The Council adopted conclusions on support for the sustainable development of European marine and maritime economies. It recalls the vital role of oceans for life on earth, economic growth, employment and innovation and highlights that oceans and seas are facing increasing pressures and should be protected from the adverse consequences of climate change.
Member states are invited to manage the oceans and seas sustainably, promote renewable resource efficiency and renewable energies, remove barriers to growth, boost investment and strengthen trade cooperation.
The Council also calls for measures to ensure that outermost, peripheral, coastal and island regions are offered adequate growth opportunities. Member states should also work on supporting new technologies that contribute to the maritime economy and encourage closer cooperation between education and industry in order to help promote training and job opportunities.
The Council agreed today its position on a proposal for a revised directive on the energy performance of buildings. This agreement will allow for the start of negotiations with the European Parliament under the Estonian presidency.
Buildings are the largest single energy consumer in Europe, consuming 40% of final energy. The aim of the proposal is to promote energy efficiency in buildings and to support cost-effective building renovation with a view to the long term goal of decarbonising the highly inefficient existing European building stock. This will also be a major contribution to reaching the EU's 2020 and 2030 energy efficiency targets.
In particular, the proposal requires member states to establish long-term renovation strategies, addressing also energy poverty. It strengthens the links between energy efficiency policy and financing.
Another important feature of the revised directive is the promotion of electro-mobility, by requiring at least one charging point and pre-cabling for every third parking space for electric vehicles in non-residential buildings and pre-cabling for every parking space in residential buildings. These requirements will apply to buildings with more than ten parking spaces.
The introduction of a smartness indicator for buildings is proposed and the inspection of heating and air conditioning systems is simplified.
The proposal underlines the importance of aligning the Digital Single Market and the Energy Union agendas, as digitalisation of the energy system is quickly changing the energy landscape, from the integration of renewables to smart grids and smart buildings.
"We welcome this agreement which is crucial to reach our European objectives in energy efficiency and will also benefit citizens and businesses by significantly reducing their energy bills. This agreement is also important for further promoting electro-mobility in both non-residential and residential buildings."
Joe Mizzi, Maltese minister for Energy and Water ManagementBackgroundThe proposal on the energy performance of buildings amends Directive 2010/31/EU and was presented by the Commission in December 2016. It's part of the implementing legislation of the Energy Union Strategy and it has close links with the energy efficiency directive.
The general aim of the Energy Union strategy is to move towards the decarbonisation of the EU economy by 2030 and beyond, whilst strengthening economic growth, consumer protection, innovation and competitiveness.
The conclusions of the European Council of October 2014 set an indicative target of at least 27% increase in energy efficiency at Union level in 2030. This target should be reviewed by 2020 having in mind an Union level of 30%.
The Council agreed today its position on a proposal for a revised directive on energy efficiency. This agreement will allow for the start of negotiations with the European Parliament under the Estonian presidency.
The main objective of the proposed directive is to improve the existing provisions and to increase energy efficiency in order to ensure that the European Union's 2020 headline targets and 2030 climate and energy goals are met.
Energy efficiency is considered as an energy source in its own right. Increasing energy efficiency will benefit the environment, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve energy security, cut energy costs for households and companies, help alleviate energy poverty and contribute to growth and jobs.
The main elements of the revised directive are:
"We are extremely pleased that we have been able to reach an agreement on this important legislation, which was a priority of our Presidency . Energy efficiency is a crucial element for Europe's successful energy transition. It will allow us to move forward on the implementation of the Clean Energy Package."
Joe Mizzi, Maltese minister for Energy and Water ManagementBackgroundThe Commission proposal on energy efficiency updates the current Directive 2012/27/EU and was presented by the Commission in November 2016. It's part of the extensive Clean Energy Package, the implementing tool of the Energy Union strategy.
The general goal of the strategy is to move towards the decarbonisation of the EU economy by 2030 and beyond, whilst strengthening economic growth, consumer protection, innovation and competitiveness.
The conclusions of the European Council of October 2014 set an indicative target of at least 27% increase in energy efficiency at Union level in 2030. This target should be reviewed by 2020 having in mind an Union level of 30%.
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Donald Tusk has not given up hope that Britain might stay in the EU. Speaking at the start of a two-day summit of the bloc’s leaders in Brussels, the European Council president channelled John Lennon: “You may say I’m a dreamer, but I am not the only one.”
Read moreEU heads of state or government meet on 23 June 2017 in Brussels to discuss economic and trade issues. Leaders are reaffirming their commitment to free trade and investment, while ensuring it is also fair and the benefits are reciprocal. European Central Bank's President Draghi is informing leaders about the economic situation. The heads of state and government are also finalising the European Semester process. Afterwards, leaders are taking stock of ongoing measures to tackle migration issues and assess where further efforts are needed. Finally, leaders are discussing how to move towards a digital vision for Europe.
The post-Second World War and post-Cold War international system is facing some strong headwinds. Europe has been under siege from massive immigration, terrorist attacks, rising populism, a war in Ukraine and, of course, Brexit. The Middle East remains stuck in violence and cold peace without any hopeful signs. Meanwhile, East Asia seems to be adrift without a concrete regional project. Most critically, the United States under Donald Trump seems to be unable and unwilling to act as a responsible stakeholder in global governance anymore.
In this time of upheaval, the European Union and its member states, as well as China, need to find new roles in some uncharted territories. We believe it is high time for the EU and China to move beyond their existing patchy patterns of cooperation and build a more stable and reliable partnership by acting together in some key areas of global governance. Both share an interest in upholding the existing international order. As such, both sides – and the world – will benefit much if the EU and China can act together.
From a European perspective, we are arguably witnessing the most profound structural change since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of systemic bipolarity in international relations. Most prominently, under Trump, the transatlantic partnership has largely changed from that of a normative community based on values to a functional necessity based on interests. The new US administration’s ideology of ‘America First’ risks a further transatlantic estrangement, if not the partnership’s erosion.
Key leaders within the EU now openly challenge some of Trump’s key approaches. In view of Trump’s bans on travel to the US from many majority-Muslim countries and his rejection of the Paris climate change agreement, Emmanuel Macron, as candidate and French President, has offered home to scientists and entrepreneurs: “I want all those who today embody innovation and excellence in the United States to hear what we say: from now on… you will have a new homeland, France.”
“The European Union and China need to find new roles in some uncharted territories”
For Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel, the US under Trump is ceasing to be a reliable partner and Europe can no longer “completely depend” on the US. The so-called West is threatened to disintegrate, taking with it some key institutions that have so far governed the existing international order.
From a Chinese perspective, the time for shouldering more global responsibilities might have come earlier than expected. Fundamentally, China’s economic development depends on the collective goods provided by the existing international order. Yet the existing order is now under duress because the US under Trump is threatening to pull the plug of some key pillars of the order. With so much uncertainty, even the success of China’s two key projects, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is not guaranteed.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, when Trump proclaims the merits of protectionism in his inaugural address, Chinese President Xi Jinping, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, not only called for an open economic order but also proclaimed China’s interest to “vigorously foster an external environment of opening-up for common development.”
Although Trump and Xi had a fairly successful informal summit, there is lingering doubt within China’s policy circles about Trump’s reliability as a leader, in addition to the existing worry that Trump may go too far in undermining some of the key pillars of international order. Moreover, many Chinese elites also suspect that the US will be unwilling to accept China as an equal partner, no matter what.
Both the EU and China grasp that their bilateral relationship is now more critical than ever. The EU is China’s biggest trading partner while China is the EU’s second-largest trading partner after the US. In addition, there are a host of issues on which the EU and China share common ground. So as Trump withdrew from the Paris agreement, the EU and China, meeting in Brussels, re-emphasised their resolve to fight climate change.
But it is also apparent that the EU and China cannot patch things up easily. The recent EU-China summit in Brussels made this fact abundantly clear. Because of the EU’s refusal to grant market economy status to China an expected EU-China joint declaration on climate change was not agreed. Instead, the focus during the summit shifted to deep differences between China and the EU. Negotiations on an EU-China investment agreement stalled; the EU continues to deplore limited market access and Chinese dumping, especially in the steel sector. EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström was critical of Beijing: “The welcome commitments from [China] about liberalisation have not been matched by concrete action”.
“There are several concrete measures that the two sides can take”
But for China, Brussels’ anti-dumping measures against Chinese products are only exposing the EU’s protectionism towards China. The challenges to a redefinition of China’s and Europe’s role in international relations also became evident in the public debate in Germany surrounding Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s recent visit to Berlin. Some observers argue for an EU-China partnership in trade and climate change, whereas others emphasise the risk of letting China gain the upper hand.
We believe that the EU and China should work with each other closely to clear the way for a steadier partnership, even if the US comes back from Trumpism. With the US disengaging from global governance and multilateralism in international affairs, Europeans are, for the first time, fundamentally challenged to develop real autonomy and agency. The EU now needs partners other than the US to uphold the international order on which Europe’s prosperity and security depend. On this front, China is an obvious choice. China’s prosperity and security also depends on the stability of the international order.
We believe that there are several concrete measures that the two sides can take.
The upcoming G20 summit in Hamburg in early July will present Europeans, China and other countries with a key opportunity to reject America’s turn towards protectionism and its America First ideology. The Chinese government laid a solid foundation for addressing climate issues within the G20 during the Hangzhou summit last year. To further this process, closer cooperation between Europe and China is now essential, and Europe and China can also send a clear signal against America’s protectionism at the Hamburg summit.
The EU and China can also work together in Africa. For Europe, supporting African peace and development is an investment in its own security and prosperity. Africa is a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Africa is also a key component in the EU’s 2016 Global Security Strategy. Africa does not only need China’s investment but also China’s experience in economic development.
“In this age of uncertainty, both the EU and China will benefit from more long-term strategic thinking when it comes to the other side”
So far, Europe has mostly criticised China for neglecting human rights and environmental issues when doing business in Africa. But without working with China and African countries, Europe can be accused of being sour obstructer. So it is time for Europeans and China to compare notes and start coordinating their Africa policies where appropriate. The EU-Africa summit later this year in Brussels provides an opportunity to start a strategic dialogue on how China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s Africa policy can complement each other.
Finally, the EU and China should also work towards an EU-China Free Trade Agreement. With the Doha Round blocked, an EU-China FTA could become a major project with potentially wide impact and a motor of further Asia-Europe economic integration.
Along the way, the EU and China may also bring the East Asian region, which is now adrift, into a region with a purpose again by facilitating the build-up of regional governance capacity. The 50th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this August is a great opportunity. The EU has for a long time shown an interest in joining the East Asia Summit (EAS).
As an ASEAN dialogue partner the EU should also participate in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus. If negotiations on an ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement are relaunched, as it is expected to happen this year, then the EU could also become in principle eligible to joining the newly-developing Asian trade architecture within the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). With President Trump’s decision to exit the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), future EU membership of the RCEP would contribute to further strengthening of regional and global trade governance. Next year’s Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Brussels would be an additional opportunity to enhance the capacity for sustainable development and inter-regional governance.
In this age of uncertainty, both the EU and China will benefit from more long-term strategic thinking when it comes to the other side. The world will be more blessed with a steadier EU-China partnership, regardless what happens in Trump’s America.
IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – European External Action Service
The post Can the EU and China act together? appeared first on Europe’s World.
18 June: finally, the last visit to the polling station.
Ever since I started to talk to the French about their political system and listened to their perceptions of what was going wrong in the Fifth Republic – a little more than three decades now – I had this impression, unbacked by any robust statistical evidence, of a quite large majority at the centre of the political spectrum that found no adequate representation in the institutions.
Of course, I also bumped into people from the extremes: heavily leftist teachers for whom communism had never been discredited and who explained to me that the GDR was the better Germany; or football fans who esteemed that the ‘Black-Blanc-Beur’ World Champions of 1998 were ‘not really French’.
But there also was this longing, shared across a wide range of middle-class people of different sensitivities and levels of education, for a national assembly, in which ‘common sense’ and ‘collective purpose’ would overcome an entrenched left-right divide that was felt to be overblown by both artificial rhetoric tradition and the electoral system. The one single most-hated feature of political life, beyond the ritual disgust with the priviledges and the famous disconnectedness of the political elite, was ‘systematic opposition’, leading to fake indignation at each and every measure of the government and obstructionism by principle. If only the ‘reasonable’ people of the left and right could get their act together and form a coalition of those willing to serve the nation rather than their own career! Alas, French political culture would never allow for a compromise-seeking ‘grosse Koalition’ of German inspiration.
And then, the miracle happened.
Last Sunday’s 2nd round of the legislative elections has virtually flooded the French Parliament with ‘reasonable’, ‘common sense’ people, eager to follow Emmanuel Macron in his historical demolition of the sterile rhetoric postures and ready to introduce a new manner of bridging existing ideological divides for the sake of the common interest of all. If this is a minority, as Mélenchon and Le Pen were quick to assert – both because of the high abstention rate and their respective claim to be the only true representative of ‘the people’ – it’s a very impressive one. In its diversity of profiles, it’s a ‘très grande coalition’ in its own right. They might as well spell it with a ‘K’.
And it is a first step on the way to fulfil the presidential promise of achieving a ‘renewal in faces and practices’ that was so often repeated over these long campaigns. Two thirds of the 577 faces in the Parliament are totally new, at the same time pushing the feminisation of the Assemblée to an unprecedented level of 38%.
As for the ‘new practices’,we will have to wait and see. For the time being, the government seems decided to practice what they preach: within a few days only no less than four ministers of Edouard Philippe’s first cabinet have been nudged out for affairs that smelt too much of these ‘old habits’ that citizens are simply no longer willing to tolerate.
At the moment of writing, the astonishing coherence between what is clearly turning into a ‘strong and stable leadership’ in the best sense of the word and the endearing enthusiasm of these fresh French politicians of a totally new type is nurturing a kind of hope and confidence that seemed totally out of reach in the kingdom of ‘declinism’. How long will it last? Not everybody is in love with Macronia: opposition, both in the streets and at the edges of the Assemblée’s hemicycle, is likely to be loud, virulent, and nasty. The forthcoming battle for labour law reform will see a fair share of fear-mongering and class-struggle, which may make the Russian hacker attack of April seem like the ‘good old days’.
Anonymous – probably a French voter in June 2017.
So let’s enjoy the moment while it lasts. We, the people, are too exhausted anyway by this long and incredibly tense election marathon. Being a citizen is a rather hard job in this country. If it was only about walking to the polling station on four election Sundays (plus several primaries)! All these endless TV debates you have to watch, all the articles and interviews you have to digest. All the nerve-wracking cliffhangers, twists and rebounds of this fascinating drama – it’s just too much. Whatever bad losers may be tempted to say, the record low turnout of 45% last Sunday, compared with the very high interest for politics that was sustained over all these months, is simply due to election fatigue. Especially as the first round had provided the certitude that the die was cast, the majority for Macron was sure, and the citizenship job had been done to the satisfaction of her Majesty the Fifth Republic.
So where does that leave us at the end of the 25th and last post of this blog’s election marathon? More puzzled than ever about the Fifth Republic. The past months has confirmed every grudge I held against her. The hyper-personalisation of the presidential regime is not good for French democracy. The constitution remains both contradictory and vague in parts. The sequence of the different elections is far from ideal. The electoral system is not fair.
But without all these flaws and shortcomings, would the encouraging outcome of the marathon have been possible at all? In the very first post of the series, dated 1st November 2016, I prepared for a rather sad journey, ‘with no providential saviour in store and hardly any light at the end of the democratic tunnel’.
Ever since I have been living in this country, I was never more pleased to have been told wrong in such a flagrant manner.
This is the last post of the French 2017 election marathon.
All twenty-five posts can be found here.
This blog should be back after the summer break,
enlarging the perspective again to European integration issues.
Thanks for having accompanied me on the journey!
The post France 2017: La grande coalition appeared first on Ideas on Europe.
will take place on Wednesday 12 July, 9:30-13:00 and 15:00-18:30, and Thursday 13 July 2017, 9.00-12:30 in Brussels.
Organisations or interest groups who wish to apply for access to the European Parliament will find the relevant information below.
If a week is a long time in politics, what about a few months?
Back in March, the European Union was bracing itself for drama: would the powerful wave of discontent that had swept over the United Kingdom and the United States in 2016 engulf the Netherlands and France?
With the staunchly anti-EU Marine Le Pen riding high in the polls for the presidential election, the bet was on France plunging the EU in turmoil. And then came Emmanuel Macron ‒ the man with no party to his name, the youngest candidate who nobody had bet on, pipping everyone to the post in the first round and going on to win handsomely in the second round.
And now, here he stands, with an absolute majority following his convincing victory in the June 2017 parliamentary election, a feat very few people thought possible only a few weeks ago. Far from being the lame-duck President with no majority that many had predicted, he has emerged as a strong leader with a majority that owes him everything. So, what now for Macron and France?
Three main areas are likely to make or break Macron’s presidency.
“President Macron holds all the cards in his hands”
On top of the list is the labour reform Macron promised during his campaign. Reforming the labour market is, without a shadow of a doubt, an explosive issue in France. Millions of people took to the streets in 2016 to oppose the reforms of Macron’s predecessor, François Hollande, known as the El Khomri law. The precedence it gave to potentially less favourable local agreements over collective sectorial agreements on working time was deemed an intolerable attack on workers’ rights.
And yet Macron wants to go much, much further, by promoting local agreements over their sectorial counterparts in all areas, including wages and working conditions. He argues that France needs to make its labour market less rigid by giving more flexibility to individual companies, to encourage job creation. Critics say that workers will be left to face far worse conditions. The parties on the Left, along with some workers’ unions, have already warned about a summer of industrial action. Considering the long pattern of mass demonstrations defying and defeating countless French governments, Macron has a huge battle on his hands. It is too early to tell its outcome, but his presidency will be defined by his ability ‒ or inability ‒ to implement the most contentious plank of his programme.
With France under a state of emergency since November 2015, terrorism will also be high on Macron’s agenda. But he is caught between a rock and a hard place: keep a regime that is supposed to be for exceptional times only and be accused of illiberal practices; end it and be accused of gross negligence if another attack occurs. That’s why the state of emergency has been called a political trap.
Macron is planning to put an end to it by incorporating its main measures, criticised by many for curtailing civil liberties, into law. By effectively making the state of emergency permanent, Macron risks turning the criticisms into widespread anger, as already witnessed in the call from French jurists and human rights organisations to withdraw his proposals. He might find solace in being supported by a large majority of French citizens, who yearn for security, but does he really want to be dubbed illiberal and tarnish his reputation of being at the vanguard of liberal progressive values? Finding a way out of this trap certainly won’t be easy.
And then there’s the EU. Leaving Brexit aside ‒ after all, no one really knows what Britain wants ‒ Macron’s priority is a strong France in a strong EU. His ambitions are bold and wide-ranging, from deepening EU integration and re-igniting the Franco-German engine to strengthening the Eurozone with its own parliament, budget and finance minister. The question remains how feasible all of this will be. Many states fear Franco-German hegemony, in a re-enactment of the ‘Merkozy’ couple of (still) German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former French president Nicolas Sarkozy. But this time it will be without the counter-balancing act traditionally provided by Britain. Many countries in the eurozone are also wary of losing sovereignty to a more integrated zone, however tempting the possibility of Eurobonds might be. And the idea of Eurobonds is not popular in Germany.
“The road to reforming France will be long and winding, with pitfalls at every corner”
And yet, following the Brexit referendum, the mood has changed in the EU. Pro-European sentiments are on the rise and the EU has more confidence to push its integration forward, as seen in the pledge to enhance EU defence cooperation.
At this point, it is too early to tell whether Macron can reshape the EU. Nothing substantial will happen anyway until the German election in September, and the Brexit talks might well consume all of EU’s energy for the foreseeable future. But Macron is certainly the most pro-European French president since François Mitterrand, and his future role in the EU deserves to be closely monitored.
President Macron holds all the cards in his hands. He has an absolute majority and he has radically redefined the whole political landscape. Out the two traditional juggernauts of French politics, the Socialist party is facing extinction and the Republican Right is licking its wounds. Marine Le Pen’s National Front is in full in-fighting mode over its future direction and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s hard Left only has 17 MPs.
But before anyone jumps to the conclusion that Macron is now set to radically change France, let’s not forget that despite his outstanding electoral successes, he can’t take popular support for granted. He might have won very handsomely indeed but with a record high abstention rate in June, at 52% in the first round and 57% in the second, France was clearly not swept by a wave of Macronmania, and its deep divisions have not suddenly disappeared.
Concentration of power can easily lead to a sense of complacency, but the French ‘street’ has a knack of biting back. Macron is all set, but the road to reforming France will be long and winding, with pitfalls at every corner.
IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – Lorie Shaull
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