussion über den vermeintlichen Stillstand in der WTO, bleiben erzielte Fortschritte oft unbemerkt. Eine wichtige Funktion der WTO ist die Aushandlung neuer Handelsregeln. Der Verhandlungsmotor der WTO läuft untertourig und zu langsam, abgewürgt ist er aber nicht. Erst vor wenigen Tagen ist das Abkommen gegen Fischereisubventionen in Kraft getreten. Dieses Abkommen kommt spät – mehr als 20 Jahre nach Verhandlungsstart – es hat dennoch das Potential einen Beitrag zur Verhinderung weltweiter Überfischung zu leisten. Auch wurde vor Kurzem ein Abkommen zur Erleichterung des Dienstleistungshandels beschlossen und ein Abkommen über Investitionserleichterungen liegt verhandlungsfertig auf dem Tisch. Gerade diese beiden „plurilateralen“ Abkommen verdeutlichen, wie auch angesichts der Blockadehaltung einiger weniger Mitglieder in Zukunft das WTO-Regelwerk weiterentwickelt werden kann: durch themenspezifische Kooperation in Allianzen mit gleichgesinnten Mitgliedern.

Das WTO-Abkommen für Investitionserleichterungen kann hierbei den Weg weisen: es ist ein Abkommen, das vor allem von Volkswirtschaften (mittlerweile: 127 der 166 WTO-Mitglieder) niedrigen und mittleren Einkommens initiiert und verhandelt wurde. Es enthält ein flexibles Regelwerk und eine umfassende Entwicklungsdimension. Es hat das Potential den weltweiten Wohlstand zu steigern, auch von Nicht-Mitgliedern. Nach wie vor blockieren Länder wie Indien und Südafrika die Aufnahme des Abkommens in das WTO-Regelwerk. Dessen ungeachtet haben die Mitglieder bereits angefangen, das Abkommen umzusetzen, indem sie die Implementierung der darin enthaltenen Regeln vorbereiten, weil sie davon überzeugt sind, dass sie hierdurch einen verlässlichen Rahmen für ausländische Direktinvestitionen bieten können. Deutschland und die Europäische Union sollten diesen Umsetzungsprozess noch stärker unterstützen, im Interesse der Partnerländer, aber auch der eigenen im Ausland investierenden Unternehmen.

Die WTO sollte nicht ohne Not zum Problemfall gemacht werden. Gerade angesichts der Notwendigkeit, die wirtschaftlichen Risiken in den Handelsbeziehungen zu China und den USA zu reduzieren, sind Deutschland und die EU auf die WTO angewiesen. Sie bleibt die zentrale Plattform, um mit der Mehrheit der Volkswirtschaften themenspezifische Partnerschaften aufzubauen, um ein kooperatives und regelbasiertes Welthandelssystem zu fördern.

Die Regierung kann sich weder darauf einigen, Steuern zu erhöhen, noch will sie am Sozialstaat kürzen. Doch es gibt andere Möglichkeiten, um viele Milliarden zu sparen., Es herrscht ein breiter Konsens, der deutsche Staat könne sein enormes finanzielles Defizit in den kommenden Jahren nur durch eine Kombination aus höheren Steuern und weniger Ausgaben schließen. Doch das greift zu kurz. Denn es gibt eine zumeist wirtschaftlich und sozial klügere Option: den Abbau ...

La campagne débute pour les élections locales en Macédoine du Nord. Sur les 309 candidats en lice, moins de 11 % sont des femmes. À Skopje, seize prétendants briguent le fauteuil de maire. Ces élections sont le premier test politique depuis le retour au pouvoir des conservateurs du VMRO-DPMNE, en 2024.

- Le fil de l'Info / Politique Macédoine, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Macédoine du Nord, Politique

El laboratorio urbano (LU) es un enfoque de gobernanza experimental para la creación conjunta de soluciones innovadoras a los desafíos urbanos como el cambio climático. Los estudios sobre los laboratorios urbanos han pasado por alto la conformación de laboratorios como un proceso diferenciado y han basado su análisis casi exclusivamente en los casos europeos. Por ello, se sabe poco acerca de la influencia que las condiciones del contexto ejercen en la conformación de los laboratorios en general y fuera de Europa en particular. Para abordar este vacío, el presente estudio analiza en forma inductiva la conformación de LU en cinco ciudades situadas en Argentina, Brasil y México, desarrolla un marco para el análisis comparativo, y plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué nos dicen los desafíos encontrados y las soluciones desarrolladas durante la conformación de los LU en estas ciudades acerca de la dependencia del contexto; qué consecuencias y limitaciones genera esa dependencia con respecto a su potencial desarrollo fuera de Europa? Comparando las experiencias europeas con las conclusiones alcanzadas respecto de América Latina, el estudio responde a estos interrogantes e identifica preguntas para investigaciones futuras.

El laboratorio urbano (LU) es un enfoque de gobernanza experimental para la creación conjunta de soluciones innovadoras a los desafíos urbanos como el cambio climático. Los estudios sobre los laboratorios urbanos han pasado por alto la conformación de laboratorios como un proceso diferenciado y han basado su análisis casi exclusivamente en los casos europeos. Por ello, se sabe poco acerca de la influencia que las condiciones del contexto ejercen en la conformación de los laboratorios en general y fuera de Europa en particular. Para abordar este vacío, el presente estudio analiza en forma inductiva la conformación de LU en cinco ciudades situadas en Argentina, Brasil y México, desarrolla un marco para el análisis comparativo, y plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué nos dicen los desafíos encontrados y las soluciones desarrolladas durante la conformación de los LU en estas ciudades acerca de la dependencia del contexto; qué consecuencias y limitaciones genera esa dependencia con respecto a su potencial desarrollo fuera de Europa? Comparando las experiencias europeas con las conclusiones alcanzadas respecto de América Latina, el estudio responde a estos interrogantes e identifica preguntas para investigaciones futuras.

El laboratorio urbano (LU) es un enfoque de gobernanza experimental para la creación conjunta de soluciones innovadoras a los desafíos urbanos como el cambio climático. Los estudios sobre los laboratorios urbanos han pasado por alto la conformación de laboratorios como un proceso diferenciado y han basado su análisis casi exclusivamente en los casos europeos. Por ello, se sabe poco acerca de la influencia que las condiciones del contexto ejercen en la conformación de los laboratorios en general y fuera de Europa en particular. Para abordar este vacío, el presente estudio analiza en forma inductiva la conformación de LU en cinco ciudades situadas en Argentina, Brasil y México, desarrolla un marco para el análisis comparativo, y plantea la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué nos dicen los desafíos encontrados y las soluciones desarrolladas durante la conformación de los LU en estas ciudades acerca de la dependencia del contexto; qué consecuencias y limitaciones genera esa dependencia con respecto a su potencial desarrollo fuera de Europa? Comparando las experiencias europeas con las conclusiones alcanzadas respecto de América Latina, el estudio responde a estos interrogantes e identifica preguntas para investigaciones futuras.

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IPI in partnership with the Doha Forum, the Stimson Center, and the Global Institute for Strategic Research, cohosted a policy forum on September 26th on Justice in Action: Beyond Promises to Progress.

This UNGA@80 side event featured the launch of the Future of International Cooperation Report 2025 (FIC’25), focusing on advancing justice beyond promises to concrete progress. It explores collective global and regional action to close justice gaps within and between countries and highlights bold policy and institutional reforms aimed at reducing inequality, underdevelopment, and injustice. The dialogue will contribute directly to preparations for the Second World Summit for Social Development (November 4–6, 2025, in Doha) and enrich debates at the Doha Forum 2025 (December 6–7).

Speaking directly to the World Social Summit’s focus on poverty eradication, full and productive employment and decent work for all, and social inclusion—as well as follow-through to the recently convened Summit of the Future and Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development—FIC’25 examines the multiple dimensions of justice across distinct regions worldwide, including its political-judicial, socioeconomic, and environmental characteristics. At the same time, the report gives ample attention to creative and bold policy and institutional reform proposals—particularly at global and regional levels of governance—for reducing high and avoidable levels of injustice (and associated levels of inequality and underdevelopment) within and between countries. A just and sustainable future in line with the outcomes of the World Social Summit requires rethinking governance, fostering inclusive societies, and leveraging innovation to bridge these divides.

Welcoming Remarks:
Zeid Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

Opening Remarks:
Mubarak Al-Kuwari, Executive Director, Doha Forum

Speakers:
H.E. Mohamed Chihi, Executive Director, Global Institute for Strategic Research, Hamad Bin Khalifa University
Amitav Acharya, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor, School of International Service, American University
Richard Ponzio, Director, Global Governance, Justice & Security Program, Stimson Center, and Co-Director, Global Governance Innovation Network
Brenda Mofya, Director, Oxfam International United Nations Office

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The post Justice in Action: Beyond Promises to Progress appeared first on International Peace Institute.

This year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin marked the largest gathering in the organisation’s history, drawing more than 20 heads of state and 10 representatives of international organisations. At the SCO+ session, China’s Head of State and Party Leader Xi Jinping delivered a keynote address, prominently unveiling the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). For Beijing, development, security, civilisation, and governance constitute the four pillars of building a “community with a shared future for mankind”, in essence, a new world order. Amid today’s ongoing upheavals, it is imperative for Germany and Europe to recognize China as a global strategic challenge.

The European Commission, Italy, and Greece are seeking to curb irregular migration through Libya. These efforts come at a time when several aspects of European Union (EU) migration policy in Libya must be acknowledged as having failed. This is particularly true of attempts to improve conditions in detention centres, and the situation of migrant workers and refugees more broadly. Most recently, a campaign by Libyan authorities against what they portrayed as EU plans to permanently settle migrants in the country showed that European policy is provoking considerable backlash. As the softer components of this policy have reached an impasse, it has been stripped to its hard core, namely arrangements with Libyan security actors to prevent departures, as well as support for interceptions at sea and returns to countries of origin. These measures are inextricably tied to Libya’s system of arbitrary detention, which serves criminal interests. European attempts to disavow this system have been unconvincing and are preventing a serious reckoning with the political costs involved.

Michel Barnier, the EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, kept a secret diary of the talks.

Published in 2021, it revealed in painful detail why Britain lost so badly at the negotiating table. Jonathan Powell, former Downing Street chief of staff, summed it up. Britain was left with:

“a flawed withdrawal agreement and a deeply disadvantageous future relationship, both of which will cause us major problems for decades to come.”

Barnier’s account highlights five key reasons.

1. Prepared vs unprepared: Barnier mastered every detail. Britain’s first Brexit Secretary, David Davis, turned up empty-handed. Barnier was shocked by his “nonchalant” approach.

2. EU unity: The EU27 stood together. Britain tried to bypass Barnier by approaching individual states, but was repeatedly sent back to him.

3. Clarity vs chaos: The EU knew what it wanted. Britain was consumed by internal arguments. Barnier wrote that Theresa May spent more time negotiating with her own ministers than with Brussels.

4. Johnson’s failed “mad man” strategy: Attempts to provoke or threaten the EU backfired. In 2020 David Frost cancelled talks, then humiliatingly returned a week later.

5. The deadline trap: Theresa May triggered Article 50 without a plan. Boris Johnson agreed to a border in the Irish Sea despite knowing what it meant. At one point Barnier had to explain to MPs that “the health of cows cannot be checked by drone.”

Barnier’s diary makes one thing clear. Britain was out-negotiated at every turn. And the consequences are still with us. Britain and Britons were far better off when we were in the EU.

• We had full access to the world’s largest single market.
• We had a seat at the table shaping the rules.
• We enjoyed freedoms and protections now lost, from cheaper food and travel to stronger rights at work.

Some Leave voters now say they did not get the Brexit they wanted. But nobody voted for a version of Brexit. That was not on the ballot paper. People who voted Leave could not know what they would get.

Now many of them, along with most of the country, regret the reality we ended up with.

As Jonathan Powell concluded, there should have been an inquiry into why Britain, once so proud of its diplomacy, was so utterly defeated.

Barnier’s diary may be the closest we will get.

• Join the discussions about this post on Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Instagram, BlueSky

The post Brexit: How Britain was out-negotiated appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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IPI, in partnership with The Elders, cohosted a policy forum on “The UN at 80: Charting a Path for the Future of Multilateralism” on September 25th.

The multilateral system is facing its greatest crisis since World War II, creaking under the strain of disordered global power dynamics. The UN has long struggled with a host of threats to multilateral cooperation, including growing disregard for the rule of law, nuclear proliferation, the rise of nationalist policymaking, and backtracking on global climate action and efforts to promote gender equality. Now, in the face of unprecedented funding cuts, the UN is being forced to reduce costs while seeking to retain relevance and improve efficiency across its three pillars. Bold thinking and action are urgently needed for a fairer, more effective, and more responsive UN to emerge from this crisis.

At the event, The Elders introduced their new policy paper, speaking to the failures of the existing multilateral system and calling for bold reform. The paper advocates for renewing the international peace and security architecture, overhauling the international financial architecture, accelerating investment in global public goods, and selecting a woman as the next UN secretary-general. The Elders shared nine “calls to action” to drive forward the process of reform.

Read The Elders’ report>>

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Juan Manuel Santos, Chair of The Elders; former President of Colombia; and Nobel Peace Laureate

Speakers:
H.E. Mary Robinson, Member of The Elders; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and first woman President of Ireland
H.E. Helen Clark, Member of The Elders; former Prime Minister of New Zealand; and former Administrator of the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
Nudhara Yusuf, Co-Chair of the Coalition for the UN We Need

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

The post The UN at 80: Charting a Path for the Future of Multilateralism appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics & Business; Head of ELIAMEP’s EU Institutions & Policies Programme and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP outline the broader framework of the EU defence cooperation, seeking to provide a concise overview of the Union’s key initiatives that shape its actions in the fields of defence (industrial) policy.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here (in Greek).

• The creation of additional fiscal space (NEC) and the provision of low cost lending (SAFE) of ReArm Europe will enhance Greece’s defence expenditures as well as demand for weapon systems throughout the EU.
• The Greek defence industry will exploit these growing opportunities due to its integration in pan-European supply chains, an outcome of the offset agreements of the 1990s and 2000s.
• With three additional policies the Greek defence industry can position itself with even greater effectiveness in this new environment.
• First, build further on the government’s ongoing energetic management of defence-related assets under state ownership, primarily with the exit of the Hellenic Aerospace Company from tight state control.
• Second, reform defence procurement so that the need for speed is addressed which is necessary for realizing Civil-Military Fusion (CMF), including through the transition of the Hellenic Court of Audit from ex ante to ex post review of defence procurement contracts.
• Third, strengthen the Hellenic Center for Defence Innovation (HCDI) with additional financial resources and appointment to its Board of distinguished Greek diaspora scientists so that HCDI can catalyse the participation of diaspora start-ups and diaspora scientific talent in the generation, by the Greek defence industry, of asymmetric force to counter the Turkish threat.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Antonis Kamaras, Research Associate, ELIAMEP.

Towards the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Academics and diplomats debate the future of the bi-regional partnership[1]

On 9–10 November 2025, the 4th European Union (EU)–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit is taking place in Santa Marta, Colombia, bringing together European, Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Goverment to  strengthen bi-regional relations. This mechanism constitutes the main forum for dialogue and cooperation between Europe and the states of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and is the continuation of the EU–LAC summits held since 1999.

Today, EU–LAC relations unfold within the context of a structural crisis of the international system, marked by the decline of the liberal international order, the fragmentation of global trade, and growing strategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China in key sectors such as technology, energy and supply chains. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 Brexit referendum, illiberal and protectionist trends have intensified, while Donald Trump’s second term has deepened these dynamics through unilateral tariffs on countries and strategic sectors. The EU has responded with an “open strategic autonomy” agenda, combining the green and digital transitions with industrial policies and economic security, while LAC seeks to diversify its ties and advance green and digital reindustrialisation processes, despite structural fragilities and a recent decline in foreign direct investment[2]. This scenario presents both challenges and opportunities to revitalise a bi-regional relationship that, despite a long-standing record of cooperation and political dialogue, has gone through extended periods of stagnation and mutual loss of relevance compared with other actors such as China and Russia[3].

To foster debate ahead of this high-level meeting, on 23 May 2025, the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) hosted a roundtable entitled Beyond the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Shaping the Future of EU–Latin America Relations. The event aimed to encourage dialogue between researchers and policymakers, bringing together academics who participated in the European Union in International Affairs (EUIA) conference, along with EU officials and LAC diplomats.

Organised by Arantza Gomez Arana (Northumbria University, UK), Bruno Theodoro Luciano (ULB and UNU-CRIS, Belgium) and Damián Rodríguez (University of the Republic, Uruguay), and with the support of the University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES), the event opened with a keynote by Professor José Antonio Sanahuja (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain), who analysed the complex geopolitical and geoeconomic context surrounding the 2025 EU-CELAC Summit. He stressed that, after a period of “polycrisis” within the EU and accelerated change in the international system, Donald Trump’s re-election has brought a dynamic of contestation to the liberal order, affecting both transatlantic alliances and the development strategies of both regions. In this context, the EU faces the challenge of redefining its integration model and external projection, while simultaneously advancing the green and digital transitions, reinforcing strategic autonomy, and strengthening the resilience of its value chains. However, this process takes place amid internal tensions and macroeconomic constraints, as well as a global environment marked by intensifying US-China rivalry and the risk of economic fragmentation and trade wars.

Sanahuja argued that the bi-regional relationship must be reframed around mutual interests and tangible results, moving away from the traditional asymmetric logic. Through initiatives such as the Global Gateway initiative and the conclusion and implementation of trade agreements -including the EU–Mercosur, EU–Mexico[4] and EU–Chile agreements- the EU seeks to diversify partnerships and secure critical inputs, while LAC requires access to finance, technology transfer and industrialisation. He warned that the success of this agenda will depend on the ability to coordinate positions in multilateral forums, avoid having CELAC’s internal divisions undermine the relationship, and seize the current window of opportunity to build shared strategic autonomy. In his view, the Santa Marta Summit should not be framed as “against” Trump, but rather as an opportunity to avoid falling into his polarising game and to project an open space based on rules and mutual benefits for both regions.

The second part of the event brought together high-level academic and diplomatic voices. Participants included Anyurivet Daza Cuervo, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Embassy of Colombia; Detlef Nolte, Professor at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA); María García, Professor at the University of Bath (UK); Renata Zilli, Researcher at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE); and Eduardo Pereira e Ferreira, Minister-Counsellor at the Mission of Brazil to the EU. Each contributed with complementary perspectives on the challenges and opportunities in the bi-regional relationship, from diplomacy and trade to global governance and sustainable development strategies.

The roundtable concluded with an exchange between speakers and participants (academics and students from different nationalities), allowing for a deeper exploration of areas of convergence and the pending challenges to strengthening EU-LAC relations. Participants agreed on the importance of promoting sustained dialogue, encouraging bi-regional research, and exploring synergies between academia and policymaking. The organising team expressed its interest in continuing work on this agenda and in assembling panels for future conferences and international events. Those interested in engaging with these topics or collaborating are warmly invited to get in touch with the organisers, as we aim to expand the network of experts and stakeholders committed to the future of EU-LAC relations.

 

[1]García, M.J. and Gomez Arana, A., 2022. Latin America-European Union relations in the twenty-first century.

[2] Sebastião D. and Luciano B.T.(2023). ‘Moving from EU-centrisms: Lessons from the polycrisis for EU studies and Global South regionalism’ inJournal of Contemporary European Research,19(2): 226-245.https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v19i2.1297

[3]Sanahuja, J.A. and Rodríguez, J.D., 2022. Twenty years of EU–MERCOSUR negotiations: Inter-regionalism and the crisis of globalisation. In Latin America–European Union relations in the twenty-first century (pp. 117-153). Manchester University Press.

[4] Proposed for adoption by the European Commission on the 3rd of September https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1644

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An article, published on 8 September 2025 in the Kyiv Independent, brandished the headline: ‘Russia’s gains speed up in Ukraine ahead of high-stakes autumn’. Relying on open-source data, the analysis showed how the average pace of Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2025 far outweigh those in 2024. Indicatively, Russia captured 363 km2 of Ukrainian territory in August 2024 as opposed to 464 km2 last month, in August 2025.

Figure 1 – The infographic summarising Russia’s monthly advances, as shared in the Kyiv Independent article published on 8 September 2025.

To make matters worse, according to some intel from the battlefield, the Russian armed forces are moving 150,000 troops, backed by columns of armour, to the frontline in Pokrovsk. These valuable reinforcements will inevitably lead to the deterioration of the situation at the front, with dispatches from the besieged stronghold of Pokrovsk suggesting the Ukrainian forces ‘are almost encircled’. The collapse of Pokrovsk, a strategic logistics and economic hub, would put pressures both on the Ukrainian military and the embattled Ukrainian economy.

Non-experts on the Eastern Mediterranean would be bemused to hear that this region, which only neighbours the Black Sea, maintains decisive influence on the course of events in the Ukrainian battlefield. Yet the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained a critical, even if overlooked, role in influencing the fate of military operations on the Ukrainian theatre. How could this be? I hear you asking.

The main connecting link lies in the trade of energy. Recent evidence shows the significant extent to which the European Union has subsidised the Russian wartime economy, and, therefore by proxy, the Russian armed forces. These statistics show that EU member states alone have funnelled more than €210 billion into Russia through the purchase of fossil fuels between 24 February 2022 and 24 July 2025.

By comparison, the EU plus the UK and EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) contributed €167 billion to Ukraine in the form of military and financial assistance in a similar period, from 24 January 2022 to 30 June 2025.

These valuable revenue flows have enabled Russia to sustain its push on the battlefield. They have enabled the Kremlin to purchase valuable defence components on the global market, replace lost equipment, accelerate the development of weapon innovations, and source domestic and foreign hired guns. The latter has meant that, while Russia has been losing personnel at exorbitant rates, the Russian military has been able to replenish those loses and keep pushing in the battlefield. Best attesting to this is the fact that the Kremlin has avoided the need for a second partial, let alone a full, mobilisation, which would threaten regime stability.

The Eastern Mediterranean has played a crucial role in these energy flows’ continuity. While additional jurisdictions, like China and India, have become important intermediaries in the sale of Russian fossil fuels amidst western sanctions, the Eastern Mediterranean state of Türkiye has best leveraged the region’s proximity to the European market.

Benefiting from reduced logistics costs due to the short distance, Türkiye emerged as the world’s largest buyer of Russian oil products in 2023. With increases in domestic consumption being unable to account for such surges in fuel imports, the safe conclusion is that Türkiye has been a ‘strategic pitstop’ enabling the circumvention of western sanctions. Concurrently, the TurkStream pipeline remains the sole active pipeline feeding Russian natural gas into Europe.

This explains why the US President, Donald Trump, has proposed placing American secondary sanctions on Russian oil if Europe initiates. While some have called this a stalling tactic, a unilateral US sanction would likely do more to harm the American economy while Europe continues to buy vast volumes of Russian fossil fuels.

The fact that this proposal come from the US also reveals the precarious position Europe has placed itself in. While European leaders have been quick to pronounce that they are ready to do ‘whatever it takes’ for Ukraine, in reality they have failed to heed to a US warning that emerged as early as 2014.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, (most) NATO member states (re)securitised Russia as a national security threat. This prompted the US to publicly encourage Europe to close its most significant security vulnerability: the continent’s dependence on Russian energy. One of the core propositions that accompanied the US position on European energy security has been to exploit the Eastern Mediterranean as a most suitable alternative supplier. This position became codified in 2019 in the ‘Menendez-Rubo Act’, co-sponsored by then Senator and current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Beyond the region’s proximity to the European market, two EU member states – Cyprus and Greece –, amongst others in the region, maintain sizable hydrocarbon reserves. This reaffirms the Eastern Mediterranean’s suitability.

Yet, at the face of military threats by no other than Türkiye, the EU has been unable to offer the protective umbrella to Cyprus and Greece necessary to salvage European energy security.

As a result, the EU has failed to arrest its energy imports from Russia even after nearly four years since Russia begun its invasion. The REPowerEU policy – EU’s response to this conundrum – only emerged three months after the full-scale invasion commenced and does not envisage the full phasing out of Russian energy until at least 2027. By that time, if the war drags on, Russia will have been waging an effectively EU-subsidised war on Ukraine for five years.

In the absence of decisive action to leverage the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves, the EU will continue to situate itself between rock and a hard place. Instantly stopping Russian energy imports would cripple the embattled European economies. Before Germany bypassed its own sanctions by indirectly importing Russian gas mainly through France, key German executives spoke of the ‘permanent damage’ to Germany’s economy from the energy crisis. Continuing to buy Russian fuel will of course lead to more Ukrainian deaths in the battlefield and beyond.

Yet, despite the challenges and the collective EU’s inaction, some, but nonetheless important, progress has been made in the Eastern Mediterranean, which further reaffirms the region’s potential. The Greek Alexandroupolis LNG terminal’s construction has enabled non-Russian gas to flow into Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, including Ukraine.

The logistics of the endeavour further reiterate the prospect for energy to play a necessary role in bringing about lasting stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Egypt is the world’s seventh largest natural gas producer, domestic demand means that it heavily relies on Israeli imports to conduct its exporting business. Amidst interminable turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is an encouraging sign for the region. Importantly, it builds on the East Mediterranean Gas Forum’s establishment in 2021, which includes both Israel and the Palestinian Authority along with six other regional states. The Gaza Marine hydrocarbon reserves, which remain intact, mean that they can be used to reconstruct Gaza and develop the West Bank once hostilities end.

Undoubtedly, the continued use of fossil fuels leads to environmental concerns. Paradoxically, exploiting these natural gas reserves can lead to an end to highly polluting instances of warfare. It could have also prevented warfare in the past. Beyond rescuing European energy security and the war in Ukraine, unleashing the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy potential will reaffirm its potential as a global strategic conduit.

A memorandum signed at the G20 in New Delhi in 2023 between the US, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy, and India resolves to establish the ‘India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’ (IMEC). The Eastern Mediterranean is a critical and necessary conduit in this strategic initiative to counter China’s economic, cultural, and political influence through the parallel Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Similarly, energy constitutes an important, albeit merely one, IMEC dimension.

Figure 2 – A visualisation of the strategic projects associated with ‘IMEC’, which includes energy infrastructure passing through the Eastern Mediterranean

If the EU is seriously interested in doing whatever it takes, then ensuring the development of the Eastern Mediterranean plan occurs unimpeded is the best next step. For academics, the highly consequential linkages between the Eastern Mediterranean, European energy security, and Ukrainian military security expose the increasing interconnectedness between security sectors and regions in a globalised world where international competition is on the rise.

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This publication builds on the paper “Sustainable Finance at an Inflection Point: The EU Taxonomy and its Impact” presented at the “EU Law and Policymaking” panel of the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference, held at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece (29–30 May 2025). The support of UACES in organising and facilitating my participation in the conference is gratefully acknowledged.

Abstract

What counts as “sustainable” in the EU? The answer is not just political, but increasingly codified through technocratic tools. This article examines the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities as a key instrument of sustainability governance. Originally developed to steer green finance and prevent greenwashing, the taxonomy now plays a constitutive role by establishing the fundamental classification system that defines Europe’s green technological trajectory. Its scientific and technical logic, designed to create market clarity, provides a coordinative framework that aligns investment, industrial policy, and research priorities. Drawing on debates in innovation studies and institutional economics, this article argues that the EU Taxonomy functions as a de facto industrial policy instrument, creating a coordinated selection environment that shapes Europe’s green technological trajectory.

 

Introduction: Defining Sustainability, the EU Way

The global financial landscape is undergoing a profound transformation: concerns about climate change and environmental degradation are increasingly redirecting capital towards sustainable investment. This shift is particularly striking in Europe. The European Union (EU) aims to achieve net zero by 2050 under the European Green Deal, with member-states rallying behind this vision. The EU Taxonomy has emerged as “a cornerstone of the European Union’s sustainable finance framework and an important market transparency tool.” Enacted through Regulation (EU) 2020/852 in 2020, the green rulebook establishes a rigorous, science-based system to classify environmentally sustainable economic activities. Yet the sustainability classification system’s influence extends far beyond its original financial transparency mandate. What began as a tool to prevent greenwashing in capital markets has gradually evolved into an instrument that shapes innovation priorities, industrial policy, and research funding across Europe

This analytical puzzle raises a fundamental question: How does the EU Taxonomy shape technological innovation and industrial development in Europe? This article argues that the EU Taxonomy exerts its influence by structuring a “coordinated selection environment” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) – a framework of incentives and signals that guides the decisions of innovators, investors, and policymakers. It does so by establishing the foundational technical criteria that regulations like the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB), and policies like the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) incorporate. In doing so, it creates a coordinated selection environment that powerfully structures economic and innovative activity around its classification of sustainability.

The discussion argues that by defining the boundaries of “sustainable” activity, the Taxonomy shapes “technological paradigms”: the shared cognitive frameworks that guide search activities within innovation communities (Dosi, 1982). This science-based classification system aligns the incentives of investors, firms, and policymakers, thereby structuring the development and selection of green technologies and fundamentally orienting Europe’s industrial trajectory.

 

What Is the EU Taxonomy, and Why Was It Created?

The concept of sustainable finance has long faced definitional challenges. In 2008, Sandberg et. al. identified fundamental heterogeneity in Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), describing it as “terminological, definitional, strategic and practical.” While acknowledging that SRI was the predominant term for investments integrating social, ethical, environmental, and corporate governance concerns, the scholars expressed scepticism about standardization unless implemented through top-down regulation. This definitional ambiguity persisted, with Strauß noting in 2021 that “the discussion about SF lacks consistency and a common understanding of SF.”

The European Commission (EC) acknowledged that achieving sustainable finance objectives required “a common language and a clear definition of what is ‘sustainable'” (EU, 2020). EUR-Lex (2021) offered a broad definition of sustainable finance as “the process of taking due account of environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations when making investment decisions in the financial sector, leading to increased longer-term investments into sustainable economic activities and projects.” However, this definition, while highlighting the importance of environmental factors in investment decisions, lacked specific criteria for measuring sustainability.

The introduction of the EU Taxonomy marked a significant shift toward technical precision. As outlined in Regulation (EU) 2020/852, this classification system establishes concrete criteria for environmentally sustainable economic activities. The regulation targets six key environmental goals: mitigating climate change, adapting to its effects, ensuring the sustainable management of water and marine ecosystems, advancing a circular economy, preventing and controlling pollution, and protecting and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems. To qualify, an activity must meet four key criteria: it must make a substantial contribution to one of the environmental goals, avoid significant harm to the others, comply with safeguards, and meet technical screening criteria. This transformation represents a fundamental shift from principles-based to rules-based regulation, replacing interpretative flexibility with science-based technical specifications. The EU sustainability assessment framework functions as a comprehensive checklist that defines what counts as an “environmentally sustainable activity” for investment and policy purposes – a seemingly technical exercise with far-reaching consequences.

The shift in terminology from “sustainable finance” to “EU Taxonomy” represents a significant rhetorical evolution with important implications for governance approaches. The term “sustainable finance” evokes normative goals and principles, emphasizing the purpose of financial activities. In contrast, “taxonomy” carries scientific and technical connotations, suggesting objective classification based on empirical criteria. However, despite the technical framing, normative judgments remain embedded throughout the taxonomy. The selection of environmental objectives, the thresholds for “substantial contribution,” and the accommodation of transitional activities all reflect value judgments about environmental priorities and the appropriate pace of sustainability transitions.

 

From Finance to Innovation: When Classification Becomes Direction

The expansion of EU’s sustainability assessment tool from financial classification to broader policy influence is significant, because it demonstrates how technical standards can become powerful instruments of economic steering. Rather than remaining neutral tools, classification systems like the Taxonomy actively shape which technologies receive investment, which research priorities get funded, and which industrial strategies governments pursue.

 

Capital Coordination and Market Formation

The EU Taxonomy’s most direct impact lies in its capacity to align investment flows across public and private sectors. Originally designed to provide clarity for financial market participants under the SFDR, the green classification system has established mandatory disclosure requirements for large financial institutions. The European Banking Authority has noted substantial engagement with the green rulebook’s criteria across the EU banking sector, with institutions reporting significant exposure to both green rulebook-aligned and non-aligned activities in their climate risk assessments. EIB has integrated sustainability assessment tool’s criteria into its lending decisions, effectively making compliance a prerequisite for accessing Europe’s largest source of public investment capital. This alignment mechanism transforms the green rulebook from a mere classification tool into what a “market-shaping” instrument that actively constructs the boundaries of legitimate sustainable investment (Mazzucato, 2021).

 

The New Architecture of Industrial Policy

While the EU Taxonomy was originally designed as a classification system for environmentally sustainable economic activities, its influence extends beyond financial markets into broader policy and research frameworks. The Green Deal Industrial Plan, unveiled in February 2023, does not directly cite the EU sustainability assessment framework. Yet, its entire architecture is built upon the same strategic logic and targets the same sectors. The Plan identifies “net-zero technologies” – including batteries, windmills, heat pumps, solar, electrolysers, and carbon capture and storage – as its core priorities. This list is not arbitrary; it is a direct reflection of the economic activities designated for climate change mitigation within the EU green rulebook (Annex I to Regulation 2020/852). The Plan operates on this pre-defined policy environment, focusing on accelerating production and competitiveness in sectors already validated by the Taxonomy’s scientific screening criteria. This alignment demonstrates how the sustainability assessment framework has helped establish a common understanding of strategic green technologies, which indirectly informs the selection of sectors for industrial development.

NZIA (2023) and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) (2024) similarly focus on key technologies and raw materials that underpin decarbonization and green innovation. While these policies do not explicitly cite the Taxonomy, they operate within the same sustainability-oriented policy environment that the Taxonomy helps define. The Net Zero Industry Act (2023) establishes manufacturing targets for “net-zero technologies” that closely mirror the green rulebook’s-eligible activities. CRMA aims to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of raw materials critical for strategic technologies. The list of these technologies: permanent magnets, batteries, fuel cells, solar panels, wind turbines, and electrolysers, directly mirrors the technologies and economic activities deemed strategic and sustainable under the Taxonomy’s climate mitigation objectives (Annex I to Regulation 2020/852). In these cases, the sustainability assessment framework functions less as a legal mandate and more as a normative and technical reference point, shaping the boundaries of strategic industrial and technological activity in Europe.

Thus, critical raw materials strategies, renewable energy deployment targets, and clean technology manufacturing incentives are increasingly aligned with the same environmental objectives that the EU Taxonomy codifies, creating a powerful ‘landscape pressure’ – a broad macro-level impetus – that shapes industrial development pathways (Geels, 2014). While these policies do not formally reference the green rulebook, they operate within the broader sustainability framework that the sustainability assessment framework defines.

The Taxonomy contributes towards shaping norms and expectations around sustainable activity that anchor the EU’s industrial strategy. Policies may not reference it directly, because they are already operating within the framework of sustainable economic activity that the EU sustainability framework codified into law. This integration represents a significant departure from traditional industrial policy approaches, where governments typically selected strategic sectors based on economic competitiveness or national security considerations. Instead, the Taxonomy’s technical criteria now provide the scientific and regulatory foundation for industrial strategy.

 

Shaping Technological Paradigms and Innovation Pathways

Beyond capital and policy, the Taxonomy also influences research and innovation funding. Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research program, prioritizes projects that contribute to climate action, environmental sustainability, and the Green Deal objectives. Its strategic plan (2025–2027) earmarks significant shares of funding for climate-related activities and biodiversity projects, effectively incentivizing research aligned with EU environmental objectives. While the program does not explicitly require applicants to reference the green framework, its priorities reflect the broader sustainability and Green Deal framework.

In practice, this means that successful proposals increasingly need to demonstrate how their activities contribute to decarbonization, ecosystem preservation, or the circular economy, echoing the classification logic of the Taxonomy. In this sense, the green rulebook functions as a definitional framework that indirectly guides the direction of EU-funded research, shaping innovation priorities even at the earliest stages of project conception. This creates a powerful “selection environment” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) that steers R&D toward Taxonomy-eligible pathways. The alignment also illustrates a broader pattern: the EU is using technical standards not just to regulate markets but to actively steer research and innovation trajectories, creating positive feedback loops between policy, funding, and technological development.

Yet, this function is dual-edged. While it creates momentum for aligned technologies (e.g., stimulating R&D in green hydrogen, which meets the Technical Screening Criteria (TSC)), it also risks creating path dependency. The novel classification system is in not only “opening up,” but also “closing down” innovation pathways (Stirling, 2008). Despite rhetoric about technology neutrality, the Taxonomy’s specific criteria inevitably privilege certain technical solutions over others. Technologies that are not (yet) recognized by the EU sustainability framework, or that represent a more radical departure from the status quo, may find it harder to attract funding and attention. Furthermore, the contentious inclusion of nuclear power demonstrates that achieving green rulebook alignment is a key strategy for technologies to secure long-term viability, influencing not just current investment but future R&D portfolios.

 

Conclusion: Classifications That Shape Futures

The EU Taxonomy’s journey from a narrow financial tool to a broad-based governance instrument reveals a core mechanism of modern economic steering: the use of technical standards to orchestrate complex transitions. This analysis has argued that the sustainability classification system’s power derives not from direct mandate but from its role as a constitutive framework – one that actively creates new realities and categories – that creates a coordinated selection environment. By providing a coherent and sanctioned guidance on sustainable activity, it aligns the incentives of investors, public banks, and industrial policymakers. This environment, in turn, shapes technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982), steering R&D and industrial strategy toward Taxonomy-aligned pathways.

Ultimately, the EU Taxonomy demonstrates that today governance is increasingly exercised through the quiet power of classification. The ongoing evolution of its TSC will therefore remain a central, and intensely political, process in determining the structure of the European green economy

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The Arctic is an exceptional venue for undisputed international cooperation against climate-induced threats. Due to this exceptionalism, it has long been an exceptional venue for undisputed international cooperation, i.e. ‘a zone of peace’. The contestations over the Arctic’s economic and security-related potential, however, seem to transform this region into a future Middle East.  While the region is under the dire pressure of climate-induced threats, the possibility of unlocking new opportunities for resource extraction and transport routes due to melting frost has fuelled the geopolitical race between major powers such as China and the EU.

Until the early 2010s, the EU and China disregarded each other in the Arctic due to the absence of a functional relationship. Due to its geographical position, the EU’s policy preferences have always been closely linked to the developments in its northern neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the Union’s regulatory influence, known as the Brussels effect, has been limited in Arctic affairs.  Moreover, the EU’s concerns over the involvement of a major power in the region were primarily about Russia. The 2007 headlines picturing the Russian flag on the Arctic seabed alarmed the Union against possible security implications of ‘the ongoing race for natural resources in the Arctic, which may lead to security threats for the EU and overall international instability’. Likewise, in those years, the Chinese interest in the region was primarily scientific. While China solidified its position as a key player in Arctic research through scientific expeditions in the late 1990s, Beijing maintained a low-key political approach, avoiding conflicts with the coastal states. By steering clear of sensitive topics like resource exploration, China was able to engage in constructive cooperation with these states.

Since the mid-2010s, however, the increasing presence of China in the Arctic has encouraged the EU to revise its Arctic policy. China’s shifting of its Arctic priorities towards the Barents, known to be the most prosperous sub-Arctic region in terms of resource endowment, has prompted the Union to add resource-related ambitions to the traditional pillars of its Arctic policy (fighting against climate change, scientific research and sustainability). In its 2012 joint communication on the Arctic region, the Commission stated that, as a priority within the scope of Raw Materials Strategy, the EU would ‘actively pursue a raw materials diplomacy with relevant Arctic states to secure access to raw materials notably through strategic partnerships and policy dialogues’.

China’s announcement of its Polar Silk Road plan in 2018 was another critical juncture. In its 2018 White Paper on Arctic strategy, China defined itself as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ as ‘one of the continental States closest to the Arctic Circle’. China also declared its objectives to include utilising Arctic resources (oil, gas, minerals, and other non-living resources) in a ‘lawful and rational manner’. Accordingly, Chinese policymakers focused on mineral resources while encouraging Chinese enterprises to explore and utilise Arctic resources. In this sense, their cooperation with Greenland for the mining operations in Kvanefjeld was a concrete example.

Beijing’s declaration of China as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ as well as its far-reaching projects and initiatives in the region, with the ambition of becoming a “polar power”, is seen as ‘cause of great concern’ by the EU. Particularly after the adoption of the European Green Deal and the subsequent strategies, such as the Clean Industrial Deal, China’s drive for Arctic resources has become a challenge for the EU’s green transition. The EU’s ambitious (internal) climate and energy policies are likely to have significant consequences with regard to its growing need for minerals essential for renewable energy technologies, batteries and the overall move towards more environmentally friendly operations. It is anticipated that there will be a substantial increase in the demand for numerous minerals extracted in the Arctic, and only Greenland possesses 25 per cent of the global reserves of rare earth minerals, which are essential to the transition of European industry.

Beijing’s drive for access to Arctic resources and strategic leverage in the region consequently has profound ramifications on the EU’s ability to deliver the European Green Deal. Particularly, the geopolitical competition over the extraction and flow of minerals becomes a matter of strategic autonomy for the EU. That is why, the Commission have occasionally raised concerns over the potential tensions that could ‘arise from competition in contested areas, such as space or the Arctic’. The concerns over China’s growing interest in the Arctic’s vast reserve of rare-earth minerals, ‘which would help the EU to reduce its dependency on China’, are shared by the other EU institutions. Indeed, strategic foresight studies reveal that the EU is overdependent on China for the supply for critical raw materials required particularly for the production and storage of solar and wind energy. Chinese firms’ dominance in the extraction and refining of these materials leaves minimal margin for supply diversification, making it more imperative for the EU to access Arctic resources.

All in all, the long-held perception of the Arctic as a peace zone is no longer valid. Rather, it has become an area for increasing rivalry, in which the EU’s economic security and strategic autonomy are at stake. In the context of the green (industrial) transition, the EU’s engagement in the Arctic matters has not only become ‘a geopolitical necessity’ to fulfil its ambitions, but also a matter of security. The tone of the EU’s current Arctic strategy reflects the EU’s security-related concerns over the ‘upturn in the activities of other actors, including China and growing interest in areas like ownership of critical infrastructure’. In this vein, the EU needs to revise its current Arctic policy based on pragmatic and strategic assessments. After all, navigating in a geopolitical race with a major power like China requires a more assertive and security-conscious approach to protect the Union’s vital interests in the High North.

 

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