Le vieux lien transatlantique se meurt, la défense européenne tarde à apparaître et dans ce clair-obscur stratégique Vladimir Poutine pourrait surgir en prenant pied dans les pays baltes pour mettre fin à toute aide à l’Ukraine… sous la menace de la force nucléaire.
Incapables de se défendre comme les États-Unis – ce qui n’est ni financièrement possible, ni stratégiquement souhaitable – et ne voulant pas se battre comme les Ukrainiens – au prix de dizaines de milliers de morts – les Européens doivent inventer leur propre façon de faire la guerre ; une guerre qui ne sera pas la copie de celle qui se déroule en Ukraine.
La défense européenne doit donc se renforcer conventionnellement mais aussi intégrer une composante nucléaire spécifiquement européenne afin d’éviter tout chantage de la part de la Russie, mais aussi tout abus du protecteur américain.
C’est la voie que trace l’évolution de la doctrine nucléaire française. Cette évolution pourrait marquer le début d’une cohésion indispensable pour que les États européens puissent conjurer ensemble une menace qu’ils ne peuvent affronter isolément. Un nouvel avenir possible se dessine. Aux Européens de le construire. Vite.
À téléchargerL’article Mourir pour Zilupe ? La guerre qui vient est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Even though the security landscape has changed drastically since the Cold War, the main goals for Swedish arms cooperation have stayed roughly the same. Cooperation is seen as valuable for gaining access to competence, for preserving domestic competence, and for decreasing unit costs for procured equipment.
The Swedish experiences of international arms collaboration vary. Success factors include constructive dialogues and relations with the partner countries and companies, and trust. Challenges include country specific equipment requirements, protection of domestic defence companies, and the differences in export regulations.
Sweden will, like other countries, continue to seek the arms cooperations that benefit its national security and its defence industry. More specifically, Sweden is interested in exploring the potential of NATO collaboration, in the light of the newly acquired membership. Sweden also recognises the potential of the EU initiatives like the EDIP and the EDF, but it is through the combination of NATO and EU initiatives that real impact can be achieved. Upcoming strategic procurement decisions will also form the Swedish industry and what collaborations Sweden will pursue in the future.
À téléchargerL’article Which Type of Armament Cooperation Do We Want/Need? The Case of Sweden est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
On the sidelines of the UN Youth Forum, four climate leaders from across the continent and diaspora unite to call for stronger protection of Africa’s environment and vital resources.
Sibusiso Mazomba (far left), member of the UN Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change; Eugenia Boateng (second from left), Founder and Executive Director of the African Diaspora Youth Hub, FABA Institute; Jabri Ibrahim, also of the UN Secretary-General’s Youth Advisory Group on Climate Change; and Damon Hamman, Graduate Student, New York University, Centre for Global Affairs. Credit: UN Photo
By Alexandra del Castello
UNITED NATIONS, May 5 2026 (IPS)
Africa is on the frontlines of the climate crisis, warming faster than the global average and facing disproportionate climate impacts, despite contributing the least to global greenhouse gas emissions.
This is particularly evident in the growing pressures that climate change is placing on water resources and systems across the continent. As water underpins agriculture, livelihoods, ecosystems, and energy production, water-related climate impacts are deepening inequalities and threatening sustainable development across Africa.
At the forefront of this year’s ECOSOC Youth Forum – the largest annual UN gathering of young people – four African climate youth leaders led a dynamic discussion spotlighting the key role that African youth play in driving climate solutions across the continent, building community resilience, strengthening water security, and advancing locally led adaptation efforts.
Their insights highlighted how young people are not only responding to the climate crisis but reshaping the development agenda through innovation, advocacy, and community rooted action.
African youth are charting bold new pathways for climate leadership and proving that the future of climate action is being shaped by their vision and determination.
Learn more about the speakers:
Eugenia Boateng is an African diaspora strategist and founder of the African Diaspora Youth Hub (ADYH) and FABA, a production strategy lab building systems to make African economies more visible, structured, and investable.
Her work focuses on translating informal economies into institutional intelligence, connecting diaspora resources to African production, and designing systems that enable value retention on the continent.
Jabri Ibrahim is a climate and energy policy expert with an extensive network across Africa, connecting youth movements, policymakers, and private sector leaders. Jabri has played a central role in mobilizing African youth for climate action, particularly through the African Youth Initiative on Climate Change (AYICC).
Sibusiso Mazomba is a climate justice activist, advocate, and researcher. He leads youth advocacy at the African Climate Alliance, driving initiatives to ensure meaningful youth participation in decision-making.
A junior negotiator for South Africa’s UNFCCC delegation since COP26, he has contributed to negotiations on adaptation, oceans, and loss and damage, representing youth and national interests on the global stage.
Damon Hamman is a Master of Science candidate in Global Affairs at New York University, concentrating in transnational security, intelligence, and conflict analysis. His work centers on the intersection of human security, diplomacy, and data-driven policy research.
He has served with the United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, where he built an AI-assisted thematic analysis pipeline for Voluntary National Reviews, contributed to policy briefs aligned with Agenda 2030 and AU Agenda 2063, and supported diplomatic engagement with African missions.
Source: Africa Renewal, United Nations
IPS UN Bureau
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Credit: UN Photo/Manuel Elías
By Samuel King
BRUSSELS, Belgium, May 4 2026 (IPS)
In January, the government of Algeria succeeded in locking two civil society groups out of access to the United Nations (UN). It raised questions at the UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, known as the NGO Committee, about two civil society groups with accreditation. It alleged that Italian organisation Il Cenacolo was making politically motivated statements at the UN Human Rights Council and the Geneva-based International Committee for the Respect and Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (CIRAC) was selling UN grounds passes. Four days later, it called a vote to revoke their status. Other states urged delay, but the no-action motion failed, and 11 of the body’s 19 members voted to recommend that the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) revoke Il Cenacolo’s accreditation and suspend CIRAC’s for a year.
As the primary gatekeeper for civil society participation at the UN, the NGO Committee controls ECOSOC consultative status, which allows organisations to attend UN meetings, submit written statements, make oral interventions, organise side events and access UN premises. Its mandate, set out in ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, is straightforward: to facilitate civil society access to the UN system.
Such access is particularly valuable for organisations working in repressive contexts, where domestic advocacy is suppressed. It can mean the difference between a community’s concerns being silenced or becoming a matter of international record. In practice, however, the Committee has so consistently worked to obstruct rather than enable access that it is widely known as the ‘anti-NGO Committee’.
On 8 April, in an almost entirely uncompetitive vote, ECOSOC members elected 19 states to serve on the NGO Committee for four-year terms. Only 20 candidates ran for the 19 seats. UN states are organised into five regional blocs, and four of them presented closed slates, putting forward only as many candidates as the number of seats available.
As a result, the Asia-Pacific group selected China, India, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), states with consistent track records of silencing civil society. Latin America and the Caribbean is represented by the likes of Cuba and Nicaragua, which suppress dissent and routinely detain critics. Four of the five African states elected have repressed or closed civic space. Two states elected from the Western European and Other States group, Israel and Turkey, have also recently intensified their repression of civic space.
The one exception was the Eastern European group, where Estonia and Ukraine won seats in a three-way contest, keeping out authoritarian Belarus, which received only 23 votes against Estonia’s 44 and Ukraine’s 38. As in 2022, when Russia lost a similar race, the result showed that competitive elections open up scrutiny and produce better outcomes. The problem is they rarely happen.
Overall, 13 of 19 newly elected states are rated as having closed or repressed civic space by the CIVICUS Monitor, our research initiative that tracks the conditions for civil society around the world. Only one, Estonia, has open civic space. Fourteen of the 20 candidates had been named as carrying out reprisals against people engaging with the UN.
In the run-up to the election, the International Service for Human Rights published scorecards assessing all 20 candidates against eight criteria; 12 of the 20 met none. Over 80 civil society organisations called on ECOSOC member states to hold competitive elections and vote for candidates committed to civil society access. Forty independent UN human rights experts, including special rapporteurs on human rights defenders and on countries including Afghanistan, Iran and Russia, issued a statement warning that Committee members were abusing the accreditation process to block access for human rights organisations. All these warnings went unheeded.
The withdrawal of accreditation from Il Cenacolo and CIRAC, which awaits ECOSOC confirmation, was unprecedented, but it sits within a long pattern of obstruction. At the Committee’s latest regular session in January, 618 applications were under consideration, 381 of which had been deferred from previous sessions.
The backlog is no accident. States ask repetitive questions about minor details and make short-notice requests for complex documentation to repeatedly delay applications until future sessions. States that repress civil society at home do the same in the international arena, targeting organisations that work on issues they deem controversial or opposed to their interests. Three states – China, India and Pakistan– stand out as the worst abusers of this mechanism, having asked almost half of the 647 questions posed to applicants during the January session. Repeated deferrals raise the costs for civil society organisations, draining financial resources and time.
The UN’s current financial crisis is compounding the problem. The consequences of funding cuts were visible at the latest session, when the question-and-answer session was cancelled following an early adjournment. The loss of the only opportunity for organisations seeking accreditation to engage directly with the Committee fell hardest on smaller organisations that had travelled to New York to take part.
The UN’s current cost-cutting drive could at least be used as an opportunity to push for online participation and other efficiency reforms to reduce the bureaucratic burden of repeated requests for information. Beyond this, there’s a need to reassert that the Committee’s function is supposed to be that of an enabler rather than an obstructor.
The NGO Committee determines whether the voices of communities facing repression and violence can be heard in the UN system, and it’s been hijacked by states with every interest in ensuring that they cannot. The floor can’t be left clear for states that repress civil society to act as gatekeepers. States that claim to support civil society must be willing to put themselves forward.
Samuel King is a researcher with the Horizon Europe-funded research project ENSURED: Shaping Cooperation for a World in Transition at CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
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Le retrait effectif des Émirats arabes unis de l’Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole (OPEP), ce vendredi 1er mai 2026, n’est pas une surprise en soi. C’est le timing choisi qui l’est. En effet, la question des quotas d’exportation de pétrole est depuis quelques années le principal point de friction entre l’Arabie saoudite et Abou Dhabi, Riyad souhaitant restreindre l’offre des pays de l’OPEP pour garantir, avec l’appui de la Russie au sein de l’OPEP+, un prix de rentabilité qui répond à ses besoins de financement pour son plan ambitieux de développement « Vision 2030 ». Les Émirats qui exportaient avant le conflit en Iran près de 3MB/J avaient l’ambition d’augmenter leur production aux alentours de 5 MB/J. Cette ambition avait été annoncée par Sultan Al-Jaber, ministre de l’Énergie, président de la Compagnie nationale pétrolière d’Abou Dhabi (ADNOC) lors de la COP28 qu’il présidait.
Ce retrait aura sans doute une incidence sur le fonctionnement de l’OPEP déjà affaibli par plusieurs départs, dont celui du Qatar en 2018. L’organisation qui contrôlait 50 % du pétrole mis sur le marché ne représente plus que 30 % de la production mondiale.
Une temporalité qui souligne des approches divergentes sur le conflit avec l’Iran
Ce qui surprend le plus dans cette décision de se retirer de l’OPEP est sa temporalité. Ce retrait vient en plein milieu d’un conflit dont l’issue n’est pas prévisible. Les Émirats, qui jusqu’ici essayaient de ménager leur voisin iranien et servaient de coffre-fort aux dépôts des oligarques iraniens (gardiens de la révolution et autres mollahs), ont changé de stratégie.
Les Émirats ont été probablement le pays le plus ciblé par les tirs de missiles et de drones iraniens. Ils ne sont pas intervenus militairement en appui de leurs alliés américain et israélien et ont bénéficié de l’aide française en vertu des accords de défense qui lient les deux pays. Les récentes déclarations du 1er mai sur le réseau social X de Anwar Gargash, l’influent conseiller politique de Mohamed Ben Zayed, ne laissent place à aucune ambiguïté : « Bien entendu on ne peut faire confiance à aucune disposition unilatérale iranienne ni s’appuyer sur elle après l’agression perfide contre l’ensemble de ses voisins ». La confiance est désormais totalement rompue avec l’Iran. Et en coulisse, les Émirats incitent les États-Unis à reprendre les hostilités.
Le choix des alliances
Abou Dhabi se singularise des autres États du Golfe par sa proximité avec Israël. L’entente avec Tel-Aviv va bien au-delà d’une reconnaissance ou de l’établissement de relations diplomatiques. Les deux pays sont engagés dans de nombreuses coopérations notamment dans le domaine de la défense. Israël aurait récemment fourni à son partenaire du Golfe un système sophistiqué de défense contre les missiles.
La coopération entre Israël et les Émirats s’étend à l’Afrique. Les Émiriens leur ont ouvert les portes du Somaliland un point très stratégique dans la Corne de l’Afrique et qui se situe à une courte distance du Yémen des Houthis.
Cette stratégie en solo exaspère le grand voisin saoudien qui a adopté une toute autre approche. Riyad maintient son alliance avec Washington et se garde bien de répliquer aux propos insultants de Donald Trump. En même temps, le royaume wahhabite privilégie désormais d’autres alliances en essayant de construire un axe avec le Pakistan, la Turquie et l’Égypte trois puissances régionales. Les Saoudiens veulent neutraliser la menace iranienne sans vouloir l’anéantissement de l’Iran. En cela, ils semblent beaucoup plus proches des Omanais (qui ont été marginalisés par les États-Unis). Abbas Araghchi, le ministre des Affaires étrangères iranien, s’est ainsi rendu à Mascate le 25 avril avant de se rendre à Moscou. Il a été reçu par le Sultan et a eu des discussions approfondies avec son homologue Sayed Badr Al-Busaïdi. Pourtant Oman a toujours été prudent dans ses relations avec l’Iran. Est-ce par sympathie pour le régime ou un choix de conserver des relations de bon voisinage avec un puissant voisin qui a des capacités de nuisance importantes ?
L’absence de réaction des pays du Golfe aux attaques iraniennes : impuissance ou attentisme prudent ?
L’absence de réaction des pays du Golfe dans leur ensemble est surprenante. Leurs installations vitales ont été durement frappées par les attaques balistiques iraniennes sans que cela entraîne de répliques de leur part. Ces pays auraient pu participer même symboliquement à des ripostes, vu le formidable arsenal accumulé, avec l’appui des forces américaines. Ils ont privilégié une attitude attentiste, voire pusillanime. Les Omanais qui partagent le contrôle du détroit d’Ormuz avec les Iraniens et dont une grande partie du trafic s’effectuait sur le rail dans leurs eaux territoriales ont accepté cette fermeture sans sourciller.
Cette absence de réaction peut se comprendre par les doutes sur la capacité des Américains et des Israéliens à détruire les capacités de nuisance de l’Iran, leur voisin immédiat, et avec lequel il faudra continuer de compter.
Cela explique aussi la volonté émirienne qui se distingue des autres monarchies du Golfe par cette envie d’en finir une fois pour toutes avec cette menace.
Quelles conséquences pour les pays du CCG ?
Ce conflit aura de multiples conséquences. Il officialisera une rupture de fait entre les deux monarchies rivales (Arabie saoudite et Émirats), mais pourrait remettre en question le fonctionnement du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG) qui n’a jamais réussi à concilier les intérêts, souvent divergents, des uns et des autres.
L’autre conséquence sera la diminution de l’importance du détroit d’Ormuz comme débouché pour les exportations de pétrole et autres. D’ores et déjà, des plans pour faire renaître de vieilles routes sont à l’étude (le chemin de fer du Hedjaz pourrait être étendu à tous les pays du Golfe et aboutir en Méditerranée par exemple), l’Arabie saoudite dispose déjà du port de Yanbu qui lui permet d’exporter une grande partie de sa production de pétrole par la mer Rouge. Les Émiriens renforceront les capacités de leur débouché maritime à Fujairah dans la mer d’Arabie en dehors du détroit. Les Omanais ont eu une intuition qui s’avérera gagnante en développant l’immense complexe maritime de Duqm sur l’océan Indien.
Le conflit avec l’Iran aura eu le mérite de clarifier les positions des uns et des autres.
L’article Retrait de l’OPEP : le pari risqué des Émirats arabes unis est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
Il est temps que les dirigeants européens exposent nettement leurs désaccords à l’égard de Donald Trump et cessent de le craindre. À ce jour, rares sont les voix qui s’y opposent clairement, à l’image du pape ou du Premier ministre espagnol Pedro Sanchez.
Un simple exemple illustre la situation de nombreux dirigeants européens : après une timide remarque du chancelier Friedrich Merz affirmant que les Américains avaient été humiliés en Iran, Donald Trump a décidé d’augmenter les tarifs sur les exportations d’automobiles européennes de 15 à 25%, malgré les accords négociés longuement l’été dernier.
L’Europe doit-elle continuer à privilégier la relation transatlantique à tout prix ? Faut-il garder des bonnes relations par souci de préservation de l’unité de l’OTAN ? Celle-ci semble en réalité déjà très fragilisée. Ou alors s’agit-il d’assurer l’aide états-unienne à la défense de l’Ukraine ? Les Etats-Unis ont d’ores et déjà drastiquement diminué leur contribution et les pays européens supportent désormais la grande majorité de l’aide.
Dès lors, les pays européens doivent prendre leurs responsabilités, pour réaffirmer leurs valeurs et sauvegarder leur crédibilité. Pour cela, il faut bâtir une autonomie européenne commune, capable de se défendre face aux chantages du président des États-Unis.
L’article L’Europe doit dire à Trump « ça suffit » est apparu en premier sur IRIS.
In the low tide, an i-Taukei fisherwoman gathers cockles along the Nasese sea wall in Fiji, a tradition weathered by time and tide. The assessment Climate Change Implications for Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Pacific Island Region looks at women’s contributions across fisheries and aquaculture systems, from harvesting to trade. Credit: Josh Kuilamu/SPC
By Sera Sefeti
SUVA, Fiji, May 4 2026 (IPS)
For generations, Pacific people have understood the ocean not as a resource but as identity, sustenance, and survival. Today, that relationship is being tested in ways science is only just beginning to fully capture.
For the first time in the region’s history, every Pacific Island country now has a clear, data-driven picture of what climate change will mean for its waters and its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
This shift marks more than just a scientific milestone. It is a turning point in how the Pacific can understand, manage, and defend its ocean in a rapidly changing climate.
From Regional Averages to National realities
The updated assessment, “Climate Change Implications for Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Pacific Island Region”, builds on a 14-year-old vulnerability study. But unlike its predecessor, this version moves beyond broad regional trends.
It goes deeper into country-specific realities.
In a region where ocean territories dwarf landmass, this matters. The Pacific controls around 27 million square kilometres of ocean, yet only about 2 percent of that is land. Fisheries are not just an industry – they are the backbone of economies, cultures, and food systems.
“This is quite amazing,” says SPC Climate Change Project Development Specialist Marie Lecomte, referring to the ability to assess climate impacts at the EEZ level. “The ocean is so big, and land masses are so tiny… it has always been very difficult to downscale ocean models to something meaningful for countries.”
Now, that gap is beginning to close.
Rising ocean temperatures and changing chemistry are reshaping marine ecosystems, impacting people’s livelihoods and national economies. Credit: Douglas Picacha/IPS
Why This Science Matters Now
For Pacific leaders, the climate crisis is not abstract. It is negotiated in global forums, defended in policy rooms, and lived daily in coastal communities.
Yet one persistent challenge has been the lack of evidence.
This report begins to change that.
It provides:
In doing so, it transforms science into something actionable:
For a region often described as the moral voice of climate negotiations, this evidence adds weight to that voice.
The Pacific controls around 27 million square kilometres of ocean, yet only about 2 percent of that is land. Now each country in the region will have a data-driven picture of the effects of climate change in its waters. Credit: Francisco Blaha/SPC
What the Science Reveals
The findings are sobering.
Rising ocean temperatures and changing chemistry are already reshaping marine ecosystems. The report maps, with unprecedented clarity, a chain reaction: warming waters alter fish biology, leading to fish stocks’ decline, which will ultimately result in the impact on people’s livelihoods and national economies.
At the centre of this crisis are coastal ecosystems, i.e. coral reefs, mangroves, and seagrass beds, the ecological foundations of Pacific fisheries.
These systems are under intense pressure from both climate change and human activity.
“For mangroves, they are also constrained by infrastructure development,” Lecomte explains. “If you build a new hotel, then you get rid of the mangrove.”
For scientists, the assessment Climate Change Implications for Fisheries and Aquaculture in the Pacific Island Region offers the most comprehensive dataset for policymakers and communities. Credit: John Nihahuasi/SPC
Across the Pacific, the risks are not evenly distributed.
Low-lying island nations, already facing sea-level rise and extreme weather, are doubly exposed. Their dependence on fisheries for food and income leaves little buffer against decline.
The consequences are stark:
Yet even in this “doom and gloom” narrative, the report resists fatalism. Instead, it offers a framework for adaptation and resilience.
However, in the Pacific, the situation is not starting from zero.
For centuries, communities have managed fisheries through customary practices like tabu areas, seasonal closures, and community governance.
The report reinforces these approaches while introducing new strategies:
It also highlights a critical but often overlooked dimension, which is women’s contributions across fisheries and aquaculture systems, from harvesting to trade work that remain under-recognised despite their central role.
Science, Power, and the Politics of Survival
Perhaps the most powerful implication of the report lies beyond science — in politics.
Despite being one of the most climate-impacted sectors, fisheries are largely absent from global climate negotiations.
This is where the findings become more than a report. It becomes leverage.
With pre-COP discussions and COP31 on the horizon, Pacific countries now have something they have long needed.
“If Pacific delegations can come to pre-COP saying we have the latest science… and we all agree on how we want to act with the regional climate change strategy for coastal fisheries being pre-endorsed,” Lecomte says, “it’s a unique chance to showcase fisheries as part of the ocean–climate nexus.”
Beyond the Data: A Call to Act
This report does not just document change but also demands a response.
It bridges worlds:
For scientists, it offers the most comprehensive dataset yet when it comes to the Pacific and its EEZ; for policymakers, it is a roadmap; for communities, it is a validation of what they already know.
That the ocean is changing and so must we.
But in that change lies something powerful. For the first time, the Pacific is not just speaking from experience. It is speaking with scientific evidence.
IPS UN Bureau Report
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