European Union

Giving a tutorial on practice based and problem solving research

Sandra Hasanefendic

Fostering regional and innovation ecosystems through strengthening professional higher education and related research activities has been an imperative in recent years in Europe and globally. I have been personally involved both as a researcher, and expert adviser in understanding how and through which mechanisms can this be achieved. In recent years, I have been following and supporting the development of a program for the Modernization and Valorization of Polytechnic Institutes in Portugal. The comprehensive policy program was launched in 2016 at the initiative of the Portuguese Government and acts in more than fifty cities all over Portugal and aims to: a) promote local innovation partnerships through collaborative initiatives and co-creation mechanisms between polytechnics, local communities and a wide variety of small and medium size companies; b) foster problem based and practice oriented learning and research approaches to help innovate in professional higher education; and c) to secure knowledge sharing on educational practices and professional development across Europe through international collaboration among regional-based partnerships.

 

The policy program is built on inclusive, open and fully participatory community principles. It is a symbol of participatory policymaking in Europe centered around dialogue, negotiation and decision making among and between academic leaders and teachers/researchers, students, experts from local communities and companies in a wide variety of sectors, as well as across different countries. Its consequences are already greatly felt in Portugal, but it is predicated that the program will have far reaching consequences for the state of polytechnic education and research in Europe. Namely, it will promote internationalization of professional higher education which has mostly been local, while at the same time stimulate innovative research activities based on regional partnerships. This is expected to additionally strengthen the role of professional higher education institutions as intermediaries in regional and innovation ecosystems which has been recently discussed by me and my colleague Hugo Horta in “Training students for new jobs: Intermediary role of technical and vocational higher education”.

 

In the first phase of the program, targeted visits of polytechnic representatives to Finland, Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland were stimulated. It was expected that this experience would lead to learning and gaining experience about the emerging professional higher education and related practice-based research activities in Europe. The second phase involved knowledge dissemination workshops, organized throughout the country and at different institutions, through which acquired knowledge and developments in other visited countries were shared. These workshops stimulated dialogues about lessons learned, but they also aimed to explore the current state of professional higher education and related research activities in Europe through tutorials and potential opportunities for improvement and innovation based on experience, yet within the limits of the national socioeconomic context.

 

The third phase of the program consisted of introducing targeted initiatives exploring aforementioned opportunities and promoting change at Portuguese polytechnics. The initiatives concentrated around the promotion of funded collaborative research projects between polytechnics and local industry and community, setting up creative research labs to promote polytechnics’ integration with their region through problem based and practice oriented research activities, and the promotion of short cycle technological courses resting on innovative learning methodologies promoting problem based and practice oriented research. It has involved the use of European structural funds and national funds in a total of 46 million Euros for a period of 18 months.

 

The current phase concentrates on the promotion of internationalization activities and partnerships between European professional higher education institutions and associated research groups. Within this framework, the Portuguese Minister of Science, Technology, and Higher Education recently visited Dutch polytechnics in Rotterdam and Leeuwarden and agreed on strategic international partnerships promoting long term collaborative activities between polytechnic institutions in Europe.

 

These international partnerships are critical in sharing learning perspectives and developments in professions to train resilient and engaged students and professionals of the future. It is expected that the partnerships will benefit students by fostering dual and joint programs, exchange in research projects among others, and contribute in gaining a more rounded understanding of their profession. Professions are not local but globally developed and by exposing students and staff to the same profession, yet in different environments and contexts, and through problem based and practice oriented research activities, the idea is that they will be able to advance the state of the profession in their local and regional contexts within Portugal.

 

 

Sandra Hasanefendic is a double doctoral degree student from the Vrije University in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) in Portugal. She researches organizational behavior in higher education. Her focus lies on non-university higher education (or professional higher education) and responses to policy pressures regarding research and innovation in education and training. Sandra also teaches, consults and advises policymakers on issues relevant to advancement of professional higher education and research activities in Portugal and the Netherlands.

 

The post Innovating regional ecosystems and modernizing professional higher education appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

I would like to take a look at the factual and legal aspects of Russia´s aggression against Ukraine´s territorial integrity in early 2014. Indeed, to what extent has the international law been violated and what are the consequences?

 

In February 2014 Russian authorities used the internal political conflict in Ukraine to deprive the Ukrainian state of its control over Crimea by attacking the Crimean Parliament and blocking the peninsula’s infrastructure as well as power ministries´ units with “unidentifiable” “green men”, which later turned out to be Russian military and security forces. Further, a fake, internationally condemned, referendum with rigged results was held in order to give the affair a flair of justice, and to absorb Crimea with apparently legal means.

 

As far as the relations between Russia and Ukraine are concerned, they are contained in a number of bi- and multilateral agreements.  The 1994 Budapest memorandum was concluded providing Ukraine with security assurances for giving up Soviet nuclear weapons. USA, UK, Russia committed to “respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the UN.

 

The Constituent Act of the Community of Independent States of 1991 set out the principles of respect of the existing borders, with Russia relinquishing any challenge to them.  In 1997 the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, and the Black Sea Fleet Status of Forces Agreement, prolonged until 2042 in 2010 by the so-called Kharkiv Accords, were concluded between Russia and Ukraine, reaffirming again the inviolability of the borders between both states.

 

Kremlin claims the legality of its actions under two concepts of international law: the protection of nationals abroad (Articles 2(4) and 51 UN Charta) and intervention upon invitation. Both, upon consideration, don’t find factual support for referring to. Rhetorical claims of Putin have no legal value and can not supplement existing case law and international practice.

 

General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262 of 27.3.2014, adopted with 100 votes,

58 abstentions, and 11 No-votes, has called upon states not to recognize any alteration to the status of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.  Russia violated the following United Nations Charter provisions:

- Article 1.1: UN´s purpose is to maintain international peace and security.

- Article 2.3: All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

- The use of force is prohibited (Article 2.4), as is intervening in another state’s domestic affairs and territory (Article 2.7).

- Armed intervention is only justified when mandated by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII or in case of self-defence.

 

The EU´s reactions include diplomatic sanctions adopted by the EU (the unilateral suspension of visa facilitation talks, negotiations on the New Agreement, and the EU-Russia Summit); level 2 restrictive measures based on Article 29 TEU (CFSP Decision) + Article 215 TFEU (Regulation); and level 3 economic sanctions (e.g. arms, oil, gas and other trade embargoes).

 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) suspended the accession process of Russia and began strengthening ties with Ukraine. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has accused Russia of the breach of the basic principles laid down in 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and condemned Russian actions in Ukraine in 2014 “Baku Declaration” and in 2015 “Helsinki Declaration”.

 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), declaring that Russia’s annexation of Crimea was “in clear contradiction with the Statute of the Council of Europe” and the commitments Russia made, when it joined the organisation in 1996, has decided to suspend the voting rights of the Russian delegation, as well as its right to be represented in the Assembly’s leading bodies, and its right to participate in election observation missions. In its resolution, adopted by 145 votes in favour, 21 against and 22 abstentions, the PACE Assembly stated that the military occupation of Ukrainian territory, threat of military force, recognition of the illegal referendum and annexation of Crimea “constitute, beyond any doubt, a grave violation of international law”.

 
Ukraine pursues many courses of action. Thus it has filed a claim at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, but the options beyond this are limited, lawyers agree. Russia does not recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, while its position as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council means little chance of formal UN sanctions given its possession of the veto. Ukraine intensified its cooperation with partner states, EU, NATO, Visegrad, etc. thus adopting a clear European course and building a significant coalition of states.

 
This case raises structural questions regarding the development of international law. If the conflict is not solved promptly, it may serve as a precedence and justification for further violation of legal practice, bringing uncertainty, potential chaos and unenforceability into any international agreement.

 
Calls for reforms in the UN Security Council composition, procedures and competences intensify since 2014, and if not attended to, may lead to further de-legitimisation of the UNO.

 
Besides, we witness qualitative and quantitative proliferation and legalization of the “hybrid war” methods, by military masking the uniforms or mercenaries, but also through manipulation, propaganda and fakes, with growing significance of populistic rhetoric for legitimizing the breach of legal norms, irrespective of factual background and international law.

 
Russia´s actions have a transformatory influence on international politics and institutions, since giving up or non-proliferation of the nuclear weapons in return for guarantees has lost its credibility.

 
Given the usual lack of legal remedies in international relations, the value of international commitments fell sharply. This fall is exacerbated by unwillingness of the guarantor states, EU, NATO, UNO, OSCE and other entities to address the conflict in a serious manner in order to provide for effective remedies for law and treaty enforcement, de-occupation and de-escalation of aggression.

 

By annexing Crimea Russia raised fundamental questions about the principles of world order. For Russia itself the annexation is a watershed event, which dramatically intensifies the internal political and economic burdens, that Russia’s authoritarian regime is faced with. In the long run, many scholars predict disintegration of the Russian Federation territory into more cohesive legal entities in accordance with economic, socio-cultural, ethnic and historical legacies, all according to the “principles” Russia itself set in motion in 2014.

 

A. Svetlov

The post The post – Crimean world: Russia´s annexation and its consequences. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

DRAFT REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, the Commission and the EEAS on the Eastern Partnership, in the run-up to the November 2017 Summit
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Knut Fleckenstein, Laima Liucija Andrikienė

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

The prevalence of cybersecurity threats against state infrastructure demonstrates the need for an effective European and national response, writes Eva Saeva. Focusing on the UK, she argues that, while legal measures are important, the fast-changing nature of the situation means that other avenues, such as public-private cooperation, are also essential.

System Lock, Yuri Samoilov, CC-BY-2.0

The first major cyberattack on a nation state occurred ten years ago, in Estonia in 2007. The attack uncovered a grey area in the field of international law, and policy-makers and security experts were caught off guard.

In the years to follow, malicious activity exploiting the virtual space’s endless possibilities and vulnerabilities rapidly evolved and attacks on critical infrastructure increased significantly (e.g. in Georgia in 2008, the Stuxnet worm in Iran in 2010), creating a whole new domain of war – the online borderless world of cyberspace. But international law followed suit and scholars, decision-makers and even the UN agreed that existing international law applies to cyberspace and any comparison with the ‘Wild West’ was deemed as groundless.

Regardless, many questions remained unanswered. For instance, what actually constitutes a harmful cyber operation and who can perform such a powerful attack? The term ‘harmful cyber operation’ means any malicious activity that targets critical infrastructure sectors (e.g. electric grids, nuclear power plants, air traffic control, hospitals, etc.) of another state that can cause major damage, death or destruction in the physical world.

This can be conducted by a group sponsored by a state, or a non-state actor, acting independently. While these attacks might not always cross the threshold of use of force (prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter), they can still cause major consequences for the victim state and violate its sovereignty or the principle of non-intervention.

The European Union has not been immune from these developments. In the EU, cyberattacks (both harmful and non-harmful) against government institutions and critical infrastructure have significantly increased in recent years (e.g. in Italy in 2014, in Germany in 2016, and most recently, in a number of EU countries with the WannaCry ransomware).

Legislation on the malicious use of the virtual space at national level is different in all Member States. However, due to the interconnected information and network systems, an attack against one Member State will likely have a spill-over effect that could lead to breaching the security of the whole EU. Therefore, the need for a supranational legislation on cyberspace is clear.

As a result, after years of negotiations on promoting closer cooperation on issues such as data protection laws and the internal security of the Union, the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, the first comprehensive EU cybersecurity legislative instrument, entered into force in August 2016. It aims at harmonising and stabilising the level of cybersecurity across the Union through public-private cooperation.

The urgent need for such cooperation reflects the awareness that critical infrastructure sectors are mainly managed by private businesses (or ‘operators of essential services’, as per the NIS Directive) with their own rules and regulations. If states want to achieve a certain level of cybersecurity, public and private actors need to start cooperating more.

Case study: The UK

The UK represents an interesting case for analysis, mainly because of its approach to cyber issues: cyber has been considered a Tier One threat to national security since 2010. In light of Brexit, many will wonder whether or not the implementation of the NIS Directive into national law will happen. The answer is yes. The transposition has to be completed by May 2018, which means that the UK will have to do it regardless of Brexit.

Whether a new law will be introduced or present legislation will be adapted is still unclear. And while in many states the NIS Directive will fill in a void, this is not entirely the case with the UK. Although there is currently no Cybersecurity Act, the UK is one of the states with some cyber-related legislation regulating the security and intelligence agencies’ work, specifically the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which deals with cyber issues.

The law currently in force is the Investigatory Powers Act (IPA) 2016, which legalised bulk equipment interference powers, previously known as computer network exploitation and today known as hacking. In other words, the IPA legalised what has already been stated in the National Cyber Security Strategy 2016 – that the UK is developing offensive cyber capabilities.

The recent WannaCry global ransomware attack and its impact on the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) provides a clear rationale for the timely adoption of the NIS Directive. The issue with hacking medical records is far from new. It was already the subject of discussion in the UK back in 1991 when the ‘unpleasant aspects of these new systems of technology’ were acknowledged in relation to hacking into hospital computers.

Yet 26 years later, the WannaCry attack caused major disturbances and a halt to the work of the NHS. The virus hit devices using Windows XP – an outdated and unsupported version of Microsoft software, highly vulnerable to attacks, a fact the NHS was aware of. However, even though the NHS is a critical infrastructure sector, there is currently no law in the UK that enforces security measures for network and information systems, which, if present, would have technically prevented the attack.

This gap was also acknowledged in written evidence provided by Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Apple, Twitter and Facebook on the Investigatory Powers Bill, which argued that the draft bill failed to provide statutory provisions on ‘the importance of network integrity and cyber security’. In cases like this, the great importance of the NIS Directive becomes obvious.

Even though the NIS Directive is an excellent initial step towards better coordination and safer cyberspace across the Union, it will be years before its effectiveness can be demonstrated. The problem is that the process of adopting law is time-consuming and cannot keep pace with technology. Laws cannot be amended immediately after a new network, device or software update has occurred. There are always going to be zero-day vulnerabilities to be exploited by security agencies and/or criminals. What the NIS Directive can do, however, is minimise the risk of further Wannacry incidents.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

Comments and Site Policy

Shortlink for this article: bit.ly/2whkVqg

Eva Saeva
Newcastle University

Eva Saeva is PhD Candidate in Law at Newcastle University. Her research concentrates on the EU’s legal approach to cybersecurity.
.
.

The post Harmful Cyber Operations in the EU: Implementing the NIS Directive into the UK Legal System appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Publication resulting from the UACES 2017 PhD and ECR Conference

While last year’s Brexit vote marked a watershed moment for the European Union, its impact on EU foreign policy might remain limited, writes Ragnar Weilandt. He argues that the UK’s dual role as a provider of capabilities and occasional driver of policy on the one hand, and as an obstacle to constructing common institutions and positions on the other, means that these contradictory influences are likely to cancel each other out.

© 2017 European Union

Brexit means that the European Union loses one of only two Member States with strategic ambition, a capable military, a nuclear deterrent and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It also loses a driver of key foreign policies such as enlargement, trade liberalisation and the global fight against climate change. At the same time, Brexit rids the EU of a member which regularly obstructed attempts to create or strengthen common institutions and to speak with one voice on the global stage.

Despite Britain having played both these fundamental and contradictory roles, it seems unlikely that Brexit will have a major impact on the EU’s presence in international affairs. British contributions might seem important for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, both France and the UK, which kick-started EU defence with their Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998, lost interest in the CSDP long before Brexit.

Most ongoing missions are rather unambitious and limited in scope, and British contributions in terms of personnel and equipment have been marginal in recent years. Rather than using the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism established by the Lisbon Treaty, the 2011 Franco-British Lancaster House Treaties established substantial bilateral military cooperation without any formal links to the EU.

Brexit might not affect the EU’s foreign policy preferences either. Enlargement, arguably the EU’s strongest source of influence beyond its own borders, is on hold for the foreseeable future. With Britain having moved from an enthusiastic supporter to enlargement sceptic in recent years, its views have largely converged with those of the remaining Member States. A victory for Remain in last year’s referendum would not have made much of a difference.

Meanwhile trade liberalisation and climate action have become second nature to the Union. Therefore, the loss of British influence is unlikely to have a major impact in these sectors either. Whether ambitious free trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are eventually concluded would have depended more on public discontent in continental Europe than on the British government’s stance anyway.

While Brexit will probably not affect the EU’s modest role on the global stage, it is also unlikely to enable a rapid progression towards a more integrated and substantial common EU foreign policy.

It is true that the UK has often spearheaded efforts to undermine the creation of a more ambitious EU foreign policy. Having failed to prevent the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in its current form, the UK engaged in political guerrilla warfare against what it saw as ‘competence creep’. On various occasions, British ambassadors blocked EEAS officials from speaking at international organisations and from issuing joint statements on behalf of the EU. The UK government even challenged the Commission’s exclusive authority over trade negotiations, in spite of this being completely in line with its own approach to international trade.

However, while Brexit removes a key obstacle to further and more substantial common external action, the view that foreign policy should remain the prerogative of the Member States is by no means limited to London. Along with the currently rather Eurosceptic climate in continental Europe, this makes major leaps towards a more integrated EU foreign policy appear rather unlikely in the short term.

Recent initiatives such as the establishment of a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) facility or the €5.5 billion European Defence Fund have raised hopes among federalists. The timing of their announcement was indeed quite symbolic. But these initiatives had been in the pipeline for quite a while and are limited in scope and ambition. Rather than a first step towards an integrated EU army, they represent a continuation of the pragmatic but modest efforts that have been made in recent years.

Although no major short-term changes should be expected with regards to institutions and policy preferences, the British decision to leave the Union is likely to affect the EU’s standing on the global stage. The Union’s international credibility has already suffered due to its inadequate reaction to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and the refugee situation in the Mediterranean. Brexit is likely to further undermine its reputation in the international arena. This is not only due to the Union losing a key member state with major strategic, economic and diplomatic capacities. It also relates to the fact that the EU is loses a member at all.

The reality that the EU has ceased to be sufficiently attractive even for one of its own members undermines its ability to promote its model as well as its norms and values towards third states. Hence, Brexit further reduces the EU’s soft power, which is arguably one of its greatest sources of international influence.

Whether this trend can be reversed depends on how the EU deals with the challenges that lie ahead. Recent political developments warrant cautious optimism. While Britain is plunging into chaos, the EU looks stronger and more stable than it has in quite a while. The Union’s economic situation is improving, its Member States have shown unprecedented unity on the Brexit talks and there is increasing support for structural reforms. And most crucially, European citizens’ support for further European integration is finally on the rise once again.

Please note that this article represents the views of the author(s) and not those of the UACES Student Forum or UACES.

Comments and Site Policy

Shortlink for this article: bit.ly/2fLY13Z

Ragnar Weilandt | @ragnarweilandt
Université libre de Bruxelles and University of Warwick

Ragnar Weilandt is PhD Candidate in Politics at the University of Warwick and the Université libre de Bruxelles. His research focuses on EU foreign policy and Euro-Mediterranean relations.
.

The post Why Brexit’s Impact on EU Foreign Policy Might Remain Limited appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Council has added 9 persons and 4 entities - including the state-owned Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) - to the lists of those subject to an asset freeze and  travel restrictions, transposing part of the new sanctions imposed by UN Security Council resolution 2371 (2017).

This resolution was adopted on 5 August 2017 in response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s ongoing nuclear-weapon and ballistic missile-development activities, in violation and flagrant disregard of previous UN Security Council resolutions.

The decision brings the total number of persons under restrictive measures against the DPRK to 62 persons and 50 entities as listed by the UN. In addition, 41 persons and 7 entities are designated by the EU autonomously.

The Council will work on the swift transposition of the other sanctions included in UN security Council resolution 2371.

The EU has implemented all UN Security Council resolutions adopted in response to the DPRK's nuclear programmes and nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. In addition, the EU has also imposed autonomous restrictive measures against the DPRK, complementing and reinforcing the UN sanctions regime.

The legal acts were adopted by written procedure. They will be published in the Official Journal of 11 August.

I’m wrapping up for a summer break, just as more Brexit stuff is about to be released: tant pis.

While we wait for that – and it might not come to much - I’d like to revisit a theme that has long floated about the Brexit debate, namely the weak/strong paradox.

Simply put, many of those who argue(d) for Brexit said that the UK was weak within the EU. It is pushed around, made to do things that it didn’t want or like, and generally got the sharp end of the stick. But if the UK left, then it would be strong, able to play a major role in the world and pursue its interests with much more ease, including with the EU, who would have to take what the UK offered.

Hopefully the paradox is evident, especially when one asks why it should be that as an insider the UK should have less power and agency than as an outsider.

As much as an answer exists, it points to the UK becoming stronger by no longer having to be involved in the large amount of EU activity that it never cared for – a ‘getting back to basics’-type argument – and to the presence in the British polity who have betrayed the national interest by working to support the EU – the ‘fifth column’ line. You can see where both come from, even if neither stands up to very close inspection.

I’ve been reminded of all this by some of the news stories and discussions this week (like this and this), that come back to a core frame of “it’s the EU’s fault”.

“It” here means pretty anything you like.

Over the past couple of years, we’ve seen the EU blamed for not giving enough to Cameron in his renegotiation, giving too much, giving the wrong sort of thing, getting involved in the referendum, not getting involved enough, pushing too hard for Article 50 notification, not negotiating outside Article 50, pushing its agenda too much in Article 50, pushing the UK around too much in Article 50, trying to backslide on Brexit, trying to push for punishment of the UK: at that’s off the top of my head. You’ll have other examples.

Think of this as the manifestation of the weak side of the paradox: if it weren’t for those pesky Europeans, we’d be fine.

Oddly, the strong side has become more muted of late. Yes there is still talk of how the UK is – comparatively – a strong and stable partner, but the language is very much on the lines of “we can work something out”, “it just needs some common sense” and “it’s in our mutual interest”, i.e. more phatic than substantive.

The big gaping hole remains the lack of a clear plan from the UK for the process: I’ll not rehearse that again, except to say that the biggest surprise is that this should still be an issue, so late in the day.

You might think of this as an extension of the referendum campaign: both sides fought hard to win the vote, but neither engaged in a debate about what their outcome was good for.

Of course, the EU makes a very convenient scapegoat: it does lots of things, it is easily portrayed as ‘other’ and it isn’t good at defending itself. It’s not just the UK who does this, which is why euroscepticism is a continent-wide phenomenon.

But here, in the context of Brexit, the most striking thing is how the EU continues to be treated as the source of all woes. I have no doubt at all that whatever results from Article 50, the EU will be blamed for making/letting it happen. Indeed, there will be even greater incentives to do so: I mean, what can the EU do? Kick us out?

The point to be kept in mind is that this is a reflection on the UK’s agency.

As a first cut, it highlights the thinness of the British position now: if there was a plan, then the plan would be the focus of discussion, instead of how the EU is being difficult. In the absence of a constructive agenda, one falls back on to sniping.

As a second cut, it remains us that the international system is not one where states have anything like complete agency: whatever its relationship with the EU, the UK is going to be buffeted about by the world and its events. It may not be anarchic but it is tough (doubtless there’s a bunch of IR theorists who can argue this at much greater than I can).

When we talk about the UK needing a plan for Brexit, it has to be a plan that is not just about the EU and Article 50, but also about the wider future. Grumbling about the water in the meeting room isn’t going to be enough.

The post The weak/strong paradox of Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

On 17 July 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1341[1] implementing Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP.

The Decision amends the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP, adding 16 persons to the list.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Decision.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 18.7.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union n°L 185, p. 56.

*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

On 10 July 2017, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/1245[1] implementing Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP. 

The Decision amends the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures as set out in the Annex I to Decision 2013/255/CFSP. 

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova align themselves with this Decision. 

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

[1] Published on 11.7.2017 in the Official Journal of the European Union n°. L 178, p. 13.

*The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

In Venice, Barcelona and Palma de Mallorca activists are demonstrating against the growing numbers of tourists. The problems connected with mass tourism, including rent hikes, pollution and noise have driven them to creative actions, but also vandalism. The issue also prompts reactions from commentators in countries outside southern Europe that are not directly affected.

In Turkey the trial against 486 people who allegedly took part in a failed coup orchestrated by preacher Fethullah Gülen in the summer of 2016 is under way. The prosecution wants life imprisonment for many of the accused - and crowds outside the court are calling for the death sentence. The expectations of the press regarding the trial vary considerably.

France's Interior Minister Gérard Collomb announced in an interview with the Sunday paper Le Journal du Dimanche that the French authorities want to differentiate more clearly in the future between asylum seekers and economic migrants, and to ensure that the latter are sent home more effectively. France's journalists are up in arms.