The European Research Council (ERC) is celebrating its first 10 years and we would like to share in this by presenting the achievements and milestones of Grassrootsmobilise, the first ERC-funded social science research programme in Greece, hosted by ELIAMEP.
GRASSROOTSMOBILISE MILESTONES
Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe Examining Grassroots Mobilisations in the Shadow of European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence (Grassrootsmobilise) explores the mobilisation of grassroots level actors in the wake of ECtHR religious freedom cases in order to determine the nature and extent of European juridical influence on religious pluralism at the local and national level. In the light of scholarly debates questioning the direct effects of courts, Grassrootsmobilise studies developments that take place ‘in the shadow of the courts’. It examines the extent to and ways in which court decisions define the opportunity structures and discursive frameworks within which citizens act. What is the aftermath of the Court’s religion jurisprudence in terms of its impact on social actors? What rights consciousnesses might be developing, and to what potential effects, concerning religion-related rights at the national and local level?
Grassrootsmobilise necessarily employs a bottom-up, methodologically innovative and multidisciplinary approach to address these questions. Qualitative fieldwork is employed by a team of postdoctoral researchers in 4 country case studies, including in-depth interview research with religious (minority and majority) actors, representatives of secular, religious, and other ideological NGOs, cause lawyers and judges, and state representatives managing religion-related policies.
Following a mapping process to identify particularly salient issue areas, the team has focused its research on a) mobilisations taking place ‘in the shadow’ of the ECtHR around religious education and the legal status of religious minorities and b) one specific ECtHR case against each country studied, in order to understand the mobilisation processes leading to and in the aftermath of the cases. Both tracks represent heretofore unstudied areas.
The above is supplemented by quantitative and qualitative research on references to the ECtHR religion-related case law in national print media and within national courts. The national courts study comprises a 3-stage process, the first two entailing quantitative studies and the 3rd a qualitative study of 5 salient local and national level cases, including interviews with relevant judges and lawyer and an analysis of the plaintiffs’ submissions to the court.
To complete the picture of how mobilisations may impact upon religious pluralism in Europe, the Principal Investigator (PI) studies ‘grasstops’ (transnational and supranational) mobilisations around the ECtHR on matters related to religion: she has conducted in-depth interviews with former and current ECtHR judges; representatives of NGOs which lobby around religion-related issues at the European level; and cause lawyers handling religion-related cases in the ECtHR.
To date, research results have been disseminated through a variety of methods: Grassrootsmobilise has been presented by the PI at international conferences, in summer school courses and at university research seminars; the PI has published a journal article building on the GRM project proposal, and another based on her grasstops mobilisations research; GRM research in the domain of religion and education was presented at the 2016 EASR Conference and has been accepted for publication as a special issue of a journal; our research related to the legal status of religious minorities was presented at an international conference on Religion and Human Rights, the researchers are preparing book chapters on the topic for a volume edited by the PI, and they will contribute related papers to a special issue of a journal emanating from the said conference; our research on ECtHR references in national courts was presented at the ICLARS conference in September 2016; finally further research was presented by individual researchers at the EUREL and ESA Conferences, the International Workshop at the Carlos III University of Madrid, at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and at the LSE Hellenic Observatory. Our website disseminates much of our research data to both an academic and non-academic audience, and our quarterly newsletter reaches a 500-strong list of stakeholders and researchers.
The content is available in Greek.
On 10 March 2017, ELIAMEP’s South-East Europe Programme hosted a roundtable discussion on the relations between Greece and Bulgaria. Dr. Ioannis Armakolas, Head of the South-East Programme together with Yorgos Christidis, Assistant Professor at the University of Macedonia, presented findings of the Programme’s latest report entitled “Greek-Bulgarian Relations: Present State and Future Challenges”. The report provides an overview of many key aspects of relations between the two countries, including political and diplomatic issues, the economy, energy and infrastructure, public opinion attitudes and media representations, disputes over heritage issues etc. The presentation of the report was followed by a lively round-table discussion, chaired by the ELIAMEP’s Director General Thanos Dokos, among attendees from the diplomacy, the academia and Greek media. Participants discussed the report’s findings, assessed Greece’s current relations Bulgaria as well as how bilateral relations might be further improved in the future. The report is available here.
The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) invites pre-applications from researchers who wish to spend 12-24 months at ELIAMEP as part of the “Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship” Programme (MSCA-IF-2017), funded by the European Commission. Researchers accepted for this scheme will devote their time to conducting research, preparing publications, engaging in knowledge transfer, and developing their professional networks.
Applicants must have a doctoral degree or at least four years’ full-time research experience by the time of the call deadline. Applicants can be of any nationality but they must not have spent more than 12 months in the last 3 years in Greece (mobility rule).
Fellowships take form of European Fellowships or Global Fellowships.
– European Fellowships are open to researchers either coming to Europe from any country in the world or moving within Europe. The researcher must comply with the rules of mobility.
– Global Fellowships are based on a secondment to a third country and a mandatory 12 month return period to a European host. The researcher must comply with the rules of mobility in the country where the Global Fellowship secondment takes place, not for the country of the return phase.
ELIAMEP welcomes project proposals from all areas of social sciences and the humanities. However, priority will be given to those projects that fit best with ELIAMEP’s existing research interests and orientations and gain the support of at least one ELIAMEP senior researcher. The project proposal will be submitted jointly by the researcher and ELIAMEP.
ELIAMEP has an extensive and prestigious record of hosting international doctoral and postdoctoral fellows. Over the last years, it was host organisation in three Intra-European Marie Curie fellows, all of whom have made significant advances in their careers. Currently, ELIAMEP hosts the REPLICIAS project (Architectural replicas in the scramble for the past: Politics of identity in Istanbul, Athens, Skopje), funded by the 2016 call of the “Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowship” Programme.
Researchers who wish to cooperate with ELIAMEP for the submission of a proposal should check that they fulfill the respective eligibility criteria and then send an expression of interest, consisting of a short CV and a two-page summary presentation of their research proposal, to development@eliamep.gr .
Proposals will be pre-selected on the basis of internal evaluation and the availability of suitable supervision. Candidates will be informed of the results of the pre-selection well before the call deadline.
Expressions of interest may be submitted to ELIAMEP up to 10 June 2017.
The new study of the South-East Europe Programme is entitled ‘Greek-Bulgarian relations: Present state and future challenges’. The authors of the report are Yorgos Christidis, Ioannis Armakolas and Panagiotis Pachalidis. The study offers an overview of relations between the two countries for the period after the end of the Cold War. Among the issues tackled in the report are diplomatic relations and bilateral problems and disputes, economic relations, energy and infrastructure questions as well as social attitudes and media representations. The auhors of the study stress that relations between Greece and Bulgaria can be considered a Balkan ‘success story’ and a factor of stability for the wider region. In a period when instability and uncertainty in the Balkans are on the rise, Greece and Bulgaria should strengthen their multiple relations. The report ‘Greek-Bulgarian relations: Present state and future challenges’ was made possible through generous funding from thge company Xanthakis SA
In Southeastern Europe, architectural heritage has often been recruited to the service of politics. Shared layers of history (for example the Hellenistic, Roman and Ottoman eras among others) have been split among competing historiographies and, in a period marked by crisis, rising nationalism and ‘East-West’ dilemmas, remain in the core of heated debates. Anchored on on-going projects in three cities in the region, this research explores the ways heritage is claimed through its physical reproduction, a topic barely researched until now.
Replicas of all sizes – ranging from the urban scale down to the artefact – get involved in political and economic agendas and often ignite reactions from various social, political and national groups inside and outside the countries where they are located. In some cases this corresponds to a recurring wave of revivalism, resulting to large replica buildings installed in the heart of the city, such as in Istanbul (where the reconstruction of the barracks on Taksim square led to the Gezi riots in 2013) or in Skopje (‘Skopje 2014’ project). In other occasions the production of copies is politicised on a smaller scale, such as in the case of the copy of “Alexander’s Sarcophagus” at the Skopje Archaeological Museum or the copies of the missing Parthenon Sculptures at the New Acropolis Museum.
The research evolves around three questions, which bring forward interdisciplinary and transnational dimensions for inquiry: How does the relationship of the replica with its original become politicized, lost or, at times, irrelevant? How does ‘replica architecture’ intersect with questions of national identity and economic policy, formulating new national narratives? Moreover, in a region of strongly defined borders, how do such reconstructions connect to each other, addressing local and international audiences?
The case studies, despite demonstrating important specificities, also inform wider discussions on spatial politics, and highlight parallel developments and important connections between neighbouring national agendas. By examining side by side the politics of (reproduced) cultural heritage in Istanbul, Athens and Skopje, one can uncover and better understand competitions and alliances, cultural exchanges and shared agonies, the struggle with financial crises, attempts to coordinate with Europe and the drawing of borders between Islam and Christianity.
Through interviews with involved actors, and the analysis of the architectural and political discourse surrounding these projects, the research will unpack instances of politicisation of heritage in the above-mentioned geography, while inviting into dialogue the disciplines of architecture, history, art history, museology, art conservation, and political sciences.
The project is coordinated and implemented by Dr Kalliopi Amygdalou and supervised by Professor Thanos Veremis and Associate Professor Ioannis N. Grigoriadis.
For further information please contact Dr Amygdalou at amygdalou@eliamep.gr
Acronym: REPLICIAS
Duration of the programme: 1/3/2017 -28/2/2019
This project has received funding from the Marie Skłodowska Curie Actions [European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme] under grant agreement No [748634]
The principal objective of ELIAMEP Asian Studies Programme is to closely monitor developments in Asia. Taking into account the shift of the US interest from the Middle East to the Asian Continent and the economic and political rise of China, such as research program can contribute to a better understanding of politics and international relations in Asia as well as to an assessement of the strategy of the important players. The main activities of ELIAMEP Asian Studies Programme will be the publication of relevant papers and the organisation of debates to facilitate public dialogue.
Although this field has not been particularly developed in Greece, ELIAMEP establishes its Asian Studies Programme having already taken some steps towards this direction. These include the following events:
Also ELIAMEP paticipated in the first ‘EU-China Think Thank Dialogue’, which took place in Beijing on 6 and 7 April 2016. It has also participated in ‘New Med’ research network launched by Ιstituto Affari Internazionali. In collaboration with Torino World Affairs Institute they co-organised the conference: ‘China in the Mediterranean’ in Torino in 17 and 18 February 2016.
Relevant Publications
Programme Coordinators: Dr Thanos Dokos (ELIAMEP Director General) and Dr George Tzogopoulos
Associate Professor at the University of Athens and Senior Research Fellow at ELIAMEP Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos wrote an article about poverty and inequality in the Sunday edition of To Vima newspaper. The article was published on 12 March 2017 and is available here (in Greek).
President of ELIAMEP, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis spoke on the future of Europe in a interview with Athina 9.84 and journalis Ioannis Papageorgiou. You can accesse the podcast here.
It appears that the EU’s solution to its current directionless and delegitimised state is a multi-speed Europe. It is ironic that the 27-nation bloc prepares to mark 60 years since its founding treaty by accepting that an ‘ever closer union’ is officially no longer on the table. Some will argue that the big four which have been backing this idea, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, are trying to cut their losses short rather than admit failure, which makes embracing divergence, whitewashing growing inequalities within and between states and appeasing populists the optimal strategy. A multi-speed Europe is, in any case, already a reality on the ground, as both the Schengen border-free zone and the eurozone attest. The next logical step for the capable and the willing is to pool resources, generate economies of scale and create structures for a new round of common projects.
Yet, there are a number of problems with regard to this proposition. First, the kind of flexibility implied in multiple speeds, has been in short supply throughout the existence of the European project. Creating pockets of deeper cooperation and enabling a well-regulated flow of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, on the basis of clusters of interests, simply surpasses the EU’s current technical and institutional capacity. Building it up will take time – time, however, is in equally short supply, considering the pervasive sense of insecurity that Europeans feel and how this is affecting their voting patterns. There is also the issue of preserving the national interest, anchored in a European method of consensus building. In spite of its well-known asymmetries, the EU project allowed for coalitions to be built, for issue linkages to grow and for win-win outcomes to emerge. By its nature, a tiered EU will render such complex interactions difficult, stoking the weaker members’ fear that they will be left behind or isolated. Finally, different speeds may ultimately translate into different classes of membership, contradicting the founding ideals of the Union. It remains a moot point whether the big four can guarantee that the criteria for entering or leaving tiers will be transparent or applied in an equitable manner.
At the same time, the current impasse serves no one, except for the anti-EU, anti-immigration forces. Those who want to integrate faster should have this opportunity. The real question is what kind of political and economic integration would serve the EU project better? The eurozone architecture may act as a stark reminder that economies operating on multiple models cannot co-habit in a monetary union without a fiscal union. A small, exclusive club could have both, dispensing with the laggards locked in a straitjacket of euro rules and austerity. If this thinking is followed through, the real danger then is that a multi-speed Europe will promote uniformity at the expense of unity. Populists would have a field day, as they would seek to project the idea of ‘uniformity’ well beyond immigration policies. Politics could turn poisonous, as European citizens might want to have concrete answers to how the political will to promote mini unions suddenly emerged, when initiatives like the Five Presidents’ Report had been received coldly in the Council, if not with indifference. If the answer is ‘Brexit and Trump happened’, European leaders would have to be aware that planning a shift of this order comes with tremendous responsibility and would require a strategic commitment to unity.
The EU has been good but not excellent at managing diversity. It has created tools, yet left countries struggling with asymmetric burden sharing, as evidenced in the eurozone crisis and the migration crisis. Allowing for significant financial assistance, solidarity has been absent as an organising principle in a Union that bore the promise of shared prosperity and deepening of democracy. Before the capable and the willing proceed, they should take stock of the pervasive sense of insecurity that has enveloped achievers and under-achievers, first-tier, second-tier and third- or fourth- tier European citizens, and fine-tune their preferences in a way that reduces EU-wide feelings of marginalisation and mistrust.’
By Dr Eleni Panagiotarea
Source: Reconnecting Europe blog
You can download the article in PDF here.
If there is any EU country where stability is taken for granted and future perspectives are optimistic, this surely will be Germany. After 12 years at the helm as chancellor by conservative leader Angela Merkel, however, some Germans are no longer averse to political change. The next election (“Bundestagwahl”) has been set for September 24. Until recently the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its sister Christian Social Union (CSU) had been seen as favorites to continue their political dominance. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) – although part of a grand coalition in the last four years – had been regarded as obsolete to offer an effective challenge.
Former leader of SPD, and current Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel, acknowledged the risk of another lost election, hence, he decided to step down in favor of Martin Schulz, former president of the European Parliament, who has brought about a wave of enthusiasm among disenchanted voters of the center-left political spectrum, who, for the moment, like what they see. Current opinion polls indicate Schulz is more popular than Angela Merkel. More importantly, the SPD has gone beyond 30 percent threshold for potential votes in all surveys while its percentage under Gabriel had been less than 25 percent. All of this suggests, the result of the September 24 election is more open than in the pre-Schulz period.
Hence, a growing number of analysts and journalists are beginning to talk of a “Schulz effect” in German politics. Traditionally, German politicians holding top EU jobs are considered “politically dead” in their own country. Indeed, this had also been the case with Schulz in the past. In the European election of May 2014, he faced Jean Claude Juncker for the position of president of the European Commission. Yet, he failed to inspire German citizens despite their common nationality.
Although it’s the same Schulz, the situation three years later differs for one main reason. Chancellor Merkel has caused some unhappiness with her “open door” policy on refugees. Recent terrorist attacks in some German cities – especially the Christmas market attack in Berlin – has increased a sense of unsafety and xenophobia. As a result, Merkel is no longer portrayed as the incomparable national leader. Her image, indeed, is slipping. The general criticism of her, starting from her management of the refugee crisis, is also expanding into other aspects of politics so that some voters are keen to find an alternative. This explains the rise of small parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AFD) and the Liberals (FDP) irrespective of their political orientation or extreme character. And it now explains the rise of SPD, boosted by the leadership change.
Martin Schulz is a very experienced and smart politician. He knows that SPD will not preserve its current high percentage if he does not persuade public opinion that he can implement a new political program. Supporting the grand coalition, the party has agreed with the CDU and CSU on almost all of critical political decision. So, it now needs to find some departure points. As President of the European Parliament, Schulz stood beside Merkel on various fronts, including the refugee crisis! His only disagreement was on dealing with the European economic crisis, where he is more open to the “mutualization of debt” proposal, which is an anathema to conservatives.
However, he will possibly bury this issue during the pre-election campaign due to its sensitivity for the German audience and a possible political cost for himself. Instead, he seeks to draw a line between himself and his predecessor by moving the SPD more towards the Left. In a recent important speech, he distanced “himself” from Gerhard Schroeder’s “Agenda 2010.” This concept set the basis for the reform of the German social security system and the labor market and, ultimately, the country’s economic progress and growth.
By promising “social justice,” Schulz can certainly give a new political direction to his party. He has also showing willing on a future political coalition between the SPD, the Greens and the Left, as is currently happening at the regional level in Berlin and Thuringia, even if the CDU and CSU win the September election. Nevertheless, a problem for Schulz is that September 24 is a long way off. His economic agenda may sound attractive, but is already being picked apart by serious scholars as a threat to the national economy.
And Germany is a country where the rational elements in economics and politics have so far not given way to the populism and the illusions seen in other European countries. It is the efficiency and sustainability that matter more than mere words or pre-election promises.
Source: china.org.cn
The question should be reversed: Can the EU have any kind of meaningful role without being strategic? The EU has not fared very well in comparison with its main competitors in terms of protecting its members and its citizens’ interests. Nor has the EU risen to the challenge of stabilizing its neighborhood. Furthermore, various crises have exposed a lack of geopolitical reflexes. And the EU is paying a price for those failures. Britain’s vote to leave the bloc has dealt a heavy blow to the EU’s unity and its capabilities in the spheres of foreign policy and defense.
Ironically, however, and in combination with the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, Brexit has also created a brief window of opportunity for the EU to reconsider its options and launch a new effort in various sectors of European politics, including defense and security. Acting collectively, the EU has the necessary economic weight but lacks the diplomatic and military weight to be a global actor. Both problems can be addressed, as the human, technological, and financial capabilities do exist. What is seriously questioned is the necessary political will—given that individually, no member state is sufficiently strong to flourish in this brave new world. The last wake-up call for Europe, perhaps.
By Thanos Dokos
Source: Carnegie Europe
You can read here the article on future perspectives for Turkey, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 8 March 2017 [in Greek].
Ambassador (retired) Alexandros Mallias wrote an article in Kathimerini newspaper discussing Greek-American relations under Trump. You can access the article here (in Greek)
Research Fellow of ELIAMEP Dr Eleni Panagiotarea wrote in the Sunday edition of Kathimerini on the second review of the third Greek bailout. You can read the article here (in Greek).
In ELIAMEP Policy Paper No. 26 Dr Theodore Tsakiris analyses relations between Russia and Turkey placing emphasis on the decision of the countries to construct ‘Turkish Stream’ pipeline. He examines the new perspectives of energy cooperation and assesses challenges and opportunities for Greece.
You can find more information for this event on the Greek version of our website.
The Second Economic Forum took place in Delphi from 2 until 5 March 2017. ELIAMEP constitutes a programming partner. President of ELIAMEP, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis talked about the future of the European Union and Europe. Director General, Dr Thanos Dokos, chaired a panel on geopolitics in Eastern Mediterranean. And Member of the Board of Directors, Professor George Pagoulatos, spoke about the impact of Brexit and the new globalization.
You can read here the article on the crisis on foreign policy and security, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 23 February 2017 [in Greek].
The Enlargement has been on the EEC/EU agenda all along its history and was believed to be its “most successful” policy. Although enlargement policy was built on values and rules, geopolitics have traditionally been a strong driving force behind it, while tension between widening and deepening has always been present. The fifth enlargement was instrumentalised by the prevailing policies of extreme neoliberalism causing public opinion reaction and nurturing “enlargement fatigue”. The implicit enlargement agenda in the neighbourhood policy has been put to the service of anti-Russian strategies which have utterly failed while jeopardising good neighbourly relations with Moscow and contributing to the negative turn of the Putin regime. During the last decade, enlargement policy has rapidly degenerated and today it is essentially at a standstill in all three of its dimensions (Balkans, Turkey, European neighbourhood countries). This is a negative development both for the EU and its neighbours. The revival of the policy is conditional upon a necessary, but improbable, major shift in the EU, with the strengthening of solidarity.
Author: Axel Sotiris Wallden