European Union

This article is based on research presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Conference 2018 (12-13 July, KU Leuven, Belgium)

While progress has been made, the EU-Mercosur association agreement still struggles to get off the ground. Bruno Theodoro Luciano argues that some of the greatest challenges are the insufficient discussion of political cooperation as well as the EU’s preferential treatment of Brazil.

Mercosur Parliament, Montevideo © Dario Ricardo / Adobe Stock

Over the past few years, after almost two decades of negotiation, the EU-Mercosur association agreement is very close to be concluded. However, both sides recognise that there are still some key standing issues to be resolved before reaching a political commitment. This article argues that although the conclusion of the EU-Mercosur association agreement is closer, important issues remain open, which could once again paralyse these bi-regional negotiations. Moreover, the privileged Strategic Partnership with Brazil might hinder the potential of EU-Mercosur relations to move beyond a mere free trade agreement, towards a more political and multi-dimensioned dialogue.

Negotiations started in 1999, in a very different context for both regions: Mercosur countries aimed to counterbalance trade talks with the United States in the framework of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The EU saw Mercosur as a promising regional integration project in the Americas, as well as a relevant market to be explored. However, due to protectionism on both sides, the negotiations reached a deadlock in 2004. Although formally revived in 2010, the EU-Mercosur agreement only gained a new momentum more recently, from 2016 onwards. The political changes observed within South American countries, especially in Argentina and Brazil, altered Mercosur’s political agenda. Therefore, trade liberalisation via the negotiations of trade agreement with external actors became a foreign policy priority in the region.

For the EU, the paralysis of the commercial negotiations with the United States via the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – most remarkably since the beginning of the Trump administration – pushed the European Commission to intensify and diversify its trade agenda with other global partners. Therefore, the EU readjusted its external trade strategy, aiming to both sign new trade agreements with countries as Canada, Japan and Korea, and to conclude negotiations previously paralysed such as the association agreement negotiated with Mercosur.

While Mercosur countries such as Brazil have in the 2000s invested in deeper relations with other nations from the Global South, especially with the other members of the BRICS countries (Russia, India, China and South Africa), the EU in the past years had to deal with its successive crises (financial, economic, migratory), being Brexit the most recent one. Now, contextual transformations in both regions, led to the strengthening of a relationship that was never prioritised by either sides.

The bi-regional deal would represent one of the world’s biggest trade agreements ever signed. However, there are still some important chapters of the negotiations to be closed. As stated by the European Commission after the conclusion of the June 2018 round of negotiations, areas such as cars and car parts, geographical indications, maritime transport and dairy still require further discussion. Moreover, the section on subsidies is still a problematic chapter of the negotiations, even though the EU has presented a revised proposal to Mercosur countries.

Besides trade, the initial set up of the EU-Mercosur agreement included two additional spheres, cooperation and political dialogue, as the main pillars for the future bi-regional relationship. Neither was thoroughly addressed during the last rounds of negotiations. However, the proposal submitted by the EU to include a ‘regional integration clause’ might point to the direction of adding more political aspects of a so far very much commercial talk. In this sense, the future of EU-Mercosur relations within the areas beyond trade are not clear-cut.

Furthermore, the EU and Brazil (biggest Mercosur country) signed a Strategic Partnership in 2007, which may hinder the potential of Mercosur to become a more relevant regional actor. This agreement expanded bilateral relations between the EU and Brazil in many sectorial dialogues, marginalising the rest of Mercosur countries from the discussion of many multilateral issues with the EU. Privileging individual relations with Brazil has raised discourses of fragmentation and rivalry within Mercosur countries, especially with regard to Argentina, Mercosur’s second biggest country.

Considering the previous stalemates of these bi-regional negotiations, the conclusion of EU-Mercosur agreement is not a guaranteed outcome. Sensitive sectors in both regions might still stall the negotiations depending on the level of concessions given in key areas such as agriculture and beef. Also, the future electoral outcomes in Brazil might turn again the political wind of the region and also undermine the negotiating progress recently achieved. In addition, the departure of the United Kingdom from the EU may alter the political pendulum within the EU’s decision-making, reducing the European support to conclude free trade agreements worldwide.

Nonetheless, the eventual conclusion of the EU-Mercosur trade agreement might not substantially transform the nature of this bi-regional agenda. Even though South American countries are nowadays more open to trade liberalisation, the region is much more interested in integrating its market to the Asia-Pacific region, and in particular to China, which has recently become the top trade partner of several Latin American countries. Moreover, the conclusion of EU-Mercosur agreement will probably follow the tendencies observed within the EU’s relations with the rest of Latin America. Although the EU has signed many trade agreements with the countries and regional blocks of the region, the signature of these deals has not necessarily pushed forward the relationship of Europe with Latin America to new domains, indicating how both regions, despite contextual changes, have not been a priority to each other.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Graduate Forum, UACES or JCER.

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Bruno Theodoro Luciano is a Doctoral Researcher in Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, United Kingdom. He was a visiting researcher at the Institute for Latin American Studies (ILAS), German Institute of Global Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, and at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. His research focuses on regional integration and regionalism and he is developing a PhD investigation on the institutional development of regional parliaments in Europe, Latin America and Africa.

The post Finally Reaching a Bi-Regional Trade Agreement? The Potential and Challenges of EU-Mercosur Relations appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

One year ago, on 20 September 2017, I gave a talk for Stratford4Europe called, CAN BRITAIN STOP BREXIT?

In my 50-minute presentation, which included over 100 graphics and historical video clips, I gave a resolute response to the title of the talk:

“Yes. Britain can stop Brexit, if that’s what Britain wants. Anything democracy decides, democracy can also undo.”

But, I pointed out, the more important question is:

‘Should Britain stop Brexit?’

In my presentation, already watched by tens of thousands of people, I explain how the EU was started, how Britain joined, and how we’re now leaving based on an entirely flawed referendum.

All the points in my talk are as valid today as one year ago – more so, because we are now possibly just weeks away from Brexit reaching a point of no return.

For anyone who wants a clearer understanding of how Brexit represents the biggest con in recent British history, please watch and share this video. Here’s an easy-to-remember URL link so you can tell all your friends, family, colleagues and associates:

CanBritainStopBrexit.com

The post Can Britain stop Brexit? Yes. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

MEPs delegation support liberalisation in Uzbekistan and regional political initiatives. Foreign affairs MEPs in favour of closer relations and an early conclusion of negotiations on the new comprehensive Agreement with Uzbekistan. The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, led by MEP Cristian Dan PREDA, visited Uzbekistan (Tashkent and Samarkand) on 19-20 September 2018.
Further information
Complete text of the press statement
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 229 - Draft report Implementation of the EU association agreement with Georgia
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

AMENDMENTS 1 - 154 - Draft report The Council’s Annual Report in accordance with Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The aim of the workshop, held on 26 February 2018, was to assess and discuss the EU’s approach to hybrid threats in its neighbourhood using the Western Balkans as a case study, in the context of the extensive use of propaganda by Russia and its meddling into several elections and in the aftermath of the 2014 events in Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea.
The first speaker, Jean-Jacques Patry, presented the concept of hybrid threat at various levels and the EU approach and measures to tackle it, particularly in the Western Balkans. The second speaker, Nicolas Mazzucchi, delivered a presentation on Russia's declining influence in the Western Balkans (on behalf of Isabelle Facon, who authored the briefing but could not attend the workshop) and added some of his own analysis on energy and cyber issues. The presentations were followed by a debate with members of the Security and Defence Committee of the European Parliament.
Further information
Workshop report
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

The aim of the workshop, held on 22 November 2017, was to discuss the future of the European Defence Agency (EDA) against the backdrop of framing a common Union defence policy.
The first speaker, Dr Christian Mölling, provided an analysis of the issue of defence cooperation among EU member states and the difficulties it faces. In this context, he described the role and power of the EDA as well as possible options for its future. The second speaker, Professor David Versailles, focused on capabilities and competencies as well as on the interaction between civilian and military capabilities. The presentations were followed by a debate involving members of the Security and Defence Committee of the European Parliament.
Further information
Workshop report
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

OTP Bank and OTP Faktoring
Environment and consumers
The unfairness of an unclear contractual term which places the exchange rate risk on the borrower and does not reflect statutory provisions may be subject to judicial review

Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoirs
Agriculture and fisheries
Advocate General Wahl proposes that the Court find that products from animals that have been the subject of ritual slaughter without prior stunning can be issued the European ‘organic farming’ label

Away from Salzburg and its repeat performance of ‘how we don’t really understand each other‘, the question that I’m getting asked a lot is whether there can be a second referendum.

This is an interesting one, because it’s often asked of me by people who’d like to see the end of Brexit and a return to How Things Were. In that sense, it’s a bit of an advance on fighting the first referendum, time and again.

That’s not to say it’s a bad thing to pursue, but rather to invite some reflection on the politics of it all and especially the framing.

Why do it?

Importantly, much hangs on why a second referendum would be happening at all, since at present there is very little chance of this government taking this course of action.

That matters because right now the people pushing for it, as I’ve just mentioned, are those who clearly would like a result that allowed a stop to the process of leaving. The overnight comments of the Czech and Maltese PMs that they’d also support such a vote merely reinforces that impression.

If Theresa May were now to accept the need for a vote, it would go much against what she has previously argued and worked to, namely as limited as number of people making decisions as possible: remember how hard she fought against even just Parliament having a role.

For that to change, May would have to find herself fully out of alternative options, probably after a hostile Parliament left her no other choice. Despite everything, that still looks a long way off.

As long as a second vote looks more like a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, it will struggle to have the credibility of the 2016 referendum (insert any punchline you feel like here), at least in the sense of having a fighting chance to overturn that decision.

How to do it?

That problem is heightened by the very obvious challenge of what might be on the ballot paper.

The UCL Constitution Unit has written a series of fine pieces on this (here), looking at technical ways one could manage the various options, but ultimately this would be an intensely political choice.

Broadly speaking, either you’re offering voters a choice between leaving with a deal or leaving without one, or also adding in an option not to leave at all. And that’s on top of any issues around wording (which were already problematic last time around).

Because that basic choice will be a political one, it offers up much scope for campaigners to suggest that the exercise is ‘rigged’ in some way that hurts their interests: two of the three options are about leaving; two of the three are about a deal; why muddy the waters with staying at all?

That’s problematic if the object of the exercise is to calm passions and rebuild popular engagement with the process and with the political system at large. If nothing else, a three-way vote risks an outcome that ‘wins’ without an absolute majority of votes.

These problems are well-understood and form a big part of the resistance to holding another referendum, but it’s worth chucking a couple more points to ponder.

Firstly,it’s not clear what a second referendum would be on.

As a reminder, the Withdrawal Agreement (WA) is a very limited document. It covers the resolution of various liabilities arising from the end of UK membership, including finances, regulation and governance, plus some arrangements to bridge to whatever new relationship might arise in the future (as long as that arises by the end of 2020).

What that document doesn’t do is set out that new relationship. Yes, there’ll be a Political Declaration alongside the WA, but that will not have the same full force of law and will be necessarily vague about the aspirations that both sides in that still-to-be-started negotiation might have.

As such, ‘Chequers’ doesn’t really get much of a look-in; certainly not in the WA, and not very much in the Declaration. That makes it harder to mobilise a narrative of ‘rejecting Chequers’, because it’ll not be the locus of the documents under consideration.

Moreover, what is the locus is not that pretty for the UK. It’s about the settlement of financial liabilities, the creation of an Irish backstop, the continuation of legal and regulatory obligations and a transition period where the UK is a pure rule-taker. The counterbalancing goodies in the Declaration are promissory and vague.

If you wanted to get people to vote against that document, then you’d find it easy to paint a picture of a failed negotiation process and of an opportunity to escape the grasping hand of an EU that seems to just take and not give.

The people factor

Secondly, any discussion of a referendum needs to take account of how people might vote.

Here, the evidence is very mixed. John Curtice points to the centrality of economic calculations, while YouGov reminds us that there’s no clear consensus on any outcome. In short, there’s no slam-dunk on the table, for anyone.

That matters because a second referendum is likely to be a one-shot policy: the chances of a third vote within the medium-term would be effectively zero. As Sarah Ludford rightly noted at an event I spoke at this week, it’s the best change for Remainers to stop Brexit, but it comes with a sizeable risk of resulting in a no-deal outcome.

(and just a quick reminder here that the last two national votes – in 2016 and 2017 – didn’t go how their authors thought they would)

Taken together, all of this points to a number of substantial issues that campaigners on all sides will need to get their heads around and then actively prepare for. Otherwise, we might find that a second referendum leaves more questions open than before.

The post The framing of a second referendum appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

It’s 72 years ago, on 19 September 1946, that war leader and former British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, gave his landmark speech at the University of Zurich in Switzerland. He called for Europe to, “build a kind of United States of Europe” to create lasting peace.

Following the Second World War, Churchill was convinced that only a united Europe could guarantee peace. His aim was to eliminate the European ills of nationalism and war-mongering once and for all.

He proclaimed his remedy, just one year after the end of the war:

“It is to re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom.

“We must build a kind of United States of Europe.”

Although Europe did not become, as Churchill then visioned and promoted, a federal ‘United States’, it did become a Union of 28 independent sovereign countries, trading and working together in peace and prosperity.

In remembering his grandfather’s speech, Conservative MP Sir Nicholas Soames said in the House of Commons:

“The speech was of great prescience and great vision. And it was also a speech of the most profound analysis.”

Sir Winston Churchill is recognised as one of the 11 ‘Founding Fathers’ of the European Union.

At the time of his 1946 speech, Churchill envisaged Britain helping to establish the ‘Union of European countries’, but not actually joining it.

But Churchill’s views later changed, as the British Empire and Commonwealth diminished, and Britain’s world influence shifted.

Churchill made his last speech about Europe at London’s Central Hall, Westminster in July 1957; some four months after six founding nations established the European Economic Community by signing the Treaty of Rome (France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg).

Churchill welcomed the formation of a ‘common market’ by the six, provided that ‘the whole of free Europe will have access’. Churchill added, ‘we genuinely wish to join’.

But Churchill also warned:

‘If, on the other hand, the European trade community were to be permanently restricted to the six nations, the results might be worse than if nothing were done at all – worse for them as well as for us. It would tend not to unite Europe but to divide it – and not only in the economic field.’ *

* (Source: Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches Vol. 8 page 8681)

During the 1960s Churchill’s health rapidly declined, but his support for a united Europe didn’t.

According to Churchill’s last Private Secretary,  Sir Anthony Montague Brown, in August 1961, Churchill wrote to his constituency Chairman:

‘I think that the Government are right to apply to join the European Economic Community..’

Sir Anthony also confirmed, in his book  ‘Long Sunset’, that in 1963, just two years before he died, Churchill wrote in a private letter:

‘The future of Europe if Britain were to be excluded is black indeed.’

• Watch an extracted version of Winston Churchill’s speech of 19 September 1946, together with a commentary in the House of Commons by his grandson, MP Sir Nicholas Soames. (Video production by Jon Danzig):

• Related article by Jon Danzig: Winston Churchill: A founder of the European Union

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
• Follow my Stop Brexit campaign on Facebook: Reasons2Remain

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The post Churchill’s antidote to war: A united Europe appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

AMENDMENTS 15 - 89 - Draft opinion Establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

MEPs delegation support deeper bilateral and regional political dialogues and initiatives. Foreign affairs MEPs advocate implementation of the recent EU- Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation agreement, including defence of human rights. The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, led by MEP Cristian Dan PREDA, visited Kazakhstan (Astana and Almaty) on 17-19 September 2018.
Further information
Complete text of the press statement
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

R O
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
The notification, by the United Kingdom, of its intention to withdraw from the EU does not have the consequence that execution of a European arrest warrant issued by that Member State must be refused or postponed

González Castro
SOPO
Pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding who work shifts, some of which are at night, must be regarded as performing night work and enjoy specific protection against the risks that night work is liable to pose

Commission v France and IFP Énergies nouvelles
State aid
The Court holds that the General Court of the European Union must reconsider whether the Commission was justified in classifying the implied and unlimited guarantee granted by the French Republic to the Institut français du pétrole as State aid

The next AFET meetings are scheduled to take place on:

Thursday, 27 September 2018, 09:00-13:00, room JAN 2Q2

Further information
Information for visitors
Draft agendas
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP

In recent years the EU concluded Association Agreements, including the creation of a Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These are amongst the most complex and comprehensive legal treaties concluded by the EU with third countries. The treaties place a profound obligation on the partner countries of legal approximation, that is, to undertake extensive, binding commitments to adopt vast swathes of the acquis in order to stimulate political and economic development and institutional modernisation. This study shows that creating the institutional framework for implementation is a challenging and drawn-out process. While all countries have made some progress with devising these mechanisms, they are short of the necessary political leadership, policy planning, administrative capacity and there is a dearth of budgetary planning to enable effective implementation. There is also a notable need to embed implementation into wider reform strategies. While these issues are being addressed on the part of the countries, the EU can assist them by providing the necessary systemic support in an integrated, sequenced and long-term way.
Source : © European Union, 2018 - EP