Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Les frères Charles et David Koch sont à la tête de Koch industries, conglomérat spécialisé dans le pétrole, la chimie, le papier, les engrais, la finance, l’élevage etc. Leur fortune personnelle est évaluée à 40 milliards de dollars chacun.

Ils sont libertariens, c’est-à-dire partisans d’un libéralisme économique absolu, réclamant l’intervention minimum de l’État en tous domaines.

Leur père a fait fortune dans le pétrole en Union soviétique du temps de Staline, ce qui ne l’a pas empêché de nourrir une logique anticommuniste virulente. Il a fondé en 1958 la John Birch Society, luttant contre la prise du pouvoir des communistes aux États-Unis, perspective pourtant assez lointaine.

En 1980, ils ont soutenu Ed Clark, candidat du parti libertarien, qui proposait la suppression du FBI, de la CIA, de l’impôt sur le revenu et des pensions publiques.

Cela n’a pas réussi, mais les frères Koch semblent aujourd’hui mieux organisés. Fini le soutien aux candidats folkloriques, désormais ils veulent porter le parti républicain au pouvoir aux États-Unis.

Une influence tentaculaire

Ils sont aujourd’hui vent debout contre l’Obamacare et prônent la suppression de l’agence fédérale de protection de l’environnement. C’est leur conviction mais également leur intérêt. Leurs industries sont très polluantes, la suppression de l’impôt leur conviendra très bien.

Les frères Koch se sont en effet intéressés de près au débat d’idées. Ils ont subventionné ou créé un système de fondations, de think tank, au point que certains parlent de « kochtopus », par référence aux tentacules de la pieuvre.

Ils sont largement à l’origine de la montée en puissance du Tea Party, qui a fait une entrée en force à la Chambre des représentants, en 2010, sur des bases très réactionnaires.

Ils ont créé un nombre de structures à but non lucratif, mais idéologiquement très intéressées, des think tank ou associations qui travaillent sur des thématiques, qui servent les intérêts des frères Koch et de leur industrie. L’idée est de limiter au maximum l’action de l’État et de laisser le marché régir l’économie.

Revendications et dérégulations économiques

La Cato Institute, créée en 1977, dont ils ont pris le contrôle récemment, emploie cent personnes qui plaident pour la réduction des impôts des services sociaux et des politiques environnementales. Selon cet institut, « les théories du réchauffement climatique donnent plus de contrôle sur l’économie au gouvernement. »

Le Mercatus center, doté d’un budget de 30 millions de dollars, prône la dérégulation économique.

Des associations de citoyens ont été subventionnées (de façon défiscalisée) : Citizens for a sound economy, qui qualifie les pluies acides et autres preuves environnementales de mythes, American for prosperity, qui dispose de 600 permanents et qui a œuvré pour la victoire des candidats du Tea Party aux élections de 2010, dénonçant le communisme d’Obama.

L’Heritage foundation : au sein de cette structure a été créé Heritage action, destiné à lutter contre l’Obamacare, avec un budget de 5,5 millions de dollars.

300 millions de dollars pour choisir le meilleur candidat

Ils ont annoncé vouloir dépenser personnellement 300 millions de dollars pour sélectionner le meilleur candidat républicain, et promettent, avec leurs alliés, d’investir 800 millions d’euros pour la campagne républicaine en vue des élections de 2016.

Les frères Koch ont leurs idées et c’est leur droit.

Le problème est l’influence qu’ils peuvent exercer, grâce à leur fortune, sur l’opinion publique américaine. Et c’est là que se pose un problème de fond : quelles sont les limites de la démocratie ? Quel est le poids de l’argent dans le débat public ?

L’avenir de la démocratie se joue ici

À un moment où l’opinion, grâce aux réseaux sociaux, se renforce, n’assiste-t-on pas à un renversement de la tendance par la manipulation des informations, du fait de la fortune de quelques-uns ? Il y a un double-mouvement. L’émancipation des individus et des peuples, grâce à l’éducation et aux nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication, et le rôle croissant des grandes fortunes sur la vie politique : milliardaires américains, récents ou anciens, oligarques russes ou ukrainiens.

La globalisation a aussi permis la constitution rapide de fortunes faramineuses. Certains, conscients que le poids de l’opinion est plus important qu’auparavant, veulent du coup l’orienter et s’en donner les moyens.

L’avenir de la démocratie se joue ici, entre la mobilisation des citoyens et l’influence des milliardaires oligarques, dont l’objectif n’est pas forcément l’intérêt général (ni l’intérêt national d’ailleurs).

The post-2015 development agenda will constitute a different mission for UN Development than the current one driven by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Unlike the MDGs agenda, the new sustainable development goals (SDGs) aim to integrate the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainable development while emphasising global challenges to a greater extent. The growing interconnection between local and global development challenges will be a key feature of the SDGs.
Current governance arrangements of UN Development, however, impose a constraint on the organisation’s ability to meet the integration requirements of the SDGs.
To deliver on the post-2015 development agenda in an integrated and coordinated manner, UN Development will require governance capacity that can foster policy coherence and interoperability in programming and operations. This means that governing boards will have to be able to coordinate their work more effectively than in the past, with a view to balancing agency and system-wide interests, as well as the local and global perspective in their decision-making. Such changes required in the capability of governing bodies also offer Member States the opportunity to rethink what constitutes legitimacy in governance.
Three options are particularly proposed to address the governance demands of the post-2015 development agenda:

1. ECOSOC as a system-wide governing body: On the basis of a system-wide strategy, the UN Development Group (UNDG) becomes formally accountable to ECOSOC and the General Assembly for the implemen-tation of system-wide objectives. This would strengthen horizontal governance of development operations;
2. Fulltime Joint Executive Board: Merging the four executive boards of the funds and programmes with major development operations; and
3. Fulltime Development Board: A single board for the governance of operational activities of the 19 funds and programmes reporting to the central bodies of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

In making the governance of UN Development “fit-for-purpose”, Member States would fundamentally recharge multilateral cooperation, whose appeal is withering, despite the reality of growing interconnectedness, complexity and uncertainty in today’s globalising world.

DT 02/2015 (en papel) - Mayo de 2015
Mario Esteban (coord.)
Este documento es fruto de las acciones realizadas a lo largo del primer año de vida del grupo de trabajo sobre la presencia empresarial española en el Sudeste Asiático, creado por el Real Instituto Elcano en diciembre de 2013.

DT 02/2015 (en papel) - Mayo de 2015
Mario Esteban (coord.)
Este documento es fruto de las acciones realizadas a lo largo del primer año de vida del grupo de trabajo sobre la presencia empresarial española en el Sudeste Asiático, creado por el Real Instituto Elcano en diciembre de 2013.

Stabilisierung autoritärer Herrschaft am Rande des Arabischen Frühlings

You can read here the article on the impact of Kenan Evren on Turkish politics written by Research Fellow of ELIAMEP and Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University, Dr. Ioannis N. Grigoriadis. This commentary was published in Kathimerini on 12 May 2015. The content is available in Greek.

Goran Sekulovski, spécialiste de la Macédoine, professeur à l’Institut Saint-Serge, répond à nos questions :
– Dans quel contexte politique et social se sont tenus les affrontements en Macédoine ? Existe-il un lien avec le conflit de 2001 ?
– Ces troubles sont-ils le fait de conflits interethniques ou de la crise politique que traverse la Macédoine actuellement ?
– La communauté internationale a-t-elle un rôle à jouer dans l’apaisement des tensions ? Comment réagissent les pays voisins de la Macédoine ?

The dominant perception in the 1980s was that reactionism, unreliability, and unpredictability characterized Greek foreign policy. Since the mid-1990s, the pattern has been one of a more pragmatic, reliable, and rational foreign policy—although to different degrees according to the government in office. This is due mainly to the influence and impact of the deep Europeanization process that has shaped various facets of Greek political, economic, and social life. The deepening of the EU remains Greece’s top strategic objective, despite the country’s current problems.

Concerns about economic survival overshadowed the importance of foreign policy issues during the past five years. Now, Greek foreign policy in principle looks much more ambitious, scoring a level of ambition of 4.5 out of 5. But Athens also needs to rapidly readjust to a changing regional and global security and economic environment.Even before the economic crisis, Greece was consistently punching below its weight on most foreign and security policy issues, allowing itself to lose some of its regional role in Southeastern Europe and letting its active role inside the EU atrophy. An inward-looking and passive mentality led to few foreign policy initiatives and to limited exploitation of opportunities for multilateral initiatives or new tactical and strategic alliances.

An assessment of the impact of the crisis on Greek foreign policy would conclude that the country’s image, prestige, and credibility have been dealt a serious blow, and that Greece’s influence both in the EU and in the union’s neighborhood has been negatively affected. Defense expenditures have been significantly reduced, although Greece still spends the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense. In this context, Greece’s participation in international peacekeeping and other operations has already been trimmed down. Greek facilities are still being offered for use in NATO (and U.S.) operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the benefits of Greek membership are probably suboptimal for both the country and the alliance.

Yet Greece remains important for the West’s geopolitical interests for five reasons.

First, in the Western Balkans, Greece is still an important actor in terms of economic investment and political influence. The dispute over the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is a major obstacle to Greece’s policy of strong support for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans. Athens objects to the country’s use of the name “Macedonia” without a qualifier, to avoid monopolization of the name by any of the three interested parties: Greece, FYROM, and Bulgaria. No substantial progress should be expected on this issue in the short term because of domestic factors in Athens and, especially, Skopje.Greece’s position on Kosovo, whose independence it has not recognized, will continue to evolve; and Athens may be expected to try to strengthen its ties with its EU neighbors Bulgaria and Romania, as well as with Serbia and Albania.

Second, the management of migration and refugee flows, the movement of jihadist fighters, and the threat of radicalization remain issues with important external and internal dimensions for the EU. Greece, alongside Italy, is located at the EU’s most sensitive external border and is struggling to deal with these challenges efficiently. Athens needs all the support it can get from its EU partners.

Third, Greece can make a contribution to European energy security through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline, the proposed gas interconnector between Greece and Bulgaria, as well as the exploitation of potential hydrocarbon deposits in Greece’s maritime zones. Participation in the so-called Turkish Stream gas pipeline from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea should not be excluded, provided the project conforms to EU regulations.

Fourth, following the example of its European partners, Greece is exploring available opportunities for improving economic and political relations with Russia and China. A quick diplomatic solution to the Ukraine crisis is a priority for Athens. On this issue, Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea bears a remote but existent similarity to Turkey’s 1974 occupation of Cyprus.The Greek government is critical of the Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its actions in Ukraine and believes that Russia is a difficult neighbor for Europe. But at the same time, Athens regards Moscow as an indispensable element of the European security architecture and would support a combined policy of deterrence and engagement. Greece aspires to become a complementary bridge between Europe and Russia by being Europe’s voice to Russia, not the other way around.

Fifth, Greece occupies a geostrategic location in a difficult neighborhood and offers key facilities, especially Souda Bay, arguably the most important—and dependable—allied military facility in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, Greece has a rather privileged relationship—of varying degrees—with Israel (where the emphasis will be on building deeper strategic ties without abandoning Greece’s traditionally good relations with the Palestinians), the Arab world, and Iran.Athens could play the role of a complementary facilitator in the Middle East, in addition to being a reliable regional partner for the West and promoting regional cooperation schemes. Of course, this presupposes that Greece would be willing and able to successfully implement a more active and effective foreign policy.

Beyond these five issues, Greek-Turkish relations will remain at the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda. Overall, the two countries are better off today than in the past in terms of bilateral relations, including trade and people-to-people contacts. Neither side appears prepared to make any meaningful concessions to fully normalize bilateral relations, and that will probably remain the case for the immediate future, especially in view of Ankara’s ambitious but rather unpredictable foreign policy.

On Cyprus, Athens will remain supportive of a settlement to the island’s division but will defer to Nicosia on the substance of an agreement.

Greek foreign policy makers will function for the foreseeable future under the Damoclean sword of the country’s economic crisis. The threat that Greece might leave the eurozone either by design (“Grexit”) or by default (“Graccident”) is imposing a number of constraints and limitations. Greece needs to find its own niche in the distribution of regional roles and convince its partners and allies of its own added value in managing common security challenges. By necessity, the key concept for Greek foreign and security policy in the next few years will be the smart use of the country’s resources. The best option—as it could have a multiplier effect for Greek efforts to accumulate diplomatic capital—would be to actively participate in shaping the new EU, especially vis-à-vis the Mediterranean and the Middle East (where Greece is promoting the protection of remaining Christian communities), and in formulating transatlantic regional policies. At the same time, however, Athens should not ignore the need for national initiatives and the further multilateralization of its foreign policy.

Despite its high ambition, Greece’s ability to deliver will be hampered by limited economic means and institutional capacity, as well as the diplomatic inexperience and lack of ideological homogeneity of the new left- and right-wing coalition government. The jury is still out on whether Athens can overcome these obstacles.

Source: Carnegie Europe

Les  comités 4, 5 et 6 de Poldef en visite mercredi 13 mai au campus coréen des hautes études scientifiques et technologiques (KAIST) ...

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