European Union

Dextro Energy v Commission
Environment and consumers
The Court confirms that a number of health claims relating to glucose cannot be authorised

A.S.
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
In the exceptional circumstances of the refugee crisis, Advocate General Sharpston considers that the Member States in which applications for international protection were first lodged are responsible for examining those applications

And so the latest disruption to the process of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU draws to a close. Much like the delay in Article 50 notification before it, this General Election has achieved little, except to underline that the British political system still hasn’t got its head around the entire matter.

While there will be countless pieces exploring what the results mean for Brexit, the basic message is going to be that they don’t mean much. If the Tories are returned, then there is no sign of any plan beyond the banalities that litter the White Paper: If Labour pull a surprise victory out of the bag, then they look no more able to fashion a coherent set of objectives. Only in the event of a hung Parliament, where the SNP and LibDems hold the balance of power, might something come of it all, but even then one hesitates at the thought of the media onslaught that would ensue.

Underlining all of this confusion is the passionately held belief that Brexit shouldn’t be the key debating ground for this election. Certainly, May called it on the basis of needing a strong mandate, but the real focus has been on the character of the leaders: if there was a visible policy, there is was social care that has stuck out. There is something of a sense that Brexit is important, but there’s nothing to be gained by talking about, as it’s a giant bear-trap, and one that many voters lack interest in.

Thus we end up where we left off, in April at the start of this election: with confused policies and confused politicians.

And the clock ticks down all the while.

If there is a winner from all this, then it is the EU. It has been able to work on its positions, fleshing out ideas without direct challenge from the UK, building consensus for the Commission team.

Neither side gains from a non-deal, but the onus is much more clearly on the UK to secure a package, so the ability to pull something together as the EU has done can only be to its advantage. As I have suggested before, May is best understood as someone who recognises that a deal on EU terms is coming down the line, so it makes sense to gather as much political capital as possible in anticipation of the storm. Sadly, that approach looks much less viable today.

There is a certain calmness in the EU’s actions. Part of that comes from the necessity of patience in an organisation that often takes a very long time to make any decision. But it also reflects the strong negotiating position that it holds in these talks: there have not been the tensions between the EU27 that many – including myself – anticipated, and all of the likely outcomes are ones that the EU can live with. Either the UK abandons leaving, or it agrees to an EU-designed deal, or it falls out without a deal: the first two axiomatically work for the EU, while the final path at least looks not to contaminate the rest of the EU.

In short, this general election has been a distraction: as we head to 19 June and the start of substantive negotiations, that will become even more apparent.

The post The Brexit non-issue appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Two years ago the European Commission published its Communication on the Energy Union, marking a new approach to the European energy sector.

It was based on an accurate diagnosis of the challenges facing the sector: a high dependency on fossil fuel imports; ageing infrastructure; a major crisis in markets that delivered high retail prices but low wholesale prices, thereby discouraging investment in carbon-free power generation.

The Communication also identified the winning strategy for Europe. Decarbonise the economy to reconcile sustainable development, security of supply and competitiveness. It announced consistent policies and measures regarding the five dimensions of energy and climate policy: security of supply, market integration, energy efficiency, decarbonisation and research and development.

EDF Group, as a leader in low-carbon electricity generation and in R&D, welcomed this initiative and its ambitions for innovative low-carbon growth.

The Communication logically suggested that some sort of governance should be implemented to ensure that national policies would lead to compliance with the European objectives. With the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ package, we now know how this governance could be organised.

But does the proposal accurately address the main issues facing the European Union? As is often the case, the glass is half-full and half-empty.

“We can be confident that the target of 27% of renewable energy sources will be met”

We need an institutionalised dialogue between member states and the European Union, and more transparency regarding national energy policies. To some extent, the Communication achieved this, launching a process of continuous discussion and triggering visits by Maroš Šefčovič, the Commission’s Vice-President for the Energy Union, to the European capitals to discuss the role of member states in the Energy Union.

The future national plans will ensure wider long-term visibility for member states’ projects. If such a dialogue had occurred earlier, we might have developed renewable sources of electricity more efficiently. And we might have prevented stop-and-go policies that induced serious shocks on the renewables sector and tensions that resulted from the impact of variable energy on power trade.

Furthermore, greater consistency has been introduced in energy and climate policy since the Energy Union was created. Before, many initiatives were developed separately and the impact of new draft legislation on existing texts or on legislation in progress was not always taken into account. The Clean Energy Package aims at consistency by launching simultaneously interlinked pieces of legislation based on a common approach. This is a positive move.

But there are downsides. The glass is half-empty in the sense that one very important element of energy and climate policy is not part of the package: the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) Directive.

The ETS Directive was launched before the Communication was released and it will be adopted before the political discussions on several elements of the package are complete. This is extremely concerning since the package’s provisions regarding renewable energy sources and energy efficiency have a major impact on the carbon market. The higher the ambition and the less flexible the governance, the higher the risk of depressed carbon prices – and possibly even a breakdown of the ETS, Europe’s main tool for cost-effective decarbonisation.

This is why the governance aspect of the package must be further enhanced. Some of the key performance indicators should measure the efficiency of energy and climate policies. It is also necessary to identify where policies may overlap and interfere with each other, to prevent any negative consequences.

It is possible, for instance, to neutralise the impact of increased energy efficiency on carbon markets. Some amendments are currently being prepared to this end, and they merit serious discussion.

“We need an institutionalised dialogue between member states and the European Union”

It is also possible to allow for enough flexibility to be able to cope with a potential crisis. The 2008 recession proved that the carbon market was not robust enough to adapt to a shock if the rest of the energy climate framework remained rigid. The ETS is under particular threat in the next five or ten years and we must introduce enough flexibility, in particular by avoiding rigid trajectories, to protect it.

We can be confident that the target of 27% of renewable energy sources will be met; most member states are sufficiently ambitious. Should any doubt arise, the mid-2020s will be the right moment to decide how to deal with any difficulties. Let us not waste time anticipating problems that may not occur.

One more point is worth mentioning: the new target to ensure that every member state reaches an interconnection capacity with networks in other countries that is equivalent to 15% of its installed capacity. This target does not fully take into account that energy policies must necessarily be cost-effective. In this particular case decentralisation is preferable to governance: Europe is better off having interconnectors with a positive cost-benefit ratio rather than sticking to precise targets.

The proposed Governance Regulation appears at first sight more political than other elements of the package. In a sense this is true: we are about to define the respective roles of the member states and the Union and the organisation of their dialogue.

But governance is also about meeting targets at optimum cost and contributing to an efficient functioning of markets. Governance is an essential element of a cost-effective European energy and climate policy, and decision-makers must keep this in mind.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – Håkan Dahlström

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The Council added 14 persons and 4 entities to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and  travel restrictions, transposing new listings imposed by UN Security Council resolution 2356 (2017). This resolution was adopted on 2 June 2017in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s ongoing  nuclear-weapon and ballistic missile-development activities, in violation and flagrant disregard of previous UN Security Council resolutions. 

The Council  decision brings the total number of persons under restrictive measures against the DPRK to 53 persons and 46 entities as listed by the UN. In addition, 41 persons and 7 entities are designated by the EU autonomously.  

The EU is implementing all UN Security Council  resolutions adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear and nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, the EU has also imposed autonomous restrictive measures against the DPRK, complementing and reinforcing the UN sanctions regime. 

The legal acts were adopted by written procedure. They will be published in the Official Journal of 9 June. 

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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EU Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meet on 8 and 9 June 2017 in Luxembourg to discuss a number of legislative files on the Justice topic (EPPO, supply of digital content, money laundering, etc.) as well as on the Home affairs one. Home affairs ministers are also expected to focus on migration, counter terrorism and improving interoperability of information systems. Both ministers meet to debate on issues related to criminal justice in cyberspace.

Download this video here.

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EU Ministers for Transport, Infrastructure, and Communications meet in Luxembourg on 8 and 9 June 2017. They are expected to agree on a general approach on a draft regulation on cross-border parcel delivery services. Ministers take stock of progress and hold a policy debate on the revision of the EU telecoms rules. They are also looking at progress made on proposed new rules for ePrivacy.

Download this video here.

On 25 May 2017, NATO leaders met in Brussels to celebrate the opening the new headquarters in Boulevard Léopold III. The location of the new headquarters is historically very significant: during construction four unexploded bombs from both the First and Second World Wars were found underneath. This should serve as an excellent reminder for what NATO stands.

While the official opening ceremony was a good occasion for the heads of state and government to come together, one issue – or rather, the presence of one person – surpassed the significance of the meeting: it was the first visit to Brussels by the 45th President of the United States of America, Donald J. Trump. Prior to the NATO meeting, much debate surrounded his visit. The stakes were high, because NATO has to face international disagreements and challenges as well as external threat that require urgent responses. As Sophia Besch, Research Fellow at CER, has outlined the task for the European allies was to contain Trump and to convince him about their efforts and contributions to NATO. On the other hand, Jeremy Shapiro, Research Director at ECFR, gave a more sober outlook for the meeting: ‘Trump will give an ordinary speech, make various extravagant promises, and the meeting will pass with neither incident nor substance.’

 

 

Besides the opening ceremony, the thematic focus centred around the issue of burden-sharing among NATO allies. Already during previous meetings with allies, Trump emphasised that European countries owe his country vast amounts for paying for European security. In one of his Tweet storms, he summarised his claim after the meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in April 2017: ‘Germany owes vast sums of money to NATO & the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive, defence it provides to Germany’. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO allies already agreed on the target of 2 percent of GDP towards NATO defence. However, this target is not only far from realistic and appropriate for some nations. It could also spur new suspicions, especially in Europe. If one imagines that Germany met this target any time soon, as of current, 2 percent of its GDP would amount to $75 billion (€67 billion, £58 billion). Surely, some of its neighbours would become worried.

In addition, this approach to burden sharing does not reflect the actual needs to make the Alliance more flexible, responsive and overall more secure. It is acknowledged that a contribution to collective defence is vital for its survival. But the 2 percent goal does not measure well the actual needs. Instead, it is suggested that a more accurate measure of both burden and risk sharing is required. The more worrying problem is not how to meet this target, but how the money is spent. For a robust and capable Alliance, its members should focus on acquiring capabilities reflecting the current security environment, i.e. one that requires tools and capabilities that respond to cyber threats and hybrid warfare. Further, they should focus on creating deployable militaries that can contribute effectively to NATO’s major operations. Lastly, allies’ contributions to burden sharing should take into account a country’s overall contribution to international and Euro-Atlantic security, i.e. its participation in non-NATO security and defence frameworks.

The outcome of the NATO meeting last month the recommitment of the allies to the 2 percent target as well as the decision to join the counter-terrorism coalition against Daesh. NATO leaders agreed on an action plan enabling states to participate in the fight against terrorism through the coordination of training and capacity building. Yet, as stressed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, this would not translate into engagement in combat operations.

Despite the importance of the meeting and the allies’ recommitments, NATO leaders neglected one pressing issue. How will they deal with one of their members – Turkey? Prior to the meeting in May, clashes between Turkey and other allies, most outspokenly with Germany as well as Austria, which is one of NATO’s partners through the Partnership for Peace programme, have troubled internal politics within the Alliance. Since the slash over campaign visits by Turkish officials in the light of Turkey’s referendum, German-Turksih relations have been tense. Then, for the second time within one year, Turkey has denied German officials access to the air base in Incirlik. These internal troubles and scuffles indicate the incoherence and diminished trust among members. Though both Germany and France voiced complaints over Turkey’s recent behaviour during the meeting, these have not received much attention and have been pushed into the shadow of Trump’s limelight appearance.

It has long been argued that NATO is only a defence alliance. Yet, with its transformations in the last three decades, it has become a truly political organisation as well. In this regard, NATO has to step up and improve its internal coherence alongside its defence capabilities. Only in a joint and collective fashion it is able to face its external threats and security challenges. It is therefore at stake and in the hands of NATO leaders as well as the Alliance as a whole to come together and revive common interests and values. This is far more significant and pressing than to denigrating and pointing fingers at each other as well as more important than shining light on those allies whose current policies and statements have been vague, ambiguous and not very trustworthy.

 

 

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters is a PhD Candidate and Teaching Assistant at the University of Kent and a Visiting Scholar at KU Leuven.

The post NATO, Trump and Turkey: The Alliance needs more coherence appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 31 March 2017, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/621[1]. The Council Decision extends the existing restrictive measures until 2 October 2017. The measures in question are a travel ban, assets freeze and a prohibition from making funds available regarding 3 individuals considered as responsible for obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition in Libya. 

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine,   the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this Council Decision. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision. 

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it. 

 [1] Published on 01.04.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L89, p. 10. 
*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The European Union and its Member States signed today a strategic blueprint, outlining the future of European development policy. This "New European Consensus on Development" represents a new collective vision and plan of action to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development.

The jointly developed strategy, in the form of a Joint Statement, was signed today during the annual two-day European Development Days by the Prime Minister of Malta, Joseph Muscat, on behalf of the Council and Member States, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the High Representative/Vice President, Federica Mogherini, and the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani.  

The new European Consensus on Development constitutes a comprehensive common framework for European development cooperation. For the first time, it applies in its entirety to all European Union Institutions and all Member States, which commit to work more closely together.  

The new Consensus strongly reaffirms that poverty eradication remains the primary objective of European development policy. It fully integrates the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. In doing so, it aligns European development action with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which is also a cross-cutting dimension for the EU Global Strategy. 

European leaders committed to three areas: 

1. They recognise the strong interlinkages between the different elements of such action. This includes development and peace and security, humanitarian aid, migration, environment and climate, as well as cross cutting-elements, such as: youth; gender equality; mobility and migration; sustainable energy and climate change; investment and trade; good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights; innovative engagement with more advanced developing countries; and mobilising and using domestic resources.
2. The new Consensus furthermore takes a comprehensive approach to means of implementation, combining traditional development aid with other resources, as well as sound policies and a strengthened approach to policy coherence, recalling that EU development cooperation always has to be seen in the context of Europe's partner countries' own efforts. The Consensus provides the basis for the EU and its Member States to engage in more innovative forms of development financing, leveraging private sector investments and mobilising additional domestic resources for development.
3. The EU and its Member States will create better-tailored partnerships with a broader range of stakeholders, including civil society, and partner countries at all stages of development.  They will further improve their implementation on the ground by working better together and taking into account their respective comparative advantages.

Background 

Europe is a global leader in development, being the world's biggest provider of Official Development Assistance. The new European Consensus on Development was agreed jointly by all European Institutions and all EU Member States in an open and transparent manner, also in consultation with other partners. It is the EU's response to today's global trends and challenges, aligning EU external action to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 

The 2030 Agenda was adopted by the international community in September 2015, and includes at its core the 17 Sustainable Development Goals and associated targets, which run to 2030. Along with the other international summits and conferences held in 2015 in Addis Ababa and in Paris, the international community has an ambitious new frame for all countries to work together on shared challenges. For the first time, the SDGs are universally applicable to all countries and the EU is committed to be a frontrunner in implementing them. 

On 22 November 2016, the European Commission proposed its ideas for a strategic approach for achieving sustainable development in Europe and around the world, including a Commission proposal for a new Consensus. Since then the European Parliament, the Council under the Maltese Presidency, and the Commission have engaged in an intensive series of inter-institutional discussions aimed at agreeing to a new collective vision for development policy which responds to the 2030 Agenda and other global challenges. 

Europe is a frontrunner when it comes to sustainable development and the 2030 Agenda, through external and other policies. 

See also

A Joint Statement by the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, the President of the Council of the European Union, Joseph Muscat, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini.

Joint statement by the President of the Council of the European Union, Joseph Muscat; the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, Federica Mogherini; the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani and the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker on the adoption of the new European Consensus on Development

With the signature of the new European Consensus on Development, we, the leaders representing the European Union institutions and the Member States, come together to mark a milestone achievement. 

Proud to lead global efforts as the world's largest development actor, we are united in our determination to set ourselves a clear vision and plan of action to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development in its economic, social and environmental dimensions by 2030. 

In 2015, the international community adopted at the United Nations the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This Agenda is a politically transformative, ambitious and universal commitment to end poverty and set the world on a sustainable path to prosperity, peace and social justice. The EU and its Member States are strongly committed to its implementation, within Europe and across the world, and this is why we are now translating this new comprehensive blueprint into our own policies including our development policies. Sustainable development is one of the key elements of our external action, as defined in the Lisbon Treaty and further set out in the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy. 

The new European Consensus on Development is the cornerstone of our revamped development policy and constitutes an important part of the EU's overall response to the 2030 Agenda. For the first time a shared framework applies to all EU Institutions and Member States, providing a common approach to development policies in the next decades. It will guide our cooperation with all developing countries, bearing in mind the need to design tailor-made approaches that reflect the growing diversity of our partner countries.   

Ending poverty in all its forms remains our primary objective. We will work to reduce inequalities, address vulnerabilities and combat discrimination ensuring that no one is left behind aiming to reach the furthest behind first. We will promote gender equality and social inclusion across our policies, foster opportunities for young people and improve people's well-being everywhere. In implementing the Consensus, we will be guided by and promote our common principles, including democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality and solidarity, as well as our commitment to a rules-based global order, with multilateralism and the United Nations at its core. Recognising the linkages between sustainable development and climate action, we also reaffirm our strong commitment to implement the Paris Agreement fully and effectively. 

Our new approach to development is based on the 'five Ps' of the 2030Agenda: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnerships. Recognising the interlinkages between the SDGs, we will pay attention to actions that meet multiple goals in a coherent way. We will work across policies and sectors to boost synergies addressing a range of cross-cutting elements to accelerate transformation. Based on the principle of policy coherence for development, development objectives will be fully taken into account across EU policies that are likely to affect developing countries. Policy coherence will be ensured to contribute to the achievement of the SDGs by partner countries. 

Achieving this ambitious vision for Our World, Our Dignity and Our Future will require  multiplying and unifying our efforts.  We will work better together by improving coordination to maximise the impact of the EU and the Member States' actions, and by applying the development effectiveness principles. We will reinforce innovative partnerships with all countries, involving civil society, the private sector, local authorities, international organisations and all relevant stakeholders. The challenges and opportunities of this era are immense, and none of us alone can successfully address them. Our collective action can make a real difference in addressing our common challenges and advancing mutual benefits. 

In line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, a full range of means of implementation will be mobilised in the spirit of partnership. Action will focus on establishing conducive policy environments to achieve the SDGs, mobilising and making effective use of domestic and international public finance, combating illicit financial flows and involving the private sector through investment, trade, innovation and technology. We also reaffirm all individual and collective Official Development Assistance commitments and will take realistic, verifiable actions towards meeting them. 

This Consensus is a pledge and a call for all of us to join forces for a prosperous, fair, sustainable, safe world and a life of dignity for all. It represents our vision that now needs to be translated into reality.

Together, we will be true to our aims, consistent in our new approach and united in our action.

On 8 June, the Council adopted the decision establishing of the military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) within the EU military staff (EUMS). The terms of reference of the EUMS, which is part of the EEAS, have also been amended and approved.

"The establishment of the MPCC is a very important operational decision to strengthen European defence. It will contribute  to make the non-executive European missions more effective and to improve the training of  soldiers of partner countries, to guarantee peace and security. This is important not just for our partners, but also for the European Union's security", said  the High Representative Federica Mogherini.

The MPCC will assume command of EU non-executive military missions, currently: EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, EUTM République Centrale Africaine (RCA) and EUTM Mali. The MPCC will be the static, out-of-area command and control structure at the military strategic level, responsible for the operational planning and conduct of non-executive missions, including the building up, launching, sustaining and recovery of European Union forces. This will allow the mission staff in the field to concentrate on the specific activities of their mission, with better support provided from Brussels.

The MPCC improves the crisis management structures of the EU. It will work under the political control and strategic guidance of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of EU member states' ambassadors and is based in Brussels.

The MPCC will be composed initially of up to 25 staff but will also benefit from the support of other departments of the EUMS.  The Director General of the EU Military Staff will also be the director of the MPCC.  He will exercise command and control over the current three training missions and other possible future non-executive military missions. He will also exercise the responsibilities related to deployment and recovery of the missions as well as overall budgeting, auditing and reporting.

The MPCC will work closely with its existing civilian counterpart, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) through a joint support coordination cell. This cell will be able to share expertise, knowledge and best practices on issues relevant to both military and civilian missions, as well as capabilities when civilian and military missions are simultaneously deployed in the same area, including  medical support or protective measures.

The decision will be published in the Official Journal of 9 June.

BackgroundProcess

On 6 March 2017, the Council adopted conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, endorsing a concept note for the operational planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operation. In its conclusions of 18 May 2017, the Council decided to establish the MPCC, pending a formal legal decision. Today this formal legal decision has been adopted by the Council.

On 14 November 2016, the Council adopted conclusions on implementing the EU global strategy in the area of security and defence. These conclusions set out the level of ambition in the form of the main goals the EU and its member states will aim to achieve in the area of security and defence, with three strategic priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises, building the capacities of partners, and protecting the European Union and its citizens. On 15 December 2016, the European Council reaffirmed the need to improve EU's capacity to react in a faster, more effective and more seamless manner, as part of an EU comprehensive approach.

About the three EU Training Missions

EUTM Somalia was launched in 2010 and ever since it has contributed to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government and the institutions of Somalia.

EUTM Mali was launched in 2013 to support the rebuilding of the Malian armed forces and to meet their operational needs.

EUTM RCA was launched in 2016 and it supports the Central African Republic government in the implementation of security sector reform in the country.

After two terrorist attacks in the last two weeks of its general election, the UK heads to the polls this Thursday unsure how the vote will finally turn out. With the polls predicting anything from a hung parliament to a substantial increase in Prime Minister Theresa May’s majority, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn is for now being labelled the political ‘winner’ of the election, with May’s negative ratings increasing as her poll lead has declined.

Will the SNP hold the balance of power at Westminster?

If it is a hung parliament, then attention will turn rather quickly to the third-largest party at Westminster, the Scottish National Party (SNP). The SNP are expected to lose between five and ten of the 56 seats they currently hold (out of a total of 59 in Scotland), though they would still have 46 MPs even if the worst-case likely scenario. The Tories in particular – but Labour and possibly even the LibDems – all look potentially set to increase their seat tally in Scotland from the one MP each they currently have (Labour having been Scotland’s dominant party until 2015).

But the polls still have the SNP on between 40% and 43% of the vote while, just as in England, different polls tell different stories for the Scottish Tory and Labour share of the vote (one suggesting they had levelled at 25% each, another putting the Tories on 30% and Labour on 18%).

“Brexit has been the elephant in the room in the Scottish election debate”

Where is the independence in the EU debate?

Apart from the unpredictability of the results, another curious dimension of Scotland’s election campaign has been the lack of debate over the SNP’s declared aim of independence in the European Union. Two weeks before Theresa May triggered Article 50, Nicola Sturgeon – Scotland’s First Minister and SNP leader – had announced that in the face of Brexit she wanted a second independence referendum once the withdrawal deal was done in autumn 2018.

May responded “no, not now” to this request. The Tory leader in Scotland, Ruth Davidson, then chose to make her Scottish general election campaign all about saying ‘no’ to a second referendum. The stage was set it seemed for a big debate about Brexit with the UK or independence in the EU. But it hasn’t happened.

Nicola Sturgeon has said that having a majority of MPs in Scotland – along with being the largest party in the Scottish parliament and winning the local council elections early last month – would mean she has a ‘triple lock’ on her request for a second independence referendum. But she has also been keen to stress that the election is about electing SNP MPs to provide opposition at Westminster to Conservative austerity policies, benefit cuts and reductions in public service spending. This has been her main line of attack.

Sturgeon has also said that if she wins a majority of MPs (which she is bound to do) she will demand a seat at the Brexit negotiating table, and will again call for Scotland to be allowed to stay in the EU’s single market and the UK (as proposed last December in the Scottish government paper ‘Scotland’s Place in Europe’). This is rather curious.

The UK government rejected Sturgeon’s proposal for a differentiated deal for Scotland (on the same day as they triggered Article 50). UK government Brexit Secretary David Davis wrote to his Scottish Government counterpart Mike Russell to say – without a hint of irony – that Scotland could not be in the UK and in the EU’s single market as it would create significant trade barriers between Scotland and England and ‘regulatory confusion’. It is also clear that Nicola Sturgeon would not agree with May’s approach to the Brexit talks (outside the EU single market and customs union) – yet she is putting the emphasis on these two demands: a seat at the table and a differentiated deal.

It appears that, despite taking the bold step of calling a second independence referendum in the face of Brexit, and coming down on the side of an independent Scotland being in the EU not the European Economic Area, Nicola Sturgeon does not want to debate these issues. As a result, with the Scottish Tories and Labour both doing well out of strongly opposing a second referendum, Sturgeon looks on the defensive.

“If it is a hung parliament, the attention will turn rather quickly to the third-largest party at Westminster, the Scottish National Party”

Where is the Brexit challenge?

Ruth Davidson, Scottish Tory leader – and Labour’s leader Kezia Dugdale – have been allowed to argue against independence without being challenged on Scotland being part of the UK’s Brexit, and on all the associated costs and damage that the Brexit decision is already doing and will do even more in the near future. It is understandable that the SNP did not want the general election campaign to be run as if it is a referendum campaign – with arguments over what currency an independent Scotland would use, how it would fund its deficit, and what would happen to the England-Scotland border.

But the SNP had plenty of potential Brexit ammunition to use over the damage to living standards caused by the fall in the pound since 23 June, the slowdown in growth (with eurozone growth in the first quarter of 2017 two-and-a-half times that of the UK), the trade barriers that Brexit will reintroduce, security and more.

To put the focus instead on an anti-Tory, anti-austerity narrative and, when talking about Brexit, to prioritise the demand that Scotland should be in the UK and in the EU’s single market, suggests an SNP that is not on the front foot on independence in the EU.

In the rest of the UK both Labour and the Tories accept Brexit – and so it was pushed to the sidelines of election debates. In Scotland, there is clear blue water over Brexit between the Tories and Labour, on one side, and the SNP (and Scottish Greens) on the other.

Yet Brexit has been the elephant in the room in the Scottish election debate. And whether there will be a second independence referendum before 30 March 2019 is, for now, quite unclear. It is one more Brexit conundrum.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – First Minister of Scotland

The post Neither Brexit nor independence: Scotland’s strange election debate appeared first on Europe’s World.

The UK’s Government is wrapped in a contradiction on Brexit. On the one hand, Theresa May states that no deal is better than a bad deal. On the other hand, the Conservative Manifesto also states that getting the Brexit negotiations right will define “our economic security and economic prosperity”.

Since the Lancaster House speech earlier this year, Theresa May has been consistently and repeatedly stating that the UK would be prepared to walk away from the Brexit negotiations. What only became clear during the election campaign is that the UK Government directly links the future prosperity of its citizens to the outcome of the UK negotiations with the EU.  This is important because for the Conservative Party to argue that “getting the Brexit negotiations right is central to everything – our economy, our finances, our position in the world. Get Brexit wrong and we get everything else wrong. From looking after our elderly to educating our children, everything depends on getting Brexit right”, fundamentally contradicts the rationale for no deal. Indeed, underlying that the UK needs to “get the Brexit negotiations right” to secure its future security and prosperity implies that no deal is in itself the bad deal.

During last week’s BBC Leaders Special on Question Time David Dimbleby asked the PM “what is a bad deal? People are very confused, you talk all the time about a bad deal which you won’t accept. Can you explain what in your mind would be a bad deal?”. In her response Theresa May said the following: “Well yes. I think on the one hand, David, you have got politicians in Europe, some of whom are talking about punishing the UK for leaving the EU, I think what they want to see in terms of that punishment would be a bad deal, and secondly, you have got politicians here, in the United Kingdom, who seem to be willing to accept any deal, whatever that is, just for the sake of getting a deal, and I think that the danger is they would be accepting the worse possible deal at the highest possible price”. A few minutes later, a member of the audience asked the PM to “quantify in billions of pounds what is a good deal” regarding the so-called Brexit bill. The Prime Minister’s answer: “well the… I am not going to give you a figure on that . . . because we need to go through very carefully what as part of the negotiation what rights and obligations the United Kingdom has”.

The PM’s response further confirms her ambiguity in defining what a bad deal is and the rationale to walk away from the negotiations with no deal. In her response to the member of the audience, Theresa May seems to accept that there will be a Brexit bill to be agreed (which depends on agreeing the rights and obligations of the UK in the EU). However, in her response to David Dimbleby, the PM states that the “punishment” (the Brexit bill) is a bad deal and therefore no deal would be a better outcome. Paradoxically, in another response to a member of the audience, May also states that “several EU politicians want to get on with trade talks very quickly”. This reinforces the view that when May talks about the “punishment” that European politicians want to inflict on the UK she is not referring to the possibility of the talks on the trade deal to collapse but, rather, to what the EU will demand for settling the UK/EU accounts on previously agreed commitments (the Brexit bill). What is important to note here is that the EU has stated that this financial settlement must precede and be agreed before any trade talks begin. As such, the refusal of the PM to quantify what the UK is willing to accept paying suggests either the UK Government has not given much thought about the issue (in fact, the possibility of a Brexit bill was not even mentioned during the EU referendum campaign), or that its intention is to use the Brexit bill as a reason for walking away from the negotiations with no deal.

But when  ”sufficient progress” regarding the Brexit bill (as well as on EU/UK citizens rights) has been achieved, which will allow the negotiations to proceed to the next stage, then the question is what constitutes a good (“right”) and a bad (“wrong”) Brexit deal? Interestingly, the UK Government is somewhat clear on what it seeks from the Brexit negotiations. As it is stated in Theresa May’s Article 50 letter, the goal of the UK is to establish a “new deep and special partnership” with the EU “in both economic and security cooperation”. In economic terms, “getting Brexit right” means, in the words of David Davies (Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union), retaining the “exact same benefits” of membership of EU membership of the Single Market  By the same token, “getting Brexit wrong” means getting a Brexit deal where these exact same benefits are not guaranteed. Crucially, as a no deal will put the UK and EU trading under WTO rules those tariff and non-tariff access will be lost. As such, accordingly to the UK’s Government own terminology, no deal also means “getting Brexit wrong”. In other words, no deal is also a bad deal. Therefore, the open question is which outcome is worse – no deal or a deal that does not deliver the “exact same benefits” of EU membership?

An important caveat here: walking away from the Brexit negotiations table with no deal will not prevent the EU from taking action against the UK in international courts. That is, the financial accounts between the UK and EU will have to be settled regardless whether the UK leaves the negotiation table or not. As such, no deal is the worst possible deal for it not only does not avoid the Brexit bill, it also prevents a (soft) Brexit deal on trade, security and on UK/EU citizen rights deal with the EU to come about, and finally, it also breaks a key pledge of the Leave campaign – a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU. One thing is certain though: the Conservative Party’s threat of walking away with no deal (the hardest form of Brexit) is incompatible with the same Conservative Party’s goal of “getting the Brexit negotiations right”.

The post No deal is incompatible with Theresa May’s claim that “everything depends on getting the Brexit negotiations right” appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Blogs are increasingly relevant to researchers and, for those starting out in contributing to them, it can be useful to reflect on the differences with other outputs, writes Anthony Salamone. He sets out some suggestions on how to approach writing for an academic blog, including how to gain the most from the experience.

LSE Library at Night, Lukasz Duleba, CC-BY-NC-2.0

As academia becomes ever more integrated into the digital environment, researchers will increasingly benefit from the ability to write for different formats. Academic blogs in particular have grown to become one of the mainstays for analysis, commentary and the exchange of ideas in many fields of study. If you are new to writing for blogs, it can be worthwhile considering how the medium varies from others (especially from longer ‘standard’ academic texts) and how to make the most of a blog contribution.

In the first instance, it is important to keep in mind that academic blogs can be diverse in terms of their purpose, style and audience. When writing for (or reading) a blog, these factors should inform the approach that you take. Generally speaking, however, academic blogs are defined by relatively short written contributions and an open audience which can range from academics to practitioners to interested members of the public. For university blogs, at least, most are run by editors and have their own contribution guidelines, publication policies and editorial structures.

Translate your argument into a more concise form

The normal length of an article can range from around 500 – 2000 words. Particularly for pieces on the more concise end of the scale, this brevity requires that you prioritise the key points that you want to make, along with any relevant evidence. It follows then that you must have a clear sense of what you want to communicate, and that you keep to it – the limitations leave little room for tangents (however interesting). If you are unsure of how to organise your ideas for this format, figure out what single takeaway you would want someone to leave with after reading your article, and make certain that the piece as a whole reflects that message.

Adapting to this form applies not only to your ideas, but also to your writing. Contributions are most often effective with shorter, concise sentences and smaller paragraphs. Moreover, a blog piece does not require substantial signposting. Broadly speaking, this sentence and paragraph structure is somewhere between that of a newspaper and an academic journal. Regardless of whether this philosophy is preferred by a particular blog, it is to your benefit to become familiar with writing in this style and to employ it in blog contributions.

The way in which you approach referencing is another component to consider. In general, the preferred form of citation is an in-text hyperlink (as shown here). Since blogs are webpages, footnotes are not possible – equally, many platforms either discourage or will not publish endnotes. Substantive points need to be incorporated into your article itself. References should only be represented by the hyperlink or with minimal in-text citations as an indicative guide, since most platforms will not publish lists of references at the end. In this sense, think of your contribution more as a column in a newspaper or magazine. Certain sites do allow endnotes and references, but they are exceptions – and it is beneficial to develop the skill of working without them.

When writing a contribution, the title is of course an important consideration. Craft a title which is short (it should fit on one line) and explanatory (it should make clear either your main argument or the principal question you address). Some platforms use descriptive titles – a short sentence which summarises your article. It is also relevant to keep in mind the likely readership of a particular blog. If your article will be read by a broad audience, technical concepts should be made accessible. If your contribution will be read by colleagues or those with requisite knowledge, avoid explaining basic parameters and concentrate on your arguments.

Select a platform which fits with your objectives

With these points of form and style in mind, attention turns to the content of your contribution and how to maximise its value to you. Overall, blog articles can be divided into two main categories – analysis/comment and research/exchange. Analysis pieces offer informed discussion and commentary on aspects of current affairs in general or contemporary issues in the field of study. As with any academic endeavour, it is advisable to focus contributions on your expertise – your areas of research, study and experience.

Writing about research in a blog can be a worry for some – particularly if work has yet to be published in a journal or book. However, it is perfectly possible to write about your research in a constructive way. Before publication, you can use blog contributions to preview your work, setting out some of the background ideas of your research. After publication, blog pieces can enable you to increase the impact of your research by distributing it to a wider audience (including through links to full publications). Additionally, when you give a talk or speak at an event, translating your remarks into a blog can be a convenient way of sharing them further in written form.

In terms of where to submit a contribution, consider which blog platforms might suit the objectives you are looking to achieve, in terms of likely readership, possible feedback or discussion, or increased recognition within a particular community. Before sending your article to a blog, take the time to read its style guide and look through some of its recent articles, to ensure that your submission fits that style. For instance, if all the articles on a blog include a summary at the start, write one yourself in the same format. While your contribution will be evaluated on the basis of its arguments and how well they are communicated, ensuring that your article meets all the stylistic standards can expedite publication.

Promote your contributions and engage in the debate

Instead of submitting a piece directly to a blog, you can also contact the editors first to make sure that your proposal sounds relevant to them. This feedback can enable you to tailor your contribution as needed, and to check, for instance, that you are not submitting something on a topic for which they already have material to publish. You might also be able to agree delivery and/or publication times, which can be useful for planning. Once you have submitted a contribution and it has been accepted, expect to receive suggested edits, which you will have to work through with the editors.

After your article has been published, take the time to publicise and record your work, from sharing it on social media, to including it on your online researcher profile, to telling your department/institute so it can be included in the next newsletter. Many blogs publish with Creative Commons licenses, which allow material to be freely republished on the same terms, so it might be the case that your article is reposted elsewhere. Blogs also commission contributions, particularly from previous authors, which can bring further opportunities to you.

Academic blogs are an important vehicle for sharing your research with and offering your analysis to colleagues and the wider world. While blogs remain largely supplementary to other forms of academic writing, their shorter format, potential reach and faster publication times make them an important part of contemporary research life.

The author is Co-Editor of Crossroads Europe, founder and Managing Editor of European Futures and former Assistant Editor of LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP).

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

Comments and Site Policy

Shortlink for this article: bit.ly/2rSkIrj

Anthony Salamone | @AMSalamone
University of Edinburgh

Anthony Salamone is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Edinburgh and Managing Editor of European Futures. He is a Committee Member of the UACES Student Forum and Co-Editor of Crossroads Europe.

The post How to Write for an Academic Blog appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

OPINION on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union Resettlement Framework and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Laima Liucija Andrikienė

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Place:           European Convention Centre Luxembourg (ECCL)

Chair(s):      Urmas Reinsalu, Estonian minister for Justice, and
                      Andres Anvelt, Estonian minister for Home Affairs,
                      on behalf of the Maltese Presidency of the Council

All times are approximate and subject to change

Justice (Thursday, 8 June)

+/- 08.00
Arrivals - Justice ministers (live streaming)

+/- 08.15
Doorstep by Ambassador Marlene Bonnici

+/- 10.00
Beginning of the meeting (roundtable)
Adoption of the agenda
Adoption of legislative A items

+/- 10.10
Establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) (public session)

+/- 10.55
Digital Agenda: Supply of digital content (public session)

+/- 11.25
Revision of Brussels II a: jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction (public session)

+/- 12.05
Insolvency: preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures (public session)

+/- 12.45
Countering money laundering by criminal law (public session)

+/- 13.05
Data protection by Union institutions and bodies: protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and of the free movement of such data (public session)

+/- 13.20
Other business - Information from the Presidency on current legislative proposals (public session)

Approval of the list non-legislative "A" items

Other business - Work programme of the incoming Presidency

+/- 13.45
Working lunch (Hate speech online)

+/- 14.30
Arrivals - Home affairs ministers

+/- 15.30
Joint session of Justice and Home affairs ministers (roundtable)

Criminal Justice in cyberspace
a)  e-evidence
b) encryption
c)  data retention

Protection of children in Migration
a)  Draft Conclusions on the protection of children in Migration
b)  Protection of children in Migration

+/- 18.00
Press conference (live streaming)

Home affairs (Friday, 9 June)

+/- 08.30
Arrivals (live streaming)

+/- 09.25
Doorstep by Ambassador Marlene Bonnici 

+/- 10.00
Meeting of the Mixed committee (roundtable)
Adoption of the agenda

Establishment of a European Travel and Information Authorisation System (ETIAS)

Schengen Information System (SIS)

Other business

+/- 11.45
Beginning of the Home affairs Council meeting

Migration

+/- 13.00
Working lunch of ministers for home affairs (Counter-terrorism)

+/- 14.45
Home affairs Council meeting resumes

Return Policy - Implementation of Commission Recommendation on Return

Information Systems and Interoperability

Other business - Work programme of the incoming Presidency

+/- 16.20
Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Resettlement (public session)

+/- 16.50
Establishment of European Travel and Information Authorisation System (ETIAS) (public session)

+/- 16.55
Schengen Information System (SIS) (public session)

+/- 17.00
Other business - Information from the Presidency on current legislative proposals

+/- 17.05
Press conference (live streaming)

On 9 June 2017, the Council agreed a general approach on the proposal for a European travel information and authorisation system (ETIAS). The general approach constitutes the Council's position for negotiations with the European Parliament.

"ETIAS will help improve our security and protect our citizens. It will require all those who do not need a visa to be checked before they travel to the Schengen area. Anyone posing a risk can be prevented from coming."

Maltese Presidency of the Council

ETIAS will allow for advance checks and, if necessary, deny travel authorisation to visa-exempt third-country nationals travelling to the Schengen area. It will help improve internal security, prevent illegal immigration, limit public health risks and reduce delays at the borders by identifying persons who may pose a risk in one of these areas before they arrive at the external borders.

Functioning of the system

The Council position includes the following elements.

The system will apply to visa-exempt third country nationals, as well as those who are exempt from the airport transit visa requirement. They will need to obtain a travel authorisation before their trip, via an online application.

The information submitted in each application will be automatically processed against other EU databases to determine whether there are grounds to refuse a travel authorisation. When no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, the travel authorisation will be issued automatically within a short time. This is expected to be the case for the large majority of applications.

If there is a hit or an element requiring analysis, the application will be handled manually by the competent authorities. In this case, the ETIAS central unit will first check that the data recorded in the application file corresponds to the data triggering a hit. When it does or when doubt remains, the application will be processed manually by the ETIAS national unit of the responsible member state. The issuing or refusal of an application which has triggered a hit will take place no later than 96 hours after the application is submitted or, if additional information has been requested, 96 hours after this information has been received.

Before boarding, air carriers, sea carriers and international carriers transporting groups overland by coach will need to check whether third country nationals subject to the travel authorisation requirement are in possession of a valid travel authorisation.

The travel authorisation will not provide an automatic right of entry or stay; it is the border guard who will take the final decision.

A travel authorisation will be valid for three years or until the end of validity of the travel document registered during application, whichever comes first.

On 8 June, the Council adopted its position on the proposed Directive on countering money laundering by criminal law.

The objective of the proposed directive is to: 

• establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions relating to money laundering;
• remove obstacles to cross-border judicial and police cooperation by setting common provisions to improve the investigation of money laundering related offences;
• bring EU rules in line with international obligations, in particular those arising from the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw Convention) and the relevant Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations.

"To conduct terrorist or other criminal activities, one needs money. With these new rules, our objective is to disrupt and effectively cut off the financial sources of criminals. It is a key dimension of the EU fight against terrorism and that is why the Maltese presidency has set a high priority on this file.  We now hope that the European Parliament will be in a position to engage in negotiations with the Council in a timely manner, in the context of the ordinary legislative procedure."

Maltese Presidency

The compromise reached by the Council achieves a balance between the positions expressed by member states whilst respecting the main objectives of the initial proposal.

Discussions at the Council focused in particular on:

• the scope of the definition of a "criminal activity" (Article 2(1)) where the Council compromise reaffirms that all categories of offences defined by the Council of Europe Warsaw Convention are covered as predicate offences, while references to existing EU legislation defining specific offences are also included to ensure that they are considered within the respective category. Furthermore, to address the growing threat of cybercrime, the Council agreed that this category should be also added in the definition of criminal activity.  
• the introduction of a criminalisation obligation for self-laundering (Article 3(3))
• the link with the PIF directive, which provides specific rules for money laundering of property derived from PIF offences (Article  1(2)) where the Council underlines that member states can transpose these rules through a single comprehensive framework on money laundering at national level;

Background

The proposal was tabled by the Commission in December 2016 together with a proposal for a regulation on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders. Both texts are part of the EU plan to strengthen the fight against terrorist financing and financial crimes. The overall objective is to further disrupt the sources of revenue used by terrorist organisations, as well as to improve the tracing of terrorists through financial movements.

Next steps

The Council and the Parliament will enter into negotiations on the final text as soon as the latter has decided on its position.