European Union

Muslim communities in the UK face integration issues

In the United Kingdom, Muslims should have equal access to opportunities in the labour market and this would greatly contribute to an integrated social atmosphere in the country. The top professions, more often than not, don’t have diversity present and the chances of ethnic minorities, with a Chinese or an Indian background, are far greater in rising to the top than those with a Muslim background, such as for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.

The reasons behind this disparity is attributed to poverty and insufficient economic mobility. Integration issues happen because ethnic minorities can be looked upon as a socially excluded diaspora, which experiences issues of poverty, discrimination, culture as well as issues with language in the country. The top jobs, such as those in the media and politics, have a mere 16percent of representation by British Muslims, who are more than sixteen years of age, which is a worrying contrast to the 30percent demonstrated by the British population. British Indians naturally outperform British Whites at the top jobs – the social segregation issues faced by Muslims in Britain, such as poverty because of a no open approach to allowing Muslim practices, whilst employed, makes it a diaspora, with greater integration problems than the British Indian population.

The issues of cultural barriers faced by the Muslim community in the United Kingdom is further getting worse because the media often speaks about British Muslims largely within the topic of extremism. These cultural barriers, such as Muslim women associating motherhood with caring for children, instead of doing that plus earning an income through a job, aside from producing low economic outputs, also exacerbates the social exclusivity problem. In the United Kingdom, gender equality is considered a norm – it’s visible in all areas of life, from getting a job to individuals’ idea of dress codes, so when a culture like that collides with another relatively primitive culture, there will be hard-to-overcome differences.

Furthermore, there is also grave concerns that Sharia Courts (in the United kingdom) are upholding extremist values and permitting wife-beating. Part of this problem lies with the atypical problem with Muslim communities and their observance of patriarchy, which in itself, apart from being an incredibly primitive thing to do, is also the most wrong thing to do because it’s very much in the nature of patriarchy to pluck out societal rights of women.

Muslim communities (in the United Kingdom) should be looked upon as contributors to British culture. There is definitely no pressure over religion, because a majority of the British population are Christians, and both Christianity and Islam have roots in the Middle East. It’s more of a cultural problem, and Muslim communities need to advance from primitive outlooks, to ones which are more beneficial to their circumstances, whilst at the same time, preserving a diversified British culture.

The post The Muslim Question appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

I’ve spent the day down at Sussex, talking euroscepticism and Brexit with a highly-informed group of colleagues. As our debate ranged over a wide terrain (see my live-ish tweeting here), several questions kept recurring, first and foremost of which was whether the UK was a special case, or a potential model of Eurosceptic activists to follow.

As you might expect in an academic setting, opinions differed, although partly this came down to definitions (again, academics).

Unusually, I found myself at one end of that range, arguing that there was a high degree of transferability inherent in Brexit, while others took the view that there was so much that was specific about the case that it rendered any mimicry both theoretically unlikely and practically impossible.

The argument here is that the use of a referendum to secure withdrawal from the EU is simply not an option in other member states, be that due to constitutional constraints or the use of referendums within a polity. Clive Church rightly pointed to Switzerland as an example of how all the advantages that Leave were able to gain in the UK would not apply, from the absence of designated lead groups to the lack of purdah and the citizens’ initiative pathway to holding a vote.

Others pointed to the structure of party politics, the additional complication of Euro-membership, the absence of a strong and critical media, or the framing of European debate within a country as reason to doubt that the success of Leave could be replicated. Indeed, listening to Matthew Elliott speak, almost of the critical junctures that he saw were ones that spoke to the particularities of the British system: Boris Johnson’s role as a spokesman to the middle ground, the Sun’s endorsement, and George Osborne’s punishment budget, to pick just three.

As Nick Startin noted, while last summer saw a massive proliferation of neologisms – Frexit, Dexit, Swexit, etc. – none has caught, because none has triggered a comparable groundswell of action comparable to that found in the UK.

All of this I accept and agree with, but also suggest is beside the point.

Ultimately, we can view Brexit as a relatively empty signifier: it means pretty much what you want it to mean.

However, where it is not empty is in establishing a new potentiality for political action: the potential – indeed, the reality – of leaving the European Union.

I’ve been using the metaphor of an ice-breaker when I talk about this: the UK has broken a new path that was not there previously, which others can chose to follow to. It broke that path with a particular set of tools and circumstances, but others do not have to use those same tools.

Indeed, the key point is precisely that each national situation will be different and will change over time. It will depend on constitutional, institutional, political, social and economic factors, not to mention the role of key individuals (this isn’t meant to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the profound variability involved).

However, one goes about it, the existence of the UK as an example of a country that has gone through to the same destination provides a validation. In fact, I’d go further and argue that through its example the UK will show both how to and how not to go about leaving: as Article 50 unwinds, so costs and trade-offs will become clearer to observers, suggesting ways to mitigate. No longer will leaving be a theoretical noodling, but a concrete reality.

Of course, in all this there is another question, namely whether any other Eurosceptic movement in the EU wants to leave. Fittingly, with both Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart in the room, there was reflection on the balance of hard and soft euroscepticism. If the UK hard element had managed to reach deep into the mainstream – to use Paul’s idea – then it is important to remember that the hard element is not always present elsewhere.

This matters, because even if exit is now possible, it does not mean that others want to do it. Indeed, the hallmark of euroscepticism elsewhere has been that it seeks reform, rather than rejection.

On this, I am less certain, but I would suggest that one possible effect of Brexit will be to make harder positions more attractive than they have been to date. As we move into a medium-term perspective on Brexit, so the chances that the UK looks successful enough for someone to claim leaving was A Good Thing will increase.

Similarly, if the EU looks to be unable to accommodate reform – in either a usual, mainstream, way or a more radical direction – then the soft option will look less credible. In short, the balance of the perceived chance of success of hard and soft positions might move in the former’s favour.

Of course, this is in the future and, as also came out today, there is more volatility in politics than for quite some time. As such, we should be hesitant about what we think might come.

With that in mind, we really only wait and see whether the Brexit baton is picked up by anyone else.

The post How transferable is the EU referendum and the Brexit experience? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Next week I embark on my new research project examining the impact of Brexit on UK local government. This is obviously quite broad but I’m essentially interested in three things:

• Why was the local dimension largely overlooked in the EU referendum campaign?
• What challenges and opportunities do local authorities believe Brexit presents them with?
• How are local authorities preparing for Brexit (if at all), and how are they trying to influence the process of Brexit and its potential outcomes?

For the moment, the focus is engaging in a pilot study to help refine these broad objectives. But at this stage it helps to explain why this research agenda is worth pursuing.

 

A lot of academic interest on the subnational dimensions to Brexit has focused on its impact on the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (see this special interest section in the Journal of Contemporary European Research for a flavour). This is for good reason, given the various constitutional and political implications present here, such as debates about Scottish independence, or the role of the border in Northern Ireland. However, for a variety of reasons, the impact of Brexit on the local level has been unfairly overlooked.

 

The EU has a significant impact on local authorities. The Local Government Association estimates they are directly responsible for the implementation of around 70% of EU legislation and policy. EU rules, such as on procurement and state aid, affect the way they deliver services and operate on a daily basis. Local authorities are the main beneficiary of the EU’s Structural and Investment Funds, from which the UK stood to benefit from £5.3billion between 2014 and 2020. Local authorities are formally recognized in the EU’s institutional structure in the Committee of the Regions. The EU also provides opportunities to engage beyond local territorial limits. Local authorities have taken advantage of these, setting up offices in Brussels to lobby EU institutions (such as Birmingham’s or Cornwall’s), and engaging in transnational networks with other local authorities (such as Eurocities or the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions), providing platforms to access EU funding, influence EU policy and share policy innovation and best practices with European partners.

 

All of this arguably gives local government the status as the most ‘Europeanized’ part of the British state. And yet we heard relatively little about the local dimension to Brexit during the EU referendum campaign. Over a year since the referendum result, we’re still largely in the dark on what Brexit means for local government. The government’s white paper on the UK’s withdrawal and new partnership with the EU managed only 28 words on the subject, and this is vague at best:

 

We will also continue to champion devolution to local government and are committed to devolving greater powers to local government where there is economic rationale to do so.

 

On the ground, local authorities are already trying to get to grips with Brexit and its implications. This includes collectively through organizations such as the Local Government Association, but also several local authorities have taken the initiative to explore the impact of Brexit, its challenges and its opportunities with their local communities. Examples include the Cornwall and Isles of Scilly Futures Group, or Bristol’s Brexit Response Group. But a wider lack of attention given to the local level impact of Brexit leaves important questions about the future of local governance in the UK left unanswered. How will local authorities continue to deliver projects which have so far relied on EU funding? Will EU funding to the local level be replaced after the UK leaves the EU. Will local authorities be able to make their voice heard and influence the process or outcome of Brexit? Will powers repatriated from Brussels be devolved to local government, or simply be re-centralized in Whitehall? And how will this affect the communities local authorities serve?

 

The EU’s impact on local authorities means Brexit matters to them, and Brexit’s wider impact on the UK will inevitably have local level consequences. Investigating the local level impact of Brexit therefore not only tells us how local authorities are adapting, but also sheds light on the ever fraught relationship between local and national politics.

The post The overlooked dimension? Brexit and local governance appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

By James Politi in Rome

Italy has been fed up for a long time with the lack of help from fellow EU countries in dealing with the migration crisis in the central Mediterranean. But this week, it’s safe to say Rome’s frustration boiled over.

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Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

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Roaming charges end on 15 June 2017. Europeans travelling within the EU countries will Roam Like at Home and pay domestic prices for roaming calls, SMS and data.

Download this video here.

Plenary session and committee meetings in Strasbourg

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

When I tell in Europe that I come from Estonia, most people react by saying something like, “Oh you are the digital natives!”, or “I know, it’s the digital country”.

Given that Estonia is a very small country of just 1.3 million people, it is definitely our strength to be known as a digital society. But how has Estonia reached this status? How have we built the digital state?

In Estonia the state has been the driver of digital development. The process started in 2000 with the creation of digital identities in cooperation with banks. To ensure that people would take up digital identities, the state needed to provide services where citizens had to use them. So the government simultaneously created both demand and supply.

The starting point was tax declarations. People started declaring their taxes online and would receive their tax returns by online transfer a few days after filing the declaration. Nowadays, Estonia is probably the only country in the world where people actually compete in how fast they do their taxes ‒ the record is currently under two minutes. Considering that over 95% of the overall population do their taxes online, we can say that people have taken up digital identities quite well.

“In Estonia the state has been the driver of digital development”

People in the 21st century are increasingly living neither online nor offline but are rather engaged in what we now call ‘onlives’. This lifestyle is largely dependent on the ability to identify oneself in the online world. Creating secure and encrypted digital identities that enable people to identify their communication or business partners, sign agreements and communicate with the state is crucial.

We know that countries compete for people and investment. Small countries with a relatively bad climate don’t have much to attract investments and people. During the years after the introduction of digital identities, Estonia acknowledged that our digital services have made doing business in Estonia a lot easier. But only Estonian residents could access these services. So we decided to create the e-residency programme that allows foreigners to become e-residents of Estonia, establish their companies there, and enjoy our digital services even if they do not live in our country. Since the introduction of the e-residency programme, almost 20,000 people have become e-residents.

The digital revolution has brought many changes to the way we behave and live our lives. Any kind of disruption brings opposition, but the state has different ways to react: it may try to abolish or to not allow the changes, or it can go with the flow and make the transition as easy and smooth as possible. Estonia has chosen the latter.

If the accusation against the collaborative economy is that they don’t pay taxes, then it is up to the administration to come up with solutions so that they can easily pay those taxes. The collaborative economy is all about the digital world and it only needs a platform where taxes can be filed with one click. The state has to be a partner of companies and citizens, not their supervisor.

“Don’t try to reinvent the wheel ‒ use the solutions Estonia has already tested”

To avoid a digital divide, it is also the state’s obligation to come up with an educational response to the changes that are taking place. How to improve people’s digital skills is a big and worrisome question that needs an answer. Humans will never be better in computing than a computer, but it is important that people feel comfortable with technology. For that purpose, Estonia has included coding and robotics in pre-school activities (it’s a great way of playing too) and we teach our children how to behave and stay on the safe side of the internet.

Teachers have to use digital tools in their curricula and our e-school system allows parents to follow their children’s results, homework and teachers’ comments via an app. We also have professional educational technologists who can help teachers find the right tools.

There are many more examples from different areas of life where we have decided to deploy digital solutions in our governance. But the key is that governments need to understand that the technical transformation is not going to stop and we should take the necessary decisions to help our people adapt to the digital age.

If your country is still hesitant, Estonia can help you. Don’t try to reinvent the wheel ‒ use the solutions we have already tested.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – © European Union 2011 PE-EP/Pietro Naj-Oleari

The post Estonia, the land of digital natives appeared first on Europe’s World.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

On 28 June 2017, the Maltese Presidency of the Council and the European Parliament representatives reached a broad political agreement ad referendum on all twelve chapters of the regulation on the European Union Agency for Asylum on the basis of the mandate given by Coreper on 20 December 2016.

The agreement is subject to endorsement by Coreper in the near future following further work on the recitals. Furthermore, the agreement excludes  some parts of the text which are related to other legislative proposals in the package on the revision of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) which have not yet been finalised. An overall agreement will only be possible once the linkages with the other legislative proposals in the CEAS package have been resolved.

The proposal for a European Union Agency for Asylum aims to improve the implementation and functioning of the CEAS by building on the work of the current European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

“This is part of the EU's efforts to have a fully-fledged EU Agency for Asylum that can respond better to the evolving irregular migration challenge and to reflect its enhanced role in a reformed Common European Asylum System.”

Michael Farrugia, Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security

The new regulation will transform EASO into a fully-fledged Agency responsible for facilitating the functioning of the CEAS, ensuring convergence in the assessment of applications for international protection across the Union, and providing operational and technical assistance to member states.

Next steps

Work will continue during the incoming presidency to finalise the text. The agreement will then be submitted to Coreper for endorsement on behalf of the Council.

Background 

Following its Communication of 6 April 2016 on the reform of the CEAS, the Commission presented in May and in July seven legislative proposals, including the above-mentioned proposal for a regulation on the European Union Agency for Asylum, with a view to:

• improving the functioning of CEAS by eliminating differing treatment of asylum seekers and varying recognition rates among member states
• reducing secondary movements and contributing to a fairer distribution among the Member States of the responsibility to offer protection to those in need.

The next AFET meetings are scheduled to take place in Brussels, room JAN2Q2:

- Monday, 10 July 2017, 15:00-18:30
- Tuesday, 11 July, 09:00-12:30, and 15:00-18:30

Further information
Information for visitors
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

About a year ago, I attended a meeting in Cambridge, to discuss the aftermath of the EU referendum.

Alongside all the rage and fury of those who felt they had been cheated, one woman asked me specifically about how to mitigate the impact of Brexit on her area of expertise, namely the conservation of rare natural habitats.

About which – specifically – I know nothing.

How I was able to give some advice to her, and it’s the same advice I will give now to all those who feel they have a stake in Brexit and who want their voice to be heard.

Some context here might be useful.

Brexit is huge. It covers and shapes everything right now. Every bit of public policy is affected by, and affects, Brexit. As can been seen in the legislative agenda for the current, long Parliament, there really isn’t anything else of note happening in the UK right now. Even on the EU side, while there is some more bandwidth available, it’s still a very involved and involving process.

Which means several things are happening.

Firstly, very few people have an overview of the entire process. In the UK, they sit in Number 10 and DExEU; in the EU, it’s Task Force 50 and some national chancelleries. Those individuals are exceptionally pressed by demands on their time, because they are the first point for arbitrating between the myriad different pressures for influence.

Secondly, most of the other people involved in the UK are not specialists in the EU, but rather in their area of specialisation.

Finally, as the opening phase of negotiations has shown, positions on either side are not reversibly set.

All of this leads to some logical points of pressure for those seeking to advance their agenda.

For those with issues that are very policy-specific, the most productive way forward is to provide ideas to those involved that marry up the policy-specific aspects with a framework that fits into broad Article 50 objectives. To take the opening case, it might be assumed that nature conservation is not on the radars of the key protagonists in London and Brussels, and that then local officials are caught up with bigger environmental regulation matters. By producing a set of policy recommendations that show those local officials how they can handle the specific issue as part of what they have already said about their plans, the activist might well be able to upload her preferences to that group, who might in turn be trying to upload this to the national negotiating team, who might in turn put it on the table as part of a bigger package.

In short, in a world with a huge pile of issues and specifics, any idea about how to advance is likely to have a good deal of traction.

But it’s possible to go further than this. Most obviously, building links with counterparts in other EU states opens up the possibility of advancing ideas and preferences that already have the buy-in of all local policy communities. Just as the EU makes decisions by working from the technical to the political, so too will Article 50 proceed.

Of course, this does not really work for more cross-cutting agendas, since the people to influence – the main negotiating teams – are under both extreme time pressure and close political scrutiny.

Here the approach might be better described as side-stepping. A head-on assault is unlikely to work, unless one can count on a very strong groundswell of public support, something that has been noticeably absent to date.

Instead, it would be more productive to try to feed the issue in via specific policy areas, in the manner already described.

To take one illustration, rather than pushing for a general, full preservation of citizens’ rights, as some have done, it might be more useful to focus on securing certain key provisions that then force movement in other areas. Thus the UK’s suggestion that five years’ residence will be needed to secure settled status might be a focus, since removing that requirement might also keep more freedom of movement than otherwise might be possible.

And this suggests a final option: the block-buster.

Within Brexit negotiations, there are several highly-problematic issues; ones that have no immediately obvious solution. The Irish border is the most significant one right now.

If one could find a credible solution to this, then potentially that could leverage change in other areas of policy. In the Irish case, that might include moving preferences on free movement, customs checks, identity cards, trade barriers and more. The negotiating parties might be willing to bend on these if they saw it as a price worth paying for the resolution of the other issue.

Of course, the very fact that no-one has come up with such a plan suggests that this is not easily done.

However, the basic strategy for anyone remains simply one of making yourself useful and constructive.

The post How to get what you want from Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 12 April, the SEDE committee organised a workshop on the implementation of the EU's arms export control system, in the context of its work on the annual report on arms exports. The workshop focused on the issues of strengthening compliance with the Council common position governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, compliance with reporting obligations, increasing transparency and public scrutiny, and the development of the EU's institutional framework.
Further information
Workshop report
Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

A landmark decision is expected today on a 26-year old border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia. But few expect it will be bring the saga over the Bay of Piran to an end.

On a map it covers a tiny slither of space, but it has always had outsized political significance, holding up Croatia’s accession prospects for years. Now the tussle is in the EU family, and the union will not want it to mark another turn for the worse in the fragile Balkans.

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On 28 June 2017 the Maltese presidency and the European Parliament reached a provisional agreement on a new directive intended to help protect workers from exposure to carcinogens or mutagens in the workplace.

By setting limits for carcinogens and mutagens this agreement helps tackling the primary cause of work-related deaths in the EU. The aim is to help save up to 100.000 lives over the next 50 years.

"With this agreement, we can better protect millions of EU workers from cancer-causing chemical substances in the work place. This is particularly important given that cancer is the first cause of work-related deaths in the EU."

Ms Helena Dalli,  Maltese Minister for European Affairs and Equality

The main elements of the provisional agreement are the following:

• Reprotoxic substances: the Commission will have to assess the possibility of including reprotoxic substances in the scope of the directive by the first quarter of 2019 at the latest, and may present a legislative proposal on the matter
• Chromium VI: it was preliminary agreed to have an exposure limit value of 0,010 mg/m3 for a period of 5 years after the date of transposition, which limit will subsequently be lowered to 0,005 mg/m3. A derogation was introduced for welding and plasma cutting processes or similar work processes that generate fumes, with an exposure limit value of 0.025 mg/m3 for a period of 5 years after the transposition date, and 0,005 mg/m3 thereafter.
• Hardwood dust: The Council and the EP agreed on an exposure limit value of 3 mg/m3 for five years after the entry into force of the directive and thereafter to 2 mg/m3
• Respiratory crystalline silica dust: the Commission committed itself to evaluate the need to modify the limit value for respirable crystalline silica dust as part of the next evaluation of the implementation of the Directive
• Health surveillance: the doctor or authority responsible for the health surveillance of workers within member states may indicate that health surveillance must continue after the end of exposure for as long as they consider it necessary to safeguard the health of the worker concerned

The directive proposes to set exposure limits for a further 11 carcinogens in addition to those covered by the existing 2004 directive. These are: respirable crystalline silica dust, 1,2-Epoxypropane, 1,3-Butadiene, 2-Nitropropane, acrylamide, certain chromium (VI) compounds, ethylene oxide, o-toluidine, refractory ceramic fibres, Bromoethylene and Hydrazine.

The directive also revises the limits for vinyl chloride monomer and hardwood dusts in the light of more recent scientific data. 

There will be minimum requirements for eliminating and reducing all carcinogens and mutagens. Employers will also have to identify and assess risks to workers who are associated with exposure to specific carcinogens (and mutagens), and must prevent exposure where risks exist. 

Next steps

Once the deal is approved by the Council's Permanent Representatives Committee the new directive has to be formally adopted by the Council and the European Parliament.

To honour the legacy of Dr. Helmut Kohl, former German chancellor and Honorary Citizen of Europe, European institutions are co-organising a European Ceremony of Honour on 1 July in the European Parliament in Strasbourg.

Helmut Kohl, who was Germany's longest serving post-war chancellor died on 16 June 2017. "I will always remember Helmut Kohl. A friend and a statesman who helped reunite Europe," said European Council President Donald Tusk on that day. 

On 1 July President Tusk will give a speech at the European Ceremony together with European Parliament President Antonio Tajani and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker as will Estonia Prime Minister Juri Ratas, from the Council Presidency. Bill Clinton, Felipe Gonzales and Dmitry Medvedev will all say a few words during the ceremony before German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron give a final address.

This will be followed by a ceremonial event in the cathedral in Speyer (Germany).

The entire event in Strasbourg, including the arrival of the invited guests, will be webcast and broadcast live on EbS+ and Eurovision network from around 9:30-13:30.

This ceremony is an opportunity to look to the past and appreciate the steps made to take Europe forward by Helmut Kohl, the architect of Germany's 1990 reunification and a major supporter of the single currency. 

After a decade of dismal years, during which the European Union seemed to be besieged by its own biblical plagues, the European Commission took the initiative to restore citizens’ confidence in the Union by publishing a White Paper on the Future of Europe.

Laudable as this initiative may be, the White Paper contains a remarkable paradox. It proposes to strengthen the bond between citizens and the Union by presenting various modes of cooperation between member states.

The need to involve citizens in the functioning of the EU has already been stressed by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in his inaugural address to the European Parliament in 2014. He described his team as “the last chance Commission: either we succeed in bringing the European citizens closer to Europe – or we will fail”.

In view of this creed, it seems almost beyond belief that citizens should form the blind spot of the White Paper on the Future of Europe. Admittedly, citizens did not play any part in the organisation of the European Communities. The Declaration on European Identity, which the European Council adopted in 1973, correctly portrayed the Communities as an organisation of democratic states.

“The European Commission should encourage citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union”

But the character of the organisation changed fundamentally in 1992 with the inclusion of citizens in the legal framework. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced EU citizenship and laid the foundation for the evolution of the EU towards a Union of states and citizens. The Lisbon Treaty, agreed in 2007, pictures the Union as one of both states and citizens, in which the citizens are entitled to participate in the national democracies of their countries and in the common democracy of the Union.

If the Commission wants to overcome the ‘multiple crisis decade’ and intends to restore the trust of citizens in the present EU, the White Paper should be preceded by and/or complemented with a strategy for reinforcing the bond of trust between the Union and its citizens.

The theory of democratic integration – something I have developed since the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty – is a solid basis for the Commission to launch a citizen-oriented strategy. The novelty of the theory is that it replaces the diplomatic perspective of states with the civic viewpoint of democracy and the rule of law.

The theory presumes that, if two or more democratic states agree to share the exercise of sovereignty with a view to attaining common goals, the organisation they establish for this purpose should be democratic too. The EU should not only pride itself on being the largest union of democratic states in the world – as the White Paper on the Future of Europe does – but aspire to function as a democracy of its own.

The practical value of the theory lies in its capacity to provide guidance to the EU in its transition from an organisation of democratic states (from Copenhagen in 1973) to a democratic union of states and citizens (Lisbon in 2007, and beyond).

“The White Paper should be preceded by and/or complemented with a strategy for reinforcing the bond of trust between the Union and its citizens”

This means that the European Parliament and the European Commission should adapt themselves to the innovations brought about by Lisbon. The European Parliament elections are still based on a law from 1976, with citizens of member states entitled only to cast their vote in the state in which they live: a state-, not citizen-based system. Although Article 10(2) of the Treaty on European Union states that the citizens are directly represented at EU level in the European Parliament, the electoral rules have not been adjusted. The rules may even amount to discrimination on grounds of nationality.

Similarly, the European Commission should no longer regard citizens primarily as participants in Second World War commemorations or twinning activities but encourage them to participate in the democratic life of the Union and initiate EU citizenship education programmes.

Looking beyond the 2019 European Parliament elections, the theory of democratic integration suggests that the long-standing stalemate in the debate about the future of Europe has been overcome. Since Lisbon, the question is no longer whether the EU should become a federal state or form a confederal union of states. Thanks to the Lisbon Treaty the clash of opinions between the federalists and the sovereignists has ceased to be relevant. The novelty of ‘Lisbon’ is that it construes the EU as a democracy without turning the Union into a state. Putting this breakthrough in technical terms, the theory holds that the EU forms a Union of states and citizens.

From this perspective, the long-term aim of the EU should be to evolve towards a Union of democratic states and European citizens, which functions as a constitutional democracy.

IMAGE CREDIT: CC/Flickr – © European Union 2014 – European Parliament

The post The paradox of the white paper appeared first on Europe’s World.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

A European ceremony in honour of former Chancellor of Germany Dr. Helmut Kohl, honorary citizen of Europe, will take place in the Plenary Chamber of the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Saturday 1 July 11.00 - 13.00. At the start of the ceremony, the coffin holding the remains of Dr. Kohl will be carried to the Chamber from the room where he has been lying in state draped by the European flag. The coffin will be carried by eight members of the German Wachbataillon and accompanied by Eurocorps.

The ceremony will start with speeches by the three presidents of the EU institutions - Antonio Tajani for the European Parliament, Jean-Claude Juncker for the European Commission and Donald Tusk for the European Council, followed by a video, "Helmut Kohl, a great European".

Then, at the request of Dr. Kohl's widow and in their personal capacity, personal farewell messages will be given by the former President of the United States Bill Clinton, former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel will deliver the closing speeches at the ceremony.

The Strasbourg University Orchestra will play works by Händel, Beethoven and Schubert. At the end of the ceremony the orchestra will play the German national anthem and the European anthem, accompanied by the Strasbourg Philharmonic Choir.

From the European Parliament, the coffin will be taken to Germany, where the former Chancellor will be buried after a requiem mass in the cathedral in Speyer.

The entire ceremony in Strasbourg, including the arrival of heads of government and state and other invited guests, will be webcast and broadcast live on EbS+ and the Eurovision network from around 9.30 - 13.30.

For information about accreditation, please refer to this document.

Press contacts:

For the European Parliament

Jaume DUCH GUILLOT (+32 2 28 43000; +32 496 59 94 76)

For the European Council

Preben AAMANN (+32 2 281 51 50; +32 476 85 05 43)

For the European Commission

Margaritis SCHINAS (+ 32 2 296 05 24; +32 496 58 38 26)

Mina ANDREEVA (+32 2 299 13 82; +32 498 99 13 82)

 

On 25 April 2017, the Council adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/734[1]. The Council Decision extends the existing restrictive measures until 30 April 2018.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Declaration.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 26.04.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L108, p. 35.

* The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.