Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

With the signing of the 2030 Agenda, the international community has committed to ending poverty in all its forms. This first Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) recognises poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon that goes beyond the simple lack of a sufficient amount of income. However, the way the SDG 1 and, in particular, Target 1.2 – “reduce … poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions” – are formulated poses challenges for its operationalisation.
Which specific dimensions of poverty should a country focus on? How can we identify them? Is it possible to agree on a universal set of dimensions with which to compare poverty across several countries?
Recently, significant advancements have been made in the measurement of multidimensional poverty; however, how dimensions of poverty are selected is often overlooked. Empirical studies have employed different approaches, ranging from a data-driven approach to the use of participatory methods or surveys to detect context-based dimensions. This Briefing Paper discusses the pros and cons of the existing approaches and argues in favour of a new one, called the Constitutional Approach. The central idea is that the constitution of a democratic country, together with its official interpretations, can be a valid source of ethically sound poverty dimensions.
What is the value added of the Constitutional Approach? And what are the policy implications of adopting it?

• The approach is grounded on a clear understanding of what poverty is, rather than an ad hoc approximation of it based on data availability. Only with a clear definition can poverty be measured, and anti-poverty strategies adequately designed and implemented.
• By drawing on norm-governed national institutions that have shaped societal attitudes, the resulting list of dimensions is more legitimate and likely to be accepted and used by national policy-makers and endorsed by the public. The selecting of valuable societal dimensions is not just a technocratic issue but must be grounded in shared ethical values.
• The approach does not require the collection of additional information to understand which poverty dimension should be prioritised. However, one must consider that this approach is only suitable for democratic countries, whose constitutions: are the result of a broad-based participatory process, still enjoy wide consensus and recognise at least the principle of equality among all citizens.
• To compare multidimensional poverty at the global level, the approach could be extended by examining a core list of overlapping dimensions across several countries.

Given the above strengths, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), which has a vital role in the Multidimensional Poverty Peer Network, could recommend this approach to governments to track country progress in SDG 1.

With the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the EU will define not only the financial but also the political priorities until 2030. Which political objectives the EU intends to pursue in the future will therefore be a key issue during the MFF negotiations. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 17 Sustainable Develop¬ment Goals (SDGs), which the EU played a key role in shaping, should guide this debate.
In terms of EU domestic policy, the 2030 Agenda should help the European budget be more strongly tuned towards socially disadvantaged groups, reduce the EU’s environ¬mental footprint and promote sustainable economic growth. This, in turn, would enable the MFF to bolster public support for Europe. In terms of EU foreign relations, the 2030 Agenda requires the EU to not only focus on short-term security and migration policy interests but to allocate resources in the budget for supporting long-term sustainable development. This would allow the EU to position itself as a frontrunner for sustainable development – internationally as well as towards industrialised, emerging and developing countries.
Two questions are central to the role of the 2030 Agenda in the next MFF: Where does the EU have the biggest deficits with respect to implementing the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs? And in which areas can the MFF make important contributions? We make five proposals on how to include the 2030 Agenda into the next MFF. These proposals complement one another and should be followed in parallel:
(1) Embed the principles of the 2030 Agenda in the MFF: Individual principles of the 2030 Agenda, such as Leave no one behind, universality and policy coherence for sustainable devel¬op¬ment, call on the EU to take the SDGs into con¬sidera¬tion not only in its foreign but also domestic policies, for example in agricultural or structural funds. Moreover, these principles require the EU to reduce the negative impact of EU policies on third countries and to promote positive synergies.
(2) Assign the SDGs to individual headings: The MFF should assign the global SDGs to individual headings and set minimum criteria for those SDGs and targets that each heading should contribute to. All headings should promote the three dimensions of sustainability – social, environ¬mental and economic.
(3) Mainstream sustainability principle: The principle of sustainability should be mainstreamed across all headings, e.g. the current climate mainstreaming, should be supple¬mented by objectives for social and economic sustainability.
(4) In heading IV (foreign relations), the EU should align its strategies for bilateral cooperation with the partners’ SDG strategies. In addition, three to four thematic flagship programmes should be created for cooperation with countries of all income groups, such as in the areas of urbanisation, inequality or climate change.
(5) Cross-cutting issues: The successor to the Horizon 2020 programme should invest more in research on sustainability. EU Impact Assessments should take greater account of the social and environmental dimensions of sustainability. The next MFF should set clear guidelines for sustainable procurement.

L’Objectif de Développement Durable 17 accorde une importance essentielle aux approches multi-acteurs et multi-niveaux pour l’atteinte des Objectifs de Développement Durable (ODD). Quels avantages et quels effets une approche multi-acteurs a-t-elle dans des programmes de décentralisation?
L’approche multi-acteurs a pour objectif l’implication de toutes les parties prenantes qui sont importantes pour un processus de réforme, issus de la politique, de la société civile et de l’économie privée. Dans le cadre des programmes de décentralisation, cette approche prévoit, la plupart du temps, une coopération simultanée avec les acteurs politiques (offre) et la société civile (demande). Elle doit s’appliquer à tous les niveaux d’un Etat (donc national, régional et communal).
Il y a jusqu’à ce jour peu d’études qui indiquent la contribution qu’une approche multi-acteurs pourrait apporter au succès de la décentralisation et comment elle pourrait déployer pleinement son potentiel. Cet article défend l’argumentation selon laquelle l’approche multi-acteurs et multi-niveaux soutient l‘effectivité ainsi que la durabilité de la décentralisation. Un aspect im¬portant, pour la promotion de la décentralisation, c’est une coopération horizontale et verticale dans un système multi-niveaux:

• Le renforcement simultané de l’offre et de la demande augmente l‘effectivité des réformes de la décentralisation. L’exemple de la participation citoyenne montre ce qui suit: la collaboration avec la commune facilite l’accès de la société civile; la collaboration avec la société civile lui permet une participation plus effective. Si la participation citoyenne est ainsi renforcée, elle contribue plutôt à l’amélioration des services communaux.
• Si la collaboration a lieu dans un système multi-niveaux, la décentralisation peut être promue de façon plus durable: les acteurs internationaux peuvent, par exemple, aux côtés de la société civile, intégrer des expériences du niveau communal dans la législation nationale et accompagner finalement la mise en œuvre au niveau communal.

Pour exploiter pleinement le potentiel de l‘approche multi-acteurs et multi-niveaux, il est important de connaitre ce qui suit:

• Les acteurs internationaux devraient trouver un équilibre quant à l‘appui des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques dans les processus de décentralisation. La demande (non-étatique) retient souvent moins l’attention. En voulant appuyer les différents acteurs, il ne s’agit pas de choisir entre l’un ou l‘autre, mais de prendre les deux à la fois.
• La participation citoyenne devrait mener à des résultats visibles, afin que la disposition à s’engager au plan de la société civile soit établie à long terme. C’est pourquoi le suivi de la participation citoyenne du côté de l’offre et de la demande est important.
• La continuité et l’intensité de l‘appui sont importants pour un succès durable des réformes.

Ces résultats proviennent d’un projet de recherche de l’Institut Allemand de Développement / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) qui mesure l’effet des programmes de gouvernance.

Sustainable Development Goal 17 assigns an important role to multi-stakeholder approaches in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). What are the advantages and impacts of a multi-stakeholder approach in decentralisation programmes?
The multi-stakeholder approach aims to involve all stakeholders from politics, civil society and the private sector that are relevant for a reform process. In the context of decentralisation programmes, this approach usually allows for simultaneous cooperation with political actors (supply side) and civil society (demand side) and applies to all state levels (i.e. national, regional and local).
There have been few studies until now on how a multi-stakeholder approach can contribute to the success of decentralisation and how it can develop its full potential. This paper argues that the multi-stakeholder approach supports the effectiveness as well as the sustainability of decentralisa¬tion. Important is the horizontal as well as vertical cooperation in the multi-level system when promoting decentralisation:

• Simultaneously strengthening the supply and demand side increases the effectiveness of decentralisation reforms. The example of citizen participation shows that support to local authorities makes it easier for civil society to gain access, while support to civil society enables it to participate more effectively. By strengthening citizen participation in this way, citizen participation is more likely to lead to the improvement of municipal services.
• If cooperation takes place in a multi-level system, decentralisation can be promoted in a more sustainable manner: for example, international actors – together with civil society – can bring experiences from the local level into legislation and subsequently support its implementation at the local level.

To fully exploit the potential of the multi-stakeholder approach, the following is important:

• International actors should find a balance in supporting state and non-state actors in decentralisa¬tion processes. The (non-governmental) demand side often receives less attention. Supporting different actors is not about an ‘either-or’ situation but rather an ‘as well as’.
• Citizen participation should lead to visible results so that the willingness to participate in civil society is established in the long term. This is why the follow-up of citizen participation on both the supply and demand side is important.
• Continuity and intensity of support are important for the sustainable success of the reforms.
• The results stem from a research project of the German Development Institute on the impact assessment of governance programmes.

The global migration governance is in a period of transition. There are two main reasons for this: First, the division between an international refugee regime based on the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and a (labour) migration regime is problematic in light of ‘mixed’ migratory flows. Second, the current global migration architecture is characterised by institutional fragmentation and a lack of normative standards. The Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees currently being negotiated are intended to address these shortcomings.
Among the crucial questions to be addressed is the role of regional cooperation in a future global migration architecture. This is because the majority of cross-border migration and displacement takes place within regional spaces. Regional cooperation on migration currently occurs in three formats, all of which focus on different issue areas: 1) Migration-related activities of regional organisations (ECOWAS, IGAD, for instance); 2) regional consultative processes (RCPs) and 3) inter-regional cooperation processes (such as Khartoum and Rabat Processes).
Experiences from Africa suggest: Groundbreaking norms, for example for the free movement of persons or on refugee rights have been developed on the regional level. This is not least due to some advantages of regional migration governance over global formats. Joint interests tend to be identified more easily, distinct regional features can be better addressed and forging common ground in the formulation of a coherent and developmental migration policy is generally not as difficult.
However, in Africa as yet the implementation of regional norms has been deficient. Moreover, the agendas of inter-regional cooperation formats are often strongly influenced by economic and security- interests of Western donors. In this context, the promotion of the protection of refugees’ and migrants’ rights tends to be neglected. Also regional migration interests risk to be undermined.
Therefore, additional to regional migration policies, it is necessary to establish binding, universal standards under international law as regards the rights and protection of refugees and migrants. At the same time, the regional level ought to be strengthened. It can provide important impulses for expanding standards of protection and implementing orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration.
The international community has to take this into account in the negotiation of the two global Compacts. The con-tributions of German and European development policy ought to focus on the following:

• Building capacities: Regional organisations ought to be supported financially and technically in all areas of migration, not only in security-relevant aspects.
• Fostering interaction: Regular exchange among regional organisations and global actors as well as civil society actors should be strengthened.
• Increasing influence: The weight of regional organisations in global policy processes and in the review and follow-up of the Compacts must be enhanced.

__________________ Anne Koch: Research division “Global Issues”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Benjamin Etzold: Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)

Security sector reform (SSR) is a core element of the European Union’s (EU) efforts to prevent violent conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations. The existing legal framework excludes the use of EU budgetary sources to finance assistance to the armed forces of partner countries. Under the umbrella of Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD), the EU seeks to address this funding gap and enable the financing of training, equipment and infrastructure to military actors. The main rationale behind CBSD is the assumption that security is a precondition for development, and that sustainable development can only be achieved when state institutions – including the military – acquire adequate capacities.
To implement the CBSD initiative, the European Commission in July 2016 proposed to adapt the Regulation establishing the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The IcSP is the EU’s main instrument to fund conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. The Commission’s proposal to amend the IcSP Regulation envisages the introduction of new types of assistance measures that address CBSD demands. Both EU institutions and the wider development community have controversially discussed the Commission’s proposal. This Briefing Paper engages this debate and discusses the possible implications of the IcSP reform.
The main argument of the paper is that the implementa¬tion of CBSD, as proposed by the European Commission, is likely to contribute to the securitisation of EU development policy. The provision of training and equipment to military actors is needed to preserve the EU’s credibility and effectiveness as a security provider in countries such as Somalia and Mali. However, the use of the IcSP for funding CBSD activities sets a precedent for using development instruments within the EU’s budget for financing assistance to military actors. Without a precise justification for the link between the proposed activities and EU development objectives, CBSD risks subordinating development policy to EU security goals.
One key problem of the debate over CBSD is a lack of clarity concerning the scope of the envisaged assistance measures. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty regarding EU development policy forming the legal basis of the Commission’s proposal. Finally, civil society organisations fear that the proposed IcSP reform marks the beginning of a trend of shifting EU priorities from civilian to military instruments to address crises and violent conflicts.
The main challenge is to address these concerns and find a suitable, permanent arrangement for funding CBSD activities within the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) between 2021 and 2027. In the short term, greater transparency of the envisaged CBSD activities and a substantive debate about their links to EU development policy objectives are needed. In the medium term, the EU should create a dedicated instrument that separates CBSD activities from funding for civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

Security sector reform (SSR) is a core element of the European Union’s (EU) efforts to prevent violent conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations. The existing legal framework excludes the use of EU budgetary sources to finance assistance to the armed forces of partner countries. Under the umbrella of Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD), the EU seeks to address this funding gap and enable the financing of training, equipment and infrastructure to military actors. The main rationale behind CBSD is the assumption that security is a precondition for development, and that sustainable development can only be achieved when state institutions – including the military – acquire adequate capacities.
To implement the CBSD initiative, the European Commission in July 2016 proposed to adapt the Regulation establishing the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The IcSP is the EU’s main instrument to fund conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. The Commission’s proposal to amend the IcSP Regulation envisages the introduction of new types of assistance measures that address CBSD demands. Both EU institutions and the wider development community have controversially discussed the Commission’s proposal. This Briefing Paper engages this debate and discusses the possible implications of the IcSP reform.
The main argument of the paper is that the implementa¬tion of CBSD, as proposed by the European Commission, is likely to contribute to the securitisation of EU development policy. The provision of training and equipment to military actors is needed to preserve the EU’s credibility and effectiveness as a security provider in countries such as Somalia and Mali. However, the use of the IcSP for funding CBSD activities sets a precedent for using development instruments within the EU’s budget for financing assistance to military actors. Without a precise justification for the link between the proposed activities and EU development objectives, CBSD risks subordinating development policy to EU security goals.
One key problem of the debate over CBSD is a lack of clarity concerning the scope of the envisaged assistance measures. Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty regarding EU development policy forming the legal basis of the Commission’s proposal. Finally, civil society organisations fear that the proposed IcSP reform marks the beginning of a trend of shifting EU priorities from civilian to military instruments to address crises and violent conflicts.
The main challenge is to address these concerns and find a suitable, permanent arrangement for funding CBSD activities within the EU’s next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) between 2021 and 2027. In the short term, greater transparency of the envisaged CBSD activities and a substantive debate about their links to EU development policy objectives are needed. In the medium term, the EU should create a dedicated instrument that separates CBSD activities from funding for civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

Drought is one of the most damaging natural hazards. Various studies rank it first among all natural hazards by seriousness of impacts such as the loss of life and livelihoods, economic losses and the adverse social and ecosystem effects. In many instances, drought can be a major factor in local conflicts, as well as internal and international migration – these negative effects of drought often persist long after the precipitation returns to normal levels. The causes of droughts are essentially natural, but climate change increases the drought severity, frequency, duration, and spatial extent. The impacts of droughts are also strongly exacerbated by anthropological activities, such as deforestation, overgrazing, soil degradation, and water mismanagement. In turn, the consequences of these activities are also exacerbated by drought, which creates a vicious cycle of ecological degradation and human misery. A reactive approach to droughts is still prevalent in many countries, even though emergency funding is costly, less effective and does not address the long-term causes of vulnerability and lack of sustainability. There is an urgent need to move forward with a paradigm shift from “crisis” to “risk” management, adopting a proactive approach based on the principles of risk reduction and prevention. There is a whole set of effective measures that need to be implemented to increase resilience to drought and minimise its effects. Monitoring and early warning systems along with assessments of the hot spots of vulnerable populations and regions, as well as investments in risk-mitigating measures are the first line of defence. These actions need to become an integral part of national drought policies. Moreover, the full cyclical phenomenon of droughts should be at the core of the drought management plans to take full advantage of the drought preparedness measures. All “drought-relevant” sectors including agriculture, food security, the environment, meteorology, water, energy and tourism have to be included in the drought policy development process and preparedness plans. Integrated proactive drought policies should encapsulate the following aspects: ·     A strong and comprehensive institution is essential to enhance information-sharing, coordination, cooperation and knowledge-management among various levels of governments, sectors and society. ·     Drought risk management must be incorporated into both long-term development measures and humanitarian responses. ·     A combination of top-down (overall drought policy, institutional set-up, funding, modern knowledge) approaches supported by bottom-up (traditional knowledge, local production, livelihoods and decision systems) measures is needed to guarantee the maximum efficiency of implemented measures. ·     Drought early warning needs to be followed by early action based on reliability, transparency and trust. ·     Flexibility of funding (contingency planning) must become an integral part of development budget planning. ·     Drought policy implementation requires capacity-building at the local level to ensure effective inter­action between concerned parties. By implementing these approaches, we can use drought as a “connector” that strengthens collaboration among many sectors, levels and actors.

Drought is one of the most damaging natural hazards. Various studies rank it first among all natural hazards by seriousness of impacts such as the loss of life and livelihoods, economic losses and the adverse social and ecosystem effects. In many instances, drought can be a major factor in local conflicts, as well as internal and international migration – these negative effects of drought often persist long after the precipitation returns to normal levels. The causes of droughts are essentially natural, but climate change increases the drought severity, frequency, duration, and spatial extent. The impacts of droughts are also strongly exacerbated by anthropological activities, such as deforestation, overgrazing, soil degradation, and water mismanagement. In turn, the consequences of these activities are also exacerbated by drought, which creates a vicious cycle of ecological degradation and human misery. A reactive approach to droughts is still prevalent in many countries, even though emergency funding is costly, less effective and does not address the long-term causes of vulnerability and lack of sustainability. There is an urgent need to move forward with a paradigm shift from “crisis” to “risk” management, adopting a proactive approach based on the principles of risk reduction and prevention. There is a whole set of effective measures that need to be implemented to increase resilience to drought and minimise its effects. Monitoring and early warning systems along with assessments of the hot spots of vulnerable populations and regions, as well as investments in risk-mitigating measures are the first line of defence. These actions need to become an integral part of national drought policies. Moreover, the full cyclical phenomenon of droughts should be at the core of the drought management plans to take full advantage of the drought preparedness measures. All “drought-relevant” sectors including agriculture, food security, the environment, meteorology, water, energy and tourism have to be included in the drought policy development process and preparedness plans. Integrated proactive drought policies should encapsulate the following aspects: ·     A strong and comprehensive institution is essential to enhance information-sharing, coordination, cooperation and knowledge-management among various levels of governments, sectors and society. ·     Drought risk management must be incorporated into both long-term development measures and humanitarian responses. ·     A combination of top-down (overall drought policy, institutional set-up, funding, modern knowledge) approaches supported by bottom-up (traditional knowledge, local production, livelihoods and decision systems) measures is needed to guarantee the maximum efficiency of implemented measures. ·     Drought early warning needs to be followed by early action based on reliability, transparency and trust. ·     Flexibility of funding (contingency planning) must become an integral part of development budget planning. ·     Drought policy implementation requires capacity-building at the local level to ensure effective inter­action between concerned parties. By implementing these approaches, we can use drought as a “connector” that strengthens collaboration among many sectors, levels and actors.

Weather risk is an issue of extraordinary concern in the face of climate change, not least for rural agricultural households in developing countries. Governments and international donors currently promote ‘climate insurance’, financial mechanisms that make payouts following extreme weather events. Technologically innovative insurance programmes are heralded as promising strategies for decreasing poverty and improving resilience in countries that are heavily dependent on smallholder agriculture. New subsidies will amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, yet funders and advocates have thus far neglected the social and ecological ramifications of these policies. Reviews have focused largely on near-term economic effects and practical challenges. This briefing draws on an initial inventory of potential adverse effects of insurance programmes on local agricultural systems that we have recently assembled. Our review shows that farmers with insurance may alter their land-use strategies or their involvement in social networks previously used to mitigate climate risk. Both processes constitute crucial feedbacks on the environmental and the social systems respectively. Based on our study, we suggest preliminary principles for avoiding maladaptive outcomes, including recommenda­tions for designing appropriate impact studies and in­surance programmes. Before implementation, pilot projects should assess existing local risk-management strategies, financial instruments, and extant state agricultural and social protection policies. Participatory processes should be designed to anticipate and appraise potential effects of insurance – including those resulting from changing land use – and interactions with existing public policies. Several recommendations for improvements to the elabora­tion and design of future agricultural insurance programmes follow from our analysis: 1.         Evaluate priorities 2.         Encourage diversity 3.         Adapt policies 4.         Choose the right scale 5.         Limit coverage to extremes 6.         Tie insurance to ecologically sound strategies Current and future ‘climate insurance’ projects should be combined with consciously designed programmes to invest in and foster farmer-led learning on sustainable agricultural techniques. Policies linking insurance coverage and subsidies to diversified and ecologically sensitive cultivation may provide new frameworks for the design of insurance programmes in developing countries. This also requires rethinking the accepted wisdom on bundling insurance with inputs, which may make social-ecological systems and smallholders more fragile and vulnerable in the face of a changing climate.

Weather risk is an issue of extraordinary concern in the face of climate change, not least for rural agricultural households in developing countries. Governments and international donors currently promote ‘climate insurance’, financial mechanisms that make payouts following extreme weather events. Technologically innovative insurance programmes are heralded as promising strategies for decreasing poverty and improving resilience in countries that are heavily dependent on smallholder agriculture. New subsidies will amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, yet funders and advocates have thus far neglected the social and ecological ramifications of these policies. Reviews have focused largely on near-term economic effects and practical challenges. This briefing draws on an initial inventory of potential adverse effects of insurance programmes on local agricultural systems that we have recently assembled. Our review shows that farmers with insurance may alter their land-use strategies or their involvement in social networks previously used to mitigate climate risk. Both processes constitute crucial feedbacks on the environmental and the social systems respectively. Based on our study, we suggest preliminary principles for avoiding maladaptive outcomes, including recommenda­tions for designing appropriate impact studies and in­surance programmes. Before implementation, pilot projects should assess existing local risk-management strategies, financial instruments, and extant state agricultural and social protection policies. Participatory processes should be designed to anticipate and appraise potential effects of insurance – including those resulting from changing land use – and interactions with existing public policies. Several recommendations for improvements to the elabora­tion and design of future agricultural insurance programmes follow from our analysis: 1.         Evaluate priorities 2.         Encourage diversity 3.         Adapt policies 4.         Choose the right scale 5.         Limit coverage to extremes 6.         Tie insurance to ecologically sound strategies Current and future ‘climate insurance’ projects should be combined with consciously designed programmes to invest in and foster farmer-led learning on sustainable agricultural techniques. Policies linking insurance coverage and subsidies to diversified and ecologically sensitive cultivation may provide new frameworks for the design of insurance programmes in developing countries. This also requires rethinking the accepted wisdom on bundling insurance with inputs, which may make social-ecological systems and smallholders more fragile and vulnerable in the face of a changing climate.

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in the closing months of 2015 represented a significant moment in the global movement towards sustainability. There is enormous potential for co-benefits to arise from the mutually supportive implementation processes of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) elaborated in the 2030 Agenda and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) underpinning the legally binding Paris Agreement. Countries’ NDCs, their climate plans, include not only commitments to mitigate emissions but also address many other themes relevant to sustainable development. We present key findings of a fine-grained analysis of how climate activities in the NDCs contribute to SDGs and their targets. Under the provisions of the Paris Agreement, countries will submit an updated NDC every five years, the intention being that they scale-up their ambitions. The first full review (“global stocktake”) will occur in 2023, but an initial stocktaking exercise will take place in 2018 (“facilitative dialogue”). Implementation of the 2030 Agenda is based on national sustainable development (SD) strategies that vary from country to country. At the global level, Follow-Up and Review mechanisms take place during the annual High Level Political Forum (HLPF) at the United Nations in New York. As a rule, these two implementation processes are kept separate, despite the many existing thematic overlaps and the shared objective of achieving global SD, but our analysis emphasises that the climate activities in the NDCs can support the achievement of a multitude of SDGs and their targets. They not only cover themes relevant to SDG 13 but also many other important fields of sustainable development. NDC climate activities also underline the interlinked character of the SDGs. In fact, numerous NDC climate activities entail synergies that can promote several SDGs at once. To generate co-benefits, NDC and SDG implementation processes should be coordinated 1) to prevent duplication and thereby reduce the costs, and 2) to achieve a more systematic implementation of the 2030 Agenda at country level that utilises already committed activities in NDCs to leverage synergies between both agendas. Moving forward, the opportunity to connect the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda should be considered in order to promote policy coherence by maximising co-benefits and systematically mediating trade-offs for a more efficient implementation: -      In the context of the Paris Agreement, countries should use future NDC updates to more closely align their climate activities with the SDGs. -      In the context of the 2030 Agenda, SD strategies should meaningfully complement NDCs. -      Co-benefits have the potential to increase the motivation for countries to fulfil commitments, but trade-offs should be anticipated early on in order to implement both agendas more effectively.

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the conclusion of the Paris Agreement in the closing months of 2015 represented a significant moment in the global movement towards sustainability. There is enormous potential for co-benefits to arise from the mutually supportive implementation processes of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) elaborated in the 2030 Agenda and the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) underpinning the legally binding Paris Agreement. Countries’ NDCs, their climate plans, include not only commitments to mitigate emissions but also address many other themes relevant to sustainable development. We present key findings of a fine-grained analysis of how climate activities in the NDCs contribute to SDGs and their targets. Under the provisions of the Paris Agreement, countries will submit an updated NDC every five years, the intention being that they scale-up their ambitions. The first full review (“global stocktake”) will occur in 2023, but an initial stocktaking exercise will take place in 2018 (“facilitative dialogue”). Implementation of the 2030 Agenda is based on national sustainable development (SD) strategies that vary from country to country. At the global level, Follow-Up and Review mechanisms take place during the annual High Level Political Forum (HLPF) at the United Nations in New York. As a rule, these two implementation processes are kept separate, despite the many existing thematic overlaps and the shared objective of achieving global SD, but our analysis emphasises that the climate activities in the NDCs can support the achievement of a multitude of SDGs and their targets. They not only cover themes relevant to SDG 13 but also many other important fields of sustainable development. NDC climate activities also underline the interlinked character of the SDGs. In fact, numerous NDC climate activities entail synergies that can promote several SDGs at once. To generate co-benefits, NDC and SDG implementation processes should be coordinated 1) to prevent duplication and thereby reduce the costs, and 2) to achieve a more systematic implementation of the 2030 Agenda at country level that utilises already committed activities in NDCs to leverage synergies between both agendas. Moving forward, the opportunity to connect the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda should be considered in order to promote policy coherence by maximising co-benefits and systematically mediating trade-offs for a more efficient implementation: -      In the context of the Paris Agreement, countries should use future NDC updates to more closely align their climate activities with the SDGs. -      In the context of the 2030 Agenda, SD strategies should meaningfully complement NDCs. -      Co-benefits have the potential to increase the motivation for countries to fulfil commitments, but trade-offs should be anticipated early on in order to implement both agendas more effectively.

Many view development co-operation as a key to reducing irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa. However, critics note that increased socio-economic development is likely to lead to more, rather than less, migration. Historical and cross-country comparison studies have shown that emigration initially increases when economic growth and rising income levels enable countries to emerge from the status of a low-income country. Only when the status of upper middle-income country has been achieved can a decrease in international migration be anticipated. Known as a “migration hump”, this correlation between development and migration also applies for sub-Saharan Africa. However, it cannot be explained solely by rising incomes and increased education. It is also driven by other factors, including demographic transition, changes in economic structures, emulation effects in migration processes, rising inequality, credit restrictions and the lowering of migration barriers.
The implication that positive socio-economic development in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa would inexorably lead to an increase in irregular migration to Europe is therefore an oversimplification. Irregular migration in particular is not driven by economic motives alone. Instead this is an example of so-called “mixed migration”, in which the drivers of voluntary and forced migration blend together. Factors such as corruption, weak rule of law, human rights infringements and fragile statehood are key drivers here.
Development co-operation cannot hinder migration, due also to the fact that Africa’s development is not solely dependent on it. Instead, development policy co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa should focus on promoting orderly, safe and legal migration, which in turn offers positive development potential while working to prevent forced and irregular migration. Specific development policy measures should therefore include:

• Migration processes influenced by development policy: The opportunities for regular migration to Germany and Europe need to be expanded and ac¬companied (for example via qualification measures).
• Support for intraregional migration: The efforts of the African regional organisations to control intraregional migration – which constitutes a large portion of migration movements – should be supported.
• Prevention of brain drain: The emigration of skilled personnel required in the countries of origin should be managed via targeted investment in training partnerships in specific sectors.
• Promotion of good governance, democracy and rule of law: Development policy measures in this area can make a key contribution to reducing human rights violations, and therefore decrease drivers of flight and forced displacement.

Many view development co-operation as a key to reducing irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa. However, critics note that increased socio-economic development is likely to lead to more, rather than less, migration. Historical and cross-country comparison studies have shown that emigration initially increases when economic growth and rising income levels enable countries to emerge from the status of a low-income country. Only when the status of upper middle-income country has been achieved can a decrease in international migration be anticipated. Known as a “migration hump”, this correlation between development and migration also applies for sub-Saharan Africa. However, it cannot be explained solely by rising incomes and increased education. It is also driven by other factors, including demographic transition, changes in economic structures, emulation effects in migration processes, rising inequality, credit restrictions and the lowering of migration barriers.
The implication that positive socio-economic development in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa would inexorably lead to an increase in irregular migration to Europe is therefore an oversimplification. Irregular migration in particular is not driven by economic motives alone. Instead this is an example of so-called “mixed migration”, in which the drivers of voluntary and forced migration blend together. Factors such as corruption, weak rule of law, human rights infringements and fragile statehood are key drivers here.
Development co-operation cannot hinder migration, due also to the fact that Africa’s development is not solely dependent on it. Instead, development policy co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa should focus on promoting orderly, safe and legal migration, which in turn offers positive development potential while working to prevent forced and irregular migration. Specific development policy measures should therefore include:

• Migration processes influenced by development policy: The opportunities for regular migration to Germany and Europe need to be expanded and ac¬companied (for example via qualification measures).
• Support for intraregional migration: The efforts of the African regional organisations to control intraregional migration – which constitutes a large portion of migration movements – should be supported.
• Prevention of brain drain: The emigration of skilled personnel required in the countries of origin should be managed via targeted investment in training partnerships in specific sectors.
• Promotion of good governance, democracy and rule of law: Development policy measures in this area can make a key contribution to reducing human rights violations, and therefore decrease drivers of flight and forced displacement.

Aid allocation is typically country-based, i.e. focusing first on how to distribute Official Development Assistance (ODA) across countries. Donors consider the needs of developing countries as well as their own interests before deciding which country should receive how much assistance. Subsequently, donor and partner governments choose the thematic areas or sectors of cooperation, such as health, education, the environment, or food security.
As an alternative approach, thematic allocation has gained increasing relevance. This form of allocation earmarks funds for specific issues prior to the selection of partner countries. The special initiatives of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the United States (US) presidential initiatives for health and food security are prominent examples.
The process of aid allocation is crucial for the effective use of scarce public funds. Global changes raise the question to what extent funds should continue to be allocated in a primarily country-based manner or whether a thematic approach is more useful. Historically, development cooperation has evolved as a policy to support poor countries. However, these countries now vary greatly in their development (fragile states, graduated countries, etc.). The North-South logic underlying the term “develop¬ing country” is inconsistent with the universal 2030 Agenda. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are organised thematically. Many challenges require cross-border solutions (e.g. climate, health, migration).
Thematic allocation aligns development cooperation with international challenges. Experience thus far shows both benefits and risks. Thematic allocation can mobilise funding for key issues, bundle resources and raise the visibility of aid. It enables cross-border cooperation, offers room for innovations and is more flexible. Yet, a number of initiatives bypass local capacities and the institutions of partner countries more frequently than country-based allocation does. In other cases, uncoordinated parallel structures arise, which do not take sufficient account of ongoing activities.
Thematic allocation is likely to become more important as part of the global effort to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Donors should therefore systematically examine to what extent they want to use thematic allocation in the future. A rigorous assessment can help to better utilise benefits and minimise risks.
The key challenge is to make effective use of the more flexible cooperation framework offered by thematic allo¬cation. To this end, donors should sharpen their thematic profiles and select issues according to their comparative advantages. Donors also require adequate organisational structures to be able to coordinate all relevant actors in a given issue area, both internally (e.g. through whole-of-government approaches) and externally working together with a broad range of partners. Ultimately, donors should further strengthen the role of partner countries in thematic programmes and initiatives to ensure that a shift of perspective from countries to themes does not come at the expense of country ownership.

Aid allocation is typically country-based, i.e. focusing first on how to distribute Official Development Assistance (ODA) across countries. Donors consider the needs of developing countries as well as their own interests before deciding which country should receive how much assistance. Subsequently, donor and partner governments choose the thematic areas or sectors of cooperation, such as health, education, the environment, or food security.
As an alternative approach, thematic allocation has gained increasing relevance. This form of allocation earmarks funds for specific issues prior to the selection of partner countries. The special initiatives of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the United States (US) presidential initiatives for health and food security are prominent examples.
The process of aid allocation is crucial for the effective use of scarce public funds. Global changes raise the question to what extent funds should continue to be allocated in a primarily country-based manner or whether a thematic approach is more useful. Historically, development cooperation has evolved as a policy to support poor countries. However, these countries now vary greatly in their development (fragile states, graduated countries, etc.). The North-South logic underlying the term “develop¬ing country” is inconsistent with the universal 2030 Agenda. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are organised thematically. Many challenges require cross-border solutions (e.g. climate, health, migration).
Thematic allocation aligns development cooperation with international challenges. Experience thus far shows both benefits and risks. Thematic allocation can mobilise funding for key issues, bundle resources and raise the visibility of aid. It enables cross-border cooperation, offers room for innovations and is more flexible. Yet, a number of initiatives bypass local capacities and the institutions of partner countries more frequently than country-based allocation does. In other cases, uncoordinated parallel structures arise, which do not take sufficient account of ongoing activities.
Thematic allocation is likely to become more important as part of the global effort to achieve the 2030 Agenda. Donors should therefore systematically examine to what extent they want to use thematic allocation in the future. A rigorous assessment can help to better utilise benefits and minimise risks.
The key challenge is to make effective use of the more flexible cooperation framework offered by thematic allo¬cation. To this end, donors should sharpen their thematic profiles and select issues according to their comparative advantages. Donors also require adequate organisational structures to be able to coordinate all relevant actors in a given issue area, both internally (e.g. through whole-of-government approaches) and externally working together with a broad range of partners. Ultimately, donors should further strengthen the role of partner countries in thematic programmes and initiatives to ensure that a shift of perspective from countries to themes does not come at the expense of country ownership.

Increasing global access to digital technologies is creating opportunities and challenges for donors and the humanitarian agencies with which they work to support people fleeing from war, massive human rights abuses and other emergencies. Digital tools make it easier for refugees to reach out to each other and humanitarian agencies, and can support greater efficiency in institutional efforts to provide essentials like medicine, food and money.
However, the effective use of digital tools to support refugee processes comes with a set of challenges. The key question for donors is: What are the existing approaches to digitalisation in refugee response, and the lessons learned, that donors can use to inform how they support digitalisation in refugee processes? To address this question, there are three things donors should focus on when developing a digital strategy for supporting refugees:

• Donors must avoid the problem of “technology looking for a problem to solve”; knowing how refugee communities already use digital tools is the best way to avoid this. Generally, refugees themselves will have found innovative ways to meet their information needs, and donors can provide financial and technical assistance to support access to the existing technologies.
• Building digital tools from scratch is an option when there is no existing tool available to meet the needs of refugees or workers in the field. Custom tools are often best deployed at the organisational level for managing information or resources. Donors should look to innovation and technology hubs, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Innovation Service, to organise partnerships between United Nations (UN) agencies, refugee-focused NGOs and technology firms.
• Donors must be realistic about what to expect from a digital solution. Technology can be useful, but it is not a silver bullet for solving every information management challenge. Ethics and safety issues must be central in the design of any digital intervention. Donors must take responsibility in making sure the partners they work with can meet the data protection and privacy standards outlined by the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) handbook on digital data protection.

This policy brief provides a review of how refugees use digital tools, gives examples from organisations deploying digital technologies in the field, and discusses the effectiveness of and the ethical issues surrounding the use of digital technologies to support refugees. By putting the needs of refugees at the centre of their digital strategies and working with implementing organisations, such as UNHCR and Mercy Corps, to develop technology solutions that meet the needs of refugees and field staff safely and ethically, donors can get the most out of digital tools for supporting refugees.

Increasing global access to digital technologies is creating opportunities and challenges for donors and the humanitarian agencies with which they work to support people fleeing from war, massive human rights abuses and other emergencies. Digital tools make it easier for refugees to reach out to each other and humanitarian agencies, and can support greater efficiency in institutional efforts to provide essentials like medicine, food and money.
However, the effective use of digital tools to support refugee processes comes with a set of challenges. The key question for donors is: What are the existing approaches to digitalisation in refugee response, and the lessons learned, that donors can use to inform how they support digitalisation in refugee processes? To address this question, there are three things donors should focus on when developing a digital strategy for supporting refugees:

• Donors must avoid the problem of “technology looking for a problem to solve”; knowing how refugee communities already use digital tools is the best way to avoid this. Generally, refugees themselves will have found innovative ways to meet their information needs, and donors can provide financial and technical assistance to support access to the existing technologies.
• Building digital tools from scratch is an option when there is no existing tool available to meet the needs of refugees or workers in the field. Custom tools are often best deployed at the organisational level for managing information or resources. Donors should look to innovation and technology hubs, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Innovation Service, to organise partnerships between United Nations (UN) agencies, refugee-focused NGOs and technology firms.
• Donors must be realistic about what to expect from a digital solution. Technology can be useful, but it is not a silver bullet for solving every information management challenge. Ethics and safety issues must be central in the design of any digital intervention. Donors must take responsibility in making sure the partners they work with can meet the data protection and privacy standards outlined by the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) handbook on digital data protection.

This policy brief provides a review of how refugees use digital tools, gives examples from organisations deploying digital technologies in the field, and discusses the effectiveness of and the ethical issues surrounding the use of digital technologies to support refugees. By putting the needs of refugees at the centre of their digital strategies and working with implementing organisations, such as UNHCR and Mercy Corps, to develop technology solutions that meet the needs of refugees and field staff safely and ethically, donors can get the most out of digital tools for supporting refugees.

Embora na maior parte dos países em desenvolvimento o potencial de receitas ao nível subnacional seja modesto, existem bons motivos para os doadores e os parceiros de desenvolvimento prosseguirem e intensificarem os seus esforços neste setor. Por um lado, as receitas obtidas localmente, apesar de insignificantes quando comparadas com as receitas obtidas a nível nacional, podem fazer uma grande diferença para a margem orçamental disponível para os municípios. Por outro lado, para além da disponibilidade de mais recursos financeiros, prevê-se que uma mobilização mais forte de receitas locais venha acompanhada de «dividendos de governação».
Consequentemente, a mobilização de receitas a nível local constitui um importante tópico para desenvolvimento, não apenas de um ponto de vista fiscal, mas também de uma perspetiva de governação mais lata. Por conseguinte, uma mobilização de receitas mais forte não deve ser apenas vista como um fim em si mesmo, mas também como um meio para promover a boa governação.
Defendemos que a fim de se desbloquearem estes eventuais efeitos positivos, os doadores e os parceiros de desenvolvimento precisam de entender melhor os efeitos que os determinantes sociopolíticos e administrativos têm na mobilização das receitas municipais.
Neste documento, sintetizamos as informações obtidas num estudo sobre como as variáveis administrativas e sociopolíticas a nível local afetam os resultados das receitas dos municípios moçambicanos. Por conseguinte, contribuímos para uma literatura em evolução salientando a relevância dos fatores locais na explicação da mobilização das receitas locais.
Os resultados mostram que, em primeiro lugar, as fragilidades administrativas conduzem a uma forte dependência de determinados instrumentos de receitas fáceis de implementar que não são necessariamente aqueles com maior potencial de receitas. Além disso, os resultados salientam a natureza sistémica do processo de cobrança de receitas: a falha ou falta de capacidade relativamente a um único passo afeta profundamente a eficácia e eficiência de todo o sistema de cobrança de receitas.
Em segundo lugar, os governos municipais que estão politicamente alinhados com o partido que governa a nível nacional mostram menos esforços para aumentar os resultados das receitas do que os governos não alinhados. Isso mostra de que modo as variáveis políticas a nível local, sobretudo na interação com outros níveis de go¬verno, podem afetar profundamente os incentivos para os municípios explorarem o seu potencial de receitas.
Em terceiro lugar, no contexto de uma sociedade civil, em geral, frágil, as variações marginais na força organizacional não parecem afetar o comportamento fiscal dos governos locais. No mesmo sentido, consideramos que a sociedade civil a nível local em Moçambique carece das capacidades para moldar e influenciar a mobilização de receitas de uma forma significativa, mesmo quando têm apoio de doadores.
Estes resultados têm implicações profundas para os doadores e parceiros de desenvolvimento. Não se considerar os efeitos sociopolíticos e os fatores administrativos nos resultados das receitas limita fortemente a capacidade de os doadores anteciparem a eficácia prospetiva das políticas e medidas destinadas a aumentar a mobilização local de receitas. Neste sentido, os profissionais precisam de alargar a sua abordagem à mobilização de receitas municipais e considerar mais siste¬maticamente o modo como as variáveis sociopolíticas e administrativas moldam as perspetivas de impactos mais fortes a alcançar.