European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Suzana Anghel, Izabela Bacian, Ralf Drachenberg, Annastiina Papunen,

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Established as an informal summit meeting in 1975, the European Council became a formal European Union institution, with a full-time President, in 2009, on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. It consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 EU Member States, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission (Article 15(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). The latter two individuals have no voting rights. Meetings of the European Council are normally also attended by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The President of the European Parliament is ‘invited to speak’ as the first item on the European Council’s agenda, followed by an exchange of views (Article 235(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)). At its formal meetings, normally four per year, the European Council adopts ‘conclusions’ that are aimed at identifying policy priorities and action to be taken by the Union as a whole.

The European Council’s role is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) TEU). It cannot exercise legislative functions. At the beginning of the 2014-2019 and the 2019-2024 institutional cycles, the European Council also adopted an agenda of strategic priorities, designed to guide the work of the European Union over the five-year period.

With the EU only just coming out of a period of economic and financial crisis and unemployment still at a high level, the 2014-2019 strategic agenda made economic issues the top priority. Subsequently, unprecedented domestic and global challenges, and notably the prospect of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (combined with a rise of populism and anti-EU sentiment), have triggered a debate on the future of Europe. As a result, previous objectives have been somewhat re-shaped in order to respond more effectively to public expectations and concerns, as well as to bind the EU-27 closer together. EU leaders thus used the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties in March 2017 to issue a finely-tuned set of policy orientations for the Union for the next 10 years. The Rome Agenda encompasses four broad chapters − a safe and secure Europe, a prosperous and sustainable Europe, a social Europe and a stronger Europe on the global scene − which should shape the action of the Union over a decade.

Reflecting the orientations set in the Rome Declaration, the new 2019-2024 strategic agenda, adopted by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting in June 2019, defines migration and the protection of citizens as the top priorities for action in the upcoming five years. Then, comes the development of a stronger economic base, including the fight against unemployment, followed by climate change and social issues. Finally, it looks to increase the EU’s influence and defend its interest in the world. The four core priorities set out in the 2019-2024 strategic agenda broadly correspond to the concerns of EU citizens, as indicated by the most recent standard Eurobarometer.

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in early 2020 and the prospect of a protracted economic recession of an unknown length and severity has, however, prompted EU Heads of State or Government to review the above priorities in order to provide for a coordinated approach and joint action to tackle the crisis. At their first video-conference dedicated to the management of the health crisis, on 10 March 2020, the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, alongside the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Central Bank and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, agreed to work together along four main axes, with a view to: 1) limiting the spread of the virus; 2) providing medical equipment; 3) promoting research, for instance on development of a vaccine; and 4) tackling the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. The EU leaders underscored the need for a joint European approach and close coordination with the European Commission in combating the pandemic.

While the European Council endorsed the proposals made by the Commission to tackle the immediate social and economic consequences of the health crisis, at their meeting on 23 April 2020, EU leaders were not able to agree on a common vision for a recovery fund to address the long-term consequences of the crisis. The Commission was therefore tasked with preparing a revised Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), to establish a link to the recovery fund. The European Council President, Charles Michel, underlined that EU leaders remained ‘committed to giving the necessary impetus to work on the recovery fund as well as the MFF, so that a balanced agreement on both can be found as soon as possible’.

Given the serious human consequences of the health crisis, the lack of overall preparedness in combatting the epidemic across the EU and the lack of coordination among Member States at the start of the virus outbreak have been criticised. And indeed, EU leaders have acknowledged that the EU needed to become better at ‘developing its executive capacity and at managing crises in a coordinated fashion’.

In addition to its horizontal priority-setting role, as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, the European Council is also tasked with identifying the Union’s strategic interests, determining the objectives of, and defining general guidelines for common foreign and security policy (Article 26 TEU). Following a request by EU leaders, the then High Representative, Federica Mogherini, presented an EU global strategy, which the European Council welcomed in June 2016. The strategy sets five broad priorities for the EU external action in coming years: the security of the Union, state and societal resilience to the East and South, an integrated approach to conflict and crisis, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21st century.

The European Council furthermore defines the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 68 TFEU). For the period until 2019, the priorities for the European Union in the area of freedom, security and justice, were to ‘better manage migration in all aspects; prevent and combat crime and terrorism; [and] improve judicial cooperation among EU countries’. Following the outbreak of the migration crisis, and a series of terrorist attacks on European soil, key strategic documents, notably the European agenda on security and the European agenda on migration, were adopted in 2015, either at the request or with the endorsement of the European Council. A new set of ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ were expected to be adopted by the European Council at its meeting of 26‑27 March 2020. Since the meeting had to be postponed following the coronavirus outbreak, the adoption of these guidelines will probably occur later in the course of the year.

The European Council has also to ‘consider each year the employment situation in the Union and adopt conclusions thereon, on the basis of a joint annual report by the Council and the Commission’ (Article 148 TFEU).

Its decisions are taken mainly by consensus, but in certain cases, the European Council can also decide by qualified majority. For example, the President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority vote for a once-renewable term of two and a half years. The President’s role is ‘to ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission’, chair its meetings, ‘facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council’, and to ensure ‘the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ (Article 15(5) TEU). The first two full-time Presidents of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy and Donald Tusk, served five years each between 2009 and 2019. The third permanent President of the European Council, Charles Michel, began his mandate at the beginning of December 2019.

While not directly accountable to the European Parliament, the President of the European Council presents a report to the Parliament after each meeting of the Heads of State or Government (Article 15(6)(d) TEU). Usually this takes the form of a declaration in person, followed by a plenary debate.

As a result of both the UK’s decision to leave the Union and the Leaders’ Agenda proposed by European Council President Donald Tusk in 2017, aimed at ‘reinvigorating and enriching’ the institution’s work ‘by engaging directly on politically sensitive issues’, the working method and formations of the European Council have evolved substantially. In recent years members of the European Council have met in five different formats:

• the EU-27, previously EU-28, Heads of State or Government meet quarterly in the regular European Council meetings;
• from 2016 to 2019, the EU-27 (leaders of all the 28 EU Member States except the UK) met, first informally and then, from April 2017, in the European Council (Article 50) format, to discuss Brexit;
• the EU-27 or EU-28 have in recent years held informal summits at least twice a year;
• the EU-27 or EU-28 for two years from October 2017 participated in Leaders’ Meetings;
• the EU-27 (leaders of all the 28 EU Member States except the UK) have met in several inclusive Euro Summits. Participation in Euro Summits is usually restricted to the leaders of euro-area countries, but the President of the Euro Summit (currently also President of the European Council) can invite other leaders as well.

‘Leaders’ meetings’, which are designed to enable a leaders’ discussion to take place on a specific topic, are a key feature of the ‘Leaders’ Agenda’. Unlike regular European Council meetings, such discussions are based, not on draft conclusions, but on short notes prepared by the President. The idea is to have an open, relatively unstructured debate on controversial but highly consequential issues, with a view to facilitating agreement at a follow-up European Council.

The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was prepared in very much the same way, by using the working method developed under the Leaders’ Agenda. Just ahead of the 2019 European elections, the EU‑27 met on 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu to assess the implementation of previous policy objectives and to reflect informally on future EU action over the coming five years. The EU leaders’ discussion was informed by President Tusk’s Leaders’ Agenda note, ‘Strategic agenda 2019-2024 – Outline’, which provided a first overview of the topics for future action. The 2019-2024 strategic agenda was then adopted at the June 2019 formal European Council.

At the first European Council that he chaired in December 2019, Charles Michel explained how he envisaged the future work of the European Council would be carried out, and presented his colleagues with an ‘indicative agenda’ for its work over coming years. Moreover, in his remarks following the European Council meeting in December 2019, President Michel also stressed that a concerted agenda, coordinated between the institutions (Council, Commission, Parliament), would be a key element in advancing the European project.

The EU Heads of State or Government see the strategic agenda as ‘the first step in a process that will be taken forward by the Institutions and the Member States’. The European Council announced that it ‘will follow the implementation of these priorities closely and will define further general political directions and priorities as necessary’.

Following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and its severe economic, as well as social, impact, the most pressing issue for Heads of State or Governments will be to achieve a ‘political agreement’ on a revised long-term budget for the 2021-2027 period able to provide the necessary support for the revival of the European economy. Given the failure of the special European Council meeting of 20-21 February 2020 to reach such an agreement and in view of diverging views among Member States on the approach to funding through the Recovery Fund, finding consensus on the revised MFF could indeed prove challenging. When, and under what conditions, the European Council will reconvene to attempt to find an agreement has still to be decided.

Read the complete study on ‘Key issues in the European Council: State of play in June 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

Launched on 20 May 2020, the ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy put forward the EU’s ambition for making its food system a model of sustainability at all stages of the food value chain. Ahead of the desired engagement of institutions, stakeholders and citizens in a broad debate, the strategy is already high on the agri-food community’s agenda.

Background

© Pixelbliss / Adobe Stock

On 11 December 2019, the European Commission presented ‘The European Green Deal‘, a roadmap for sustainability that envisaged a ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy on sustainable food, to address priorities and challenges related to every step in the food chain. Many citizens and stakeholders contributed to the Commission’s consultation on a sustainable food strategy in February/March 2020. Initially planned for the end of March, the launch of the strategy was delayed due to the outbreak of the coronavirus. This change of plans raised lively debate among stakeholders and policy-makers on whether the strategy should be further delayed or not. In the end, the idea prevailed that the current environmental and climate emergencies, and a need for a resilient food system evoked by the crisis, do not permit additional delays.

A long-awaited and highly anticipated strategy finally unveiled

On 20 May 2020, the Commission adopted its communication on ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally friendly food system‘, accompanied by an action plan that put forward 27 legislative and non-legislative measures over a timespan running from 2020 to 2024 (with a review by mid-2023).

The strategy includes elements that have been on the agri-food policy agenda for a while, from the use of pesticides to food labelling, as well as aspects stirred up by the weaknesses of the EU’s food chain revealed by the coronavirus crisis. Food security (largely taken for granted in the EU in recent times, except for the most deprived) becomes one of the strategy’s dimensions, along with the environmental impact of food production and supply, and food affordability in a fair economic environment. The strategy envisages a proposal for a legislative framework on a sustainable food system and, in light of the lessons learned during the coronavirus crisis, the set-up of a contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security in times of crisis. A revamped agricultural crisis reserve (never used so far in its current format) would also help to mitigate future agricultural market crises.

The strategy covers all steps taken by the food from production to consumption. Given the role of agricultural policy in achieving both environmental and climate goals, a host of actions (summed up in the box to the right) aim at making EU agriculture (and fisheries) more sustainable, while supporting farmers (and fishermen). Actions include quantifiable targets for 2030, roadmaps for action and policy tuning (this latter, through identified steps for aligning the common agricultural policy (CAP) reform proposals with the Green Deal’s ambitions).

‘Farm to Fork’ moves for healthy and sustainable food production Targets for 2030

• 50 % cut in the use and risk of chemical pesticides and in the use of more hazardous pesticides.
• 20 % at least reduced use of fertilisers.
• 50 % cut of EU sales of antimicrobials for farmed animals and in aquaculture.
• 25 % at least of organically farmed area and a significant increase in organic aquaculture.

Other areas of action

• Rewarded CO2 sequestration on farms.
• Bioeconomy and energy efficiency.
• Animal welfare and plant health.
• Sustainable production in the farm animal and fish and seafood sectors.
• Integration of the nine objectives of the common agricultural policy (CAP) in the Member States’ CAP strategic plans.
• Competition rules and unfair trading practices (UTPs).

Moving forward in the food value chain, the strategy calls on all actors (processors, service operators, retailers, and consumers) to take action, and outlines a number of initiatives (see box to the right) for a sustainable food system. As no food strategy can make it without lining up people’s attitude towards food ethics with their consumption habits, key actions aim at facilitating consumers in making informed food choices for healthy and sustainable diets.

For enabling the sustainability transition, the strategy relies on research and innovation (on natural resources, bioeconomy, etc.), targeted investments (such as on broadband for mainstreaming the use of technology), and better data use (statistics on farm sustainability, monitoring data, SMEs’ skills). Finally, as European food is already a global standard for food, it should also promote the global transition to sustainable food supply, through international cooperation and trade.

‘Farm to Fork’ moves for healthy and sustainable food supply and consumption Actions in the food chain

• EU code of conduct for responsible business and marketing practice.
• Sustainable corporate governance and circular business models.
• Food nutrient profile, packaging and marketing standards.
• Combating food fraud.

Actions on food consumption

• Information to consumers (harmonised front-of-pack labelling: nutritional, ‘green’ and social claims; origin mark).
• Sustainable food promotion and procurement, and tax incentives.
• Targets to reduce food loss and waste, and revision of date marking (‘use by’ and ‘best before’ dates).

Stakeholders’ diverging reactions

The Commission aims to involve stakeholders and citizens in a broad debate on the strategy, the launch of which has already prompted much debate in the agri-food community. Reactions range from emphasising its positive aspects, at times despite negative expectations, to raising doubts or criticism. In general, ecologist NGOs welcomed the strategy as a timely potential game-changer to save the planet from destructive practices, and as a shift towards sustainable future policies, though commitments are still just aspirational. Others see it as a first real attempt at an EU food policy that favours biodiversity and health over agribusiness profits, aims at empowering consumers to make informed healthy food choices, and can offer opportunities to food and drink sector SMEs hit by the crisis. This entails changes in production and consumption patterns, including alternative proteins for food and feed. Critics emphasise the lack of a scientific approach, such as in the case of the farming sector’s claims that certain proposals lacking an impact assessment would endanger EU agriculture and mislead consumers. Sector stakeholders question targets on pesticides as unrealistic and those on fertilisers as too ambitious, whereas targets on organic farming would be achievable by rewarding organic conversion. Others regret the absence of issues such as access to land, or consider new farm policy proposals are needed. In certain views, meat production and consumption are not adequately addressed by the strategy, despite being a main societal challenge. On the other hand, the meat sector warns about simplistic measures putting off meat consumption and recalls meat’s important place in the EU’s rural economy and eating habits, and as a key component of circular food systems. Think-tanks generally welcome a strategy that identifies the conditions for reaching sustainable food systems, but warn that broad support for its realisation is essential, in particular for overcoming its intrinsic limitations.

The starting point of EU interinstitutional talks

Putting forward a framework for legislative and non-legislative initiatives that the European Parliament and Council will contribute to shaping, the European Commission invited the co-legislators to endorse the ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy and contribute to implementing it. In Parliament, first reactions have mirrored Members’ different policy angles and political ideas, though the need for rethinking the EU’s food system is a common view. Commissioners in charge of steering the strategy regularly participate in meetings with Parliament’s committees dealing with environment, public health and food security, and agriculture. In Council, early discussions have highlighted the main challenges and opportunities for EU Member States in achieving the strategy’s targets, such as the budgetary aspects and the differences in the initial positions at country level.

On 15 January 2020, Parliament adopted a resolution on the Green Deal. Noting that food production is still the biggest driver of biodiversity loss, and that providing safe, healthy and good quality food for all should be a top priority, Parliament welcomed the Commission presenting a ‘Farm to Fork’ strategy to tackle such issues.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘‘Farm to Fork’ strategy: Striving for healthy and sustainable food‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Anja Radjenovic and Rafał Mańko with Gianna Eckert,

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With the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, many countries around the world that were or are due to organise elections or referendums, have had to decide whether to hold them as originally planned, introducing mitigating measures, put them on hold or postpone them to a later date.

When deciding whether to continue with elections or not, decision-makers have needed to take into account a variety of legal, technical and sanitary parameters and implications, as well as constitutional arrangements, to ensure that democratic institutions function as they would in normal circumstances and to ensure people’s fundamental rights and freedoms are upheld.

While postponing an election may be the most feasible and responsible option from the public health perspective, the decision may open the door to other risks, including undermining people’s trust in democracy and casting doubt on the regular nature of elections. However, as experts suggest, democracy can also be undermined by holding elections during the pandemic, as their free and fair nature might be questioned.

In order to protect election staff and voters, health and safety procedures can be built into election-related procedures, and special voting arrangements can be introduced, such as postal or e-voting, that allow citizens to cast their votes remotely. These entail other technological, security and social challenges, however, that need to be taken into account.

This briefing provides example of how selected EU Member States have dealt with elections and referendums that were due to take place during the coronavirus pandemic.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Coronavirus and elections in selected Member States‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

As Covid-19 adds increased pressure on international security, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations have been adapted and contributed to the mitigation of the effects of the pandemic in host countries.

Peace, conflict and peacekeeping in the wake of coronavirus

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Increasingly, research on the implications of Covid-19 on international security indicates that the pandemic will disproportionately affect the most vulnerable populations and countries in the world, leading to an increase in the likelihood of conflict and exacerbating the implications of ongoing conflict. Based on current trends, root causes of conflict, such as resource scarcity, inequality and food insecurity, are expected to grow. At the same time, the impact of the pandemic on the global economy, including on the most developed countries, is likely to suppress budgets for peace operations further, compounding a trend that has seen peacekeeping budgets and personnel decline in recent years. This has also given rise to a growing gap between authorised and deployed personnel. As noted by the 2019 report on the Global Peace Index, this comes at a time when the number of countries facing internal conflicts had already increased. Some experts argue that the pandemic offers an opportunity to reverse these trends in peacekeeping. As, across the world, military and peacekeeping operations have had to adapt to the spread of the pandemic, opportunities for more strategic and flexible planning, and more effective use of capabilities are being explored. This approach is reflected by the European External Action Service (EEAS). Among other things, the EEAS has recently highlighted the importance of the integrated approach in the face of the crisis; solidarity of missions and operations with host nations; the importance of quick responsiveness of CSDP missions and operations, and the adaptability of the planning and conduct of missions and operations within the agreed mandates.

CSDP missions and operations in the face of Covid-19

Through the CSDP, the EU has developed a broad crisis management agenda, which includes conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation, in accordance with United Nations (UN) principles. The UN recognises the EU as one of its most important regional partners in peacekeeping. Currently, there are 17 CSDP missions and military operations, with a range of mandates such as military training, capacity-building, counter-piracy, security sector reform, border assistance and counter-terrorism. They deploy over 5 000 personnel. EU civilian missions carry out tasks consistent with the EU Global Strategy’s commitment to strengthening the resilience and stabilisation of countries recovering from – or threatened by – conflict and instability. CSDP missions and operations are present in some of the countries ranking lowest on the Normandy Index, which measures threats identified by the Global Strategy (e.g. Somalia, Central African Republic). In the face of the coronavirus pandemic, the CSDP missions and operations continue to deliver on their security mandate; they are additionally exploring ways to support their host countries. While ongoing missions and operations do not have a humanitarian aid mandate, within their existing mandates, means and capabilities, civilian missions are providing specific advice and sharing information with international and national partners helping to address the pandemic (see Figure 1). Several missions are also donating medical and protective equipment. The actions of the CSDP missions are in full coherence with the wider actions undertaken by the ‘Team Europe‘ global response to the coronavirus, addressing the humanitarian, health, social and economic consequences of the crisis. Within the limits of their resources and mandate, military missions are also offering support. For example, the EU military Training Mission in Somalia is providing advice to the medical team of the Somali army on how to deal with Covid-19 emergencies.

The European Parliament is a long-standing advocate of a more effective CSDP. In January 2020, it called for a forward-looking approach to capability planning, as well as early anticipation of needs for crisis response; it expressed concern about limited force generation, and emphasised that Parliament should be consulted about strategic planning for missions. In 2017, it urged the Council to move towards the harmonisation and standardisation of European armed forces.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘CSDP missions and coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

CSDP missions and operations Force generation and contribution against Covid-19

Written by Philip Boucher

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In the digital age, citizens need to manage a range of online identities that are linked to their offline identity. In managing these identities and entering into agreements, citizens navigate a complex legal and technical infrastructure. As digital identities become increasingly important, it is worth considering how this infrastructure can be made more trustworthy, empowering users while increasing the availability of data and ensuring citizens’ safety and privacy.

In this context, the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) hosted a roundtable discussion to examine how citizens can manage their identities online while maintaining privacy, safety and security. The event was organised in cooperation with ELONTech and the IOT Council in the context of the work of next generation internet, a European Commission initiative to reimagine and re-engineer the internet for the third millennium and beyond.

In her introduction, STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) highlighted the importance of managing digital identities safely and securely in the digital age, paying particular attention to who owns and controls the identity management tools. She then welcomed the speakers, all experts on digital sovereign identity and coming from industry, academia and policy-making, including Remy Knecht, COO of ITSME.be; Daniel Du Seuil, Convenor European Self Sovereign Identity Framework, part of the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI); Loretta Anania, Scientific Officer at DG Connect, European Commission; Thibaut Verbiest, Head of Regulatory Affairs Europe & Africa at Diginex and Petros Kavassalis, Associate Professor at the University of the Aegean.

Itsme.be is an identity management service that is widely used for securely signing digital transactions. While they are well known for their banking services, their COO, Remy Knecht, explained that they are also active in many other domains, including utilities, human recourses and mobility. These services are useful for many citizens, but only when they are trustworthy, that is, when they respect privacy and protect users when something goes wrong. Remy concluded his talk by identifying gaps in regulations and standards to providing a reliable link between decentralised IDs (known as DIDs) and more traditional centralised IDs, such as government-issued documents.

Daniel Du Seuil from the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure (EBSI) spoke about how DIDs empower citizens by giving them control of their own data and identities. Citing several problematic experiences of identity management around the world, he emphasised the importance of empowering citizens while ensuring adequate protection of security and privacy. He argued that good partnerships between the public and private sector are key to achieving this.

The European Commission has been active in promoting the development and application of DIDs, for example through the next generation internet initiative. Loretta Anania – a Scientific Officer at the Commission – emphasised that privacy is not just a value, but a hard-won right enshrined in the EU Treaties that needs to be respected. However, while the treaties themselves do not provide guidance on how to respect these rights in the digital age, she argued that legislation such as the GDPR and eIDAS could form a solid basis for positioning Europe as a centre for safeguarding digital identities.

With their decentralised structure, blockchain technologies can form a key part of decentralised identity solutions. Thibaut Verbiest from Diginex – a digital financial services company focusing on blockchain technology – said that users already have to deal with dozens of digital IDs, passwords and accounts, and the number is growing. He emphasised the need for user-friendly systems. However, reliable decentralised systems for ID management can be expensive, and firms also need to consider regulatory elements as they are compelled to use the most GDPR-compliant technologies available to them. He highlighted that decentralised and centralised ID services could enter a virtuous circle whereby centralised IDs provide the basic credentials to enable users and service providers to engage in decentralised systems confidently, while decentralised systems provide a layer of transparency for centralised systems of the state by acting as a witness or notary.

Providing the final talk of the event, Petros Kavassalis recalled that the internet has always had to compromise between centralised and decentralised systems. Both have their role, and neither one alone can provide all of the privacy and security that users need. For that, it is key to develop a ‘trust layer’, and to complement technology with appropriate regulation.

During the subsequent discussion, inclusion emerged as a key issue. The primary device used for managing digital IDs are smartphones, but not all citizens have one. Indeed, many citizens prefer or require traditional physical interactions, and they should not be excluded from key services such as banking. Technology could provide some alternative solutions but, in the meantime, it remains important to maintain an ecosystem of identity management services that can cater to all citizens’ needs.

In his concluding remarks, STOA second Vice-Chair Ivars Ijabs (Renew Europe, Latvia), underlined the importance of DIDs, highlighting the competition to provide ID services from a wide range of platforms, including for example Facebook, which is also used as an ID service to access to many other online services. In closing, he stressed the important role of STOA, working at the interface of science and policy-making, to address these issues.

The full recording of the meeting is available here.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP / DAINA LE LARDIC

It is (almost) back to ‘business as usual’ as Parliament meets again in plenary from Wednesday 17 to Friday 19 June 2020. Members will deal with a full agenda, including up to three voting sessions each day, using the alternative electronic voting procedure introduced since the coronavirus outbreak, which has now proven to run smoothly.

On Wednesday afternoon, the session begins with Council and European Commission statements on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 19 June, at which the European Union budget and the proposed coronavirus recovery plan will be the focus of the agenda. Already under somewhat strained discussion, the coronavirus epidemic has further delayed the process of agreeing the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021‑2027. Parliament has already called on the Commission to propose a contingency plan for 2021, should the MFF, as seems increasingly likely, not be agreed in time. Nevertheless, Members will vote on Thursday afternoon on amendments to a Budget Committee report on guidelines for the 2021 Budget – Section III, the first under the yet to be agreed new MFF. Parliament’s guidelines on Section III are intended to assist the Commission by indicating political priorities for the deployment of next year’s EU budget; the recovery from the coronavirus crisis the most urgent, whilst Parliament will also seek to reinforce focus on the European Green Deal and digital transformation. Members will also vote on Wednesday night on two further draft amending budgets for the current year. Draft amending budget No 3/2020 concerns the over €3.2 billion surplus (mostly higher than expected revenues, and underspent expenditure) from 2019, which was carried over to 2020. While this surplus will reduce Member States’ gross national income contributions in 2020, Parliament is keen to see Member States devote the equivalent amount to support regions and businesses affected by the coronavirus crisis. To tackle the likely effects of the coronavirus crisis on the labour market, Members will also consider a proposal from the Commission to mobilise €345 000 to provide technical assistance that will strengthen the functioning of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund on Wednesday night. The fund provides vital support for workers who lose their jobs due to structural changes in global markets. Members will also vote on Wednesday night on draft amending budget No 4/2020, to make €279 million available in the 2020 budget to assist regions in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Austria affected by natural disasters caused by extreme weather events in 2019.

Thursday morning’s session begins with debates on a statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the foreign policy consequences of the Covid‑19 crisis. The virus has greatly exacerbated already deteriorating international relations on the one hand, and strengthened resolve on the other to support vulnerable regions in facing the threat to public health globally. In response, Parliament has already called for more strategic action, including updating the Global Strategy and supporting the Western Balkan countries, Africa and Latin America. At a time when the danger is real, access to reliable information is vital, yet the coronavirus epidemic has seen a corresponding worldwide outbreak of hoaxes, conspiracy theories, mis- and disinformation. In some countries, this has provided a pretext for restricting freedom of expression. Members will hear statements from the Council and the Commission on Thursday morning on tackling disinformation regarding Covid‑19, and the virus’s impact on freedom of expression. Parliament has already underlined that the issue presents a major public health problem, as well as the importance to democracy of a free and independent media. In advance of a Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs report on media freedom, Members will vote later on Thursday on a proposal to set up a special committee on foreign interference in EU democratic processes. Members will also vote on setting up further special committees on the fight against cancer and on artificial intelligence.

Looking beyond the coronavirus pandemic, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on tourism and transport in 2020 and beyond on Wednesday evening and vote on a motion for resolution the following day. Here, the Commission has acted quickly to avoid the confusion seen at the beginning of lockdown measures, issuing guidelines to help Member States safely lift travel restrictions and support the badly affected tourism and transport sector. Members are likely to insist that the EU take more action and provide greater financial support for the sector.

Planned to provide a comprehensive reflection on the direction and organisation of the EU, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the Conference on the Future of Europe on Wednesday evening. The Conference participants were to include citizens as well as representatives of Member State governments and Parliament and civil society. However, the Covid‑19 epidemic brought a halt to discussions between the EU institutions on the composition and structure of the Conference – and will inevitably have an effect on the proposed ‘Agora’ format. Nevertheless, keen to revive the discussions, Members will vote on a motion for resolution, which is expected to call for the Conference to be launched as soon as possible during the second half of 2020.

Returning to non-coronavirus related business on Wednesday evening, Members will debate a joint report from the Foreign Affairs and International Trade committees on recommendations on the negotiations for a new partnership with the United Kingdom following the 2016 ‘Brexit’ vote to leave the EU. The fourth round of EU-UK negotiations ended on 5 June 2020, with limited progress and critical divergence between the parties has emerged on level playing field commitments, fisheries, cooperation on criminal matters and the overarching institutional framework to govern future relations. The UK confirmed during the second EU-UK Joint Committee meeting on 12 June that it will not request an extension to the transition period, which will thus end on 31 December 2020. Parliament fully supports the Commission negotiating position, and the debate will be followed by a series of votes to agree Parliament’s position, with a final vote scheduled for Thursday.

Members will also vote on a motion for resolution on Thursday, following a statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the PRC national security law for Hong Kong and EU defence of a high degree of autonomy for the people of Hong Kong. Parliament has already strongly condemned China’s increasing interference in Hong Kong, as well as its apparent willingness to abandon its commitments to uphold rights and freedoms under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984.

Finally, Parliament is asked to consent to three reports on fisheries agreements, scheduled for votes on Wednesday evening. These include the conclusion of the Protocol on the implementation of the 2019‑2024 Fisheries Partnership Agreement with the Republic of Cape Verde, the 2019‑2024 Protocol on the implementation of the EU-Guinea-Bissau Fisheries Partnership Agreement and the Protocol on the implementation of the EU-São Tomé and Príncipe Partnership Agreement. All three agreements concern access rights for the EU fleet to fish in the respective regions and promote sustainable fisheries and the blue economy in those waters.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Annastiina Papunen,

© Shutterstock

The European Council meeting on 19 June, to be held by video-conference, will be almost exclusively dedicated to the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the proposed new EU recovery fund, dubbed ‘Next Generation EU’. The two European Commission proposals are now to be considered as one package for the purpose of negotiation, since the recovery fund is in effect embedded within the revamped EU long-term budget. This has increased the pressure on Member States to reach a political agreement on the MFF, but also multiplied the issues of disagreement among the EU leaders. In addition to the MFF-specific issues, on which divergences could not be overcome at the special European Council meeting in February 2020 – namely the overall size of the EU budget, the use of rebates and the funding allocation per policy area – the proposal for the recovery fund raises sensitive new questions, notably on the balance between loans and grants, the allocation criteria for funding and the modalities for repayment.

EU leaders are not expected to reach agreement at this stage, but rather to have a first exchange of views on the new proposals from the Commission. The outcome of this discussion will provide pointers for the European Council President, Charles Michel, on further steps and the possible timing for an in-person meeting of leaders in the course of July, with a view to reaching an agreement on the EU budget package. To this end, the video-conference meeting of 19 June could produce a statement in which EU Heads of State or Government express their commitment to finding a political agreement before the summer break. In addition, this statement might also address foreign policy issues, such as Turkey’s drilling activities in the Mediterranean or sanctions on Russia.

1. The next Multiannual Financial Framework and the EU recovery fund

The European Council’s video-conference on 19 June 2020 will be its fifth virtual meeting since the start of the coronavirus crisis, but the first devoted mainly to the next MFF. EU leaders have discussed the 2021-27 long-term budget on numerous previous occasions (see EPRS’s The European Council and the 2021-27 Multiannual Financial Framework). Yet, at the special European Council meeting of 20-21 February 2020, no political agreement could be found between the Heads of State or Government on the negotiating box presented by Charles Michel. The video-conference of 19 June will be the first opportunity for EU leaders to discuss together the European Commission’s revised proposal for the 2021-27 MFF, including its proposal for an EU recovery fund, called ‘Next Generation EU’, which Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented in the European Parliament’s plenary session on 27 May 2020.

‘Next Generation EU’

The proposed recovery fund amounts to €750 billion, of which €500 billion would be in grants and €250 billion in loans. According to the proposal, the money for the recovery plan would come from the financial markets. The Commission would issue bonds with a maturity of up to 30 years to raise funds, and the money would be paid back over time through future EU budgets and possible new own resources, such as a digital tax. One of the corner-stones of the plan is the Commission’s current strong credit rating, which might however, according to some experts, be at risk in the future.

The money would be invested through three pillars: (i) supporting the Member States to recover; (ii) kick-starting the EU economy and helping private investment; and (iii) learning the lessons from the crisis. The key element of the proposal is the new €560 billion Recovery and Resilience Facility, which aims to help Member States tackle the challenges identified in the European Semester process.

Initial reaction to the European Commission’s proposals

While most Member States have reacted positively to the Commission’s proposals, some national governments have expressed criticism. These latter voices include Finland and the ‘frugal four’ group (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) of net contributors to the EU budget (that is, countries contributing more to the EU budget than the amount of EU funding they receive), which insist on budgetary discipline and on maintaining a relatively small EU budget. They have called for changes to the Commission’s proposals, notably as to the size of the EU budget, the balance between grants and loans, and the length of time for paying back the loans.

During the debate in the Parliament’s plenary session, most MEPs welcomed the Commission’s new proposal. The President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, was pleased that ‘the European Commission’s plan takes on board [the Parliament’s] proposals’. He will address the European Council at its meeting on 19 June, and relay the Parliament’s views on the EU budget.

2. Main discussion points at the European Council video-conference

Since the MFF and the recovery fund proposals will be considered as one package, EU leaders will need to address simultaneously two sets of sensitive issues, on which diverging views persist. Regarding the MFF, the traditional dividing lines concern mainly (i) the size of the budget, (ii) the rebates, and (iii) the balance between policy areas. Other delicate issues include the question of conditionality and the introduction of new own resources. The recovery package adds additional sensitive points to the discussion, notably (iv) the balance between loans and grants, (v) the allocation criteria for the funding, and (vi) the length and modalities of repayment.

Total amount

The new MFF proposal envisages a total of €1.1 trillion (in 2018 prices) in commitments, which represents a reduction compared to the €1.279 trillion in the 2018 Commission proposal, but a small increase compared to the €1.095 trillion in Charles Michel’s negotiating box discussed at the special European Council meeting of 20-21 February 2020. Together with the €750 billion envisaged under the new temporary recovery instrument, Next Generation EU, this would present an overall budget of €1.85 trillion. Some Member States, such as Denmark, have indicated their preference for a ‘slim and modern budget’ and have argued that the current proposal is too high.

Rebates

Certain Member States (Austria, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) benefit from rebates or ‘budget correction mechanisms’ to compensate for what is, in their view, ‘a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to [their] relative prosperity’. The Commission argued in its 2018 MFF proposal that the elimination of all rebates would increase the fairness of the MFF, and proposed to phase out the current rebates over time. In its new proposal, the Commission has softened its previous stance and argues that the current rebates could be phased out over a much longer period than previously proposed. As all ‘frugal four’ Member States would benefit from this solution, this could be a crucial argument to convince them to agree on the new MFF. Charles Michel’s proposal in February already included the idea of retaining a lump-sum correction mechanism.

Balance between policy areas

Another highly debated issue is the balance between the funding of ‘traditional’ and of ‘modern’ EU policies. Traditionally, the biggest share of MFF expenditure has been ear-marked for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and cohesion policies, representing respectively 38 and 34 per cent of the overall 2014-20 MFF. The ‘friends of cohesion’, a group (currently encompassing Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) which defends a strong level of cohesion funding and opposes cuts in this area in the 2021-27 MFF, has reiterated its opposition to a reduction in the appropriations devoted to these policy areas.

Conditionality

Conditionality can be defined as the requirement that all EU spending should comply with a set of Union policy standards, with funding withdrawn in the event of lack of compliance. The European Commission has already been using conditionality requirements for many years, in particular in the field of cohesion policy. In its 2021-27 legislative proposals, the Commission has reinforced existing requirements such as ‘macro-economic conditionality’ and ‘infringement conditionality’. It has also introduced new ones, such as ‘rule-of-law conditionality’, which would seek to protect the Union’s budget in cases of generalised deficiencies as regards respect of the rule of law in a Member State. The measures to be applied to the failing Member State would have to be approved by the Council by ‘reverse qualified majority’ (that is, a qualified majority to block the proposal rather than to approve it). This approach is supported by some Member States (notably Belgium, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands), while others (such as Bulgaria and Romania) are more critical.

New own resources

The European Parliament has repeatedly, most recently on 15 May 2020, called on EU leaders and the Commission ‘to take bold decisions regarding the reform of the EU own resources system, including the introduction of a basket of new own resources’. These could include ‘a common consolidated corporate tax base, digital services taxation, a financial transaction tax, income from the emissions trading scheme, a plastics contribution and a carbon border adjustment mechanism.

On 27 May, the Commission indicated that it would propose additional new own resources at a later stage in the 2021-27 financial period. Options include a new own resource based on non-recycled plastics packaging waste; an emissions trading system-based own resource extended to the maritime and aviation sectors; a carbon border adjustment mechanism of some kind; an own resource based on the operations of companies drawing huge benefit from the EU single market, and a digital tax on companies with a global annual turnover of above €750 million.

Balance between loans and grants

Initial discussions among EU leaders on a long-term response to the socio-economic consequences of the Covid-19 crisis concentrated on two issues: (i) on whether or not to issue joint debt instruments, or ‘coronabonds‘. These would keep borrowing costs down, but spark fears in some Member States of ‘opening the door to mutualisation of members’ debt under the banner of the EU’; (ii) on the delivery method for recovery support, i.e. in the form of grants or loans. Grants would not need to be paid back, whereas loans would. Some countries have strongly advocated a grants-based solution as opposed to loans, which would only lead to an increase in the debt burden. Others, especially the ‘frugal four’, consider grants to be an inefficient use of money, which could leave the EU budget in a situation of permanent deficit; thus, they have strongly backed a loan-based recovery approach, with clear conditions and criteria attached.

The Commission proposal, which includes both loans and grants, attempts to find a compromise between Member States calling for a grant-based recovery fund, such as Germany and France, and those preferring a recovery fund based on loans, such as the ‘frugal four’. Nevertheless, as indicated by the Chancellor of Austria, Sebastian Kurz, this point is expected to be a crucial issue for discussion and trade-off in the negotiations. Even if only used as ‘an exceptional and temporary emergency mechanism’, as stated by the European Commission, policy analysts and financial experts argue that the introduction of a possibility to borrow on capital markets would be ‘a radical change for the EU’.

Allocation criteria for the recovery funding

Criticism has been expressed about the targeting of the recovery fund support, with some experts and Member States suggesting that the proposed support allocation criteria are outdated and not fit for purpose. In the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the Commission plans to take into account Member States’ population, GDP per capita and unemployment figures from 2015 to 2019. The Commission insists, contrary to views of critics, that this allocation key ‘will be particularly beneficial to the countries most affected by the crisis, notably those with low per capita income and high unemployment’. The biggest potential recipients would be Italy, Spain, and Poland.

Length and modalities of repayment

The Commission proposes that ‘the funds raised will be repaid after 2027 and by 2058 at the latest’. However, some Member States, such as Finland, argue that ‘the repayment period in the recovery instrument should be shorter than the proposed 30 years, and the financing facility must comply with the principle of a balanced budget, laid down in the Treaty’.

3. Steps towards reaching agreement

Following the presentation of the updated MFF proposal, President Charles Michel urged ‘all Member States to examine the Commission’s proposal swiftly and work constructively towards a compromise in the best interests of the Union’. In his opinion, ‘everything should be done to reach an agreement before the summer break’. The European Commission invited ‘the European Council and the co-legislators to examine these proposals rapidly with a view to reaching a political agreement at the level of the European Council by July’. In order to see if there is enough room for an agreement, Charles Michel has held numerous bilateral or group meetings with Member States to discuss their assessment of the Commission’s proposals. In order to involve all relevant actors in the MFF negotiations, Charles Michel attended the meeting of the European Parliament’s Conference of Presidents on 11 June, to discuss with EP group leaders the state of play of the negotiations.

Based on his consultations and the results of the video-conference, if Charles Michel sees the potential for reaching the ‘landing zone’ of the negotiations, he is expected to call for an extraordinary European Council meeting in early July in Brussels, with the aim of reaching a ‘global compromise’ (i.e. MFF and recovery fund). Observers and practitioners agree that, in order to reach an agreement, a physical meeting is required, as video-conferences are less effective due to the limited possibility for side-discussions, the lack of interpretation, and the reduced confidentiality resulting from the increased number of people ‘in the room’.

4. Other items

In the statement expected following the video-conference, the European Council could possibly also touch upon foreign policy issues. In light of recent developments regarding Turkey’s drilling activities in the Mediterranean, EU leaders might once again express their solidarity with Cyprus and Greece. Imposing new sanctions on Russia, as well as renewing the existing economic ones which will expire in July 2020, would also require the green light of the European Council.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council video-conference of 18-19 June 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© BillionPhotos.com / Adobe Stock

Policy analysts and politicians alike acknowledge the ‘game-changing’ impact or potential of the coronavirus pandemic for the world economy and geo-political order, as well as on regional disputes and domestic politics in many countries. For the European Union, the crisis highlights the need for closer and more effective cooperation and action at European level, not least because a number of major players around the world are attempting to use the crisis to increase their international influence, often at the EU’s expense.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous item in this series, published by EPRS on 8 June.

From bad to worse? The impact(s) of Covid-19 on conflict dynamics
European Union Institute for Security Studies, June 2020

Is the Covid-19 crisis an opportunity to boost the euro as a global currency?
Bruegel, June 2020

Europe after coronavirus: The EU and a new political economy
Chatham House, June 2020

Global currencies during a crisis: Swap line use reveals the crucial ones
Central for European Policy Studies, June 2020

A new policy toolkit is needed as countries exit Covid-19 lockdowns
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2020

The impact of Covid-19 on cyber-crime and state-sponsored cyber activities
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, June 2020

Covid-19: Choc sanitaire et géopolitique
Institut français des relations internationales, June 2020

Will Covid-19 change the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2020

Next generation EU bonds might face a credit-rating challenge
Central for European Policy Studies, June 2020

Coronavirus and Europe’s new political fissures
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Economic recovery will be the battered EU’s ‘Phoenix moment’
Friends of Europe, June 2020

Covid-19 and emerging economies: What to expect in the short- and medium-term
Bruegel, June 2020

How Europe should prepare for the post-coronavirus world
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Cities on the frontline: Managing the coronavirus crisis
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, June 2020

In navigating the economic recovery, one size does not fit all
Chatham House, June 2020

European coronavirus lockdown status
German Marshall Fund, June 2020

After Covid: Resetting Europe-Africa relations for mutual benefit
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

Europe needs mobility and cooperation to fight the coronavirus
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Trade in time of corona: What’s next for the EU?
European Centre for International Political Economy, June 2020

The US and Europe have addressed Covid unemployment in divergent ways: The differences are revealing
Atlantic Council, June 2020

Protecting biodiversity could spare us future pandemics
Friends of Europe, June 2020

Covid-19 pandemic threatens US elections: The pandemic adds significantly to the risk of a contested result and a constitutional crisis
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2020

Critical supply chains: Do we need to bring them back home?
Friends of Europe, June 2020

European society and economy after Covid-19
European Centre for International Political Economy, June 2020

How the constitution’s federalist framework is being tested by Covid-19
Brookings Institution, June 2020

Youth or consequences: Put youth at the center of Covid-19 recovery
Brookings Institution, June 2020

Britain: Living with coronavirus
Chatham House, June 2020

How (and why) Turkey strengthened its grip on Libya despite Covid-19
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 2020

Emerging from the pandemic, Turkey rolls out a more assertive foreign policy
Carnegie Europe, June 2020

Covid-19: Voices from Asia
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

India: Covid-19 could be Modi’s reform moment
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 2020

Turkey’s ‘coronavirus diplomacy” and its impact on relations with the EU
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, June 2020

Multiplying crises: The coronavirus in Sudan
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

Hurricane season, Covid-19 pose twin threats to vulnerable
Atlantic Council, June 2020

Living with Covid-19: The thinking behind Spain’s lockdown exit plan
Real Instituto Elcano, June 2020

La vie des cultes en temps de Covid-19 : Épilogue
Fondation Jean Jaurès, June 2020

Where the pandemic hits the hardest: Fragility, conflict and Covid-19 in Asia
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, May 2020

Trump’s Covid-19 response is deepening the transatlantic rift
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

The recovery fund faces a tricky passage
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

Securing Europe’s medical supply chains against future shocks
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

L’énergie solaire en Afrique subsaharienne après le Covid-19: Guérir un secteur malade
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2020

Covid-19: Cartographie des émotions en France
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, May 2020

Reopening America and the world
Brookings Institution, May 2020

The role of greater cohesion funding for solidarity and sustainability post-COVID-19
Institute for European Environmental Policy, May 2020

Global sustainable development in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic
Institute for European Environmental Policy, May 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus and international power‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by James McEldowney,

In December 2019, the European Parliament declared a climate and environmental emergency in Europe and across the globe – a recognition of the challenges that the EU faces in this area. The agricultural sector is not only affected by climate change but also contributes significantly to it, according to some assessments. Evidence from a range of reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre points to the impacts that climate change will have on yields, length of growing season, water availability, biodiversity, and habitats. The pattern of climate change will have a differential impact in terms of the regions affected. A clear north–south divide emerges, with countries of southern Europe likely to face declining yields due to increased temperatures and reduced precipitation. In the legislative proposals for the common agricultural policy (CAP) for the post-2020 period, the European Commission has set a high level of ambition in both environmental and climate change objectives, taking into account the fact that agriculture is responsible for around 10 % of the EU’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The European Green Deal outlined in the Commission’s political guidelines aims to make Europe the world’s first climate-neutral continent by 2050. A range of mitigation and adaptation responses are available, designed to curb GHG emissions and reduce vulnerability to climate change.

The EU can use the CAP as a tool to influence policy-making in the area of climate change. In fact, data on the operation and impact of the CAP on climate change and GHG emissions have been examined using a range of sources, including a study undertaken for the Commission. One of its conclusions is that there are a range of CAP measures that are only partially relevant to climate needs, as the CAP is constrained by the lack of compulsory implementation. Additionally, a series of inconsistencies and ‘missed opportunities’ were identified in the study. It remains to be seen how such findings will influence the content and design of the new CAP strategic plans, given that the Commission’s future proposals for them include giving greater discretion to Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU agricultural policy and climate change‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU agricultural policy and climate change’ on YouTube.

Written by Sofija Voronova with Anna Nichols,

The near-ubiquity of data in the lives of ordinary people, along with its exponential growth in generation rate and potential misuse, has made the protection of personal information an increasingly important social, legal and political matter for the EU. In recent years, both awareness of data rights and expectations for EU action in this area have grown considerably.

The right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data are both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the EU Treaties. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 gave the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties and abolished the pillar structure, providing a stronger basis for a more effective and comprehensive data protection regime in the EU.

In 2012, the European Commission launched an ambitious reform to modernise the EU data protection framework. It resulted in the adoption in 2016 of the main EU data protection legislative instrument – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – and the Law Enforcement Directive. The framework overhaul also included adopting an updated Regulation on Data Processing in the EU Institutions and reforming the ePrivacy Directive, pending in the Council since September 2017.

The European Parliament has played a major role in passing these reforms, both as co-legislator and author of own-initiative reports and resolutions seeking to guarantee a high level of data protection to EU citizens. Last but not least, the European Court of Justice has also played an important part in building the EU data protection framework, with several landmark judgments delivered in recent years.

In the coming years, potential challenges to the data protection framework include the question of how to adapt the GDPR to emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, facial recognition technology and the Internet of Things. Potential fragmentation issues include differing Member State interpretations of consent for data processing, while compliance burdens for SMEs and insufficient resources for data protection authorities may present challenges for enforcement. The European Commission is expected to address these issues in its upcoming evaluation of the GDPR.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU data protection policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Understanding EU data protection policy’ on YouTube.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Sara Suna Lipp,

Dementia is a growing public health concern, with no reliable prognosis or effective treatment methods. In the age of big data and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, the goal of more precise, early diagnosis and prediction of the progression of dementia may not be very far away. However, solving a huge biomedical problem via AI could have a profound impact on human privacy, rights and dignity.

Dementia is an increasingly common condition in various brain diseases described by symptoms such as a diminished ability to think, reason and remember. Dementia not only impacts the patient’s daily life but also poses a huge burden on families, caregivers and on national economies. Currently, about 50 million people worldwide, including 10 million in European Union (EU) Member States, are affected, and the numbers are expected to triple by 2050. Strikingly, 5 % of these cases correspond to early-onset dementia, where the disease develops before the age of 60. Current costs of dementia in the EU are estimated at €200 billion. Contrary to cancer, heart disease and HIV, there is still no reliable method for early diagnosis, or treatment to prevent or reverse dementia.

Recent health innovations and dementia research are gaining momentum using AI algorithms. Referring to systems that respond autonomously to their environment, AI and machine learning (a subset of AI denoting the ability of computers to ‘learn’ without explicit programming) could identify ‘biomarkers’, common patterns, measurable biological molecules or functions, which are indicative of pre-onset dementia. Early diagnosis may set the first stage in combating dementia, but AI could present additional possibilities.

Potential impacts and developments

AI technologies have been employed to assist dementia patients in their daily lives and to monitor and integrate information to detect unexpected behavioural changes. Smart systems remind patients to eat or take their medication. Moreover, machine-learning applications collect and analyse speech or walking patterns over time to survey disease progression.

AI as a diagnostic tool

Up to now, dementia drug development has focused on treatments targeting later stages, with no success. Remarkably, research shows that biomarkers as well as genetic testing can be indicative up to 20 years prior to onset of the disease. Several EU-funded initiatives such as European Prevention of Alzheimer’s Disease and the PREVENT research programme aim at generating extended datasets to understand the origin and development of dementia. Academic and private-sector interest in early detection has facilitated promising progress. AI is used to mine complex ‘big data’ obtained from brain scans, blood and spinal fluid samples, to identify factors as well as metabolic alterations that are predictive of dementia. Non-invasive methods such as blood-based testing could provide a particularly affordable route to tracking dementia progression. Early diagnosis is crucial to manage dementia and improve patients’ quality of life.

AI as a treatment tool

As AI technologies progress, interdisciplinary efforts by neuroscientists and AI experts create maps of nerve cell connections in the brain. What if, in the future, we could have access to human brains (neural networks) like Google maps? What if one day we could create a backup and restore our minds when necessary, such as in the case of getting dementia? Substantial amounts are being invested in several large-scale research projects such as the EU’s Human Brain Project (HBP), the United States’ Brain Research Initiative and Japan’s Brain Project, which are working towards an understanding of how, on the structural and functional level, millions of neurons come together to make the brain work, generate and store information. Furthermore, there are several companies researching links between the human brain and computers, ‘brain-machine interfaces‘, to preserve and enhance brain function, with additional potential to treat brain disorders causing dementia. Neuralink, founded by Elon Musk, intends ‘to implant computer chips into human brains and to develop brain-machine interfaces connecting the mind to external processing power’. Similarly, Kernel, founded by Bryan Johnson, states its objective as ‘to read and write the underlying functions of the brain‘. Although mapping the complete human brain is far from a reality, rapidly evolving science and technology may bring developments that until recently sounded like science fiction.

Despite its promise, using AI to fight dementia raises ethical and societal concerns. All these developments depend on the collection of very sensitive data – comparable to genetic data – operating in close proximity to the human body. Privacy, data governance and informed consent will therefore be important issues to address. Results obtained by AI algorithms for early diagnosis may be difficult to comprehend and explain, even by experienced physicians – raising issues of trust. Do people trust more in decisions made by machines or by humans? And what happens in the case of erroneous diagnosis? Who would be accountable for incorrect treatments and how would damage be compensated? In addition, inequity in accessibility to the technology may lead to a growing social gap.

More complex scenarios emerge when considering whether AI-powered brain-interface technologies could be utilised as a dementia treatment to restore brain information. Could a person’s personality be changed? What happens to autonomy and free will? How easy would it be to manipulate or change people’s thoughts? How would human relationships be affected, knowing that a person is partially governed by a programmed machine? Non-therapeutic human enhancement, such as creating ‘super-smart’ people, could lead to very controversial dual-use of this technology. Lastly, technological foreign invasion of the brain could cause major cybersecurity issues, such as hackers being able to target brains instead of computers to extract information (i.e. financial, political), or to manipulate people’s ideas. The possibilities for misuse of AI technologies therefore pose fundamental challenges to basic human rights, dignity and even personhood.

Anticipatory policy-making

AI research and development in dementia diagnosis and treatment require close attention to several legal and ethical issues: privacy, autonomy, data protection, cybersecurity, surveillance, dual-use, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination. Due to the strategic importance of AI and its future use, the European Commission published a White Paper and European strategy for data in February 2020, setting out policy options and measures for a European approach to AI and big data. The OECD Recommendation on Responsible Innovation in Neurotechnology, released in December 2019, is the first international standard aiming to guide governments and innovators to plan for and address challenges in the field of brain research. The OECD Recommendation’s principles can assist the EU to build on existing rules.

Medical/brain data are highly sensitive. Therefore, policy-makers must ensure that data storage and transmission methods are vigorous and secure. Potential use of the technology ‘to read and write’ the brain may threaten privacy and autonomy, and cybersecurity requires rigorous implementation of safety and security standards. Today’s legal framework may be unable to react to these serious concerns. Societal deliberation, increased oversight and advisory-body capacity are essential at the early research and development stage.

AI-powered brain interfaces necessitate a code of conduct and surveillance mechanisms. Due to the potential dual-use/misuse, legal guidance criteria to define legitimate and ethically permissible use of brain data are required, and risk assessment within a common EU framework is crucial. Currently, a Commission draft proposal for a risk-based approach is open for consultation, and a legislative proposal is expected in late 2020. Furthermore, transparency and informed consent procedures require re-evaluation to provide legal protection for long-term safety and against risks. Legal responsibility needs attention as erroneous diagnosis/actions impact issues from safety to privacy. Finally, future laws should ensure non-discrimination and fairness through equal distribution and accessibility to these technologies to avert social inequalities.

Read this ‘At a glance’ on ‘What if AI could advance the science surrounding dementia?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to Science and Technology podcast ‘What if AI could advance the science surrounding dementia?’ on YouTube.

Written by Tania Latici,

© Владимир Котелевский / Adobe Stock

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) might not be the first organisation that comes to mind for fighting pandemics. As the coronavirus crisis hit the world indiscriminately, NATO was fast to react, and used all the instruments in its toolbox to assist Allied countries and partners. From coordinating the transport of medicines and supplies, to launching scientific programmes to study the virus, NATO has again proven its value in times of crisis. Close European Union (EU) and NATO coordination during the crisis was equally helpful in ensuring a coherent, civil-military approach.

Armed forces almost everywhere across the EU and NATO have been engaged as governments responded to contain and vanquish the coronavirus. Their efforts include deploying military medics to assist over-run civilian facilities, building field hospitals, airlifting essential medical and protective supplies, evacuating patients and repatriating citizens, but also in distributing food, disinfecting public spaces and providing psychological support to people in distress. Over 100 transport missions for supplies or personnel took place in the spring of 2020. The pandemic has seen the largest peacetime military deployment in history.

NATO also underwent a virtual transition, with Foreign and Defence Ministers having addressed the pandemic in online meetings in April, and with the Chiefs of Defence in the NATO Military Committee meeting by videoconference for the first time in history on 14 May 2020. The latter discussed lessons learned for NATO during the pandemic and how to improve NATO’s resilience for future health crises. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has also appointed a group of experts to guide the Alliance’s reflection process about its political dimension and about reinforcing unity between NATO Allies.

NATO instruments and Allied responses Disaster relief

NATO’s main civil emergency response mechanism, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), operational 24/7, has proven key during the crisis. Centralising requests and offers for assistance, the EADRCC enables NATO and partner countries to coordinate responses. The Centre informs Allies about the state of play through situation reports. Italy and Spain were among the first to request assistance through the mechanism, and responders include Czechia, Germany, Luxembourg and Turkey, which provided medical supplies, equipment and disinfectants. Both partner countries and NATO members have requested assistance through the EADRCC, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The EADRCC also responded to the request of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for military and civil defence assets to ensure the transport of essential and humanitarian supplies. NATO’s contribution is coordinated through the EADRCC and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-ITA) is a multinational headquarters based in Milan, able to be mobilised quickly on missions within or beyond the territory of NATO members. The NRDC notably supported local authorities in the Italian region of Lombardy, one of the hardest hit by the pandemic. The support included the disinfection of hospitals, supply delivery and diverse logistical support.

NATO has also launched a scientific project using immuno-diagnostic methods to provide rapid and accurate Covid-19 diagnoses. Conducted by scientists from Italy and Switzerland, the initiative is set to last 24 months. It has been launched and funded through NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme.

Strategic Airlift

Jointly coordinated by NATO and Eurocontrol, the Rapid Air Mobility initiative simplifies air traffic control procedures for military relief flights. The programme thus enabled a medical supply delivery from Turkey to the United Kingdom, as well as a United States Air Force aircraft to redistribute over 15 000 kg of supplies around distribution hubs in Italy. Another airlift framework is the Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS), a programme enabling nations to charter commercial transport aircraft. The SALIS helped countries such as Czechia and Slovakia to import essential supplies, and also Poland, which transported 170 tonnes of medical supplies. A co-ownership and sharing arrangement, the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) entails co-ownership and sharing of three strategic transport aircraft. Romania’s National Military Command Centre, for instance, coordinated two military shipments of medical supplies through the SAC.

The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is part of the NATO Support and Procurement Organisation and deals with logistics and procurement activities. During the pandemic, the NSPA organised deliveries of key supplies and equipment to Allies, partners and international organisations. For example, the NSPA provided Luxembourg with field hospital tents and equipment within less than 24 hours of the request, managing the transport, construction and maintenance. The NSPA also manages the SALIS.

NATO’s defence posture during the coronavirus crisis

Security challenges will persist despite the coronavirus, emphasised Jens Stoltenberg. ‘NATO must continue to ensure that the health crisis does not turn into a security crisis’, he added. Besides having contributed to a rapid and substantial force mobilisation in responding to the virus, NATO also suffered its consequences, including the switch to virtual work and cancellation of various military exercises to protect soldiers and staff. Nevertheless, NATO ‘must continue to deliver credible and effective deterrence and defence’ which puts the concept of resilience at the heart of the Alliance’s focus – in line with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty – whereby each member should develop capacity to resist and recover from an attack or a major crisis.

EU-NATO cooperation

The EU and NATO have been in close consultation since the beginning of the pandemic. Their overarching cooperation on security and defence matters takes place in the framework of the 2016 and 2018 Joint Declarations, which substantially expanded the fields and mechanisms through which they work together. Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană reportedly participated in weekly coordination calls, including with EU counterparts, addressing matters from global supply chains to economic effects and to the repatriation of citizens. During the videoconference meeting of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council (Defence format) of 12 May 2020, the NATO Secretary-General briefed EU ministers and discussed defence cooperation in light of the pandemic. On 14 May 2020, EU Military Committee Chair, General Claudio Graziano, briefed NATO Chiefs of Defence, about the EU’s response and relief measures. Echoing remarks of Commission Vice-President Margrethe Vestager, Jens Stoltenberg emphasised the risks stemming from investments into and potential foreign take-overs of strategic infrastructure in Allied countries. This, he warned, could severely weaken countries in the face of future crises.

During the 6 April 2020 Defence configuration of the Foreign Affairs Council, ministers mandated the creation of an EU Task Force at the level of the European External Action Service and the EU Military Staff, which is meant to exchange information among Member States’ armed forces on military assistance in support of civilian authorities to help fight the coronavirus pandemic. Its main aim is to enable the sharing of best practices and lessons learned, while bolstering strategic communication efforts. The task force also coordinated with NATO, in particular with the EADRCC. Lastly, the EU-NATO bi-annual meeting on 19 May 2020 (by videoconference) was chaired by the respective heads of the Military Staffs, Lieutenant Generals Hans-Werner Wiermann (NATO) and Esa Pulkkinen (EU). Besides taking stock of their common response to the crisis, the participants also discussed emerging technologies and ongoing EU military operations.

Post-pandemic outlook

Jens Stoltenberg encouraged Allies to maintain and, in some cases, increase defence spending after the pandemic. Despite adamant commitments made by the Chiefs of Defence to maintain their contributions to collective defence, doing so might prove challenging for governments under pressure to refloat economies drowning as a result of the pandemic. At the same time, armed forces’ contributions during the crisis could present an opportunity to advocate increased civil-military approaches, and to highlight how military means can also serve civilian purposes. As NATO is currently undergoing a reflection process about its future in the next 10 years, its Secretary-General stated it must ‘stay strong militarily, be more united politically, and take a broader approach globally‘. German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer advocates improving NATO’s military capabilities to render it better at ‘combating less traditional security challenges’ such as climate change or disinformation campaigns, while engaging more with civilian authorities.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘NATO’s response in the fight against coronavirus‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Issam Hallak, Sidonia Mazur, Frederik Scholaert,

© Rawf8 / Adobe Stock

Following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) on 1 February 2020, the EU and the UK launched negotiations on a new partnership agreement, to come into effect at the end of the transition period, scheduled for 31 December 2020. The negotiations are intended to address nearly all the domains covered in the Political Declaration negotiated by both parties alongside the Withdrawal Agreement, including trade and economics, fisheries, thematic cooperation, and internal and external security. As far as negotiations on the future economic relationship are concerned, while the parties agree in principle on an exceptional zero-tariff and zero-quota comprehensive and balanced free trade agreement (FTA) aiming for as ‘frictionless’ trade as possible, they still disagree on major aspects of the economic partnership, especially fisheries and level playing-field (LPF) commitments.

The EU wants the future agreement in the fisheries domain to retain the status quo as far as possible, including reciprocal access to waters in return for access to markets and quota-shares that are based on historical fishing patterns. The EU also insists that an effective LPF would ensure fair competition. After the third round of talks, which took place in May 2020, the UK’s chief negotiator, David Frost, said that the EU proposal on fisheries was ‘simply not realistic’, and it was unacceptable that the LPF binds the UK to EU law or standards; if need be, the UK would aim for a less ambitious FTA. The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, said that negotiating an FTA providing for tariffs would be far more time-consuming, and the EU would still demand the same LPF commitments because ‘open and fair competition is not a “nice-to-have”, it is a “must-have” ‘.

Following the fourth round of negotiations, from 2 to 5 June, the positions therefore still seemed irreconcilable. However, the long stand-off in the earlier negotiations on UK withdrawal had seemed equally irreconcilable before the final agreement was reached and then ratified. One area in which the two sides did manage to agree in those negotiations is the financial settlement included in the Withdrawal Agreement. While that settlement is now being implemented, it had initially been seen as one of the more difficult areas of the withdrawal negotiations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Three critical issues in EU-UK relations‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© deemka studio / Adobe Stock

As the coronavirus pandemic now appears to have peaked in several parts of the world, analysts are turning their attention to how best to revive economies from the abrupt and severe economic downturns they have been suffering as result of the lockdowns imposed over the last three months. Among the tools in play are macro-economic policy (spending and taxation measures), monetary policy and sector-specific support or incentives. They are also reflecting on how best to counter the impact of the crisis depending on the type of economy concerned (notably advanced industrialised or emerging market economies).

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on coronavirus and related issues. Earlier publications on the topic can be found in the previous item in this series, published by EPRS on 28 May.

Covid-19 and emerging economies: What to expect in the short- and medium-term
Bruegel, June 2020

Five ways that the coronavirus should transform the EU
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

Upholding freedom of movement in a post-lockdown world
Friends of Europe, June 2020

Pandemic politics: Is there a right time, and way, to protest during a pandemic?
Brookings Institution, June 2020

Graphing the pandemic economy
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2020

The right kind of standard to fight a pandemic
European Centre for International Political Economy, June 2020

Quelle Europe de la supply chain et des approvisionnements?
Fondation Robert Schuman, June 2020

Living with Covid-19: The thinking behind Spain’s lockdown exit plan
Elcano Royal Institute, June 2020

Le bien public mondial, au-delà des mots
Institut français des relations internationales, June 2020

Turkey’s ‘coronavirus diplomacy’ and its impact on relations with the EU
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, June 2020

The three pillars of Turkey’s Syria policy in the face of Covid-19
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, June 2020

38 million have applied for unemployment: But how many have received benefits?
Rand Corporation, June 2020

A Just Transition Fund: How the EU budget can help with the transition
Bruegel, May 2020

The EU recovery plan: A ‘Merkel’ but not a ‘Hamilton’ moment
Atlantic Council, May 2020

Globalization paradox and the coronavirus pandemic
Clingendael, May 2020

Covid-19: How to finance the debt?
Chatham House, May 2020

The MFF recovery plan breaks with a fundamental taboo
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2020

What’s the ECB doing in response to the Covid-19 crisis?
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2020

The Franco-German bond to the rescue
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2020

European coronavirus lockdown status
German Marshall Fund, May 2020

Securing Europe’s medical supply chains against future shocks
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

Reopening America and the world
Brookings Institution, May 2020

An uncompromising budget
Bruegel, May 2020

Trigger warning: Germany, the law, and burden-sharing
European Council om Foreign Relations, May 2020

Covid-19’s reality shock for external-funding dependent emerging economies
Bruegel, May 2020

The recovery fund faces a tricky passage
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

The Covid-19 crisis in emerging markets demands a once-in-a-century response
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2020

Covid-19 and India: Economic impact and response
Bruegel, May 2020

Reading tea leaves from China’s two sessions: Large monetary and fiscal stimulus and still no growth guarantee
Bruegel, May 2020

Minimum wage and the EU: Happily ever after?
European Policy Centre, May 2020

Economic crisis reveals shortcomings of China’s overseas lending
International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2020

After Covid-19: Economic security in EU-Asia connectivity
Egmont, May 2020

The coronavirus must push Europe to rescue multilateralism
Carnegie Europe, May 2020

The uncertain pandemic consensus
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2020

The role of greater cohesion funding for solidarity and sustainability post-Covid-19
Institute for European Environmental Policy, May 2020

Securing Europe’s medical supply chains against future shocks
Centre for European Reform, May 2020

DRC: Living with coronavirus
Chatham House, May 2020

Après-ski: The spread of coronavirus from Ischgl through Germany
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, May 2020

En Grèce, un succès sanitaire avant un nouvel effondrement économique?
Institut Jacques Delors, May 2020

Coronavirus should spur DoD to build back resilience and agility
Atlantic Council, May 2020

What is the world doing to create a Covid-19 vaccine?
Council on Foreign Relations, May 2020

Planète nucléaire: Le TNP à l’épreuve de la Covid-19
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, May 2020

Sri Lanka’s other Covid-19 crisis: Is parliamentary democracy at risk?
International Crisis Group, May 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Financing the recovery‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read all EPRS publications on the coronavirus outbreak

Written by Frederik Scholaert,

© Doharma / Adobe Stock

Every year, 8 June marks World Oceans Day, celebrated since 1992 and officially designated by the United Nations in 2008. Its aim is to raise global awareness of the crucial role oceans play in sustaining life on earth and our duty to protect its rich marine biodiversity and to use its resources sustainably. This year’s specific theme, ‘Innovation for a Sustainable Ocean’, highlights the need for innovative solutions to deal with the challenges oceans are facing. World Oceans Day also offers an opportunity to take stock of progress, globally and in the EU.

Benefits from oceans

The importance of oceans in sustaining human life on earth cannot be under-estimated. They provide a rich biodiversity, seafood and ingredients for medicines and are vital to the air we breathe. Marine resources constitute an important source of protein. EU citizens consume on average 24 kg of seafood per year. Phytoplankton produce about half of the world’s oxygen. Furthermore, oceans mitigate the negative impacts of human activities. Seagrass and seaweed function as a biological purification system, by storing nitrogen and phosphorous compounds from land areas. By storing and spreading heat and by holding 50 times more carbon dioxide than the atmosphere, oceans also largely absorb the impacts of climate change. Many people also depend on oceans for their income, worldwide some 3 billion people. In the EU, some 4 million people are employed in the blue economy, covering traditional sectors such as fisheries, coastal tourism and maritime transport and emerging sectors such as aquaculture, blue biotechnology and in particular offshore wind and ocean energy, sectors in which Europe is a world leader.

Pressures on oceans

However, oceans are increasingly under pressure from human activity. Excess nutrients from agriculture or wastewater cause eutrophication, a process that can lead to harmful algal blooms and ultimately to oxygen depletion. Other well-known polluting factors are oil spills and marine litter. A major problem is plastic waste, representing some three quarters of all marine litter. Research indicates that 4.8 to 12.7 million tonnes of plastic enters the oceans each year and that single-use plastics even occur at depths over 6 000 m. According to one prediction, without significant action, plastic in the oceans might outweigh fish by 2050. Oceans also literally took the heat from climate change by absorbing more than 90 % of the excess heat produced since 1970. Ocean heatwaves are harming vulnerable ecosystems, especially warm-water coral reefs, leading to a loss of biodiversity and threatening small-scale fisheries (especially in lower latitude zones affecting mostly developing countries). Rising seawater temperatures are leading both to an overall loss in biomass and a poleward shift in fish stocks. Up to a quarter of fisheries’ catch potential could be lost by the end of the century due to unabated emissions. By storing carbon emissions (some 20 % to 30 % of these emissions to date), oceans are also becoming more acidified. Ocean acidification, in combination with increasing water temperatures, aggravates the impacts of climate change, affecting not only fisheries but also marine aquaculture. Fish stocks are also suffering from past and current overfishing.

EU action and policies

The EU is an active player in shaping global ocean governance through established policies, new legislative initiatives and international commitments.

The common fisheries policy requires an exploitation of stocks in line with the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), a target which has been largely achieved in the north-east Atlantic and adjacent seas. In the Mediterranean and the Black Sea however, the state of the stocks remain a serious concern, with an average level of exploitation indicating long-term overfishing, at more than twice the MSY level. Scientific advice is the basis for setting fishing opportunities, and if necessary a fishery is closed in order to allow stock recovery (for example currently for eastern Baltic cod, which is suffering from various pressures, including low oxygen and high water temperatures).

The Marine Strategy Framework Directive, adopted in 2008, provides a framework for EU action in the field of marine environmental policy. It aims to achieve ‘good environmental status’ in EU waters. A recent Commission assessment, complemented by a staff working document, states that Member States have made considerable efforts to develop their national programmes by integrating existing policies and processes while also developing completely new measures – about 25 % of all measures – for the purpose of this directive. However, it also mentioned that not all pressures on the marine environment were covered properly and that achieving ‘good environment status’ by 2020 therefore remained unlikely.

Marine protected areas (MPAs) are an important conservation tool, used for both the protection of marine biodiversity and as a traditional fisheries management measure (in particular for protecting juveniles and spawning areas). They also enhance ocean resilience against climate change for many reasons. For instance, they improve the ability of marine organisms to adapt (as areas of reduced stress) and allow increased carbon take-up (e.g. through the restoration of degraded coastal habitats). Well-integrated networks of MPAs also increase species survival by allowing them to migrate from one area to another. The EU has achieved its international commitment to establish MPAs in 10 % of its waters, although with shortcomings such as an uneven geographical distribution and a lack of proper management.

Increased competition for maritime space between blue economy sectors highlights the need to manage our waters more coherently. These activities often also cross national boundaries. Maritime spatial planning (MSP) has therefore become a key EU instrument to manage competition for maritime space sustainably, with a directive requiring Member States establish such plans by 2021. At global level, the EU is supporting work on accelerating MSP processes worldwide, e.g. via the MSPglobal initiative, launched in 2018.

Ocean pollution, in particular plastics, has received greater attention in recent years, both from the public and among policy-makers. A recent EU directive, the Single-use Plastics Directive, seeks to address the top 10 single-use plastics and discarded fishing gear found on European beaches, through bans and requirements relating to consumption reduction, product design, labelling and awareness-raising and additional extended producer-responsibility requirements. The EU also adapted its rules on port reception facilities for the collection of waste from ships by restructuring relevant fees in a way that does not incite ships to dump waste into the sea, as well as to check what waste they have delivered. Member States have until mid-2021 to implement the new directives in their national legislation.

Other examples of EU action in the field of global ocean governance are the commitments made each year during the Our Ocean conferences. At the latest, 2019 conference in Oslo, the EU made 22 new commitments (worth almost €540 million).

Important EU programmes supporting innovation, the theme of this year’s World Oceans Day 2020, are the blue growth projects funded by the EU’s research programme and the blue labs and career projects funded by the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. Innovation is also supported by the EU through the sharing of open data and by stimulating ocean literacy. Copernicus, the EU earth observation programme, contains a marine environment monitoring service, and currently offers some 250 open data ocean products. Furthermore, the European marine observation and data network (EMODnet) collects and makes marine data from more than 150 private and public organisations freely available. The EMODnet project also includes the well-known European atlas of the seas project, where users, particularly schools, researchers and professionals can explore, collate and create their own marine and coastal maps from more than 200 layers. On developing labour skills, an expert group was set up to advise the Commission on education, training, skills and career development within the blue economy and published three compendiums, including on ocean literacy (understanding the ocean’s influence on humans and vice versa).

In a 2018 resolution on ocean governance, the European Parliament called for a number of actions, including an international moratorium on commercial deep-sea mining until the effects have been studied and for pilot projects to be set up to collect marine litter (e.g. fishing for litter). More recently, in a 2020 resolution on the European Green Deal, Parliament urges the Commission to give the Green Deal a ‘blue’ dimension, fully recognising the ecosystem services oceans provide by developing an ‘oceans and aquaculture action plan’.

During the virtual ocean literacy summit on World Oceans Day 2020, the Commission launches ‘EU4Ocean‘, connecting diverse organisations, projects and people that contribute to ocean literacy.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘World Oceans Day 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf,

© Halfpoint / Adobe Stock

Around 24 million people in the EU, or 5.6 % of the population, are ‘severely materially deprived’. Fighting poverty and social exclusion is therefore a key priority, and to this end the EU supplements its Member States’ aid to those most in need through the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), which has a budget of €3.8 billion. Partner organisations selected by the Member States manage this support, providing food (e.g. distribution of food packages and meals) and material assistance (e.g. clothes), or activities to improve inclusion (e.g. better access to support and social services) to those in need. In parallel, the European Social Fund (ESF) remains the broader funding instrument fighting poverty and social exclusion.

The coronavirus crisis poses specific risks for the most deprived and unparalleled challenges for the activities supported by the FEAD and the ESF. To safeguard the most vulnerable, and aid workers and volunteers, against the coronavirus disease, emergency measures have been taken to provide them with protective equipment. Changes, launched in April 2020, have sought to adapt the FEAD to the challenging situation. For instance, electronic vouchers have been introduced to deliver food aid and basic material assistance, to reduce the risk of contamination during delivery. Furthermore, FEAD money has been made available for buying protective equipment for those delivering the aid.

Yet again, partner organisations and other players involved in the implementation of the FEAD have been enabled to quickly address the additional needs of the most deprived arising from the crisis. During the crisis, the fund will be 100 % EU-financed, including the 15 % normally paid by the Member States. Moreover, to face the acute labour crisis and its social consequences on the most deprived, the EU has taken initiatives to address immediate needs and mitigate negative impacts on employment and social policy, including measures to support the most vulnerable or deprived groups. Since the onset of the pandemic, the European Parliament has been at the forefront of initiatives to protect the most deprived.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Impact of coronavirus on EU aid to the most deprived‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© Adobe Stock

In response to developments such as the growing importance of the digital economy, climate change, migration and terrorism and the United Kingdom leaving the European Union (EU), calls for EU institutional reform and greater citizen involvement have been increasing. Consequently, a reflection on the future of the EU has been taking place not only at an institutional level, but also in academia and in broader political fora.

Members of the European Parliament from the Constitutional Affairs Committee have warned that the Covid‑19 crisis has made the need for reform more crucial than ever. The Conference, say the Members, should be launched as soon as possible so that effective reforms can be implemented based on its outcome. Moreover, a joint declaration between the European Parliament, Council and Commission will need to be concluded before the summer, for the Conference to be launched in September and to be at full speed by the end of the year.

Conference on the Future of Europe

In her July 2019 statement to the European Parliament, then Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen committed to establishing a Conference on the Future of Europe, to start in 2020 and run for two years. The purpose of the Conference is to offer a new type of format which would be an inclusive platform to offer new ways for citizens to express their main concerns and have them directly taken into account in the work of the institutions.

Following a plenary debate, the European Parliament adopted its position on the Conference on the Future of Europe in a resolution of 15 January 2020. It considered that the Conference should aim ‘to adopt a bottom-up approach to engaging directly with citizens in a meaningful dialogue’ and that ‘in the long run, a permanent mechanism for engaging with the citizens in contemplating the future of Europe should be envisaged’.

The European Parliament ‘believes that citizens’ participation in the Conference process should be organised in such a way that the diversity of our societies is fully represented’ and ‘believes that ensuring youth participation will be an essential part of the long-lasting impacts of the Conference’.

Committing itself to a genuine follow-up to the Conference without delay, ‘with legislative proposals, initiating treaty change or otherwise’, the European Parliament ‘is of the opinion that a high-level patronage should be ensured by the three main EU institutions at the highest level’, believing that this ‘should guarantee the process and provide for its oversight all as well as kick off the Conference process’.

Additionally, to contribute to the design and structure of the Conference, the European Parliament created a working group, which will prepare proposals for Parliament’s approach to the organisation of the Conference. The working group is composed of one representative per political group, as well as a representative of Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs. At the same time, this committee has launched discussions on the way forward and on how to shape the structure and the scope of the Conference.

European Parliament’s proposals and debates

The Conference on the Future of Europe represents a more formalised and structured continuation of the series of initiatives towards institutional reforms that have been engaged in recent years.

The European Parliament adopted two resolutions in February 2017, proposing institutional adjustments on the European integration process. The first resolution suggested exploring the unused potential of the Lisbon Treaty. The second resolution envisaged more substantial changes to the institutional architecture.

Furthermore, the European Parliament has been organising plenary debates on the Future of Europe, inviting Heads of State or Government to publicly share their visions of the future of the European Union and engage in a debate with Members of Parliament in an open and constructive way. Since the beginning of 2018, several debates have already taken place. A synthesis of the speeches, prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service, concludes a series of four briefings giving an overview of the Future of Europe debates (I – June 2018; II – October 2018; III – January 2019; IV – April 2019). All speakers considered that the challenges of the 21st century cannot be solved by EU countries acting individually and underlined the need for unity of the European Union. In its resolution of 13 February 2019 on the state of the debate of the future of Europe, the European Parliament underlined that ‘the Union must tackle the challenges of its future with greater and better political integration, with full respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic principles and by working together’.

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• Citizens to be the cornerstone of the Conference on the Future of Europe, European Parliament press release, 15 January 2020
• News headlines – Future of Europe, European Parliament
• Future of Europe, European Parliament Multimedia Centre
• The Future of Europe: Contours of the current debate, European Parliamentary Research Service, April 2018
• Unlocking the potential of the EU Treaties: An article-by-article analysis of the scope for action, European Parliamentary Research Service, January 2019

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass,

© spr / Adobe Stock

The digital shift has touched all aspects of human activity, and culture is no exception. Cultural assets and works have been digitised and digital technology has become a tool for novel creations. Digital-born works have enriched the resources available to those interested in culture. Technology has huge potential to facilitate and democratise access to cultural resources.

However, certain technical conditions are required to allow access to these cultural resources, for example webpages devoted to digitised cultural heritage and its hidden treasures as well as those devoted to novel creations. These conditions include an internet infrastructure, computers, tablets, or, more frequently, a smartphone − all of which has a price tag. Moreover, the deployment of such infrastructure needs to be evenly distributed so as to provide equal and democratic access to cultural resources − which is not yet the case.

Access to costly technology is not sufficient. The technology used must go hand in hand with digital skills that are not evenly acquired by all ages and social groups. Persons with disabilities are in a particularly difficult situation, since ICT equipment often does not suit their specific needs. Moreover, cultural resources are often not available in suitable formats for them.

European Union policies and strategies in many areas take all these challenges and access barriers into consideration. EU funds finance connectivity infrastructure in areas in need, training, and educational initiatives across policy areas going from culture and education to innovation and technology. The relationship between technology, science, the arts, and culture is becoming increasingly close in the digital era.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Digital culture − Access issues‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Irmgard Anglmayer,

© Adobe Stock

Ex-ante impact assessment and ex-post evaluation are regulatory policy tools that help inform the policy-making process with evidence-based analysis. Geared towards rationalising policy-making, these tools aim at raising the quality of policies and legislation. The use of impact assessment and evaluation is wide-spread across Europe, as virtually all countries have developed frameworks for regulatory governance. This development is somewhat due to the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), two actors that have strongly inspired and shaped regulatory policy reform across Europe. However, national Better Regulation agendas are largely government-driven, often leaving parliaments marginalised in the process. Notwithstanding, both the EU and the OECD acknowledge that Better Regulation is a shared responsibility between the executive and the legislative branch. The aim of this study is to shed light on the parliamentary dimension of Better Regulation, by capturing the practices of 38 national parliaments.

The first chapter contextualises the role of parliaments in Better Regulation and reflects on concrete areas for parliaments to join in the process. There is considerable potential for parliamentary involvement at both ends of the policy cycle – impact assessment and evaluation. While such engagement can take multiple forms (spanning from passive scrutiny to an active use of the tools), it relates to two parliamentary core functions: law-making and oversight.

The regulatory policy potential of parliaments is exemplified by the case of the European Parliament (EP), where the use of impact assessment and evaluation has, a mere ten years after their instigation, encountered a high degree of institutionalisation. The systematic use of these regulatory policy tools strengthens EP committees’ position in law-making, and in holding the executive to account. Overall, it facilitates effective scrutiny of European Commission action and leads to better informed policy-making.

Based on survey data from 37 national parliaments across Europe plus the Canadian Parliament, chapters 2 and 3 analyse the level, types, processes, particularities as well as, to the extent possible, the impact of individual parliaments’ engagement in impact assessment and evaluation of those parliaments that choose to get involved. Many do not (or not yet) take an active role: the survey revealed that roughly half of the surveyed parliaments do not engage beyond classical parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms within the general framework of parliamentary control. Non-engagement can have multiple reasons; some survey respondents pointed explicitly at the distinct roles and/or the strict separation of power of the executive and the legislative, while others said they simply do not have the necessary capacities.

Among the EU-27, seven national parliaments (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Sweden) engage systematically in their own ex-ante impact assessment work, albeit in fundamentally different ways. The broadest spectrum of impact assessment activities appears to be assumed by the Polish Parliament. An additional seven parliaments carry out smaller-scale impact assessment work (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal and Spain). Moreover, the Latvian Saeima avails of impact assessment capacities, but has not yet tested them. Out of the 11 surveyed parliaments outside the EU, only Canada engages actively, by informing the law-making process with budgetary impact assessments.

With regard to ex-post evaluation, six EU-27 parliaments have developed structures for substantial involvement (Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Sweden). Moreover, the research services of the Bulgarian and Latvian parliaments carry out ad hoc evaluations upon request, albeit in low numbers. Four further EU-27 parliaments engage in evaluation activities at a smaller scale, mainly by scrutinising government evaluations in-depth or by performing ex-post budgetary scrutiny (Austria, Ireland, Portugal and Spain).

From amongst the non-EU countries, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (UK) stand out with their policy evaluation mechanisms. The Canadian Parliament has a long heritage of performing post-enactment reviews, as opposed to the parliament of Moldova, which has only set up evaluation capacities with the support of an external capacity-building programme in recent years. Finally, the Albanian and Montenegrin parliaments have lately amended their rules of procedure to allow for policy evaluation. The latter three are examples of countries that have implemented Better Regulation systems in the context of their enlargement or association process with the EU.

Data show that only a few parliaments have a long-standing tradition in regulatory policy activities, and notably in evaluation (e.g. France, Sweden; Switzerland, Canada). Interestingly, some of the most mature evaluation systems can be found in parliaments whose evaluation mandate is constitutionally anchored; this applies to France, Sweden and Switzerland. Constitutional recognition appears to be conducive to the institutionalisation of parliamentary evaluation. Most other parliaments have only recently begun to engage in evaluation. In comparison, parliamentary impact assessment ventures appear more recent (with the notable exception of Sweden).

In general, regulatory policy activities by parliaments are mainly related to oversight and the objective to hold the government to account. Only a few parliaments have taken this further and also embedded impact assessment work into their legislative function. In this respect, they conduct their own impact assessments, either related to legislative initiatives or amendments tabled by parliament, or, more rarely, related to government initiatives.

From a comparative perspective, parliaments engaging in one way or another in regulatory policy show highly diverse patterns. This can be explained by the fact that ambition and type of engagement are determined by a number of external factors, including parliaments’ capacities, political will, the approach of the respective country’s government to Better Regulation and not least the function of the parliament in the constitutional/legal/political system of the country. One conclusion to draw from this study is that parliaments show great diversity in terms of drivers, depth and types of engagement. There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach.

Chapter 4 of this study seeks to capture, from a comparative perspective, some patterns in the regulatory policy activities of the parliaments surveyed. This concerns mainly parliaments’ level of engagement and some reflection on where these impact assessment and evaluation capacities are located in parliaments’ organisation.

Read the complete study on ‘Better Regulation practices in national parliaments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Maria Niestadt,

© tatomm / Adobe Stock

Carriers and travel companies can offer vouchers for journeys and holidays cancelled due to coronavirus. However, this offer cannot affect passengers’ and travellers’ right to opt for reimbursement instead, the European Commission has explained. At the same time, airlines, various Member States and some Members of the European Parliament have been calling for temporary changes to the rules.

Background

When travel bans and restrictions at borders were introduced, and journeys cancelled due to the Covid-19 outbreak, many citizens were no longer able to travel. Refund requests currently far exceed the level of new bookings. Carriers in all transport modes as well as travel companies are facing sharp cash flow reductions, risking becoming insolvent. To stay solvent, they are offering passengers vouchers instead of refunds. At the same time, travellers also struggle with reduced income and ensuring that their rights are applied.

The rights of passengers in the EU are set in four passenger rights regulations (regulations 261/2004, 1371/2007, 1177/2010 and 181/2011). They give passengers a full set of rights, whether they travel by air, rail, ship, bus or coach. In addition, the EU has adopted a Package Travel Directive (2015/2302). Among others, the EU gives passengers and travellers rights in the event of cancellations, namely the right to be reimbursed (e.g. in money or in the form of a voucher) or re-routed (not applicable in the current situation). The EU rules also set a deadline by when such reimbursement is due: within 7 days (following the passenger’s request) for air, sea and inland waterways transport; within 14 days for rail transport; within 14 days for bus and coach transport and within 14 days after termination of a package travel contract.

European Commission position

The Commission believes that there is no need to change the current rules. In its March 2020 interpretative guidelines on EU passenger rights and in its informal guidance on the application of the Package Travel Directive, the Commission explains that the carrier and the package travel organiser can offer the customer a voucher but the latter has the right to refuse it and opt for a cash refund or re-routing instead. The Commission reiterates this position in its 13 May 2020 recommendation on vouchers, while suggesting how to make them more attractive (e.g. protection against insolvency, validity of at least 12 months, higher value).

European Parliament and Council positions

The European Parliament asked the Commission, in an April resolution, to ensure that the interpretative guidelines on passenger rights are properly implemented. At the same time, media reports that more and more Members of the European Parliament are in favour of changing EU rules on vouchers. Different views on vouchers have also been exchanged during Transport and Tourism (TRAN) Committee meetings.

Transport Ministers discussed the issue of vouchers on 29 April. While a number of Member States support the temporary suspension of EU rules forcing airlines to offer full refunds for cancelled flights, others oppose changing these rules. Twelve Member States have issued a joint statement calling to temporarily allow airlines to choose the means by which passengers are reimbursed.

Stakeholders’ position

Airlines have been asking to quickly amend EU rules and support vouchers or delayed reimbursement of tickets, instead of the current system. Consumer organisations, on the other hand, have called to maintain the current rules and welcomed the idea of making vouchers more attractive.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU rules on vouchers offered to passengers and travellers‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.