Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The techno-geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States has intensified in recent years. Turkey’s souring relations with the US over the past decade has pre­vented the former from reaping the spoils of the Sino-US tech war as an American ally. Ankara has its own ambitions in the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution and is prioritising gaining access to advanced technology under affordable price arrange­ments in which Chinese tech companies offer important opportunities. Since Turkey is a NATO member and an EU candidate, its incremental move towards China’s tech­nology ecosystem should be of concern to EU decision-makers. Brussels should pro­mote policies to foster collaboration with Turkey so that today’s geoeconomic chal­lenges can be tackled together.

Börsenturbulenzen durch Trump

Union und SPD müssen dringend die Steuern reformieren. Pauschal die Mehrwertsteuer zu erhöhen, wäre aber für viele ein Schlag ins Gesicht. Es gibt viel bessere Lösungen., Die finanzielle Ausgangslage für die nächste Bundesregierung ist denkbar schlecht: Sie muss sparen, um die bereits bestehende riesige Finanzierungslücke im Bundeshaushalt zu schließen. Das Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur hilft ihr dabei nicht, da dieses – so zumindest das Versprechen – ...

Im Südsudan sollten Staatschef Salva Kiir und sein Vize Riek Machar an der Spitze einer Übergangsregierung dem Land Stabilität bringen. Doch es brechen alte Rivalitäten auf.

Wird Kanada das 28. Mitglied der EU oder doch der 51. Bundesstaat der USA?

There has been a significant increase in the number of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) since 2020. This presents a challenge for the United Nations, which has a presence in all countries that have recently experienced UCGs. In places like Afghanistan, Mali, and Sudan, it has also presented particular challenges to UN peace operations, which face the task of continuing to carry out their work amid a political crisis and using their good offices to facilitate a peaceful return to constitutional order.

The report examines lessons from the experiences of the UN missions in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Mali (MINUSMA), and Sudan (UNITAMS) following recent UCGs. It provides a brief overview of recent trends in UCGs and how the responses of member states and international and regional organizations have impacted the responses of UN peace operations. It then analyzes how these UN peace operations approached political engagement with the de facto authorities. It concludes with several lessons:

• A principled approach at the highest levels of the UN: While some UCGs may bring to power leaders with greater political will to engage with the UN, they are almost always an indicator of growing political instability. The UN secretary-general, along with the African Union (AU) and other regional organizations, should thus continue adopting a principled approach to condemning UCGs.
• A pragmatic approach for UN peace operations: While the UN should take a principled approach to UCGs at the headquarters level, UN peace operations are well-positioned to take a more pragmatic approach to engaging with de facto authorities. They should take advantage of any openness displayed by the authorities to engage despite fears that doing so might legitimize them.
• Planning for UCGs and reviewing political strategies: Even if the UN is unable to prevent UCGs, it can better prepare for managing relationships with transitional authorities. It is therefore important to consider such scenarios in mission planning for potential and current operations and to conduct strategic assessments as soon as possible following UCGs to consider how to adapt and potentially identify a new direction for engagement.
• The challenge of remaining impartial: Fears of “legitimizing” de facto authorities stem from the assumption that those authorities are inherently illegitimate. Yet not all elected authorities have popular legitimacy, and not all authorities who come to power unconstitutionally lack it. UN missions thus need to factor public opinion into how they respond on the ground.
• The need for a “One UN” response: While there is unlikely to be a “one-size-fits-all” approach to engagement with de facto authorities across the entire UN presence in a country, coordination is needed to ensure UN personnel have a common understanding of core principles of engagement and a coherent approach to communication.
• The limits of UN engagement: Ultimately, the ability of UN missions to shape political transitions following UCGs tends to be constrained by factors outside their control. Regional organizations like the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) tend to adopt a more principled response, raising questions about the extent to which UN missions should seek to link their engagement to that of these organizations. Missions also face competing pressures from member states supporting different political factions.

The post UN Peace Operations and Unconstitutional Changes of Government appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Die Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt sucht im Forschungsbereich „Transformation der Energiewirtschaft“ zur Mitarbeit in verschiedenen Forschungsprojekten zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) für 10 Wochenstunden.

The policy brief “From Migration Fears to Missed Opportunities: The Cost of Politicising EU Enlargement” follows upon the results of the report “The Rise of Radical Right and Eurosceptic Political Forces and the Impact on the EU’s Enlargement Policy.” It is part of the think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration initiative, led by ELIAMEP’s South-East Europe Programme and supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans.

As debates over EU enlargement intensify, migration has become a focal point for radical right and Eurosceptic parties across Europe. This brief by Ioannis Armakolas (Director, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Ioannis Alexandris (Research Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) explores how these political forces frame enlargement as a migration risk, shaping public discourse and influencing policy decisions. The brief highlights how migration concerns are linked to fears over cultural identity, security, and economic stability, influencing public perception and national policies.

The analysis also examines the broader political landscape, including how national governments respond to these pressures and the role of public referenda in shaping enlargement outcomes. Drawing lessons from past accessions, the brief underscores the economic and strategic benefits of integration while cautioning against the long-term costs of stagnation. Offering concrete policy recommendations, the paper advocates for a proactive communication strategy that counters misinformation, highlights the economic advantages of enlargement, and reengages public opinion with a fact-based narrative.

You can read the policy brief here.

 

 

The South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP is a member of the IGNITA network which is led by led by OSF-WB.

 

 

 

 

 

You can learn more about think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration by visiting the website of ELIAMEP and OSF-WB.

 

 

 

Funded by: OSF WB

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

US-Präsident Trump will Zölle in Höhe von 25 Prozent auf alle Autos, die nicht in den USA gefertigt werden, erheben. Handelsexpertin Sonali Chowdhry aus der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin kommentiert das Vorhaben wie folgt:

Die neue US-Regierung nimmt gegenüber ihren Handelspartnern eine zunehmend konfrontative Haltung ein. Ihre jüngste Ankündigung – pauschale Zölle von 25 Prozent auf Automobilimporte, unabhängig von deren Herkunft – trifft neben der EU auch andere große Autoexporteure wie Kanada, Mexiko, Japan und Südkorea. Diese neuen Autozölle zielen auf eine stark globalisierte Branche ab und werden zweifellos komplexe internationale Lieferketten stören.

Deutschland ist innerhalb der EU besonders stark betroffen, da die USA der größte Importeur deutscher Autos sind. Im Jahr 2024 gingen 13 Prozent der deutschen Neufahrzeugexporte in die USA, und auf mehrere große deutsche Automobilkonzerne (Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Volkswagen und Audi) entfallen rund 65 Prozent der weltweiten Exporte in die USA. Auch die USA werden die Auswirkungen dieses Zollkriegs zu spüren bekommen, da die höheren Kosten wahrscheinlich an die Verbraucher*innen weitergegeben werden und die Inflation anheizen.

Für die EU ergeben sich im Wesentlichen drei strategische Reaktionen: Erstens kann sie Gegenmaßnahmen zum Preis weiterer wirtschaftlicher Verluste ergreifen und zweitens sektorale Vereinbarungen im Vertrauen auf den politischen Willen der USA suchen. Drittens kann die EU den Handel innerhalb des europäischen Binnenmarktes und mit anderen Freihandelspartnern vertiefen, um die Ausfuhren zu diversifizieren. Die dritte Option ist die einzige, die zu spürbarem und langfristigem Wirtschaftswachstum führen und die Widerstandsfähigkeit der EU stärken kann.

Die Abteilung Kommunikation des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt für die Pressestelle eine studentische Hilfskraft (w/m/div) (für 19 Wochenstunden).