Biztonságpolitika

La troisième conférence sur le Soudan s'est tenue ce mercredi 15 avril à Berlin. Comme pour les deux précédentes, son objectif était de rassembler des fonds pour l'aide humanitaire, alors que le pays entre dans une quatrième année de conflit et que la moitié de la population souffre de la faim aigüe, soit plus de 20 millions de personnes.

Les activités économiques ont repris leur cours normal mardi 14 avril au grand marché Bakuadianga, dans la commune de Dibindi. Cette réouverture intervient après une journée de paralysie causée par la grogne des marchands, qui protestaient contre les nouvelles modalités de l'impôt annuel sur les micro-entreprises.

Le calme est revenu ce mercredi 15 avril dans la ville de Fungurume, province du Lualaba, après une journée de mardi marquée par de vives tensions ayant fait deux morts et plusieurs blessés, à la suite de la mort d’un creuseur artisanal dans la concession de Tenke Fungurume Mining (TFM).

Les Forces armées de la RDC (FARDC) et plusieurs groupes armés opérant dans les hauts plateaux du Sud-Kivu entravent l’acheminement de l’aide humanitaire et empêchent les civils de fuir les zones de combat. C’est ce qu’a dénoncé l’ONG Human Rights Watch dans un communiqué publié ce mercredi 15 avril.

La République démocratique du Congo a réussi une opération majeure sur les marchés financiers internationaux en levant 1,25 milliard de dollars américains à travers son tout premier emprunt international, appelé Eurobond « Mbote ».

Cette levée de fonds historique marque une étape importante pour le pays pour financer des projets de développement, a indiqué le ministre des Finances, Doudou Fwamba, mardi 14 avril.

Qu’est-ce qu’un Eurobond ?

Les affrontements opposant l’AFC-M23, les FARDC et les combattants Wazalendo ont entraîné une vague massive de déplacements de population dans le territoire de Masisi, au Nord-Kivu. Selon des acteurs de la société civile, sept villages se sont vidés de leurs habitants depuis le 27 mars 2026, notamment dans les groupements d’Ufamandu et de Nyamaboko.

Le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général des Nations unies en République démocratique du Congo et chef de la MONUSCO, James Swan, et la ministre des Affaires étrangères, Thérèse Kayikwamba, ont convenu de soutenir les efforts en faveur de la paix en RDC.

La 13ᵉ édition de la Semaine de la Science et des Technologies a débuté ce mardi 14 avril sous le thème « Au cœur des gestes techniques ». L’événement, officiellement lancé à Kolwezi par la ministre d’État à l’Éducation nationale, Raïssa Malu, vise à promouvoir l'innovation technologique comme moteur de progrès social.

Two new GSDF offices signal a shift toward unmanned, AI-enabled operations amid demographic decline.

Le chef de file de l’opposition hongroise Péter Magyar est député européen. Il a été élu en 2024 après un premier passage par Bruxelles comme diplomate entre 2011 et 2016. Le chef de Tisza a beau être vice-président d’une commission parlementaire, on le voit peu dans les couloirs du Parlement. Mais ses collègues députés lui accordent apparemment toute leur indulgence. 

A nemzetiszocialista állam felsővezetésének legtalányosabb tagja lehetett a jeges pillantású Heydrich SS-tábornok és birodalmi protektor. Mivel jóval a háború vége előtt ugyebár merénylet áldozata lett, Göringgel ellentétben nem volt alkalma arra, hogy kihallgatói vagy éppen egy tárgyalóterem közönsége előtt magyarázza meg ill. ki a viselt dolgait. Hasonlóan önfelmentő szándékú memoárt sem hagyott hátra, mint pl. Speer. Titkosszolgálati vezetkőként természetesen naplót sem vezetett, mint ahogy Dr. Goebbels tette grafomán módon, és bizalmas barátai sem voltak. De ha tévedünk, és történetesen voltak is, és túl is élték a háborút, abban az esetben jól felfogott érdekük az elhatárolódás volt, nem pedig az igazság felfedése erről a rettegett és nem éppen rokonszenves férfiról, bármi is legyen az.

[...] Bővebben!

A segítséget kérő Pola és a Zara közti üzenetváltást a Vittorio Venetón is vették, ahol Iachino is csak ekkor szerzett tudomást arról, hogy egyik cirkálóját találat érte. Negyed kilenckor Cattaneo is tájékoztatta főparancsnokát a történtekről, egyben kérte, engedélyezze két romboló visszaküldését a Polához, hogy segítsenek a bajba jutott hajón. A zászlóshajó rádiósainak hibájából azonban az üzenet csak tíz perccel később jutott el Iachinóhoz, aki 20.18-kor, már azután, hogy Cattaneo elküldte üzenetét, de még azelőtt, hogy ő ezt megkapta volna, utasította Cattaneót, két cirkálójával és rombolóival forduljon vissza a Pola megsegítésére. Cattaneo felismerte, hogy az üzenetek elkerülték egymást, ezért nem engedelmeskedett azonnal, hanem 20.24-kor ismét rákérdezett, és kérte az előbbi üzenet megerősítését.

Közben Iachino megkapta Cattaneo első üzenetét, ám úgy vélte, két kis romboló kevés lesz ahhoz, hogy segítséget tudjanak nyújtani a Polának. Ezért 20.45-kor ismét megerősítette az 1.Osztag visszafordulását elrendelő parancsát, majd negyedórával később a biztonság kedvéért azt még egyszer leadatta Cattaneónak.

[...] Bővebben!

El kell dönteni, hogy mi a fontos és mi a nem fontos, és persze el kell dönteni, hogy mi mennyire fontos. Ideális esetben a védelmi szféra a szuverén nemzeti létezés - rosszabb esetben az arra irányuló remény - alapvető intézményrendszere. Állapota annak tükre. Következésképp sem szolgalelkűségnek-önfeladásnak, sem öncélnak-kisajátításnak nem a terepe ugye.

Addig is, ha nem vagy képes háborúzni, keresd a békét.

Zord

Abstract

The relationship between attack and defense has long been a central problem in military theory and strategic studies. From Carl von Clausewitz’s claim that defense constitutes the stronger form of war to modern realist analyses of the offense–defense balance, scholars have sought to explain why wars begin, how they evolve, and why they so often persist longer than expected (Clausewitz, 1832/1976; Van Evera, 1998). This article examines the interaction between offensive and defensive forms of warfare through a theoretically grounded and historically informed framework. Drawing on offense–defense theory and the security dilemma, the study analyzes how military technology, doctrine, and political incentives shape strategic behavior (Jervis, 1978; Glaser & Kaufmann, 1998). Using closed historical cases—most notably the First World War and the evolution of military doctrine in the interwar and Cold War periods—the article argues that technological change rarely abolishes the structural advantages of defense (Lieber, 2000). Instead, successive innovations tend to reinforce defensive denial and resilience while preserving political incentives for offensive action. This enduring tension helps explain the prevalence of long wars, miscalculated military strategies, and persistent security dilemmas in international politics (Nilsson, 2012).

1. Introduction
The tension between attack and defense lies at the heart of warfare. Political leaders and military institutions have historically favored offensive action, associating it with initiative, decisiveness, and strategic success (Snyder, 1984; Van Evera, 1998). Defense, by contrast, is often framed as a secondary or reactive posture. Despite this preference, historical experience repeatedly demonstrates that defense is frequently more effective and sustainable than anticipated by those who initiate wars. Conflicts launched with expectations of rapid victory often devolve into prolonged struggles of attrition (Nilsson, 2012).

2. Clausewitz and the Primacy of Defense
Carl von Clausewitz argued that defense is the stronger form of warfare because it benefits from time, terrain, preparation, and moral advantage (Clausewitz, 1832/1976). Defensive forces can exploit interior lines and compel attackers to expend resources under conditions of uncertainty and friction. Clausewitz nevertheless emphasized that defense alone cannot secure political objectives; decision ultimately requires an offensive transition, underscoring the paradox at the heart of war (Posen, 1984).

3. Offense–Defense Theory and the Security Dilemma
Offense–defense theory formalizes the Clausewitzian insight within international relations. It asks whether conquest is easier than defense and how this balance shapes state behavior (Glaser & Kaufmann, 1998). When offense is believed to dominate, states are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies and consider preventive war. When defense is perceived as dominant, restraint and cooperation become more plausible. Misperceptions, however, frequently distort this balance, intensifying the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978; Van Evera, 1998).

4. The First World War: The Failure of the Offensive
The First World War illustrates the catastrophic consequences of misjudging the offense–defense balance. European militaries entered the war with doctrines emphasizing speed and decisive battle, rooted in the ideology of the offensive (Snyder, 1984). Industrial firepower fundamentally shifted advantages toward defense. Trench systems, machine guns, and artillery rendered frontal assaults prohibitively costly, producing prolonged attrition rather than decisive victory (Van Evera, 1998).

5. Doctrine and Technology Between the Wars
The interwar period witnessed divergent responses to defensive dominance. Some militaries sought to restore maneuver through combined arms and concentration, while others invested in deep defensive fortifications. These approaches reflected different interpretations of the same historical lesson: defense had proved dominant, but political and strategic imperatives prevented its full acceptance (Posen, 1984).

6. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Defense
The nuclear age transformed the offense–defense relationship at the strategic level. Second-strike capability imposed extreme defensive dominance by ensuring that no attack could escape devastating retaliation, producing a condition of deterrent stability (Waltz, 1979). Nuclear weapons thus reinforced defense at the strategic level, even as states preserved offensive capabilities (Lieber, 2000).

7. Why Offensive Beliefs Persist
Offensive doctrines persist because they promise initiative, control, and decisive results. Political incentives reward action over restraint, while military organizations often privilege aggressive concepts. Historical memory highlights rare offensive successes while neglecting numerous failures, reinforcing systematic underestimation of defensive resilience (Fearon, 1995; Snyder, 1984).

8. Conclusion
The relationship between attack and defense is characterized by enduring asymmetry. Across historical periods, defense has demonstrated structural advantages, while offense remains politically compelling. This tension explains the persistence of long wars and repeated strategic miscalculations. Understanding the enduring strength of defense is therefore essential for realistic strategy and sustainable security policy in international politics (Clausewitz, 1832/1976; Jervis, 1978; Nilsson, 2012).

References

Clausewitz, C. von. (1976). On war (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans.). Princeton University Press.
(Original work published 1832)

Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324

Glaser, C. L. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171–201.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100014720

Glaser, C. L., & Kaufmann, C. (1998). What is the offense–defense balance and can we measure it? International Security, 22(4), 44–82.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2539240

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958

Levy, J. S. (1984). The offensive/defensive balance of military technology: A theoretical and historical analysis. International Studies Quarterly, 28(2), 219–238.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2600696

Lieber, K. A. (2000). Grasping the technological peace: The offense–defense balance and international security. International Security, 25(1), 71–104.
https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560390

Nilsson, M. (2012). Offense–defense balance, war duration, and the security dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(3), 467–489.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712438350

Posen, B. R. (1984). The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars. Cornell University Press.

Snyder, J. (1984). The ideology of the offensive: Military decision making and the disasters of 1914. Cornell University Press.

Van Evera, S. (1998). Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security, 22(4), 5–43.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2539239

Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. McGraw‑Hill.

 

A The Relationship Between Attack and Defense in Warfare Theoretical Foundations and Historical Lessons bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

Dans les longs couloirs des hôpitaux sénégalais, une révolution silencieuse est en marche. En première ligne, des femmes, médecins, chercheuses ou formatrices, se sacrifient sans bruit pour sauver des vies. Par leur engagement et leur expertise, elles redessinent patiemment, mais sûrement, les contours de la souveraineté sanitaire du pays de la Teranga.

La traite transatlantique est relativement bien documentée et fait beaucoup parler d'elle. En revanche on ne sait très peu de chose de la traite arabo-musulmane qui a duré plus d'un millénaire et qui a concerné quelque 8 à 17 millions d'Africains vendus.

Environmental activists and farmer groups opposed to the construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP), the world’s longest heated oil pipeline, are mounting a last-ditch legal effort meant to stop its construction in a suit they plan to have filed in London, UK,  believing that it stands a chance to stop the controversial […]

Business Forum: Harnessing Opportunities, Unlocking Growth - March 12th, photo by IDB

By Claudia Escorza
MEXICO CITY, Apr 3 2026 (IPS)

In Asunción, Paraguay last month, finance ministers, central bank presidents, and private sector leaders gathered for the Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) Annual Meetings to talk about growth.

In a session titled “Seizing Opportunities, Stimulating Growth” hosted by IDB Invest, the bank’s private sector institution, they discussed how investment and innovation could strengthen agribusiness and food systems across Latin America.

One place to start is clear: the IDB Invest should exclude industrial livestock production from its portfolio. Industrial animal agriculture is a leading driver of deforestation, water pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions in the region.

It puts profits in the hands of a few, while rural and Indigenous communities are left to deal with dirty water, damaged land, and fewer ways to earn a living. Yet at the very session dedicated to agribusiness, livestock was conspicuously absent from the conversation.

If the IDB Invest won’t even acknowledge the problem, it’s obviously not trying to solve it. Public development money shouldn’t be funding an industry that worsens the climate crisis and harms communities.

Equally troubling is the lack of transparency when projects do move forward. When the IDB Invest supports a project, communities have a right to understand its risks, impacts, and benefits. That did not happen, for example, in the case of Pronaca, an Ecuadorian agribusiness company that received a $50 million loan from IDB Invest.

An independent investigation by the Bank’s own accountability mechanism found seven violations of environmental and social safeguards, including failures to disclose critical information and assess the company’s role in the contamination of a local river that the Indigenous Tsáchila community rely on for food and hygiene, and which holds deep spiritual significance within their cosmology.

But key environmental documents were classified as confidential, and meaningful information was never shared. This isn’t just a problem with the IBD’s internal procedures. It can have real impacts on human rights.

Perhaps most importantly, the IDB Invest must ensure the effective participation of affected communities from the very beginning of any project. In the Pronaca case, the investigation found no evidence that nearby Indigenous communities were consulted at all, even though one community is located just a few hundred meters from a facility.

This absence of consultation wasn’t accidental, but instead part of a deep imbalance of power, where decisions are made in boardrooms and imposed on territories without consent. Communities must have a seat at the table, not as an afterthought, but as decision-makers with the ability to shape, or reject, projects that affect their futures. Anything less is incompatible with the IDB Invest’s stated mission to reduce inequality.

This month’s meeting in Paraguay showed that the IDB Group is quite ambitious when it comes to growth in Latin America. However, it would be a mistake for the IDB to believe that growth is the only measure of progress and should be the priority no matter the cost.

Right now, the IDB has the opportunity and the responsibility to pursue a sustainable growth agenda by excluding harmful industries, committing to full transparency, and including the impacted communities at every step of the process. To do that, the IDB must listen to those who were not in the room, and must recognize that economic growth cannot be built on weakened ecosystems and silenced communities.

Claudia Escorza, the Latin America Regional Coordinator for “Stop Financing Factory Farming (S3F) coalition, is based in Mexico City, and advocates sustainable food systems.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');  

Public Domain. Smoke rises above Tehran, Iran. Source: UN News

By Daniel D. Bradlow
JOHANNESBURG, South Africa, Apr 3 2026 (IPS)

By Easter 2026 it was still not clear when – or how – the war initiated by Israel and the US against Iran would end. But what was already clear was that it would harm Africa in a number of ways.

Firstly, it would adversely affect the global supply and prices of oil and gas, fertilisers and food. Secondly, local currencies would be affected. More than a month after the war had started a number of African currencies had begun to lose value against the US dollar.

Thirdly, interest rates stopped falling and further rate increases were highly likely. Fourth, there will be a decline in access to affordable foreign financing.

How should Africa respond?

African countries cannot avoid being harmed by the current Gulf war. Nevertheless, based on my work in international economic law and global economic governance, I think there are two lessons that, if followed, can help the continent emerge from the crisis in a better place.

First, governments and societies need to be pragmatic. Their first priority must be to do whatever they can to mitigate the impact of the war, particularly on their most vulnerable citizens. This will require governments to make trade-offs.

Our mission is to share knowledge and inform decisions.

About us

They will have to reallocate budgets to at least maintain the level of imports necessary to meet the society’s basic needs. They will need to convince their creditors to help finance their necessary imports. They will also need to persuade them to be flexible enough that they leave governments with at least some policy space.

Second, states and societies need to identify opportunities within the crisis for actions that over the medium term can help them meet their financing, economic, environmental and social challenges. This requires collaboration between the state and its non-state stakeholders. Business, labour, religious groups, civil society organisations and international organisations all have something to contribute.

Oil price surge is hurting African economies: scholars in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa take stock

Action in the short run

The focus of Africa’s efforts in the short term must be on minimising the negative effects of the war and on managing the state’s external debts in the most sustainable and effective way.

This is easy to state, but hard to implement. This is particularly the case in the current international environment, in which it is not realistic to expect donor countries and other international sources of finance to be particularly generous.

African countries will need to convince their creditors to acknowledge that this crisis is beyond Africa’s control and that they should not compound the pain that’s being experienced. This will require, at a minimum, that the creditors agree to suspend debt payments for the next year.

Creditors have already accepted the principle that debt payments can be suspended when debt challenges arise from sources beyond the debtor’s control. Many of them have accepted clauses requiring such action under specific conditions in their most recent debt contracts. They also did this during COVID.

Second, African countries, which are already heavily indebted, should challenge their multilateral creditors to accept the consequences of being among the biggest creditors for the continent. This includes the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank. By custom these institutions are treated as preferred creditors.

This means that they get paid before all other creditors. Instead of participating in any debt restructurings, they also make new loans to the debtor in crisis. This shifts the debt restructuring burden onto the debtor’s other creditors. It also increases the total amount owed to the multilaterals.

This cannot continue. These institutions need to be more creative in providing Africa to financing. This should include:

• Using their financial resources to guarantee the financial transactions of African countries so that they can reduce their borrowing costs and attract new equity investments.
• More generously supporting innovative debt for development swaps. These involve creditors agreeing with African sovereign debtors to convert a portion of the existing debts into financing for specific local projects, for example in health or education.
• Helping African governments convert their foreign exchange denominated debts into local currency debts at affordable interest rates.

Third, governments should work with the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions to use these institutions more effectively to finance African development. For example:

• They should require the institutions to only undertake transactions that are consistent with their development mandates. This means no more opaque transactions like the recent one that the African Finance Corporation concluded with Senegal.
• African governments should take the necessary action to activate the African Financial Stability Mechanism that they agreed to establish last year. This would create a useful financial safety net for the continent.

Fourth, African governments must build on the efforts they began last year to become a more effective advocate for African development financing interests at the international level. Among these efforts was the initiative by African ministers of finance to develop common African positions on sovereign debt restructurings. Another was South Africa’s launch of the African Expert Panel that proposed a number of initiatives on African debt and development financing.

In the medium term

African countries should advocate for the IMF to review its governance arrangements so that it becomes more accountable and responsive to developing countries, including African states and societies.

They should also advocate for the IMF to more use its existing resources, including its gold reserves, more creatively to support Africa.

Second, Africa should call for a debate on the preferred creditor status of multilateral financial institutions. This has become particularly relevant because the members of the Alliance of African Multilateral Financial Institutions are claiming that, like all other multilateral financial institutions, they are entitled to this status.

It is not clear that there are good arguments for excluding these institutions from preferred creditor status while protecting the position of the legacy institutions. This suggests that there is a need for some general principles that help determine which institutions should be treated as preferred creditors. These should be acceptable to all multilateral financial institutions and other market participants.

Third, African societies must make every effort to demonstrate that they are taking control of their own development. They should demand that their governments and all other actors in African development finance behave responsibly in regard to the financial, economic, environmental and social aspects of these transactions.

Another medium-term objective should be to limit the illicit financial flows that are so often associated with international trade and investment. This goal would be advanced by the successful conclusion of the current efforts to agree on a UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation.

Prof Daniel D. Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship at the University of Pretoria, was Senior Non-Resident Fellow, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University and Professor Emeritus, American University Washington College of Law

Source: Conversation Africa

IPS UN Bureau

 

Follow @IPSNewsUNBureau
!function(d,s,id){var js,fjs=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],p=/^http:/.test(d.location)?'http':'https';if(!d.getElementById(id)){js=d.createElement(s);js.id=id;js.src=p+'://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js';fjs.parentNode.insertBefore(js,fjs);}}(document, 'script', 'twitter-wjs');