Agrégateur de flux

By Mari Carlson (University of Helsinki)

The European Green Deal marked a bold attempt to confront the environmental crisis – not merely through environmental policy, but across the full spectrum of internal and external governance. Trade policy, in particular, underwent an unprecedented wave of greening. Yet before the ink had dried, the Covid-19 pandemic and successive geopolitical shocks plunged the Union into deeper turbulence. This sparked a profound reorientation of the logics guiding EU trade policy.

In this shifting landscape, EU farmers found themselves caught between a liberalised trade regime and a rising tide of environmental regulation. As geopolitical tensions mounted, farmers across the EU protested what they perceived as unfair competition, compounded by a lack of adequate protective measures. At the same time, trading partners accused the EU of veering towards green protectionism, casting doubt on the legitimacy of its normative trade posture.

In my recent article for the Journal of Common Market Studies, I explore this contradiction. Was EU agricultural trade policy becoming more unilateral and geopolitically driven under the European Green Deal, potentially levelling the playing field for EU farmers? And if so, why were farmers still contesting it?

Legitimising Trade through Environmental Othering

Under the European Green Deal, the EU’s agri-food trade policy underwent a comprehensive normative overhaul, backed by a robust enforcement toolkit. This was not simply a technical adjustment in trade mechanics. It marked a deliberate strategic shift, driven by the perception that global governance had failed to adequately respond to the environmental crisis.

The European Commission actively elevated the Union’s environmental agenda, asserting its leadership on the global stage. It portrayed the EU as a principled guardian of sustainability, legitimising its trade posture through normative ambition rather than market logic. Central to this strategy was what I term environmental othering. Trading partners were not depicted as bad trade actors but as environmentally irresponsible ones. This reframing enabled the EU’s environmental agri-food trade measures to appear morally justified rather than protectionist.

To reinforce its normative stance, the Commission leaned heavily on the EU’s reputation for high food safety and animal welfare standards. Moreover, the EU’s new sustainability model was presented as a global benchmark and the solution to the global environmental crisis, while marginalising other countries’ food systems by portraying them as unsustainable or in need of improvement.

In this way, the environmental crisis was framed as a shared global threat, but one that subtly positioned others as inferior. This logic of depoliticisation, previously seen in EU climate adaptation discourse, was repurposed within the trade-agriculture nexus to justify assertive and unilateral action.

Geopoliticising Agri-Food Trade in the EU’s Strategic Turn

The transformation of EU agri-food trade policy reflects a broader strategic shift in how the Union approaches trade governance. Under the logic of open strategic autonomy, trade policy is no longer primarily guided by economic principles or the pursuit of the common good. Instead, it is shaped by geopolitical imperatives, normative ambition, and long-term strategic foresight.

This geopoliticisation of trade is steadily displacing multilateral cooperation and long-standing commitments to trade liberalisation. The Commission’s deployment of enhanced enforcement mechanisms, sanctions, and unilateral sustainability-linked measures signals a decisive departure from its historically cooperative posture.

My analysis explores how the Commission has sought to normalise and depoliticise contentious trade measures, even when these risk contravening multilateral trade rules. The deployment of legally targeted justification strategies does not necessarily reflect confidence or assertiveness. Rather, such narratives serve to mask internal tensions and pre-empt external contestation. By presenting its actions as both legally sound and environmentally principled, the Commission consolidates the EU’s normative stance while sidestepping direct confrontation with trading partners.

The boundary between trade and foreign policy is steadily dissolving, as strategic interests reshape the rules of engagement. Within this shifting terrain, the EU’s role as a firm supporter of multilateralism grows increasingly difficult to sustain. My analysis argues that the Union’s revised approach to agri-food trade risks accelerating global fragmentation and entrenching a broader trend towards rising unilateralism.

While the EU’s assertive turn has elevated its profile as a geoeconomic actor, the persistence of farmer resistance exposes unresolved domestic contradictions. These tensions reveal that the Union’s external ambitions are not always underpinned by internal consensus, particularly when domestic stakeholders feel marginalised by the pace and trajectory of change. Moreover, when policy shifts remain largely discursive rather than materially transformative, their impact on sectoral realities tends to be limited.

Level Playing Field or Uneven Terrain?

The European Green Deal is not the first instance of the EU seeking to level the regulatory playing field in agriculture. For nearly three decades, it has championed the integration of multifunctional objectives, including sustainability, biodiversity, and food security, into the architecture of trade rules. As multilateral negotiations faltered, the Union pivoted towards bilateral agreements, offering a more pragmatic channel for advancing these aims. Yet such deals often came at a cost: the more regulated party, typically the EU, faced pressure to concede unless its counterpart agreed to raise standards, a concession that seldom materialised.

Agricultural cost structures vary significantly across countries due to differences in climate, labour costs, subsidies, and regulatory frameworks. These disparities make uniform liberalisation structurally implausible. Neoliberal trade logic assumes that markets can reallocate resources efficiently, but this overlooks the strategic, environmental, and social dimensions of agriculture.

This imbalance continues to fuel claims of unfair competition, especially as the European Green Deal was raising environmental ambition without securing equivalent commitments from trading partners. At the heart of this tension lies a fundamental incompatibility between the agricultural sector and the neoliberal trade regime. Agricultural markets are shaped by distinct cost structures and strategic imperatives that resist the logic of liberalisation.

As the EU strengthens environmental and health regulations and reasserts food self-sufficiency as a national security priority, the traditional trade paradigm becomes increasingly untenable. Even as the Commission pursues more assertive and geopolitically attuned trade policies to advance broader foreign policy objectives, these efforts fall short of addressing the domestic and global pressures that continue to destabilise the system. Farmers, burdened by compliance costs, and civil society groups, demanding stronger global sustainability norms, both continue to challenge the legitimacy of the neoliberal trade model. The level playing field, while rhetorically powerful, remains a utopian concept – one that obscures deeper asymmetries in global trade.

Mari Carlson is a doctoral grant researcher in the Doctoral Programme in Sustainable Use of Renewable Natural Resources at the University of Helsinki. Her research focuses on EU trade and agricultural policy through the lens of geopolitics and environmental sustainability. Her work is funded by the Finnish Cultural Foundation.

Website: https://researchportal.helsinki.fi/en/persons/mari-carlson

The post Strategic Greening of EU Agricultural Trade on Uneven Terrain appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Die Bundeswirtschaftsministerin hat das lange erwartet Energiewende-Monitoring vorgelegt. Steht die Energiewende am Scheideweg – und braucht sie eine Neuausrichtung? Das besprechen wir ausführlich mit Prof. Dr. Andreas Löschel, der selbst eine Art Chef-Monitorer der Energiewende ist. Wo steht die ...

Wer eine App entwickeln möchte, muss früh entscheiden: nativ, hybrid oder Progressive Web App (PWA)? Die richtige Wahl der Plattform mag auf den ersten Blick zwar anspruchsvoll wirken, lässt sich aber mit Blick auf einige Metriken wie Zielgruppe, Budget, Time-to-Market oder gewünschte Funktionen schnell eingrenzen.

Dieser Ratgeber zeigt Ihnen die technischen Kerneigenschaften der einzelnen App-Typen auf und erklärt anhand typischer Projektsituationen, welche Wahl am besten zu Ihrem Projekt passen könnte.

Native, Hybrid, PWA – die Grundlagen

Um eine gemeinsame Wissensgrundlage zu schaffen, stecken wir zunächst die technischen Grundlagen der einzelnen App-Typen ab.

Native App

Native Apps werden speziell für eine Plattform entwickelt (z. B. für iOS auf Swift/SwiftUI und für Android auf Kotlin oder Jetpack Compose).

＋ Die Vorteile: Aufgrund der gezielten Programmierung erzielen sie sehr hohe Performance, fühlen sich durchgängig „systemtypisch“ an (bessere UX) und besitzen meist den vollen Zugriff auf Gerätefunktionen, Hintergrundprozesse und UI-Paradigmen.

－ Die Kehrseite: Möchten Sie eine native App für iOS und Android herausbringen, benötigen Sie zwei Codebasen, zwei Build- und Release-Pipelines, zwei Kompetenzprofile im Team. Wartung und Feature-Parität erfordern Disziplin und Budget.

Hybride Apps

Hybrid-Entwicklung bündelt Web-Technologien in einem nativen Container. Moderne Frameworks erlauben plattformübergreifende Entwicklung mit einer Codebasis, die auf iOS und Android läuft, und optional gezielten nativen Modulen für Spezialfälle.

＋ Die Vorteile: Beschleunigte MVPs und reduzierte initiale Kosten, da Sie keine zwei separaten Entwicklungen aufsetzen müssen. Außerdem können Sie mit geringerem Budget eine breitere Zielgruppe abdecken.

－ Die Kehrseite: Trade-offs bei Performance in stark interaktiven Flächen, komplexere Brücken zu manchen OS-Features und ein zusätzlicher Layer, der gepflegt werden will.

Progressive Web Apps (PWA)

PWAs sind Webanwendungen mit App-Feeling: auf dem Homescreen installierbar, offlinefähig (Service Worker), mit schnellen Updates ohne Store-Review und unmittelbarer Reichweite per URL.

＋ Die Vorteile: Geräteunabhängige Nutzung, Möglichkeit auf SEO (Suchmaschinenoptimierung) und geringe Installationshürden.

－ Die Kehrseite: Grenzen ergeben sich dort, wo intensive Hintergrundprozesse oder spezielle Hardware-Zugriffe notwendig sind. Zudem variieren die Plattformfähigkeiten je nach Betriebssystem und Browser.

Native, Hybrid, PWA – Vergleich der Funktionen

Um die Stärken und Schwächen nativer, hybrider und von Progressive Web Apps besser einordnen zu können, sehen Sie nun einen Vergleich wichtiger Kriterien, um eine App entwickeln zu lassen. So können Sie sich anhand Ihrer Möglichkeiten, Wünsche und Ziele ein besseres Bild Ihrer Go-to-Plattform bilden.

KriteriumNativeHybridPWAPerformance und UXGerätefunktionen, Offline-Nutzung und PushEntwicklungsaufwand, Wartung und Skalierung Performance und UX

→ Wenn jedes Frame zählt, etwa bei aufwendigen Animationen, Games oder hochfrequenten Interaktionen, sind native Apps klar der Spitzenreiter.

→ In produktivitätsorientierten Oberflächen mit viel Formularlogik, Listen und Standardinteraktionen können bei geringerem Budget auch Hybrid-Apps genutzt werden, solange Sie konsequent auf UI-Performance (Render-Pfade, Bildoptimierung, asynchrone Datenflüsse etc.) achten.

→ PWAs können häufig auch eine gute Leistung aufzeigen, stechen jedoch besonders durch ihre solide Web-Performance-Disziplin und schlanke UI hervor.

Gerätefunktionen, Offline-Nutzung und Push

→ Zugriffe auf Kamera, Sensoren, lokale Verschlüsselung, sichere Keychains oder Hintergrund-Synchronisation sind mit Native-Apps am breitesten und stabilsten.

→ Hybrid-Apps können vieles davon via Plugins oder sogenannten „native Modules“ abdecken. Das funktioniert in den meisten Fällen sehr gut, ist jedoch mit zusätzlicher Integrationsarbeit verbunden.

→ PWAs beherrschen die wichtigsten Fälle im Web-Kontext, doch bei tiefen OS-Integrationen und verlässlichen Hintergrundjobs stoßen sie je nach Plattform schneller an Grenzen.

Offline-Szenarien können unabhängig vom gewählten Ansatz bei allen drei Varianten implementiert werden. Sie müssen hier vor allem auf Sync-Strategien, Konfliktauflösung und Telemetrie achten.

Zum Thema Push-Mitteilungen: Native Apps nutzen die offiziellen Push-Dienste der Plattform (Apple Push Notification service (APNs) bei iOS oder Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) bei Android), Hybrid-Frameworks können sich ebenfalls an diese nativen Kanäle anbinden.

Info: Push-Notifications bei Progressive Web Apps Bei PWAs ist „Web Push“ der neueste Weg: Seit iOS 16.4 unterstützt Apple Web Push für als Home‑Screen‑Web‑Apps installierte PWAs. Voraussetzung sind die Installation im Standalone‑Modus und eine erteilte Benachrichtigungsberechtigung. Entwicklungsaufwand, Wartung und Skalierung

→ Eine Codebasis für alle Plattformen senkt initiale Kosten und beschleunigt Releases – ein Vorteil des hybriden Ansatzes und von PWAs, insbesondere in den frühen Phasen. Mit wachsender Komplexität steigen aber die Anforderungen an Architektur, Testing und Release-Management, was Ihre späteren Kosten ungeplant in die Höhe treiben kann.

→ Native Entwicklung bedeutet doppelten Entwicklungsstrom, dafür weniger Kompromisse und klare Nutzung der offiziellen Plattform-Patterns.

→ PWAs punkten mit sofortigen Web-Updates und geringerer Release-Reibung, erfordern aber sauberes Caching- und Offline-Design.

Native, Hybrid, PWA – geläufige Use Cases

Nachdem wir die Grundlagen und Vorteile der einzelnen Entwicklungsvarianten geklärt haben, zeigen wir Ihnen, in welchen Szenarien native, hybride oder Progressive Web Apps ihre beste Anwendung finden.

Performance-kritische Produkte → Native Apps

Wer 60 fps in komplexen Animationen, AR-Funktionen, rechenintensive Visualisierungen oder Gaming-Mechaniken benötigt, fährt mit Native am sichersten. Die enge Verzahnung mit den nativen APIs und Rendering-Pipelines bietet Reserven, wenn das Frontend an Grenzen stößt.

Produktiv-Apps im Feld -> Native oder hybride Apps

Außendienst, Bau, Logistik oder Lager benötigen in der Regel stabile Offline-Fähigkeiten, verlässliche Hintergründe und Gerätezugriffe (Scanner, Sensoren, sichere Datenspeicher). Hier liegt die Tendenz zu Native oder einer Hybrid-Lösung mit gezielt nativen Modulen, um kritische Pfade kompromisslos abzusichern.

Content, Commerce und Reichweite → PWAs

Bei Katalogen, Medien, Lead-Gen und Shopping mit schnellem Iterationstempo führt die PWA das Ranking an: die geringste Installationshürde, organische Sichtbarkeit (SEO) und sofortige Updates sind hier ideal. Wenn Push-Mitteilungen, App-Store-Präsenz oder gerätespezifische Features im Marketing-Mix wichtig sind, kann auch eine Hybrid-App die Brücke schlagen, ohne gleich zwei native Entwicklerteams zu beanspruchen.

MVPs und validierungsgetriebene Roadmaps → Hybrid oder PWAs

Wenn Hypothesen getestet und Produkt-Market-Fit gesucht wird, zählen Time-to-Market und Lernzyklen zu den wichtigsten Metriken. Hybride Apps oder PWAs erleichtern schnelle Releases und Budgetfokus auf Nutzwert statt Infrastruktur. Kommt mit der Zeit etwas mehr Traktion, können Sie schrittweise auf native Module oder in besonders anspruchsvollen Bereichen auf voll native Implementierungen erweitern.

Fazit

Für die richtige Wahl des App-Typs sollten Sie sich im Vorhinein sauber priorisierte Ziele stecken. Native, hybride und Progressive Web Apps kommen alle mit ihren eigenen Vor- und Nachteilen, die Sie in Ihre Entscheidung einfließen lassen müssen. Hier sehen Sie noch einmal die wichtigsten Punkte zusammengefasst:

→ Native maximiert Performance, UX und Funktionstiefe, jedoch auf Kosten des Aufwands und Budgets.

→ Hybrid balanciert Tempo und Funktionsbreite und kann mit moderaten Kosten und Aufwand realisiert werden.

→ PWAs liefern Reichweite und Entwicklungseffizienz, können spezifische Anforderungen an Funktionen jedoch nicht immer erfüllen.

Treffen Sie die Entscheidung entlang Ihrer Top-Prioritäten, nicht entlang von Framework-Trends. Wenn Sie schnelle Klarheit wollen, priorisieren Sie die Anforderungen, mappen Sie sie auf die drei Optionen und planen Sie ein schlankes MVP. Aus den ersten echten Nutzersignalen ergibt sich der nächste Schritt – ob ein kompletter nativer Track, ein hybrider Ansatz mit gezielten nativen Modulen oder die bewusste Konzentration auf eine PWA für maximale Geschwindigkeit und Reichweite.

Der Beitrag Native, Hybrid, PWA: die richtige Wahl erschien zuerst auf Neurope.eu - News aus Europa.

Elisabetta Gualmini und Alessandra Moretti von der sozialdemokratischen Partito Democratico wurden im März suspendiert. Hintergrund war ein Antrag belgischer Staatsanwälte, die das Parlament aufforderten, ihre Immunität im Zuge weitreichenden Ermittlungen wegen Einflussnahme gegen Geld aufzuheben.

Relations have taken a step forward, but how much of it is substantive?

ELIAMEP and the Institute of Global Affairs of The American College of Greece (ACG) organised the 5th Summer Academy titled “Leadership Beyond Boundaries: Empowering the Next Generation of Mediterranean Leaders”, which took place at the premises of the International Olympic Academy from Monday, July 14 2025, to Saturday, July 19 2025. In total, the 5th ELIAMEP-ACG Summer Academy brought together 29 participants (emerging leaders from various fields) and 21 distinguished speakers from 19 countries across the Mediterranean, Europe, and Asia, to discuss critical issues concerning the Mediterranean. The Summer Academy included lectures, discussions as well as trainings in negotiations and public speaking & media. The report of the 5th Summer Academy is available here. The agenda and the list of speakers and staff members who contributed to the 5th Summer Academy are available here.

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An OSCE-organized training course on media literacy for representatives of Turkmenistan’s national media and state institutions of the National Human Rights Action Plan for 2021-2025 took place on 16 and 17 September 2025.

The training course was delivered by two national trainers who successfully completed a series of train-the-trainer courses on media literacy organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat in 2024-2025. An international expert from Kazakhstan facilitated the event remotely.

The trainers introduced the concept of the media and information literacy focusing on the current trends in the modern media environment and five UNESCO laws of media and information literacy.

In his opening speech, William Leaf, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat referred to the Policy Manual “Spotlight on Artificial Intelligence and Freedom of Expression” published in 2021 by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

“The Manual highlights the importance of promoting awareness and digital literacy to empower individuals to better manage their own media consumption,” said Leaf.

“Earlier this year, the Centre organized the first training course delivered by three national trainers and we are proud to contribute to the creation of the pool of national experts on media literacy and the practical implementation of the media freedom-related provisions of the National Human Rights Action Plan for 2021-2025,” he added.

The training course also presented international and national legal frameworks related to media and information literacy and exposed participants to the instruments of media literacy and fact-checking. Participants explored the formats of fact-checking and work with Artificial Intelligence in state institutions. They also practised writing press releases with the use of AI tools and discussed the rights and responsibilities of social media users.

Emmanuella Doussis, Professor, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head of the Climate and Sustainability Programme and Senior Policy Advisor, ELIAMEP

Guterres’ recent report and speech to the General Assembly present clean energy as a reality, and one which must not and cannot be held back. It is already creating growth, jobs and energy security, and billions of dollars are being channelled into the green transition. Renewable energy sources are now more cost-effective than fossil fuels, and new renewable energy capacity is outstripping conventional fuels on every continent. However, progress is not fast enough and, still more crucially, not fair enough. Africa and developing countries receive only a small share of the global funding, while fossil fuel subsidies continue.

The General Assembly can serve as a key forum for cooperation, even amidst geopolitical antagonisms, as environmental and climate issues are, and must increasingly be, perceived as peace and security issues. Multilateral alliances (G77, LDCs, AOSIS), as well as regional blocs like the EU, often play an active role in helping build majorities, making concerted demands, and putting pressure on major powers that often act unilaterally (e.g. China, the US, Russia), as well as on other polluting states. The General Assembly’s unanimous decision to consult the International Court of Justice on states’ obligations with regard to climate change has recently led to a landmark opinion relating to the international law governing the response to the phenomenon. Although non-binding, the opinion could shape practice and open the way for appeals, in particular from the countries most affected by climate change. So, while the General Assembly does not produce legally-binding texts directly, its actions can produce important results indirectly. Which is to say the General Assembly can keep the debate around the green transition in the spotlight and act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation, especially in areas where convergences and potential partnerships (should) transcend geopolitical divisions.

Maria Gavouneli, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Member of the Board, ELIAMEP

There is a short answer: none at all! The General Assembly has always been a forum for big words and little action. Over the decades, we have had a series of declarations and statements that rarely translate into binding obligations for UN member states, and then only after their content has been transposed in treaties or monitoring and accountability mechanisms as a result of difficult and often lengthy negotiations. Lately, even texts that formerly would have been adopted by consensus have been subject to complicated and lengthy voting processes.
The longer answer is, of course, different and more involved. It is on the sidelines of the General Assembly, in the UN’s corridors of power, that the big issues are discussed and often decided. While world leaders read their prepared monologues in turn, it is the organized meetings in smaller chambers—and ad hoc huddles—that can make the difference. This is especially true in times like the present, when simply setting-up a session is problematic, even before one considers the agenda and items ranging from the Middle East ceasefire and the peace plan in Ukraine to energy security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the resolution of bilateral disputes between Greece and Turkey. Truth be told, this has always been where the General Assembly, and the UN in general, has made its most important contributions.

Mihalis Kritikos, Adjunct Professor, School of Governance, University of Brussels; Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

The UN is back: the example of artificial intelligence

Amidst a frantic and ever-escalating geopolitical rivalry in the sphere of technology, artificial intelligence is redefining the dynamics of global power while its governance has become the subject of hundreds of separate initiatives. Given this somewhat fragmented landscape, the recent decision by the UN General Assembly to create two new mechanisms to promote international cooperation in AI governance—the UN Independent International Scientific Panel on AI and the Global Dialogue on AI Governance—is especially important. There are three reasons for this:

First, because the UN is setting out to create a global platform for dialogue that will give developing countries an equal voice in shaping the future of AI, while aligning the discourse with the ambitions of the Global South. Second, because the resolution seeks to put in place a framework based on a human-centred approach to AI that promotes the transparency and social utility of the technology. And third, because it sends a powerful signal to the world that the UN remains capable of achieving convergence and laying the foundations for a common framework to address the challenges of a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

If the scientific independence of the committee and the multilateralism of the global dialogue are safeguarded, then the future global governance of this influential technology will be in safe hands.

Panayotis Tsakonas, Professor, National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; Head, Foreign Policy & Security Programme, ELIAMEP

The retreat of multilateralism, the systematic erosion and/or removal of international norms/rules, and the ascendancy of the logic of power in inter-state relations that followed Trump’s election and have largely been imposed by the United States is expected to detract markedly from the Great Powers’ ability to cooperate in a meaningful and effective way at the upcoming 85th General Assembly of the United Nations. There, the United States (the strongest but least legitimate part of a divided—if not fragmented—West), an ever-stronger China, which is already working towards building an enlarged anti-Western coalition, the dynamically “anti-Western” Russia, and India, the most populous nation in the world, are expected to reaffirm their positions and roles in the new and continually evolving “post-Western” world.

In this world, however, several “non-aligned” countries will, for reasons of pragmatism and self-interest, may choose not to place themselves under the “protection” or control of the US, China or Russia. These non-aligned nations, which include most of the almost forty that did not condemn Russia’s invasion at the UN General Assembly in March 2022 and February 2023, not only do not form a distinct bloc (a “Global South”), they are often in conflict with one another.

The scope for cooperation between the Great Powers within the framework of the UN General Assembly will therefore be curtailed, with the few areas of potential cooperation limited to “global goods” such as the climate, health and/or development, and global security problems such as international terrorism, organized crime, unregulated AI development, and the uncontrolled militarization of space. The Great Powers may find themselves cooperating on these issues, either because they recognize the cost of non-cooperation, or because their interests largely converge. Moreover, the prospect of China, Russia, India, and a number of other medium- and small-sized states forging alliances in one or more of these domains cannot be discounted. Formed under an “anti-Western banner” at the forthcoming UN General Assembly, they may seek to create and promote new international principles and norms.

Dimitris Tsarouhas, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University; Non-Resident Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP

To mark the UN’s annual assembly, the organization released a shocking report that accurately describes the state of the international community 80 years on from its founding. In 2024, military spending soared to 2.7 trillion dollars, an amount more than 13 times higher (!) than the official development aid provided by wealthy nations, and 750 times the UN’s regular budget.

Many member states are either actively engaged in, or preparing for, military conflict. The window for saving the UN mission is closing, even though its good offices are needed now more than at any other time since the end of the Cold War.

 

 

 

Sobald fertiggestellt, zählt der Brenner-Basistunnel zu den längsten Eisenbahntunneln der Welt: Er verbindet Innsbruck in Österreich mit Franzensfeste in Italien und verkürzt die Fahrzeit auf der Schiene um rund 60 Prozent – auf nur noch eine halbe Stunde.

La situation en Serbie, marquée par des manifestations contre le régime en place, signe le début d'une possible rupture de l'isolement des Balkans. Même si les autorités parviennent temporairement à réprimer les protestations, celles-ci finiront par ressurgir, tant les tensions sociales et politiques accumulées sont profondes et persistantes.

- Libres opinions. L'espace de débat du Courrier des Balkans / Serbie

„Das ist so ein kleiner Schritt, dass man ihn vielleicht nur beschließt, um das Thema vom Tisch zu bekommen“, so Borrell.

Si nos sociétés pouvaient se résumer à un grand corps numérique, les data centers en seraient le cœur. Véritables « usines à données », ils assurent le stockage, le traitement et la distribution des informations qui irriguent notre quotidien. Sans eux, pas de cloud, pas d’intelligence artificielle, pas de services publics numériques performants. Mais ces […]

Die wichtigsten Punkte: Frankreich: Sicherheitskräfte wappnen sich für Massenproteste – bis zu 800.000 Menschen könnten auf die Straßen gehen; EU-Parlament: Zwei italienische Abgeordnete mit Verbindungen zur „Qatargate“-Affäre sind nach ihrer Suspendierung wieder in der S&D-Fraktion; Klima: Die Umweltminister ringen um das 2035-Ziel – Dänemark drängt auf eine Ausweichlösung über die Vereinten Nationen.

African states and regional organizations have increasingly turned to new forms of African-led security arrangements that differ in mandate, composition, and structure from African Union (AU)–led peace support operations. These ad hoc security initiatives (ASIs) and enterprise security arrangements (ESAs) have provided flexible and rapid responses to complex security threats. However, they are heavily militarized and poorly aligned with evolving frameworks for the protection of civilians (POC).  

This issue brief examines how ASIs and ESAs, while offering speed and adaptability, often lack civilian components, rely on external support, and do not consistently draw on a coherent normative framework for POC. As a result, protection frequently becomes secondary to counterinsurgency objectives, creating logistical weaknesses, alienating local populations, and reinforcing perceptions that protection is transactional or secondary to other interests. The brief highlights emerging practices—such as Rwanda’s deployment in Mozambique and the Multinational Joint Task Force’s Civil-Military Cooperation Cell—that suggest the potential for more protection-conscious approaches, though these remain uneven and underdeveloped.  

The brief concludes that ASIs and ESAs are likely to remain features of Africa’s security landscape, but their effectiveness will remain limited unless they systematically integrate AU and UN POC frameworks. Stronger pre-deployment planning, the inclusion of AU civilian cells in the field, and alignment with broader political strategies are essential to ensure that these mechanisms contribute not only to counterinsurgency but also to the protection of civilians. 

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The post The Role of Ad Hoc Security Initiatives and Enterprise Security Arrangements in the Protection of Civilians in Africa appeared first on International Peace Institute.

With UN peacekeepers increasingly deployed in areas experiencing local-level conflicts that do not involve state forces, responding to communal violence has become an acute challenge for missions. Such contexts require peace operations to adopt a dialogue-based approach to the protection of civilians (POC), focused specifically on local political solutions. 

This issue brief examines the engagement of the UN mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) in the town of Batangafo, where communal violence between Christian and Muslim communities has been pervasive. It highlights how MINUSCA’s dialogue-based engagement helped reduce violence and strengthen local peace agreements. It identifies four lessons: 

• Protecting civilians in the context of communal conflict requires political solutions—not just military ones.
• Continuous and proactive dialogue helps to prevent escalation and reinforce peace agreements. 
• Economic incentives can be leveraged to encourage armed groups to commit to peace. 
• Sustainable protection depends on aligning local and national peace processes. 

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The post Political Solutions to Political Problems: UN Peacekeeping Operations and Dialogue-Based Protection of Civilians in Communal Conflicts appeared first on International Peace Institute.

UN peacekeeping missions are often criticized for failing to act when civilians are under threat. Yet recent empirical evidence suggests that peacekeepers can and do respond to violence by adjusting where and how they deploy forces in the field. This issue brief examines patterns of subnational deployment across African missions from 2012 to 2022, focusing on whether and how missions with protection of civilians (POC) mandates adjust their military presence in response to attacks on civilians. The findings indicate that peacekeeping missions are more likely to strengthen their presence in areas experiencing recent violence—especially violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups—but also respond to state-led violence, albeit less consistently. This responsiveness highlights the operational flexibility some missions can exercise and challenges the assumption that host-state consent fully constrains the implementation of POC mandates. The brief also underscores the need to assess peacekeepers’ behavior not only in terms of mandate design but also in terms of how missions adapt on the ground. 

The brief concludes with important considerations for peacekeeping stakeholders committed to POC: 

• Missions are often actively protecting civilians, with operational flexibility as a key ingredient.
• Host-state consent can constrain action, but missions can still act decisively; sustaining political consensus on POC is crucial. 
• Mandates and planning frameworks must allow dynamic deployments so missions can adapt to evolving threats. 

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The post Being Present Where It Counts: Peacekeeping Responsiveness to Violence against Civilians appeared first on International Peace Institute.