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The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM observed few ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, and none in Luhansk.

The SMM observed a calm situation overall in the Donetsk region. At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM recorded only one ceasefire violation – an airburst from an anti-aircraft gun 4km north-north-west of its position[1]. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near government-controlled Marinka (23km west-south-west of Donetsk) located 3km west of the first “DPR” checkpoint on the road to Donetsk city, the SMM saw and heard two incoming explosions by 82mm mortars approximately 200m north of its position.

In a field 4km north-west of “DPR”-controlled Yenakiieve (37km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed an on-going field exercise with live ammunition, conducted with main battle tanks (MBT), and saw at least four airbursts and four impacts 2-3km west of its position. In addition, the SMM heard intensive outgoing heavy-machine gun and small-arms fire at distances ranging between 3 and 5km north-west of its position.

In government-controlled Pavlopil (26km north-east Mariupol), the SMM spoke to three school children and their mothers. The children had started attending school in government-controlled Talakivka (17km north-east of Mariupol) from 1 September due to the closure of the only school in Pavlopil (see SMM Daily Report 1 September). The interlocutors told the SMM that starting from the coming week the children would be on a special list used by Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint personnel in government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) allowing them to cross the checkpoint without waiting in line. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint in Hnutove confirmed this information to the SMM. The mothers told the SMM that they crossed the checkpoint, where they had to wait for one and a half hours to proceed in both directions, to take their children to school every day.

On 3 September, in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM met with the deputy “chief” of the city “police department” who informed that the “department” had only approximately 30 percent of its pre-conflict staff as most had left the job due to the conflict and that the “department” faced difficulties in recruiting new staff due to low numbers of applicants. However, the population in the city had also decreased to 210,000 people compared to 300,000 people before the conflict, he noted. 

At a checkpoint in government-controlled Zaitseve (50km north-north-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed a queue of 163 civilian vehicles waiting to enter “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-north-east of Donetsk) and 540 civilian vehicles waiting to enter government-controlled area.

At a checkpoint on the southern outskirts of government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a queue of approximately 230 civilian vehicles waiting to enter from “DPR”-controlled to government-controlled area.

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a calm situation overall and recorded no ceasefire violations.

In a training area in “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed five MBT tanks (T-64).

In government-controlled Krymske (43km north-west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander informed the SMM about shelling by 120mm mortar in the government-controlled northern area of Zholobok  (48km north-west of Luhansk) near the contact line, during the night of 2 September. Due to security reasons, the SMM could not observe possible impact areas, which were mined according to signs.

At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the government-controlled northern side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the commander told the SMM that only those who had a special permit were allowed to cross the checkpoint. The interlocutor showed the SMM a list of medical staff who lived on the “LPR”-controlled southern side and were allowed to cross the bridge to work on the government-controlled side.

The SMM visited school number 14 in government-controlled Zolote 3 (60km north-west of Luhansk), where the school director told the SMM that there were 12 enrolled pupils – compared to 65 pupils before the conflict and 47 pupils at the end of the previous academic year. The interlocutor added that the school – located about 700-800m from the contact line – had been severely damaged by shelling, but its gymnasium had been renovated and new windows and a new roof had been installed with funding from the Norwegian Refugee Council and Germany before the academic year had started.

In government-controlled Kolesnykivka (30km east-north-east of Luhansk), at the international Ukraine-Russian Federation border, two Ukrainian Border Guard servicemen informed the SMM that the situation had been calm in the village and the Ukrainian side had closed the border crossing point since May this year.  

On 3 September, the SMM met with the owner of a pasta factory in “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city who said the factory had employed 80 personnel and had annually produced more than 1,000 tons of pasta before the conflict. The interlocutor told the SMM that now, the factory had 25 active employees and operated at only 6-8 percent of its capacity and faced problems with raw material supplies, as the main flour supplier was located in government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).   

The SMM visited again two Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. In both areas, the SMM observed that all previously registered weapons were present and their serial numbers matched the SMM’s records.

The SMM visited for the first time one “LPR” heavy weapons holding area and visited again one “LPR” heavy weapons holding area, whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At the first area, the “LPR” members allowed the SMM to see weapons only from a distance and the SMM could not verify the serial numbers.* At the second area, the SMM saw that all weapons previously observed on 1 July (six multiple rocket launcher system (MLRS) (Grad, 122mm)) were absent. “LPR” members told the SMM that all weapons had been relocated to a new holding area.

The SMM observed the following weapons’ movements in areas that are in violation of respective withdrawal lines. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw two military type trucks (KRAZ) towing howitzers (D-30, 122mm).

On 3 September in Kharkiv, the head of the special police rapid response battalion of Kharkiv regional police informed the SMM that the battalion personnel operated in the districts adjacent to the Anti-Terrorism Operation area. He added that during the first half of 2015, the regional police, mainly his battalion, had seized a number of weapons and ammunition, including 21 grenade launchers, 5 machine guns, and 331 hand grenades.

In Kyiv, the SMM met with the chief administrator of Hospital Number 17 to follow up on media reports on casualties during the grenade blast outside the Parliament building on 31 August (see: SMM Spot Report 31 August). The interlocutor informed the SMM that three National Guard members who were reported by media to be in critical condition were recovering and described their prognosis as “favourable”.

In front of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ main investigative department for organized crime, the SMM monitored the gathering of approximately 50 members and supporters of Svoboda party (men and women equally, different age groups) who accused Minister Avakov of what they referred to as reprisals against political opponents. They also expressed their support for Svoboda party leader, Oleh Tiahnybok who was at the time of the gathering questioned inside the Ministry about the protest outside the Parliament building on 31 August. The SMM observed that around 26 police officers were present, with additional police officers on hold in three busses parked nearby. The protest ended peacefully.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Odessa, Chernivtsi and Ivano-Frankivsk and Lviv.

 

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Members of the “LPR” continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation.

Denied access:

-   At an “LPR” heavy weapons holding area “LPR” members allowed the SMM to see weapons only from a distance and the SMM was thus unable to verify serial numbers.

Delay:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint at Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) a “DPR” “traffic police officer” together with an armed “DPR” member stopped and delayed the SMM for 33 minutes before he received “permission” from relevant superiors and let the SMM proceed.

At a “DPR” checkpoint near Shirokyi village (6.5km south-south-west of Donetsk city) a DPR “police officer” stopped the SMM and asked for IDs and names of the SMM drivers. After 10 minutes the SMM was allowed to pass.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfillment of its mandate”.

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Átmenő osztályzattal vizsgázott Szerbia a hét derekán Belgrádból eltávozó Nemzetközi Valutaalap küldöttsége előtt, amelynek tagjai azért jártak errefelé, hogy felülbírálják a kora tavasszal jóváhagyott 1,2 milliárd euró értékű készenléti hitelcsomag elnyerésekor támasztott követelések elvégzésének folyamatát. Magyarán, górcső alá vetették, hogy a szerb kormány megtett-e minden tőle telhetőt a reformok végrehajtásában.

A Kolibri Nagycsaládosok Egyesülete egy rendhagyó tartalmú felhívást tett közzé a napokban. Gajda Nóra, az egyesület elnöke kérdésünkre elmondta, maga a szöveg szándékosan ilyen titokzatos, a részleteket nem is szándékozzák előre feltárni a közvélemény előtt, de minden kiderül majd, miután az akciót lebonyolították. Ehhez nincs is mit hozzáfűzni, jöjjön a felhívás szövege változatlan formában:

Quatre bâtiments de surveillance et d’assistance hauturiers commandés pour la Marine nationale.

La Direction générale de l’armement a notifié le 17 août 2015 aux chantiers navals Piriou, la réalisation de quatre Bâtiments de soutien et d’assistance hauturiers destinés à la Marine nationale. La commande porte dans un premier temps sur deux unités, deux autres BSAH doivent être commandés l’an prochain.

En février dernier, lors d’une intervention devant les députés de la commission « Défense », l’amiral Bernard Rogel, le Chef d’État-Major de la Marine nationale (CEMM) déplorait la lenteur du programme BSAH (Bâtiments de Soutien et d’Assistance Hauturiers), lancé en 2006. Le programme initial portait sur huit unités.
Le lundi 17 août 2015, la Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) a notifié à Kership, filiale commune à Piriou et à DCNS, le soin de construire quatre BSAH destinés à la Marine nationale, dont deux fermes. Une première commande porte sur deux unités, dont la mise en service pourrait avoir lieu entre 2017 et 2018. Deux autres BSAH, également prévus dans la Loi de Programmation Militaire (LPM), doivent être commandés l’an prochain en vue d’une livraison en 2019. La tête de série sera basée à Toulon, où elle remplacera les bâtiments de soutien de région Gazelle et Taape, opérationnels depuis 1978 et 1983. Les autres BSAH succèderont à Brest aux remorqueurs de haute mer Tenace (1973) et Malabar (1976), ainsi qu’au BSR Élan (1978), positionné à Cherbourg.
Longs de 70,30 mètres pour une largeur de 15,80 mètres et un tirant d’eau de 5 mètres, les BSAH bénéficient d’un design inspiré des navires de services à l’offshore. Ils se verront confier trois types de missions, le soutien d’une force navale (accompagnement d’un groupe aéronaval ou amphibie, intervention auprès d’un sous-marin en escale, remorquage de cibles et d’antennes, etc…), de soutien de région (remorquage d’engins, ancrages, relevages…) et de sauvegarde maritime dans le cadre de l’action de l’État en mer (sauvetage, assistance à la protection des biens, protection de l’environnement, lutte contre les pollutions maritimes…). Pouvant opérer sans ravitaillement pendant trente jours, ils permettront à la Marine nationale de disposer, sur chaque façade maritime de la métropole, d’unités de soutien très polyvalentes et réactives, l’objectif étant que les BSAH puissent intervenir en moins de six heures.

Caractéristiques

• Longueur hors tout : 70,30 mètres
• Largeur hors membres : 15,80 mètres
• Tirant d’eau : 5 mètres
• Port en lourd : environ 1 000 T
• Surface de chargement en pontée : 250 m2
• Déplacement 2 700 t en pleine charge
• Vitesse : 14 nœuds
• Coque / superstructure : acier
• Aménagement : 17 hommes d’équipage + 12 passagers

• Propulsion : 2 x 2 650 KW
• Groupes électrogènes : 2 x 300 KWe

Équipements spécifiques

• Capacité de traction au point fixe : 80 T
• Grue de 12 T à 25 m
• Accueil de 12 plongeurs et de leurs matériels
• Lutte incendie
• Mise en œuvre d’un barrage flottant antipollution
• Embarcation de travail d’environ 8 mètres
• Embarcations semi-rigides
• Transport des armes et munitions
• Soutien d’un sous-marin en escale

L’émissaire marocain qui a rencontré les journalistes Eric Laurent et Catherine Graciet en enregistrant leurs conversations est un redoutable avocat d’affaires.

Évtizedekig biztosíthatja Egyiptom gázellátását az a nemrég felfedezett lelőhely, amely szakértők szerint 850 milliárd köbméter gázt rejthet magában. Ez a mennyiség Szerbia számára 425 évre elegendő lenne, mivel az országnak évente 2 milliárd köbméter földgázra van szüksége.

A tavaly őszi bukaresti mérkőzéshez hasonlóan, Magyarország és Románia labdarúgó-válogatottja a budapesti találkozón is osztozott a pontokon. A 2016-os Európa-bajnokság selejtezőjének hetedik fordulójában a két csapat támadói nem jártak sikerrel, a 0–0-s döntetlen pedig azt jelenti, hogy a Feröer-sz...

/ France - Régions, Roumanie

In 2014, based on the international and domestic political situation and threat level posed to the interests of the Czech Republic and its citizens the BIS focused mainly on Russian, Chinese and Ukrainian activities in the Czech Republic.
As in previous years, the BIS concentrated on the high number of Russian intelligence officers living or engaging in activities in the Czech Republic. Given the high numbers of Russian intelligence officers travelling to the Czech Republic and to the Czech Republic’s responsibility to secure not only its own security but also the security of its allies in the Schengen Area, the BIS aimed to decrease the number of Russian intelligence officers entering the Schengen Area via the Czech Republic.
In 2014, Russian intelligence services focused on Czech power engineering, on issues related to its further development, and on the scientific and technical sector. Russia continued in its attempts to exert influence over the Russian community in the Czech Republic, or more specifically to establish pro-Kremlin organizations and individuals as representatives of the Russian community responsible for the communication with Czech state institutions and bodies.
Intelligence has confirmed that Russia does not consider its ongoing interest in Czech nuclear power engineering as fighting a losing battle. This interest has only become less conspicuous. In 2014, Russian interests in the Czech Republic have broadened (the Temelín and Dukovany nuclear power plants, supplies of nuclear fuel) and include also the State Energy Concept and all entities even indirectly involved in fulfilling the goals of Czech energy policies. Russia started perceiving Czech nuclear power engineering in a broader Central European context aiming to make good use of investments and efforts devoted to creating, managing, stabilizing and future exploitation of networks expanding Russian influence in Central Europe.
Activities of Russian intelligence officers and their associates in the Czech Republic are in direct contradiction to “expert and knowledgeable” comments claiming the Czech Republic does not have anything of interest to Russian espionage. However, Russia is greatly interested in Czech Republic’s participation in international scientific and technical projects linked to obtaining access to funds from Czech and European grants. This access could be provided by Czech middlemen working with Russia. Russia not only aims to gain competitive advantage over the Czech Republic and the EU but also strives to secure funding for its activities from the Czech Republic and the EU.

In relation to the Ukraine crisis Russia and its sympathizers engaged in white, grey and black propaganda. Russian methods of exerting influence and spreading propaganda were based on time-tested Soviet practices, i.e. concealing or covering up own (Russian/Soviet) steps and highlighting or demonizing Western reactions1. Russia has been creating influence and propaganda structures in the Czech Republic over a long period of time. The role of these structures is to promote and protect Russian economic and political interest to the detriment of the interests of the Czech Republic, the NATO and the EU. Russia could draw on these structures after the situation in Ukraine deteriorated and did not need to start creating influence structures from scratch. Russian propaganda in the Czech Republic makes use of a number of tools: from ideologically manipulated citizens supporting Russian propaganda unknowingly, to professionals intentionally working with the Russians. Unveiling the memorial commemorating Internationalists (March 2014) demonstrated that the Czech public is highly perceptive to direct Russian (or other foreign) involvement in the Czech Republic. Russia is well aware of this fact; therefore, Russian-language propaganda related to the Ukraine crisis spread by Russian (state and non-state) actors did not play a major role in the Czech Republic. However, the Czech public was and is greatly influenced by Czech pro-Russian organizations and individuals using websites to present their interpretations of Russian stances. The arguments are put forward in a way leading Czech citizens to believe they are recipients of opinions held by fellow citizens not of Russian propaganda. On the one hand, a part of the Czech public is willing to protest a memorial commemorating Soviet occupants – internationalists from 1968, but on the other hand it defends the Russian occupation of Crimea and the presence of Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine.         In general, Russian and pro-Russian propaganda in the Czech Republic and other EU member states is aimed not only against the integrity of the EU and NATO. It is assessed that Russia is creating a structure in Europe drawing on the concept of the Comintern (the Communist International; the Third International) founded by the Soviet Union. This structure is ideologically based on Dugin’s expansionist Neo-Eurasianism2 (which is in a way acceptable to all European political parties, from left-wing extremists and populists to right-wing extremists).        The Comintern was founded in Moscow in 1919 with the goal of protecting the Soviet Union by exporting the revolution to neighboring states, i.e. weakening potential enemies by internal disputes and creating a buffer zone of befriended (or more precisely subordinated) states around the Soviet Union. The Comintern became a tool used for promoting Soviet influence and interests beyond the borders of the Soviet Union by controlling communist parties abroad (in 1928 the Comintern had 580 000 foreign members), spreading propaganda3, covertly financing communist parties abroad4, and by serving as an important and successful espionage platform. The Comintern employed skillful Soviet intelligence officers (e.g. acting under cover as academics or journalists) who recruited young people (especially students with the potential of pursuing a career as civil servants or politicians) helping Soviet espionage activities. The recruiters exploited the ideological naivety, zeal or activism of the young people they targeted. The recruits were not requested to spy against their country, but asked to help in the fight against Fascism (Nazism, Imperialism, etc.) – a relevant issue even today with Fascism, Nazism and Imperialism joined by anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-EU sentiments. The current international, political and societal climate is very close to that of the 1930’s – the golden era of the Comintern5.
It is assessed that the functioning and administration of the new reincarnation of the Comintern (NRI) is not as strict (almost military-like) as in the case of the original Comintern. However, this does not mean the NRI has lesser propaganda and espionage capabilities than the Comintern. The NRI being a more liberal and activist platform is attractive for today’s Western activists (with pro-Russian stances or fighting against the system – USA, NATO, EU, globalization, multiculturalism, liberalism, capitalism, etc.). Even though the NRI does not have the capability of creating a traditional espionage network (agent – handler – the center) as was the case of the Comintern, it has great potential for recruiting active informants.
In 2014, the BIS did not detect any activities of Ukrainian intelligence services aimed against the Czech Republic and its interests or with a harmful effect on the international status and good name of the Czech Republic. Furthermore, there are no indications of Ukrainian intelligence services engaging in activities aiming to destabilize political, societal and ethnic relations in the Czech Republic.       In 2014, Chinese intelligence services focused on gaining influence in Czech political and state structures and on political intelligence. These activities were actively aided by several Czech citizens, including politicians and civil servants.
Source. 
A lire : La Russie subventionne des dizaines d'ONG défendant ses intérêts dans les pays baltes.

A Nemzetközi Menekültügyi Bizottság elnöke felszólította az Egyesült Államokat, hogy 2016 folyamán fogadjon be 65 ezer szíriai menekültet. Nemet mondtak.

En 2013, environ 52 millions de repas ont été servis aux militaires, dont 40 millions sur le territoire national, 7 millions en opérations extérieures et 5 millions à bord des navires de la Marine nationale. Aussi, la Cour des comptes a voulu savoir s’il n’y avait pas là matière à faire des économies : 1 […]

Cet article La Cour des comptes veut des économies sur les repas servis aux militaires est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

Une fois de plus, la Roumanie s'en sort à peu près bien. Aux fanfaronnades de l'ancien Président Traian Băsescu appelant à la fermeture immédiate des frontières face aux réfugiés qui « ne sont pas un problème de la Roumanie mais des dirigeants de l'Europe occidentale qui n'ont qu'à s'en prendre à eux-mêmes », ont suivi de près les déclarations rassurantes du Premier ministre Victor Ponta annonçant que la Roumanie va bien accueillir 1705 personnes, décision confirmée par le Président Klaus Iohannis.
Malgré cela, (...)

/ Populations et minorités

Le ministre de la Défense rendra visite lundi après-midi aux soldats du RICM de Poitiers (Vienne). Il y rencontrera 500 militaires de ce régiment blindé qui appartient à la 9e brigade d’infanterie de marine (9e BIMa où il sera rejoint par son "régiment-frère", le 1er RIMa) et bientôt à la 1ere division de Besançon.

Actuellement, un petit contingent du RICM est déployé dans le cadre de l'opération de sécurité intérieure Sentinelle. Et 300 soldats viennent de terminer leur condition opérationnelle (les 1er et 4e escadrons rentrent ainsi du Centac) en vue de leur déploiement sur les deux fuseaux (est et ouest) du dispositif Barkhane.

Le programme de ce déplacement qui s'inscrit dans le cadre des visites ministérielles aux forces est le suivant:
- 15h30 Arrivée du ministre de la Défense au RICM. Honneurs militaires
- 15h45 Entretien avec le Chef de corp.s Présentation du régiment et du programme de préparation des militaires
- 16h05 Visite des ateliers par le ministre de la Défense
Atelier n°1 : entrainement au tir en engin blindé sur simulateur
Atelier n°2 : instruction « milieu » au personnel partant pour l’opération Barkhane
Atelier n°3 : remise en condition des matériels par le personnel des 1er et 4e escadrons de retour du Centre d’entrainement au combat (CENTAC)
Atelier n°4 : préparation d’une unité en régime de base arrière
- 17h55 Adresse au régiment 
- 18h40 Départ du ministre de la Défense

 

Következik a Szekeres József nyugállományú ezredessel készített interjú írott változatának folytatása a harmadik résszel, mely eredetiben itt hallgatható meg.

* * *

A haderő modernizációja

1978-ban elkezdődött az átfegyverzés a T-72-re, és úgy döntöttek, a tatai ezrednél azt én fogom csinálni. Ezért kineveztek parancsnoknak, ahhoz pedig elő kellett léptetniük alezredesnek, megint soron kívül. Akkor már három éve voltam ezredtörzsfőnöki beosztásban. Ezredessé 1984-ben léptettek elő, amikor élenjáró ezrednek nyilvánítottak minket. Hozzáteszem, hogy a Magyar Néphadsereg történetében én voltam az első harckocsizó ezredparancsnok, akit ezredessé léptettek elő. Pl. Mórocz altábornagy, később hadseregparancsnok és honvédelmi minisztériumi államtitkár, Verpeléten őrnagyként volt az ezredparancsnokunk, úgy ment hadosztálytörzsfőnöknek is. Pacsek vezérkari főnök Rétságon volt ezredparancsnok alezredesként, később Mórocz helyett ő lett a hadosztálytörzsfőnök. Őt sem léptették elő. Darányi vezérőrnagy, hátországi védelmi parancsnok, alezredesként jött hadosztályparancsnoknak a kalocsai ezredtől.

[...] Bővebben!

Le format de la force Sangaris, déployée en Centrafrique depuis le 5 décembre 2013, a été réduit lors de ces dernières semaines. Désormais, elle compte environ 900 hommes et son dispositif s’articule autour du Groupement tactique interarmes (GTIA) Centurion, composé principalement par des éléments du 1er Régiment étranger de cavalerie (1er REC), du 2e Régiment […]

Cet article Centrafrique : Un responsable de l’ONU veut une action « plus robuste » contre les groupes armés est apparu en premier sur Zone Militaire.

Az Egyesült Államok Védelmi Minisztériuma beismerte, hogy az USA Oroszország partjai mentén lévő oceanográfiai kutatóhajói hírszerzést folytatnak – írja a TASS. Erről a Foxnews TV-csatornának nyilatkoztak. Az Egyesült Államok Oroszország partjai melletti kutatóhajóival kapcsolatban a Pentagon magas rangú képviselője nyilatkozott. „Persze, hogy vannak. És mégis mit gondolt mivel foglalkoznak ezek a oceanográfiai kutatóhajók? Bálnákat vizsgálnak?” – nyilatkozta a Pentagon képviselője.

Az Egyesült Államok folyamatosan veszít a gabonapiacon a konkurenseivel szemben – írja a Rusvesna. Nem a kőolaj az egyetlen termék, aminek a piacárt nemzetközi küzdelem folyik. Az Egyesült Államok és Oroszország a gabonapiac két legnagyobb exportőrei akik összecsaptak a vásárlók kegyeiért.

Zentán szeptember 7.

Orosz jóváhagyással Egyiptom és az Egyesült Arab Emírségek veszi meg azt a két Mistral típusú hadihajót, amelyeket Párizs eredetileg Moszkvának szánt, de az ukrán válságból fakadó diplomáciai ellentétek miatt végül nem szállítottak le - adta hírül csütörtökön az Egypt Independent című egyiptomi hírportál orosz sajtóértesülésekre hivatkozva.

Aláírták az Északi Áramlat-2 projekt részvényesi megállapodását az érintett hat cég vezetői pénteken Vlagyivosztokban, ahol Vlagyimir Putyin orosz elnök részvételével nagyszabású nemzetközi gazdasági tanácskozáson tekintik át a Távol-Kelet fejlesztésének lehetőségeit. Az Északi-Áramlat mintegy 1200 kilométer hosszú, Oroszországot és Németországot közvetlenül összekötő földgázvezeték, amelynek két, egymással párhuzamosan futó ága a Balti-tenger alatt húzódik, kiindulási pontja Viborg és egészen a németországi Greifswaldig tart.