European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© Solarisys / Adobe Stock

With the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, which has caused the shutdown of some 70 000 cinemas in China, nearly 2 500 in the US and over 9 000 in the EU, the joy sparked by the success of the film industry in 2019 has quickly given way to anxiety. Shootings, premieres, spring festivals and entertainment events have faced near-total cancellation or postponement due to the pandemic, thus inflicting an estimated loss of US$5 billion on the global box office; this amount could skyrocket to between US$15 billion and US$17 billion, if cinemas do not reopen by the end of May 2020.

The EU film sector is essentially made up of small companies employing creative and technical freelancers, which makes it particularly vulnerable to the pandemic. The domino effect of the lockdown has triggered the immediate freeze of hundreds of projects in the shooting phase, disrupted cash flows and pushed production companies to the brink of bankruptcy. To limit and/or mitigate the economic damage caused by coronavirus, governments and national film and audiovisual funds across the EU have been quick in setting up both general blanket measures (such as solidarity funds and short-term unemployment schemes) and/or specific industry-related funds and grants (helping arthouse cinema and providing financial relief to producers and distributors).

For its part, the EU has acted promptly to limit the spread of the virus and help EU countries to withstand its social and economic impact. In addition to the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII) and the CRII+, both approved by the European Parliament and the Council in record time, the Commission has set up a Temporary Framework allowing EU countries to derogate from State aid rules, and proposed a European instrument for temporary support (SURE) to help protect jobs and workers affected by the coronavirus pandemic.

In the meantime, various film festivals have gone digital and a number of streaming companies have started offering free options to all those confined to their homes by the lockdown. Similarly, major studios are also releasing films to home video earlier than what has been the norm thus far. It remains unclear as to how long it will take before audiences go back to cinemas and what unexpected consequences the various mitigation measures in place could have.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Coronavirus and the European film industry‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Cinema sites and cinema screens in the EU-27, 2018

Written by Philip Boucher, Mihalis Kritikos, Silvia Polidori and Gianluca Quaglio,

Striking the right balance between managing the health-related risks of the Covid‑19 pandemic and mitigating the possible socio-economic impacts of the containment measures is a delicate political exercise, being performed on the basis of imperfect data. This was one of the main conclusions reached at the first-ever online event in the history of Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel, which took place on 23 April 2020. The meeting, moderated by Chair of the Panel Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), was focused on the current pandemic crisis and the main scientific pathways that have been developed to manage its effects. Joining the discussion were: Dr Andrea Ammon, Director of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC); Professor John Ioannidis, C.F. Rehnborg Chair in Disease Prevention at Stanford University; Professor Paolo Vineis, Chair of Environmental Epidemiology at Imperial College; Jean Stéphenne, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of CureVac – a pioneering clinical stage biopharmaceutical company in the mRNA-based drugs field (including a potential vaccine for Covid‑19; and Marko Russiver, co-founder of Guaana, a hackathon and ideation platform. Participants discussed the effectiveness of the measures to combat the health crisis, the reliability and comparability of the data grounding the various national strategies and the timeline for the development of an effective treatment and/or vaccine.

Most of the speakers argued for the need to take extreme care in removing lockdown measures (or ‘Phase 2′), and when discussing the timing for the development of an effective treatment and/or vaccine. One of the main findings of this online experts’ meeting was that data upon which national strategies are grounded remain imperfect and do not allow experts to reach solid conclusions about the behaviour of the virus, or develop long-term strategies. All the speakers recommended caution when implementing Phase 2 and suggested that the latter would be better limited, initially, to certain geographical areas. Each country should have implemented adequate testing and solid contact tracing and should further develop credible epidemiological indicators and offer the highest level of protection to those people most at risk – health personnel and people living in nursing homes – until such time as an effective vaccine is discovered.

More specifically, Professor Ioannidis presented data on the relative risks of Covid‑19 infection among people less than 65 years old in Europe which show that those under 65 years of age had a 34- to 73-fold lower risk of dying of Covid‑19 infection than those 65 years and older. He argued that a vast proportion of infections are asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic (they remain unnoticed and untested), and that the risk to death from Covid‑19 is very low, and largely confined to subjects with pre‑existing diseases. His main suggestions centred on the need to implement draconian infection-control and hygienic measures in hospitals and nursing homes, and associate the gradual removal of lockdown measures with continuous epidemiologic surveillance, as well as paying closer attention to studies on Covid‑19 treatments that are performed without a control group or without randomised trials.

STOA meets experts on coronavirus

Professor Vineis highlighted the need to move to Phase 2 in a step-wise fashion. Transition policies need to take account of the recent analysis by Imperial College London researchers of the likely impact of multiple public health measures on slowing and suppressing the spread of coronavirus. He proposed a strategy based on ‘test-trace-isolate’ measures, with particular emphasis on high-risk and fragile subjects and on the measurement of a series of indicators that could define when a country is ready for a gradual re-opening. He argued in favour of interaction between integrated informational systems, mathematical modelling and a sound network of public health professionals, as the tools required for a safe transition to Phase 2. He also questioned the accuracy of immunological (serological) tests as a credible means of estimating the prevalence of infection and the development of herd immunity.

Dr Ammon explained the data collection strategy at ECDC, which relies on event-based surveillance, data reported by EU Member States and population-based surveillance to address the massive information requirements of Member States and the EU institutions. The ECDC is also encouraging countries to implement participative surveillance systems, engaging citizens through mobile apps, online questionnaires, hotlines, and in other ways. She presented evidence indicating that, in 20 EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries, the initial wave of transmission appears to have passed its peak. Dr Ammon, nevertheless, stressed that caution should be exercised when starting to lift some of the measures that have been implemented in the Member States and that ECDC has provided guidance to the European Commission on the recently published joint European roadmap towards lifting Covid‑19 containment measures.

Jean Stéphenne highlighted the range of relevant measures, including lockdown, masks, diagnostics and treatments, but pointed to the importance of developing a vaccine as the ultimate solution to the crisis. He set out the key elements in an ambitious vision towards the development and production of an mRNA vaccine (mRNA vaccines represent a promising alternative to conventional vaccine approaches because of their high potency, capacity for rapid development and low-cost manufacture.) During the first development phase, there is a need for sufficient investment capital (~€1 billion) and research subjects (~500 for first-stage testing, then ~17 000 for second-stage testing). He anticipated that CureVac could begin production of the vaccine in the first quarter of 2021, based on conditional approval, itself based on a benefit/risk assessment.

Marko Russiver reported that hackathons organised on their platform have generated 30 solutions to problems associated with the coronavirus crisis within a rapid timeframe, with eight of the solutions already in use. The hackathon approach has spread quickly, and is being scaled-up to a global platform that has already helped over 200 000 people worldwide. They have run over 50 hackathons in the last month, escalating into a ‘global hack’ with ideas coming from 98 different countries. He described teams comprising individuals of eight different nationalities, whom have never physically met, collaborating and building tools to respond to the crisis in an innovative way.

In the discussion that followed, the participants highlighted the need for continuous assessment of the entire range of prevention and containment measures before entering Phase 2. In his concluding remarks, STOA second Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew Europe, Latvia), highlighted the need to pay particular attention to the quality and comparability of the data submitted by the Member States. The current pandemic crisis should be seen as an opportunity to strengthen the capacity of the current risk management structures to respond to public health emergencies in a coordinated manner.

Written by Giulio Sabbati,

Graphics: Samy Chahri, Lucille Killmayer,

This infographic aims to present the latest available data on migrant flows to the EU in the year 2019. It covers the detection of illegal crossings on the EU’s external borders, numbers of deaths of migrants on those crossings, the number of asylum applications in EU Member States and their decisions on those applications. This Infographic updates and complements previous editions issued in September 2015 (PE 565.905), in April 2016 (PE 580.893), in February 2017 (PE 595.918), in December 2017 (PE 614.604) and in May 2018 (PE 621.862).

Detections of illegal border crossings in the EU (2019)

Frontex, the EU border surveillance agency, collects data on detections by national border-control authorities of illegal crossings of the EU’s external borders. External borders are those between Member States and third countries, as well as between Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries.

The map shows the different routes and the number of illegal entries into the EU in 2019 for each route. The line chart shows the number of illegal crossings at six-monthly intervals, and the pie chart the share that each route represents in the total. The four boxes below denote the monthly average number of illegal border crossings for each route. The table shows the top 15 nationalities of migrants

Missing migrants along the Mediterranean migratory routes

Missing migrants along the Mediterranean migratory routesThe International Organization for Migration (IOM) carries out the Missing Migrants project, aimed at compiling data on migrants who have died or gone missing, either at the external borders or in the migration process. It excludes, for instance, deaths in refugee camps or during return to a migrant’s homeland, or as a result of labour exploitation. Various sources of data are used such as relevant national authorities, IOM field missions, direct reporting by IOM and other organisations receiving survivors, and media reports. IOM and UNHCR make sure that data are consistent.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recent migration flows to the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Visit the European Parliament page on ‘Migration in Europe‘.

Written by Jana Titievskaia (1st edition),

© sahachat / Adobe Stock

The EU has opened up its public procurement markets to third countries to a large degree, yet many of these countries have not granted the EU comparable access. In 2012, the European Commission tabled a proposal for an international procurement instrument (IPI). It then revised the proposal in 2015, taking on board some recommendations from Council and Parliament. However, the revised proposal did not advance owing to differences in Member States’ positions. In 2019, discussions in Council gained new momentum in the context of a changed global trading environment, and growing recognition of the need to take a more strategic stance vis-à-vis China. The IPI would give the EU leverage in negotiating the reciprocal opening of public procurement markets in third countries.

Versions

• March 2020:  ‘EU international procurement instrument‘ (1st edition)

Amended proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries Committee responsible: International Trade (INTA) Revised legislative proposal:
COM(2016) 34 Rapporteur: Daniel Caspary (EPP, Germany)

Initial proposal: COM(2012) 124

Shadow rapporteurs: Inmaculada Rodríguez-Piñero Fernández (S&D, Spain)
Liesje Schreinemacher (Renew, the Netherlands)
Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Geert Bourgeois (ECR, Belgium) 2012/0060(COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Awaiting progress towards general approach in Council following deadlock, before Parliament finalises its position for trilogue negotiations

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen,

© Adobe Stock.

At the European Council’s video-conference meeting on 23 April, EU leaders demonstrated greater willingness to achieve a coordinated response at EU-level to face the coronavirus crisis than had previously been the case. Although concrete decisions were postponed, Heads of State or Government adopted a more united approach and took decisive steps towards collective action. Notably, they welcomed both the ‘Joint European Roadmap towards Lifting Covid-19 Containment Measures’ and the ‘Roadmap for Recovery’, but also agreed to ‘work towards establishing’ an urgently needed recovery fund ‘dedicated to dealing with this unprecedented crisis’. However, whilst asking the European Commission to shape the recovery strategy and to clarify the link between the Recovery Fund and the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), EU leaders gave little guidance on specific details, such as the total amount, whether it would provide loans or grants, or on a precise timetable.

Furthermore, EU leaders called on Turkey to end its illegal drilling activities off Cyprus in the island’s Exclusive Economic Zone. They also announced a video-conference between EU Heads of State or Government and their counterparts from the Western Balkans, on 6 May 2020, date of the previously planned EU-Western Balkans Summit.

1. Video-conference of EU Heads of State or Government

On 23 April, the members of the European Council held their fourth video-conference meeting aimed at defining a coordinated EU response to the Covid-19 outbreak. EU Heads of State or Government stressed their ‘strong will to move forward together’. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, in his invitation letter, called on EU leaders to ‘show even greater determination in overcoming our differences’. This call for unity was also shared by the President of the European Parliament, who, as at ordinary meetings of the European Council, addressed EU leaders at the start of the meeting, stressing that ‘the time has come to put blinkered self-interest to one side and to make the solidarity which is at the heart of the European project our guiding principle once again’. Other participants in the 23 April video-conference were the Presidents of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, and of the Eurogroup, Mário Centeno, as well as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell.

The video-conference working method, besides being rather challenging for discussions in the European Council, especially on technical issues, has another consequence, which is that there are in fact more people ‘in the room’ than just the members of the European Council and the above-mentioned guests. In contrast to normal ‘physical meetings’ in Brussels, some leaders had their advisors with them during the discussions.

2. Results of the video-conference

As was the case with the European Council video-conferences of 10 March and 17 March, the ‘Conclusions of the President’, rather than formal conclusions, outlined the results of the discussions. The video-conference of 26 March, on the other hand, concluded with a joint statement.

Table 1 gives an overview of the main points resulting from the video-conference, the type of action taken or answer given by the European Council as well as the envisaged follow up. The wording used in the conclusions is rather vague and less decisive, and is mostly of a reactive nature (i.e. welcoming actions of other players) rather than providing any concrete decisions.

Table 1: Overview of main elements of the European Council video-conference of 23 April 2020

Topic European Council action Tasks and follow up Various dimensions of the European response to the pandemic discussed The European Council will continue to follow the situation closely Joint European roadmap towards lifting of Covid-19 containment measures welcomed The European Council will coordinate as much as possible to ensure gradual and orderly lifting of restrictions Joint Roadmap for Recovery

welcomed

The European Council will monitor progress in close cooperation with other EU institutions

Eurogroup agreement on three important safety nets for workers, businesses and sovereigns endorsed The package should be operational by 1 June 2020 Recovery fund agreed to work towards establishing The Commission will analyse the exact needs and urgently come up with a proposal

MFF

mentioned The Commission will adjust its MFF proposal and clarify the link to the recovery fund

Recovery Fund and MFF

remains committed to

Give the necessary impetus to find a balanced agreement as soon as possible

Economic situation

tasked The Eurogroup, in an inclusive format, will continue to closely monitor and prepare the ground for a robust recovery 3. EU recovery strategy

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, this video-conference focused on the recovery plan, which EU leaders had requested at their 26 March video-conference. EU leaders welcomed the joint roadmap for recovery presented on 21 April by Charles Michel and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. As previously announced by Charles Michel, it focuses on four areas for action:

1. The internal market,
2. an unprecedented investment strategy,
3. a global recovery strategy, and
4. EU resilience and governance.

The President of the European Council indicated that ‘this roadmap will be complemented by a more detailed Action Plan setting out the measures to be taken with the appropriate timings’. In this context, Charles Michel also stressed that producing ‘essential goods in Europe’ was a means of increasing the EU’s strategic autonomy.

4. EU recovery fund and the next Multiannual Financial Framework

One of the core topics of the video-conference meeting was the long term recovery of the EU. The leaders asked the Commission to submit urgently a proposal for the financing of the EU recovery strategy, possibly combining two instruments: 1) a recovery fund, based on Article 122 TFEU, and ‘dedicated to dealing with this unprecedented crisis’, and 2) a strengthened 2021-2027 MFF.

EU Heads of State or Government agreed ‘to work towards establishing a recovery fund’ which ‘shall be of a sufficient magnitude, targeted towards the sectors and geographical parts of Europe most affected, and be dedicated to dealing with this unprecedented crisis’. Yet, the mechanics and the size of the fund, questions which were left unresolved following the Eurogroup meeting of 7-9 April – as countries could not agree on the financing modalities – were again left open. Thus, the Commission was tasked with analysing the exact needs, and with clarifying the fund’s link with the EU’s long-term budget or MFF.

Ursula von der Leyen expressed her conviction that ‘there is only one instrument that can deliver this magnitude of tasks behind the recovery and that is the European budget clearly linked to the recovery fund’. Therefore she was glad that the Heads of State or Government had demonstrated unity and encouraged the Commission to explore innovative financial instruments in relation to the MFF. She announced that the Commission would propose to increase the headroom (i.e. the space between the existing ceiling in the MFF and the own resources ceiling). Based on ‘the legal guarantee of the Member States, the European Commission will be able to raise funds which will then be channelled through the European budget into the Member States’. The current estimates by the Commission assume that ‘an Own Resources ceiling of around 2 per cent of GNI for two or three years instead of the current 1.2 per cent will be required’. President von der Leyen announced that the money would be concentrated in four areas which would receive increased investment:

1. increased financial support for investment and reforms in Member States and cohesion;
2. modern policies: the European Green Deal, digital transition and increased strategic autonomy;
3. the EU’s common crisis response; and
4. strengthening the support to the EU’s neighbourhood and partners.

She indicated the investment should be front-loaded in the first years. According to some estimates, the new recovery fund and MFF package could amount to up to €2 trillion.

The Commission President indicated that her aim was to present the revised MFF proposal in the second or third week of May. However, many questions will need to be answered before the Commission can actually do so. Next to legal considerations linked to the strict rules applying to the MFF, consensus will need to be achieved on issues such as the required balance between loans and grants.

5. Main messages from the European Parliament President

When addressing the European Council, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, relayed Parliament’s recently adopted resolution to the Heads of State or Government. He stressed that Parliament supported the idea of a dedicated ‘recovery fund’, provided that certain key conditions be met, first and foremost, the embedding of the recovery fund in the MFF. For Parliament, this requires a significantly strengthened MFF, which draws on existing EU funds as well as on innovative financial instruments, such as recovery bonds backed by the EU budget. President Sassoli underlined that this fund needed to come quickly, and promised that ‘the European Parliament, as the democratic representative of EU citizens and one arm of the budgetary authority, will do its part, and it expects to be fully involved’.

6. Other items Turkey’s illegal drilling activities

EU leaders reaffirmed their ‘full solidarity’ with Cyprus, and recalled their previous conclusions condemning Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone and calling for their end.

Western Balkans

EU Heads of State or Government will hold a video-conference with their counterparts from the Western Balkans on 6 May 2020, the first day on which an informal EU-Western Balkans summit had initially been scheduled to take place in Zagreb. President Michel stressed that Albania and North Macedonia had recently been given the green light to open accession negotiations, and that the meeting would consider the EU’s priorities for the Western Balkans.

Secretary-General of the Council

Member States also agreed to renew the mandate of Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen as Secretary-General of the Council, to be formally confirmed subsequently by written procedure.

7. Next steps

Apart from the Western Balkans video-conference scheduled for 6 May, no date has been set for a follow-up meeting of the European Council on the roadmap for recovery. However, the European Council has announced that it would monitor progress on all the elements of the strategy in close cooperation with other EU institutions. And since a revised MFF proposal is expected early in May, another meeting of Heads of State or Government can be expected in mid- to late May. Charles Michel reported the political will of the EU leaders to work together on the MFF and the recovery fund, and take decisions in the coming weeks. In this context, EU Heads of State or Government have promised to complement the roadmap with ‘a more detailed Action Plan setting out the measures to be taken with the appropriate timings’. What form this roadmap takes remains to be seen.

Incidentally, as a result of this new crisis, Charles Michel will probably not be able to publish his own work programme for the European Council anytime soon, and is likely to find himself in a similar situation to his two predecessors, who could only present their own work programmes in their second mandates once the respective crises they had faced (i.e. the economic and financial, and the migration crises) had receded.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council video-conference of 23 April 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Nicole Scholz,

© s-motive / Adobe Stock.

Medicines shortages have been a growing problem in the European Union (EU) in recent years. As the coronavirus outbreak unfolds, the risk of bottlenecks in the supply of medicines to patients has become particularly high. More broadly, problems with the availability of, and access to, new medicines – most frequently associated with high-priced medicines – have also been a central topic in political debates for some time now.

The causes underlying medicines shortages are complex and multi-dimensional. The European Commission links them to manufacturing problems, industry quotas, legal parallel trade, but also to economic aspects, such as pricing (which is a competence of the Member States). The coronavirus crisis has brought to the fore the geopolitical dimension of these shortages, that is, the EU’s dependency on countries beyond its boundaries, especially China and India, for the production of many active pharmaceutical ingredients and medicines.

Solutions to the problem are believed to entail collaboration and joint action, as well as the involvement of multiple stakeholders, including regulators, industry, patients, healthcare professionals, and international players. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Health Organization, in particular, are conducting work to improve access to medicines. Medicines supply-chain stakeholders have all weighed in on the debate, offering explanations and recommendations for addressing the problem.

Key EU institutions, several Council presidencies and the Member States have addressed the challenge of shortages and more broadly, that of safeguarding access to medicines, through various initiatives. The European Parliament has specifically addressed the issue in a March 2017 resolution. Ensuring the availability of medicines and overcoming supply-chain problems revealed by the coronavirus crisis are also expected to be important topics in the Commission’s forthcoming pharmaceutical strategy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Addressing shortages of medicines‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tania Latici,

© Jörg Hüttenhölscher / Adobe Stock

While armed forces may find it difficult to distance themselves from what is perceived as their primary mission, the coronavirus pandemic largely challenges society’s vision of their role. This has been showcased through the vital contributions of the military to civilian authorities’ responses to contain and stop the spread of coronavirus.

Exchanging guns for bags of food supplies and disinfectant spray, military personnel have been among the first responders in the coronavirus pandemic. Whether distributing food, building hospitals or shelters for the homeless, European armed forces were mobilised early. Trained to react quickly in highly dangerous conditions, the military carried out missions of repatriation and evacuation of citizens and transported medical supplies and protective equipment. Almost all European Union (EU) Member States have mobilised their armed forces in one way or another.

Discouraging post-crisis economic projections indicate that the impact of the coronavirus pandemic will not spare the defence sector, nor will it weaken geopolitical tensions. With resources further under strain, countries’ abilities to meet the EU’s defence ambitions with the required investments is under question. However, current EU defence initiatives, if appropriately financed, could see the EU being better prepared to face future pandemics among other threats. Examples include various projects under the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) mechanism, as well as the European Defence Fund, whose precursor already envisioned pandemic-relevant projects. While EU missions and operations abroad continue, they too have seen their activities limited. However, this has not stopped the EU from deploying staff to help locals in host countries to tackle the virus.

In coordination with the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has also provided vital assistance to Allies and partners. Its disaster relief coordination centre, as well as the strategic lift platform and rapid air mobility mechanism, successfully ensured the swift provision of essential equipment and supplies. Around the world, armed forces have demonstrated their added value by closely assisting authorities and citizens in battling the pandemic.

Read this briefing on ‘The role of armed forces in the fight against coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Giulio Sabbati,

In May 2019, on a turnout of 51%, European Union citizens elected their representatives to the European Parliament for the next five years. On 31 January 2020, the United Kingdom withdrew from the Union. Of the 73 seats vacated by Members elected in the UK, 27 have been redistributed among 14 Member States, while 46 remain available for potential EU enlargements and/or the possible creation of a transnational constituency in the future. The number of seats in the Parliament has fallen from 751 to 705. The 705 MEPs elected have an average age of 50 years (with the youngest being 21 and the oldest 83). A majority of MEPs (414) are new to the Parliament. Women now represent 39.5% of all MEPs.

© European Union 2020, EPRS

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Members of the European Parliament from February 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

EU farmers are among the few key workers who have not seen a dramatic change in their daily routines since the coronavirus crisis began. They are still farming to supply EU citizens with food. Some public health protection measures have however affected farming activities and sales badly. While the EU has taken a number of measures to mitigate this impact, the possibility of further measures is high on the agricultural policy agenda.

Impact on farming activities

© Minerva Studio / Adobe Stock

Although farming has continued during the pandemic, farming activities are in distress. Disruptions to the EU agri-food supply chain range from difficulties accessing supplies and farm workers, to limitations or closures of the destination markets for produce. The situation varies by product and region, with the crisis hitting at different times. Seasonal labour plays an important role in various stages throughout the production process for fruit and vegetables, wine and other permanent crops. Beyond supply chains, the crisis is also affecting prices and final demand. The absence of the demand normally sparked by springtime religious festivities and private celebrations has already had a major impact on sectors as diverse as sheep-meat production and floriculture. The closure of restaurants and catering services is having a dramatic effect on meat and wine consumption. The European Commission’s April 2020 outlook notes the effects of consumers neglecting high-value bovine meat cuts in favour of less expensive poultry meat. Farmers’ representatives have highlighted costs relating to the seasonal nature of certain products (such as flowers and ornamental plants, the sector worst affected with demand falling by up to 80 %) and to the loss of usual markets (such as for eggs and egg products). Surplus volumes of milk are resulting from a drop in demand, and some dairies cannot process all milk deliveries. Although agricultural production is on track for this year, the final impact will depend on how the crisis develops and on the strategies put in place.

EU support measures

The EU has taken several measures to alleviate the impact of the crisis on farmers and farming activities.

Preserving the food supply chain: The guidelines issued by the Commission in mid-March – on ensuring the availability of goods and essential services and the free movement of workers – are helping Member States to work together despite the restrictive border management measures adopted to protect health. The objectives are to let lorries transporting goods pass through fast-track border crossings (‘green lanes’), and to allow workers in critical occupations (including seasonal farm workers) to travel to their workplaces.

Supporting activities and simplifying business operations: Recent legislative initiatives have adapted common agricultural policy (CAP) rules to the crisis. Farmers and rural development players now have more time to apply for EU subsidies, as the deadline has been postponed from 15 May to 15 June 2020 (several Member States have decided to take advantage of this extension and allow CAP beneficiaries more time). Increased advances on payments of EU subsidies for the year 2020 will help to augment cash flows (such increases mean higher advances on both direct payments, from 50 % to 70 %, and rural development payments, from 75 % to 85 %). The reduction of physical on-the-spot checks for CAP aid, accompanied by flexibility on checking requirements needed prior to payments, will help to cut red tape and avoid delays in payments, while minimising physical contact between farmers and inspectors.

The Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus (CRII+) introduces flexibility and simplification to the use of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), including favourable conditions for loans and guarantees, cover for operational costs of up to €200 000, and leeway for EU countries to amend their rural development programmes so as to reallocate residual funds.

In addition to CAP measures, the temporary framework for State aid enables Member States to secure liquidity for businesses through a range of measures, such as public loans and direct grants. Farmers can benefit from up to €100 000 each, topped up by de minimis aid (national support for agriculture granted without the need for prior Commission approval) of €20 000 (or in some cases €25 000) per farm.

Sustaining agricultural markets: On 22 April, the Commission announced a series of measures to support those agricultural markets worst hit by the crisis. The package of proposals would provide aid for the withdrawal from the market and private storage of certain products (skimmed milk powder, butter, cheese, beef, and sheep and goat meat). The crisis management measures would become a priority in the use of funds in the market support programmes for wine, fruits and vegetables, olive oil, apiculture and the EU’s school scheme. Derogations from competition rules would also allow milk, floriculture and potato sector operators to cooperate on production planning or product withdrawal.

Investing in agriculture and the bioeconomy: In early April, the European Investment Bank (EIB) launched a programme of loans worth €700 million with a view to unlocking close to €1.6 billion in investment in the agriculture and bioeconomy sectors. The financing initiative aims to support a wide range of projects, for investments ranging from €15 million to €200 million by companies operating in agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, or in the up- or downstream value chain.

Debate on further EU instruments and action

Both national authorities and stakeholders welcomed the initial EU measures. However, many have pushed for further and more targeted measures and for funding outside the CAP budget. Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) and EU agriculture ministers have urged the Commission to make further efforts to address the difficulties of EU farmers. The Commission has stressed the need to use up any unspent rural development funds, given the lack of money at a time when most of the funds have run out and the future budget has not yet been agreed.

Market measures: The rules on common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (the CMO Regulation) provide that the Commission can activate exceptional and emergency measures, such as those announced on 22 April and presented above, to address market disturbances. Such measures have been the most common and pressing request of all stakeholders, together with more specific proposals, such as crisis support for the distillation of wine into ethanol for the manufacture of disinfectant.

Crisis reserve: The CAP’s financial rules (CAP horizontal regulation) provide for a reserve for crises in agriculture, based on an annual reduction of direct payments to farmers to finance exceptional measures. If not used, such amounts are reimbursed to farmers at the end of the year. The deployment of the reserve could free up to €478 million, but such a decision would mean less money for farmers later on.

Rural development: The EU’s rural development policy is based on multiannual national (sometimes regional) programmes, co-financed by Member States. According to the Commission some €6 billion is still available in programmes ending in 2020, or more than double that if calls for applications not yet finalised are considered. Adjustments are possible to redirect the remaining funds towards measures that could help those farmers and rural areas hardest hit by the crisis, such as support for investment in restoring the production potential of farms or setting up medical facilities in rural areas. Moreover, when the programmes include risk management tools, these can compensate farmers for their losses.

Future agricultural budget: EU support for farmers and rural areas still plays a major role in the EU budget, with direct payments to farmers representing the bulk of total CAP expenditure. Such payments help to make farming more profitable, but they can also function as a safety net in cases of agricultural income loss in difficult times. Their hectare-based nature directs them towards certain types of farm. Proposals under discussion for the post-2020 EU budget and CAP envisage a reduction in agricultural funds for the 2021-2027 period. If resources are redirected owing to the current crisis, safeguarding an adequate post-2020 CAP budget that gives full consideration to agricultural policy’s key role will prove extremely challenging.

Trade: The role of trade in the EU’s food system goes beyond food and drink exchanges, to include trade in agricultural inputs, packaging materials, machinery, and any supplies that contribute to food security. As food security is not achievable at local level, and self-sufficiency cannot work everywhere, the EU can act to prevent the restrictive measures adopted to protect health from limiting trade in the internal market, while also outlawing unfair trading practices. In addition, the EU can act at global level to favour exchanges, by means of bilateral talks with trade partners (for instance regarding US customs tariffs on EU exports) and the promotion of EU products on the market. On the defensive side, there are calls to revise the rules on EU import quotas from third countries, and to put agriculture-sensitive trade negotiations aside.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Coronavirus crisis support for EU farmers‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© wernerimages / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic poses a serious challenge to the European Union, arguably testing at once its solidarity, resilience, capacity and even relevance. Some analysts see the current crisis as an ‘existential’ threat to the Union, whilst others sense it to be a significant opportunity to assert the need for collective solutions and to build greater systemic strength for the future. A lively debate has broken out among thinkers and commentators about the implications of the crisis for the future of European integration, the policy priorities of the Union, and the capabilities and resources of its institutions.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the challenges of the coronavirus for the EU and related issues. The papers gathered here have all been written before the European Council video-conference of 23 April 2020.

Covid-19: A turning-point for the EU?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Corona will kill or cure the EU
Friends of Europe, April 2020

Covid-19: Lessons from the ‘euro crisis’
European Policy Centre, April 2020

The great lockdown: Impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the global economy
Polish Institute for International Affairs, April 2020

European vision and ambition needed: Italy and Germany must promote a global EU response to Covid-19
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Why the EU should take the global lead in cancelling Africa’s debt
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

How the EU should co-ordinate an end to the Covid-19 lockdown
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Defence against the coronavirus, or the soldier and the welfare state
Egmont, April 2020

Beyond coronabonds: A new constituent for Europe
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Covid-19 : En qu(o)i les Français ont-ils confiance?
Fondation Jean Jaurès, April 2020

Protecting employment in the time of coronavirus
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

Will Covid-19 reduce the resistance to Eurobonds?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

Européaniser notre relance économique
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, April 2020

A global agreement on medical equipment and supplies to fight Covid-19
European Centre for International Political Economy, April 2020

Covid-19 and the liberal international order: Exposing instabilities and weaknesses in an open international system
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, April 2020

Why the EU should lead talks between Kosovo and Serbia
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

The EU needs a more comprehensive vision to tackle pandemics
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

Coronavirus does not mean the end of globalisation
European Centre for International Political Economy, April 2020

Covid-19: La fin du leadership américain?
Institut français des relations internationales, April 2020

10 ways of thinking about crisis resilience
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, April 2020

Coronavirus: Trends and landscapes for the aftermath
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

From Strategic Autonomy to the internationalization of the euro: Europe’s challenges and the impact of the Covid-19 crisis
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

The pandemic and the toll of transatlantic discord
German Marshall Fund, April 2020

L’UE face au coronavirus: Comment financer l’économie européenne en temps de crise?
Confrontations Europe, April 2020

A coordinated, unlimited and flexible insurance policy to respond to the pandemic
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

Eurozone passes coronavirus rescue plan, but political unity remains elusive
Atlantic Council, April 2020

Europe’s missing coronavirus exit strategy
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

Take me to your leader! Or how the EU could emerge stronger from the corona crisis
Egmont, April 2020

Corona: EU’s existential crisis
Clingendael, April 2020

The EU can emerge stronger from the pandemic if Merkel seizes the moment
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Debt monetization and EU recovery bonds
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, April 2020

A joint effort to increase production of medical masks in Europe
Clingendael, April 2020

Climate ambition in times of corona
Friends of Europe, April 2020

Covid-19: Can the EU avoid an epidemic of authoritarianism?
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Europe’s debate on fiscal policy: Too much yet too little
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 20

A proposal for a coronabond: The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Boosting Europe’s resilience with better health systems: Lessons from the Covid-19 crisis
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Will SURE shield EU workers from the corona crisis?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

EU trade in medical goods: Why self-sufficiency is the wrong approach
Bruegel, April 2020

How is the Covid-19 crisis serving the EU?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

A European approach to fund the coronavirus cost is in the interest of all
Bruegel, April 202

Bouncing back again: How past crises can help Eastern Europe fight Covid-19
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Trouble for the EU is brewing in coronavirus-hit Italy
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Kaczynski’s folly: Time for Europeans to speak out
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

The coronavirus crisis: An opportunity to mend Polish-Ukrainian relations
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

In the corona crisis, who is the more reliable international partner?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, April 2020

The ripple effects of the coronavirus in Turkey
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

Why an inclusive circular economy is needed to prepare for future global crises
Chatham House, April 2020

Coronavirus and the future of democracy in Europe
Chatham House, April 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Implications for the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Cécile Remeur,

© Thomas / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic and its financial and economic consequences have caused a major economic downturn, and the European Union (EU) has moved rapidly to respond with monetary and fiscal policy measures. The fiscal policy instruments deployed include the adaptation of State aid rules to the exceptional circumstances to allow Member States to support their economies by means of direct or indirect intervention.

From a competition law point of view, measures that constitute State aid are in principle illegal, unless issued under an exemption, such as the De minimis Regulation or the General Block Exemption Regulation, subject to notification and European Commission approval. The State aid rules do, however, already allow for aid to compensate for damage caused by natural disasters and exceptional events, such as a pandemic.

State aid can also be used to remedy serious disturbances to the economy. The temporary framework adopted by the Commission in March 2020 sets out temporary State aid measures that the Commission will consider compatible with the State aid rules, allowing Member States full flexibility in supporting their coronavirus-stricken economies. The temporary framework is in place to address Member States’ various needs more effectively.

The framework initially focused on measures to ensure liquidity. In early April, it was broadened to include measures to support the economy and coronavirus-related medical investment, research and production, as well as measures to ease the social and tax liabilities of companies and the self-employed and measures to subsidise workers’ wages.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State aid and the pandemic: How State aid can back coronavirus economic support measures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Monika Kiss,

© Angelov / Adobe Stock

The coronavirus pandemic and the measures taken to curb its spread have had far-reaching and lasting consequences in different sectors of the economy, in the form of job and income losses or significantly modified working conditions.

This briefing gives an overview of the host of problems confronting workers and employers due to the pandemic and its consequences, and presents possible solutions that can be applied at different levels. A set of solutions concerns the level of the individual worker or the company employing them. Certain types of occupations, for instance, allow ‘going digital’ (even if teleworking also has its challenges). In other cases, the company can pay partial or total wages or sick leave to its employees.

At yet another level, that of the Member States, short-time work schemes can be introduced or have their scope further extended. Governments can also regulate parameters of teleworking or extend income replacements to groups of workers benefiting from lesser social protection.

Through initiatives such as the Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in Emergency (SURE) and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiatives, the European Union is taking an active part in tackling the coronavirus crisis by supporting Member States, companies and workers to face the challenges. At its 16-17 April plenary session, the European Parliament voted on and adopted a number of important coronavirus-related proposals, concerning among others workers in certain sectors (healthcare, fishermen and aquaculture farmers) as well as more flexible use of the European structural and investment funds.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Coronavirus and the world of work‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carla Stamegna and Angelos Delivorias,

© bluedesign / Adobe Stock

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union specifies the maintenance of price stability in the euro area as the primary objective of EU single monetary policy. Subject to that, it should also contribute to the achievement of the Union’s objectives, which include ‘full employment’ and ‘balanced economic growth’. Responsibility for monetary policy conduct is attributed to the Eurosystem, which carries out its tasks through a set of standard instruments referred to as the ‘operational framework’. To tackle the financial crisis, the Eurosystem has complemented its regular operations by implementing several non-standard monetary policy measures since 2009.

The first strand of these measures had the primary objective of restoring the correct functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism by supporting certain distressed financial market segments, playing an important role in the conduct of monetary policy. A second strand of non-standard measures was aimed at sustaining prices and fostering economic growth by expanding the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet through massive purchases of eligible securities, including public debt instruments issued by euro-area countries. Net purchases were conducted between October 2014 and December 2018, after which the Eurosystem continued to simply reinvest repayments from maturing securities to maintain the size of cumulative net purchases at December 2018 levels. Due to prevailing conditions, however, in September 2019, the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council decided to recommence net purchases in November of the same year ‘for as long as necessary to reinforce the accommodative impact of its policy rates’.

The spread of the coronavirus in early 2020 has impaired growth prospects for the global and euro-area economies and made additional monetary stimulus necessary. In this context, the ECB has increased the size of existing asset purchase programmes, and launched a temporary, separate and additional pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP).

Read the complete briefing on ‘Developing a pandemic emergency purchase programme: Unconventional monetary policy to tackle the coronavirus crisis‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Simplified representation of the primary and secondary market for public debt securities

Written by Lieve Van Woensel and Mihalis Kritikos with Jens Van Steereghem,

New genetic technologies allow scientists to drastically accelerate the traditional breeding process, thereby achieving in years what previously took centuries. How will this change the way we produce food?

EP

The breeding of plants and animals has been happening ever since the advent of agriculture. It involves selecting individual organisms with desired traits and making them reproduce with other organisms without losing the valuable trait, subsequently using the offspring as new stock from which to select new desirable traits. Over time, the bred organisms develop so many new characteristics that they are markedly different from their wild relatives. The conventional process takes a long time. Breeders have to wait for valuable traits (larger fruit, resistance to disease, more meat, etc.) to arise spontaneously, by extensive screening of crops using classical mutagenesis, or by crossbreeding to utilise the strengths of existing stocks of desired traits.

However, modern genetic techniques can speed up this process. Now, scientists can use the large amounts of genomic data available through DNA sequencing, as well as an increased understanding of molecular biology to determine the traits certain genes engender, and subsequently modify these genes by editing the DNA sequence. Whereas conventional breeders have to wait for the edit of the gene to occur spontaneously, breeders can now introduce the edit with precision. The most popular editing technology currently in use is CRISPR-Cas – a straightforward, efficient and cheap molecular tool that can be programmed to cut specific DNA sequences. It is in repairing these cuts that the sequence can be modified, using the cellular repair mechanisms of the organisms themselves. Scientists can use this method to knock out genes (make them lose their function), edit genes (modify a single pair or a few base pairs, i.e. letters of the DNA code), delete regions of DNA, or add DNA (foreign DNA, referred to as trans/cisgenes). At the moment, the most accessible edits are knock-outs of genes that have a clear correlation to a trait. However, more understanding of gene networks and systems biology, and further optimisation of the technology is likely to lead to more fundamental engineering, changing the biology of agricultural species to produce food with prescribed qualities.

Potential impacts and developments

In plants, research has focused on increasing yields, improving tolerance to biotic and abiotic stress, and biofortification. Biotic stress consists of viral, fungal and bacterial diseases. Abiotic stress can be environmental – relating to cold, salt, drought and nitrogen, or deriving from herbicide exposure. Biofortification increases the nutritional value of the plant. One example is the genetically modified organism (GMO) golden rice, which is enriched with beta-carotene, a precursor of vitamin A. The main species being edited in research are rice, maize, tomato, potato, barley and wheat. Examples include development of a variety of wheat resistant to powdery mildew (a type of fungal disease), enhancement of seed oil composition in camelina, and inhibition of fruit ripening in tomato. It is hoped that many of these CRISPR-Cas edited crops will be part of a transition to a more sustainable form of agriculture.

In animals, research has produced hornless dairy cattle, removing the need for painful dehorning, pigs resistant to classical swine fever virus, and beef cattle with larger muscles, for instance. The example of hornless dairy cattle is one of several initiatives aimed at reducing animal suffering in food production. Other research is geared towards producing beef cattle with male-only offspring and egg-laying hens that lay only female eggs. In both cases offspring of the other sex are now culled because they are not commercially useful.

These engineered plants and animals are only edited, in other words they contain no transgenes, i.e. genes from other species (even though this is possible using CRISPR-Cas). This means that all changes introduced could have occurred by random mutation or classical mutagenesis in conventional breeding. CRISPR-Cas does have the tendency to produce off-target effects, which means edits occasionally occur in other parts of the genome that were not targeted. This is not really a problem, as mutations also occur naturally in organisms, often without effect. Moreover, the edit itself and potential off-targets can be checked by DNA sequencing, allowing the selection of organisms with only the desired edits. Scientists are also working hard to improve the CRISPR-Cas system to reduce off-target effects and make it specific to the targeted sequence.

Policy can determine whether the technology contributes to more sustainable food production or, on the contrary, leads to an unfair distribution of the surplus value resulting from innovative gene editing.

Anticipatory policy-making

Given the rapid pace of scientific developments in the field of gene editing, its regulatory oversight seems more necessary than ever. In February 2017, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) noted that the debate about genome editing should address not only safety, but also broader societal questions, such as justice, equality, proportionality and autonomy. In July 2018, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that genome-edited organisms qualify as products of genetic engineering and hence fall under the scope of the Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC. According to the ruling, as genome-editing techniques have not yet demonstrated a long safety record in the open field or in a number of applications they cannot be exempted from the rules applying to GMOs.

The Commission is now working with EU Member States and stakeholders to implement the Court’s ruling. In October 2018, the Commission asked the European Union Reference Laboratory for GM Food and Feed (EU-RL GMFF), together with the European Network of GMO Laboratories (ENGL), to draw up a report on the detection of food and feed plant products obtained by new mutagenesis techniques. The report was published in March 2019. It highlights challenges and limitations relating to detection and identification, concluding that products of genome editing can only be readily detected in commodity products if prior knowledge of the altered genome sequence is available. During the 2014-2019 term, the European Parliament objected to every proposed authorisation of genetically modified food and feed, demanding the suspension of all GMO approvals.

In November 2019, the Council asked the European Commission to prepare a study on the status of new genomic techniques under EU law, by 30 April 2021, so as to minimise legal uncertainties in this area. The Commission is currently carrying out targeted consultations with Member States and EU-level stakeholders to gather information for this study. The main question that needs to be addressed is whether products developed using gene editing should be regulated on the basis of the process or the final product’s characteristics, or whether a hybrid approach should be taken.

As food safety is a sensitive matter of primary concern to all Union citizens, any policy initiative in this field should not only be informed by the findings of the Commission study and the respective public consultations, but also be grounded in the principles introduced by Regulation 2019/1381 on the transparency and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain and the need to accommodate conflicting value frames by broadening the scope of the risk assessment framework and/or by transforming ethical or socio-economic considerations into substantive regulatory standards.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if CRISPR became a standard breeding technique?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© denisismagilov / Adobe Stock

As the coronavirus crisis continues to take its deadly toll across the world, it does so with varying degrees of severity depending on the country. Some states are considering relaxing preventive measures against the disease, others are doing so already. Many analysts and politicians are beginning to turn their attention from short-term measures to contain the virus and save economies from collapse to longer-term challenges, such as the pandemic’s impact on international governance, defence, foreign policy and the international debt market.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous edition item in this series, published by the EPRS on 15 April.

How the EU should co-ordinate an end to the Covid-19 lockdown
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Protecting employment in the time of coronavirus
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

In the corona crisis, who is the more reliable international partner?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, April 2020

The EU needs a more comprehensive vision to tackle pandemics
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

The global coronavirus crisis: An uneven recovery and rising political risk
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2020

Covid-19: La fin du leadership américain?
Institut français des relations internationales , April 2020

From Strategic Autonomy to the internationalization of the euro: Europe’s challenges and the impact of the Covid-19 crisis
Instituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Year of the Rat: The strategic consequences of the coronavirus crisis
Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, April 2020

L’UE face au coronavirus: Comment financer l’économie européenne en temps de crise?
Confrontations Europe, April 2020

A coordinated, unlimited and flexible insurance policy to respond to the pandemic
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

Eurozone passes coronavirus rescue plan, but political unity remains elusive
Atlantic Council, April 2020

The coronavirus threatens NATO: Let’s move to protect the alliance
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, April 2020

The armed forces and Covid-19
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2020

Call on European Parliament: Stop freight cabotage restrictions and save the Single Market
European Centre for International Political Economy, April 2020

Humanity, politics and politicians in Covid times
Friends of Europe, April 2020

The coronavirus as a yardstick of global health policy
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

Europe’s missing coronavirus exit strategy
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

Lessons from comparing the Covid-19 pandemic with the global cyber threat
International Institute for Strategic Studies, April 2020

Covid-19: Les réponses européennes
Fondation Robert Schuman, April 2020

What you need to know about the coronavirus pandemic
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Take me to your leader! Or how the EU could emerge stronger from the corona crisis
Egmont, April 2020

Coronavirus: How are countries responding to the economic crisis?
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Corona: EU’s existential crisis
Cligendael, April 2020

The EU can emerge stronger from the pandemic if Merkel seizes the moment
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Beware Russian and Chinese positioning for after the pandemic
Chatham House, April 2020

How are China and Russia responding to and capitalizing on the coronavirus crisis
German Marshall Fund, April 2020

Covid-19 in Latin America: Political challenges, trials for health systems and economic uncertainty
Real Instituto Elcano, April 2020

Pandemic may replace the nation-state: But with what?
Atlantic Council, April 2020

The perils of more debt
Bruegel, April 2020

A joint effort to increase production of medical masks in Europe
Cligendael, April 2020

The coronavirus: A geopolitical earthquake
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Covid-19 brings human rights into focus
Chatham House, April 2020

Covid-19: Can the EU avoid an epidemic of authoritarianism?
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

China was slammed for initial Covid-19 secrecy, but its scientists led the way in tackling the virus
Egmont, April 2020

The Covid-19 pandemic and European security: Between damages and crises
Instituto Affari Internazionali, April 2020

Coronavirus in conflict zones: A sobering landscape
Carnegie Europe, April 2020

Covid-19: America’s looming election crisis
Chatham House, April 2020

Europe’s debate on fiscal policy: Too much yet too little
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

Covid-19: The self-employed are hardest hit and least supported
Bruegel, April 2020

A proposal for a coronabond: The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Three implications of the corona crisis in Iran
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020

Boosting Europe’s resilience with better health systems: Lessons from the Covid-19 crisis
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Will SURE shield EU workers from the corona crisis?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2020

Social distancing: Did individuals act before governments?
Bruegel, April 2020

Anatomy of the coronavirus collapse
Brookings Institution, April 2020

Turkey preparing early release in response to crisis: Will political prisoners be excluded?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020

EU trade in medical goods: Why self-sufficiency is the wrong approach
Bruegel, April 2020

What the coronavirus pandemic teaches us about fighting climate change
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

How is the Covid-19 crisis serving the EU?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Lessons from Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19
Atlantic Council, April 2020

A green recovery
Bruegel, April 2020

A European approach to fund the coronavirus cost is in the interest of all
Bruegel, April 202

Covid-19 and the Iranian shadows of war
Chatham House, April 2020

Could the coronavirus change the way we think about health?
European Policy Centre, April 2020

The pandemic offers new opportunities for South African leadership in the region
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Bouncing back again: How past crises can help Eastern Europe fight Covid-19
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Bojo’s Coronavirus fall out
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, April 2020

The impact of the coronavirus on mortgage refinancings
Brookings Institution, April 2020

The refugee drama in Syria, Turkey, and Greece
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2020

Don’t sacrifice democracy on the altar of public health
European Policy Centre, April 2020

Trouble for the EU is brewing in coronavirus-hit Italy
Centre for European Reform, April 2020

Defeating Covid-19 in Gaza: Is it enough?
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2020

Coronavirus: Between the global and the national
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, March 2020

Coronavirus: Infodemics and disinformation
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, March 2020

Conflict and peace scenarios in times of Covid-19
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, March 2020

Covid-19: Le prix de l’incurie
Institut français des relations internationales , March 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Impact and challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Anja Radjenovic,

© Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock

To curb the spread of coronavirus and to protect their populations, the EU and its Member States have restricted crossings of their external borders, and many internal EU borders, as well as restricted freedom of movement within their territory. These steps have also served to address the challenges the pandemic has posed to public order, public health and national security. However, the resulting restrictions on people’s movement and access to EU territory could disproportionately affect the most vulnerable, among them asylum-seekers-already in the EU or trying to reach its territory to seek asylum.

The situation of asylum-seekers during the current pandemic is especially critical in the EU hotspots; Greece, for instance, whose reception capacity has been stretched to the limit, is struggling to ensure the safety of the most vulnerable asylum-seekers, especially unaccompanied minors. While the EU has been assisting Greece to protect stranded asylum-seekers, NGOs and international organisations as well as the European Parliament have called for greater efforts to improve their living conditions and ensure the preventive evacuation of those at high risk.

Several Member States have adopted emergency measures to deal with the pandemic. To protect public health, they have closed their external borders and ports to asylum-seekers, suspended asylum procedures and returns, and imposed mandatory confinement in asylum reception centres to restrict freedom of movement. All those measures risk having a negative impact on asylum-seekers’ fundamental rights under EU and international law.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Tackling the coronavirus outbreak: Impact on asylum-seekers in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Shutterstock

As the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic intensifies, technological applications and initiatives are multiplying in an attempt to limit the spread of the disease, treat patients and facilitate the work of overworked healthcare workers. At a time when everyone needs better information, including epidemic disease modellers, state authorities, international organisations and people in quarantine, measures such as social distancing, and digital information and surveillance technologies have been unleashed in an unprecedented manner to collect data and reliable evidence in support of public health decision-making.

Countries around the world are authorising clinical trials involving experimental techniques such as gene editing, synthetic biology and nanotechnologies, in a race to prepare and testing future vaccines, treatments and diagnostics. Artificial intelligence, robots and drones are helping to track the disease and enforce restrictive measures while service robots are being deployed in various ways in hospitals.

Bottom-up technologies, such as 3D printing and open-software solutions are being harnessed to address the growing need for medical hardware (e.g. masks, ventilators and breathing filters) and optimise the supply of the necessary medical equipment to hospitals. Blockchain applications can meanwhile track contagion, manage insurance payments related to the disease outbreak, sustain medical supply chains and facilitate the performance of much-needed EU-wide clinical trials in an effective, transparent and credible manner.

At the same time, throughout this pandemic crisis, telehealth technologies have emerged as a cost-effective means to slow the virus’s spread and to maintain hospital capacity, by operating as a triage system, keeping those with moderate symptoms at home and routing more severe cases to hospitals.

But are these technologies safe and effective in the context of Covid-19? Have they been tested before in a public health emergency context? Are they ready to provide tangible and operative solutions that could facilitate governments’ efforts to address the many challenges associated with this pandemic? Do they strengthen the evidence-based character of the response measures taken worldwide? Can possible regulatory hurdles concerning their authorisation be by-passed via ad hoc fast-track procedures? Does their extensive or immediate use involve risks and threaten our values and rights in the long run?

EPRS in-depth analysis

This well-timed EPRS publication on the ten technologies central to the fight against Covid-19 offers some well-informed answers to these crucial questions. More importantly, it constitutes a much-needed analysis of what is at stake, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, in technological terms world-wide, paying particular attention to applications that have either been put in use or are being tested before operational deployment.

The analysis presents a non-exhaustive overview of the technologies currently in use, highlighting their main features and significance in the response to the coronavirus pandemic but also their possible limitations. It examines a wide range of technological applications developed to monitor and contain the rapid spread of the disease but also to ensure that public health institutions maintain their capacity to meet the ever-increasing needs generated by the pandemic.

However, given that most of these technological applications have been mainstreamed or put forward in a hasty decision-making environment where decisions are extremely reactive, careful thought must also be given to their potential repercussions. In the context of the current pandemic, governments have launched numerous data-collection and location-tracking technological applications by means of emergency laws that involve the temporary suspension of fundamental rights, triggering questions about the potential future impact on hard-won civil liberties and concerns about state authorities maintaining heightened levels of surveillance even after the pandemic has ended. Medical devices and in-vitro diagnostics vaccines are meanwhile in the pipeline for fast-tracked authorisation although most of these technologies have never been applied in a medical emergency context before. Furthermore, all this also raises the question of whether the fight against Covid-19 will facilitate even more aggressive automation of daily life when everything returns to ‘normal’.

The analysis addresses the possible lasting legal and ethical questions that policy-makers, legislators and expert groups that advise governments and international organisations and will be confronted with very soon and brings forward some preliminary considerations. It illustrates the main regulatory and socio-ethical dilemmas that the manifold use of these technologies poses when used in a public-health emergency context such as the current one but also those that will arise once the virus has subsided. The analysis identifies the legal challenges that emerging technologies, such as those currently employed in the context of Covid-19 pose to existing EU legislation, examines possible legal gaps and proposes options for the emergency authorisation of some of the technological applications under consideration.

Although the focus of this analysis is on technological applications presenting solutions to pressing pandemic-related problems, this piece of work does not aim to reinforce ideas of techno-solutionism. In other words, technological applications in their own right cannot solve complex societal challenges, such as those associated with the current pandemic. Rather, the main findings of the analysis indicate that technology cannot in itself replace or make up for other public policy measures but it does have an increasingly critical role to play in emergency responses in a variety of domains.

The current crisis has demonstrated not only the vulnerability of global public health systems but also the potential of certain emerging technological pathways to fight this pandemic disease at the levels of prevention, containment and treatment. The first major pandemic of our century, Covid-19 represents an excellent opportunity for policy-makers and regulators to reflect on the legal plausibility, ethical soundness and effectiveness of deploying emerging technologies under extreme time pressure. Striking the right balance will be crucial when it comes to maintaining the public’s trust in evidence-based public health interventions and for safeguarding the potential of promising – albeit immature – technologies to serve the public interest.

Read the complete ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Ten technologies to fight coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak,

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The crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic has, with tragic consequences, brought to the fore the fact that the European Union (EU) is dependent on non-EU sources for medical equipment such as personal protection equipment (including masks) and artificial respiratory equipment, as well as other products needed in the fight against the virus. In response to shortages, Member States have taken initiatives to produce and distribute medical equipment and the EU has put in place a number of coordinated responses, such as the creation of the rescEU stockpile of emergency medical equipment, and the restriction of exports of personal protective equipment outside the European Union.

A mapping of EU trade in four categories of product – pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, personal protection and medical supplies – shows that, in all four categories, as few as five trade partners provide about 75 % of EU imports. Exports are more diffuse, with five partners receiving approximately half of EU exports. In 2019, the EU was a net exporter of medical products in all four categories, with pharmaceutical products representing most of its trade surplus of medical products. The weaker domain is personal protection products. The main EU import partners are Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, China, and Singapore, with the first three appearing among the top four countries in all categories. Additional insights into the value chains of chemical and pharmaceutical sector production in the EU’s top five import partners suggest that China and other countries provide a far larger share in raw materials and manufacturing than direct imports suggest. These results imply that the production of medical products is far more scattered than direct import numbers would suggest.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU imports and exports of medical equipment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gregor Erbach (1st edition),

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On 4 March 2020, the European Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a European climate law, setting the objective for the EU to become climate-neutral by 2050 and establishing a framework for achieving that objective. This would involve the Commission reviewing the EU’s 2030 target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in light of the mid-century climate neutrality objective, exploring options for 50 to 55 % emissions reduction, and proposing a new 2030 target, if necessary. The Commission would be empowered to set out an emissions trajectory for the period between 2030 and 2050. The proposed regulation would also require EU institutions and Member States to build on their climate change measures. The Commission would have to carry out five-yearly assessments – aligned with the review cycle of the Paris Agreement – of progress made towards the objectives and of the consistency of national and EU measures with the objectives. It would be required to take corrective action and could issue recommendations to Member States whose measures were inconsistent with the emissions trajectory. Moreover, the Commission would have to ensure broad public participation.

The December 2019 European Council meeting endorsed the 2050 climate-neutrality objective. In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.

Versions

• April 2020:  ‘European climate law‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2020) 80 final
4.3.2020 Rapporteur: Jytte Guteland (S&D, Sweden) 2020/0036 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Mairead McGuinness (EPP, Ireland), Nils Torvalds, (Renew, Finland), Syliva Limmer (ID, Germany), Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany), Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland), Silvia Modig (GUE/NGL, Finland) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen,

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The European Council video-conference meeting on 23 April 2020 is expected to shift EU leaders’ attention away from immediate and short-term priorities, such as limiting the spread of the coronavirus, to a longer-term strategic approach focused on a recovery strategy for the European Union, and the financing thereof. The recovery strategy could be based on four pillars: 1) the internal market, including the Green Deal, the digital agenda and the EU’s strategic autonomy; 2) an investment strategy, to be included in the next seven-year EU budget and reflected in the work programme of the European Investment Bank; 3) a global recovery strategy reinforcing the external responsibility of the EU and promoting multilateralism; and 4) strengthening resilience and governance for a stronger EU after the crisis. As the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the seven years from 2021 to 2027, which has yet to be agreed, touches upon all four pillars of the recovery strategy, EU leaders will engage in a strategic discussion on the MFF during their video-conference.

1. European Council discussion of the coronavirus outbreak to date

The European Council video-conference on 23 April 2020 will be the fourth of its kind in six weeks, the previous ones having taken place on 10 March, 17 March and on 26 March. The first three video-conferences focused on five priorities outlined by the European Council: 1) limiting the spread of the virus; 2) providing medical equipment; 3) promoting research, including the development of a vaccine; 4) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the outbreak; and 5) providing help for EU citizens stranded in third countries. Whilst, on 23 April, the EU Heads of State or Government will review the follow-up to previously agreed measures in the fight against the Covid-19 outbreak, they are likely to concentrate their attention on the recovery strategy for the medium and long term, and the related financial needs.

Since the last European Council video-conference, at which discussions were directed at finding appropriate financing instruments to help countries in fiscal difficulty due to the crisis, a comprehensive reflection has been carried out on ways of tackling the socio-economic consequences.

Tackling the socio-economic consequences of the outbreak

At their video-conference on 26 March, the EU Heads of State or Government invited the Eurogroup to present, within two weeks, proposals on ways to tackle the dire socio-economic consequences of the coronavirus crisis. The latest IMF World Economic Outlook projects that the global economy will shrink by 3 % in 2020, the biggest drop since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Eurogroup met in an inclusive format (with all 27 Member States) for a video-conference on 7-9 April. Whilst originally scheduled for just one day, an agreement among ministers advocating very different instruments to support those Member States most affected by the Covid-19 outbreak, proved more complicated to achieve. The gridlock reflected differing views on, i) the relevance of debt mutualisation, with Italy strongly backing ‘corona bonds’ and the Netherlands, in particular, vehemently against; and ii) on macroeconomic conditions for European Stability Mechanism (ESM) loans, which some countries, spearheaded by Italy, said were too strict.

The Eurogroup report of 9 April on the EU’s economic policy response to the Covid-19 outbreak states that it is ‘committed to do everything necessary to meet this challenge in a spirit of solidarity’. The ministers mention that a coordinated and a comprehensive strategy is needed to fight the coronavirus and its adverse socio-economic impact, and that the plan should include short, medium and long-term actions to maintain stability and confidence.

The Eurogroup agreed on a financing plan of more than half a trillion euro, consisting of several tools. To fight the pandemic, EU budget flexibility will be used, and the emergency support instrument will be activated, whilst three safety nets are being deployed: 1) to address the needs of workers suddenly facing unemployment, on 2 April, the Commission made a proposal for a Council regulation on a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE); 2) to support the challenges EU businesses are facing, State aid rules have been adjusted, and the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have announced relief measures; and finally, 3) to help EU countries cope with the immediate consequences of the outbreak, the Eurogroup set up a Pandemic Crisis Support tool, under the ESM, amounting to 2 % of Member States’ GDP and which can be used for direct or indirect healthcare, cure and prevention costs.

The ministers also discussed the possibility of setting up a temporary Recovery Fund, but due to differing views on its financing, no decision could be taken. In his letter to the President of the European Council following the meeting, Eurogroup President, Mario Centeno, asked the Heads of State or Government to give the Eurogroup guidance on the next steps to be taken. The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, referred to the agreement as ‘a significant breakthrough’, and stated that work would be taken forward at the video-conference meeting on 23 April.

2. Roadmap and action plan

Although mainly focused on the immediate response to the coronavirus outbreak, during their video-conference on 26 March, EU leaders asked the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council to ‘start working on a roadmap, accompanied by an action plan, to prepare an exit strategy and a comprehensive recovery plan, including unprecedented investment’. Charles Michel explained that this task included two pillars: 1) for the short term, submitting a roadmap for an exit strategy that is coordinated with Member States, which will prepare the ground for, 2) a long-term recovery strategy.

European roadmap towards lifting containment measures

On 16 April, Charles Michel and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, presented the first part of the road map to the European Parliament, focusing on the coronavirus crisis exit strategy. Put forward the previous day, their European roadmap aimed at coordinating the lifting of containment measures across the EU. In particular, it stresses that, prior to the lifting of restrictive measures, Member States should assess their readiness relying on three criteria: epidemiologic (spread of disease), sufficient health system capacity and appropriate monitoring capacity, including large-scale testing and contact-tracing. In addition, Member States should inform the Commission and neighbouring countries of their decisions to lift restrictive measures. EU leaders are expected to endorse the roadmap at their meeting on 23 April. The roadmap has not been wholly uncontroversial: although EU leaders had asked for such a plan to be drawn up, its presentation was postponed until after Easter as the Commission faced criticism from EU capitals on both the process and the timing.

Comprehensive recovery plan

Charles Michel indicated that the European Council video-conference on 23 April ‘will focus on the recovery plan of the roadmap’. At the Parliament’s plenary session of 16 April, he argued that this medium to long-term recovery strategy should focus on four pillars: 1) The internal market, 2) an investment strategy, 3) a global recovery strategy, and 4) resilience and governance.

Internal market

The EU’s internal market – based on freedom of movement of labour, goods, services and capital – finds itself significantly challenged, as the coronavirus has prompted Member States to close borders, and even in some cases, to impose national export bans on key products. Supply chains, that are often global, have also faced disruption. Before the coronavirus outbreak hit, the European Council had been expected to discuss the strengthening of the EU’s economic base as one of the main items on the agenda of its March 2020 meeting, which was eventually postponed. Ahead of that meeting, 15 Member States had published a joint contribution on the topic. The context is now quite different, yet the discussion probably more important than ever. Charles Michel stated on 15 April that the internal market needed to be repaired and improved, and would feature on the agenda of the next European Council meeting. He added that the industrial strategy, SMEs, the digital agenda, the European Green Deal and climate change were all important points for discussion in this respect.

Investment strategy

According to the European Central Bank, the global and European economies are likely to enter a severe recession as a result of the coronavirus crisis. Consequently, both Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen have called for a Marshall Plan for Europe’s recovery, which would consist of a comprehensive investment strategy including a series of tools. A key element to support recovery will be the Union’s long-term budget (MFF) for the years 2021-2027, which will be adapted to the new economic situation. Charles Michel also expects the European Investment Bank to play a vital role in developing an investment strategy to promote future economic recovery. Furthermore, the EU’s finance ministers expressed their commitment to do ‘everything necessary’ to respond to this unprecedented challenge posed by the virus. The European Parliament believes that ‘the necessary investment would be financed by an increased MFF, the existing EU funds and financial instruments, and recovery bonds guaranteed by the EU budget; this package should not involve the mutualisation of existing debt and should be oriented to future investment’.

Global recovery strategy

For the first time since the start of the Covid-19 outbreak, the European Council will consider the EU’s external responsibility and contribution to the global recovery effort. President Michel has notably stressed that the EU remains committed to multilateralism in its external action. In that context, he recalled the joint international efforts undertaken so far in different fora, including the G7 and the G20, to coordinate support to medical research as well as to provide economic and trade responses to the crisis. Cooperation with Africa on an equal footing, through a renewed partnership, comprising, inter alia, support to African health systems, represents one of the key priorities of the EU’s global recovery strategy. One of the goals is to ensure that no vulnerable country or community is left aside, without access to treatment or vaccination, when the latter becomes available.

Resilience and governance

Under this fourth pillar, Charles Michel expects EU leaders to reflect on the lessons to be learnt from the Covid-19 outbreak in order for the EU to be stronger after the crisis. The aim is also to achieve unity and show more solidarity among Member States. The two topics of unity and solidarity are recurrent themes in the European Council’s crisis response.

President Michel has stressed that the EU ‘must develop a more resilient system of governance, while upholding the principles of solidarity, unity and the fundamental values of freedom, rule of law at the heart of the EU’. While thus far, the President of the European Council has not directly linked this debate to the forthcoming conference on the Future of Europe, currently likely to start in September 2020, other actors, such as the European Parliament, have already established a link with that process. The Parliament considers that the current crisis only heightens the urgent need to start an in-depth reflection on how to become more effective and democratic, and that the planned conference on the Future of Europe would be the appropriate forum to do this.

Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)

The EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) is a horizontal tool, which addresses all policy areas of the EU; thus, it can be used to address the various new challenges posed by the coronavirus crisis, and play an important role regarding all four pillars of the recovery strategy. On 28 March, Ursula von der Leyen announced that the Commission will put forward an updated MFF proposal, including a stimulus package for the recovery, which is expected to published by the end of April. In order to provide some guidance for the Commission, Heads of State or Government will hold a strategic discussion on the long-term budget at their next meeting on 23 April.

In its resolution of 17 April 2020, Parliament insists ‘on the adoption of an ambitious MFF that has an increased budget in line with the Union’s objectives, the projected impact on EU economies by the crisis and citizens’ expectations on European added value, has more flexibility and simplicity in the way we use the funds to respond to crises, and is equipped with the necessary flexibility.’ Furthermore, it calls on the Member States to reach rapid agreement on this new MFF proposal.

3. Other items Libya

EU leaders may also discuss external relations topics, including the deteriorating situation in parts of the EU’s neighborhood. The humanitarian situation in Libya, where a triple – sanitary, security and migratory – crisis is unfolding remains of particular concern. Malta has warned of the deteriorating humanitarian situation and called for the Foreign Affairs Council meeting, prior to the EU leaders’ meeting on 23 April, to consider the possibilities of a humanitarian aid mission in Libya.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the video-conference call of EU Heads of State or Government on 23 April 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.