European Union

DRAFT REPORT Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Committee on Foreign Affairs
David McAllister

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 235 - Draft report Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Kosovo
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

MPs debated a petition on Monday 10 September to withdraw Article 50 if Vote Leave broke electoral laws. But hardly any MPs turned up.

The petition, which had almost 200,000 signatures, requested:

‘If Vote Leave has broken any laws regarding overspending in 2016 EU referendum then Article 50 should be immediately withdrawn and full EU membership continued.’

Of course, we all now know that Vote Leave did break electoral rules, with allegations of fraud currently being investigated by the police.

But Tory and Labour frontbenchers rejected the calls to withdraw Article 50 over Vote Leave’s overspending.

Some MPs complained that the debate, in Westminster Hall, clashed with another debate in the main House of Commons chamber on the same afternoon on ‘Legislating for the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement’.

When I Tweeted a photo of the debate in Westminster Hall with hardly anyone there, many Tweeters expressed their fury.

• “Absolutely disgraceful, what has happened to MPs supposedly representing their constituents?” Tweeted @NotWhatIBelieve.
• “This image is a clear demonstration of how little our politicians care about the fact that Vote Leave cheated,” Tweeted @JayPatrol
• “How far has UK democracy sunk, that cheating is dismissed with a shrug of the shoulder,” Tweeted @julian_rowden.
• “Shows how grossly irresponsible and cowardly most MPs are being over Brexit,” Tweeted @ChristophBennet.
• “Outrageous,” Tweeted @Akinsey08
• “This is such a joke. Incompetent government, useless opposition, upholding the result of a fraudulent referendum. Democracy is dead; there is no integrity left in British politics,” Tweeted @audrymaeve.
• “If anyone remains in any doubt as to the democratic credentials of both Tory and Labour parties this should  clarify. This Country is mired in corruption,” Tweeted @MichaelMandb01.
• “I despair. MPs not doing their job. Democracy dead. Corruption admired. Fascist britain looms,” Tweeted @Jennie_Pawson.
• “That is our MPs for you.  Only interested in themselves and their own advancement,” Tweeted @Johnantifas.
• “If it was about a pay rise it would be standing room only,” Tweeted @ASupermum.

Many directly Tweeted their MPs to demand to know why they were not at the debate.

• “@ChrisRuane2017 As my MP and someone who claimed to support Remain in the 2017 GE, where are you in this picture? If you weren’t there, why not?” Tweeted @wible1
• “@DLidington as one of your constituents can you please advise me why it’s ok for politicians to break the law?” Tweeted @KatherineRoe
• “Did you attend this important debate @JDjanogly? If not, why not, when @vote_leave broke electoral law?” Tweeted @amandarandall5
• “@alexsobel did you attend this?” Tweeted @AngryRemainer.

Alex Sobel, Labour Co-op MP for Leeds West, and a strong anti-Brexiter, was one the only MPs to respond.

• “I was in the main chamber for the Legislating the EU Withdrawal Bill debate. Here is my contribution http://bit.ly/2CGgJF8 It was a big mistake to timetable two Brexit debates at the same time,” he Tweeted back.

Today, Mr Sobel emailed me the following comment:

“The Government knew there was a Westminster hall debate that day, triggered by many thousands of signatures. They then chose to put down their own Brexit debate on the same afternoon in the commons chamber, the houses premier debating chamber.

“It is regrettable that many MPs had to make the choice about which debate to attend. If the public are to trust that petition debates are valued, scheduling must be done better.”

Tonight I have asked Andrea Leadsom, Leader of the House of Commons, to respond. After all, it’s her job to announce every Thursday the timetable for Commons proceedings for the following week.

When Ms Leadsom announced that there would be a debate in the House of Commons on the afternoon of Monday 10 September, she already knew that the Commons Petitions Committee had also scheduled the debate on the petition to rescind Article 50 on the same afternoon.

(I will report back here if I receive a reply from Ms Leadsom).

During the debate about the petition in the empty Westminster Hall, the Brexit minister Chris Heaton-Harris said that while the government “respects the views and wishes” of those who signed the petition, the referendum result was one that “cannot be ignored”.

And Labour’s shadow Brexit minister Paul Blomfield said the law did not provide for overturning referendum results for cheating.

The government’s formal response to the petition stated:

‘The British people voted to leave the EU and the Government respects that decision. We have always been clear that as a matter of policy our notification under Article 50 will not be withdrawn.’

The response added:

‘The British people voted to leave the EU, and it is the duty of the Government to deliver on their instruction. There can be no attempt to stay in the EU.

‘The result of the referendum held on 23 June 2016 saw a majority of people vote to leave the European Union. This was the biggest democratic mandate for a course of action ever directed at any UK Government.

‘Following this, Parliament authorised the Prime Minister to trigger Article 50, passing the EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Act.

‘In last year’s General Election, over 80% of people then voted for parties committing to respecting the result of the referendum.

‘It was the stated policy of both major parties that the decision of the people would be respected. The Government is clear that it is now its duty to implement the will of the electorate.

‘This was not a decision made after just a few weeks of campaigning, but one that came after a debate that had taken place both in Parliament and across the country for decades.’

The statement added:

‘The British people can trust this Government to honour the referendum result and get the best deal possible. To do otherwise would be to undermine the decision of the British people.

‘The premise that the people can trust their politicians to deliver on the promises they make and will deliver them in Parliament is fundamental to our democracy.’

But the statement, by the Department for Exiting the European Union, made no reference to the cheating by the Vote Leave campaign and did not answer the premise of the petition, that Article 50 should be rescinded in the event that Vote Leave broke electoral laws.

The government’s statement concluded:

‘It is the Government’s duty to deliver the will of the people and reach a desirable final outcome.’

So, it appears the government believes that promises made by their politicians need to be ‘honoured’, even if those promises are based on lies, and the campaign to win the EU referendum was based on cheating. So much for democracy and fair elections.

But even if Westminster Hall had been filled to the rafters with MPs, it would not have made any difference. Although almost 200,000 people signed the petition for the Article 50 notice to be withdrawn if Vote Leave cheated, petitions carry no weight in Parliament.

Petitions debated by MPs in Westminster Hall cannot directly result in a change to legislation or policy. The only motion that can be voted on is that ‘This House has considered the petition…”

Of course, the vote can only be ‘Aye’: the petition has been considered by MPs. But it’s meaningless. Petitions to Parliament are meaningless. Democracy in the UK is becoming meaningless.

• Watch the video of the debate:

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 182 - Draft report Implementation of the EU association agreement with Moldova
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

will take place on Monday, 24 September, 15:00-16:00 in Brussels.

Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.

Further information
watch the meeting live
Access rights for interest group representatives
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 224 - Draft report Report on the 2018 Commission Report on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

National Technical University of Ukraine ‘Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute’ Photo credits: Oksana Turysheva

Myroslava Hladchenko

During the last decades, the development of the knowledge economy in Western societies has significantly changed both the roles played by universities and the relationship between the university, industry and government, resulting in the emergence of the Triple Helix (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) as one of the global models of world society (Meyer 2010). The main idea behind the Triple Helix lies in the expansion of the role of knowledge in social development more broadly and of the university in the economy more specifically (Etzkowitz 2002). The university is expected to extend its traditional missions of knowledge transmission (teaching) and production (research) to include economic and social development (Pinheiro et al. 2015; Benneworth et al. 2015).

 

Similar to other global models of world society, the Triple Helix originates and has been applied in the context of developed or mature economies, but less developed countries have also made attempts to implement this global model into their specific national contexts. Meanwhile, the specific national context as an institutional environment can be characterised by a high degree of institutional complexity caused by means-ends decoupling at the state level (Hladchenko and Westerheijden 2018; Hladchenko et al. 2018). Means-ends decoupling (Bromley and Powell 2012) at the state level implies that policies and practices of the state are disconnected from its core goal of creating public welfare. Such means-ends decoupling occurs, for instance, in oligarchic economies, where the state is captured by exploitative, rent-seeking oligarchies in business and politics. This bleak picture describes numerous post-communist countries, one of which is Ukraine.

 

In a recent article ‘Implementing the Triple Helix model: Means-ends decoupling at the state level?’, co-authored with Romulo Pinheiro we explore how means-ends decoupling at the state level affected the implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine. The data emanate from personal interviews with the senior managers of four universities and science parks established within them who were directly involved with the pursuit of public policy geared towards promoting the implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine. For our research we selected the science parks located in universities with different disciplinary profiles: Technical University, Classical University, University of Economics and University of Life Sciences.

 

Means-ends decoupling at the state level

Decoupling is one of the main concepts of sociological institutionalism. Bromley and Powell (2012) distinguish between policy-practice and means-ends decoupling. The former refers to a gap between policy and practice, the classical object of implementation studies. The latter refers to a gap between practices and outcomes (Bromley and Powell 2012), that is, policies are executed according to plan yet intended outcomes are not achieved. It occurs because the implemented practices are compartmentalised from the core goals of the actor in question, e.g., state, organisation, individual (Bromley and Powell 2012). Consequently, means-ends decoupling entails an “efficiency gap” (Dick 2015) and the diversion of critical resources (Bromley and Powell 2012). Means-ends decoupling at the state level results in institutional complexity for organisations when they confront incompatible prescriptions emanating from a single or multiple institutional logics, thus experiencing institutional complexity (Meyer and Höllerer 2016). Meanwhile, institutional complexity promotes organisations in applying means-ends decoupling to attain legitimacy (Bromley and Powell 2012).

 

Backdrop to the Case: Means-Ends Decoupling at the State Level in Ukraine

Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was established as an independent state in 1991 which also involved the transition to a market economy.  However, state policies aimed at lustration, de-Sovietisation and decommunisation were not adopted and civil society remained underdeveloped. Moreover, inconsistently implemented privatization allowed a post-Soviet oligarchy consisting of the Soviet political elite and actors from the Soviet shadow economy to emerge. Drawing on our theoretical framework, in the Ukrainian case, means-ends decoupling was sustained at the state level, as the policies and practices of the state were disconnected from its core goal of creating public welfare. It resulted in inconsistencies within the institutional logic of the state, leading to a high degree of institutional complexity experienced by organisations and individuals that did not belong to the privileged group of so-called “rent seekers”.

 

Diffusion and Implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine

The diffusion of the Triple Helix model in the Ukrainian context was initiated by the National Technical University of Ukraine ‘Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute’, acting as an institutional entrepreneur. In the period 2004–06, KPI participated in the EU’s TEMPUS project together with European higher education institutions. As a result of this collaboration the first Ukrainian science park (Kyivska Polytechnika) was established in 2006. In 2009-2010, in the context of implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine, the government awarded the status of ‘research university’ to 13 flagship universities. However, the implementation of the Triple Helix in Ukraine turned into means-ends decoupling at the state level due to the rent-seeking behaviour of the powerful actors from the governmental institutions. Urgent domestic reforms to foster the knowledge economy were not undertaken while the research universities lacked funding for infrastructure.

 

Means-ends decoupling at the state level – the cause of the diversion of intellectual capital

Means-ends decoupling at the state level, caused by the rent-seeking behaviour of business and political oligarchies, led to the implementation of the Triple Helix model in Ukraine also reflecting a case of means-ends decoupling. Consequently, contradictions within the institutional logic of the state resulted in a high degree of institutional complexity experienced by the science parks established at the case universities. What is more, means-ends decoupling at the state level causes the means and ends of the organisational actors to be also decoupled due to the institutional complexity that they confront. That is, institutional complexity triggers means-ends decoupling at the organisational level, as claimed by Bromley and Powell (2012). In addition, the more senior managers of the university and the science park maintain the logic of confidence in practices that deviate from the Triple Helix model, the greater rent-seeking and means-ends decoupling at the organisational level.

 

One of the many negative consequences of means-ends decoupling at the state level and rent-seeking behaviour of powerful actors in governmental institutions is the loss of intellectual capital through brain drain. Thus, the longer means-ends decoupling and rent-seeking will persist both at the state and organisational levels, the further will Ukraine move away from the so-called ‘world society’ and its corresponding institutional arrangements.

 

Myroslava Hladchenko is an associate professor at the University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine.

 

References

Benneworth, Paul, Harry de Boer, and Ben Jongbloed. 2015. Between good intentions and urgent stakeholder pressures: Institutionalizing the universities’ third mission in the Swedish context. European Journal of Higher Education 5(3): 280–296.

Bromley, Patricia, and Walter Powell. 2012. From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: Decoupling in the contemporary world. The Academy of Management Annals 6(1): 483–530.

Dick, Penny. 2015. From rational myth to self-fulfilling prophecy? Understanding the persistence of means-ends decoupling as a consequence of the latent functions of policy enactment. Organization Studies 36(7): 897-924.

Etzkowitz, Henry, and Loet Leydesdorff. 2000. The dynamics of innovation: From national systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of university–industry–government relations. Research Policy 29: 109–123.

Hladchenko, Myroslava, and Romulo Pinheiro. 2018. Implementing the Triple Helix Model: Means-Ends Decoupling at the State Level? Minerva First Online: 7 July 2018.

Hladchenko, Myroslava, Don Westerheijden, and Harry de Boer. 2018. Means-ends decoupling at the state level and managerial responses to multiple organisational identities in Ukrainian research universities. Higher Education Research & Development: 1-14

Hladchenko, Myroslava, and Don Westerheijden. 2018. Means-ends decoupling and academic identities in Ukrainian university after the Revolution of Dignity. European Journal of Higher Education 8(2): 152-168.

Meyer, John. 2010. World society, institutional theory, and the actor. Annual Review of Sociology 36: 1–20.

Meyer, Renate, and Markus Höllerer. 2016. Laying a smoke screen: Ambiguity and neutralization as strategic responses to intra-institutional complexity. Strategic Organization 14(4): 373-406.

Pinheiro, Rómulo, Patricio Langa, and Attila Pausits. 2015. One and two equals three? The third mission of higher education institutions. European Journal of Higher Education 5(3): 233–249.

 

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Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

The personalities of the High Representative (of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security within the European Union [EU]) have fascinated journalists and academics since the position was created. Michaela Korsch argues we should move pass the gossip and introduce rigour and method in our understanding of an individual who is pivotal in translating the preferences of twenty-eight member states into a consistent foreign policy.

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For the next High Representative, leading experts already dream of a job advertisement that sounds something like this: ‘Candidates that will be considered must be well-known, highly respected, and experienced politicians in foreign policy with agreeable strategic objectives in international politics. And most importantly make sure you have a ‘bright and shiny’ personality!’

When considering media coverage on the personalities of the High Representatives, it appears that having the best dirt raises your status: Federica Mogherini, currently the High Representative, was attributed a nerdy personality when Brussels started to think of her as a successor to Catherine Ashton (the first holder of the position from 2009-2014).

Well, if ‘nerdy’ is referring to Mogherini’s degree in political science and her knowledge of three languages, things could be worse.

In comparison to Catherine Ashton, the former Italian foreign minister got off lightly. At the beginning of her term Ashton was referred to as ‘Lady Who’, a not exactly flattering comment on her appearance. It became even worse when Rod Liddle attested Ashton had the ‘charisma of a caravan site on the Isle of Sheppey’. Wait, does a caravan site have a personality? Anyway.

Academic literature on EU foreign policy has noticed these expressions about the High Representatives, as those mentioned above. However, I suggest that what (possibly) works for a journalist, might not work as well for a political scientist.

So here is my claim: less chatter, more methodology!

Let us find the means to thoroughly investigate the personalities of the High Representatives instead of only quoting ‘gossip’; to understand a personality is more than a reflection of superficialities (speaking of ‘nerdy Federica’) or picking up chitchat from London (‘Lady Catherine Who’). It can shed light on how the EU as a foreign policy actor sees the world and subsequently acts.

Foreign Policy Analysis, a subfield of international relations, offers valuable insights for this. The operational code approach addresses the beliefs of foreign policy actors on their context of action as well as their preferred strategy to achieve goals. To investigate the leadership style of an actor the leadership trait analysis is a well-known tool within the field. Media coverage will of course still work to stress certain ideas.

Why (of all foreign policy actors out there) investigate the High Representative? Of course, the position’s influence is limited (compared to the national foreign minister of, e.g., Germany or France), but calling it ‘more an embarrassment for the EU than a support’ falls short of an explanation. It is time to take the personalities of the High Representatives seriously (credits for this ‘evergreen’ quote go to Andrew Moravcsik).

Both Ashton and Mogherini have shown they are able to enhance the EU’s foreign policy. In 2015, Mogherini negotiated (with international partners and based on Catherine Ashton’s groundwork) the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. Ashton stood out for reaching an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013 which normalized their relationship, just one of serval of her successes. A ‘charisma free zone’ certainly looks different.

Having said this, note that like other EU offices the choice for a High Representative is the result of a horse trade – just in case you are waiting for the next incumbent to be the glorified person identified by our leading experts. Twenty-eight member states take part in a system of unanimous voting while insisting on their preferences and facing different challenges in international relations. Of course, they also seek to protect their national sovereignty.

What the EU needs is a High Representative with a personality able to translate this ‘horse trading mentality’ into a more consistent EU foreign policy. Arguably this is the best solution for a Union still waiting to act on a global scale. I doubt that there is room for an ‘EU foreign minister’ being a leader like a national foreign minister can be. The key is to adjust the expectations of what the High Representative is expected to be and how.

So, it is time to ask what the ‘bright and shiny’ personality of the High Representative looks like in scientific terms – it is a safe bet that the answer would be more elaborate and rigorous than what we currently know and how it influences EU foreign policy. Perusing the literature on the EU’s foreign policy shows there is a glaring gap to be filled.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Michaela Korsch (Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt) is a political scientist and external PhD candidate investigating the personal influence of the High Representatives Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini.

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On this week’s BBC Question Time, Prisons Minister, Rory Stewart, said we couldn’t have a new ‘People’s Vote’ on the final Brexit deal because, basically, it’s too complicated for a referendum choice.

When QT presenter, David Dimbleby, asked the minister if the government would put the final Brexit deal to an election, Mr Stewart replied that the Chequers deal “involves 17 different components. It’s not appropriate for a referendum choice.”

So, we were asked a simple question in 2016 on whether or not we should remain a member of the European Union. But now we’re not allowed any say on the complicated answer. How democratic is that?

If the terms of us leaving are too complicated to be decided by a referendum, then the same argument can be applied to the original question of whether we should remain in or leave the EU.

Because the decision about our membership of the EU doesn’t involve just ’17 different components’. It involves tens of thousands of components.

Mr Stewart talked of the Chequers deal as if it is a done deal. But the rest of us know that it’s a dead deal.

Many MPs – both Remainers and Brexiters – say they won’t vote for it. More crucially, the European Union say they won’t accept it.

So what deal will we get? Nobody knows, but a no deal, which would be catastrophic for all our lives, is increasingly looking likely.

We must have a democratic say on this. It’s vital.

The problem is that binary choices don’t work. Not in our own lives, and not in politics.

• Do you say a simple yes or no to a holiday? No, you also need to know where you’re going, when, and how much.
• Do you say a simple yes or no to a new job? No, you also need to know what the job entails, the salary, and the conditions of employment.

When we know the actual final details of the Brexit deal or no deal, the electorate needs to have a say on it.

It’s no good giving us a yes or no choice to a complicated question, and then telling us we can’t have any say on the detailed answer.

We need another referendum, or another snap general election.

We cannot allow incompetent government ministers to decide the future of this country, and all our lives, without any further input from us, the people.

Mr Stewart proclaimed on Question Time that:

“If we don’t leave the European Union, there will be a political crisis that will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.”

No, Mr Stewart.

Most of us can now see the exact opposite: leaving the European Union will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.

Give us a say on our future. That’s democratic.

The government’s view is that they can go ahead and decide our future for us, without any say by us.

That’s not democratic. That’s dictatorship.

• Watch the 90-second video of the Prison Minister saying that the Brexit deal is not appropriate for a referendum choice:

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'Brexit deal is too complicated for a referendum'

→ 1-minute video: Freudian slip by the prisons minister – Please share'FINAL BREXIT DEAL IS TOO COMPLICATED FOR A REFERENDUM'Last night on BBC Question Time, Prisons Minister, Rory Stewart, said we couldn’t have a #PeoplesVote on the final Brexit deal because, basically, it’s too complicated for a referendum choice. When QT presenter, David Dimbleby, asked the minister if the government would put the final Brexit deal to an election, Mr Stewart replied that the Chequers deal “involves 17 different components. It’s not appropriate for a referendum choice.”So, we were asked a simple question in 2016 on whether or not we should remain a member of the European Union. But now we’re not allowed any say on the complicated answer. How democratic is that?If the terms of us leaving are too complicated to be decided by a referendum, then the same argument can be applied to the original question of whether we should remain in or leave the EU. Because the decision about our membership of the EU doesn’t involve just ’17 different components’. It involves tens of thousands of components.Mr Stewart talked of the Chequers deal as if it is a done deal. But the rest of us know that it’s a dead deal. Many MPs – both Remainers and Brexiters – say they won’t vote for it. More crucially, the European Union say they won’t accept it.So what deal will we get? Nobody knows, but a no deal, which would be catastrophic for all our lives, is increasingly looking likely. We must have a democratic say on this. It's vital.The problem is that binary choices don’t work. Not in our own lives, and not in politics.Do you say a simple yes or no to a holiday? No, you also need to know where you’re going, when, and how much. Do you say a simple yes or no to a new job? No, you also need to know what the job entails, the salary, and the conditions of employment.When we know the actual final details of the Brexit deal or no deal, the electorate needs to have a say on it. It’s no good giving us a yes or no choice to a complicated question, and then telling us we can’t have any say on the detailed answer.We need another referendum, or another snap general election.We cannot allow incompetent government ministers to decide the future of this country, and all our lives, without any further input from us, the people.Mr Stewart proclaimed on Question Time that, “If we don’t leave the European Union, there will be a political crisis that will tear this country apart for the next 50 years.”No, Mr Stewart. Most of us can now see the exact opposite: leaving the European Union will tear this country apart for the next 50 years. Give us a say on our future. That’s democratic. The government’s view is that they can go ahead and decide our future for us, without any say by us.That’s not democratic. That's dictatorship.• Words and video compilation by Jon Danzig• Please re-Tweet, and follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter:twitter.com/Reasons2Remain/status/1040609288090214400• This video is now available on the Reasons2Remain YouTube channel. Please share, and follow our channel. https://youtu.be/kMzoo14K_qI Before commenting on the Reasons2Remain campaign page, please read our new Rules of Engagement: Rules.Reasons2Remain.com********************************************► Watch Jon Danzig's 50-minute video: 'Can Britain Stop Brexit?' Go to CanBritainStopBrexit.com********************************************• To follow and support Reasons2Remain just ‘like’ the page, and please invite all your friends to like the page. ********************************************• Please recommend Reasons2Remain in the reviews section. Here's the link: facebook.com/Reasons2Remain/reviews/********************************************• Follow Reasons2Remain on Twitter: twitter.com/reasons2remain and Instagram: instagram.com/reasons2remain/********************************************• Explore our unique Reasons2Remain gallery of over 1,000 graphics and articles: reasons2remain.co.uk********************************************• Reasons2Remain is an entirely unfunded community campaign, unaffiliated with any other group or political party, and is run entirely by volunteers. If you'd like to help, please send us a private message.********************************************• © Reasons2Remain 2018. All our articles and graphics are the copyright of Reasons2Remain. We only allow sharing using the Facebook share button. Any other use requires our advance permission in writing.#STOPBREXIT #EXITBREXIT #PEOPLESVOTE #FINALSAY

Posted by Reasons2Remain on Friday, 14 September 2018

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 290 - Draft report Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world 2017 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 291 - 391 - Draft report Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world 2017 and the European Union’s policy on the matter
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Delegations

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Publication resulting from the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018

The process of European integration has always faced challenges, but the complexities in which the European Union finds itself today are unprecedented, Karlis Bukovskis reflects. Following his participation at the UACES GF 2018 Conference, Bukovskis offers a conceptualisation of the recent wave of populism and trends in integration, in order to contemplate Europe’s institutional future.

© Jakub Jirsák/Adobe Stock

Challenges and crises are part and parcel of the European integration process. Indeed, they have often been a driving force for deeper integration, with countries delegating sovereign-decision making power to supranational institutions to address them.

Even when a member decides to leave the European Union (EU), overall integration deepens; in the case of Brexit, we have seen the emergence of European defence structures, an area previously less integrated than the economic, foreign policy, or even the justice and home affairs sectors.

The EU has been in a prolonged self-evaluation process — a process initially caused by the sovereign debt crisis and then exacerbated by the migration crisis and Brexit. Together with a slow recovery of the economy, the recent surges of populism and Euroscepticism, the EU project is undoubtedly yet again in a complex situation.

What, then, does the future hold for the EU, in relation to populism and its institutional developments?

Populism in Form / Populism in Substance

Populism – broadly, the appeal to anxieties of the masses – has been part of the political process and rhetoric since the dawn of politics.

We can distinguish two sides of the recent populist wave in democratic countries. On the one side: populism in form, which seeks to address as many voters as possible via all means possible. On the other: populism in substance, aimed at destroying existing policies, multilateral and economic ties by appealing to anti-globalisation and anti-Europeanisation.

The first is a product of modern technological developments putting a world of information at one’s fingertips. The consequent changes to the political process and voter mobilisation have been monumental; Facebook heroes, Twitter warriors and television are performing the function of mass electoral mobilisation — previously the domain of mass party politics and political ideologies.

Ad-hoc issues and topical matters dominate the political rhetoric and electoral process. Differences in values, policies, historical interpretations, regimes and policies – traditionally an endless well for political rhetoric – will continue to be used by both marginal and mainstream politicians exercising and promoting populist rhetoric: this is populism in form.

Populism in substance is exemplified in modern foreign policy through oversimplified positions and solutions. For example, the utilisation of EU-Turkey relations in domestic political debates and the maximising of the rift between the positions of current administration of the United States of America and the EU by politicians seeking popularity points. Similarly, the developments in the Visegrad group countries and those in Western European countries are used as political vehicles by fellow member states.

In spite of the results of the Dutch national elections and Emmanuel Macron’s victory in last year’s French presidential elections, Euroscepticism still finds ears among voters. It is largely due to the towering complexity of the EU to the everyday voter and the European Commission’s lost reputation as neutral arbiter since J.-C. Juncker’s rule.

Brexit and the emergence of internal opposition, especially in the form of the Visegrad group countries, signify the EU’s re-entry into an era of inter-governmentalism after prolonged periods of de facto federalisation. A willingness to see the EU’s supranational institutions as instruments for the promotion of national interests has been around since its birth.

Today, Visegrad elites are balancing the revival of national self-esteem and the wish to remain in the EU, resulting in harsh rhetoric and shattered relationships.

Evidently, after being subjected to prolonged periods of conditionality, transition and transformation, the post-communist countries are now ready to be treated as equal partners, not only by their fellow member states, but also by the supranational institutions. And this wish plainly sells among voters.

The Institutional Future of the EU

The prolonged reality of the multispeed Europe is principally due to the federalism/inter-governmentalism debate. Different intensities of integration between countries are based on their national interests, economic exposure and political views of particular ruling elite or even individual politicians. The Schengen area, the Eurozone, the PESCO are just some examples of enhanced cooperation advancing and reshaping, and thereby making more complex, the institutional structures of the EU.

Moreover, every opt-out has been a chance for countries and their societies to put their foot down and say ‘no’ to EU integration without impeding overall integration. As a result, not only does the current shape of the EU allow various levels of collaboration, but the same stands also for engagement levels with third countries.

It is no longer just about membership of the EU. DCFTAs, FTAs, FTAs+ are free trade area formats that provide an opportunity for the EU to secure permanent cooperation and Europeanisation of countries that will never be part of the EU, and especially not part of the EU core.

Meanwhile, the EU core and the Banking Union are becoming more and more distant not only from the already existing EU member states, but also from membership aspirers. As the EU core becomes more homogenous, it also becomes more demanding to semi-core and periphery countries of the EU.

As a result, countries championing EU membership will have to go to much greater lengths and delegate much more sovereignty than countries of previous enlargements. For instance, further European Monetary Union integration makes EU accession a much greater leap for nation states.

It is evident that domestic integration problems will dominate the agenda at least until 2025 with the EU’s internal structure becoming increasingly complex. This will weigh heavily on relations both inside and outside the EU.

Already incomprehensible to a non-professional audience, the EU and its institutions will be further estranged from its population.

In external relations, the EU will become more complex to deal with and more complicated to integrate into. At the same time, however, new formats of association and engagement with the EU will allow flexibility in relations towards the third countries.

The EU is now debating its future, domestically, at the European Parliament, and in the Council regarding the finalization of the Economic and Monetary Union. This is an opportunity for the member states and their leaders to express their wishes and fears regarding the EU. The pertinent question remains, however, of the extent to which the non-professional audience will be able to participate, both in comprehending and in shaping, this “ever complex Union”.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Karlis Bukovskis

Karlis Bukovskis is the Deputy Director and a researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (LIIA), the author of numerous articles, and the scientific editor of several books. Bukovskis is a lecturer on global political economy, international financial system and the EU integration at Riga Graduate School of Law and Riga Stradins University.

The post The Future of Populism and the Institutional Setting of the “Ever Complex Union” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

How did the European Union respond to the Ukraine crisis? Maryna Rabinovych considers the EU’s approach as a development exercise and suggests how its policy can be improved in the nearby future.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kiev © Natalia Bratslavsky/AdobeStock

The 2013 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent aggression in Eastern Ukraine posed a complex challenge to EU’s policy vis-à-vis Ukraine. The Union’s foreign policy response to the Ukraine crisis involves three key aspects: sanctions and diplomatic pressure on Russia; selective engagement with Russia and, finally, the intensification of development cooperation with Ukraine. Following the logic of the Comprehensive Approach to Conflicts and Crises (presently converted into the Integrated Approach), the EU managed to develop a large-scale multi-aspect development response to the Ukraine crisis, disposing of a rich toolbox.

However, since this response was conducted outside the realm of EU’s development policy and related assessment instruments, it is useful to reconsider the EU’s ENP to post-Euromaidan Ukraine as a development exercise. Such analysis is highly relevant for improving EU’s development engagement with Ukraine, given the ENP’s declared pivotal role in the EU’s general effort to implement Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Moreover, an insight into the development aspect of the ENP is crucial for conceptualizing the joint Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument in terms of the 2021-2027 EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework.

Policy’s Comprehensiveness and Systemic Response

Apart from constituting a major threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine exacerbated the economic and financial situation in Ukraine, absorbing around 20% of the country’s GDP annually. It also brought to the surface systemic military, political and institutional issues within Ukraine, involving inter alia corruption, the absence of checks and balances and a dysfunctional judicial system. The complexity of these issues as well as the trend towards a comprehensive EU external action (stemming from the adoption of the Agenda 2030 and the stipulation of general policy objectives in Art.21 (2) TEU) have determined the comprehensiveness of EU’s development response to the Ukraine crisis.

The EU’s policy towards post-Euromaidan Ukraine can be considered as comprehensive in several regards. First, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) that fully entered into force in 2017 is perceived as “the most advanced agreement of its kind ever negotiated by the European Union”. Of particular significance is the parties’ creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), directed to “Ukraine’s gradual integration to the Internal Market”. Moreover, the implementation of the AA is reinforced by ‘overarching’ technical support projects (e..g, “Association4U”) and projects on individual DCFTA disciplines (e.g., state aid, public procurement).

Second, parallel to the implementation of the AA, the EU has been conducting an ambitious state-building programme in Ukraine since 2014, based on macro-financial assistance and budget support. The 2014 State-Building Contract for Ukraine followed an OECD ‘menu’, involving multi-aspect reforms (e.g., public finance management, civil service and electoral law reforms). Third, the comprehensiveness of EU response is exemplified by its sector-specific blends of macro-economic and technical assistance projects, involving civil society support.

Despite the comprehensive scope and rich toolbox of the above engagement, the integration and state-building axes lack a common conceptual prerequisite (such as the sustainable development concept) and encourage few synergies. Furthermore, although there is an engagement with SDGs (e.g., Goal 8 “Decent Work and Economic Growth” and Goal 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”), the development-related targets and indicators are absent and no link is made to Ukraine’s own efforts to achieve SDGs. These drawbacks lead us to the problem of policy coherence in the Union’s development response to Ukraine.

Donor Coordination and Policy Coherence

The Agenda 2030 and the new European Consensus on Development distinguish several aspects of coherence: donor coordination, goals’ integration (focus on cross-cutting themes), and horizontal policy coherence/Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. According to DG Development and Cooperation, donor coordination platform should have been established in Ukraine to conduct multi-donor projects and measure progress. The emphasis on “Mobilization, coordination and disbursement of assistance” (to be exercised by the EEAS/DEVGO and Ukrainian Government) was also made in the 2014 Agenda for Reform.

However, no such platform was created internationally. This testifies to the EU’s failure to engage other donors into a truly comprehensive effort to promote Ukraine’s development, thereby juxtaposing it to Russian aggression. Moreover, Ukraine’s national foreign aid coordination project “OPENAID” project ceased to exist in 2017, following the notorious dismissal of its coordinator Olena Tregub. This raises additional concerns regarding the transparency of large aid flows Ukraine presently gets and aid effectiveness. Hence, so far, the positive examples of EU-led donor coordination in Ukraine remain sector-specific, and include “U-LEAD” project (involving German GIZ, Swedish SIDA, Polish Aid and Swiss SDC) and “PRAVO-Justice” (involving authorized bodies of France, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Germany), targeting decentralization and the rule of law, respectively.

Next, the integrated approach to reforms or the introduction of cross-cutting areas were barely distinguished in EU’s aid delivery to Ukraine. Some cross-cutting fields (e.g., gender and human rights) are distinguished in the 2015 Special Measure to Ukraine (focusing on decentralization). The link between the “deep” disciplines of the DCFTA and the economic dimension of the rule of law (promotion of legal certainty, transparency and accountability standards) remains highly underestimated. The single positive example of integrated approach to economic and political goals is the can be found in the “PRAVO-Justice” focus area “Property Right Protection and Ease of Business”.

As opposed to development policy, horizontal policy coherence is seldom mentioned in the ENP context, largely due to the fact that ENP is often viewed as “internally coherent by default”. An additional reason is the lack of a single unifying concept, such as development or sustainable development, as stipulated in the Agenda 2030 and EU development policy documents.

Conclusion

The analysis demonstrates that the EU managed to develop a comprehensive development response to the Ukraine crisis in terms of the ENP and State-Building Contract for Ukraine, addressing various reform fields through creative blends of development instruments. The continuation of the Union’s development engagement with Ukraine can benefit from building bridges between the “association” and “state-building” axes of aid; strengthening the role of “sustainable development” in the ENP; expanding the opportunities for donor coordination; strengthening of Ukraine’s domestic dimension of aid transparency and aid effectiveness, as well as promoting horizontal policy coherence.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Maryna Rabinovych

Maryna Rabinovych works as a Global Community Manager at the Ukraine Democracy Initiative, based in Sydney. She also pursues a PhD research that focuses on the legal aspects of the EU’s rule of law promotion via free trade agreements in the Eastern Neighbourhood and beyond.

 

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 174 - Draft report Implementation of the EU association agreement with Ukraine
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 239 - Draft report Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Serbia
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Ahmed
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
A person cannot be excluded from eligibility for subsidiary protection if he is deemed to have ‘committed a serious crime’ on the basis of the sole criterion of the penalty provided for under the law of the Member State concerned

NK Rosneft and Others v Council
External relations
The General Court of the EU upholds restrictive measures adopted by the Council against a number of Russian banks and oil and gas companies in connection with the crisis in Ukraine