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This time Russian drones weren't to blame

The change is set to pass via fast-track procedure, prompting criticism from legal actors, anti-corruption NGOs and even the country's prosecutor general

France alone makes up over half of the protocol’s funding gap among 68 ratifying countries

Perceptions of Washington’s indifference can perpetuate a risky status quo.

In the draft Council text, obtained by Euractiv, countries push the Commission for measures to boost European competitiveness that align with a tech sovereignty agenda

Digital innovation, powered by AI and data, can transform rare disease care across Europe. To achieve this potential, policymakers, industry, and patient communities must collaborate to ensure equitable access, ethical use of data, and shared progress in a connected health ecosystem.

The U.S. should avoid a narrow Christian focus.

Selon les dernières données publiées par ONU Tourisme dans l'édition 2025 des "International Tourism Highlights", 1,465 milliard de touristes ont voyagé à travers le monde en 2024.

On Thursday, 16 October 2025, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Committee on Development (DEVE) will organise a joint public hearing on "Global Gateway – past impacts and future orientation". This hearing brings together experts and stakeholders to discuss the achievements and challenges of the Global Gateway strategy, launched by the Commission in 2021.
The hearing will allow Members to take stock of the results so far, and to provide guidance for future implementation. The hearing's takes will contribute to the ongoing work in AFET and DEVE on an own-initiative report on Global Gateway, which will also address the governance structure, the geopolitical considerations of the approach, as well as the emerging relation with the EU's development cooperation. The own initiative report is expected to be presented on 20 November, the vote in Plenary is planned for March 2026.
Draft Programme
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Thursday, 16 October 2025, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Committee on Development (DEVE) will organise a joint public hearing on "Global Gateway – past impacts and future orientation". This hearing brings together experts and stakeholders to discuss the achievements and challenges of the Global Gateway strategy, launched by the Commission in 2021.
The hearing will allow Members to take stock of the results so far, and to provide guidance for future implementation. The hearing's takes will contribute to the ongoing work in AFET and DEVE on an own-initiative report on Global Gateway, which will also address the governance structure, the geopolitical considerations of the approach, as well as the emerging relation with the EU's development cooperation. The own initiative report is expected to be presented on 20 November, the vote in Plenary is planned for March 2026.
Draft Programme
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Western Balkans region stands at a critical crossroads for democracy, challenged by rising disinformation campaigns that exploit social divisions and fuel political polarisation, ultimately undermining democratic institutions and sowing scepticism toward European integration.
In the morning of 2 December, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS) will hold a joint public hearing and discuss ways to effectively counter disinformation and FIMI in the Western Balkans, strengthen its democratic institutions, build public trust, and focus on the role the EU can play in this process.
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Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Western Balkans region stands at a critical crossroads for democracy, challenged by rising disinformation campaigns that exploit social divisions and fuel political polarisation, ultimately undermining democratic institutions and sowing scepticism toward European integration.
In the morning of 2 December, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS) will hold a joint public hearing and discuss ways to effectively counter disinformation and FIMI in the Western Balkans, strengthen its democratic institutions, build public trust, and focus on the role the EU can play in this process.
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Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Finland’s surging deficit “cannot be fully explained” by its rapid increase of military expenditure, said EU Commissioner for Economy Valdis Dombrovskis

While his trial had been scheduled to start on 27 November, a hearing in Moscow's alleged spying case against French [...]

Bulgaria still needs stronger prevention and rehabilitation services to reduce the physical and economic burden of stroke

Das Parlament hat seinen zweiten Zwischenbericht über die fortdauernde Erosion der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Ungarn und die wiederholten Verstöße gegen die Werte der EU angenommen.
Ausschuss für bürgerliche Freiheiten, Justiz und Inneres

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

The Winter War that started in 2022 between Russia and Ukraine had some very surprising outcomes, one of which being that it is still going on in 2025. The defence Ukraine provided for itself with limited initial assistance from the West showed how effective the Soviet defences would have been during the Cold War. Ukraine’s armed forces and its defences was the barrier between East and West, with much of the Soviet weapons, plans, and systems for protecting the Greater Soviet Union being based in Ukraine. Attacking one of the greatest defensive structures in modern history with capabilities from the late 80s, proved to be as difficult to collapse as designed, even with modern 2022 weapons. Three years later, most of the modern 2022 weapons systems are burnt hulks on the Ukrainian plains, and the great Soviet weapons stockpiles have been stripped and torn apart in war, used by both sides of the conflict.

With Russia depleted and weakened, and its allies in the southern regions on the edge of failing, it remains a question to whether or not a failed Russia would be a better strategic outcome for the West. At the end of the Cold War, the menace that faced the world came about in the form of insurgency movements, supplied by smaller players at the will of larger adversaries. Sufficient attention to terror threats like those currently in Nigeria were effectively ignored, or given little attention that lead to any effective solutions. Today, the largest threats come from internal strife, likely designed to weaken and perplex any solutions, funded from abroad. Even with strategic victories in Europe and the Mid East, the main threat of large military action will come from Asia, and a feebled West will enable a large assault when weakness in leadership is demonstrated in North America and Europe. That claim can easily be made, linking the escape from Afghanistan towards enabling the war in 2022, a pure example of War Through Weakness.

China’s latest demonstration of its military prowess came with the introduction of several long range missile types, married to laser based defensive weapons systems. With the success of the China made J-10 against Indian Rafale jets, the move from Russia being the world’s largest weapons exporter towards China is likely to take shape rapidly. India itself uses licensed produced T-90 tanks and Sukhoi jets, technology that always surpassed China’s military technology in the past, but was unable to give significant advantage in the recent bout with Pakistan. Russia in its weakened state would secede a lot of regional power dynamics towards insurgencies in the South and China in the East, a security problem that could become more dynamic and difficult to address for the West in the future. With so little attention given to smaller regional conflicts, the likelihood of a small regional issue being felt in the West is almost a certainty, with Europe and the United States being target number one by all of these groups. Asymmetric warfare can never be ignored, even when a conventional war is the focus of defense policy.

Russia’s losses in Ukraine has lead to such a massive depletion of equipment, that the most substantial T-72 stockpiles are now likely in the old Soviet periphery of the Caucasus region and by allies like Venezuela. China, who has already taken to replacing much of its modern 2008 equipment with newer systems, has the largest and most modern standard military force in the world. While quantity has its own quality, massive quantities of common tanks like the ZTZ96 are at least equal to a T-72B, and the ZTZ99 variants can match the capabilities of a T-90, with more modern variants recently demonstrated in China amongst missiles and lasers. While the PLA ground forces would most likely be used against Indian forces on the border regions, China’s strategic missile forces are meant for the US Navy and for an assault on Taiwan. Western allies must decide what they wish for in their relations with Russia and end any adversarial support coming from other regions as soon as possible, as the main field of battle is now internal. Without addressing internal divisions, a motivation will come about for the massive army being built by China to advance an assault. A signal of weakness is being sought to continue the 2022 war beyond Europe to go worldwide. You can see it in every town and city in the West, and in every cannon forged for the PLA daily.

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.

Over the past decade, cooperative climate action has become a central feature of global climate governance. Thousands of businesses, subnational governments, civil society organizations, and international partnerships have mobilized to complement and support multilateral and state-led efforts. Using insights from the CoAct Database (formerly N-CID), and data from a sample of 387 initiatives, this chapter takes stock of developments since 2013 and looks ahead to how cooperative action can contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, particularly addressing priorities arising from the Global Stocktake (GST). Our analysis yields five headline findings. 1. Rapid expansion, but uneven focus. CCIs have multiplied since 2015 and increasingly address adaptation, yet mitigation continues to dominate. While themes such as energy, land use, and industry remain strong, adaptation-related themes, e.g., particularly water, oceans, and resilience, remain underrepresented. 2. Effectiveness is improving, but equity gaps persist. Many CCIs now deliver more tangible outputs and report more systematically, yet overall output effectiveness has plateaued since 2018. Smaller and less-resourced initiatives often lag behind due to capacity constraints, while limited accountability mechanisms—such as monitoring, transparent governance, and membership control—continue to hinder performance. 3. Participation has broadened, but inclusivity remains limited. Participation of actors in CCIs has expanded, but leadership and decision-making remain concentrated among Northern and institutional actors. Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) are largely absent from governance structures, while engagement of businesses, investors, and local civil society has stagnated in recent years. 4. Stronger alignment with global priorities is needed. Future orchestration should strengthen coherence between CCIs and priorities in the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for instance those emerging from the Global Stocktake (GST). Integrating adaptation, nature, and resilience more effectively—and fostering synergies across thematic axes such as energy–nature, food–energy, and cities–ecosystems—can enhance the systemic impact of cooperative climate action. 5. The next five years are critical. To sustain momentum and credibility, CCIs and orchestrators, such as the High-Level Climate Champions, COP presidencies and the UNFCCC secretariat, must focus on inclusion, capacity, and accountability—especially in underrepresented regions. Expanding implementation and participation in low- and middle-income countries will improve both effectiveness and procedural justice. Deliberate orchestration by COP Presidencies, policymakers, and leading CCIs can ensure that cooperative climate action evolves toward greater balance, legitimacy, and transformative impact. While cooperative climate action has expanded and matured over the past decade, its transformative potential remains only partly realized, calling for deeper structural and systemic change. As the world moves on to implement the Paris Agreement, cooperative initiatives should help accelerate ambition, bridge gaps in implementation, and foster more equitable and effective global climate action.