Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The debate in the European Union (EU) on the expansion of majority decision-making is entering a new round. Germany, in particular, is seeking to build a coalition in favour of more majority decisions in light of the, at times, difficult decision-making process concerning foreign and security policy, and the prospect of future EU enlarge­ment. Too often, however, this debate is not taking into account how and with what results majority decisions are being used in other, sometimes equally contested policy areas. An analysis of the public votes since 2010 compiled in the SWP’s new EU Council Monitor shows that EU member states generally strive for consensus, even in majority decisions. Larger groups of member states are almost never outvoted. Still, Hungary and Poland increasingly stand out as two states that are outvoted more often than others, albeit to a slightly lesser degree than the United Kingdom (UK) was before Brexit. One way out of the dilemma between strengthening the EU’s ability to act and protecting vital national interests could be a well-balanced “sovereignty safety net”.

Die Debatte in der Europäischen Union (EU) über die Ausweitung von Mehrheits­entscheidungen geht in eine neue Runde. Insbesondere Deutschland sucht unter dem Eindruck der teils schwierigen Entscheidungsfindung in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie unter der Perspektive künftiger Erweiterungen eine Koalition für mehr Mehrheitsentscheidungen. Unterbeleuchtet ist in der Debatte, wie und mit welchem Ergebnis Mehrheitsentschei­dungen in der Praxis genutzt werden. Eine Ana­lyse der im neuen EU Council Monitor der SWP aufbereiteten öffentlichen Abstim­mun­gen im Rat seit 2010 zeigt: Die EU-Mitglied­staaten streben in der Regel auch bei Mehrheits­entscheidungen einen Konsens an. Größere Gruppen von Mitgliedstaaten werden so gut wie nie überstimmt. Zunehmend ragen aber mit Ungarn und Polen zwei Staa­ten heraus, die – auf einem etwas niedrigeren Niveau als Großbritannien vor dem Brexit – häufiger überstimmt werden als andere. Ein Ausweg aus dem Dilemma zwischen Handlungsfähigkeit der EU und dem Schutz legitimer nationaler Inter­essen könnte ein gut ausbalanciertes Souveränitätssicherheitsnetz sein.

jQuery(document).ready(function($){$("#isloaderfor-utbmaw").fadeOut(300, function () { $(".pagwrap-utbmaw").fadeIn(300);});}); Download the Report

In advance of the Security Council’s open debate on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), IPI, together with the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN, co-hosted a policy forum on April 17th on the topic of “Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Examining the Use of UN Sanctions.”

The purpose of this policy forum was to consider how sanctions have been used in response to CRSV. The discussion examined the relationship between the annual reports of the secretary-general on CRSV and sanctions designations and provided recommendations to enhance complementarity.

The policy forum also launched the IPI publication “UN Tools for Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: An Analysis of Listings and Sanctions Processes,” written by Jenna Russo and Lauren McGowan. The event and publication were made possible with generous support from the government of Denmark.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Christina Markus Lassen, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the UN

Speakers:
Lauren McGowan, Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute
Tonderai Chikuhwa, Senior Policy Adviser, UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict
Natascha Hryckow, Associate Fellow, Global Fellowship Initiative of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Former Coordinator for the UN Panel of Experts on Somalia (VTC)
Francesca Cassar, Africa, Economic and Development Coordinator, Permanent Mission of Malta to the UN
Pauline Brosch, Policy Specialist, Protection and Transitional Justice, UN Women

Moderator:
Jenna Russo, Director of Research and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, International Peace Institute

The recent political consensus on the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) marks a significant step towards a common raw materials policy within the European Union (EU). Against the backdrop of increasing geopolitical tensions, the EU aims to bolster its “strategic autonomy” within its raw material supply chains. To achieve this goal, it is essential for the EU and its member states to enhance collaboration with mineral-rich third countries. The current geopolitical environment will require a con­certed effort on the part of the EU with respect to its raw material diplomacy, as only through such effective engagement will the EU be able to diplomatically and program­matically implement raw material partnerships that appeal to third countries.

Since the Security Council first recognized conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) as a threat to international peace and security in 2008, the UN has developed an increasing number of pathways to prevent and respond to such crimes. One of these is the annual report of the secretary-general on CRSV, which includes an annexed list of perpetrators who are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of CRSV violations in contexts on the agenda of the Security Council. In addition, perpetrators of CRSV may also be designated in UN sanctions regimes. Yet while both of these processes aim to prevent and respond to CRSV, they are not always coherent with one another.

This paper analyzes the relationship between the annual reports of the secretary-general on CRSV and sanctions designations to provide recommendations to enhance their complementarity. It provides an overview of the CRSV annual report and the process for listing parties. It then focuses on designations in sanctions regimes for crimes related to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), including the level of coherence between the reporting of the secretary-general and designations in sanctions regimes. Next, the paper analyzes the reporting and political barriers that inhibit more regular designations for SGBV in sanctions regimes. Finally, it provides recommendations to the UN and member states on how to improve the coherence, coordination, and effectiveness of these processes, including the following.

For member states:

• Explicitly list SGBV as a criterion within all sanctions regimes for contexts where sexual violence may be taking place.
• Prioritize utilizing existing SGBV-related criteria as appropriate with available evidence.
• Provide additional resources for panels of experts.
• Increase coherence between the parties listed in the annual reports on CRSV and the individuals and entities designated in sanctions regimes.
• Organize an annual field visit for sanctions committees to the context in question.
• Create a standing capacity within the UN to engage with designated parties, with the aim of encouraging compliance and facilitating de-listing.

For the UN Secretariat and panels of experts:

• Establish a platform for regularly coordinating and sharing information between the office of the special representative of the secretary-general on sexual violence in conflict and panels of experts.
• Institute more structured handover processes between incoming and outgoing members of panels of experts.
• Provide more robust training on SGBV for panels of experts.
• Strengthen CRSV expertise and capacity within the Security Council Affairs Division.