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Der Konflikt in Tigray, Äthiopien, begann 2020 und forderte viele Opfer. Ein Friedensabkommen brachte keine vollständige Lösung. Afrika-Forscher Gerrit Kurtz weiß: Die Region steht vor großen Herausforderungen.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive trans­ition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:

- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environ­mental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assess­ment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incen­tives with effective risk-sharing and flexible finan­cing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Frag­menta­tion in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmoni­sation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and comple­mentarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
 Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing com­plementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow finan­cial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effective­ness of blended finance and guarantees, particu­larly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.

The reform would introduce common purchasing rules for all hospitals funded by the national health insurance system and expand centralised drug procurement

Le Rassemblement national a-t-il été victime d’une cyberattaque d’ampleur ? Après l’annonce d’un piratage revendiqué visant le parti, la justice a réagi. Le parquet de […]

L’article Le RN visé par une cyberattaque : des visuels aux couleurs des drapeaux algérien et marocain affichés est apparu en premier sur .

The money is meant to support the development of critical sovereign combat air technologies

Recruteur de mannequins et rabatteur présumé de femmes pour le pédocriminel américain Jeffrey Epstein, Daniel Siad a été retrouvé mort lundi soir à son domicile de Colombes (Hauts-de-Seine), près de Paris, a indiqué le parquet de Nanterre, mercredi. L'information avait été donnée par le journal Le Parisien.

Frissítés: Birtalan Albert összeállítása a megnyitóról alább meghallgatható: Korábban írtuk: „Tusványos nem a Fidesz érdekeit kell szolgálja. A határon túli magyarok és a szabadegyetem sem lehet ellenzékben” – mondta a Tusványos egyik alapítója, Toró T. Tibor az Erdélyi Magyar Nemzeti Tanács ügyvezető elnöke a rendezvény ma délelőtti megnyitóján. Az alapokhoz való visszatérést sürgetve, Toró T. […]

Articolul Elkezdődött az idei Tusványos apare prima dată în Kolozsvári Rádió Románia.

EFSA cuts safe exposure level for the metabolite TFA in food by 3.5 times

Un drame est survenu mardi vers 11 heures à la Place Force, dans la commune de Kasa-Vubu à Kinshasa. Un conducteur de moto-taxi a perdu la vie par électrocution à la suite d’une violente altercation avec quatre agents du service des transports urbains. Ce tragique incident a immédiatement provoqué une vague d’indignation et des troubles parmi les motocyclistes et les riverains. La police est intervenue et aurait fait usage d’armes à feu.

Andy Burnham, nouveau chef du Parti travailliste, a été officiellement nommé Premier ministre du Royaume-Uni par le roi Charles III. À 56 ans, l’ancien maire de l’agglomération de Manchester devient le quatrième chef de gouvernement nommé par Charles III depuis 2022, et le septième Premier ministre depuis la mise en place du Brexit. Que peut faire ce nouveau Premier ministre par rapport à ses prédécesseurs ? Alors que le parti d'extrême droite « Reform UK » accuse Andy Burnham d'être arrivé au pouvoir sans avoir été élu, dispose-t-il d’une légitimité suffisante pour engager les réformes déjà annoncées ?

Des présumés rebelles des ADF ont attaqué, lundi 20 juillet, le carré minier de Mambau, situé dans la chefferie de Babilo-Babombi, au territoire de Mambasa en Ituri.

Lors de cette incursion, les assaillants ont semé la désolation : plusieurs habitations ont été réduites en cendres, des biens commerciaux ont été systématiquement pillés, et un nombre indéterminé de civils ont été emmenés de force en brousse, rapportent des sources locales.

À Omsk, à 2 500 kilomètres de la ligne de front, la spectaculaire frappe de drones ukrainiens contre la plus grande raffinerie de Russie n’a quasiment pas perturbé le quotidien ni les approvisionnements en carburant : seulement deux jours de panne sèche et quelques stations-service irrégulièrement livrées. Mais dans les esprits, le choc est profond. Comment les habitants d’Omsk ont-ils vécu cette attaque ? Alors que le désir d’arrêter les combats est de plus en plus présent chez les Russes, peuvent-ils l’exprimer publiquement ?

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jul 22 2026 (IPS)

A proposal to restrict US visas to foreign journalists assigned to cover the US has triggered a strong protest from the New York-based Foreign Press Association (FPA).

The FPA says it is dismayed by the US administration’s proposals for restricting international press visas. The shortened duration of the press “I” visa would make it impossible for overseas press to maintain consistent coverage of the US, let alone staff a bureau.

The likely administrative backlogs and possible politically motivated visa denials fly in the face of the First Amendment in the US and challenge international media standards.

“The demand for frequent visa renewal obviates any chance that correspondents could maintain any kind of family life, let alone to develop the network of sources and resources essential for professional journalism.”

“The benefits of free press coverage stand in their own right. However, we should also point out that many essential US industries depend on international media coverage.”

Markets, education, entertainment, STEM, sports, and culture are just some examples of industries where companies and institutions could decide to relocate to more cosmopolitan and accessible countries, the FPA said.

The administration rule changes reducing the length of stay for foreign journalist (I) visas to 240 days and 90 days for Chinese journalists harm the international media’s ability to cover the United States. Journalists, who have spent years building relationships and developing a deep understanding of the U.S. economy, people, culture, and politics, would join the millions whose ability to travel to and work in the U.S. is challenged by the administration’s policies.

According to the US State Department, media (I) visas are for representatives of the foreign media, including members of the press, radio, film, and print industries. The media representative must be traveling temporarily to the United States to work in their profession. The individual may only participate in informational or educational activities, essential to the foreign media function.

Activities in the United States while on a media (I) visa must be for a media organization with a home office outside of the United States. Activities in the United States must be informational in nature and generally associated with the newsgathering process and reporting on current events.

Since at least the Second World War, the FPA pointed out, the State Department has set an example for other countries with its untrammelled welcome for the foreign press and its consistent defense of First Amendment rights. The flurry of reflexive xenophobia represented by these proposals reverses all those decades in a way that clearly does not take account of the needs of the press, nor indeed of the USA.

“Many of us can testify to the professional development of journalists from more restrictive countries like China when exposed to a more open press here, which makes it even more illogical that the proposals impose additional restrictions on Chinese media”.

“We recall that the Headquarters Treaty with the United Nations and other international bodies commits the host country, the US, to facilitate entry to press from member countries to cover the work, and cannot see any provisions to ensure that this international treaty obligation is fulfilled. Once again this suggests that these proposals were rushed through without consideration of the realities, and we can testify, with no consultation with the media affected”.

Ian Williams, President, Foreign Press Association of the USA, told Inter Press Service (IPS), “It’s worse than a crime; it’s a screw-up (mistake), as Napoleon’s general didn’t say… They have lumped journalists in with the overall category of foreigners and acted with reflexive xenophobia—perhaps exacerbated because if there’s any group they hate more than foreigners, it’s journalists.”

The proposals, he said, show no sign of intelligent appreciation of the role of journalism or journalists, and they have produced no statistics for journalists and the alleged threat to security or immigration. Their arguments and proposals are an exercise in knee-jerk prejudice, a reflex that operates without the intervention of the intellect.

“One also wonders whether they have given any thought to American interests. Whatever you think of their social utility, NYSE and NASDAQ depend on global media for international investors,” he said

Similarly, as one would expect from a bunch of Philistines with no professional experience, by bundling the media, along with educational visas, they may have muddied the waters. Higher education has a heavy dependence on foreign tuition income, and they will fight back politically and in the courts, maybe joined by the Murdoch Press, which has regularly imported reactionary talent from abroad.

“Ironically one thinks of the foreign press personalities who have come into the USA—people like Rupert Murdoch, Andrew Neill, Douglas Murray, Conrad Black, Andrew Sullivan, and Stuart Varney—and furthered the conservative cause here, but that is not who they are thinking about,” declared Williams, a former President of the UN Correspondents’ Association (UNCA).

Dr. Alon Ben-Meir, President, Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution, told IPS that by conditioning a journalist’s ability to live and work in the United States on repeated, discretionary renewals, the administration is creating precisely the climate of self-censorship that the First Amendment was meant to prevent.

If a reporter knows that a critical story about the president or his allies might translate into a denied extension, the line between immigration policy and political reprisal evaporates, he said.

“This is not a hypothetical danger. The rule expressly allows the government to scrutinize the “content” a journalist is covering when deciding whether to grant an extension, opening the door to ideological filtering of who gets to report from the United States. That logic is indistinguishable from the methods long used by authoritarian regimes that the United States has historically condemned,” said Dr Ben-Meir

The proposal also creates a ready-made instrument for selective punishment of journalists from countries with which the Trump administration has tense or adversarial relations. The singling out of Chinese journalists for especially harsh 90-day limits is an explicit signal that Washington is prepared to wield visa policy as a geopolitical stick, not a neutral administrative tool, he pointed out.

Once this precedent is established, nothing prevents the administration from tightening the screw further on reporters from other states whose governments it wishes to pressure—or punish.

The result would be a two-tiered press landscape in which journalists from favored countries enjoy relative stability, while those from disfavored states face constant uncertainty and the implicit demand to “behave,” he declared.

Dr. Ben-Meir said foreign governments and international bodies, including the UN, should make it clear that undermining foreign press access in the United States will invite reciprocal restrictions on American journalists abroad—further isolating US audiences from the world.

And American citizens, who ultimately bear the cost of an information-starved public sphere, must insist that their government not abuse immigration law as a backdoor censorship tool.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Alors que les Européens poursuivent leur réarmement stratégique face à la menace russe, le Kremlin multiplie les provocations. Un navire de guerre russe a ainsi mené un exercice de tir réel au large des côtes anglaises lundi soir, à la veille de l’arrivée au 10 Downing Street du nouveau PM britannique Andy Burnham. « Un salut viril en forme de menace », estime Bruno Fuchs, député MoDem et président de la commission des Affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée nationale, qui accuse Vladimir Poutine de vouloir ainsi « déstabiliser l’Europe » à l’heure où celle-ci se réarme. Bruno Fuchs qui ne croit pas en revanche « à une attaque imminente de la Russie », alors que Poutine « a déjà du mal à avancer dans le Donbass ».

La ministre de la Transition écologique Monique Barbut a présenté, mercredi, sa démission à Emmanuel Macron qui "ne l'a pas acceptée", et elle a décidé de "poursuivre sa mission à la demande" du président "qui l'a assurée de son soutien", a annoncé son cabinet à l'AFP.

Les familles Soglo et Vieyra commémorent, samedi 25 juillet 2026, le cinquième anniversaire du rappel à Dieu de l'ex-Première dame du Bénin Rosine Vieyra Soglo. Une messe d'action de grâce sera célébrée à cette occasion pour le repos de son âme.

La célébration eucharistique se tiendra, samedi 25 juillet 2026 à 11 heures, à la chapelle Saint-Joseph, située à l'étage de la paroisse Saint-Michel de Cotonou.
L'ancien président Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo, la famille Soglo et la famille Vieyra invitent parents, amis, proches et toutes les personnes ayant connu ou admiré l'ancienne Première dame à se joindre à eux pour ce moment de recueillement et de prière. Cette présence constituera un précieux témoignage de communion, d'amitié, de fidélité et d'affection à la mémoire de Rosine Vieyra Soglo.

Rosine Soglo, de son vrai nom Rose-Marie Honorine Vieyra, est décédée le 25 juillet 2021 à Cotonou à l'âge de 87 ans. Epouse de l'ancien président Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo (1991-1996), la défunte a été huissière de justice et une figure marquante de la vie politique béninoise.

Fondatrice de la Renaissance du Bénin (RB), elle a marqué plusieurs générations par son engagement politique et son action en faveur de la démocratie. Son souvenir demeure vivant cinq ans après sa disparition. Elle a également fondé l'Association Vidolé (ou ONG Vidolé), organisation caritative pour la protection des enfants et le soutien aux femmes et aux nouveau-nés.

Les incursions répétées d’hommes armés en provenance du Soudan du Sud inquiètent de plus en plus les populations vivant le long de la frontière dans le territoire d’Aru, en Ituri. Face à cette menace transfrontalière grandissante, la société civile et les notables locaux alertent également sur une montée de la criminalité dans les principaux centres commerciaux de la région.