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After Monday’s Conciliation Committee on EU air passenger rights, key European Parliament, Council and Commission negotiators will brief journalists on the outcome of negotiations.
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

After Monday’s Conciliation Committee on EU air passenger rights, key European Parliament, Council and Commission negotiators will brief journalists on the outcome of negotiations.
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

ENTSCHLIESSUNGSANTRAG
eingereicht gemäß Artikel 115 Absätze 2 und 3 der Geschäftsordnung
zu dem Entwurf eines Durchführungsbeschlusses der Kommission über die Finanzierung des Jahresaktionsplans 2026 für die Vereinigte Republik Tansania
(D115284/01 - 2026/2749(RSP))
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

The international development debate is increasingly referring to the notion of the “social contract”. In this paper, we measure what governments give societies, a core element of social contracts. To enable social contract comparison across countries and over time, we develop indices to capture the three “Ps”: protection against internal and external threats, provision of social and economic services, and political participation. These indices are composed of indicators, which are mainly input variables to gauge the willingness of governments to deliver the three Ps. Subsequently, we calculate the values of 154 countries for the three indices around the year 2019. The results show that the indices are useful and valid. They highly correlate with each other and with other indicators such as per capita income and the Human Development Index. Yet, these correlations are not perfect, meaning that the indices are not another redundant development index. They add information and value. Finally, we make a first step in identifying patterns in the results. Countries in Latin America were doing comparatively well on average in terms of political participation in 2019. When controlling for per capita income, governments in sub-Saharan Africa, were delivering disproportionately more on average in terms of protection and political participation, but less so in terms of provision. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa fail mainly with regard to political participation.

The international development debate is increasingly referring to the notion of the “social contract”. In this paper, we measure what governments give societies, a core element of social contracts. To enable social contract comparison across countries and over time, we develop indices to capture the three “Ps”: protection against internal and external threats, provision of social and economic services, and political participation. These indices are composed of indicators, which are mainly input variables to gauge the willingness of governments to deliver the three Ps. Subsequently, we calculate the values of 154 countries for the three indices around the year 2019. The results show that the indices are useful and valid. They highly correlate with each other and with other indicators such as per capita income and the Human Development Index. Yet, these correlations are not perfect, meaning that the indices are not another redundant development index. They add information and value. Finally, we make a first step in identifying patterns in the results. Countries in Latin America were doing comparatively well on average in terms of political participation in 2019. When controlling for per capita income, governments in sub-Saharan Africa, were delivering disproportionately more on average in terms of protection and political participation, but less so in terms of provision. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa fail mainly with regard to political participation.

The international development debate is increasingly referring to the notion of the “social contract”. In this paper, we measure what governments give societies, a core element of social contracts. To enable social contract comparison across countries and over time, we develop indices to capture the three “Ps”: protection against internal and external threats, provision of social and economic services, and political participation. These indices are composed of indicators, which are mainly input variables to gauge the willingness of governments to deliver the three Ps. Subsequently, we calculate the values of 154 countries for the three indices around the year 2019. The results show that the indices are useful and valid. They highly correlate with each other and with other indicators such as per capita income and the Human Development Index. Yet, these correlations are not perfect, meaning that the indices are not another redundant development index. They add information and value. Finally, we make a first step in identifying patterns in the results. Countries in Latin America were doing comparatively well on average in terms of political participation in 2019. When controlling for per capita income, governments in sub-Saharan Africa, were delivering disproportionately more on average in terms of protection and political participation, but less so in terms of provision. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa fail mainly with regard to political participation.

Thousands gather outside Istanbul City Hall to mark one year since the arrest of Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on 18 March 2026. Credit: Yasin Akgul/AFP

By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jun 15 2026 (IPS)

When Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán lost by a landslide to a unified opposition in April, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was watching. The lesson he drew was not that he should be more moderate; it was that he needed to crack down harder. He had already arrested Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP)’s leading presidential contender, in March 2025. After Orbán’s defeat, he has accelerated his campaign to fracture the opposition and rewrite the rules before the next election in 2028.

Electoral autocracy

Erdoğan has been in power since 2003. After surviving a coup attempt in July 2016, he used emergency powers to purge the state at scale. Over 150,000 people were detained, fired or suspended from their jobs. Emergency decrees expanded the government’s power to shut down organisations and remove elected officials. A 2017 constitutional referendum, narrowly approved in a campaign that independent observers found deeply flawed, replaced Turkey’s parliamentary system with a hyper-presidential one.

Independent media has been systematically dismantled. Turkey now ranks 163rd out of 180 countries on Reporters Without Borders’ 2026 World Press Freedom Index. Yet elections have continued, and the opposition has continued to win at the municipal level, most strikingly in Istanbul in 2019 and again by an even wider margin in 2024. That residual competitiveness is what Erdoğan is now moving to close.

İmamoğlu had beaten Erdoğan’s candidate in Istanbul twice, was formally nominated as the CHP’s 2028 presidential candidate and polled strongly against Erdoğan nationally. Authorities arrested him on charges of corruption and links with terrorism as his nomination was under way, triggering Turkey’s largest wave of protests in over a decade. A 4,000-page indictment filed in November 2025 sought to sentence him to over 2,000 years in prison. Espionage charges followed in February 2026. His trial began in March amid continuing protests. He remains in prison, and in the 14 months since his arrest, over 500 more people have been detained, including 16 CHP-affiliated mayors.

With İmamoğlu imprisoned, Erdoğan’s next move was to prevent the CHP from consolidating around anyone else. On 21 May, an appeals court annulled the outcomes of the CHP’s 2023 national congress, ejecting the party’s elected leader Özgür Özel, who had raised the CHP to rough parity with Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in national polls, and reinstating his predecessor Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, a divisive figure who lost the last presidential election. Özel condemned the ruling as a judicial coup and refused to leave the party’s headquarters. Three days later, riot police stormed in, firing rubber bullets and teargas. The government denied any involvement, implausibly claiming the judiciary had acted independently. The operation was legal in form and political in substance.

Turkey’s constitution limits presidents to two five-year terms, and Erdoğan’s second expires in 2028. In May 2025, he appointed a legal team to draft a new constitution. It seems clear the goal is to extend his eligibility. The AKP and its nationalist allies fall short of the parliamentary threshold required to change the constitution or call a referendum on it. Some analysts believe the government’s recent initiative to end the decades-long conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party is at least partly designed to attract enough parliamentary votes to clear that threshold.

There is a structural reason the stakes are so high. Turkey’s hyper-presidential system means that, unlike Orbán, Erdoğan would have no safe path back from electoral defeat. For him, losing power could mean political extinction. His crackdown is a response to this threat.

Civil society resistance

Turkey’s civil society has, however, not submitted. Huge protests followed İmamoğlu’s arrest. A mass rally marked his 100th day in jail, and people marched again when the CHP headquarters were raided. Most recently, when Erdoğan ordered the closure of Bilgi University, one of Turkey’s oldest liberal academic institutions, students and staff immediately gathered outside to protest. Within two days the government reversed the closure. This illustrated both the extent of Erdoğan’s repressive urges and their limits when met with swift resistance.

The government has responded to protest with blanket bans on public gatherings, social media restrictions and mass arrests. Four days after İmamoğlu’s arrest, at least 1,879 people had been detained. Police repeatedly intervened forcefully, using teargas and detaining protesters and journalists.

Orbán’s downfall has frightened Erdoğan as much as it has inspired the Turkish opposition. He is moving to eliminate the conditions that made it possible. He has got rid of the most credible and unifying opposition candidate, neutralised the main opposition party and is in the process of dismantling what’s left of an electoral architecture that, however tilted, could still allow the opposition to win.

Turkey’s democracy now depends on whether enough people keep showing up, and on whether they can keep resisting Erdoğan’s campaign to dismantle democracy.

Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.

For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org

 

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On Wednesday at 10.00, lead MEPs Arba Kokalari and Michael McNamara will hold a press conference following the final EP vote on the so-called AI “digital omnibus”.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday at 10.00, lead MEPs Arba Kokalari and Michael McNamara will hold a press conference following the final EP vote on the so-called AI “digital omnibus”.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Bajrakitiyabha était l'aînée des sept enfants du roi Vajiralongkorn et le membre le plus éminent de la famille royale thaïlandaise.

Molemo "Jub Jub" Maarohanye is accused of trapping a taxi driver in a car and firing a gun in the man's direction.

A majority of nearly 55 percent of Swiss voters rejected a proposal to cap the country's population at ten million in a referendum held on Sunday. Launched by the right-wing populist Swiss People's Party (SVP), the 'No to a Switzerland of 10 Million' initiative proposed restricting the number of refugees admitted to the country once a certain population threshold is reached and, under certain circumstances, also ending the freedom of movement agreed with the EU.

Darüber, wie Deutschland zu mehr Wachstum kommen kann, wird viel diskutiert. Was fehlt: eine gerechte Frauenpolitik. Die fängt etwa beim Ehegattensplitting an., Die Bundesregierung diskutiert derzeit über viele große Reformen – bei Rente, Pflege, Steuern, Sozialstaat und Fachkräften. Es geht um die Frage, wie Deutschland aus seiner wirtschaftlichen Schwäche herausfinden kann. Doch ein wichtiges Thema bleibt bisher weitgehend unbeachtet: die Gleichstellung ...

On Wednesday at 13.30, lead MEP Malik Azmani will speak to journalists after the EP plenary vote on the reform of EU returns policy.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On Wednesday at 13.30, lead MEP Malik Azmani will speak to journalists after the EP plenary vote on the reform of EU returns policy.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Bonn, 15. Juni 2026. Der diesjährige Welttag zur Bekämpfung von Wüstenbildung und Dürre am 17. Juni fällt in das Internationale Jahr der Weidelandschaften und Pastoralisten. Dies bietet einen guten Anlass, um auf die wichtige Rolle der pastoralen Bewirtschaftung von Weidelandschaften für eine nachhaltige (ländliche) Entwicklung aufmerksam zu machen.

Unter Pastoralismus versteht man die Haltung von Nutztieren, die nicht ausschließlich an eine feste Hofstätte gebunden sind, sondern zumindest teilweise (während eines Teils des Jahres und/oder mit einem Teil der Herden) in der Landschaft umherziehen, um Futter (Gras) zu finden.

Das Internationale Jahr der Weidelandschaften und Pastoralisten steht unter dem Motto „Anerkennen, Respektieren und Wiederherstellen“. Der erste Schritt – das Anerkennen – besteht darin, die Bedeutung des Pastoralismus sichtbarer zu machen. Angesichts seiner Beiträge zur Ernährungssicherung, zum Erhalt der biologischen Vielfalt, zum Klimaschutz und zur ländlichen Entwicklung ist diese Anerkennung überfällig. Tatsächlich ist natürliches Dauergrünland (Gras ist die typische Vegetationsdecke von Weidelandschaften) mit mehr als 3,2 Milliarden Hektar nach Wäldern die zweitgrößte Vegetationsform der Erde, und es bedeckt etwa doppelt so viel Fläche wie Ackerland. Weltweit leben – je nach Definition – 200 bis 500 Millionen Menschen vom Pastoralismus. Sie leisten einen erheblichen Beitrag zur weltweiten Fleischproduktion; darüber hinaus liefern sie Milch, Häute, Dung und weitere Produkte. In einigen afrikanischen Ländern, etwa Somalia, bildet Pastoralismus sogar das Rückgrat der Wirtschaft.

Die Bedeutung von Weidelandschaften geht jedoch weit über ihre wirtschaftliche Funktion hinaus. Grasland speichert Kohlenstoff, schützt Böden, reguliert den Wasserhaushalt und fördert biologische Vielfalt. Je nach Art ihrer Nutzung können diese Funktionen erhalten und sogar verbessert oder aber erheblich beeinträchtigt werden. Nachhaltiger Pastoralismus orientiert sich an der verfügbaren Vegetation in der Landschaft, vermeidet Überweidung und ermöglicht dadurch die Regeneration der Vegetation einschließlich etwaiger Bäume. Zudem treten die Tiere Gras in den Boden ein und erhöhen so seinen Gehalt an organischem Kohlenstoff. Nicht nachhaltiger Pastoralismus liegt hingegen vor, wenn die Herdengröße zu hoch ist und Überweidung verursacht. Dies führt zur Degradation der Vegetation bis hin zu kahlen Böden. Solche Flächen sind anfällig für Wind- und Wassererosion, Sand- und Staubstürme und verlieren ihre Funktion als Kohlenstoffspeicher.

Der zweite Schritt – der Respekt – zielt darauf ab, die Leistungen und Potenziale des Pastoralismus zu bewahren. Dabei müssen jedoch auch die bestehenden Herausforderungen klar benannt werden. Traditionell standen Vegetationsangebot und Herdengröße meist im Gleichgewicht; dies geschah unter anderem dadurch, dass in Dürrezeiten Teile der Herden verloren gingen. Heute kann dieses Gleichgewicht auf vielfältige Weise gestört werden. So kann der Verlust von Teilen der Weide- und Ökosystemflächen durch landwirtschaftliche Nutzung den Pastoralisten wichtige dauerhafte, saisonale oder als Reserve genutzte Weideflächen entziehen. Infrastrukturmaßnahmen und Grenzkontrollen können die Wanderbewegungen der Herden einschränken. Die Einrichtung eingezäunter Ranches sowie die Unterteilung von Weidelandschaften für eine intensivere Beweidung kann zwar kurzfristig die Tragfähigkeit erhöhen, gleichzeitig aber – abhängig von Niederschlagsmustern, Vegetation und Bewirtschaftungssystem – die Ökosysteme verändern.

Der dritte Schritt – die Wiederherstellung – muss sich darauf konzentrieren, Entwicklungen zu korrigieren, die Weidelandschaften und die Lebensgrundlagen der Pastoralisten geschwächt haben. Wichtige Maßnahmen sind die Unterstützung der Herdenmobilität, der Schutz von Wanderkorridoren und die Wiederherstellung geeigneter Weideflächen. Landwirtschaftliche Expansion und großflächige Ranchwirtschaft sollten die Interessen von Pastoralisten berücksichtigen. Verbesserungen bei Tiergesundheit, Vermarktung und Infrastruktur können Einkommen steigern und gleichzeitig mit dazu beitragen, Überweidung zu vermeiden. Investitionen in Tiergesundheit können zudem sowohl das Risiko als auch die Angst vor Krankheitsübertragungen und Epidemien verringern und damit die Mobilität der Herden erleichtern.

Der langfristige Trend zur Sesshaftwerdung dürfte dennoch anhalten, da Bildung, Gesundheitsversorgung und zusätzliche Einkommensmöglichkeiten oft leichter zugänglich sind. Auch Bevölkerungswachstum und Klimawandel setzen pastoralen Systemen Grenzen. Diese Entwicklungen machen eine ausgewogene und standortspezifische Abwägung konkurrierender Interessen umso wichtiger.

Trotz seiner Bedeutung erhält der Pastoralismus oft zu wenig politische Aufmerksamkeit. Entscheidend ist eine stärkere Beteiligung von Pastoralisten an politischen Entscheidungen. Ihre Interessenvertretungen müssen gestärkt und ihre Beteiligungsrechte institutionell verankert werden. Gelingt dies, werden viele der Ziele, die in den Leitbegriffen „Anerkennen, Respektieren und Wiederherstellen“ zum Ausdruck kommen, leichter erreichbar sein. Industrieländer können sowohl im eigenen Land in einigen dieser Bereiche mehr tun als auch ihre Partnerländer dabei unterstützen und ermutigen, solche Maßnahmen zu ergreifen: im politischen Dialog und bei der Projektplanung zu Themen wie ländlicher Entwicklung, Menschenrechten und indigenen Bevölkerungsgruppen, Umweltschutz, wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung, Frieden und Sicherheit, Armutsbekämpfung und Ernährungssicherung.