European Union

Harms
Transport
In the event of cancellation of a flight, the airline company must also reimburse commissions collected by intermediaries when tickets are bought, as long as it was aware of them

The Vostok 2018 (or Orient-2018) military exercise, between 11-17 September, will mobilize for four days no less than 300 000 soldiers (virtually all forces of Central and Western Russian military districts of Russia), 36 000 armored vehicles and more than a thousand aircraft (planes, helicopters and drones).

The Chinese and Mongolian armed forces will be invited. There will be an air of Zapad-81 (in 1981 with 100.000 soldiers, a hard message to the West and to the revolted Poland), but more imposing in a way.

Tag: Vostok 2018

AMENDMENTS 1 - 141 - Draft report Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Montenegro
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 176 - Draft report Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Albania
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

IR
SOPO
Dismissal of a Catholic doctor from a managerial position by a Catholic hospital due to his remarriage after a divorce may constitute unlawful discrimination on grounds of religion

I asked for more information on the activity of the mission and Iooked for an interview with the EULEX Kosovo mission. Several e-mails signed by no one have arrived : conversation with no-names, unable to understand my request and my questions.

People who treat us as idiots who do not know the sites of the European Union (www.eeas.europa.eu and www.europa.eu). Poison pens who do not dare to sign a letter, people who do not dare to take responsibility. Which simply "did not feel like" transferring questions to the right people. Answers from an EU mission`s information service with visible evidence of not wanting to help. I have never encountered such a situation concerning an EU, UN (etc.) mission or operation...

(I have not had any other choice because unfortunately there is no more e-mail address on the site.)

We strongly doubt the importance of these information services funded by European citizens. They would be obliged to answer us.

They have webpage whose links do not work anymore. (I can imagine the thousands of euros that were paid for this.) But they do not stop creating advertising for themselves, in the name of genderism, book about the biography of the female mission`s members and the other things really very, very important. (In this case, no problem with urls.) Unbelievable.

My books and university textbooks about CSDP and EU missions are used by several universities all over Europe in Africa and elsewhere in education. In our next book on the Balkans this case will be mentioned.

-----
Dear Mr. Türke,
As already mentioned on 2 and 9 August 2018, we do not have the resources to meet each request for information.
Having explained the above, we hereby inform you that we will not respond to any further inquiries on this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Office of Chief of Staff
EULEX Kosovo

From: Dr. TÜRKE András István [mailto:(...)]
Sent: Wednesday, September 5, 2018 10:33
To: EULEX Kosovo Information
Subject: request for additional informations II.

Dear Office of the Chief of Staff,

Please forward my e-mail towards competent persons, who are able to answer to my questions, like Ms. Alexandra Papadopoulou or Mr. Bernd Thran.
Thanks a lot.

Best regards:
Andras Istvan Türke
director
—
Europa Varietas Institute
www.europavarietas.org

Le 2 août 2018 à 10:13:23, EULEX Kosovo Information (eulexkosovoinformation@eulex-kosovo.eu) a écrit:

Dear Mr Türke,
Thank you for your email and interest in EULEX Kosovo.
Unfortunately, we do not currently have the resources to meet each request for information. While we regret not being able to accommodate your request for information, we would kindly direct you to the EULEX website (www.eulex-kosovo.eu) which contains information about the Mission, its work, press releases, EU in Kosovo, EU External Action, CSDP, and other relevant data. We would also kindly direct you to the websites of EEAS and EU, www.eeas.europa.eu and www.europa.eu respectively for more information.

Yours sincerely,
Office of the Chief of Staff
EULEX Kosovo

From: Dr. TÜRKE András István [mailto:(...)]
Sent: Thursday, 19 July 2018 10:18
To: EULEX Kosovo Information
Subject: request for additional informations

Madam / Sir,

I am director of the independent Swiss based Europa Varietas Institute.

I am writing a book about EU diplomacy and mission in the Western Balkans (1991-2018) and I request for some additional informations about the activity of EULEX Kosovo.

I read a lot of very critical books about EULEX activity during the period 2008-2013, the mission was accused to being biased towards former UCK members.
I would like to know how far the mission has been changed since them.
What are the on-site experiences, the most important challenges to overcome?
What are the lessons learned compared to other EULEX missions?
I would like to have information that is beyond the official EU texts.

---
I need some lists
- about prosecutors investigated 400 war crimes
- about the 150 drafted laws
- about EULEX HoMs with period of activity

Other interesting documents are welcome.

I need also these documents but impossible to download, there are a lot of bugs on your site :
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/justice/judgments/criminal-proceedings/D...
http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/docs/justice/judgments/criminal-proceedings/D...
(+ other and older verdicts)

Thanks a lot.

Best regards:
Andras Istvan Türke
director

—
Europa Varietas Institute
www.europavarietas.org

Tag: EULEX Kosovo

Plenary session and Committee meetings, Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

In this piece, Samuel D. Schmid, Andrea C. Blättler, and Joachim Blatter summarise the key findings from their winning article of the JCMS 2017 Best Article Prize: ‘Democratic Deficits in Europe: The Overlooked Exclusiveness of Nation‐States and the Positive Role of the European Union’ (Vol 55, Issue 3), available here.

State parliament (Landtag) in Berlin © Matyas Rehak/Adobe Stock

The European Union, many believe, has a democratic deficit. The sovereign nation-state is seen as democratically superior. Even more, it is often argued that the EU undermines the functioning of national democracies, compounding this alleged democratic deficit.

In our article we show that when it comes to the electoral inclusion of immigrants, nation states suffer from a democratic deficit and the EU plays a democracy-enhancing role. European democracies are much more exclusive than they should be according to normative standards derived from democratic theory. The EU has been key to mitigating the exclusiveness of democracies. By requiring its member states to enfranchise non-national EU citizens on the local level, it pushes one of the currently most relevant “frontiers of democracy” in the right direction.

Why should democracies include long-term immigrant residents?

Normative theorists of democracy, whether they are liberals, republicans, or communitarians agree that democracies should – in order to retain full legitimacy – grant voting rights to all adult, legal and long-term residents. The same goes for Robert Dahl, one of founding fathers of empirical democracy measurement. He defined inclusive suffrage accordingly when he introduced his concept of polyarchy.

Currently, the most significant group often excluded in this definition of the demos are long-term immigrant residents. They far outnumber disenfranchised resident citizens (e.g. criminal convicts, the mentally disabled). In the article, we deduce a strong normative demand that immigrants have to be included into the demos after five years of continuous residence. Democracies can opt to do so either by allowing immigrants to naturalize or by providing them with alien voting rights.

Constructing the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX)

Taking this position as a benchmark, we construct an evaluative assessment tool: the Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX). It has two constitutive dimensions. The de facto dimension contrasts the number of people who are actually included with the number of people that should be included with regard to both mechanisms of inclusion. The de jure dimension assesses the laws regulating the immigrants’ access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement in light of the normative demands.

The details of measurement, normalization, and aggregation are elaborated in the article. We draw on extensive original data collection and established resources such as the electoral rights indicators (ELECLAW) and the citizenship policy indicators (CITLAW) provided by the GLOBALCIT Observatory based at the European University Institute.

The exclusiveness of 20 European democracies – and the positive role of the EU

Having selected the 20 most established democracies with stable territorial boundaries among all EU member states[1], the first and main result of our study is the stark discrepancy between the laws and practice of electoral inclusion in these established European democracies and the ideal of ‘universal suffrage.’ In Figure 1 below, ‘universal suffrage’ equates a value of 100 on our IMIX scale. Even Sweden, the most inclusive country in our sample, is far from reaching this standard and suffers from a notable democratic deficit.

Figure 1: How 20 EU democracies fare in immigrant electoral inclusion – and how Switzerland compares

Legend: Figure 1 shows the scores on the IMIX scale for the 20 EU member states evaluated, plus the scores for Switzerland, as case for which we estimate a hypothetical “EU support” in a later study. Data clusters around 2010. Blue is the IMIX score without “EU support”. Yellow is the proportion attributable to “EU support”. We talk about “EU support” and not about an “EU effect” because we do not claim a causal role for the EU in each country, but a functional role as a safeguard in all countries.

The second main insight is the positive function of EU membership. According to EU law, EU members must grant voting rights to non-national EU citizens in local legislative elections. This EU norm plays a supportive role for the electoral inclusion of immigrants and reduces the democratic deficit of member states. This became also very visible when we added Switzerland to our sample in a further study . Currently, Switzerland is one of the most exclusive countries in Europe. Membership in the EU would make a huge difference since it would allow the many immigrants from EU countries to have a vote at least on the local level (which is currently only the case in a very limited number of cantons and municipalities).

Not only the least inclusive European democracies (could) get a boost in inclusiveness through EU membership. Almost all countries that fall into the ‘fairly inclusive’ category are greatly aided in achieving this label by applying EU law. For instance, Belgium’s de facto score is 34 percent due to enfranchised non-national EU citizen residents; and only Sweden would remain in the ‘fairly inclusive’ category if ‘EU support’ was subtracted from the IMIX score. We thus conclude that the EU plays an important democracy-enhancing role when it comes to immigrants’ electoral inclusion in EU Member States.

Avenues for supranational and postnational citizenship – and democracy measurement

In times when the EU faces an unprecedented legitimacy crisis and when there are claims that the EU continues to suffer from structural democratic deficits and produces such deficits on the national level, it is important to highlight existing shortcomings within national democracies. These democratic deficits within EU Member States do not reduce the democratic deficits of the EU per se; however, they put into perspective the often-proclaimed superiority of national democracies. Moreover, our analysis shows that the EU plays an important role in reducing this democratic deficit.

In contrast to most indices in the field of immigration, integration, and citizenship, the IMIX uses an approach grounded in the tradition of democratic theory and democracy measurement. As we show in our working paper, new democracy measurement tools represent major steps forwards in aligning methodology to theory and practice. Nevertheless, regarding the fundamental dimension of electoral inclusion there is still a gap between measurement tools, theoretical discourses, and practical struggles. The aspect of inclusion was side-lined in almost all significant democracy indices in the 20th century, supplanted by the notion of participation (of those already included). It is only taken up on the margins of the two most recent and sophisticated democracy measurement tools, the Democracy Barometer and the Varieties of Democracy Project.

Therefore, we hope that the IMIX also inspires democracy measurement projects to better capture one of the currently most important “frontiers of democracy” – that is, to include inclusion in an adequate way.

[1] We exclude the Baltic states because of the second criterion. Our concern about their territorial integrity is further connected to the fact that they have large non-citizen Russian-speaking minorities, which – if fully included – may undermine the autonomy of these polities.

This piece is based on the winning article of the JCMS 2017 Best Article Prize: ‘Democratic Deficits in Europe: The Overlooked Exclusiveness of Nation‐States and the Positive Role of the European Union’ (Vol 55, Issue 3) available here.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of  Ideas on Europe, JCMS or UACES.

Comments and Site Policy

Samuel D. Schmid is a graduate of the University of Lucerne and a current PhD Researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. His thesis investigates the association between the openness of borders and the inclusiveness of citizenship across 20 Western democracies from 1980 to 2010. Twitter: @samdschmid

 

Andrea C. Blättler graduated with a BA from the University of Lucerne and is currently completing joint master’s degree in political theory at Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main & Technische Universität Darmstadt and spent a DAAD-funded term at The New School for Social Research, New York. She works at the intersection of political and social theory on questions of power and social stratification.

 

Joachim Blatter is professor of Political Science at the University of Lucerne. He wrote his Habilitation at the University of Konstanz, and has been a research fellow at Harvard, the Australian National University, and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB). His current research focuses on dual citizenship, the transnationalization of national democracies, and on the migration of migration policies.

 

The post How the EU Mitigates a Fundamental Democratic Deficit of European Nation-States appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The president of the European Commission, in his letter of intent accompanying the September 2015 State of the Union speech, announced that the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), the Dublin System, and Easo would be comprehensively reviewed. From May to July 2016, the Commission put forward a wide-ranging European Asylum package, which reformed the Regulations of Dublin and Eurodacas well as the Reception Conditions Directive, and which proposed the establishment of a common asylum procedure in the EU,a Qualification Regulation, a Union Resettlement Framework,and a European Union Agency for Asylum(EUAA).

While the Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on 28 June 2017 on all twelve chapters of the regulation on the future EUAA, “an overall agreement will only be possible once the linkages with the other legislative proposals in the CEAS package have been resolved”. That is, the final adoption of the new EUAA Regulation will not take place until the whole asylum package is finalized (Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus and Malta aim to strike a difficult deal by June’s summit of European leaders). However, since negotiations are already well advanced, the core provisions of the Regulation on the EUAA will not substantially differ from the text partially agreed between the Council and the Parliament. This blog post thus zooms in on the key operational novelties of the text, which was partially agreed upon by the Council and the Parliament on 28 June 2017, and analyzes what changes these novelties would bring to the current mandate of Easo.

Although the EUAA will not be mandated to set out a comprehensive strategy of asylum, the agency, through guidance on the situation in third countries of origin, shall “ensure greater convergence and address disparities in the assessment of applications for international protection” (Proposal for a EUAA, COM(2016) 271 final, 04.05.2016, p. 7). The EUAA shall “develop a common analysis on the situation in specific countries of origin and guidance notes to assist Member States in the assessment of relevant applications” (article 10(1) partial agreement EUAA). Importantly, as soon as the EUAA’s Management Board endorses the guidance notes, accompanied by the common analysis, the Member States shall take them into account when examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to their competence for deciding on individual applications (article 10(2a) partial agreement on the EUAA).

The new monitoring role of the EUAA will also indirectly shape a common strategy of asylum in the EU. A key difference between Easo and the future EUAA will be its monitoring role in order to guarantee that the national authorities are sufficiently prepared to manage exceptional and sudden pressure in their asylum and reception systems. Should the EUAA’s information analysis raise serious concerns regarding the functioning or preparedness of a Member State’s asylum or reception systems, the agency, on its own initiative or at the request of the European Commission, may initiate a monitoring exercise (article 14(2) partial agreement EUAA).

The Member State concerned will receive the findings of the monitoring exercise and the draft recommendations of the EUAA’s Executive Director for comments. As soon as the agency takes the concerned Member State’s comments into account, the EUAA’s Management Board shall, by a decision of two-thirds of its members with a right to vote, adopt those recommendations (article 14(3a) partial agreement EUAA). As with the EBCG’s vulnerability assessments (article 13 Regulation 2016/1624), the future EUAA will be conferred a recommendatory power in order to put forward measures to be adopted by the national authorities. Nevertheless, Member States will still maintain indirect control of the EUAA’s recommendations (see, here) through the enhanced majority that is required in the Management Board.

Whereas the Commission did not initially propose that the EUAA’s Executive Director be able to appoint experts from the staff of the agency to be deployed as liaison officers in Member States, the provisional text agreed on 28 June 2017 indicated that liaison officers “shall foster cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and the Member States’ authorities responsible for asylum and immigration and other relevant services” (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA). Like the EBCG’s liaison officers, the EUAA liaison officers will facilitate the monitoring role of the agency by reporting regularly to the Executive Director on the situation of asylum in the Member States and their capacity to manage their asylum and reception systems effectively (article 14a(3) partial agreement EUAA).

The EUAA will thus be in charge of monitoring “the operational and technical application of the CEAS in order to prevent or identify possible shortcomings in the asylum and reception systems of Member States and to assess their capacity and preparedness to manage situations of disproportionate pressure so as to enhance the efficiency of those systems” (article 13(1) partial agreement EUAA). With this aim, the agency shall namely assess the national procedures for international protection, staff available and reception conditions (i.e. infrastructure, equipment or financial resources) on the basis of the information provided by the Member State concerned and by relevant intergovernmental organizations or bodies,as well as information analysis on the situation of asylum and on-site visits that the agency may undertake (article 13 (3) and (4) partial agreement EUAA). This new monitoring task of the EUAA shall ultimately contribute to the effective and harmonized implementation of the CEAS by the Member States (see, here, here and here).

The second substantial novelty that the EUAA will bring is the possibility of making an emergency intervention if the functioning of the CEAS is jeopardized due to the insufficient action of a Member State to address the disproportionate pressure on the asylum and reception systems in a Member State (article 22(1)partial agreement EUAA), the refusal of the competent national authorities to request or accept assistance from the EUAA (article 22(1)partial agreement EUAA), or the unwillingness of a Member State to comply with the Commission’s recommendations to implement an action plan intended to address serious shortcomings identified during a monitoring assessment (article 14(3a)partial agreement EUAA).

The procedure set out in article 19(1) Regulation 2016/1624 of the EBCG regarding situations at the external borders requiring urgent action will be, to a more limited extent, replicated for the EUAA. While the proposal for a Regulation on a EUAA originally stated that the Commission would be the EU institution in charge of adopting a decision by means of an implementing act to be taken by the agency to support the Member State concerned, the provisional text finally states that the Council shall be the authority responsible for adopting such an implementing act.

Three days after the Council adopts its implementing act, the EUAA’s Executive Director shall draw up an Operational Plan and determine the details of the practical implementation of the Council’s decision (article 22(2) partial agreement EUAA). Subsequently, the Member State concerned will have three days to reach an agreement with the Executive Director on the Operational Plan and will immediately cooperate with the agency to facilitate the practical execution of the measures put forward (article 22(4) partial agreement EUAA). The Regulation of the EUAA under negotiation does not yet include a similar provision as article 19(10) Regulation 2016/1624, which indicates that if within 30 days a Member State neither executes the decision adopted by the Council nor agrees with the EBCG’s Director Operational Plan, the European Commission may authorize the re-establishment of border controls in the Schengen area.

The third novelty of the future EUAA in comparison to its predecessor Easo will be its involvement in the examination of international protection applications. Several provisions of the EUAA mention that the agency will assist or facilitate the Member States in examining the applications of international protection submitted to their asylum systems. Firstly, among the operational and technical assistance that the EUAA shall provide to Member States, the agency shall facilitate the examination of applications for international protection (article 16(2)(b) partial agreement EUAA) to the competent national authorities. In this regard, the Asylum Support Teams (ASTs) “should support Member States with operational and technical measures, including (…) by knowledge of the handling and management of asylum cases, as well as by assisting national authorities competent for the examination of applications for international protection and by assisting with relocation or transfer of applicants or beneficiaries of international protection” (recital 16 partial agreement EUAA).

Secondly, the operational plan that the Executive Director of the EUAA draws up shall also include organizational aspects such as the assistance of the agency to the Member States in examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to the competence of the national asylum systems to decide on individual applications (Article 19(2)(i) partial agreement EUAA). Lastly, the EUAA in the hotspots will be competent to not only register the applications for international protection, but to also examine such applications if the concerned Member State requests so (article 21(2)(d) partial agreement EUAA).

The Regulation does not yet specify to what extent the EUAA may assist or facilitate the competent national authorities in examining applications for international protection. The negotiations regarding the final text of the recital 46 of the EUAA’s Regulation reveal the tensions for regulating and limiting the “examination powers” of the agency. The text put forward by the European Commission for the recital 46 states that “the competence to take decisions by Member States’ asylum authorities on individual applications for international protection remains with Member States”. The Commission clearly establishes that the EUAA cannot be conferred decision-making powers. The European Parliament, however, adds that this limitation should not preclude “the joint processing of applications for individual protection by a Member State and the Agency at the request of the Agency and within the framework set out in an operational plan agreed between the host Member State and the Agency”. Lastly, the Council considers that “the competence of Member States’ asylum authorities to take a decision on individual applications for international protection should remain unaffected”.

The question to be answered is whether the EUAA will be able to jointly process applications for international protection, and if it cannot, to what extent the agency may support the processing of asylum applications. In 2013, the Commission adopted a study in which the concept of “joint processing” was defined as “an arrangement under which all asylum claims within the EU are processed jointly by an EU authority assuming responsibility for both preparation and decision on all cases, as well as subsequent distribution of recognized beneficiaries of international protection and return of those not in need of protection” (p. 114).

The 2013 study of the European Commission on joint processing put forward four options that progressively move from supporting the Member States in processing asylum applications, to designing a centralized EU authority with decision-making powers and responsible for all asylum processing. Currently, the Member States are solely competent to adopt decisions concerning the admissibility and applications for international protection and Easo is mandated to operationally support the competent national authorities in preparing and reaching such decisions.

The next level of European integration would consist in introducing the mechanism of joint processing in situations where a Member State is subject to an extraordinary number of asylum applications. Joint processing teams of Easo would be deployed and make recommendations on asylum cases to the requesting Member State, which would continue to have exclusive decision-making powers. The ASTs of Easo deployed in the Greek hotspots are in practice adopting recommendations on the admissibility of the international protection applications, recommendations that the Greek officials largely rubberstamp when adopting a final decision (see here, here and here). Precisely, the future EUAA, upon the request of a concerned Member State, will be formally conferred the power to examine applications for international protection in the hotspots, as well as the task to facilitate the examination of such applications not necessarily under the hotspot approach to the competent national authorities.

However, the EUAA will be very far from processing and deciding every asylum application within the EU. Instead, the future Regulation on the EUAA opts for reinforcing the operational tasks of the agency and maintaining the Member States as the exclusive decision-making authorities. Although centralizing the asylum decision-making process would ensure a full harmonization of the national procedures and foster a consistent evaluation of the protection needs, this option would demand a “major institutional transformation” and “substantial resources” than can only be envisioned in the long-term. In other words, the transformation of Easo into an agency with decision-making powers to process all the applications for international protection in the EU is still a rather hypothetical scenario since the Member States’ sovereignty would be challenged, a complete overhaul of Easo and all CEAS legislation would be required, and a specialized court or board would need be created.

There are also doubts as to whether article 78(2) TFEU is a sufficient legal basis for conferring the power to exclusively adopt binding decisions on all asylum claims to a EU authority. Pursuant article 78(2) TFEU, the EU shall ensure: “(…) common procedures for the granting and withdrawing of uniform asylum or subsidiary protection status”. On the one hand, TSOURDIbelieves that a EU-level processing scenario in which decisions are taken entirely by a EU authority instead of the Member States is legally impossible under article 78(2)(e) TFEU “which envisages that ‘a Member State’ is ultimately responsible for the examination of an application”. On the other hand, the 2013 Commission’s study on the feasibility of joint processing of asylum applications in the EU considered that article 78(2) TFEU, read together with articles 78(1) and 80 TFEU, represent an adequate legal basis and open up the possibility for a completely harmonized, EU-based approach for joint processing of asylum applications within the EU.

Hence, as is the case with the EBCG that does not establish a European System of Border Guards with autonomous enforcement powers to exclusively manage the European external borders (see here, here, here or here), the future EUAA will not be directly conferred decision-making powers in asylum matters either, but rather will be given an assistance role in examining applications of international protection (see here). It remains to be seen whether the EUAA will openly interpret its new and vaguely regulated examination prerogative, and to what degree the agency will examine the applications for international protection and exert an indirect impact on the final decisions that the national asylum systems ultimately will adopt.

To conclude, although the Commission refers to the future EUAA as a fully-fledged agency for asylum matters in the EU, the agency will neither be conferred decision-making powers regarding asylum applications, nor executive tasks on the ground. As with the mandate of Easo, the tasks to be conferred to the future EUAA are limited to “facilitate and improve the proper functioning of the CEAS and to assist Member States in implementing their obligations within the framework of CEAS, the European Union Agency for Asylum should provide Member States with operational and technical assistance(…)” (p. 15).

The post It will be a new agency. It will be an enforcement agency. It will be the European Union Agency for Asylum! No wait… it will be EASO appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Length of video : 173'
You may manually download this video in WMV (1.6Gb) format

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Alpenrind and Others
Freedom of movement for persons
A posted worker is covered by the social security system of his place of work if he replaces another posted worker, even if those workers were not posted by the same employer

The aim of the workshop, held on 26 February 2018, was to assess and discuss the EU’s approach to hybrid threats in its neighbourhood using the Western Balkans as a case study, in the context of the extensive use of propaganda by Russia and its meddling into several elections and in the aftermath of the 2014 events in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea. The first speaker, Jean-Jacques Patry, presented the concept of hybrid threat at various levels and the EU approach and measures to tackle it, particularly in the Western Balkans. The second speaker, Nicolas Mazzucchi, delivered a presentation on Russia’s declining influence in the Western Balkans (on behalf of Isabelle Facon, who authored the briefing but could not attend the workshop) and added some of his own analysis on energy and cyber issues. The presentations were followed by a debate with members of the Security and Defence Committee of the European Parliament.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the European Defence Fund
Committee on Foreign Affairs
David McAllister

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

DRAFT OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Fabio Massimo Castaldo

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP