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The role of transnational democracy activists during Togo’s constitutional reform episode, 2017-2019

Amidst resurgent autocratisation around the world, digitalisation makes it easier than ever before for civil society activists and opposition politicians to connect with potential allies in other countries. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, domestic  grassroots social movements seem to be increasingly connecting and forming transnational networks and platforms. Against this observation it becomes relevant to study whether transnational alliances can and will play a greater role in fostering democratisation and countering autocratisation. This paper first provides background on the phenomenon of increased transnational networking in sub-Saharan Africa. It then proceeds to present a brief case vignette of the role transnational activist  connections played during Togo’s constitutional reform episode 2017-2019. Findings show that activists purposefully sought transnational allies, but that for the specific case at hand, the links to transnational networks and platforms were still too  nascent. The Togolese regime hence was able to easily obstruct transnational democracy activists from having greater influence.

When government and civil society organisations join forces in transnational advocacy: lessons from the Strategic Partnership Programme

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

When government and civil society organisations join forces in transnational advocacy: lessons from the Strategic Partnership Programme

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

When government and civil society organisations join forces in transnational advocacy: lessons from the Strategic Partnership Programme

Advocacy is a strategy to fight the root causes of poverty and exclusion, including activities to influence policies, awareness-raising, legal action and networking (van Wessel, Hilhorst, Schulpen, & Biekart, 2020, p. 730). While some of the advocacy  activities might only take place at the domestic level targeting national actors, many domestic issues are framed by civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of transnational campaigns. As development challenges are not confined to national  borders, CSO networks can contribute to policy processes at different policy levels through transnational advocacy. The contribution engages with an advocacy programme that sought cooperation between government and civil society actors,  challenging not only the state–civil society divide, but also the power-laden relationship between donors and implementing partners. Although this approach could not tackle structural imbalances in the aid system, the programme still showed that complementary action between government and civil society actors can contribute to stronger transnational advocacy.

Sámi-EU relations as an example of transnational cooperation for sustainable development?

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Sámi-EU relations as an example of transnational cooperation for sustainable development?

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Sámi-EU relations as an example of transnational cooperation for sustainable development?

Neoliberal institutionalism frames international institutions as being able to “obviate the need for national power” (Barkin, 2003, p. 334). As the concept of transnational cooperation is informed by the school of neoliberal institutionalism, the question  arises as to how relevant power relations are in settings of transnational cooperation, and in what way power can actually be obviated in these settings? Transnational cooperation formats are often seen as an ideal space for diverse actors to cooperate with each other, but like other political spaces, they are not free of questions of power – instead they are very much shaped by power relations. For the case of Sámi-EU relations as a para-diplomatic and post-colonial relationship, it is decisive to  understand the dimension of power in order to comprehend this relationship and in what way power relations are challenged and changed in these transnational cooperative settings.

Transnationalisation light: non-state inclusion and North/South differentials in global development governance

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Transnationalisation light: non-state inclusion and North/South differentials in global development governance

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

Transnationalisation light: non-state inclusion and North/South differentials in global development governance

Global development governance has traditionally been dominated by states. Recent trends towards transnationalisation and multi-stakeholderism, however, emphasise non-state actor inclusion in more horizontal structures. This paper investigates the  extent of genuine transnationalisation in global development governance, focussing on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) as an ambitious attempt at transnationalisation. Although we find that the GPEDC  demonstrates a strong commitment to formally incorporating non-state actors, (wealthy) states continue to wield decisive influence. Despite apparent inclusivity, we observe a condition we term “transnationalisation light”: the limited realisation of  substantive non-state stakeholder inclusion. Notably, power imbalances persist between and among state and non-state actors, often favouring Northern stakeholders and exacerbating evolving North/South divisions.

A High-Level Panel Discussion on Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan

European Peace Institute / News - Fri, 08/03/2024 - 18:21

Event Video 
Photos

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In collaboration with the Malala Fund and the Atlantic Council, IPI hosted a high-level panel discussion to mark International Women’s Day on March 8th. The event addressed the harrowing reality of millions of women and girls living under systematic oppression at the hands of the Taliban and highlighted the ongoing efforts of Afghan women and the international, legal, and research communities to ensure justice for these abuses—in particular, the momentum around efforts to codify the crime of gender apartheid.

The discussion placed thought-leaders of international law, human rights experts, Afghan women, diplomats, and activists in dialogue to offer insights on the lack of basic rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s repressive regime took over in August 2021. Panelists shed light on the crimes being perpetrated by the Taliban, called on the international community to recognize these crimes, and discussed developing tools for accountability. The event also offered a platform for the testimony of women and girls impacted by the Taliban alongside that of legal and policy experts on gender apartheid.

Participants heard directly from Afghan women and girls in the audio recordings of the initiative “Inside Afghanistan’s Gender Apartheid,” an interactive audio timeline and collaborative effort between the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center and the Civic Engagement Project. The initiative, which was publicly launched at the event, documents the first-hand accounts of life under gender apartheid and analyzes the impact of the Taliban’s increasingly entrenched and institutionalized legal system that curtails freedom, stifles potential, and erodes dignity.

Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico Alicia Buenrostro Massieu delivered opening remarks, situating the deteriorating state of Afghan women and girls within the larger international imperative to achieve and protect gender equality for all. Articulating the global backlash on women’s rights she instructed, “the pushback is intensifying and so must our response…it is high time to end the systematic exclusion of women and girls.”

Nayera Kohistani, women’s rights defender and teacher, spoke from her personal experience of “dehumanization” and being reduced to a “second-class citizen…with no human agency or dignity.” While she painted a vivid and grim picture of the situation that Afghan women face on the ground where “the Taliban has criminalized [their] whole existence and identity,” she also shared details of Afghan resistance and protest.

Nobel Peace Laureate Malala Yousafzai labeled the event a true moment of solidarity. She drew attention to the technologies of “highly calculated policies of oppression” that the Taliban relies on, noting that Afghanistan is the only country in the world that forbids girls from completing an education. She emphasized the need for solidarity from the global community with the girls who are “having their childhood and their future stolen” to not only change the conditions for Afghan girls but to also communicate to all girls around the world that their education, humanity, and human rights matter.

Panelists Penelope Andrews, anti-apartheid expert and Professor of Law and Director of the Racial Justice Project at New York Law School, and Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair of the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls, provided the legal and policy expertise on the codification of gender apartheid in international law. Drawing from a depth of knowledge on racial apartheid in South Africa, Professor Andrews identified the situation of women in Afghanistan as unequivocal gender apartheid based on the evidence of systemic, vicious, and comprehensive oppression and denial of basic civil and political rights on every level. She made an actionable request: include gender apartheid in the draft convention on crimes against humanity. To galvanize and focus efforts, she said, naming a harm is one of the most influential tools available so there is an imperative to recognize what is happening to Afghan women clearly: “This is gender apartheid – calling this what it is, we can create the conditions for people to be able to live dignified lives.”

Dorothy Estrada-Tanck identified the explicit codification of gender apartheid in Afghanistan as a priority for the UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls. While there are legal instruments currently available to address the rights violations women in Afghanistan are facing based on human rights tools built over the last 80 years, Estrada-Tanck pinpointed their insufficiency to identify and frame the mass nature and scale of this “state-sponsored, institutionalized and systematic oppression and subjugation.” Recognizing and codifying this as a crime against humanity is necessary to accurately name and understand the full scope of the elements of this regime and most importantly, to trigger action from the international community. Calling on the international community’s not just moral, but legal obligation to prevent and combat this crisis, she concluded, “This is a test for the multilateral system, where are we going to draw the red line?”

The event was co-sponsored by the Global Justice Center, Rawadari, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, and the Permanent Missions of Mexico and Malta.

Opening/Closing Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and Chief Executive Officer, International Peace Institute
H.E. Vanessa Frazier, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malta to the UN
H.E. Alicia Buenrostro Massieu, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN

Speakers:
Malala Yousafzai, Nobel Peace Laureate
Nayera Kohistani, Afghan Activist and Expert
Penelope Andrews, John Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law & Director, Racial Justice Project, New York Law School
Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Chair, UN Working Group on Discrimination against Women and Girls

Moderator:
Jomana Karadsheh, International Correspondent, CNN

Marcel Fratzscher: „Klares Signal für Kehrtwende verpasst – EZB könnte alten Fehler wiederholen“

Zu den Ergebnissen der jüngsten Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die EZB hätte ein klares Signal für eine Kehrtwende ihrer Geldpolitik und eine baldige Zinssenkung geben sollen. Die Entscheidung der EZB und ihre Kommunikation sind eine verpasste Chance, mehr Klarheit zu schaffen und die Finanzierungsbedingungen zu verbessern. Damit bleibt die Geldpolitik eine der wichtigsten Bremsen für die Konjunktur und für die schwachen Investitionen in der Eurozone und in Deutschland.

Die EZB läuft Gefahr, ihren Fehler von vor zwei Jahren zu wiederholen und zu spät zu handeln, denn Geldpolitik entfaltet ihre volle Wirkung erst nach anderthalb bis zwei Jahren. Die Inflation in der Eurozone ist deutlich gesunken und die Inflationserwartungen sind schon jetzt konsistent mit der Preisstabilität. Die von der EZB immer wieder betonte Sorge vor sogenannten Zweitrundeneffekten – vor allem, dass die Inflation zu höheren Löhnen und einer stärkeren Nachfrage führt – hat sich bisher nicht bewahrheitet. Es ist richtig, dass Löhne steigen und auch die Lohnstückkosten zulegen. Aber dies sind notwendige temporäre Aufholeffekte. Es gibt keinerlei Anzeichen für permanente Effekte, beispielsweise durch eine Lohn-Preis-Spirale, durch die sich eine höhere Inflation verfestigen könnte.

Die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist heute höher, dass die EZB ihr Ziel der Preisstabilität über die nächsten drei Jahre unterschießen wird, als dass die Inflation zu hoch bleiben wird. Dies würde nicht nur die Glaubwürdigkeit der EZB erodieren, sondern könnte auch der Wirtschaft einen empfindlichen Schaden zufügen.

Tomaso Duso: „Der Digital Market Act sichert den Wettbewerb – und ein Stück Demokratie“

Nach einem mehrjährigen und intensiven Gesetzgebungsprozess auf EU-Ebene tritt heute der Digital Market Act in Kraft, der den großen Tech-Unternehmen Verpflichtungen auferlegt, um den Missbrauch ihrer Marktmacht zu verhindern. Wettbewerbsexperte Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin, kommentiert das Gesetz wie folgt:

Mit dem Digital Market Act (DMA) tritt endlich eine Regelung in Kraft, die die Marktstellung der großen Digitalkonzerne aufgreift und faire Wettbewerbsbedingungen im digitalen Binnenmarkt zu gewährleisten verspricht. Sechs Tech-Giganten wurden zunächst als Gatekeeper definiert: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, ByteDance, Meta und Microsoft, aber auch andere Unternehmen wie Booking.com stehen auf der Beobachtungsliste. Diese Unternehmen bieten Dienste an, die für jeden Anbieter, der in der digitalen Welt Geschäfte machen will, unverzichtbar sind. Aufgrund ihrer zentralen Stellung und ihrer großen Marktmacht müssen sie künftig besondere Pflichten erfüllen und sich an Verhaltens- und Datenzugangsregeln halten. Anders als im Wettbewerbsrecht, wo die Beweislast bei den Behörden liegt, die nachweisen müssen, ob Unternehmen gegen die Wettbewerbsregeln verstoßen haben, wurden im DMA spezifische Pflichten im Voraus definiert. Deren Einhaltung müssen die großen Tech-Unternehmen nun durch Compliance Reports nachweisen.  

In den vergangenen Jahren waren die Instrumente der Wettbewerbspolitik überfordert und zu langsam, um der enormen Dynamik und der Komplexität dieser Märkte gerecht zu werden. Mit der neuen Regulierung hat Europa Maßstäbe gesetzt, um den Wettbewerb auf den immer zentraler werdenden digitalen Plattformmärkten durch klarere und effektivere Regeln zu schützen. Jetzt ist die Zeit der Durchsetzung gekommen: Insbesondere die Europäische Kommission, aber auch die nationalen Wettbewerbsbehörden wie das Bundeskartellamt in Deutschland sind gefordert, eine neue und sehr komplexe Aufgabe zu übernehmen, für die es viel Mut und Entschlossenheit braucht. Es geht um die Sicherung von Wettbewerb, Innovation und Wohlstand, aber auch um ein Stück Demokratie.

Zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div)

Die Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt

 zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (w/m/div) (für jeweils 10 Wochenstunden)

Da es sich um eine Sammelausschreibung handelt, beachten Sie bitte die verschiedenen Konditionen und Aufgabenfelder. Bitte geben Sie in Ihrer Bewerbung an, für welche Ausschreibung(en) Sie sich bewerben möchten.

 


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