European Union

by Matti Ylönen (Academy of Finland Research Fellow; Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki)

A few years ago, the idea of the Brussels effect took the European Union (EU) circles by storm as an exciting new framework for understanding the global exemplary impact of the EU rules. Now, it faces tumultuous waters as Donald Trump has returned to the White House, bringing with him Elon Musk and the backing from the emerging American tech oligarchy. They portray the EU more as an adversary than an ally, being irked by the major Acts and competition policy measures that the EU has introduced to reign in the power of large online platforms, digital gatekeeper firms, and large language models.

To grasp the challenge that the new world political situation poses for the Brussels effect, we must start by revising its original definitions. Anu Bradford devised the Brussels Effect in the 2010s to understand how the stalemate in global governance and American politics had given an outsized role for the EU as a global rule-maker. The big breakthrough of this concept came with her 2020 book The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World. In this blog post, I summarize my reconceptualization of the Brussels effect, recently published in JCMS.

Bradford envisioned the de facto effect encompassing Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) adjusting their global conduct to the EU rules. The de jure effect involved third countries adopting EU-style regulations for legislative simplicity, for enticing MNEs, or through policy diffusion via ‘economic and political treaties and via international organizations and governmental networks’. I illustrate Bradford’s original theory with Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. The original Brussels Effect

Bradford’s theory was a welcomed expansion from the theories of ‘Europeanization’, ‘market power Europe’ and ‘normative power Europe’, but its one-directionality and its focus on EU rules (instead of institutions) hindered its applicability in situations where the EU policy faces significant lobbying efforts or resistance. Moreover, the original definitions of de facto/jure effects lacked analytical tools for understanding how such effects may evolve over time. These are some of the key issues that I address in my reconceptualization of the Brussels effect.

Accordingly, Figure 2 below receonceptualizes the Brussels effect with systematic definitions of instrumental/structural power drawn from the International Political Economy (IPE) literature. (In key role here are two IPE articles: How does business power operate? A framework for its working mechanisms, and Structural power and bank bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States.)

Whereas instrumental power means the power of A over B to make B to do something they otherwise would not do, structural power concerns the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy. It can be divided into two aspects. First, automatic capacities can be exemplified with the power that the control over the US dollar supply wields to the United States, given how decisions over the US monetary policy influence other jurisdictions. Second, structural power can manifest in agents’ strategic mobilization of resources that derive from their structural power.
Figure 2. The reconceptualized Brussels Effect

The ability of the de facto effect to make MNEs use EU requirements as a yardstick for their global operations essentially involves structural power as an automatic reaction to EU rules. Such adaptation is automatic in a sense that it does not require active involvement from the EU – companies adopt rules modeled after the EU because they want to avoid multiple overlapping reporting systems.

In the reconceptualiztion of the original Brussels effect, the EU’s structural power also affects third countries as an automatic reaction – either through direct exemplary influence, or through the lobbying efforts multinational corporations. When mediated by private firms, this power can be either instrumental or structural, depending on the amount of leverage they have over particular governments.

Now that the two mechanisms of the Brussels Effect have been given unified definitions, opportunities emerge for a broader inquiry into the two-way power relations associated with this effect. First, we much consider how the Brussels effect has taken on a life of its own in the speeches and texts of prominent EU policymakers. This tendency is addressed in the middle of Figure 2 by highlighting the potential socializing role of the Brussels effect.

The successful mainstreaming of this effect can even turn it into a conscious policy goal for European policymakers, signaling its transformation from an automatic capacity to strategic mobilization of the EU’s resources in its external relations. Such tendencies also highlight the need to approach the EU as (a set of) institutions instead of defining the Brussels Effect merely as the global impact of the EU rules. Institutions (such as the Commission or the Parliament) may advance the Brussels Effect also in more indirect ways that what can be captured with the term ‘rules’ .

Second, Figure 2 tackles the attempts by MNEs and third countries to influence or even derail the Brussels effect across policy processes. Such advocacy efforts are captured by highlighting the power of these actors to influence EU rules in different stages of policymaking. This advocacy can signal either instrumental or structural power, depending on the power resources an MNE or a third country possess.

The top-right corner of Figure 2 also introduces the modified de facto effect. It involves situations where companies are lobbying for EU-styled rules in third countries in form, while aiming to dilute their contents. In my article, I argue that such dynamics have characterized, for example, the dynamics surrounding the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation.

The second part of my article addresses various forms that such advocacy can take across the EU’s policymaking cycle, building on the five background conditions that Bradford outlined for the Brussels effect to occur: market size, inelastic targets, regulatory capacity, stringent standards, and their non-divisibility. Two of them – market size and inelastic targets of regulation – are practically beyond influence for external actors. However, external actors can try to influence the remaining pillars. Figure 3 captures such dynamics.

Figure 3. Ways to undermine the necessary background conditions of the Brussels Effect

An important, novel starting point for Figure 3 is that the potential forms of the Brussels effect can change significantly as EU rules progress from the drafting stage to political, juridical and enforcement stages. If third countries copy EU-styled rules immediately after they have been ratified, they essentially mimic the political will of the EU. However, such policy diffusion can take very different forms after the EU rules have been tested in courts and enforced, possibly with significantly altered outcomes. This aspect has received insufficient attention in the literature.

Figure 3 also highlights how external actors can weaken regulatory capacity and the stringency of standards in various stages of policymaking. Regulatory capacity can be weakened through exerting ‘epistemic authority’ by flooding decision-making processes with misleading policy inputs. Poaching skilled policymakers from the EU institutions may also serve similar purposes. Stringency of standards, in turn, can be weakened for example by court cases with malicious intent. Finally, the non-divisibility of the EU rules can be weakened by weaponizing other policy fields (such as trade policy) to counteract the EU’s measures.

In conclusion, my reconceptualizon of the Brussels effect empowers this framework with the analytical tools for understanding the advocacy dynamics surrounding this effect in a pivotal situation where American tech executives are calling for Trump to counteract the EU’s competition and tech policy rules. Importantly, this contribution can also help policymakers to identify the weakest links in the EU policy processes for external influence. Such an understanding is crucial for strengthening the institutions that sustain democratic decision-making in the Union.

Matti Ylönen is an Academy of Finland Research Fellow at the University of Helsinki, acting as a Principal Investigator in a project “Seeing Like a Tech Firm: Advocacy in the Era of Platform Capitalism”. He has published extensively on the political roles of various private actors in global political economy.

The post Reconceptualizing the Brussels Effect amidst the looming tech oligarchy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Delegations

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The agreed draft legislation comes in response to a number of emerging challenges, such as risks relating to digital toys and the surge in online shopping.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

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The agreed draft legislation comes in response to a number of emerging challenges, such as risks relating to digital toys and the surge in online shopping.
Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection

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The European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union meet for their annual dialogue

Length of video : 77'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
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AW "T"
Principles of Community law
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Alace
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Hamoudi v Frontex
Law governing the institutions
Action for damages against Frontex: AG Norkus analyses the allocation of the burden of proof in relation to the existence of damage in collective expulsion cases

Belgian State
Citizenship of the Union
A third-country national who is the parent of a Union citizen enjoys a derived right of residence for more than three months in the host Member State if he or she proves, first, that he or she was dependent on that citizen in his country of origin on the date on which he or she left that country and, second, that he or she is dependent on that citizen on the date on which his or her application for a residence card was submitted, if several years have elapsed between those two dates

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Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety

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The informal agreement between EU co-legislators will ensure soil is monitored in all EU countries and farmers get better support to improve soil health.
Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety

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Length of video : 60'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
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Length of video : 123'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Meeting on Tuesday, leading members of the European Parliament and of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada signalled their strong support for Ukraine’s EU accession process.

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Meeting on Tuesday, leading members of the European Parliament and of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada signalled their strong support for Ukraine’s EU accession process.

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On Tuesday, the International Trade Committee adopted revised rules for screening foreign investments in the EU.
Committee on International Trade

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On Tuesday, the International Trade Committee adopted revised rules for screening foreign investments in the EU.
Committee on International Trade

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Length of video : 120'

Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP