European Union

The controversial pig farm on the grounds of a former concentration camp for Roma in the Czech Republic is being shut down. The agricultural company agreed to an offer from the government to buy the land and tear down the facility in the village of Lety in South Bohemia. Commentators are relieved to see a battle that lasted 20 years end this way.

In the eyes of one Google developer, women are less suited to working in the tech industry than men for biological reasons. Google took action and fired the man who published his opinion in a ten-page internal "manifesto". The case has also triggered debate among Europe's journalists.

At the beginning of August 2007 the US real estate bubble burst, bringing banks across the world to their knees. A year later the financial crisis came to a head when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Commentators doubt the world has learned the right lessons from this experience.

The new sanctions are intended to persuade North Korea to end its nuclear programme. They received an unanimous vote of approval in the UN Security Council last weekend. For many commentators, however, sanctions alone are not enough.

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The relationship between the EU and the Republic of the Philippines is a longstanding one, which has broadened and deepened remarkably in recent years. Europe's dialogue with ASEAN began in the late 1970s, and was formalised in 1980 with the signature of an EC Cooperation Agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For many years this agreement was the primary legal framework for EU relations with the Philippines.

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10 years ago, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which established a framework for the rights, dignity and well-being of indigenous peoples. 

Since then, there has been a rising recognition and understanding of the challenges faced by indigenous peoples. These positive trends have been enforced by the enhanced cooperation and partnerships between states, civil society at large and indigenous peoples. Such partnerships have benefitted from the fact that indigenous peoples are standing up for their rights, to end all forms of discrimination and to speak up against human rights violations and abuses. 

While they only make up less than five percent of the world's population, they account for 15 percent of the poorest people around the world. Indigenous peoples are also often among the first victims when human rights situations worsen. 

The EU has a range of polices in place to support the rights of indigenous peoples as set out in the UNDRIP, from human rights, to development and financing instruments. The EU's bilateral cooperation with many countries places a strong emphasis on indigenous peoples' participation at local and national levels in the countries they live. The EU is also taking action to fight violence against indigenous peoples and human rights defenders, especially when they are protecting lands and natural resources. Through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the EU supports indigenous human rights defenders at risk in getting out of harm's way. 

This commitment to prevent and protect against threats and violence was reiterated by the EU Council conclusions on Indigenous Peoples adopted on 15 May this year. 

The EU will continue to stand by indigenous peoples in combatting discrimination and inequality. This is why the EU also is deeply committed to indigenous peoples' inclusion in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development where we will apply a rights based approach to development - encompassing all human rights so that no one is left behind. The EU's contribution to it will be guided by the new European Consensus for Development. 

The EU looks forward to continue our dialogues with indigenous peoples at all levels of EU cooperation to maximise the impacts of our actions. We will work with all partners, starting from indigenous peoples themselves, to ensure that the international community's commitments to UNDRIP continue in the coming years.

Have you been struggling to keep up with all the new books on Brexit? Were you secretly planning to spend your summer holiday catching up on some of them? OK – perhaps not. But if you were, then here to help is a guide on what to take away with you to the beach or pool to focus on an issue that will keep us busy for several more summers to come.

Summer brings with it a host of reading lists on what to take away with you to while away the hours by the poolside or on the beach. The thought of a guide on what books to take away to read on Brexit might fill most people with horror. Even though Brexit negotiations are now underway, ‘banging on about Europe’, as David Cameron once put it, remains a sure way of boring most people. Giving the appearance you’re prepared to bang on about it while on holiday might seem just downright bizarre.

But that doesn’t apply to everyone. The number of people bored by others banging on about Europe is bound to decline as Brexit hits home. And it certainly doesn’t apply to those struggling to study and understand Brexit, aka ‘Brexicologists’. The past year has witnessed a flood of books explaining what happened in June 2016 and trying to understand what might happen next. Then there’s the mountain of reports and articles from governments, parliaments, think tanks, universities, businesses and so forth. We’ll leave them for another day.

It’s easy to lose track and even though it might not be the ideal way (or one many are prepared to admit) to use a summer holiday, time away does offer a chance to reflect on the biggest political development Britain has faced in decades. Below I list some of the best books published since the referendum. A regularly updated list can be found on my website.

The campaigns

Not long seemed to pass between the final votes being counted and the appearance of the first books telling of what happened inside the campaigns. Tim Shipman’s All Out War: The full story of how Brexit sank Britain’s political class remains a provocative and well-written account of both the Remain and Leave campaigns. Cameron’s communications director, Craig Oliver, was equally quick out of the blocks with Unleashing Demons: The inside story of Brexit. It remains one of the best insider accounts. Owen Bennett’s The Brexit Club takes us into the victorious but often deeply fractious Leave campaigns. Another quickly published account is Harry Mount’s Summer Madness: How Brexit split the Tories, destroyed Labour and divided the country. Love him or loathe him, UKIP funder and businessman Aaron Banks’s updated The Bad Boys of Brexit is guaranteed to evoke strong feelings.

Explaining the vote

The rush to have the first word and so define history means anecdotes can win out over careful analysis. Jason Farrell and Paul Goldsmith offered a more considered approach in How to Lose A Referendum: The Definitive Story of Why the UK Voted for Brexit. In explaining their eighteen key reasons for Leave’s victory, they delve into both the history of UK-EU relations and more recent developments in the campaign.

Former Labour minister Denis MacShane was quick to turn his pre-referendum book ‘Brexit: How Britain will leave the EU’ into Brexit: How Britain Left Europe. Last time I heard he was working on the next book Brexit: How Britain will stay in the EU, which will focus on the limits of Brexit and be ideal reading for your 2018 summer holiday.

Tory donor and polling supremo Lord Ashcroft teamed up with Kevin Culwick to quickly publish Well, You Did Ask… Why the UK voted to leave the EU. Published soon after the vote, it collated some of the earliest polling that helped explain why the British people voted as they did.

The most detailed analysis of the vote so far published is Harold Clarke, Matt Goodwin and Paul Whiteley’s Brexit: Why Britain voted to leave the European Union. As the most comprehensive analysis so far of the vote it is required reading for anyone interested in the referendum. You can read my review of the book for the LSE’s Brexit blog here.

If numbers are not your thing then Andrew Glencross’s Why the UK voted for Brexit provides a short academic analysis of the referendum divided into four sections covering the history of Euroscepticism, the renegotiation, the campaign, and the future handling of Brexit. It focuses on the nature of direct democracy in the UK and the nature of Euroscepticism.

What now?

Brexit is not an event or a single process, but a series of potentially open-ended processes touching on everything from tariffs and health to matters of war and peace. Understanding where this unprecedented development takes the UK or the EU is the biggest challenge Brexit poses. Almost every book listed in this review offers some ideas on where we go next. Some do so more than others.

Published not longer after the vote, journalist Ian Dunt’s Brexit: What the hell happens now? gives an easily digested – but Remain leaning – account of what may unfold.

A more detailed and academic analysis looking at the implications of Brexit across a wide range of institutions and policy areas can be found in Janice Morphet’s Beyond Brexit: How to assess the UK’s future.

Cambridge professor of law, Kenneth Armstrong’s Brexit Time: Leaving the EU – why, how and when? is divided into four sections examining the world before the vote, the vote itself, preparing for Brexit, and Brexit itself. It’s accompanied by a very helpful online edition.

Former foreign secretary, SDP leader and supporter of Leave, David Owen, teamed up with David Ludlow to write British Foreign Policy After Brexit, which offers thoughts on where Brexit leaves Britain in the world.

UCP’s ‘Haus Curiosities’ series of short pamphlets offers two on Brexit. C4 News political editor, Gary Gibbon’s Breaking Point: The UK referendum on the EU and its aftermath, looks not only into what drove Brexit but provides some analysis of what it could mean for the UK and the remaining EU. Stephen Green’s Brexit and the British delves into the divisions in British society to find answers to why Britain voted as it did.

Academic overviews

The breadth of Brexit as a topic means we can expect many edited books on the topic. Both of those so far produced are ideal for postgraduate readers or those with an existing knowledge of the topic of UK-EU relations.

David Bailey and Leslie Budd’s The Political Economy of Brexit looks not only at the political economy of Brexit, but also at such issues as the unity of the UK and the future of the EU. Contributors include Edgar Morgenroth, Jan Toporowski, Lisa De Propris, Sukhwinder Salh, Margarita Nyfoudi, Alex De Ruyter, Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, John Milios, Jim Gallagher, John Bachtler, and yours truly.

Similarly, William Outhwaite’s Brexit: Sociological Responses builds around a sociological approach a broad-ranging coverage of the topic. Contributors include Martin Westlake, Jonathan Hearn, John Holmwood, Stefan Auer, Craig Calhoun, Chris Thornhill, Gurminder K. Bhambra, Colin Crouch, Gerard Delanty, Antje Wiener, Simon Susen, Harry F. Dahms, Adrian Favell, and yours truly.

Polemics

Guilty Men: Brexit Edition by ‘Cato the Younger’ is the most provocative of all the books listed here. It is based on the 1940 classic of the same title that condemned the men guilty of the policy of appeasing Hitler. This Brexit edition is aimed squarely at those in Britain and Europe who Cato argues led Britain into making its biggest mistake since the days of Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. Unapologetic in its tone, the fifteen men and women listed are found guilty of deceit, distortion, personal gain, failures of leadership, and gloating, hubris and frivolity.

Longstanding Eurosceptic Dan Hannan’s What Next: How to get the best from Brexit offers a Leavers analysis of where Britain and UK-EU relations can go next with a focus on the nature of UK democracy.

Christmas stocking fillers

With your productive holiday of Brexit reading behind you, you’ll no doubt be keen to keep abreast of the many Brexit books due out later this year. Worry not if you once again find yourself falling behind with reading them. If you’re good then maybe on Christmas morning you’ll find Santa has stuffed one of the following into your stocking. What better way to spend Boxing Day than reading about Brexit?

The autumn will see the publication of Anand Menon and Geoffrey Evans’ Brexit and British Politics. Anand – the Professor of Brexit studies – will be familiar to many as the head of the ESRC’s UK in a Changing Europe programme. Their book looks set to explain the outcome of the vote by looking at longer-term trends in British politics.

The autumn will also see Brexit: What Everyone Needs to Know by David Allen Green. Part of OUP’s ‘What everyone needs to know’ series, what you need to know about Brexit will be set out in the answers to 41 questions.

I’ll be adding my own contribution with Europe’s Brexit. Thanks to the work of a team of thirty people across Europe, this edited book will look at how the rest of the EU – all twenty seven other member states and the EU’s institutions – responded to the UK’s renegotiation, referendum campaign, the result of the vote, and reacted up to the triggering of Article 50.

By 2018 we should all have a much better idea of where Brexit is taking us. The year already promises some textbooks to accompany the debate, with a Handbook of Brexit planned by Patrick Diamond, Peter Nedergaard and Ben Rosamond. If I spend the summer reading and writing on Brexit then my own Brexit: A Concise Introduction should also be available thanks to Policy/Bristol University Press. If you can’t wait that long then catch the Brexit: A Crash Course of lectures at NYU on which the book will be based.

This post first appeared on the LSE’s Brexit Vote blog.

The post A Brexit summer reading guide appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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The EU and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) share a commitment to regional integration as a means of fostering regional stability, building prosperity, and addressing global challenges.

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This fictional story, which can potentially materialize, is to be pondered about, given the current oncoming of apparently uncertain times in the global politics.

This is a scenario of how, for the sake of progress and stability, the EU should avoid the political and territorial division of the European continent and ongoing divisions into the 1st and 2nd class countries.

For long the Europe’s political boundaries did not coincide with its geographic ones, but the decision of the EU Council, eagerly endorsed by the Parliament in Luxembourg, to join Ukraine, finally gave hope to the citizens of the EU. Since then they could look into the future with certainty. For the EU this important and logical step meant the beginning of its own successful transformation into a modern polity.

For the EU, Ukraine in this respect is not only the land of the rising sun. It is the home of Humanism and Progress, the island of Normality in the sea of chaos and crisis. Ukraine serves as a centre of continental gravity, which exercises both passive influence (because it is so attractive) and active policies of cooperation with the neighbouring European Union. Humanitarian assistance is being constantly shipped to the EU´s capitals in order to relieve the needs of destitute and homeless population of the European continent.

By 2030 the EU came to bureaucratic perfectionism, but at the cost of common sense and human individuality. Led by unaccountable politicians, the EU turned into a bureaucratic monster, unable to make concerted decisions, thus further undermining its democratic legitimacy and neglecting civil rights of its subjects. The inability to deal with complex issues and various challenges, impaired EU´s functionality and threatened its very existence. Brittle peace which at rare times still could break out within the EU was always of undurable nature, with increasingly more countries leaving this sinking ship.

As a response to the ongoing crisis the EU was about to turn into authoritarian and repressive state, squeezing the last taxes from its impoverished citizens. Total control of all social life and public sphere in the EU, together with regular, illegal and inhumane screening of all EU´s citizens, further undermined public trust in the European Union. What followed, was the mass migration of Europe´s citizens to Ukraine, for whom this country meant going back to the normality. They fled from the EU´s over-regulation and pervasive dominance of ultimate rationality.

In this context the European Union´s decision to join Ukraine, which is seen as the true, original Europe, unspoilt by genetically modified products, Bureaucratization of all spontaneous activities and Standardization of everyday life, came just right. Ukraine remained the only state in the world, still free from thought control. It built upon its democratic traditions to become the richest and most developed state on the European continent.

It is not only the geographical center of Europe, which lies in Ukraine. The decision came as a recognition of the key role, played by Ukraine in the fields of global security, food and energy supply as well as cutting edge technologies, such as green energy, aircraft and space ships. The Ukrainian space ships fly American, European and even Brazilian satellites into space for over half a century now.

The Ukrainians, as opposed to the EU´s citizens, managed to nourish their love for freedom, stemming from the Cossack state of the 17th century. This country made the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity the everyday reality already back then. The Cossacks had direct democracy, which is the most democratic of democracies.

Besides, Ukraine is the country, which gave birth not only to Belarus but also to Moskovia, which in the 18th century self-proclaimed itself as Russia.  The first constitution in Europe, written in 1710, was also the Ukrainian one. It established a democratic standard for the separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judiciary, and that well before the publication of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws. The Constitution was unique for its historic period, as it limited the executive authority, protected individual rights and established a unique Cossack parliament.

Europe acknowledged Ukraine´s outstanding contribution to the European civilization and world peace. This country lost over 10 million dead (a quarter of its population) during the WWII. Nevertheless Ukraine could quickly rise from the ashes of the war and already in 1951 the first computer in Europe came from Kyiv. And although this computer´s initial average speed was just 50 operations per second, this invention paved the road for further evolution of technology.

In the light of all these facts, already well known in Western Europe, there is still some way to go in order to materialize the future of the common European house.

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AMENDMENTS 1 - 86 - Draft opinion on the EU-Africa Strategy: a boost for development
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Michaela Martin and Christine Emeran

A result of the rapid expansion and diversification of the higher education sector is that academic quality has come under greater scrutiny. The development of internal quality assurance (IQA) systems by higher education institutions (HEIs), as a means of monitoring and managing quality, constitutes one of the most important reform initiatives to address this concern.

 

Higher education institutions (HEIs) confront a number of challenges in IQA design, such as choosing an appropriate focus, integrating IQA tools into a cost-effective and coherent system, considering graduate employability, and finding an appropriate balance between centralized and decentralized structures. For these reasons, a demand exists for reliable empirical knowledge about how to make IQA effective while sustainable for the enhancement of quality and relevant for higher education in different national and institutional contexts.

 

UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) research on internal quality assurance

To provide more knowledge on factors that condition IQA, IIEP, in coordination with the International Association of Universities (IAU), conducted an international survey to understand the purpose, orientation, structures, tools and processes, drivers, and obstacles of IQA practices in HEIs worldwide. In addition, IIEP conducted case studies on eight universities to document good principles and innovative IQA practices, analyze their effects, and identify factors (both internal and external) that contribute to an effective IQA system. The universities studied under the project are: American International University (Bangladesh), University of Duisburg-Essen (Germany), University of Talca (Chile), Daystar University (Kenya), University of the Free State (South Africa), Xiamen University (China), University of Bahrain (Bahrain), and Vienna University of Economics and Business (Austria).

 

This research followed a multi-stakeholder approach in the primary data collection to compare different actor groups’ perspectives on IQA, such as academic and administrative staff, students, and academic and administrative leaders. In each of the case universities interviews were held with university leadership at different levels, focus groups discussions with programme directors and students and survey conducted with academic and administrative staff. The overall purpose of the research was to highlight approaches to IQA and study their effectiveness with a view to providing good principles to inspire other HEIs to better design and implement an IQA system.

 

Benefits of Internal Quality Assurance

The research project revealed that, in the institutions examined, IQA has initiated a large set of reforms, particularly, in the domain of teaching and learning that has generally improved the coherence of study programmes and its alignment with labour market needs. In addition, as an IQA effect, management processes were streamlined and better integrated with data analysis and evaluation.

 

The research data also found a number of common factors for success, although they largely depend on the context of each individual institution and modes of implementation. Overall, the participating universities agreed that leadership support, stakeholder involvement, IQA integrated with strategic planning and an effective management information system were of tremendous importance. Leadership support was identified by both academic and administrative staff as a necessary and commonly present factor in the case universities in facilitating the integration of centralized and decentralized management of IQA. Linking IQA with decision-making can close the loop at three levels: individual level; academic programmes, and strategic planning of the whole university. Indeed, strategic planning provides a framework of orientations and goals, including on quality, at all levels towards which IQA works most effectively if all levels are engaged.

 

Lastly, the effectiveness of the IQA system also relied heavily on the level to which students and staff were aware of and involved in its processes and tools. For instance, programme reviews and job market analysis were found effective if they incorporated employer recommendations to revise academic programmes in line with employment needs. In terms of limits, students and staff felt that they did not receive enough feedback from certain IQA tools, such as course evaluations or student satisfaction surveys, the study found. In addition, the data from certain tools was not always used for maximum benefit by all stakeholders. For instance, the results of graduate tracer studies were predominantly used by management rather than academics who are in charge of the revision of study programmes.

 

Overall, the study concluded that IQA is most effective if it leads to a regular internal dialogue on quality. A dialogue that fosters a quality culture that is also the ultimate purpose of IQA and will contribute to improved academic quality and graduate employability.

 

Visit here for more information on this study.

 

Michaela Martin and Christine Emeran work on higher education issues at the UNESCO International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP-UNESCO).

 

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The Council has adopted a decision authorising a stabilisation action in the central regions of Mali, in the Mopti and Segou governorates. In response to the invitation from the Malian authorities, the European Union (EU) will deploy a team of experts to support Malian national plans and policies, in order to counter the growing insecurity and to re-establish and expand the civilian administration in these regions. The action's primary objective is to help consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and gender equality by strengthening general governance in this region for the benefit of the local communities.

The EU stabilisation team will be responsible for advising the Malian authorities in Mopti and Segou on governance-related issues, and supporting the planning and implementation by the Malian authorities of activities aimed at reinstating the civilian administration and basic services in the region. The team will be able also to support an enhanced dialogue between the Malian authorities and the local communities.

The stabilisation team will consist of 10 people and will have a budget of €3.25 million for an initial operating phase of one year. It will be based within the EU Delegation in Mali and will operate in Bamako, Mopti and Segou. This action will complement those of the EU Delegation in Mali and the CSDP missions deployed there (EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUTM Mali), and is part of the EU's integrated approach in Mali. The stabilisation team will also work in close cooperation with other international actors in the region, particularly the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

This stabilisation action is decided by the Council on the basis of Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that 'where the international situation requires operational action by the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.' This is the first time that a Council decision has been decided in that context. The decision was adopted by the Council by written procedure.

As everyone (semi-)winds down for the August break, and the pace of events slows, it is a useful point to consider Article 50 and Brexit once more.

While I have usually looked at this from the British end, this time I’d like to look at it from the EU’s perspective, not only because I’m now in a large research project with Hussein Kassim doing just this, but also because the structure and process of Article 50 is very much driven by the EU.

Moreover, I have a number of thoughts that I’m trying to marshal together and this is as good a time as any.

With all that in mind, I want to suggest that the EU’s position is conditioned primarily by salience, and only secondarily by substance.

Salience as a key driver

The opening observation is that the EU faces a wealth of issues and difficulties at any given time, by virtue of its size and nature. Because it reaches into a very large number of policy areas and because it covers many states (both as members and as external partners), there is always copious scope for something to go wrong.

Moreover, at present, the EU faces a particularly large number of grave problems, above and beyond the normal noise. Most obviously, the long-running eurozone crisis remains highly problematic, despite nearly a decade of efforts to address it, with a model of economic governance that still lags far behind monetary centralisation. The migrant/refugee crisis might not be quite as hot as in 2015, but it is still highly political and increasingly pervasive in its effects. And Russian challenges to security are as poor as they have been at any point in the post-Cold War era.

And that’s just to pick on the three most obvious candidates, alongside Brexit.

But Brexit differs in one crucial aspect. It looks manageable, in a way that the others do not.

By this, I mean that it is a ‘going-away’ problem, a bit of difficulty that is contained to one country that wants to get away. Sure, it’s still tricky to work out the details, but the basic intent of the UK appears to be to get further away, not closer. By contrast, the other issues are ‘coming-closer’ ones, pervasive and structural, with higher cost implications for the EU. Put differently, if nothing’s now, the UK will stop being the EU’s direct problem, while the others will just get worse.

To be clear, this is an attitudinal view, rather than an objective one, as we’ll discuss below. But the point remains that in the grand scheme of (EU) things, Brexit is low down the list.

You can find markers of this all over the place.

The European Parliament Think Tank’s review of 2016 European Council conclusions showed that only 5% of space was devoted to Brexit, as against 50% on migration, 20% on economic governance and 20% on foreign policy. Also consider how most EU27 discussions of Brexit have also been bound up in (and increasingly are subservient to) wider discussions about the future of the Union. It also accounts for the common view across the continent that the British have been crazy to decide to visit Brexit on themselves when there are many more important things to be dealing with. More prosaically, Jean Claude Juncker spends maybe some more time than half-an-hour per week (as claimed by his chief of staff), but evidently not much more.

In short, for most member states and most institutions, there are more pressing issues to deal with than Brexit.

The upshot of this is two-fold:

Firstly, it means that EU preferences are formed primarily by those who do find the matter salient. And secondly, it means that the EU’s position might not be as stable as it currently looks.

When actors care

Taking each of those points in turn, we can observe that there have been parts of the EU that have seen Brexit as a key priority for action.

Exhibit one includes the Commission and the President of the European Council. As guardian and figureheads of the Treaties they have been the logical point of contact in the initial phases of the process, firstly as Donald Tusk managed the renegotiation, and then as the Commission slotted into its conventional role as negotiating partner in Article 50. From the day after the referendum, both have worked together to pull together a management plan and then a negotiating mandate. This latter is clearly informed by the central idea that the EU’s legal order needs to be preserved, not least because to have otherwise would compromise their own positions within the Union: if a departing state can change the treaty architecture, then what might a extant member state require or demand?

These bodies are thus pursuing both their official role and engaging in an (indirect) defence of their position: recall that in June 2016, it wasn’t clear what would happen with populists in the Netherlands, France, Hungary, Poland or elsewhere. Brexit was (and is) an opportunity to demonstrate the value of membership to all and sundry.

Exhibit two is Ireland. Of all of the EU27, this is the member state that most obviously has a stake in how Brexit unfolds. It is no accident that the border question is included in the opening round, since Irish politicians and diplomats worked very hard indeed to get it positioned there, working on the basis that the UK didn’t seem to be too bothered about it all. Quite aside from the apparent intractability of the matter, the willingness of the country to make such a strong push reflects on this idea of salience: economic modelling suggests Ireland will suffer much more than any other member state as the UK transitions.

Exhibit three are the ‘odds and sods’ group, which currently includes Spain and Croatia. The former saw an opportunity to include references to the status of Gibraltar in the mandate, while the latter has become the only vocal critic of that mandate, focusing on free movement restrictions that arise from the on-going transition arrangements the country has had since joining in 2013. While neither of these have been big issues, they highlight how particular issues can become important as negotiations progress.

What matters

Of course, to argue that most member states don’t care is misleading. And the argument here is that low salience combines with a Commission-led mandate that addresses most concerns, leading the rest to leave this to one side until a more critical juncture. That juncture will be at the end of the process, when decisions are actually made. As such, we might expect that the relative harmony of the EU over Article 50 is conditional, not structural.  To pick just a couple of  examples, the European Parliament might decide it needs more on citizens’ rights before it accepts a deal, while accommodations in any transition deal might cause problems around the financial settlement, to the displeasure of net budget contributors.

It is also important to underline that Article 50 is not the whole game of Brexit. Equally as important is the way in which the UK’s departure will change the balance of the EU. Those countries that saw the UK as a counter-weight to Germany or France, or who used it to promote liberalising, Atlanticist agendas will now find that the environment is less conducive. Security will be a key part of this, as there is a potential to return to the old cleavages and a structural boost to Europeanist models.

This means that states have to think about what Brexit means for the rest of the UK’s relationship with Europe, through NATO, WEU and all the dense network of multi- and bilateral agreements. And it also means that states have to think about how to adapt their EU strategy: there will have to be a realignment of alliances and coalitions.

And this brings us back to the starting point: Brexit qua Brexit is only ever going to be part of a much larger picture for most member states, and much of what will matter will be in their own hands and have little to do with the choices that are reached within Article 50. That leaves a lot of opportunity for those who do care to shape matters.

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