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Bruno Retailleau-t pártszavazáson emelték pajzsra a Republikánus Párt (LR) tagjai, ezzel hivatalosan is ő lett a mérsékelt jobboldali párt jelöltje. ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Bruno Retailleau LR-elnök jelöltette magát 2027-re, de így is több a kérdés, mint a válasz appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

In Hungary, strategic hydrocarbon reserves are stored at several locations, depending on geological conditions and industrial centers

Strategic gas storage facilities:
>Hungarian natural gas storage facilities are located in porous rock layers (depleted gas fields). The strategic (safety) reserve is primarily stored in the Szőreg-1 storage facility, but the country's entire storage capacity is distributed among the following locations:
>Algyő (Szőreg-1): This storage facility was specifically created for strategic purposes and is operated by HEXUM Földgáz Zrt.
> Zsana: The largest storage facility in the country, where gas is stored in limestone.
> Hajdúszoboszló: Underground storage facility with a sandstone structure.
> Pusztaederics: Also constructed in sandstone.
> Kardoskút: Smaller capacity, sandstone-based storage facility.

Strategic oil storage facilities:
The storage of crude oil and petroleum product stocks (petrol, diesel) is coordinated by the Hungarian Hydrocarbon Stockpiling Association (MSZKSZ). Storage is partly on its own bases and partly in rented capacities:
> Százhalombatta: One of the most significant storage capacities is located in the vicinity of the Dunai Refinery.
> Tiszaújváros: Warehouses in the area of ​​the Tisza Refinery.
> Vámosgyörk, Komárom, Pétfürdő: Other important logistics points and storage bases where MSZKSZ and its partners stockpile.
> Fényeslitke: A strategically important point near the Ukrainian border.

Language Undefined Tag: HungaryStrategic oil storageStrategic gaz storage

Ezzel kapcsolatban a Pátria Rádió kérdezett. A beszélgetés meghallgatható itt.

The post Macron új nukleáris stratégiát hirdetett Franciaország számára appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

A Heti TV Pirkadat című műsora kérdezett.

The post Antiszemitizmus vádak, viták és Macron bejelentései appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Hogy hat az önkormányzati választás a 2027-es elnökválasztásra? Ki mit csinál? Két forduló közti elemzés Csepeli Rékával (NKE)! A felvétel ----> tovább olvasok!

The post A két forduló között: az önkormányzati választás tétje (Csepeli Réka a Franciapolitikában) appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Catarina Maldonado Vasconcelos, reporter for Expresso.pt, contacted the Europa Varietas Institute with the following questions. The questions were answered by Dr. habil. Andràs Istvàn Türke, director of the EuVI.

CMV: How credible are the allegations that Russia may be trying to influence Hungary’s upcoming parliamentary elections?

AIT: As a historical precedent, we should know that before the regime change, a very close relationship developed between the Hungarian and Russian secret services, and since there was no revolution or court proceedings in Hungary, the threads of the relationship did not disappear overnight, but rather, we can speak of their continuation. The first case that caused a major resonance was the case of Béla Kovács (nickname "KGB Béla") from the first half of the 2010s, who was a member of the Hungarian far right and worked as a representative in the European Parliament. (For more details in French See my article pp. 7-8).

Viktor Orban was the first to publicly call for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary in 1989, under the auspices of the still-existing Warsaw Pact, in front of a large crowd. Something may have happened to Orbán, who was still militantly anti-Russian in the opposition cc. in the periode 2008-2014, although as we saw above, the Hungarian far-right party Jobbik had the closest Russian relations in the early 2010s. According to unconfirmed (but heard from several sources) Hungarian foreign ministry rumors, Orbán is being held in check by the KGB with some kind of Kompromat case and his existence depends on the whims of the Russian secret services. The point is that with a radical, 180° foreign policy U-turn, the Hungarian Prime Minister has been one of the most committed supporters of Putin's policies for many years. In this, his loyal partner is the Hungarian Foreign Minister since 2014, his former confidant. It is interesting to observe to what extent the otherwise aggressive, vocal Hungarian foreign policy remains completely silent when Hungary is harmed by the Russians or, for example, when the Hungarian minority in Ukraine (Transcarpathia) is attacked by Russian military attacks.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that we know from BND (German intelligence) materials what a serious influence the Russian-Ukrainian mafia can exert on Hungarian politics. For example, when (in 2003) they managed to get the Hungarian authorities to release a high-ranking Albanian politician wanted by INTERPOL through their Hungarian intermediaries in Serbia. And from the recent past, we can mention the Russian hacking of the servers of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry (which the Hungarian side also practically acknowledged without a word), and according to the latest news, the Russian connection can also be detected in the raid against Ukrainian cash-carriers of Ukraine's Oschadbank.

The Hungarian EU Commissioner was also recently questioned in the case of the fact that informants from the Hungarian Permanent Representation in Brussels surrounded several European Commission employees in order to obtain classified documents. The method is very reminiscent of the Hungarian intelligence gathering carried out in the 1970s and 1980s, which functioned as an “extended arm” of the KGB and was "remotely controlled" by the Russians.

So: On the one hand, the threads of connection are deep, multifaceted and have existed for a long time, and on the other hand, it is in the fundamental interest of Russian power politics to preserve its useful idiots, its Trojan horses, within the European Union. Hungary does not derive any economic or political advantage from its close friendship with President Putin. Although we assume that the current elite can also derive financial benefits from secret business relationships between the oligarchs.

CMV: If the reported Kremlin-linked operation in Budapest exists, what might its strategic goals be?

AIT: In terms of strategic goals, they are essentially using the same tools that they developed to perfection with the Wagner Group in Africa. (We wrote about this in detail here.) By manipulating public opinion, infiltration, fake Facebook profiles and fake propaganda videos, they managed to turn the French against them in the Sahel in an instant, supporting the local Islamist opposition forces. We see many examples that the methods are the same in Hungary, the latest example being the activation of those Romanian and Moldovan fake profiles (to speed up the algorithm) on the Hungarian ruling party's Facebook content, which were proven to have been created by the GRU to influence the Romanian and Moldovan elections. Hungarian News portals whose Facebook articles had only garnered a few hundred likes suddenly gained nearly 50,000 links.

CMV: How would you characterize Viktor Orbán’s political relationship with Vladimir Putin and Russia over the past decade?

AIT: (Please see below.)

What else we would add: Through the settlement bond business, the Orbán government has granted EU citizenship to countless dubious figures, and in the past, an amazing mafia was built on the dual citizenship introduced by Orbán (granted to Hungarians living across the border). According to conservative estimates, tens of thousands of Ukrainians, Russians, and Serbs may have obtained citizenship with forged papers, and the administration was largely carried out by the Ukrainian mafia.

Hungarian diplomacy fought hard to remove countless Russians from the EU sanctions list, which is also completely contrary to Hungarian national interests. This is how Patriarch Kirill, who was also involved in a pedophile case in Hungary, was removed from the sanctions list. He was a KGB agent under the codename "Mikhailov" from 1976 as Bishop of Vyborg and later as Bishop of Smolensk. As is well known, Budapest has consistently opposed the restrictions imposed on Russian oil and gas.

Viktor Orbán and the Hungarian government media often use Kremlin terminology (e.g. "peace-loving", "sanction inflation") and hold Ukraine responsible for the prolongation of the conflict. Viktor Orbán was the first EU leader to shake hands with Putin in Beijing (2023) after the outbreak of the war, and then visited Moscow in July 2024 as part of a "peace mission", which was sharply condemned by the EU leadership. The Hungarian government has indicated that it would not arrest Vladimir Putin if he came to Hungary, despite the fact that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued an arrest warrant for him.

CMV: To what extent does Hungary’s energy dependence on Russian oil and gas shape its foreign policy decisions?

AIT: The issue of Hungarian energy dependence is a complex one. First of all, there is the issue of the expansion of the Paks power plant, which from a professional point of view could be divided into two elements from the beginning: In the mid-2010s, it did not seem like an irrational decision for a Russian company to build a new one next to an earlier Russian investment. Especially since after Chernobyl, ROSATOM was forced to de facto introduce the world's strictest safety measures in the design and construction of new reactors in order to remain commercially viable. (And the earlier, but more modern than Chernobyl, Paks power plant has also been operating reliably for decades.) Undoubtedly, the investment from outside the EU already posed certain political risks. The other element was how committed the Hungarian state was to nuclear energy, essentially completely ignoring (even then) green energy, i.e. whether the planned new nuclear capacity was actually needed, or whether about half of it would be enough.

The second question is the issue of fossil energy. Hungarian politics very wisely assessed the possibilities for building gas storage facilities back in the 2000s and built the appropriate capacities. (My company, the Europa Varietas Institute (EuVI), also participated in this, and we wrote analyses, among other things, on the extent to which North African alternatives were limited by the fact that the Russian side had essentially already acquired control and majority ownership over the main gas pipeline networks there. In Hungary, the Hungarian gas storage facilities were built on time and with adequate capacity, and the Hungarians were even able to help Serbia several times with the gas stored here.

Similar wise foresight and thinking did not take place with regard to oil pipelines and oil storage. And in this, it is likely that the Russian lobby and background activity can also be felt. The point is that the Hungarian refinery in Százhalombatta can essentially only refine "Russian-type oil" and it was not developed further, partly due to the decision of MOL (Hungarian Oil Company) and partly due to the decision of the Hungarian political elite, be able to process oil of other origins. Officially, this was justified by the high costs. There would have been time to prepare, since EuVI had already indicated to the Hungarian government in 2008 that the Russians were only waiting for a favorable opportunity and were going to retake Crimea. All this resulted in a warlike situation, with a protracted geopolitical crisis, which could also make oil supplies uncertain. However, Hungarian politics did not take any action and, despite our predictions, was completely unprepared for the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014.

Even then, it would not have been too late to take action and start diversifying, fully or partially separating from Russian oil. But nothing happened then or in 2022. In the latter case, Hungarian politics, which had already openly turned against its European partners and become a close ally of Russian diplomacy, practically took on Russian interests, despite common sense and by giving up Hungarian national interests. After all, at that time they could have already started securing alternative sources and accelerating green energy investments, even while partially retaining the Russian source (Druzhba pipeline). (Nota bene, Switzerland decided at that time to achieve complete energy independence by 2050, and it was at that time that it also launched its large-scale green energy programs. This did not happen on the Hungarian side.) Furthermore, it also contradicts rationality that Hungarian-Croatian relations have also reached a low point with the continuous attack of the Croatians on the Hungarian side, while the Adriatic pipeline could represent one of the alternatives.

In summary, it can be said that Hungary is at least 4 years late in starting diversification, which is the result of a flawed energy policy on the one hand, and a flawed diplomacy on the other, which is also marked by an excessively strong Russian relationship that threatens sovereignty.

CMV: How significant is the upcoming Hungarian election for the country’s political trajectory after more than a decade of Orbán’s rule? What impact could the Hungarian election have on the European Union’s unity regarding Russia and Ukraine?

AIT: In this regard, I would caution against overly optimistic expectations. In the event of a TISZA victory, the political line will definitely be much more pro-European and will keep a greater distance from the Russians. The question (and I am skeptical in this area, since the problem has not been solved since the 1989 regime change) is to what extent the Russian threads will be cut back in the areas of the deep state and mafia networks. A closer friendship with America is obvious, but a serious condition for this is that Trump's unprofessional diplomatic rampage ends and American politics normalizes. On the other hand, good Russian relations are important to Hungary (if only because of the aforementioned Paks investment) so it is never in its interest to become as anti-Russian as Poland.

The second half of the question is much more complex and requires a little historical political review. After the 1989 regime change, a broad political consensus emerged in the Hungarian political elite that, due to the Hungarian minorities in the countries surrounding Hungary, the fundamental goal of Hungarian diplomacy is to promote the Euro-Atlantic integration of all neighboring countries. This made it possible to blur the borders between Hungarians and Hungarians, alleviating the injuries of the so-called Trianon trauma. The initial contact went well, but the Ukrainian side did not ratify the passages regarding Hungarian autonomy. In any case, even Viktor Orbán's own politics supported the issue of Ukrainian accession until recently, and then - with the Russian turn - they overturned this political consensus. As we know, the Ukrainian accession to the EU has been being pushed by the Poles within the EU for a decade and a half, even if it openly goes against the official EU position. <Note: I wrote an essay about this, in the context of Hungarian-Polish diplomacy, regarding the Visegrad syndrome of Hungarian politics.> Another question, however, is that the overwhelming majority of Hungarian society opposes the accession of Ukrainians, they only have a very good opinion of the Ruthenians, but they do not have a very good opinion of Ukrainians and Ukrainian politicians en bloc (although the relatively broad Hungarian social solidarity towards refugees has changed in this regard), since they immediately associate it with Ukrainian border petrol smuggling and the Ukrainian mafia. Therefore, TISZA does not have a fundamental interest in pushing the issue of Ukrainian accession. They will probably not become obstacles to EU policy, but will rather strengthen political circles that slow down integration processes and oppose "excessive support" for Ukraine.Catarina Maldonado Vasconcelos

Language Undefined

How was it shot at? It burned for two weeks!” – Boldizsár Győri reports from Brodi, from the attacked pumping station of the Druzhba (Hungarian "Barátság") pipeline | Source: 24.hu
UKRAINE-CONFLICT

A local resident mistook our colleague reporting from the scene for an enemy agent, so the Ukrainian authorities interrogated him at length, but finally managed to clarify the situation. Boldizsár Győri obtained important information from the locals about the damage to the Druzhba pipeline.

“Arrest that guy, this guy needs to be detained. The services are already on their way.”

What’s wrong?

“It’s none of your business! Detain him!” – Mihajlo says to some neighbors, grabbing my wrist. He’s been walking behind me for a while, and now I understand that he’s been following me.

A police car arrives a few minutes later, and I am then

interrogated for five and a half hours

by colleagues from the Ukrainian internal security service, the SBU, in Brodi, a beautiful former bank building from the Monarchy. But how did we get here?

Brodi is a small town in western Ukraine, near which runs the Friendship pipeline, through which Russia supplies oil to Hungary and Slovakia. On the outskirts of the town there is a pumping station and a control room, which is designed to help build up pressure in the pipeline before the slopes of the Carpathians. In the same place is also Europe’s largest oil tank, the size of a football field, which was hit by the Russians at the end of January.

The area burned for weeks, shrouding the area in thick, black smoke, residents were advised not to open windows, and schools were ordered to close.

The oil transport has not resumed since, although the Ukrainians have started to fix the problem, the Hungarian government finds them slow, and claims that there was no damage that would hinder the operation, meaning that the oil transport is stopped for political reasons.

This is a closed area and a completely ordinary checkpoint, like everywhere else in the country, you know, there is a war!

– warns a military commander before the road leading to the bombed area.

Behind it is a completely ordinary checkpoint: dozens of soldiers and police officers armed with automatic rifles are standing around, there is debris on the ground, behind them a labyrinth built of concrete elements. Next to it is parked a minibus that looks like a radio-electronic reconnaissance vehicle, antennas and objects that look like radars are sticking out of the roof into the sky. There is no way around it, you have to turn back. Around the former pumping station there is a concrete fence several meters high with barbed wire, with a tall observation tower in the middle. A few meters away, however, a housing estate begins, then a road, then the forest, through which the pipeline itself runs.

I didn’t hear anything, I didn’t see anything, and I don’t want to talk to you

– says one of the customers in the housing estate’s shop about the impact. “Orbániszt,” he tells the salesperson when he learns that I am a Hungarian journalist. In recent weeks, I have already felt firsthand the level of interstate relations in Ukraine.

“Don’t ask me such questions, I don’t know anything,” says another resident, who probably knows more than many energy experts about what exactly burned and what didn’t burn in the estate visible from his window.

Among them may be the Hungarian delegation that crossed the border, but the Ukrainian side is unwilling to receive them as an official delegation, and it is also questionable whether the first delegation to arrive in Kiev will be allowed into the bombed area.

Still, I find someone willing to talk.

How was it shot? It burned for two weeks. There's a white car parked somewhere here, look for it, it's black from the smoke

- says a man waiting in a car. Two old men are standing in front of a garage, one of them is Mikhailo.

"You're a reporter, and you don't know what happened?" - he starts the conversation with a scolding.

First, a rocket fell here, between the garages, there are still pieces of metal from it in the area and a four- to five-meter hole. Then one also flew into the tank. Your leader wants us to continue pumping, but we can't. Zelensky offered to get it through Odessa, if only the Russians could bring the oil there

- he explains. "The smoke poured out of it for two weeks. Everything was black," he adds.

Not much further away, a family leans against the fence, but a third interview doesn't take place. By the time I get there, Mihajlo is already shouting at them from behind me to stop me. I gather that the police car that just passed me in a double-decker was looking for me, but didn't recognize me.

Mihajlo grabs me by the wrist. "Please, don't touch me, you're not a policeman!" I tell him. He apologizes, lets go, and then continues to instruct the police on the phone how to find the otherwise secluded, unpaved street. Mihajlo is shaking with excitement, and a few seconds later his hand is on my wrist again.

The police are soon followed by the SZBU, then a five-hour conversation, with lots of phone calls and breaks, in the classicist building. After an hour, the mood changes, everything is fine, but the protocol has to be followed.

They are released: the residents are very nervous, this is a small town, a foreigner with a camera on his neck immediately arouses suspicion. Saboteurs recruited by the Russians via Telegram often cause trouble around critical infrastructure.

Finally, the mood calms down.

Before the war, I really wanted to go to Hungary, to one of their thermal spas

- says one of the officers. “Unfortunately, since then you could only cross the border with a permit, and it is actually impossible to obtain one.”

When saying goodbye, he apologizes for the procedure and adds: “Come visit us when there is peace. I will show you around the city.”

Language Undefined Tag: euviblog/druzhba_pipeline_damage_

A globális-lokális törésvonal felerősödése elvileg a jobboldal jobboldalának, a szuverenistáknak, de a centrumnak is kedvező – a centrum azonban egy ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Európai politika, az ukrajnai háború tétje és a szuverenista erősödés a centrumból nézve: Szent-Iványi István a Franciapolitikában appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Az USA, Kína és Oroszország a nagy játékosok, de a csatába még India is beleszólhat. Erről beszélt Kusai Sándor volt ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Ez már a második hidegháború kora – Kusai Sándor a Franciapolitikában appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Ahogy lenni szokott minden hónapban, itt az EU Infó következő adása. Átbeszéltük Európa sokféle kitettségét és kiszolgáltatottságát nyersanyagok, digitális szolgáltatások ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Európai függőségei, a 90 milliárdos ukrán hitel és az Epstein-ügy európai következményei: itt az EU Infó 16. appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Fekete Rita vendége voltam, ahol 40 perc alatt végigbeszéltük a legfontosabb francia vonatkozású bel- és külpolitikai kérdéseket. Az iráni háborúviszont ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Nukleáris doktrína, politikai erőszak és 2027-es elnökválasztási esélyek: mi a helyzet a francia politikában? appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Lemondott Jack Lang, a párizsi Arab Világ Intézet vezetője – Mitterrand elnök egykori kultuszminisztere, közismert közéleti szereplő, miután felmerült a ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Francia politikust sodort el az Epstein-ügy, de mi lehet még a háttérben? appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

A szokásos EU Infóban egy igen kemény és turbulens január dolgait kellett értelmezési keretbe rakni. Szokás szerint ezt tettük.

The post Kemény európai üzenetek Trumpnak, geopolitikai helyezkedés, és az uniós szerződésmódosítás esélye (EU Infó 15.) appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Gonda Zita középiskolai vezető tanár, a Franciatanárok Magyarországi Egyesületének frissen kitüntetett elnöke. A beszélgetésünk során a francia nyelv magyarországi helyzete ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Így áll most a francia nyelv Magyarországon – és így segíti a technológia a tanítását (Gonda Zita a Franciapolitikában) appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

A Franciapolitika vendége Kohán Mátyás volt, akivel azt is megbeszéltük, hogy van-e értelme a médiazajban szakpolitikai részletekkel, vagy ha tetszik, ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Hogy lesz belpolitika a külpolitika, mit olvasnak a magyarok, és hogy navigál ebben a helyzetben a publicista-újságíró? Franciapolitika Kohán Mátyással appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Marine Le Pen perének lezárulása kapcsán kérdezett ismét a Pátria Rádió. Arról beszéltem, hogy az A-tervről kezd lemondani a Nemzeti ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Jordan Bardellának szüksége lesz még Le Penre appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Janos Besenyö (Ed.) :
NATO’s Regional Challenges – Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Sahel
2025, NATO CoE-DAT (Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism), Ankara
Download 

> EUVI/ CERPESC Contribution: History of the Sahel (András István Türke)

The Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) is pleased to present this book on the topic of NATO’s Regional Challenges: Terrorism and Counter- Terrorism in Sahel.
Many political analysts have been forecasting inevitable conflicts driven by the different challenges characterized by regions where the Alliance might have to deal with the situation that no other power can or wish to handle singlehandedly. Amongst these geographically determined areas stand out a vast part of Africa, that is facing great problems generated by climate change, overpopulation, social discrepancies, ideological differences, poverty and armed conflicts including terrorism. This area includes countries like Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria or on commonly understood as the SAHEL region.
Amongst many international and national efforts to support better security and well-being of the people living in the vast dry land also NATO planners are monitoring closely their strategic southern flank in order to be prepared to conduct wide range of activities. One of these is supporting counter-terrorism with the toolset that only the Alliance has. To be prepared includes updated Situational Awareness or better to say, Situational Understanding.
In order to support planners, decision-makers or troops of NATO to be deployed to the region COE DAT launched a research project having a large sum of well-known SMEs from around the world. The research aimed for providing an appreciation of the area discussing geography, history, culture and also addressing the challenges that affect the everyday life of the people who must face with them. The focus is directed on the evolving terrorism and its direction with the aim of finding answers and recommendations to the Alliance to counter it as this book concludes.

The post NATO Book about the Sahel appeared first on CERPESC.

2024-ben mintegy 6 millió külföldi élt Franciaországban, a bevándorló népesség létszámát pedig 7,7 millió főre becsülték (a migrációs hátterű francia ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Francia bevándorláspolitika és bevándorlási viták a Macron-érában appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Ahogy ígértem, körüljártuk a Franciapolitikában a francia elnök javaslatát, mely szerint tiltanák a 15 év alattiaknak a közösségi média, illetve ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Kell-e tiltani a közösségi médiát és a mobilt a 15 év alattiaknak? (Szűts Zoltán a Franciapolitikában) appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.

Kinek érdeke a dél-amerikai szabadkereskedelmi egyezmény megkötése és kinek nem? Miért szankcionál az Egyesült Államok európai szereplőket? Mekkora Európa tényleges ----> tovább olvasok!

The post Gazdatüntetések, szabadkereskedelem, DSA – no meg az európai hatalom korlátai (EUInfó 14.) appeared first on FRANCIA POLITIKA.