European Union

The school attack in Peshawar has set all eyes on Pakistan. The war between the military forces and the Talibans has evolved into a spiral of violence that is difficult to resolve. Clare Castillejo, senior researcher at FRIDE, analyses the factors behind the attack and the state of the Pakistani talibans.

What are the implications for the country and for the troubled region?

Flickr_Henry_Patton

Three years after the fall of Gaddafi, the political situation in Libya has evolved in a chaotic way. Fragmented and with two governments, the country is unable to maintain the security across its territory and deal with several domestic and external challenges.  Barah Mikaïl, senior researcher at FRIDE, analyses the failed political process in Libya, the risk of spillover into neighbouring countries and the role of the international community.

In what ways is Tunisia different from its neighbours? What are the factors behind its positive path to democracy? What would an electoral victory of Essebsi mean for the democratic transition? What are the challenges ahead?

Flickr-Stephan de Vries

The first round of elections has showed how positively Tunisia has advanced towards democracy in comparison with other Arab spring states. However, Tunisia still faces several socio-economic and security challenges. According to Kristina Kausch, Head of FRIDE’s Middle East Programme, implementation of the necessary reforms will only be achieved if a strong unity government is in place.

To watch the video, click on the image

When I was 9 years old, my family moved to Finland and I went to the International School of Helsinki until the age of 11, when I went off to boarding school in the UK. My best friend, probably the first one I had, was an American girl called Katja Ollendorff. She lived in the next suburb to us, so we spent a lot of time at each other’s houses and we were both obsessed with the Police. I remember evenings spent dissecting all the inner meaning of the lyrics of every song on Zenyatta Mondatta, and probably ascribing much more meaning than the original authors ever intended.

In the way of diplomatic kids, though, our respective families moved on. We kept in touch by letter for a while, but eventually lost touch.

Fast forward to 2014. I use a mail application called Mailbox, which encourages you to aim for #inboxzero. When you get there, you get an image, curated from somewhere on the web. Today it was a very striking pattern, and I was intrigued, so I clicked on it.

It took me through to an Instagram page and you can probably imagine my astonishment when the account was owned by a graphic designer called Katja Ollendorff! Like Antonia Mochan, this is hardly a run-of-the-mill name! I left a message on the page, to see if it was indeed the same one, and it is.

We all know that the 6 degrees of separation seem to have been reduced to half that through social networks, or maybe they are just more visible. But this connection seems utterly random. The connection between me and Mailbox, and Mailbox and Katja is so tenuous as to have made this connection hugely unlikely. What if I hadn’t got to #inboxzero today? I might never have come across her again. Even when I do reach it, I rarely click on the picture – this one was just particularly eye-catching. The whole thing is completely weird and wonderful at the same time.

As you know, I am a passionate advocate for the power of social networks to bring people together. It was joyous to have this example of how that happens given to me today.

Many many thanks to all those that took part in yesterday’s Day of Multilingual Blogging. Here’s a wrap up of how it went.

Bienvenue à la Journée du Blogging Plurilingue! Cette année, la journée sera plus longue que dans les années précédentes, étant donné que je suis en Australie.

ça n’a pas commencé bien: quand j’ai essayé d’acceder au blogue ce matin, j’ai reçu un écran blanc, et le message “Error establishing a database connection”. Panique totale! Heureusement et grace aux bons gens chez EZPZ Hosting, le problème est maintenant resolu, et je peux continuer…

J’ai créé une liste de tous les blogues participants, pour le rendre plus facile à suivre  et je mettrai les liens à tous les papiers ici ici en bas au fur et à mesure.  Pas oublier à utiliser le hashtag #babel14!

Bon blogging!

A thorough review of the European Union’s (EU) approach towards its neighbourhood should be a top priority of the new EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini, and European Commissioner for the neighbourhood, Johannes Hahn. EU neighbourhood policies have produced few results in the tumultuous South (See FRIDE commentary no. 17 – Rethinking relationships to Europe’s South), and have been derailed both by Russia’s assertiveness and very uneven local commitment in the East.

Andreas Marazis

A new EU approach to the East (perhaps via a renewed Eastern Partnership – EaP) should be more flexible, potentially broader in the number of countries it includes, but especially customise bilateral ties. It will also need to focus on curtailing Russian influence; supporting societies seeking increased ties with Europe; pursuing relations with less interested neighbours (quickly scaling engagement up or down in response to their reform performance); and substantially upgrading EU member-state involvement in shaping and supporting Brussels-formulated policies.

The EU has sought to avoid geo-political competition with Russia over their shared neighbours, but has been naïve in thinking that Russia would accept a democratic turnaround in Ukraine including a pro-EU orientation. After Russian actions, such as annexing Crimea, establishing and supporting a separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine, and embarking on a propaganda war of disinformation (including about the downing of flight MH17), the EU needs to recognise that it is facing geo-political competition to the East.

In this sense not only is the EU’s relationship with Eastern neighbours at stake, but also the Union’s security is threatened by Russian actions. Any EU policy with neighbours in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and even Central Asia should be ready for an action-reaction cycle. Russia will seek to lock neighbours into its perceived sphere of influence – via Moscow-led initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union – using political means by offering an authoritarian model as an alternative to democracy; by economic means through embargoes and boycotts; and by military means.

The major success of the EaP has been concluding Association Agreements (AA) with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. But the challenges remain enormous. In the short term Ukraine is on the verge of economic collapse while the fight over the Donbass region continues. The future of Ukraine will be decisive for Europe’s partnership ambitions with eastern neighbours. Moldova’s elections at the end of November could result in a new Communist government that might drag its feet on AA implementation. The relatively inexperienced Georgian government will need to process indictments against former government officials transparently and democratically, while further improving judicial reform. All three countries will need substantial EU support on economic and democratic reforms.

Next to stronger engagement with Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian societies, the EU should also open up the possibility of eventual membership to these countries to encourage them on their reform path. In the meantime all three will remain affected by protracted conflicts (Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and Crimea and Donbass in Ukraine). Russia plays a direct role in each of these conflicts and will not give up these areas of influence. The EU can do little besides helping to develop the three states so that they become more attractive to the lost territories, while also continuing security assistance through its ongoing Common Security and Defence Policy missions in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

The EU should not give up on the other three Eastern European countries that have chosen not to associate with the EU – though for different reasons. Belarus remains highly authoritarian, but will look for EU cooperation as leverage against Moscow’s domination. The EU should involve Belarussian civil society where possible and keep hammering on human rights and democracy until better times arrive. Armenia is heavily dependent on Russia for its security (especially due to the conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh) and for its economic survival. Still Yerevan remains interested in implementing some political and economic reforms, and aligning with the EU in agreements that are less comprehensive than Association Agreements.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has become highly problematic. Baku thinks that the combination of energy deliveries to Europe (that account for a very small percentage of overall EU consumption) and Europe’s cautious response to Russian aggression in Ukraine can let it get away with almost anything. Having gotten rid of opposition parties and silenced free media, the regime is now targeting non-governmental organisations and think tanks that receive funding from abroad. The EU will need to increasingly see Azerbaijan for what it is: an authoritarian regime that requires a tougher approach from Brussels and EU member states.

Most essentially, EU efforts in the East will need to be strongly backed by its 28 member-states, especially when it comes to confronting Russia, or supporting EU security policies in the Eastern neighbourhood. The EU’s clout in this region is minimal without firm backing from the larger member states especially, with robust support from smaller member states on particular aspects. For example, Poland and Sweden have led the way on developing the EaP. Now others, including Germany, the UK and France, will also have to coordinate and step up their efforts to give political weight to any future EU approach to the East.

The EU will need a more flexible approach to the East that is bilaterally customised. Such an approach could be placed under a broader umbrella for the EU’s relationship with the six current EaP countries, Russia and Turkey on some aspects, and even the Central Asian countries (for which the EU currently has a separate strategy that will also be reviewed early next year). Such an approach should not seek to foster regional cooperation – with Russia countering it – but should address crucial political, economic, democratisation and security issues on a bilateral basis and, where useful, through other ad hoc issue-focused multinational formats. The EU should be prepared for ongoing problematic relations with Russia (including an uncertain future for Russia itself mid- to long-term) and be ready to assist countries that genuinely want to implement democratic reform and build closer ties with the Union.

Jos Boonstra is Head of  the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia programme