Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik / Briefing Paper

Dans de nombreuses régions (semi)arides, les femmes rurales sont au coeur des dynamiques liées à l’eau – et par conséquent très affectées par la pénurie. Celle-ci affecte leur quotidien, leurs activités agricoles, leurs initiatives économiques et leurs réseaux de solidarité qui dépendent directement de la disponibilité de la ressource. Ces femmes sont souvent à la fois plus vulnérables aux changements climatiques à cause d’un accès parfois difficile aux services publics, à la terre, à l’eau et aux institutions. En même temps, ces femmes jouent un rôle central pour le développement rural des oasis, notamment à travers leur savoir-faire, leurs initiatives et leur capacités d’adaptation.
Ce Policy Brief analyse les expériences des femmes dans les oasis du Sud-Est marocain. Il montre que le stress hydrique agit comme un facteur multidimensionnel qui redéfinit les tâches domestiques, les pratiques agricoles, les opportunités économiques et les formes de sociabilité des femmes, ainsi que leur contribution au développement. Il signale trois défis majeurs des femmes en zones rurales vulnérables : (a) un accès limité aux ressources (terre, crédit, infrastructures, éducation) ; (b) des formations inadaptées aux réalités rurales et aux besoins; et (c) des normes sociales freinant leur présence dans les espaces de décision. L’hétérogénéité des femmes rencontrées et de leurs besoins souligne le besoin d’approches ciblées et diverses.
L’exemple marocain montre également l’importance de considérer l’eau dans toutes ses dimensions : domestique, agricole, économique et institutionnelle. Ceci permettrait de mieux comprendre à la fois la vulnérabilité des femmes, et leur contribution au développement durable. Les enseignements tirés des oasis marocaines
offrent ainsi un repère pour d’autres pays (semi-) arides, en soulignant quatre leviers d’action pour les institutions marocaines et les politiques de développement :
1. Produire et diffuser des données genrées
• Collecter des informations désagrégées par sexe, âge, statut socio-économique et autres.
• Cartographier les vulnérabilités, les ressources et les compétences des femmes
• Assurer une meilleure circulation de ces données entre terrain et décideurs pour un soutien adapté.
2. Soutenir l’accès des femmes aux services publics, à la terre et aux crédits
• Promouvoir l’accès aux services de santé et d’éducation suivant les besoins spécifiques ainsi que l’accès aux crédits et à la terre
3. Soutenir les initiatives féminines
• Appuyer les initiatives collectives et individuelles par des formations adaptées, un accès au financement et à la valorisation, et la commercialisation des produits.
4. Accompagner le changement des normes sociales et la représentation institutionnelle
• Intégrer les dimensions culturelles et sociales dans les politiques et programmes de développement.
• Promouvoir une évolution des représentations sociales sur les rôles et capacités des femmes
• Valoriser la diversité des initiatives féminines et faciliter la participation des femmes dans les instances de gouvernance y compris de l’eau par des formations et sensibilisations.

Hind Ftouhi est chercheure senior à l’Institut National d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek est chercheure senior au Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi est doctorante à l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock, Casablanca.

In many arid and semi-arid regions, rural women are at the heart of water-related dynamics – and therefore greatly affected by its scarcity. This scarcity affects their daily lives, farming activities, economic initiatives and solidarity networks, which are directly dependent on the availability of this resource. These women are often more vulnerable to climate change because of the difficulties they sometimes experience in accessing public services, land, water and institutions. At the same time, they play a central role in the rural development of the oases, in particular through their know-how, initiatives and ability to adapt. This policy brief analyses the experiences of women in the oases of south-eastern Morocco. It shows that water stress acts as a multidimensional factor which redefines women’s domestic tasks, agricultural practices, economic opportunities and forms of sociability, as well as their contribution to development. It highlights three major challenges facing women in vulnerable rural areas: (a) limited access to resources (land, credit, infrastructure and education); (b) training that is often ill-suited to rural realities and their needs; and (c) social norms that restrict their participation in decision-making bodies and spaces. The heterogeneity of the women encountered and of their needs underlines the necessity for targeted and diverse approaches. The example of Moroccan oases also shows the importance of considering water in all its dimensions: domestic, agricultural, economic and institutional. This would provide a better understanding of both women’s vulnerabilities and their contributions to sustainable development. The lessons learnt from the Moroccan oases provide a benchmark for other arid countries, highlighting four action areas for Moroccan institutions and development policies:
1. Produce and disseminate gendered data
• Collect information disaggregated by gender, age, socio-economic status and other factors.
• Map women’s vulnerabilities, resources and skills.
• Ensure better circulation of these data between the field and decision-makers to provide appropriate support.
2. Support women’s access to public services, land and credit
• Promote access to health and education services according to specific needs, as well as access to credit and land.
3. Support women’s initiatives
• Support collective and individual initiatives through appropriate training, access to finance, and product development and marketing.
4. Support changes in social norms and institutional representation
• Integrate the cultural and social dimensions into development policies and programmes.
• Promote changes in the social representations of women’s roles and abilities.
• Promote the diversity of women’s initiatives and facilitate the participation of women in governance institutions, including water governance, through training and awareness-raising.

Hind Ftouhi is a senior researcher at the Institut National d’Aménagement et d'Urbanisme (INAU-Rabat).
Lisa Bossenbroek is a senior researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur les Sociétés Contemporaines (CRESC-Rabat).
Amal Belghazi is a doctoral student at l’Université Hassan II, Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines et sociales Ain Chock in Casablanca.

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.

Climate and biodiversity are inseparable, yet global action to address them remains divided. As countries and non-state actors ramp up pledges, analysis and monitoring often lack one essential ingredient: knowing where implementation actually happens. Without spatial data, we cannot see progress, verify impact, or ensure fair outcomes. This commentary, addressing policymakers at UNFCCC COP30 and beyond, urges that climate and biodiversity tracking be rooted in place.

Violent conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has resulted in population displacement, psychological trauma, and the destruction of livelihoods, which has hindered economic growth. These events have increased in frequency and severity over time in the region. Violent conflict disrupts children’s human capital accumulation through widespread malnutrition and the disruption of social and emotional skills that should have been acquired in early childhood. This study aims to estimate the relationship between early-life exposure to violent conflict and children’s human capital formation (focusing on child health, nutrition, and schooling) in four selected SSA countries since 2003. Using nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) merged with georeferenced conflict data, the study finds that children exposed to violent conflict, measured by the number of fatalities, experience reduced human capital formation, including stunted growth, underweight status, and lower educational outcomes. Specifically, children in households exposed to violent conflict have higher dropout rates (given their enrollment) and experience delays in completing primary school. Furthermore, the impact of conflict on long-term malnutrition is particularly pronounced among young children and those living in rural areas. Limited access to health facilities during or after conflict, disruptions in livelihoods and/or markets that result in deprivations in the dietary intake of children and mothers, and the place of residence appear to be the underlying mechanisms.

Bonn, 24. November 2025. Zivilgesellschaft ist kein Allheilmittel gegen Autokratisierung. Sie kann jedoch Rechtsverletzungen offenlegen und zu Pluralismus beitragen – daher verdient sie gezielte Förderung.

Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen stehen weltweit unter Druck – und das von mehreren Seiten. Der weltweite Trend der Autokratisierung schränkt den Raum für die Zivilgesellschaft ein. Gleichzeitig brechen vielen Organisationen die Finanzierungsquellen weg. Zu den Verlusten durch die Abwicklung der United States Agency for International Development (USAID) kommen Kürzungen bei anderen Gebern wie Großbritannien und den skandinavischen Ländern. Zudem steht die organisierte Zivilgesellschaft in Form von Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) seit langem in der Kritik, nicht demokratisch legitimiert zu sein und im Globalen Süden oft die Agenden westlicher Geber zu implementieren.

Auf deutscher Seite werfen die Kürzungen im Haushalt des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) die Frage nach einer Ausgabenpriorisierung auf. Trotz vieler Herausforderungen sollte die Zivilgesellschaftsförderung nicht heruntergefahren, sondern vielmehr gezielt zum Schutz der Demokratie eingesetzt werden. Denn eine starke Zivilgesellschaft kann durchaus wichtige Beiträge im Kampf gegen Autokratisierung leisten.

Seit den 1990er Jahren wurden zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen von westlichen Gebern oft idealisiert. Dabei kam es vielfach zu einer Gleichsetzung von Zivilgesellschaft und NGOs, welche nicht nur in der Demokratieförderung, sondern auch bei der Erbringung sozialer Dienstleistungen als eine Art Allheilmittel („magic bullet“) angesehen wurden. Sie galten als besonders bevölkerungsnah und kosteneffektiv.

Diese Zeiten sind vorbei. NGOs werden nicht nur von autoritären Regierungen immer weiter eingeschränkt, sondern auch kritische Stimmen aus den eigenen Reihen zweifeln an ihrer Effektivität. Wo sie als Demokratieförderer auftreten, regt sich Kritik an ihrer demokratischen Legitimation. Zudem werfen Kritiker*innen aus dem Globalen Süden NGOs vor, vorrangig Geberagenden zu implementieren. NGOs können auch neue Hierarchien schaffen, indem sie „für“ marginalisierte Gruppen sprechen – anstatt diese zu befähigen, für sich selbst zu sprechen.

Klar ist: Professionelle NGOs im Globalen Süden sind selten Mitgliederorganisationen und sind nicht demokratisch gewählt. Demokratische Parteien können sie nicht ersetzen. Ihre Stärke liegt aber darin, einzelne Themen („issues“) auf die politische Agenda zu setzen. Was sie wirklich können, ist, in den Sektoren, in denen sie Expertise haben, den Finger in die Wunde zu legen.

Durch Advocacy, Lobbyarbeit und Recherche bringen NGOs Menschenrechtsverletzungen und andere Probleme wie Umweltverschmutzung an die Öffentlichkeit. Damit leisten sie wichtige Beiträge zur politischen Meinungsbildung und erhöhen die Transparenz und Rechenschaftspflicht der Regierung. In einigen Ländern wie Malawi oder im Senegal trug die Mobilisierung durch NGOs dazu bei, die Aufhebung von Amtszeitbeschränkungen zu verhindern.

Wo Oppositionsparteien verboten oder eingeschränkt werden, leisten NGOs einen begrenzten aber wichtigen Beitrag zu politischem Pluralismus. So zählen im autoritären Einparteienregime Kambodschas die Workshops von NGOs mittlerweile zu den wenigen verbliebenen Räumen, in denen Bürger*innen kritische Ansichten diskutieren können.

Gleichzeitig gilt es, den Blick auf Zivilgesellschaft zu weiten. Jüngst waren es die Proteste der jungen Generation (GenZ), die in Ländern wie Madagaskar, Kenia und Bangladesch, autokratische oder korrupte Regime herausfordern. Soziale Bewegungen, Gewerkschaften und religiöse Vereinigungen entfalten oft hohen Reformdruck. Nicht immer sprechen diese Akteure – im wörtlichen wie im übertragenen Sinne – die Sprache der Geber. Doch setzen sie autoritären Regierungen oft mehr entgegen und sind stärker in der Bevölkerung verwurzelt als professionalisierte NGOs.

Daher sollten die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und andere Geber die Förderung von Zivilgesellschaft fortsetzen und die nötigen Mittel bereitstellen. Gerade in Zeiten knapper Kassen sollte genau geprüft werden, welche Ziele mit der Förderung erreicht werden sollen. Vorrangig förderungswürdig sind Organisationen, die Regierungen zur Rechenschaft ziehen und sich für Menschenrechte, Transparenz und Pluralismus einsetzen. Realismus hinsichtlich der Leistungen von NGOs ist angebracht. Doch wo sie zum Schutz der Demokratie in den Partnerländern beitragen, sollte die deutsche Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik dies fördern. Zudem gilt es, auch anderen Akteuren der Zivilgesellschaft, die wichtige demokratische Beiträge leisten – wie sozialen Bewegungen, Gewerkschaften und informellen Gruppen – bessere Zugänge zu Förderung und politischer Unterstützung zu eröffnen.

Global development policy is going through an upheaval following the cuts in ODA (Official Development Assistance) by leading donors and the knock-on effects of US withdrawal from international institutions and its own pivot to national interests. The longstanding policy norms such as framing development as a shared global endeavour, combining moral and strategic redistribution and favouring multilateral coordination are eroding.

As the 7th AU-EU Summit convenes in Luanda, marking 25 years of partnership, the AU-EU relationship faces a critical juncture. This Policy Brief, “From Cairo to Luanda: A 25-Year Parliamentary Stocktake of AU-EU Relations” argues that the partnership must evolve from symbolic engagement toward a genuinely equitable relationship. The brief examines persistent challenges and opportunities across four areas: geopolitical shifts and the pursuit of a partnership of equals; reframing peace and security cooperation around equity and conflict prevention; ensuring the Global Gateway fosters local prosperity, particularly in Critical Raw Materials; and addressing human capital, mobility, and debt as interconnected priorities. It underscores the essential role of the Pan-African and European Parliaments in translating high-level commitments into tangible benefits for citizens.

Along the southern coast of India, hard protective infrastructure has become the default response to increasingly frequent cyclones and severe coastal erosion. However, such interventions not only intensify erosion by disrupting sand movement, but also obscure its root causes, which are often contested through diverging narratives and knowledge claims about the sand and the sea. Making use of the burgeoning literature on ‘geosociality’ and ‘situated knowledges’, this paper interrogates how knowledge about coastal dynamics is produced, legitimised and contested in shaping these protective measures. Drawing on multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork, including interviews and participant observation among ocean engineers, policymakers and artisanal fishers, we unravel the diverging and oftentimes contested epistemologies that shape how uncertain coastal futures are navigated. By examining the social entanglements with geomorphic processes such as sand movement and erosion, we show how different forms of knowledge adapt to the unpredictability of the sea, yet with uneven socio-spatial consequences, particularly for artisanal fishers. We argue that coastal protection practices are embedded in epistemic hierarchies that prioritise technical expertise and predictive science, rendering fishers' situated knowledges less legitimate in decision-making. By situating both livelihood practices and scientific modelling within their social and epistemic contexts, we demonstrate how confronting uncertainty can challenge power asymmetries that shape knowledge production. Rather than defaming engineering knowledge, we call for complementary approaches that recognise uncertainty, complexity and the value of co-produced knowledge. Situating fishers' knowledges alongside modelling practices provides openings for re-politicising adaptation and rethinking whose expertise counts in shaping coastal futures.

Am IDOS setzen wir uns für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung unseres Unternehmens ein – ökologisch, sozial und ökonomisch – und tragen durch Forschung, Beratung und Ausbildung zu nachhaltigen Transformationen weltweit bei. Dabei verstehen wir Nachhaltigkeit nicht als einmaliges Ziel, sondern als einen fortlaufenden Prozess, den wir mit Verantwortung und Weitblick gestalten wollen. Nachhaltiges Handeln im betrieblichen Alltag ist für uns eine Selbstverpflichtung, die wir mit Überzeugung und Kontinuität verfolgen. Unser Anspruch ist es, heute so zu handeln, dass auch morgen noch gute Arbeitsbedingungen und ein verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit natürlichen Ressourcen möglich sind. Mit dem vorliegenden Bericht legen wir erstmals eine Bilanz unserer Treibhausgasemissionen für den Zeitraum 2022 bis 2023 vor.

The global development architecture is under the spotlight. This refers to the broad architecture of actors, norms, instruments and institutions that mobilise and coordinate resources, knowledge and political support for development goals. Within this system, Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a core financial instrument, primarily provided by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) DAC (Development Assistance Committee) members. It functions alongside other modalities such as South–South cooperation, climate finance, philanthropic aid and private-sector engagement.

We argue that following the rise of new partners such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya’s problem is no longer access to finance, but rather the governance of finance. In other words, the question is not simply how much money the country can borrow or from whom, but whether its institutions are capable of turning loans into productive investments rather than patronage networks. As the debt burden mounts, Kenya’s ability to prevent growing options for economic partnerships from undermining domestic accountability will determine whether its infrastructure boom becomes a foundation for long-term development or a monument to short-term political ambition.

This research explores how epistemological dissonance shapes agrarian sustainabilities in Mbeya, Tanzania. Through a case study of smallholder farmers navigating both market-driven and eco-cultural paradigms of sustainability, the research explores how plural epistemologies shape local sensemaking and agricultural decision-making. It demonstrates how farmers reconcile divergent sustainability logics, those rooted in market interpretations of sustainability with those rooted in relational ethics, ecological stewardship, and cultural continuity within agrarian landscapes. Employing hybrid strategies, farmers compartmentalize production, input intensive, market-targeting monocultures co-exist alongside primarily subsistence agroecological systems. These spatial divisions mirror deeper ontological tensions, as farmers articulate pride in market breakthroughs while expressing anxiety about environmental degradation, cultural erosion, and the loss of intergenerational practices. Building on plural sustainabilities literature and epistemologies of the South theories, the paper adds to scholarship reinterpreting sustainability not as a universal, singular paradigm, but a contested, contextually negotiated process. The case of Mbeya illustrates how epistemological dissonance becomes embodied through emotional and cognitive labor, and how hybrid sensemaking enables farmers to navigate conflicting knowledge systems. Rather than viewing hybridity as incoherence, the paper interprets these strategies as acts of situated resilience, adaptation, and resistance. The analysis contributes to political ecology and sustainability studies by foregrounding the ontological multiplicity at play in agrarian transitions and calls for institutional recognition of knowledge pluralism. Ultimately, the paper proposes a shift toward pluriversal sustainability frameworks that integrate both empirical and relational epistemologies, acknowledging that sustainable futures are as much about values and worldviews as they are about technologies and yields.

The European Think Tanks Group and the German Institute for Development and Sustainability (IDOS) teamed up with the Istanbul Policy Center to organise a public seminar and a closed-door workshop to explore how three key actors – Turkey, the European Union and China – are responding to the above trends and changes. Comparing their current policies, agendas, and past practices provided a means to explore whether their approaches to international cooperation, particularly in the context of their engagements with the Global South, are converging (or diverging) during today’s turbulent times, and to determine the scope and relevance of further comparative research. This blog post highlights some key points of what was discussed and links them to current academic and policy debates.

Despite the potential of renewable hydrogen to galvanize economies and climate action, governments and development banks often lack a coherent framework to assess and approve hydrogen projects on sustainability grounds. Decision-making processes regarding land allocation, permitting and infrastructure access remain fragmented, increasing the risof extractive investment models that provide limited local benefits while causing environmental harm. Transparent, universally accepted sustainability guidelines can help decision makers select project partners that align with their respective priorities and objectives, including the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, such a framework can enhance investor confidence and public trust by ensuring that hydrogen projects deliver tangible socioeconomic benefits to host communities. Recognizing this need, a broad coalition of stakeholders has collaborate to develop the Guidelines for Sustainable Hydrogen Projects, integrating expertise from multiple disciplines to create a flexible yet comprehensive decision-making tool. The Guidelines serve as a reference for governments, development banks and other stakeholders in evaluating hydrogen project proposals. Rather than prescribing rigid requirements, they provide a non-exhaustive set of criteria that can be adapted to local contexts. The Guidelines emphasize maximizing domestic value creation while safeguarding environmental and social standards. Applicable to large-scale projects with a minimum capacity of 200 megawatts (MW) - including renewable electricity generation, water desalination, electrolysis, and related infrastructure - they help ensure that hydrogen investments contribute to long-term sustainable development. By aligning with the SDGs, they promote inclusive economic growth, responsible resource management and climate action.

Technological change, an overwhelming fact in recent socioeconomic history, involves, as Joseph A. Schumpeter famously put it, “creative destruction” on a large scale: it gives rise to new goods, production methods, firms, organisations, and jobs, while rendering some received ones obsolete. Its impact extends beyond the economy and affects society, culture, politics, and the mind-set of people. While it allows solving certain problems, it causes new ones, inducing further technological change. Against this background, the paper attempts to provide a detailed, yet concise exploration of the historical evolution and measurement of technological change in economics. It touches upon various questions that have been raised since Adam Smith and by economic and social theorists after him until today living through several waves of new technologies. These questions include: (1) Which concepts and theories did the leading authors elaborate to describe and analyse the various forms of technological progress they observed? (2) Did they think that different forms of technological progress requested the elaboration of different concepts and theories – horses for courses, so to speak? (3) How do different forms of technological progress affect and are shaped by various strata and classes of society? Issues such as these have become particularly crucial in the context of the digitisation of the economy and the widespread use of AI. Finally, the paper explores the impact of emerging technologies on the established theoretical frameworks and empirical measurements of technological change, points to new measurements linked to the rise of these technologies, and evaluates their pros and cons vis-à-vis traditional approaches.

Solid waste management is one of the most pressing urban governance issues in low- and middle-income countries. Because waste volumes are increasing, the associated fiscal, environmental and health costs will also rise. The idea of working with informal waste workers to address this problem is often suggested but rarely implemented. Based on the case of Irbid, Jordan’s second-biggest city, we show why it was successful there and draw recommendations for other municipalities. 
Irbid used an approach that combined what we call “frontloading trust” and “prioritising integration over training”. First, the mayor and municipal managers invited informal waste worker representatives to a structured dialogue about waste management challenges in the city, about the role of informal workers, and about potential solutions. During this months-long process, they overcame class differences, stigma and distrust and agreed on how to work together in the future. Then, rather than requiring extensive prior training of informal workers, they started to work together, which allowed workers to show what they were able to contribute (“prioritising integration over training”). 
Based on this process, the municipality and informal worker representatives signed the first Memorandum of Understanding of its kind in Jordan, legalising the work of informal workers, providing them with official badges and safety equipment and piloting their integration into municipal sorting facilities. After only a few months, data showed that the integration of informal workers had reduced landfill waste, had saved the municipality a lot of money, had improved waste services for residents, and had increased respect, protection and income for informal waste workers. 
This case shows that challenges like urban waste management require not only technical but social and governance innovations that include rather than exclude informal workers, and that can thereby contribute to improved livelihoods for all concerned.

On 24 and 25 November, African and European heads of state and government will meet in Luanda, Angola, for their seventh joint summit. In addition to issues of economic cooperation and trade relations, migration and multilateralism, peace and security will also be an important topic of discussion. Instead of making general statements about the importance of their partnership in this area, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) should take concrete steps to deepen their cooperation in conflict prevention and peace mediation, the protection of critical infrastructure, and security and defence policy cooperation.

South Africa’s energy transition unfolds within a complex landscape of urgent decarbonization needs, persistent energy insecurity and global competition over renewable value chains. Thus, the central question we ask in this policy brief is: which localization measures could strengthen equity considerations in the energy transition? Based on interviews conducted with stakeholders in South Africa’s energy and industrial policy sectors, and augmented by current academic literature and policy documents, this policy brief finds that policy and incentive gaps undermine domestic manufacturing, job creation and community ownership in the renewable energy sector. Without a stronger localization strategy, the Just Energy Transition Partnership could fail to deliver on its equity promises. Key recommendations include reforming public procurement to reward local content and social impact, leveraging concessional finance to attract private investment in domestic renewable energy industries, establishing bilateral partnerships for technology transfer, facilitating industrial upgrading and promoting community and worker-owned renewable energy initiatives.