Unterausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung (SEDE) - Europäisches Parlament

The 2007 European Union (EU) Strategy for Central Asia was reviewed for the fourth time in 2015. Over the last eight years, the EU has successfully established several institutionalised mechanisms for strengthening relations and working with Central Asian governments, including an increased presence on the ground. Despite this, the EU’s engagement in Central Asia is one of limited to no impact. The region has become more unstable; forecast gas deliveries from the region to Europe have so far not materialised; trade is minimal with the exception of EU-Kazakhstan links, democracy is seen by the Central Asian regimes as a threat to their survival; corruption severely undermines economic development and siphons off much of the development aid; and the human rights situation has been backsliding. The EU should not and cannot compete with Russia and China in the region. The EU would do best to focus on a few key areas where it can achieve concrete results. Besides broader economic and some security cooperation, the EU should focus on education in supporting the region’s development while further emphasizing human rights and strengthening political and financial support to civil society.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Central Asia, located at the centre of the Eurasian continent and straddling the borders of some of the world’s most pressing hot spots, offers economic opportunities and natural resources but also remains insecure and troublesome. For the European Union, the region is not a priority. It is too distant and Brussels experiences difficulties in executing its democratic and value-based agenda on the ground. Regional dynamics have been significantly influenced by many players present in the region; Russia, China and the United States are the most significant. Russia’s position relies on a holistic approach, including military might and the more recent Eurasian narrative. China, pursuing its Silk Road ideas, has no equal in trade and energy. The US has partially retreated from Central Asia and is reviewing its security-centered strategy. Under these circumstances, what should the EU regional approach look like? What are the shared interests and divergent objectives of the actors present in Central Asia? With what actors could the EU cooperate and with whom should it abstain from regional rapprochement? Finally, what options does the EU have to strengthen its posture in the region from a regional and geopolitical perspective?
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2016 - EP

will take place on

4 February, 9:00-10:30, in Strasbourg and 17-18 February, in Brussels.

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Length of video : 72'
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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

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Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2016 - EP

On 25 January the Subcommittee on Security and Defence will exchange views with General Mikhail Kostarakos, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, on the state of play and the way ahead of the military dimension of the Comprehensive Approach.
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draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2016 - EP

On 25 January the Subcommittee on Security and Defence in association with the EP Delegation to the EU-Ukraine PAC will hold an exchange views with Kenneth Deane, Director CPCC, EEAS and Liubov Nepop, Acting Head of the Mission of Ukraine to the EU, on the general security situation in Ukraine and the EU's role, notably with regard to the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine), a civilian mission under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy.
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draft agenda
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2015 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The public hearing presented an overview of the current CSDP partnerships with third countries and organisations, the possibilities of evolution and general tendencies.
Location : Altiero Spinelli 1G-2
Programme
Programme
Presentations
Presentation by Rory Keane, Head of the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security, Brussels
Presentation by Prof. Dr. Joachim A. Koops, Dean of Vesalius College & Director, Global Governance Institute (GGI)
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Although EU Regulation 428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items system is in line with the main export control regimes and is seen as a model for others to follow, there are a number of ways in which the regulation could be enhanced and refined.
Part One outlines the current state of play, purpose and implementation of the current regulation. In Part Two, against the backdrop of the European Commission's reform proposal, the effectiveness of the EU's dual-use export controls regime is explored further with regard to its potential contribution to international, national and human security, as well as their impact on EU economic and trade interests. The study concludes that the system's effectiveness could be improved in a number of ways, but that this requires an effort to mobilise political will at different levels and across different institutions within the EU and its Member States, and to enhance human resources, cooperation and capacity-building. The European Parliament should also give consideration on a regular basis to issues relating to the scope and implementation of the regulation, in order to ensure that the objectives continue to be achieved.
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Workshop
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Nach den Terroranschlägen vom 13. November 2015 in Paris hat erstmalig ein Mitgliedstaat der EU die „Klausel über die gegenseitige Verteidigung/Beistandsklausel“ des Vertrags von Lissabon (Artikel 42 Absatz 7 EUV) geltend gemacht. Bei diesem Instrument handelt es sich um ein „reaktives“ zwischenstaatliches Instrument. Da keine speziellen Vorkehrungen zur Anwendung dieses Instruments bestehen, ist in dem Wortlaut für die EU-Institutionen keine ausdrückliche Rolle vorgesehen. Infolgedessen behält jeder Mitgliedstaat, der die Klausel geltend macht, einen großen Handlungsspielraum bei bilateralen Diskussionen mit Partnern, die verpflichtet sind, Unterstützung zu leisten, und denen es gleichzeitig frei steht zu entscheiden, auf welche Art und in welchem Umfang sie Unterstützung leisten. Artikel 42 Absatz 7 war nicht die einzige Klausel, die Frankreich hätte geltend machen können, um um Beistand zu bitten, aber diese Klausel enthielt die wenigsten Einschränkungen. Angesichts der immer stärker belasteten finanziellen und militärischen Kapazitäten des Landes ist es nur logisch, dass die Wahl auf die einfachere Klausel fiel. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass der Rechtsakt über die direkten Folgen – die einstimmige politische Unterstützung und bilaterale Diskussionen über den Beistand – hinaus Auswirkungen auf die weitgefasstere Debatte über die Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (GSVP) der EU haben wird. Dieser erste Anwendungsfall der Klausel hat durchaus das Potenzial, die Entwicklung der Europäischen Union sowie deren strategische Überlegungen (einschließlich der zukünftigen allgemeinen Strategie der EU für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik) zu beeinflussen und die vorsorgliche Bereitschaft, die Bündelung und gemeinsame Nutzung von Fähigkeiten sowie das „Gesamtkonzept“ der EU für Krisen wieder stärker in den Mittelpunkt zu rücken. Das Europäische Parlament unterstützt seit Langem den gegenseitigen Beistand in Krisenfällen. Mit seiner Aufsichtsfunktion (insbesondere auf der Grundlage von Artikel 36 EUV) und seiner Rolle bei der Koordinierung mit den nationalen Parlamenten könnte das Parlament Debatten über die Rolle der EU in multidimensionalen und transnationalen Krisen anregen und an diesen teilnehmen. Durch solche Debatten kann ein Beitrag zur Einschätzung von Artikel 42 Absatz 7 geleistet und möglicherweise der „Werkzeugkasten“ der EU für den Bereich Sicherheit verbessert werden.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2015 - EP

Following the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015 in Paris, the 'mutual defence/assistance clause' of the Treaty of Lisbon (article 42.7 TEU) was invoked for the first time by an EU Member State. This tool is a 'reactive', intergovernmental instrument. Devoid of specific implementation arrangements, the text foresees no explicit role for EU institutions. As a result, any Member State invoking the clause maintains a wide margin of manoeuvre for pursuing bilateral discussions with partners, who are at once bound to assist and free to decide the type and scope of their assistance. Article 42.7 was not the only clause France could have invoked to ask for assistance, but it was the least constraining. At a time when the country's financial and military capabilities are increasingly stretched, the simpler clause was a logical choice Beyond the immediate consequences – Member States' unanimous political support and bilateral discussions on assistance – the act is likely to affect the wider debate about the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Union's strategic thinking (including on the future 'EU global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy') and developments may be influenced by the inauguration, with a renewed focus on preparedness, pooling and sharing of capabilities, and the EU's 'comprehensive approach' to crises. The European Parliament has long supported mutual assistance in cases of crises. With its oversight role (in particular based on Article 36 TEU) and role in coordinating with national parliaments, the Parliament could stimulate and take part in debates on the EU's role in multidimensional and transnational crises. Such debates can contribute to an evaluation of Article 42.7 and potentially improve the EU’s security 'toolbox'.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The Monthly Highlights publication provides an overview, at a glance, of the on-going work of the policy departments, including a selection of the latest and forthcoming publications, and a list of future events.
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

The EU and its Member States must prepare for the possibility of a chemical or biological attack on their territory by the self-styled 'Islamic State' in Iraq and the Levant. Since the beginning of October 2015, terrorist attacks in Ankara, the Sinai Peninsula, Beirut, Paris and Tunis, for which ISIL/Da'esh has claimed responsibility, have cost the lives of 500 people. Immediately following the latest attack in Paris, the jihadist terrorist group threatened further attacks in European cities.
ISIL has vowed that future strikes will be more lethal andeven more shocking. This has prompted experts to warn that the group may beplanning to try to use internationally banned weapons of mass destruction infuture attacks. At present, European citizens are not seriously contemplatingthe possibility that extremist groups might use chemical, biological,radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials during attacks in Europe. Under thesecircumstances, the impact of such an attack, should it occur, would be evenmore destabilising.

European governments and EU institutions need to be onalert, and should consider publicly addressing the possibility of a terroristattack using chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear materials. TheEU institutions have devoted considerable efforts to preventing a CBRN attackon European soil and preparing worst-case scenarios. However, some gaps remain,in particular with regard to information-sharing among Member States.

Further information
EPRS Briefing: ISIL/Da'esh and 'non-conventional' weapons of terror
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

will take place on Monday 25 January, 15:00-18:30, in Brussels.

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Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP