ELIAMEP

You can read here the article on required changes in the Greek national security, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 9 August 2017 [in Greek].

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy starts a new series of strategic dialogues. The failure of negotiations on the Cyprus Question is the first theme of analysis. You can find more information on the Greek version of our website.

Sorry, this entry is only available in Greek.

Transatlantic relations have entered a difficult period since the inauguration of Donald Trump. While during the administration of Barack Obama collaboration and mutual understanding were taken for granted on a plethora of issues of joint interest, the new US president does not significantly count on Europe. Although he has softened his rhetoric in comparison to his comments before the election of last November – principally regarding his support for NATO – the US and the EU have not yet worked out how their new symbiosis will look in the next four years.

Meetings between Trump and European leaders help both sides formulate their approaches. In that regard, the third visit of the US president to the EU deserves particular attention as he decided to go to Paris, accepting the invitation of his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron to attend the Bastille Day celebrations. The timing is symbolic. This year, American troops joined their French allies in the annual parade, to mark 100 years since the US intervened in World War I.

Until their recent meeting in Paris, Trump and Macron had met on the sidelines of other multilateral summits and events such as a NATO gathering in Brussels. One of their initial handshakes is still attracting the attention of international media. Macron treated Trump to a strong handshake in front of the cameras in May, which he then refused to release for several long moments. As he explained to French media, he wanted to show he would not make small concessions to his American counterpart.

In the French capital, the two presidents had of course much more to say than focusing on handshakes and publicly explaining them. Although their meetings started with Trump’s bizarre compliment of Macron’s wife, Brigitte, on her figure, the two leaders did later start serious discussions about Syria and terrorism. As Macron asserted during the press conference, both countries are “determined to take any necessary measures in order to root out terrorism and to eradicate it no matter where, in particular the narrative on the Internet” and also tackle cyber crime.

Also, the two presidents agreed to work together in Syria supporting a political roadmap for the post-conflict days, months and years. It is important to mention – as Macron revealed – that Paris no longer requires Assad’s departure. This constitutes a fundamental shift in French policy.

From the American side, however, the outlook for the future is obscure. Trump praised Macron in the press conference saying that “the friendship between our two nations – and [themselves] is unbreakable.” However, as it is the case with almost all of his public remarks, he was ambiguous on critical issues.

It is not clear how the US and France will cooperate on trade as Trump advocates a new type of protectionism and Macron is always talking about free trade, or more recently about fair trade, possibly as a courtesy to his American counterpart. France is enjoying a trade surplus with the US that amounted to $15.6 billion in 2016 with the total trade volume reaching approximately $78 billion.

Cooperation between the US and France on climate change also remains a mystery. Trump sent ambivalent messages about the Paris agreement when he said, “Something could happen with respect to the Paris Accord. We’ll see what happens.” With regard to NATO contributions, Trump is demanding member states spend two percent of GDP on defense. France’s current contribution is 1.8 percent. It is close to the target but still falls short of satisfying Washington’s interests.

Last but not least, it is worth-mentioning that both Trump and Macron referred to their Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping with great respect in the press conference. Trump described him as a “friend” who “loves China” and “wants to do what’s right for [it].” Macron announced that he will visit Beijing early next year, and said that he saw China as “a key partner in order to build peace all around the world” and commented positively on Xi’s multilateralism vision. When two world leaders meet to discuss other topics and simultaneously talk about the need for cooperation with China, this clearly shows the growing international role of the country.

Πηγή: Global Times

You can read here the article on the Cyprus Question, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 13 July 2017 [in Greek].

The London School of Economics and the Hellenic Observatory published a new book on Greece: Modernisation and Europe 20 years. The book is edited by Dr Spyros Economides. Contributions include chapters written by Professors Loukas Tsoukalis, George Pagoulatos and Dimitri Sotiropoulos.  By clicking here, you can access the book.

Assessments of the quality of democracy focus on deviations from the rule of law and decreasing levels of political participation, but do not adequately explore the mechanisms through which the quality of democracy decreases. Populism is such a mechanism, used by populist leaders, after they ascent to power. Populism is combined with clientelism and corruption to form means of political domination in democratic regimes which are backpedalling or backsliding. Examples are three recently consolidated democratic regimes of Western Balkans. The governments of Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia, Nikola Gruevski in FYR Macedonia and Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro purposefully use populism, clientelism and corruption. Although not present in all backsliding democracies, populism, clientelism and corruption are associated with backsliding from recently consolidated democracies and deterioration of the quality of democracy.

Τhe paper written by Dr Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos is available here.

You can read here the article about terrorism and the refugee crisis, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 9 July 2017 [in Greek].

You can read here the article on the name dispute ith FYROM, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 3 July 2017 [in Greek].

The Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) is launching a new online discussion on critical security issues. The views of Greek and international scholars and policymakers will be published on this website in order to enhance the ongoing debate and raise public awareness. This is the continuation of a pilot reseearch project implemented from September 2016 until December 2016 in cooperation with the Greek opinion-making newspaper: Hi Kathimerini.

Radicalisation

• Dr Rosa Vasilaki: ‘How can the radicalisation phenomenon be explained?‘ (in Greek)

In Greece, the sovereign debt crisis and its subsequent management by the country’s European partners have tarnished EU membership and watered down a previously overwhelming level of support for European integration. Often portrayed as a ‘special case’, Greece sees the EU as failing to deliver the goods, be they economic growth or, more recently, solidarity vis-à-vis unprecedented migration flows. The Greek political class understands the benefits of continued membership – even if this becomes multi-speed – but lacks the tools and the credibility to influence the EU’s future direction according to the national interest. Unable to provide a positive narrative or endgame for the European project, it is left with a public struggling to associate the EU with political stability and economic prosperity. There is no roadmap to economic recovery, unemployment remains disproportionately high and approximately half a million Greeks, primarily the youngest and brightest, have emigrated since 2008.

A major survey conducted by Chatham House and Kantar Public in 10 European countries offers interesting insights into Greek attitudes toward the EU. Predictably, 67% of Greeks consider austerity as the EU’s greatest failure, a percentage that singles Greece out from every other country in the survey and betrays the effects of the three bailout programmes on Greek society’s perception of the EU. ‘Economic crisis’ is the phrase most strongly associated with the EU (62%), followed by ‘loss of national power’ (44%, double the survey’s average). Reflecting the same undercurrent, 39% ‘strongly disagree’ with the statement that ‘people like you have benefited from being a member of the EU’. Yet, prior to the crisis, Greece was a net recipient of the EU budget, a fact that has been lost in public debate. More recently, hundreds of billions of euros of mostly EU funds have been committed to keep the economy afloat, admittedly with stringent conditions attached. Rather than explain this to the public, Greek political leaders have used the crisis to scapegoat the EU and divert attention from their own failures.

Stuck in the eurozone’s straightjacket of fiscal discipline, and unable to will the EU tools that could replenish the sovereignty lost at national levelGreeks feel overwhelmingly ‘uneasy’ (74% versus 38% survey average) and ‘pessimistic’ (60% versus a 40% average) about the EU. Populists of all persuasions tap into this deep-seated frustration, pitting patriots against foreigners and quislings and invoking national determination against the implementation of reforms imposed ‘from above’. They also tap into the strong and rising anti-German undercurrent in Greek politics. The survey shows that a significant number of Greeks see German interests as defining the solution parameters to the the Greek crisis with over 80% (compared to the sample average of 27%) thinking that Germany plays a negative role in the EU.

Greek leaders and European elites developing policy approaches to re-legitimize core aspects of integration and bring the Greek people ‘on board’ should consider a number of important results reported in the survey:

– An overwhelming number of Greeks (80%) think that ‘within the next 10 years other member states will decide to leave the EU’. The price tag of membership may prove increasingly highfor Greece and a number of other countries, given the EU’s continuing inability to balance national interests equitably or rein in members that openly defy European values and EU commitments. It is worth noting that with regard to ‘Britain’s vote to leave’, 73% of Greeks believe that it will weaken the EU, 3% more than the British (70%). At the same time, for a majority of Greeks (60%), maintaining a good relationship with the UK in the future should not come at the cost of compromising the EU’s core values.

– Regarding the EU’s future path, 53% disagree that ‘the EU should become a US of Europe with a central government’, an unexpected result considering that the Greek public was, prior to the crisis, among the most pro-integrationist in the EU. Greeks no longer link integration with the possibility of real convergence to the EU average but with sub-optimal concessions on national sovereignty which disrupt political stability and the social fabric. At the same time, even though Greeks today are living in more precarious situations compared to other country samples (31% had to ‘go without needed medication and 48% had to ‘borrow money to pay for life essentials’ compared to European averages of 19% and 22%), 44% are ‘moderately’ satisfied with their life, mirroring the extent to which they have ‘some control’ (43%) over it.

– Trust in the EU’s rules of the game and its ability to deliver benefits for citizens is in doubt, as reflected in the fact that Greeks are evenly divided on whether the EU is moderately democratic (41%) or not democratic (40%). Greeks see a Europe characterized by asymmetries over the sovereign debt crisis and more recently the refugee crisis. Regarding immigration, many have negative views, with 68% rejecting the idea that ‘immigration has been good for the country’ and 58% believing that ‘all further migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped’. Greeks appear ambivalent as to whether EU enlargement has gone far enough and whether new countries should be able to join the EU. Interestingly, although 67% oppose Turkey joining the EU, this is less than in Germany, Belgium, France (73%) and Austria (82%).

What are the implications of these findings for the Syriza-Anel government? The current administration and any future government elected in 2019 must promote difficult reforms at home before it can have a meaningful say in reform at EU level. An important reservoir of public support stands unutilized. 47% agree that ‘people should take responsibility for themselves rather than expect the state to provide for them’. This marks an important shift from state reliance to self-reliance. Provided that this can be tapped and a credible roadmap to growth can be paved, the Greek political class can adopt a number of strategies to re-energize support for the EU, and help address its contested legitimacy. In a country where many feel that sovereignty has been eroded by the EU and the IMF, Greek political leaders should view multi-speed Europe as an opportunity. Deepening integration and cooperation in key domains for the Union such as the eurozone and the Schengen area can only come with the creation of necessary tools to manage this, a fiscal capacity and/or eurozone budget or the reform of the Dublin system for managing refugees. These would provide significant policy space, and potentially generate mechanisms for financial and operational support. The same could apply for foreign and defence policy. Obviously, in areas where the national or even level performs better, political leaders will need to balance their approach with the recognition that 66% of Greeks think that ‘the EU should return some of its powers to individual member states’.

Greece along with the countries that have shouldered the burden in the refugee crisis, could promote solidarity as an organizing principle in future EU policy. Greeks (68%) followed by Italians (66%) and Germans (62%) top the list among European publics in believing that ‘every EU member state should have to accept the same proportion of refugees according to their population’.

Finally, in order to repair the EU’s reputation in Greece, Greek leaders must communicate a positive narrative around the EU’s ‘greatest achievements’. In Greece, the highest of these  are considered to be ‘freedom to live and work across the EU’ (56%), followed by 41% who value ‘removing borders between states (i.e. the Schengen area)’ – predictably, only 19% vouch for ‘the euro currency’. The sense of European belonging that emerges in this survey cannot be discarded. 43% are proud to be Greek and European, while 66% (the highest percentage in the group) consider nationalism ‘a danger to peace and stability in Europe’. It is this valued existence of a common space that can propel Greek political leaders to contribute to initiatives where a collective European response brings benefits. Besides terrorism and migration, mechanisms will be needed to share the tasks and costs associated with the management of unemployment, health and social security, and environmental protection at the EU level.

Author: Dr Eleni Panagiotarea 

Source: Chatham House

Since the early 1990s, Greece’s record at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) over religious freedoms violations has been exceptional. More than simply indicating the challenges Greece has been facing in the treatment of religious diversity and the simultaneous prevalence of the Christian Orthodox Church, these convictions by the ECtHR have exposed a further weakness of the country, namely the consequences of its policies towards the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. In spite of certain limited attempts, the seclusion and even neglect of this minority of about 120,000 people (consisting of Ethnic Turks, Pomaks and Roma), who have remained in the region following the forced exchange of population and the signing between Greece and Turkey of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, has long formed a topic of academic and political discussion (Anagnostou & Triandafyllidou 2009, Tsitselikis 2012). In the light of recurrent debates in Greece over the minority’s identity and the implications of its continued segregation, as well as the tensions following Turkish prime minister’s statements that question the premises of the Treaty of Lausanne, the ECtHR has increasingly represented the venue that minority members themselves turn to in order to claim their rights (see Serif v Greece, Agga v Greece, Xanthi Turkish Union and Others v Greece, including a current case over the application of sharia law and the rights of inheritance for the Muslim minority women). This paper uses socio-legal and mobilization theories and seeks to contribute to an emerging scholarship on the “radiating effects” (Galanter 1983) of Court’s decisions in a European context. The original findings draw on semi-structured interviews with the key actors involved in the interaction between the Greek state, the Muslim minority and the ECtHR. By focusing specifically on national policies towards the minority of Western Thrace, the paper thus argues that one of the key “radiating effects” of the ECtHR has been the creation of a venue where Greco-Turkish relations are tested and where long-established historic conventions are currently being challenged, once again, within the context of religion.

Download: Markoviti – GRM Working Paper 2017

In his perspective paper for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Dr George Tzogopoulos argues that the EastMed pipeline, a proposed means of transporting gas from the eastern Mediterranean to new markets, would be expensive and difficult – but it is feasible. Easier and less expensive solutions are also being considered, but the security element works in EastMed’s favor. EastMed would allow Cyprus, Greece, and Israel to collaborate while developing their roles as hubs of stability in a turbulent neighborhood. The EU and the US would likely see improvement in Western energy dependence. And Israel would have the opportunity to improve its relationship with the EU, not only by participating in a project of European interest but also by finding new clients for its own gas in the European market.

‘The gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean are altering regional dynamics. Transporting that gas to new export destinations, principally in Europe, will be complicated but feasible.

With this challenge in mind, Cyprus, Greece, and Israel have intensified their contacts of late. Trilateral summits are regularly taking place with the participation of Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades and Greek and Israeli Prime Ministers Alexis Tsipras and Benjamin Netanyahu. (In April 2017, Italy joined the club, signing a declaration in Tel Aviv to that effect.)

The first trilateral summit took place in Nicosia in January 2016 and the second in December 2016 in Jerusalem. A third was held only a few days ago in Thessaloniki. At that most recent summit, the leaders agreed to deepen their energy collaboration by exploring means of constructing an underwater “EastMed” pipeline.

The project envisages a 1,300 km offshore pipeline and a 600 km onshore one from Eastern Mediterranean sources to Cyprus, from Cyprus to Crete, from Crete to mainland Greece (the Peloponnese), and from the Peloponnese to Western Greece. Then, the plan is to connect Western Greece to Italy east of Otranto via a 207 km offshore pipeline across the Ionian Sea, the so-called Poseidon.

At first glance, the biggest obstacle to the construction of the EastMed pipeline – which, if constructed, would be the longest and deepest subsea pipeline on earth – is its technical viability. Practical challenges abound. On the approach to Crete, for example, there is a stretch of about 10 km where the depth is quite high, which could cause construction problems. However, the companies involved are optimistic that technology will advance sufficiently to enable the pipeline to be built.

The Natural Gas Supplier Corporation (DEPA) of Greece describes the project as “technically feasible,” according to studies it has conducted. To bolster its case, DEPA notes the success of the Medgaz pipeline, which runs between Algeria and Spain. Israel energy minister Yuval Steinitz, too, has attempted to ease fears about construction issues and suggests that EastMed can be completed by 2025.

Technical feasibility is not the only matter of concern, however. Another challenge is the cost, which has been projected to range anywhere from
$4 billion to $7 billion. Low gas prices are also concern, as they could prevent private companies from supporting the project alongside the EU (which is prepared to offer co-financing).

Alternatives scenarios are on the table to address these concerns. LNG bases in either Cyprus or Israel could work in theory, but the prohibitively high cost of constructing them makes them a nonstarter. On a practical level, there are two real options available.

The first is to construct a 550 km submarine pipeline beginning from the Leviathan reservoir in Israeli waters, passing through Cypriot waters, and reaching southern Turkey. Israeli gas would then be shipped from southern Turkey to Europe via existing, and perhaps some newly constructed, pipeline networks. This project is estimated to cost half or possibly even less than half what EastMed would cost. But in view of the lack of resolution on the Cyprus Question, Israel is hesitant to proceed to an agreement with Turkey on this matter.

The second option is to use already existing LNG facilities in Egypt. Gas from the eastern Mediterranean could theoretically be supplied to the two Egyptian facilities in Damietta and Idku, turning Egypt back into a gas exporter. But the recent discovery of the Zohr field represents an unknown factor. It cannot be anticipated how this field will influence Egypt’s energy priorities and the balance between domestic consumption and exports. Also, neither the construction of new pipelines nor the reversal of the existing one connecting Israel to Egyptian LNG facilities would be an easy process.

If the Cyprus Question is resolved soon, the Turkish option will gain ground. But the restarted talks between Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci are highly unlikely to lead to a breakthrough. In any case, Turkey will not be considered a reliable partner by Israel for as long as President Tayyip Erdoğan dominates the political sphere, despite the rapprochement achieved last summer. Israel also has reservations vis-à-vis Egypt: the growing Russian role in Egypt’s energy sector cannot be ignored.

Israel has always attached great significance to political and security parameters. If the EastMed project develops, it will certainly improve Israel’s relationship with the EU. Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete has said construction of this pipeline would contribute to the reduction of Europe’s dependency on Russian energy, a potential result also viewed with favor by the US.

The traditional division among EU member states on their view of Moscow can work in EastMed’s favor. While Germany is looking favorably towards Nord Stream II, which will complement Nord Stream I in the transporting of Russian gas to Europe under the Baltic Sea, the EU might well emphasize energy security and push (with the support of the US) for the realization of EastMed.

Israel is the driving force for energy development in the eastern Mediterranean, and its choices on this matter will have serious implications in terms of both strategic calculations and long-term economic planning. By cooperating with trustworthy democratic countries, Jerusalem will be able to mitigate the risk of instability, secure clients on the Continent, strengthen its relationship with the EU, and improve its image in Europe.’

Author: Dr George Tzogopoulos

Source: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

Europe, and most importantly, Western Europe has become a fertile ground for ISIS recruits. Western Muslim Europeans have been making the trip to Syria and Iraq, filling in the ranks of ISIS, and back.  Western intelligence agencies are faced with multiple challenges: what is the level of threat those war hardened returned fighters represent to public safety? Can these returned jihadists become de-radicalized and re-enter the society, without killing anybody that does not agree with their ideology?

The purpose of this study is to present to counter-terrorism policy makers, the reasons Western European Muslims born and converted become radicalized, by presenting the psychological factors that contribute to the radicalization of the Western European Youth, towards jihadism.  Furthermore, by using the Freudian splitting of the Id, the Ego, and the Superego, it examines how Muslim extremists using tenants of the Muslim faith are influencing the psychic of the youth toward radicalization, as the only true expression of the Muslim faith. This study also examines, how fundamentalism impacts the minds of “believers” and castigates everybody else that is considered a “non-believer”, while influencing the path of a young mind towards his or her becoming the defender of the Ummah, or the Muslim community at large.

Finally, what lessons security agencies can learn and apply towards, before a youth becomes radicalized and then jihadist and makes the trip to ISIS fold, and after the return of the well grown jihadist by now, back to European society.

Working Paper 80/2017: Recruitment of Europeans into ISIS

Author: Spiros Bamiatzis

TARGET will initiate institutional change in seven gender equality innovating institutions (GEIIs) in the Mediterranean basin – including research performing organisations (RPOs), research funding organisations (RFOs) and a network of universities. TARGET takes a reflexive approach which goes beyond the formal adoption of a gender equality plan by emphasising an iterative reflection of progress made as well as establishing a community of practice to effect institutional transformation. Actual change is the result of increased institutional willingness and capacity to identify, reflect on and address gender bias in a sustained way.

Starting point and anchor of the process is a tailored Gender Equality Plan or Strategy (GEP/GES) in each GEII. TARGET will build the institutional capacity for a reflexive gender equality policy by: developing effective tools for each stage of the GEP/GES (audit, planning, implementation, monitoring, self-assessment) to be customised to the specific institution; supporting the development of competences to conduct a gender audit, to design, implement, monitor and self-assess a tailored GEP/GES; establishing a community of practice of relevant stakeholders within each GEII; initiating an organisational learning process within each GEII which combines self-assessment with GEP/GES evaluation. The TARGET countries have been characterised as relatively inactive in developing gender equality policies in R&I.

Based on the collaborative work with research organisations in ten countries in adopting GEPs, the TARGET project will further develop new knowledge for institutions, practitioners and policymakers. It shall do so through the comparative analysis of GEP implementation and sustainability, and by developing a basis for effective sharing of practice in both proactive and relatively inactive countries, while taking into account differences in cultural, socio-economic and political settings.

ELIAMEP’s role in the TARGET project

• As an established research and policy institute in Greece and in Europe, ELIAMEP is a partner among the consortium organisations that have committed to formulating and adopting a Gender Equality Plan (GEP) – the first research and innovation organisation in Greece to do so. While it is a relatively small organisational entity (in terms of scientific and administrative staff), ELIAMEP is the center of a larger research community that includes a wide network of its researchers who are also affiliated with different Greek universities, links with many research and funding organizations in Greece and abroad, and a large number of trainees and external collaborators.
• ELIAMEP is the consortium partner responsible for developing policy recommendations for promoting gender equality in research and innovation institutions.
• To ensure that action taken has a multiplier effect, ELIAMEP will also undertake targeted dissemination activities to initiate a national/regional discourse on gender equality in Research & Innovation.

Partners

Institute for Advanced Studies (IAS, coordinator), Austria

Agentia Romana de Asigurare a Calitatii in Invatamantul Superior (ARACIS)

Romania

Idryma Proothisis Erevnas) (RPF, Cyprus)

Fondazione Regionale per la Ricerca Biomedica (FRRB), Italy

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

University of Belgrade (UB), Serbia

Réseau Méditerranéen des Ecoles d’Ingénieurs (RMEI), France

NOTUS, Spain

Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini (FGB), Italy

Universite Hassan II de Casablanca (UH2C), Morocco

For more information, you can contact Dia Anagnostou, anagnostou.eliamep@gmail.com

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 741672

Research Fellow of ELIAMEP, Dr Filippa Chatzistavrou, gave an interview on Greek News Agenda analysing the future of Europe. The interview is available here.

You can read here the article on the Cyprus Question, which was written by Director General of ELIAMEP Dr Thanos Dokos. This commentary was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini on 15 June 2017 [in Greek].

The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) invited a group of experts from diverse backgrounds to pursue reflection on “Access to education for refugee children in Greece: evaluations and experiences from the past year”. The discussion was held on Monday, June 12th 2017 in Athens at the premises of the Foundation.

The discussion started with brief presentations by Mrs. Geli Aroni from the Commission for the Management, Coordination and Monitoring of the Refugee Children’s Education of the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs (Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs), Mr. Nikos Belavillas – Professor at the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA) and a member of the Ministry of Education’s Commission for the Coordination of the Refugee Children’s Education, Mr. Vassilis Papastergiou – lawyer and representative of the Hellenic League for Human Rights (CSHR), and Mrs. Marina Nikolova – member of the Migration Research Group of ELIAMEP and country coordinator of the European Website on Integration (EWSI). Coordinator of the discussion was Mrs. Dia Anagnostou, ELIAMEP’s Senior Research Fellow and Assistant Professor at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences.

The participants had the chance to present their experience and to exchange knowledge and ideas on the future education plan for the refugee children. The invited experts evaluated the results and the experiences from the past year and discussed possible strategies to address the educational needs of children for the next year. Results of the already implemented program were announced and the challenges and concerns for the next year were articulated.

The list of participants can be found here and the event’s minutes will soon be available.

On Friday 2 and Saturday 3 June 2017, the two-day event regarding the “The Unknown Balkans” took place at The Hub Events.

Attendees were able to discuss with more than 25 speakers (academics, diplomats, journalists and politicians) coming from EU countries and also the Western Balkans, on issues related to the region of Southeast Europe, with particular emphasis on Kosovo, FYROM and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides the conference panels, there were two short films and photo exhibitions as well, with pictures from the 3 countries.

Thanos Veremis, Vice President of ELIAMEP, Luan Shllaku, Executive Director of the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, and Ioannis Armakolas, Assistant Professor at the University of Macedonia, Research Fellow Stavros Kostopoulos & Head of the Southeast Europe Program at ELIAMEP started the event with the introductory remarks.

The first day of the conference, Friday 2 June included panels for the “Skopje 2014” program in FYROM,  the possibilities of an exit from the political crisis in FYROM, on issues of democracy & the new authoritarianism in the Balkans and finally on the overall strategy of the European Union regarding the Balkan region. Among the speakers and coordinators on the first day of the event were Dimitris Kourkoulas, Dusan Reljic, Tobias Flessenkemper, Maria – Eleni Koppa, Dane Taleski, Zoran Ilievski, Alexandros Mallias, Tasos Teloglou, Patrik Svensson, Yannis Papageorgiou and others.

On the second day of the conference, Saturday 3 June, a debate was held on the problems of managing the cultural heritage in the Balkans, as well as a photo exhibition of the photographer Maria Katsaouni. Among the speakers were Dimitris Moschopoulos, Skender Boshtrakaj, Hajrula Ceku and Dzenan Sahovic.

Finally, the documentaries “Kosovo Rising” and “Home” (which won the 2017 BAFTA Short Film Awards) were screened. After the debates, discussions with the producers of the two documentaries Alexia Euripidou & Stephen Nugget and Shpat Deda respectively, took place.

The agenda of the event is available here.

The video of the event is available here.

Photo credits @Marianna Katsaouni

This is the fourth in a series of National Reports to be published as part of the new phase of the New Pact for Europe project.*

Greece continues to be in a state of vulnerability, primarily the result of severe domestic errors, but also glaring gaps in the EMU architecture, and unfortunate Eurozone crisis management. Even though the crisis was also produced by EMU systemic failures, adjustment has been highly asymmetric, focusing almost exclusively on the national level. The sense of vulnerability is exacerbated by the effects of the refugee and migration crisis. Despite the disenchantment, a solid, though weakening, majority of Greeks continue to support the country’s participation in the EU institutions and the euro. Drawing on the discussions held amongst the members of the group, the report presents a set of conclusions on how to address the key challenges in strengthening Greece-EU relations:

• To help deficit countries shoulder the burden of adjustment, Europe needs a growth- and investment-friendly policy mix, greater fiscal integration, a financial union, and a drive to integrate digital, energy, and capital markets.
• A common migration policy should be based on proper burden-sharing, and solidarity, constituting an organising principle.
• Security is an area where European citizens demand a truly common European policy. The common tools that have been created must be utilised fully, providing incentives for closer cooperation.
• Europe needs to deliver effective EU policies in foreign affairs and security policy, defence, the protection of the multilateral global order and the environment, and, at the same time, promote greater risk-sharing though the fiscal and the financial channels.

*After a first successful period in 2013-2015, which included more than 80 events in 17 EU countries and the publication of two major reports, which elaborated five strategic options on the future of the EU, the New Pact for Europe project entered a new phase in 2016-2017. The ultimate aim of this new phase of the NPE project is to work out the details of a wider ‘package deal’ to equip the EU with the tools it needs to meet the internal and external challenges it faces. This proposal will contain solutions generated by connecting the discussions on the key policy challenges, and propose changes in the way the EU and its policies are defined to avoid future fundamental crises.

National Reflection Groups have been created and met specifically for this purpose in ten EU countries (Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia), followed by transnational exchanges between these groups. This national report is the result of the work and discussions of one of these National Reflection Groups.

For more information on the NPE project, please see the project website: www.newpactforeurope.eu

Click here to download the publication.