European Union

Nobody should take anything for granted when it comes to Britain’s vote to stay or leave the EU. Many of the mistakes and inaccurate assumptions that have overshadowed recent votes could be repeated with the EU vote and lead to Britain leaving the EU.

A British referendum on its EU membership vote was not something many in the EU (and some in the UK) wanted. A renegotiation and referendum are seen as an unwanted headache for a union with enough already on its plate. An exit would be unprecedented, opening a Pandora’s Box of problems for both sides.

Some pro-Europeans may now seek comfort in analysis that argues that when all is said and done the British won’t actually vote to leave. They’ll be buoyed by some polling data, arguments that Cameron is the best Prime Minister to secure an ‘in’ vote, that British businesses will be behind membership, that UKIP will lead ashambolic and divided ‘out’ campaign and so forth. Given what is at stake it pays to take a more cautious analysis.

Do you believe pollsters anymore?

Polls might point to an uphill struggle for the ‘out’ campaign, but we should all be cautious of taking polls too much for granted after the polling farce of the 2015 UK general election (the most polled vote in UK history). Pollsters also made a bad call over last year’s Scottish independence referendum. They correctly tracked the growth in support for independence, but the final result of 55:45 was much wider than many had thought in the final weeks. Despite the few polls in the closing weeks of the independence referendum, there have only ever been a few that point to Scottish independence. By contrast there have been numerous polls pointing to a vote to leave the EU.

Will Cameron secure a renegotiation?

It’s not clear if Cameron can secure much by way of a renegotiation. Britain’s EU debate is often blind to how the rest of the EU must agree to its demands. The rest of the EU wants to see reform, but survey the member states and you find limited sympathy for a UK that can appear to be blackmailing them. What they will offer is therefore unclear. The crunch area of free movement of people in particular looks set to cause tensions throughout the EU. If Britain’s 1975 renegotiation is anything to go by then Britain will get largely token changes.

Will the British public believe in Cameron’s renegotiation?

Nobody should assume the British people will swallow another token renegotiation. Eurosceptics, the media, academics, perhaps even some supporters of an ‘in’ vote (those uneasy with the nature of the renegotiation) will shine many lights on and through the deal. When in a 2011 referendum the British people rejected AV they did so in large part because the referendum turned into a vote on the popularity of Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg, but also because they recognised that AV – to quote Nick Clegg himself – was a ‘miserable little compromise’. After the experiences in Scotland, voters are also now likely to see through any last minute commitments in the face of a rising ‘out’ vote.

Is Cameron the best Prime Minister to win a referendum?

Cameron is hailed as the best man to lead the UK through a referendum because he can guarantee a large proportion of the Conservative party and its supporters will follow him in a vote to stay in. Yet he is a prime minister who has played fast and loose with the unity of the UK and the UK’s membership of the EU. He governs with a majority of 12. He led a lacklustre election campaign that seemed to win by accident. He has struggled to hold his party together over Europe, making repeated concessions to Eurosceptics. Finally standing up to them may split his party and lead to a leadership challenge. His concentration could turn to holding his party and premiership together more than holding the UK in the EU. It is unclear whether he will bind ministers through collective cabinet responsibility, or punish those reluctant to back fully any ‘in’ campaign. If his position becomes exposed then expect leadership hopefuls to sense danger in backing him and the ‘in’ vote. Other parties may back off if they sense a danger from tying themselves too closely to the leader of a losing campaign. This was one reason behind Labour leader Ed Miliband’s reluctance to get behind Nick Clegg in the AV referendum.

Will ‘in’ or ‘out’ run the most shambolic campaign?

Both campaigns will struggle to define a clear message and strategy thanks to political differences, personal dislikes and financial problems. The ‘in’ campaign is likely to break-up as soon as the referendum is concluded. UK pro-European campaigns have a record of struggling to exist let alone campaigning effectively. Similar problems beset Scotland’s unionist campaign. There has been much speculation whether the ‘out’ campaign would be better off not relying on UKIP and the one-man show of Nigel Farage. But UKIP can provide some single-party unity that if played right could mirror the SNP’s role as the core of the independence movement. The ‘out’ campaign may struggle to find the grass roots movement that drove Scotland’s independence campaign. That said, UKIP has shown that it can sometimes reach out to disaffected voters by presenting itself as a party apart from the Westminster elite. Like the SNP, the ‘out’ campaign could also be buoyed by the campaign, coming to see any defeat as a tactical as opposed strategic one. UKIP will likely continue to grow, fuelled by factors that are not just about Europe. Left wing Eurosceptic groups, until now largely hidden in the UK, will be given attention thanks to their rejection of what they see as the EU’s imposition of neo-liberal agendas on the whole of Europe.

Who will be better at selling an unknown?

The ‘out’ campaign will struggle to set out a clear agenda for a post-EU Britain. Even UKIP is vague about what relationship it wants the UK to seek. This does not mean the ‘in’ campaign will be in a stronger position. The ‘in’ side will have to await Cameron’s renegotiation deal and not all may back in completely. Some ‘in’ supporters – especially on the left – will be uneasy with any deal that limits such things as workers rights. The ‘in’ campaign may resort to a repeat of ‘Project Fear’, the term applied (especially by their opponents) to the approach taken by unionists in Scotland of arguing about the unknowns and dangers of independence rather than making a positive case for staying. This is in no small part down to the larger unknown of what it is that the EU itself is, ‘ever closer union’ being a vague aspiration.

Who can win hearts and minds?

Scotland’s pro-union campaign relied largely on facts and figures to back the case for remaining in the UK. Its lack of emotional appeal was a key weakness. When it comes to the EU, banging on about trade and jobs can be effective but only gets the pro-EU side so far. Britain’s political debate has long yearned for more than a commitment to the EU. Arguing Britain should accept a reduced place in the world doesn’t work as an optimistic vision to be sold to a people that still embrace a global identity. Ideas of ‘independence’ or ‘freedom’ from Europe might be completely overblown in reality, but they play to deep national desires. Growing English nationalism means using the term ‘Little Englander’ will turn hearts against the ‘in’ campaign. Arguments the EU is a project to create peace won’t work when the Cold War let alone the Second World War are distant memories. Eurosceptics will also appeal to the heart by arguing you can love Europe – embrace a European identity that ranges from food and sport to philosophy and science – while opposing the EU.

Can you bank on the business community for support?

Britons might not be sold on the idea of ‘ever closer union’ but even some Eurosceptics are uneasy at the idea of leaving the Single Market. At the same time, problems in the Eurozone, Europe’s relative decline and emerging markets mean the EU is no longer the economic future it appeared in the 1970s when Britain was the ‘Sick man of Europe’. Britain’s decision not to join the Euro does not appear to have cost it as heavily as some once warned. Business support is therefore no longer as united as it was. Some business backing could actually be harmful to the ‘in’ campaign. The City of London might be vital to the UK’s economy, but it is viewed with a great deal of suspicion. Small and medium sized enterprises, which today make up the majority of the UK economy, do not rely as directly on the links the single market creates. If inward investment is not clearly affected by fears of a Brexit – as has so far been the case – then we should expect people to be sceptical of any economic warnings.

Will the media support an ‘in’ vote?

Just as the business community is no longer as overwhelmingly in favour of UK membership, so too is the UK media. A print media beset by declining sales will continue playing to a Eurosceptic agenda which portrays Europe as a hostile other. Some titles may pinch their noses while they urge their readers to vote to stay in, but some of their columnists will not hold back. Local newspapers, still widely trusted, could be easily overlooked. When it comes to online media, one only has to read the comments sections of most online discussions on EU stories to witness how prolific ‘Cyberkips’ can be. The role of twitter or other online campaigning can be overplayed, but its growing role leaves Eurosceptics with an added edge.

Will the British people be patronised?

But surely the British people will see sense once they wake up to the horrible predictions of what would follow a Brexit – of 3 million jobs gone, of a Britain doomed to be stripped of its UNSC seat, of London sliding into irrelevance and a property slump. There will of course be costs from an exit. But the warnings can be deeply patronising and appear over the top. Pro-Europeanism can be associated with an aloof, metropolitan elite living in a bubble of their own, detached from the reality of the daily struggle of the average British man or woman. No nation’s citizens like being told what to do by other states or an elite who think that only they know best. The British are no exception.

Will the referendum really be about Europe?

All referendums run the risk of becoming votes on something else and the EU vote could be no exception. Talk of holding the vote in 2016 instead of 2017 reflects a desire to get the issue out of the way while Cameron still enjoys something of a honeymoon. Holding such a vote towards the middle of any government’s time in office risks turning the vote into one on the government’s – and in particular, Cameron’s – popularity. But 2016 might not be possible if the Lords delays the referendum bill or the EU refuses to agree any speedy renegotiation. The day chosen may itself affect the result thanks to anything from bad weather through to an unexpected event. Finally, have the political class fully understood what it is that the British people are angry about with regard to the EU? Is the key issue immigration, trade, sovereignty, suspicion of foreigners or anger at the dysfunctional nature of the UK’s political system? UK political parties have often misjudged what has been driving Scottish nationalism. They could do the same over Europe.

Will Scotland be a factor?

The SNP does not want to see Scotland forced to leave the EU by a UK-wide ‘out’ vote. Nevertheless the vote could provide the SNP with the reason to call another independence referendum, should Scotland vote in favour of remaining in the EU while the rest of the UK votes to leave. The SNP will also be uneasy at forming part of a grand-alliance with those UK parties it accuses of neglecting Scotland. The possibility of Scotland splitting from the UK if the UK splits from Europe may not lead some – largely Conservative – politicians to reappraise their opposition to the EU. The connections between Euroscepticism and English nationalism mean that some in England would welcome an England separated from Europe and Scotland.

Will European events sink a British vote?

The EU today is not something that can be sold with much of a positive image. If a Grexit comes about and the EU struggles to cope then any UK ‘in’ campaign may find itself overwhelmed by hostility to staying in what can appear to be a deeply dysfunctional union. Britons might underestimate the extent to which Britain can separate itself from such events, but there could still be a strong desire to reject any close relationship. It may not take any cataclysmic event to influence the vote. Smaller disputes over the budget, controversial new laws or policy, or questionable behaviour in the EU’s institutions and leadership would be jumped on – as they have long been used – by the ‘out’ campaign as evidence of the EU’s inherent flaws.

Who gets to vote?

Recent headlines that ‘immigrants’ would be denied a vote in the referendum (except Commonwealth and Irish immigrants) highlighted tense feelings on both sides of the campaign about the inclusion of EU citizens, seen as highly likely to vote to stay in the EU. The UK is home to several million citizens from other EU state. The potential influence of their vote may not be as big as some might believe. The same might be said of voters who have lived outside the UK for more than 15 years (and are therefore excluded), and 16 and 17 year olds who some would like to be given a vote, as happened in Scotland. But if the vote is a close one then the government may rue the decision to exclude these people. A similar decision to exclude Scots living elsewhere in the UK from voting in Scotland’s independence referendum may have cost the unionist side crucial votes. Excluding these groups has setup a potential fight with both the House of Lords and some other EU member states, potentially delaying the date of any referendum.

Will it settle the issue?

The European question is about more than whether to be or not to be in Europe. Referendums rarely settle issues that are this complex. As with the Scottish referendum it merely provides a temporary way of managing an issue. Had Scotland voted to leave the UK what would have followed would have been decades of bitter debates about implementing separation, the meaning of sovereignty, managing shared responsibilities and coming to terms with changing identities. An EU referendum is unlikely to be any different, especially if the majority is a slim one. Britain could easily face another referendum sooner rather than later.

This article first appeared on E!Sharp. 

The post Why it might not be all right on the Euro-referendum night appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The European Parliament (EP) descended into disarray earlier this week as MEPs failed to speak with one voice about the way negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are being handled by the European Commission. A key discussion and vote on the controversial trade agreement between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) had been scheduled for midday Wednesday 10 June but Parliament President Martin Schultz announced late the night before that this would be postponed.

Following months of debate within the EP political groups a common position was due to be adopted but has fallen apart as divisions in the Socialist and Democrat (S&D) party risked the collapse of the consensus. The primary sticking point has been and remains the Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism. This would allow individual corporations which have invested in a given country to sue that country’s government for anticipated harm to speculative investment; for instance, if a policy to protect public health by banning alcohol advertising were shown to damage alcohol company profits, the company would be able to claim financial compensation. Notable cases that have been launched under current ISDS mechanisms include Phillip Morris v Australia, where the tobacco giant is contesting the introduction of plain packaging laws, Phillip Morris v Uruguay, where the same corporation is suing for profits lost in light of legislation requiring health warnings on tobacco products, and Achmea v Slovakia, where the company investing in health system privatisation sued the government for its lost profit as a result of renationalisation.

ISDS foresees that cases such as these should be dealt by a private arbitration tribunal, overseen by high-level lawyers agreed by the parties, rather than by a national or international court, without judicial review, circumventing the authority of national and EU legal systems and giving preferential legal treatment to foreign investors. MEPs, civil society and the general public have expressed significant reservations about ISDS but the US and the European Commission continue to insist upon its inclusion.

The draft resolution which was due to be voted on by the EP plenary in Strasbourg this week contained a compromise text in favour of a cosmetically reformed version of ISDS. The S&D group, the second-largest political group in the Parliament, is opposed to the ISDS provision but the final compromise that it reached at committee level supported the inclusion of a ‘reformed’ ISDS. A group of unhappy S&D MEPs joined with colleagues in the Green (Greens/EFA), European United Left (GUE/NGL), European Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and EPP groups to table a stronger amendment, excluding the ISDS mechanism completely. This split the S&D party line and presented the wavering plenary consensus with a choice between different ISDS positions. On Tuesday night it became apparent that holding the vote would risk rejection of the full resolution and the president took the decision to postpone. Shortly after the announcement the two biggest groups, S&D and EPP, took to Twitter to blame each other for the breakdown.

Within the rest of the EP, support for ISDS hangs in the balance. Politico reported on Wednesday that the EPP, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) had been prepared to veto the whole resolution if the anti-ISDS amendments were included. However, there are sceptical MEPs in most groups and five of the 13 Committees which have offered opinions on the resolution have included provisions to limit or exclude ISDS, including the Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee. To compound the issue, the European Ombudsman, Emily O’Reilly, published a report in January which heavily criticises the Commission’s conduct in the TTIP negotiations, denouncing the lack of transparency and public access to documents, meetings and information about lobbying activity. Public opinion is also overwhelming against inclusion of any form of ISDS. The Commission received over 150,000 responses to its public consultation on ISDS and TTIP in mid-2014, the most ever received for a consultation of this kind, and more than 97% of the contributions rejected ISDS.  Many civil society organisations have criticised the Commission for obscuring the extent of this opposition and ploughing ahead with its commitment to inclusion of the mechanism.

Negotiations between US and Commission officials are ongoing based on the negotiating mandate given by the Member states and continue behind closed doors. In the EP, the file has been sent back to committee level so is now unlikely to be agreed before the next plenary session in July, meaning that it will be September before a plenary vote is held. This adds considerable pressure, since TTIP is high on the agenda for President Obama and his administration are eager to finalise before the US elections in November 2016.

The post TTIP debacle in the European Parliament appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

General : European Parliament negotiations with the Council and Commission on an Inter-institutional Agreement on Better Regulation should open officially soon. ALDE group leader Guy Verhofstadt will conduct the talks on Parliament’s behalf.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

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Ministers will take stock of preparations for the UN conference on climate change that will take place in Paris in December. In this context they will discuss the Commission communication: "The Paris Protocol - A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020" (6588/15), which is part of the Energy Union package.

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The success of extreme right-wing parties in last year’s European elections is a worrying symptom of the nationalism which has grown across the continent in response to austerity and the financial crisis.

Migrant communities are all too often the target of such movements, and indeed of ‘mainstream’ politicians and media who claim migrants have a detrimental impact on employment, housing and public services.

Birmingham hit world headlines in January when  Steve Emerson – a self-proclaimed ‘terrorism expert’ – told a Fox News debate on the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris that our city had become “totally Muslim” – a place that non-Muslims do not visit. The statement was completely erroneous. Birmingham is in fact one of Europe’s most diverse cities, one that has been welcoming people from different countries, backgrounds and faiths for decades.

“It is too simplistic to view issues around diversity and identity through the lens of “immigration”. The social demographics of modern cities are much more complex than that”

Typically, the people of Birmingham responded with humour, wit and intelligence to Emerson’s claims. If you missed it, the #FoxNewsFacts hashtag is well worth reading. Birmingham continues its long history of embracing new arrivals from around the world.  We welcomed a significant Irish community that arrived in the 19th Century to flee famine; post-war economic migration from the Commonwealth saw large communities from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean coming to take up important roles in our local economy; more recently those fleeing conflict in places like Somalia and Afghanistan found a home here alongside others from Central and Eastern Europe seeking employment using their rights as EU citizens.

It is too simplistic to view issues around diversity and identity through the lens of “immigration”. The social demographics of modern cities are much more complex than that. Birmingham is now the embodiment of a ‘superdiverse’ city. Around 42% of our residents are people from what we term BME (black and minority ethnic) communities, this includes 2nd or 3rd generations who are not considered, nor consider themselves, as immigrants. Coupled with the fact that half our population is under 35, this gives Birmingham an extraordinary energy and a strategic advantage in this globalised world. Over the past two decades, we have seen our societies change at an unprecedented pace. We live in a world increasingly interconnected through advanced communications, transport and trade. This has resulted in fundamental changes in migration patterns and the social makeup of urban areas.

Around 22% of Birmingham’s 1.1 million residents were born outside the UK, compared with an average of 14% across England as a whole. Those who arrived in the UK after 2001 make up 9.6% of the city’s residents. Research from Professor Jenny Phillimore at the University of Birmingham’s Institute for Research into Superdiversity indicates that people have moved to the city from nearly 190 countries in recent years. This superdiversity has had a clearly positive impact on the city – migrant communities contribute tremendously to Birmingham’s cultural life, to its day-to-day vibrancy and they bring their own trade and business links. However, it also raises significant challenges for cohesion.

Newly-arrived communities are often among the most excluded, because they do not know how to access services or where to seek advice. Superdiversity can lead to fragmentation. Many arrivals come in such small numbers that they are unable to fit in to established or emerging community clusters. Without social connections, they risk becoming isolated and disconnected.

“Young people from all backgrounds must receive the high-quality education they are entitled to”

We work hard to provide services that are flexible and responsive to the needs of our diverse population. Particular emphasis is given to newly-arrived communities, where we work with partners to develop practical solutions such as:

-       Birmingham Places of Welcome – a network of small community organisations, including faith communities, who offer an unconditional welcome to local people for at least a few hours a week.

-       Birmingham’s Near Neighbours programme which brings people together in religiously and ethnically diverse communities to build relationships of trust and is being used to create a minimum standard of service for those needing advice.

Birmingham City Council also works closely with local faith groups. We were the first in the UK to sign the Faith Covenant which was developed by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Faith and Society to facilitate partnerships between local authorities and faith groups. It sets down a joint commitment on principles for working together with an open, practical engagement on all levels.

Demographic changes also place pressure on planning and mainstream local services. For instance, a combination of net migration into the city and high birth rates has led to a population bulge among young people. Youngsters under 15 make up 22.9% of Birmingham’s population, something that would be welcomed by parts of Europe experiencing an ageing and declining population. The City Council works with schools and other education partners on innovative school place planning and providing additional primary and special school places.

In the past year, the city has had to manage a sensitive case in which individuals on school governing bodies were alleged to have made a systematic attempt to introduce an Islamic agenda into a small number of Birmingham schools. An independent government review into the so-called Trojan Horse case has since found there was no evidence of a conspiracy, but it recognised there were actions by a few people which fell far below acceptable standards. The City Council unequivocally condemns such actions.

While this case undoubtedly warranted a full and independent review, the way it was handled by the government and reported on in the media raised the spectre of Islamophobia, an on-going problem for our Muslim communities and wider society.

Important lessons have been learnt by schools, the City Council and our communities. The most crucial is that young people from all backgrounds must receive the high-quality education they are entitled to. Issues raised by the Trojan Horse case are being addressed swiftly, in partnership with the schools concerned.

Another important issue is civic engagement – making sure all parts of the community feel they have a stake in society. Low voter turnout in Britain and across Europe shows that this is clearly not just an issue that concerns migrant communities, but they are often disproportionately affected. We are tackling this by working with Operation Black Vote, a campaign group, which has developed a Civic Leadership Programme designed to nurture future leaders from Black and Minority Ethnic communities in the West Midlands with the aim of increasing their representation in all areas of civic and public life.

In another practical step, the city has hosted citizenship ceremonies over the past 10 years for Birmingham residents who have successfully applied to become British citizens. These ceremonies provide formal recognition and are an important ‘rite of passage’ for new citizens.

“Shared values are central to building strong and cohesive societies”

We are building a city where diversity is embraced, and where there are shared values and a real sense of belonging. We are currently developing a Birmingham Equalities and Social Inclusion Strategy to ensure that the Council positively promotes equal chances for all.

I firmly believe that the superdiversity of Birmingham’s community deeply enriches our city and contributes both to its social and economic prosperity and its vibrant cultural life. Promoting cohesion is at the very centre of what the city strives to do. The challenges of migration do not prevent Birmingham from developing progressive social policies. Shared values are central to building strong and cohesive societies.

I’m proud that Birmingham is a place where people from all faiths and backgrounds live and work together, peacefully side by side.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – looking4poetry

The post Cultural diversity should go hand in hand with progressive social policies appeared first on Europe’s World.

We are often told that feeding the world requires more efficient agro-industrial units, further genetic modification of plants, or cloning of ever-more productive animals. The facts speak otherwise: we already produce enough food for 14 billion people – double the global population – but around 40% of it goes to waste. What we really need is a more sustainable and coherent food policy. That policy should cover all aspects of food production and consumption to minimise waste and ensure a more equitable distribution of global food supplies.

The European Commission had taken a step towards a common European food policy by drafting a Communication on Sustainable Food, but unfortunately its publication has been postponed and risks being withdrawn altogether. As co-chair of the European Parliament’s Sustainable Food Systems Group, I believe future food policy should incorporate health, sustainability, ethical production, food safety, productivity, affordability and quality.

The world’s obese now outnumber the malnourished. With rapid increases in the prevalence of heart disease, adult diabetes and other chronic diseases related to diet and nutrition, food policy needs to encourage healthier eating. That means more vegetables and fish instead of red meat, and vegetable oils instead of animal fat for cooking.

But buying healthy food isn’t always an easy task. Whole-wheat bread can be poor in fibre, healthy-sounding breakfast cereals can give kids their daily quota of sugar, and canned guacamole may contain just 2% of avocado.

“Future food policy should incorporate health, sustainability, ethical production, food safety, productivity, affordability and quality”

The popularity of organic and locally produced food shows that consumers want to know what their food is made of. To help consumers make informed choices, we need to improve the way food is labelled in Europe and to introduce minimum health standards for food authorised for sale in the EU market.

We also need to bear in mind that unhealthy food increases health inequalities since underprivileged people eat the unhealthiest diets and pay relatively more to get the nutrients they need. Seasonal vegetables offer a way to strike a balance between nutritional needs and the weekly food budget. Instead of having everything available throughout the year, we should give more priority to seasonal, locally produced ingredients. We don’t need to eat fresh strawberries every day of the year; and besides, they taste much better during the summer season.

Turning to ecologically sustainable food, we have to change the globalised production methods which leave enormous carbon footprints through excessive transport and inefficient land use. Intensive farming and pesticides impoverish the soil. We need to put more effort into recycling nutrients that protect our ecosystems. Instead of giving cattle access to pasture, we keep them indoors, growing huge amounts of soya to keep them fed. Through genetic modification we alter ecosystems without knowing all the long-term consequences.

 “Labelling schemes that clearly indicate origin and respect for welfare standards should be made mandatory”

Most Europeans want to eat animal products from animals that have led happy lives. Although our animal welfare standards are higher than in many places, Europe needs to do more to ensure livestock production is ethical. Long distance transportation, inhumane housing conditions and the demands of high productivity remain the dark side of livestock farming in Europe.

The answer here is again to give consumers the power to choose. In addition to strengthening wider legislation on animal welfare, labelling schemes that clearly indicate origin and respect for welfare standards should be made mandatory. A succession of food safety scandals have produced a wide consensus in Europe on the need for stricter and more harmonised rules. Yet long and often opaque food production chains are still vulnerable to fraud.

Stronger safety rules are also needed to control the use of chemicals in food. Current restrictions on residues are not set at sufficiently low levels, and are not keeping pace with scientific data on issues such as the negative effects of endocrine disruptors.

On a larger scale, millions of people are fed through public procurement arrangements. Schools, hospitals and other public institutions offer lunch based on public tenders where all too often price is the dominant criteria, to the detriment of environmental, ethical and health standards. Public procurement processes need to be adapted also to ensure that farmers who commit to produce sustainable food are rewarded. Europe-wide indicators to better define sustainability in food production would help.

Finally, it goes without saying that eating should be a pleasure. I believe that, if we stick to the criteria mentioned above, we can lay the foundation for sustainable food production for generations ahead, while treating ourselves to food that’s healthy and delicious – just like my favourite dish of Broccoli-cashew salad with cucumber and feta.

 

IMAGE CREDIT: CC / FLICKR – Alison J-B

The post How to make our food sustainable, healthy, affordable and delicious appeared first on Europe’s World.

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The 7th EU-Mexico summit takes place in Brussels on 12 June 2015. This is the first bilateral summit since 2012, and the first one to be chaired by Donald Tusk, President of the European Council.

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On 6 March 2015, the Finnish Parliament passed the Finnish Climate Change Act (FCCA), the first of its kind in Finland. Pro-environmental organisations and political parties generally heralded the act as a symbolic success, as it enshrines the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050. However, the act has also been described as relatively unambitious[1], given that it focuses mainly on administrative procedures and monitoring and does not require, for example, interim carbon budgets – a specific amount of carbon dioxide equivalent that can be emitted over a 5-year period, a key aspect of the related UK Climate Change Act.[2] The FCCA thus reflects Finland’s role as a follower, rather than leader, on climate change in Europe. But does this ‘backbench approach’ reflect the attitudes of the Finns or merely of their political elite? In this post, we consider to what extent the FCCA is in line with climate policy preferences among the Finnish public. Drawing on nationally representative survey data from the Finnish Climate Barometer 2015[3], we focus on the design of the Act, as well as the public’s preferences for Finland’s role in international climate change politics.

Climate Change in the Finnish Mind

A good starting point to gauge general attitudes towards climate change is how concerned people are about the issue. In the Finnish Climate Barometer survey, 69% of the Finnish population indicated that they were either concerned or very concerned about climate change (Figure 1). This finding squares with a 2014 Eurobarometer survey on climate change where, compared to other European countries, nearly a quarter of the Finnish population ranked climate change as the ‘single most serious problem facing the world as a whole’. A similar survey focusing on climate change attitudes among Finnish businesses found similar results.

Figure 1. Responses to ‘I am concerned about climate change’

This high level of baseline concern about climate change translates into an even higher sense of urgency to address it. 78% of the Finnish population – an overwhelming majority – indicated that addressing climate change was either urgent or very urgent (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Responses to ‘Addressing climate change is urgent’ 

These high levels of concern about climate change and a clear sense of urgency to do something about it generally provide fertile ground for strong climate policy. It is thus not surprising that the previous Finnish Parliament approved the FCCA and that the newly-appointed government’s programme promises active measures to mitigate climate change. But to what extent is the FCCA in line with general policy preferences among the Finnish population? 

Mandatory interim targets?

As we discussed above, the FCCA is mainly procedural and largely symbolic. For example, it clarifies Ministerial responsibilities and specifies regular planning activities for long-term, mid-term and adaptation policy plans, but fails to enshrine clear, stepwise targets to reach its goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050.[4] However, it has also been pointed out that the Act does provide for more transparency – which could in turn create “political pressure for more effective policy measures if monitoring shows a discrepancy between objectives and performance”.[5] But is this approach in line with general policy preferences in the Finnish population? To this end, one survey question asked people whether they would prefer a carbon budget approach similar to the one used in the United Kingdom, where there are absolute limits on carbon emissions over five-year periods. Results indicate that 65% of Finns would prefer a stronger approach to climate policy similar to that of the UK, while about 15% did not know (Figure 3). Thus, the new legislation falls short of a more ambitious and serious climate approach based around interim targets favoured by most Finns.

Figure 3. Responses to ‘Finland should imitate the UK’

Finland as a climate leader?

How does this desire for greater climate ambition fare when Finns consider what other countries are or should be doing? Figure 4 reports to what extent Finns thought that Finland should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions regardless of what other countries do. Again, a clear nearly two-thirds majority of the Finns surveyed (60%) agreed or strongly agreed that Finland should address climate change regardless of what others are doing. These responses thus indicate Finns wish to see Finland as a leader, rather than a follower. This vision is clearly out of sync with the rather unambitious FCCA and the national energy and climate strategies adopted so far. 

Figure 4. Responses to ‘Finland should mitigate regardless of others’ 

Where next?

A new government has just taken office in Finland and is currently in the process of specifying its policy priorities. So far Finland has been a backbencher on national climate policy, indicated by a willingness to accept EU-level climate targets, but with little ambition to exceed them and take leadership. A weak signal of greater ambition can be detected in the new government’s programme that sets as its target to reach the EU 2020 climate goals by the end of the current legislature in early 2019. The FCCA can support this, but is in itself a very cautious step to develop climate policies. The survey data presented here indicate a strong desire in the general public for Finland to become a real forerunner in addressing climate change. Indeed, vast majorities of the population are concerned about climate change and would prefer their government to take much more decisive, carbon budget-driven steps to address the issue. Future evaluations of Finnish climate policies will show if the relatively unambitious FCCA can support such radical change.

 

[1] Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

[2] Benson, D., & Lorenzoni, I. (2014). Examining the Scope for National Lesson‐drawing on Climate Governance. The Political Quarterly, 85(2), 202-211.

[3] The survey was commissioned by the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation (Tekes) the Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), the independent fund reporting to the Finnish Parliament (Sitra) and an independent think tank Demos Helsinki. TNS Gallup Oy collected a sample of 1005 persons between 15–74 years of age across Finland using Gallup Forum – (Response Panel 5.–14.3.2015). The margin of error is approximately +/- 3 percentage points.

[4] Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

[5] p. 314 in Pölönen, I. (2014). The Finnish Climate Change Act: Architecture, Functions, and Challenges. Climate Law, 4(3-4), 301-326.

The post The Finnish Climate Change Act – In Line with What Finland’s Public Wants? appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Plenary sessions : EU-Russia relations were high on Parliament's agenda this plenary week in Strasbourg. In two separate resolutions, MEPs called on EU member states to maintain their unity following Russia´s illegal annexation of Crimea and drew attention to the militarisation of the Black Sea basin. Meanwhile the debate and vote on Parliament´s recommendations for the ongoing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations were postponed due to the high number of amendments.

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

On 11 June 2015 the Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union in close cooperation with the Commission organized in Luxembourg the first Eastern Partnership Ministerial Meeting on Digital Economy. The meeting was co-chaired by the Minister of Transport for Latvia Mr Anrijs Matīss, and Commission’s Vice President Andrus Ansip.