Annoncé à Bruxelles, absent à Tirana : le train promis n'est jamais arrivé. Avec le gel des fonds européens après le scandale AKSHI, l'Albanie voit ses ambitions européennes freinées par un décalage persistant entre discours politiques et réalité institutionnelle.
- Articles / PS Albanie, Courrier des Balkans, Albanie, Questions européennes, Trains BalkansCentral Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development partners.
Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.
Central Asia has emerged as a key region where the convergence of geopolitics and development cooperation is most visible. Major powers are redefining their approaches: Japan combines official development assistance (ODA) with commercial partnerships to advance connectivity and reform; the EU is emphasising a sustainable infrastructure and governance-oriented approach; the US is expected to catalyse private investment rather than direct aid; China deepens its regional presence through the Belt and Road Initiative; while Russia leverages historical and security ties to maintain influence. Meanwhile, middle powers – countries that do not wield vast influence like major powers but possess substantial capacity to shape international events – are exploring new opportunities for engagement. Türkiye positions itself as a bridge between advanced economies and the Global South, emphasising connectivity and energy cooperation through the Middle Corridor and the Organization of Turkic States.
South Korea’s 2025 ODA Strategy for Central Asia identifies the region as a strategic partner for shared growth, integrating pragmatic diplomacy with value-based cooperation. By leveraging their soft power and policy experience, these middle powers offer a distinctive model for development partnership. Central Asian governments are responding to a changing international environment by diversifying partnerships through regional integration and more strategic engagement with development partners.
Hyeyoung Woo is a specialist at the Center for International Development (CID), Korea Development Institute (KDI). From July to October 2025, she served as a guest researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS). She holds a Ph.D. in Development Policy from the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, where her dissertation examined transition countries, including those in Central Asia. Over the past years, she has contributed to policy consultations through Korea’s Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) with Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, particularly in fintech regulatory sandbox development and official development assistance (ODA) evaluation.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – the global framework establishing 17 universal and interconnected goals to guide sustainable development efforts – was adopted in 2015 following a uniquely participative and ambitious process. A decade on, it is increasingly evident that most of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are unlikely to be achieved by 2030 as originally envisioned. Discussions about a follow-up framework beyond 2030 are gaining momentum ahead of the SDG Summit in September 2027. This paper evaluates the process design, inclusiveness, negotiating strategies, fora and fault lines in 2015 and discusses to what extent the lessons learned can be applied to negotiations for a potential follow-up framework. We find that several process design elements and negotiation strategies, as well as actor composition, fostered trust and ownership, reduced polarisation and enabled agreements on ambitious targets. In particular, the process benefited from the inclusion of diverse, non-hierarchical actor communities, a long, science-based stocktaking phase, the breaking up of traditional negotiating blocks, transparency, and emphasis on common interests. We also identify several recurring fault lines that are overwhelmingly still relevant today. Apart from the above best practices of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, we identify several shortcomings that should be addressed in the beyond-2030 negotiations: inefficiencies due to competing tracks for the development of the goals; top-down agenda-setting processes leading to less ambitious outcomes; barriers to participation of and accountability towards some marginalised and informal actors; and the watering down of goals and indicators – including non-tangible targets and unresolved inconsistencies and trade-offs within the agenda. Finally, the paper argues that the beyond-2030 negotiations will take place in a context that is similar to the process that led to the SDGs but is nevertheless in many ways more challenging than in 2015, amidst intensifying crises, political shifts and loss of trust.
Après la reprise du contrôle du camp d'Al-Hol par l'armée syrienne, des dizaines de femmes et d'enfants originaires des Balkans, notamment de Bosnie-Herzégovine, vivent dans l'incertitude. Les espoirs de rapatriement s'éloignent, tandis que les ONG dénoncent les conditions de détention.
- Le fil de l'Info / Balkans Syrie, Relations internationales, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Populations, minorités et migrations, Radio Slobodna EvropaA katonai hagyományőrző rendezvények evidens módon illeszkednek a podcastunk profiljába, amivel csapatunk is tisztában van, de igazság szerint néhány zsámbéki eseményt leszámítva nincs ilyenekről tapasztalatunk sajnos. Ami pedig kifejezetten a középkori/lovagkori tematikájú fesztiválokat illeti (tágabb értelemben a vikinges tematikát is ide sorolhatjuk), ahol persze a folklór is fókuszban lehet a pusztán katonai dolgok mellett, ezekről kb. annyit „tudunk”, hogy sok helyen léteznek, ill. hogy időnként a visegrádi és a nagyvázsonyi várakban is rendeznek (vagy most már csak rendeztek?) ilyesmit. Mindenesetre aztán az angliai Rózsák Háborújához kötődő adásaink előkészítése során rábukkantunk arra az információra, hogy a Lancester- és a York-házak közötti utolsó jelentős csata helyszínén, a délnyugat-angliai Tewkesbury egyébként csendes és nagyrészt azért érdektelen városkájában már négy évtizede rendeznek nyaranta egy efféle elég komoly programot, az emlékezetpolitika és a turizmus jegyében egyaránt.
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Le 27 Janvier 2026, l’International Peace Institute (IPI) a organisé le séminaire annuel de l’Observatoire sur Maintien de la Paix, en collaboration avec la Direction Générale des Relations Internationales et de la Stratégie (DGRIS) du Ministère Français des Armées. L’édition de cette année était consacrée aux transitions des missions. Le séminaire a réuni des représentants d’États Membres, du personnel des Nations Unies, ainsi que des experts indépendants.
La première session a permis de dresser un bilan du UN Transition Project, conclu en 2025. Réunissant le Bureau de la Coordination du Développement des Nations Unies (DCO), le Département des Opérations de Paix (DPO), le Département des Affaires Politiques et de la Consolidation de la Paix (DPPA) et le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD), ce projet débuté en 2014 a apporté un appui direct aux pays engagés dans des processus de transition et a contribué à l’élaboration de lignes directrices du Secrétariat de l’ONU sur les transitions. Au-delà d’un retour sur les conclusions et les bonnes pratiques issues du projet, les participants ont examiné l’évolution du contexte politique depuis l’adoption de la résolution 2594 du Conseil de Sécurité. Les échanges ont souligné l’importance de préserver à la fois la flexibilité et la cohérence dans la planification des transitions, tout en soutenant un engagement politique avec les gouvernements hôtes. Les experts ont également identifié des pistes pour pérenniser les efforts sur certains aspects particulièrement critiques, tels que la protection des civils pendant et après les transitions, à travers une planification intégrée avec les équipes de pays des Nations Unies et le recours à des mécanismes de financement tels que le Fonds pour la Consolidation de la Paix.
La deuxième session a porté sur les retours d’expérience du terrain sur les défis identifiés des contextes de transition actuels ou récents. La majeure partie de la discussion s’est concentrée sur les retraits accélérés et aux transitions menées dans des situations de crise, en s’appuyant notamment sur l’expérience de la MINUSMA. Les participants ont échangé sur les moyens de faire face aux lacunes de financement, aux enjeux de transfert de connaissances et de capacités, ainsi qu’à la difficulté de maintenir un engagement politique dans des environnements instables. Les experts ont également insisté sur l’importance d’intégrer la communication stratégique dans la planification des transitions, ainsi que d’assurer une bonne gestion de l’information et la sensibilisation des populations, en particulier lors des renouvellements de mandat, des transitions ou des reconfigurations de la présence onusienne.
Lors d’un déjeuner travail, les participants ont été briefés par les co-facilitateurs de la Revue sur l’architecture de Consolidation de la Paix de 2025 (Peacebuilding Architecture Review – PBAR), conclue récemment, notamment sur le rôle que peuvent jouer la Commission de Consolidation de la Paix des Nations Unies et le Fonds pour la consolidation de la paix dans les contextes de transition. Les échanges qui ont suivi ont porté sur les défis liés au financement de la consolidation de la paix, les obstacles à la mise en œuvre des recommandations du PBAR et la volonté des États Membres de s’engager pleinement dans cette architecture.
La dernière session a été consacrée aux transitions potentielles à venir et à la manière dont elles pourraient s’appuyer sur les principaux enseignements du séminaire. Les participants ont souligné la nécessité pour les missions de disposer de stratégies de sortie dès leur conception tout en anticipant les différents scénarios, l’importance d’associer les autorités du pays hôte, la société civile et les communautés locales aux processus de transition, la pertinence des indicateurs pour évaluer les transitions, ainsi que les défis et opportunités liés au développement d’approches en réseau dans l’action multilatérale.
Dans le cadre de l’Observatoire du Maintien de la Paix, IPI publiera également en 2026 trois notes d’analyse consacrées aux transitions des missions des Nations unies, portant sur:
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